10 Crisis and Reform Intergovernmentalism PDF

Analysing International Relations 10 – Crisis and reform of intergovernmentalism Prof. dr. Daniel Thomas  Change in global governance and international order 10: Crisis and reform of intergovernmentalism Crisis of traditional global governance New forms of interg...

Analysing International Relations 10 – Crisis and reform of intergovernmentalism Prof. dr. Daniel Thomas  Change in global governance and international order 10: Crisis and reform of intergovernmentalism Crisis of traditional global governance New forms of intergovernmentalism 11: Non-state actors in global governance 12: Power shifts and international order  Crisis of traditional global governance The traditional model: formal intergovernmentalism Assumption: problem-solving depends on cooperation among states Goal: to constrain the behaviour of states by making, monitoring, adjudicating, and enforcing international rules Organizing principle: multilateralism “an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of ‘generalized’ principles of conduct… without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence.” (Ruggie 1992)  The limits of formal intergovernmentalism Inflexibility: Power shifts and new problems are emerging faster than treaties and formal IGOs can be reformed. Irrelevance: Many global problems involve the activities of private actors, so aren’t easily addressed by inter-governmental solutions. Illegitimacy: Public opinion is increasingly mistrustful of IGOs, and other stakeholders (NGOs, firms) aren’t included.  Is UN-based governance in crisis? Multilateralism Index 2024 International Peace Institute (New York) & Institute for Economics and Peace (Sydney) 2013-2023, 3 dimensions, 5 issue-areas Participation (by states in the UN system) is improving, except on trade. Inclusivity (NGOs, gender, geography) is improving in all 5 areas. 4 paradoxes of the multilateralism crisis Abdessalam Jaldi (2023). The Crisis of Multilateralism viewed from the Global South. Policy Center for the New South. Policy Paper, April Global problems increase the need for global governance, but multilateral institutions are losing legitimacy and effectiveness. Financial assistance via multilateral institutions is growing, but not enough to address growing economic inequality. Multilateral institutions play a growing role in world politics but they lack the legitimacy and finances to be effective. Weakness of global multilateral institutions increases 2023: Bad year or sign of a crisis? 78th UN General Assembly, September 2023 -- annual gathering of heads of state and government Where are the leaders of the major powers? Present: Brazil, Germany, Japan, Nigeria, South Africa, USA Not present: China, France, India, Indonesia, Russia, UK  Reaction to 2023 UNGA “The real political value is moving to other places… Reform of the UN is blocked so other political clubs inevitably become more important.” -- Richard Gowan, International Crisis Group (an NGO) UN will endure but will “busy itself with second-tier issues as it did during the cold war.” -- Mark Malloch-Brown, former UN deputy secretary general  Possible sources of the multilateralism crisis Lack of hegemonic leadership Power politics Globalization and backlash  Lack of hegemonic leadership Hegemonic stability theory: International cooperation requires a hegemon willing and able to provide public goods by serving as: buyer-of-last-resort: when world economy lacks sufficient demand lender-of-last-resort: when world economy lacks financial liquidity enforcer of rules: in case of non-compliance Charles Kindleberger (1973). The World in Depression, 1929- 1939 Cooperation collapsed in the 1930s because the world lacked hegemonic leadership. UK was willing but no longer able. US was able but not yet willing.  Qs for reflection What is the status of hegemonic leadership today? Is the US willing and able? Is another actor (China, India, EU) willing and able? Is hegemonic leadership necessary to sustain cooperative institutions? Is it sufficient? What about ‘post-hegemonic cooperation’? What about institutionalized or nonhegemonic cooperation? Or is the real problem somewhere else? The non-representativeness of decision-making in int’l institutions? Great powers’ noncompliance with int’l rules?  Power politics Abdessalam Jaldi (2023). The Crisis of Multilateralism viewed from the Global South. Policy Center for the New South. Policy Paper, April 1. G-7 states resist reform of old institutions to fit new distributions of wealth and power. 2. Major ‘emerging and developing economies’ refuse to give up their special privileges in trade and climate negotiations. 3. Rivalry among great powers  UN system is polarized and unable to address contemporary challenges.  Illegitimacy and disfunction of global governance institutions.  Globalization and backlash Thomas Hale, David Held and Kevin Young (2013). Gridlock: Why Global Cooperation is Failing When We Need It Most Why aren’t current intergovernmental institutions providing the effective global governance that the world needs? Post-1945 Anti- Unmanag Economic Weakenin internatio global ed pain & g of global nal backlash globalizati cultural governanc institution in national on change e s politics  Evidence of globalization and backlash Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and Nita Rudra (2021). The Globalization Backlash: Exploring New Perspectives. Comparative Political Studies 54:13, 2267-2285 Evidence of globalization, approx. 1970-2007 Trade openness (global imports + exports as % of global GDP): Sharp increase Foreign direct investment (FDI): Steady increase in global flows of FDI. Preferential trade agreements (PTAs): Steady increase in # of PTAs. Politics: Big drop in support for national autonomy in political parties’ election platforms, worldwide. Evidence of an anti-globalization backlash Global trade dropped sharply in 2007-2009, then stabilised FDI dropped sharply after 2007 Fewer new PTAs after 2010, except South-South Party platforms, worldwide: more pro-national autonomy after 2004 Break time  Alternatives to traditional intergovernmentalism: New forms of intergovernmentalism 1. New roles for IGOs: Collaboration & Orchestration 2. New types of IGO: Informal intergovernmentalism 3. Sub-global multilateralism: Minilateralism 4. Temporary multilateralism: Ad hoc coalitions  1. New roles for IGOs Gap between the governance goals and capabilities of IGOs: Ambitious goals – IGOs aim to provide public goods and to regulate the behaviour of state & non-state actors. Limited capabilities – IGOs often lack the material resources and authority needed to achieve their goals. Governance gap  innovation (new roles for IGOs): a. Collaboration  1.a. Collaboration IGOs work directly with target actors to promote policy change and self-regulation. UN Sec Gen with EU and AU leaders  UN collaborates with states, to promote certain policy priorities Example: Sustainable Development Goals 17 goals, 169 targets, 232 indicators negotiated and approved by states. Achievement of the goals is voluntary, not legally-binding States are responsible for achieving the goals, mostly individually but also with support from others (#17)  UN collaborates with states and businesses, to promote policy goals UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights** 31 principles on states’ and businesses’ duty to protect human rights, and victims’ access to remedy for business-related abuses. Now also promoted by other IGOs. Lawyers are starting to use them in litigation against businesses. France, Netherlands, other European states are adopting ‘human rights due diligence standards’ for businesses. UN is negotiating a binding int’l treaty, but how would it be enforced? ** Also known as ‘the Ruggie Principles’ because drafted by political science professor John Ruggie  UN collaborates with private businesses, to promote self-regulation Example: UN Global Compact A forum for dialogue among stakeholders -- now 15,000 companies in 162 countries…. based on 10 principles about corporate responsibility regarding human rights, labour, environment and corruption. Not a formal, regulatory body.  1.b. Orchestration Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal (2010). International Regulations Without International Government: Improving IO Performance through Orchestration. Review of Int’l Organizations 5(3), 315–44 IGOs work indirectly (through intermediaries) to address target actors in pursuit of governance goals. Orchestrator: an IGO Intermediaries: other IGOs, states, firms, NGOs, public-private partnerships Targets: behaviour of states, firms, persons See also: Kenneth W. Abbott, Philipp Genschel, Duncan Snidal, and Bernard Zangl, eds. (2015). International Organizations as  Forms and examples of IGO orchestration Managing states: Enlisting intermediaries to shape state preferences, beliefs and behaviour in ways that promote state support for and compliance with IGO goals, policies and rules. European Commission works with networks of national regulators to draft legislation and lobby for support from member states. UN OHCHR supports NGOs to monitor states’ human rights compliance. Bypassing states: Enlisting intermediaries to influence the conduct of private actors or to supply public goods to private targets without involving states. UNHCR enlists NGOs to provide humanitarian aid in conflict zones. WHO facilitates private-private & public-private partnerships to fight disease. CITES Secretariat works with NGOs to track trade in endangered species.  2. Informal intergovernmentalism Felicity Vabulas and Duncan Snidal (2013). Organization without delegation: Informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) and the spectrum of intergovernmental arrangements. Review of International Organizations 8:2, 193-220 Cooperation via informal IGOs without legal status or delegated authority. Formal IGOs Informal IGOs Organizing Written and formally Explicitly shared principle adopted expectations expectations Membership Legal membership Explicit but non-legal Structure Regular meetings, formal Regular meetings, budget, secretariat rotating chair, little-no secretariat Delegation Yes No of authority to IGO Examples UN, WHO, WTO, EU G-7, G-20, G-77, BRICS+  3. Minilateralism Moses Naim (2009). Minilateralism. Foreign Policy, June 21. Cooperation among small groups of states with shared interests, with or without formal organization. Response to great power rivalries and disfunction of global institutions. “bring to the table the smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem” (Naim 2009) Scale varies, but between bilateralism and global multilateralism (many or all). Scope varies: may be single-issue or multi-issue. Based on shared interests, not values or ideology.  4. Ad-hoc coalitions Yf Reykers et al (2023). Ad hoc coalitions in global governance: short- notice, task- and time-specific cooperation. International Affairs 99 (2), 727- 745 Global governance increasingly involves ad-hoc coalitions: “autonomous arrangements with a task-specific mandate established at short notice for a limited period of time” Key characteristics Task-specific mandate: to achieve specific goal, not structural change Created on short notice Intended to function for a limited period of time Other variables Operate outside of existing IOs but may cooperate with them. May involve only states, or a mix of states, IOs and non-  Pros & cons of ad-hoc coalitions Advantages A functional option when national solutions can’t address the problem and existing IGOs don’t work. Less costly – no permanent bureaucracy. Less constraining – no ongoing commitments. Disadvantages Easily blocked or manipulated by powerful states. No centralized accumulation of expertise. Not well suited to promoting structural change over time (ending poverty, etc.). Not well suited to promoting rule compliance over time.  Next office hour: Today, 15.00-16.00, WH 2.10A Next lecture: Non-state actors in global governance