Podcast
Questions and Answers
Which representation allows for the consideration of strategies as contingent plans?
Which representation allows for the consideration of strategies as contingent plans?
What is the first step in the generalized backward induction procedure for finite games?
What is the first step in the generalized backward induction procedure for finite games?
What does the outcome of the generalized backward induction procedure provide?
What does the outcome of the generalized backward induction procedure provide?
Which type of game is not suitable for the generalized backward induction procedure?
Which type of game is not suitable for the generalized backward induction procedure?
Signup and view all the answers
How does the generalized backward induction change the extensive form of the game?
How does the generalized backward induction change the extensive form of the game?
Signup and view all the answers
Study Notes
Extensive Form Games
- The simplified Stackelberg model is represented in extensive form, where firms make sequential decisions.
- Firm 1 (Leader) has a single decision node with two actions: (q_L) (Low) and (q_H) (High).
- Firm 2 (Follower) has two decision nodes, leading to four possible strategies based on the leader's choice.
- Strategies are contingent plans specifying decisions at each node, essential for analyzing outcomes in dynamic environments.
Backward Induction
- Backward induction is a method for finding Nash equilibria in games of perfect information.
- Steps include identifying Nash equilibria in final subgames and progressively reducing the game until terminal nodes are reached.
- This method is useful for finite-stage games but ineffective for infinitely repeated games, which require different analysis.
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
- Involves players with private, payoff-relevant information, leading to games of incomplete information.
- It requires that the strategy profile forms a Nash equilibrium where expected payoffs account for uncertainties about other players' types.
- It involves random variables determined by Nature, representing the probability distribution of types players can have.
Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBNE)
- Refines Nash equilibrium in games where players observe predecessors' actions to update their beliefs about types.
- Requires that strategies are sequentially rational given the belief system, enhancing the robustness of decision-making processes.
- A belief system assigns probabilities to decision nodes ensuring consistency with observed events.
Types of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
- Separating Equilibrium: Informed players signal different types through distinct actions, allowing uninformed players to infer types.
- Pooling Equilibrium: All informed players take the same action; uninformed players cannot deduce type information, leading to retained prior beliefs.
Key Mathematical Notations
- (X_1) and (X_2) are strategy sets for firms, while (θ_i) denotes the type variable associated with each player, chosen by Nature.
- Payoff functions are defined in terms of strategies and types, thereby incorporating the uncertainty present in the players' decisions.
References for Further Reading
- Introductory texts: Gibbons (1992), Mas-Colell et al. (1995) cover foundational concepts of game theory.
- Advanced study: Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) provide comprehensive insights into dynamic games and strategic interactions.
Studying That Suits You
Use AI to generate personalized quizzes and flashcards to suit your learning preferences.
Description
This quiz covers two critical concepts in game theory: the extensive form representation of games and backward induction.