Analysing International Relations 10 – Crisis and Reform of Intergovernmentalism PDF

Analysing International Relations 10 – Crisis and reform of intergovernmentalism Prof. dr. Daniel Thomas  Change in global governance and international order 10: Crisis and reform of intergovernmentalism Crisis of traditional global governance New forms of intergovernment...

Analysing International Relations 10 – Crisis and reform of intergovernmentalism Prof. dr. Daniel Thomas  Change in global governance and international order 10: Crisis and reform of intergovernmentalism Crisis of traditional global governance New forms of intergovernmentalism 11: Non-state actors in global governance 12: Power shifts and international order  Crisis of traditional global governance The traditional model: formal intergovernmentalism Assumption: problem-solving depends on cooperation among states Goal: to constrain the behaviour of states by making, monitoring, adjudicating, and enforcing international rules Organizing principle: multilateralism “an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of ‘generalized’ principles of conduct… without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence.” (Ruggie 1992) Instruments: intergovernmental treaties & formal organizations  The limits of formal intergovernmentalism Inflexibility: Power shifts and new problems are emerging faster than treaties and formal IGOs can be reformed. Irrelevance: Many global problems involve the activities of private actors, so aren’t easily addressed by inter- governmental solutions. Illegitimacy: Public opinion is increasingly mistrustful of IGOs, and other stakeholders (NGOs, firms) aren’t included.  Is UN-based governance in crisis? Multilateralism Index 2024 International Peace Institute (New York) & Institute for Economics and Peace (Sydney) 2013-2023, 3 dimensions, 5 issue-areas Participation (by states in the UN system) is improving, except on trade. Inclusivity (NGOs, gender, geography) is improving in all 5 areas. Performance (fulfilling UN goals) is falling in all 5 areas.  4 paradoxes of the multilateralism crisis Abdessalam Jaldi (2023). The Crisis of Multilateralism viewed from the Global South. Policy Center for the New South. Policy Paper, April Global problems increase the need for global governance, but multilateral institutions are losing legitimacy and effectiveness. Financial assistance via multilateral institutions is growing, but not enough to address growing economic inequality. Multilateral institutions play a growing role in world politics but they lack the legitimacy and finances to be effective. Weakness of global multilateral institutions increases demand for ‘minilateral’ solutions, which make reform of global institutions less likely.  2023: Bad year or sign of a crisis? 78th UN General Assembly, September 2023 -- annual gathering of heads of state and government Where are the leaders of the major powers? Present: Brazil, Germany, Japan, Nigeria, South Africa, USA Not present: China, France, India, Indonesia, Russia, UK  Reaction to 2023 UNGA “The real political value is moving to other places… Reform of the UN is blocked so other political clubs inevitably become more important.” -- Richard Gowan, International Crisis Group (an NGO) UN will endure but will “busy itself with second-tier issues as it did during the cold war.” -- Mark Malloch-Brown, former UN deputy secretary general  Possible sources of the multilateralism crisis Lack of hegemonic leadership Power politics Globalization and backlash  Lack of hegemonic leadership Hegemonic stability theory: International cooperation requires a hegemon willing and able to provide public goods by serving as: buyer-of-last-resort: when world economy lacks sufficient demand lender-of-last-resort: when world economy lacks financial liquidity enforcer of rules: in case of non-compliance Charles Kindleberger (1973). The World in Depression, 1929-1939 Cooperation collapsed in the 1930s because the world lacked hegemonic leadership. UK was willing but no longer able. US was able but not yet willing.  Qs for reflection What is the status of hegemonic leadership today? Is the US willing and able? Is another actor (China, India, EU) willing and able? Is hegemonic leadership necessary to sustain cooperative institutions? Is it sufficient? What about ‘post-hegemonic cooperation’? What about institutionalized or nonhegemonic cooperation? Or is the real problem somewhere else? The non-representativeness of decision-making in int’l institutions? Great powers’ noncompliance with int’l rules?  Power politics Abdessalam Jaldi (2023). The Crisis of Multilateralism viewed from the Global South. Policy Center for the New South. Policy Paper, April 1. G-7 states resist reform of old institutions to fit new distributions of wealth and power. 2. Major ‘emerging and developing economies’ refuse to give up their special privileges in trade and climate negotiations. 3. Rivalry among great powers → UN system is polarized and unable to address contemporary challenges. → Illegitimacy and disfunction of global governance institutions.  Globalization and backlash Thomas Hale, David Held and Kevin Young (2013). Gridlock: Why Global Cooperation is Failing When We Need It Most Why aren’t current intergovernmental institutions providing the effective global governance that the world needs? Economic Anti-global Post-1945 Weakening Unmanaged pain & backlash in international of global globalization cultural national institutions governance change politics  Evidence of globalization and backlash Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and Nita Rudra (2021). The Globalization Backlash: Exploring New Perspectives. Comparative Political Studies 54:13, 2267-2285 Evidence of globalization, approx. 1970-2007 Trade openness (global imports + exports as % of global GDP): Sharp increase Foreign direct investment (FDI): Steady increase in global flows of FDI. Preferential trade agreements (PTAs): Steady increase in # of PTAs. Politics: Big drop in support for national autonomy in political parties’ election platforms, worldwide. Evidence of an anti-globalization backlash Global trade dropped sharply in 2007-2009, then stabilised FDI dropped sharply after 2007 Fewer new PTAs after 2010, except South-South Party platforms, worldwide: more pro-national autonomy after 2004  Alternatives to traditional intergovernmentalism: New forms of intergovernmentalism 1. New roles for IGOs: Collaboration & Orchestration 2. New types of IGO: Informal intergovernmentalism 3. Sub-global multilateralism: Minilateralism 4. Temporary multilateralism: Ad hoc coalitions  1. New roles for IGOs Gap between the governance goals and capabilities of IGOs: Ambitious goals – IGOs aim to provide public goods and to regulate the behaviour of state & non-state actors. Limited capabilities – IGOs often lack the material resources and authority needed to achieve their goals. Governance gap → innovation (new roles for IGOs): a. Collaboration b. Orchestration  1.a. Collaboration IGOs work directly with target actors to promote policy change and self-regulation. UN Sec Gen with EU and AU leaders  UN collaborates with states, to promote certain policy priorities Example: Sustainable Development Goals 17 goals, 169 targets, 232 indicators negotiated and approved by states. Achievement of the goals is voluntary, not legally-binding States are responsible for achieving the goals, mostly individually but also with support from others (#17)  UN collaborates with states and businesses, to promote policy goals UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights** 31 principles on states’ and businesses’ duty to protect human rights, and victims’ access to remedy for business-related abuses. Now also promoted by other IGOs. Lawyers are starting to use them in litigation against businesses. France, Netherlands, other European states are adopting ‘human rights due diligence standards’ for businesses. UN is negotiating a binding int’l treaty, but how would it be enforced? ** Also known as ‘the Ruggie Principles’ because drafted by political science professor John Ruggie  UN collaborates with private businesses, to promote self-regulation Example: UN Global Compact A forum for dialogue among stakeholders -- now 15,000 companies in 162 countries…. based on 10 principles about corporate responsibility regarding human rights, labour, environment and corruption. Not a formal, regulatory body.  1.b. Orchestration Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal (2010). International Regulations Without International Government: Improving IO Performance through Orchestration. Review of Int’l Organizations 5(3), 315–44 IGOs work indirectly (through intermediaries) to address target actors in pursuit of governance goals. Orchestrator: an IGO Intermediaries: other IGOs, states, firms, NGOs, public-private partnerships Targets: behaviour of states, firms, persons See also: Kenneth W. Abbott, Philipp Genschel, Duncan Snidal, and Bernard Zangl, eds. (2015). International Organizations as Orchestrators.  Forms and examples of IGO orchestration Managing states: Enlisting intermediaries to shape state preferences, beliefs and behaviour in ways that promote state support for and compliance with IGO goals, policies and rules. European Commission works with networks of national regulators to draft legislation and lobby for support from member states. UN OHCHR supports NGOs to monitor states’ human rights compliance. Bypassing states: Enlisting intermediaries to influence the conduct of private actors or to supply public goods to private targets without involving states. UNHCR enlists NGOs to provide humanitarian aid in conflict zones. WHO facilitates private-private & public-private partnerships to fight disease. CITES Secretariat works with NGOs to track trade in endangered species.  2. Informal intergovernmentalism Felicity Vabulas and Duncan Snidal (2013). Organization without delegation: Informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) and the spectrum of intergovernmental arrangements. Review of International Organizations 8:2, 193-220 Cooperation via informal IGOs without legal status or delegated authority. Formal IGOs Informal IGOs Organizing Written and formally adopted Explicitly shared expectations principle expectations Membership Legal membership Explicit but non-legal Structure Regular meetings, formal Regular meetings, rotating chair, budget, secretariat little-no secretariat Delegation of Yes No authority to IGO Examples UN, WHO, WTO, EU G-7, G-20, G-77, BRICS+  3. Minilateralism Moses Naim (2009). Minilateralism. Foreign Policy, June 21. Cooperation among small groups of states with shared interests, with or without formal organization. Response to great power rivalries and disfunction of global institutions. “bring to the table the smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem” (Naim 2009) Scale varies, but between bilateralism and global multilateralism (many or all). Scope varies: may be single-issue or multi-issue. Based on shared interests, not values or ideology. Big Q: Does it enable flexible and innovative problem-solving or exacerbate power imbalances?  4. Ad-hoc coalitions Yf Reykers et al (2023). Ad hoc coalitions in global governance: short-notice, task- and time-specific cooperation. International Affairs 99 (2), 727-745 Global governance increasingly involves ad-hoc coalitions: “autonomous arrangements with a task-specific mandate established at short notice for a limited period of time” Key characteristics Task-specific mandate: to achieve specific goal, not structural change Created on short notice Intended to function for a limited period of time Other variables Operate outside of existing IOs but may cooperate with them. May involve only states, or a mix of states, IOs and non-state actors. Examples on refugees; piracy; access to vaccines; counter-terrorism  Pros & cons of ad-hoc coalitions Advantages A functional option when national solutions can’t address the problem and existing IGOs don’t work. Less costly – no permanent bureaucracy. Less constraining – no ongoing commitments. Disadvantages Easily blocked or manipulated by powerful states. No centralized accumulation of expertise. Not well suited to promoting structural change over time (ending poverty, etc.). Not well suited to promoting rule compliance over time.  Analysing International Relations 11 – Non-state actors in global governance Prof. dr. Daniel Thomas  New forms of global governance What new forms of global governance are emerging, with what role for various types of actors? LAST CLASS 1. New roles for IGOs: Collaboration & Orchestration 2. New types of IGO: Informal intergovernmentalism 3. Sub-global intergovernmentalism: Minilateralism 4. Temporary intergovernmentalism: Ad hoc coalitions TODAY 5. Non-state demand for global governance: Epistemic communities 6. Diverse actors in global governance: Multistakeholderism 7. Rule-making without governments: Global performance indicators 8. Rule-enforcement without governments: Private enforcement  New actors in global governance: Epistemic communities Peter M. Haas (1992). Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. International Organization 46:1, 1-36 Transnational networks of professionals (often scientists) with shared knowledge and methods of problem-solving that contribute to global governance by… building knowledge via research, raising awareness of problems, proposing solutions, pressuring governments and IGOs to change policies. Often depend on social movements to convert scientific consensus into effective political pressure, to create domestic incentives for governments to change policies and cooperate.  Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea 1970s: Growing chemical pollution of Mediterranean, but no action by govts 17 coastal states had different levels of understanding & commitment (ES, FR, IT, MA, YU, AL, GR, CY, TK, SY, LB, IS, EG, LI, TU, AL, MO) But an epistemic community of marine biologists reached agreement on the problem, then convinced all 17 governments to accept rules to reduce chemical pollution. Result: very successful ‘Mediterranean Action Plan’ Question: Do governments (still) listen to scientific experts?  Diverse actors in global governance: Multistakeholderism Mark Raymond and Laura DeNardis (2015). Multistakeholderism: anatomy of an inchoate global institution. International Theory 7:3, 572-616 A decentralised, non-hierarchical model of governance involving multiple types of stakeholders in rule-making and rule-implementation to address global problems. ‘Stakeholders’ -- actors with relevant expertise and interests States/governments Formal IGOs Firms/corporations Civil society actors: NGOs, social movements, civil society networks, individuals  2 examples Not very successful: governance of the diamond trade (KCPS) Very successful: governance of the internet (ICANN)  Governance of the diamond trade Goal: stop the trade of ‘blood diamonds’ from confict zones Process: In 2022, governments, diamond businesses, and NGOs adopted the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS). Problem: Compliance depends on monitoring by government officials, who are often corrupt. Result: KPCS continues but major NGOs have withdrawn.  Governance of the internet We all use it, but how is it governed?  Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) A nonprofit organization based in Los Angeles, California Ensures ‘single and interoperable internet supported by stable, secure and resilient unique identifier systems’ (protocol numbers, domain names) 1998-2016: worked under contract to US government Since 2016: fully independent, bottom-up, community-based, consensus- driven, multistakeholder governance See http://www.icann.org/community ICANN’s governance process 3 meetings per year Community Forum: Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees (SO/ACs), cross- community interaction, and plenary sessions on topics of community-wide interest. Policy Forum: policy development and regional outreach ICANN-74, The Hague, 13-16 June 2022 General Meeting: global outreach, capacity building, leadership training  But multistakeholder model of internet governance is contested! Daniëlle Flonk (2021). Emerging illiberal norms: Russia and China as promoters of internet content control. International Affairs 97(6), 1925–1944 Mark Raymond and Justin Sherman (2023). Authoritarian multilateralism in the global cyber regime complex: The double transformation of an international diplomatic practice. Contemporary Security Policy 45(1), 110–140 Liberal vs. authoritarian states disagree on internet governance: US, EU, others support liberal ‘multistakeholder’ model. Russia and China prefer more state control, less multistakeholderism (‘authoritarian multilateralism’).  Rule-making without governments: Global performance indicators Private firms, NGOs, and IGOs shape global governance by setting standards, assessing performance by states, and publicizing the results. Goals: To make credible and neutral information on governance available to all. To shape the behaviour of investors, consumers, voters, governments by by simplifying, quantifying and standardizing social phenomena. But note: GPIs are very controversial, highly contested!  Ratings by private businesses Government bonds (risk of default): Fitch, Moody’s, Standard & Poor, CTRISKS Government’s accounting behaviour (risk of inaccuracy): International Financial Reporting Standards, by the Int’l Accounting Standards Board Political stability (risk of conflict, loss of investments): Economist Intelligence Unit, Euromoney Country Risk, Oxford Analytica  Ratings by private businesses Government bonds (risk of default): Fitch, Moody’s, Standard & Poor, CTRISKS Government’s accounting behaviour (risk of inaccuracy): International Financial Reporting Standards, by the Int’l Accounting Standards Board Political stability (risk of conflict, loss of investments): Economist Intelligence Unit, Euromoney Country Risk, Oxford Analytica  Ratings by IGOs World Bank: Doing Business Index – ranking of national business regulations from most to least business-friendly (discontinued in 2021) World Bank: Business Ready – new ranking of countries by conditions enabling private business and investment (coming in spring 2024) World Bank: Human Capital Index – indicators of child health & education European Banking Authority: indicators on national frameworks for loan enforcement European Bank for Reconstruction and Development: indicators on national insolvency frameworks  The working of GPIs Judith G. Kelley and Beth A. Simmons (2020). The Power of Global Performance Indicators How they work: Define targets & assessment criteria. Publicize governance outcomes. Promote competition among states. Activate transnational pressure by IGOs and NGOs. Why they work: Improve understanding of the implications of policy choices. Raise fear of material consequences via official sanctions or private disinvestment. Raise fear of reputational damage via ‘naming & shaming.’  The working of GPIs Judith G. Kelley and Beth A. Simmons (2020). The Power of Global Performance Indicators How they work: Define targets & assessment criteria. Publicize governance outcomes. Promote competition among states. Activate transnational pressure by IGOs and NGOs. Why they work: Improve understanding of the implications of policy choices. Raise fear of material consequences via official sanctions or private disinvestment. Raise fear of reputational damage via ‘naming & shaming.’  Rule-enforcement without governments: Private enforcement of int’l law Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and J.C. Sharman (2021). Enforcers Beyond Borders: Transnational NGOs and the Enforcement of International Law. Perspectives on Politics 19(1), 131-147 NGOs contribute to the enforcement of international law by operating as private intelligence agencies, police, and prosecutors. How: (1) investigating and gathering evidence; (2) monitoring and catching lawbreakers ‘in the act’; (3) lawsuits & political pressure against govts, companies, individuals. Why: Motives: Gap between int’l legalization (govts develop int’l rules) and weak int’l enforcement. Opportunities: Legal changes (NGOs have ‘standing’ in some international and domestic courts) and technological changes (satellite imagery, data leaks, forensic computing). Examples: Amnesty International, Climate TRACE, Greenpeace, Transparency International, Global Witness, Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, Bellingcat Bellingcat investigation of MH17 disaster  Private global governance & state authority Michael O. Allen (2023). Unbundling the State: Legal Development in an Era of Global, Private Governance. International Organization 77(4): 754-788 Int’l commercial arbitration (ICA) is a method of dispute resolution whereby parties agree to have their disputes resolved by private individuals (i.e., arbitrators) rather than a court of law. Very popular among multinational companies. Key forum: Int’l Court of Arbitration -- a private body under the International Chamber of Commerce, a business group. Allen’s argument: ICA weakens state authority by reducing the economic incentive to develop strong domestic legal institutions.  Some Qs for reflection Is formal intergovernmentalism unnecessary or just insufficient for addressing global problems? Do non-governmental forms of global governance have democratic legitimacy? – If yes, how? – If no, does this matter? What are the effects of multistakeholderism and private global governance? – makes global governance more effective? – encourages illegal NGO vigilantism? – leads to ‘corporate capture’ of a public function? – weakens state institutions?  Analysing International Relations 12 – Power shifts and international order Prof. dr. Daniel Thomas  Today Why do great powers rise and fall? How do power transitions affect international institutions? What international order do rising powers want? What international order does the US want? How do power transitions affect the risk of war? Is war between US and China inevitable? Why do great powers rise and fall?  Differential growth rates Robert Gilpin (1981). War and Change in World Politics A state’s domestic arrangements and stage of technological development determine its rate of economic growth. Differences in economic growth rates accumulate over time, leading some states to lose power and others to gain.  Power resources and imperial overstretch Paul Kennedy (1987). The Rise and Fall of Great Powers The power of states depends on their economic and military resources and how efficiently they use those resources, relative to other states. Great powers decline when their global ambitions exceed their economic & military resources (‘imperial overstretch’), leading to costly, unwinnable wars and under-investment in economic strength.  Domestic ideology and global recognition Manjari Chatterjee Miller (2021). Why Nations Rise: Narratives and the Path to Great Power It’s more than resources -- rising powers are not all the same. Active rising powers: states with growing economic and military strength that adopt domestic ideologies that legitimize their global ambitions and that mimic the prevailing great power to gain global recognition of their status. Reticent rising powers: states with growing resources that do not pursue the domestic ideology or global recognition of a great power. Active Reticent 1800s US Netherlands Today China India A cartoon from about 1900, when the US was considering great power status  A more recent cartoon, as US power seems to be in decline How do power transitions affect international institutions?  Redistributions of power destabilise international rules and institutions. John Mearsheimer (1994/1995). The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security 19(3), 5-49 Great powers create international rules and institutions in order to maintain or increase their share of world power. Redistributions of power weaken the foundations of existing international rules and institutions…. and often lead to war. New great powers create new rules and institutions. Redistributions of power don’t necessarily destabilize international rules and institutions. Robert Keohane (1984). After Hegemony Hegemons (great powers) create int’l order (rules on trade, etc.) that benefits them, and use their power to maintain it. Wise hegemons create int’l order that also provides public goods (benefits accessible to all). As hegemon declines, other states fear loss of public goods, so they invest in maintaining existing rules and institutions. Redistributions of power don’t necessarily destabilize international rules and institutions. Robert Keohane (1984). After Hegemony Hegemons (great powers) create int’l order (rules on trade, etc.) that benefits them, and use their power to maintain it. Wise hegemons create int’l order that also provides public goods (benefits accessible to all). As hegemon declines, other states fear loss of public goods, so they invest in maintaining existing rules and institutions. What int’l order do rising powers want, and why?  Rising powers seek recognition & voice Edward Newman and Benjamin Zala (2018). Rising powers and order contestation: disaggregating the normative from the representational. Third World Quarterly 39:5, 871-888 Argument: The difficulty of adapting int’l order to rising powers depends on what these states are contesting & demanding. Question: How are rising powers challenging int’l order? Normative contestation: content of int’l rules, kind of order they support Representational contestation: who gets to set and oversee int’l rules Method: study language used in summits of BRICS leaders Finding: BRICS accept basic int’l norms while contesting representation – they are more focused on great power status & multipolar decision-making than on normative change.  Rising powers favour a hybrid int’l order Matthew D. Stephen (2014). Rising powers, global capitalism and liberal global governance: A historical materialist account of the BRICs challenge. European Journal of International Relations 20:4, 912–938 Rising powers’ dilemma: Increased dependence on world economy → support for status quo. Statist forms of development → tension with liberal principles of free market and individual rights. Result: Rising powers favour a hybrid order: more transnational integration but based on less liberal principles.  China pursues a hybrid strategy on int’l order Nana de Graaff, Tobias ten Brink and Inderjeet Parmar (2020). China’s rise in a liberal world order in transition. Review of International Political Economy 27:2, 191-207 Factors shaping China’s strategy on int’l order: National development via global market integration. State-directed capitalism based on close relations between business and the Communist party-state. Result: Hybrid strategy, combining adaptation, confrontation, and building alternative institutions, with variation across issue-areas. → Chinese is challenging some aspects of liberal int’l order, accepting others.  China’s selective approach to liberal int’l order Ruonan Liu and Songpo Yang (2023). China and the liberal international order: a pragmatic and dynamic approach. International Affairs 99(4), 1383–1400 Chinese scholars and govt officials are selective about the LIO, which they see as a tool of US hegemony. Aims: to promote sovereign equality under int’l law; to become a rule-maker, not just a rule-taker; to build institutions beyond the lLO architecture Obstacles: shortage of power resources; shortage of allies; internal problems; lack of universal values. “Although China has no apparent intention to overturn the LIO, it does wish to see an international order that recognizes its great power status, provides a more equitable distribution of benefits, and allows resistance to some liberal norms that may jeopardize its core interests and harm its regime security. Moreover, China seeks a more balanced relationship with the United States, the dominant power in the LIO, to satisfy its aspirations for great power status.” (1398)  China favours a new int’l order, consistent with CCP ideology Jessica Chen Weiss and Jeremy L. Wallace (2021). Domestic Politics, China’s Rise, and the Future of the Liberal Int’l Order. International Organization 75:2, 635-664 China’s approach to int’l order depends on the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party. Key elements of CCP ideology: (1) state over markets; (2) state interests over individual rights; (3) rule by law, not rule of law; (4) ethnic nationalism, not civic nationalism. As a result, China favours an international order that… prioritizes state sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference; enables states to protect citizens from market forces; limits the priority of individual rights.  China is not committed to the liberal int’l institutional order Xinyuan Dai and Duu Renn (2016). China and International Order: The Limits of Integration. Journal of Chinese Political Science 21, 177-197 A statistical study of commitment to the int’l institutional order (IIO). China accepts treaties that create broad multilateral principles but resists additional protocols that create more concrete or demanding obligations. China is less embedded in IIO than other P-5 states, BRICS, Japan, Korea China and Russia are less embedded in human rights institutions than other P-5 (FR, UK, US) or other BRICS (BR, IN, SA)  China is contesting the UN’s liberal agenda, with mixed success Rosemary Foot (2024). Reining in a liberal UN: China, power shifts, and the UN's peace and security pillar. Global Policy 15(Suppl. 2), 18–28 Since 2000, China is contesting UN’s focus on human security (protection of civilians and ‘Responsibility to Protect’), advocating a focus on state security (preventing war). Method: UNSC vetoes, more funding for UN actions, more Chinese officials in UN bureaucracy, new normative discourse on development and security. Effects: Uneven thus far (reasons below), but longer-term effects could be greater. Liberal paradigm is embedded in UN institutions and practices. Geopolitical concerns and rivalries reduces audience for China’s agenda.  What int’l order does the US want, and why? “How can the hegemon that established the international institutional order according to its own interests and values have serious grievances against it?” (Dai 2020: 495)  US’ conditional approach to liberal int’l order Xinyuan Dai (2020). Challenges to the International Institutional Order. Chinese Journal of International Politics 13:4, 485–508 Due to shifts in power, the US is increasingly critical of the liberal int’l order. To win the Cold War, the US accepted the costs of collective security, economic openness, and democracy promotion. After Cold War, costs were harder to justify. US approach is now more conditional: Support where US retains dominant power (IMF, NATO) Challenge where US has lost power (WTO, UN)  Crisis of liberal int’l order is due to its declining legitimacy within Western states. G. John Ikenberry (2018). The end of liberal international order? International Affairs 94:1, 7–23 Growth of ‘liberal international order’ created by US and based on economic openness, multilateral institutions, security coop’n, democratic solidarity. After WW2, included US, Western Europe, Japan. After Cold War, states in East Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa adopted democracy and capitalism. In recent decades: Neoliberalism → economic inequality → far-right populism and nationalism in EU and US → rejection of liberal int’l order.  How do power transitions affect the risk of war?. The end of Dutch hegemony: The 4th Anglo-Dutch War, 1780-1784  Classic study of power transition Thucydides (c. 400 BC). The Peloponnesian War On war between Athens and Sparta, 431-404 BC Argument: Dominant state (Sparta) used force against a rising state (Athens) to stop it from gaining more power. “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear this caused in Sparta.” “The Athenians made their Empire more and more strong… [until] Athenian strength attained a peak plain for all to see and the Athenians began to encroach upon Sparta’s allies. It was at this point that Sparta felt the position to be no longer tolerable and decided by starting the present war to employ all her energies in attacking and if possible destroying the power of Athens.”  Power transition theory A.F.K. Organski (1958). World Politics Uneven rates of economic growth → ‘power transitions’ in world politics. During power transitions, two factors determine a state’s preference for war vs. peace: (1) position in the int’l distribution of power; (2) satisfaction with current int’l order. Hypotheses: 1. Satisfied states don’t challenge the dominant state. 2. Unsatisfied but weak states don’t challenge the dominant state. 3. Strong, unsatisfied states challenge the dominant state → war.  Power transitions are always conflictual. John Mearsheimer (2001). Tragedy of Great Power Politics Assumptions: The threat of war is always present in international politics. Anarchy → insecurity → all states prefer to dominate their neighbours. Only some states (‘great powers’) achieve a dominant position. Expectations: As rising states approach ‘great power’ status, they become more aggressive. Dominant states will use force to resist rising states.  Bipolarity and nuclear weapons both reduce the risk of war during power transitions. Kenneth Waltz (1979). Theory of International Politics Multipolar distributions of power tend to be unstable, with high risk of war. Uncertainty about alliances and war outcomes → willingness to take risks. Bipolar distributions of power tend to be stable, with low risk of war. Clear balance of power → low expectation of gain → low risk of war. Small states seek security by allying with a great power, but have little impact on the overall balance. Kenneth Waltz (1990). Nuclear Myths and Political Realities. Amer Pol Sci Rev 84:3 Nuclear weapons → consequences of war are predictable → low risk of war.  Power transitions depend on regime type Douglas Lemke and William Reed (1996). Regime types and status quo evaluations: Power transition theory and the democratic peace. International Interactions 22:2, 143-164 Tests the ‘democratic peace’ hypothesis (democracies don’t fight each other) in the context of power transitions. Finding: Power transitions involving two democracies are more likely to be settled peacefully than power transitions involving other types of regimes. 1890-1910, dominant power UK (democracy) faced two rising powers: – USA (democracy) → peaceful transition – Germany (non-democracy) → war  Power transitions depend on identities & ideologies Kori Schake (2017). Safe Passage: The Transition from British to American Hegemony Studied 9 crisis in UK-US relations between 1820s and 1940s. Finding: Converging identities of UK & US enabled peaceful transition. – UK became more democratic (more like the US) – US became more imperial (more like the UK) Result: UK and US focused more on their cumulative power compared to other states than on their relative power compared to each other. Prediction: Deep ideological differences between US and China will make power transition very conflictual, focused on relative gains.  Power transitions are what rising powers make of them. Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson (2020). Partnership or Predation? How Rising States Contend with Declining Great Powers. International Security 45:1, 90-126 Rising state may cooperate with or challenge a declining great power. Choice is based on rising state’s calculation of power and threats, not interdependence or ideology. Rising power will cooperate with declining great power when useful to offset threats from other great powers. Rising power will challenge declining great power if it doesn’t face threats from other great powers or cooperation helps it overcome these threats. After WW2, rising US cooperated with declining UK to offset rising USSR. Power transitions are what dominant powers make of them Manjari Chatterjee Miller (2024). The Most Dangerous Game: Do Power Transitions Always Lead to War? Foreign Affairs 103(4) July/August The degree of conflict during power transitions depends on how the dominant power responds to the rising power. Dominant power’s strategy shapes rising power’s satisfaction w/ int’l order: confront and repress → rising power dissatisfied, inclined to conflict contain and accomodate → rising power satisfied, inclined to cooperate The US could use its dominant position to revise the existing int’l order in ways that increase the legitimacy of its hegemonic position, attract support from other states, and reduce China’s interest in overturning int’l order. But so far, it has not done so.  Is war between China and US inevitable?.  US-China conflict is inevitable. John Mearsheimer (2021). The Inevitable Rivalry: America, China, and the Tragedy of Great-Power Politics. Foreign Affairs (Nov-Dec) In 1990s, US had a choice: resist or assist the growing relative power of China US leadership believed that economic growth and interdependence would produce domestic reform and cooperative int’l behaviour. US integrated China into world economy (WTO), facilitated its growth. Power trends: Population: China 3x greater than US. Economy: China will be 1.5-2x greater than US. Military: China is gaining, soon more powerful than US in East Asia region. Expectation: China aims to dominate its region (east Asia, western Pacific). US will not tolerate China as peer competitor. → Conflict is “inevitable.”  Thucydides trap Graham Allison (2017). Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? The ‘Thucydides trap’ Great power’s fears + Rising power’s ambitions → High likelihood of war. Historical record War in 12 of 16 cases when rising state had enough power to challenge the hegemon. Conclusion Avoiding war requires great political & psychological flexibility.  There is no ‘Thucydides trap’ in China-US relations Ling Shengli and Lv Huiyi (2018). Why are China and the United States Not Destined to Fall into the ‘Thucydides Trap.’ China Quarterly of Int’l Strategic Studies 4(4) War is unlikely because China-US relations differ from Athens-Sparta relations: US has little to fear: China is growing but US is far ahead in military power, alliances, influence over int’l orgs, cultural power. Economic interdependence. Nuclear deterrence. US allies in Asia-Pacific have economic ties to China, so favour peace. China is part of various Asian IOs that promote dialogue.  Small and middle powers shape hegemonic change Danny Quah (2017). A Thucydides Fallacy: The New Model of Power Relations for Southeast Asia, the US, and China. The Diplomat, 27 July Avoid the ‘Thucydides fallacy’ -- don’t focus just on great powers! The world order consequences of hegemonic change depend on: Supply: What declining & rising powers are offering the rest of the world. Demand: What the rest of the world wants. As countries of Global South become richer and more powerful, their expectations will shape the outcome of the US-China rivalry.  Power transition and the future of alliances Richard Higgott and Simon Reich (2022). The age of fuzzy bifurcation: Lessons from the pandemic and the Ukraine War. Global Policy 13, 627– 639 Trends Globalisation + China’s rise + US decline → geopolitics and geoeconomics are no longer aligned. Many US security allies (EU, Australia, others) are linked economically to US rivals (China & Russia). Consequences: Cooperation and competition vary across issue-areas. Small & medium-sized states will pursue mixed strategies: bandwagon with US on some issues but balance, hedge and even pursue strategic autonomy on other issues. China and US will struggle with the inconsistency of allies & alliances.