Alfred Schutz: On Multiple Realities PDF

## Alfred Schütz: On Multiple Realities ### 16 Although it is debatable whether this principle applies to the continuity of existence, analysis, or the intellectual criterion for verifying the validity of scientific methods, it seems to me that it is realized in all these different aspects with th...

## Alfred Schütz: On Multiple Realities ### 16 Although it is debatable whether this principle applies to the continuity of existence, analysis, or the intellectual criterion for verifying the validity of scientific methods, it seems to me that it is realized in all these different aspects with the help of the method of research in the social sciences characterized here, which even establishes continuity between the practice of everyday life and conceptualization in the social sciences. Secondly, a word about the problem of methodological unity of empirical sciences. It seems to me that social scientists can agree that one should not look for the essential difference between the social and natural sciences in a different logic governing each of branches of knowledge. This does not mean that the social sciences should abandon the specific approaches used to explain social reality, for an ideal unity of research methods. This conviction is based on a completely unfounded assumption that only methods used in natural sciences, especially in physics, are scientific. As far as I know, proponents of “unity of sciences” have never made any serious attempt to find an answer or even ask the question whether the methodological problem of natural sciences in their current state is not merely a peculiar case of a more general, yet unresolved problem regarding how scientific knowledge is possible and what its methodological and logical assumptions are. In my own personal conviction, phenomenological philosophy has prepared the ground for such inquiries. Their outcome might likely demonstrate that the specific methodological approaches developed in the social sciences in order to capture social reality are more adequate to reveal the general principles governing all human knowledge than the methods of natural sciences. ### 2 ### On Multiple Realities William James in the famous chapter of his *Principles of Psychology* analyzes our sense of reality. As he points out, reality means simply the relation to our emotional and active life. All that excites and stimulates our interest is real. To call something real means that it is in some relation to ourselves. In short, “real” is a kind of fringe. According to our primitive impulse, we immediately acknowledge the existence of everything that we can comprehend, as long as this is not questioned. However, there are probably infinitely many different orders of reality, each of which possesses its own, distinctive, and separate manner of being. James calls them “sub-universes,” as examples, giving the sensory world or physical objects (which constitute the ultimate reality); the world of science; the world of ideal relations; the world of “idols of the tribe”; various supernatural worlds of mythology and religion; different worlds of individual points of view; worlds of real insanity; imaginative worlds. The average mind takes all these sub-universes more or less separately, when one of them is experienced for a while we forget its connection to others. But every object that we are aware of is finally related to one of these sub-universes. “Every world which the mind can entertain is real in its own way; only reality escapes our grasp.” By making such remarks, James’ genius touches one of the most important, philosophical questions. Purposely limiting his analysis to the psychological aspect of the issue, he does not delve into many other implications. The following, fragmented reflections constitute a tentative outline of a general perspective on some of these issues, with the specific intention of clarifying the relation between the reality of the everyday world and the world of theoretical considerations. ### 1. Reality of Everyday Life #### (1) Natural Attitude in Everyday Life and its Pragmatic Motives We shall begin by analyzing the everyday world, in which (and to which) a fully aware and adult human acts among his fellow human beings, experiencing reality in line with his natural attitude. “The world of everyday life” should be understood as an intersubjective world that existed long before our birth and was experienced and understood – by our ancestors – as an organized world. It currently constitutes a given, for our experience and interpretations. The basis of all interpretation of the world is the inventory of past experiences, both our own and those passed down to us by our parents and teachers, which serve as “tak for granted” knowledge and work as a scheme of reference. To this stock of tak for granted knowledge belongs the knowledge, according to which the world in which we live is a world of well-defined objects, which have specific characteristics, objects we are moving among, which resist us, and which we can effect. Accordingly to the natural attitude, the world is not (and never was) merely a conglomerate of colored patches, chaotic sounds, and centers of heat and cold. Philosophical and psychological analyses concerning the formation of our experience may later on, retrospectively, describe how elements of this world affect our senses, how they are passively perceived (unstructured and undifferentiated), how in the process of active apperception our minds single out some properties from the field of perception, treating them like well-defined objects, clearly cut out from the less or more undefined background or horizon. The natural attitude is alien to these problems. According to it, the world from the very beginning is not a private world of an individual, but an intersubjective world, common to all of us, which constitutes for us a highly practical, and not a theoretical, object of interest. The world of everyday life constitutes both a stage and an object of our acts and interactions. We must master it, as well as modify it to realize our own intentions, within its framework and among our fellow human beings. So, not only do we act within the world, but also act upon it. Our bodily movements (kinesthetic, locomotor, operational) propel the world, either modifying objects themselves, or changing their interrelations. On the other hand, these very objects resist our actions, which we must overcome, or else yield to. In this sense, it would be true to say that our natural attitude towards the world of everyday life is governed by the pragmatic motive. In this understanding, the world will be something that we must modify through our actions, and something that modifies our actions. #### (2) Manifestations of Spontaneous Life of Human Beings in the External World and Some of Their Forms What should we understand by the term “action” used above? How does a human being through his natural attitude experience his own “actions” in connection to the world? It is obvious that “actions” are manifestations of spontaneous life of human beings. Neither does a human being perceive all of his actions as actions, nor does he experience all of his actions as generating changes in the external world. Contemporary philosophical thought lacks a clear distinction between various forms of all these experiences as well as commonly accepted terminology in this field. In vain we would seek help on the ground of contemporary behaviorism, where manifest and latent behavior are distinguished, sometimes adding a third category of partly manifest behavior (sub-overt) to characterize the manifestations spontaneity in speech acts. Our task is not to criticize the erroneous stance of behaviorism or the inadequacy and inconsistency of the above trichotomy. It is sufficient for our purposes to point out that the behaviorist interpretation of spontaneity does not contribute to the question that interests us, namely, how different forms of spontaneity are experienced by the mind where they occur. Behaviorism at best provides a scheme of reference useful only to an observer of other peoples’ behavior. Only an observer may be interested in analyzing human and animal activity, considering the relational scheme of reference such as “stimulus - response” or “organism - environment,” and only from their viewpoint are these categories accessible. However, our problem is not what happens to a person, understood as a psychophysical entity, nor what his responses are, but rather what attitude he takes towards these events. In short, we are interested in the subjective significance that a person attaches to certain experiences of his spontaneous life. What appears to an observer as objectively the same behavior may have completely different senses to the acting person, or may even be meaningless. As it was shown elsewhere, significance is not an intrinsic feature of certain experiences that appear within our stream of consciousness, but rather the result of an interpretation of past experiences perceived through the reflexive attitude. As long as I experience my actions by turning towards their objects, these actions have no meaning. They become significant only when I grasp them in retrospect as well-defined experiences from the past. Only those experiences that can be recalled beyond their actuality and for which questions concerning their appearance can be formulated, are subjectively significant. Therefore, if we accept this characterization of significance, do any experiences of my spontaneous life exist that are subjectively meaningless? It seems to us that the answer is affirmative. The physiological reflexes such as the patellar reflex, reaction of the pupil, blinking, blushing; also certain passive responses provoked by what Leibniz calls imperceptible waves and faint little perceptions; further my gait, my facial expression, my mood, these manifestations of my spontaneous life, which result in my style of writing, open to the graphological interpretation, etc. All those forms of involuntary spontaneity are perceived when they occur, but leave no trace in the memory, they are experiences - to borrow from Leibniz useful terminology for the discussed problem - perceived, but not apperceived. They are fundamentally actual experiences, which means that they exist only in the actuality of their perception and cannot be apprehended by reflexive attitude. They are inherently linked to the environment, and thus cannot be dissociated from it, or remembered. They belong to the category of fundamentally actual experiences, which means that they exist only in the actuality of their experience and cannot be apprehended by reflexive attitude. Subjectively significant experiences that emerge out of our spontaneous life should be called behavior. (We avoid the term “behavior” because in its current usage it also includes subjectively meaningless manifestations of spontaneity such as reflexes.) The term behavior, as we are using it here, refers to all kinds of subjectively significant spontaneous experiences, those pertaining to internal and external life. If it is permissible to use objective terms to describe subjective experiences - and after making this clarification there is no risk of misunderstanding - we can say that behavior can be manifest and latent. The former simply means doing (mere doing), and the latter simply thinking (mere thinking). The concept of behavior, as we are using it here, does not imply any reference to intention. Thus, it includes all those so-called automatic actions within our inner and external life — habitual, traditional, affective — which Leibniz calls “the category of empirical behavior.” Behavior, which is preconceived, that is, based on a previously established design, should be referred to as action, regardless of whether it is manifest or latent. In connection to the latter, a distinction should be made whether it is a matter of a preconceived intention to realize the plan, or not, that is, whether it is a matter of the intention to conduct an action and bring about the projected state of affairs. Such an intention transforms a preliminary idea (forethought) into a purpose, the plan into a design. If this intention is absent, the projected action of a latent character remains in the domain of imagination, e.g., in the form of daydreaming; whereas, if the intention arises, we can talk about the planned or intended actions (performance). An example of latent action that is a performance is deliberate thinking concerning the solution of a scientific problem. In the case of so-called manifest actions, that is, those taking place in the external world by means of bodily movements, it is no longer necessary to draw a distinction between actions without intention to realize them and those with intention. Any manifest action according to the accepted definition here, constitutes a performance. In order to distinguish between performance (latent) related simply to thinking, and performance (manifest) requiring bodily movements, the latter will be called working action. Working action therefore will be an action in the external world, based on a plan and possessing intention to realize the projected state of affairs, and expressed through bodily movements. Among all the described forms of spontaneity, working action is one of the most crucial aspects of human beings constituting the reality of everyday life. As we shall see, the fully conscious “I” unites its present, past, and future in a specific dimension of time during working action; the “I” fully exists within its working acts; it communicates with others through them; it organizes various spatial perspectives of the world of everyday life, all through them. However, before we can deal with these issues, we need to clarify what is meant by the term “fully conscious ‘I’.” #### (3) Tensions within Consciousness and Attention to Life One of the crucial points of Bergson’s philosophy is the theory that our conscious life possesses countless, different dimensions, ranging from the dimension of actions to the dimension of dreams. Each of these dimensions possesses its own special degree of tension. Action has the highest degree of tension, while the dimension of sleep has the lowest. Bergson argues that these different degrees of tension are a function of this ever-shifting attention to life: actions are characterized by the highest level of interest related to facing reality and its demands; dreams, in contrast, are characterized by a complete lack of interest. Therefore, *attention à la vie*, that is, *attention to life,* constitutes the primary regulatory principle of our conscious life. It determines the area of the world that is significant for us; expresses the continuous stream of our thoughts; it defines the scope and function of our memory; and allows us - using terms as they are used here - to both experience current experiences that focus on objects and at the same time turn, through the reflexive attitude, towards past experiences and inquire about their meaning. By the term full consciousness (wide awakeness), we try to define that dimension of consciousness which has the highest degree of tension, stemming from a stance of full attention to life and its demands. Only the “I” who performs actions, specifically the “I” who works, is fully interested in life, thus, is fully conscious. It lives within its actions, and its attention is exclusively directed towards the effective realization of plans, that is, towards fulfilling the design. The above discussion does not fully follow Bergson’s terminology, but I hope it accurately captures his important thought. Here are some excerpts of Bergson’s writings, which are significant for our discussion: *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience,* Alcan, Paris 1889, p. 20; 94-106; *Matter and Memory,* trans. by Marcelle Page, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London 1911, p. 184; *Dream and Sleeping* [in:] *Spiritual Energy,* trans. by H. Wildon Carr, Macmillan, New York, 1920, p. 97-128; *Intellectual Effort,* ibid., p. 179-220; *Introduction to Metaphysics* [in:] *Thought and Motion,* trans. by H. Wildon Carr, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1914, p. 15-68; *The Recall of The Present and The False Recognition* [in:] *Spiritual Energy* op. cit. pp. 129-178; *Consciousness and Life,* ibid., pp. 15-18; *Perception of Change* [in:] *Thought and Motion,* op, cit., pp. 99-132; *“Ghosts of the living” and “Psychic Research”* [in:] *Spiritual Energy* op. cit., pp. 71-96; *De la position des problèmes* [in:] *La pensée et le mouvant*, Alcan, Paris 1934, p. 91 (part of the introduction to the original that was not included in the English translation - note of the translator). This attention has an active and not a passive character. Passive attention is the opposite of full consciousness. By means of passive attention, we experience e.g., the flow of imperceptible, faint perceptions that – as we have already noted – are fundamentally actual, and do not constitute significant manifestations of spontaneity. Significant spontaneity can be defined by Leibniz as the effort to reach other, always different perceptions. In its lowest form, it leads to drawing boundaries of certain perceptions, transforming them into apperception; in its highest form, it leads to the active performance of working, which takes place in the external world, modifying it. The concept of full consciousness points to the starting point of a justified, pragmatic interpretation of our cognitive life. The state of full consciousness of the acting “I” determines that part of the world that is pragmatically significant, and these significances determine, in turn, the form and content of our stream of thought: form, because they regulate tension within our memory, and thus also the range of our past and recalled experiences and anticipated future experiences; content, since all those experiences are subjected to specific modifications, related to attention, through a previously established design and its realization. These issues lead us to analyze the dimensions of time within which the acting “I” experiences its actions. #### (4) Temporal Perspectives of *Ego agens* and Their Unification Let us begin by distinguishing, in relation to actions in general (manifest and latent), between actions understood, on the one hand, as an ongoing process, that is, actions in progress (actio), and, on the other hand, as an action completed or a realized thing (actum). In the process of actions I am directed towards a state of affairs that is to be brought about by my action. Yet, I do not necessarily have to be consciously aware of the experiences related to the process of ongoing actions. In order to recall them, I have to turn towards them with the reflexive attitude. As Dewey put it, I have to stop and think. However, even if I adopt such a reflexive attitude, I will not be able to capture my ongoing action. What I can capture is either an action completed (past action) or – if my actions are still in progress at the time when I turn towards the past – realized initial phases (my ongoing action). When I was engaged in realizing my action, it constituted an element of my present reality. Now that present reality has become past, and the vivid experience of my action in progress has yielded to my memories concerning action or to retention of the realized action. Looking back from the perspective of the present, where I adopt a reflexive attitude, my past or begun in the past and still ongoing actions can be understood only in terms of completed actions performed by me. ==End of OCR for page 22==