Political Theory: An Introduction PDF

 Political Theory Bhargava~00_Prelims.indd i 4/30/2008 11:00:56 AM Process Black  This page is intentionally left blank. Bhargava~00_Prelims.indd ii...

 Political Theory Bhargava~00_Prelims.indd i 4/30/2008 11:00:56 AM Process Black  This page is intentionally left blank. Bhargava~00_Prelims.indd ii 4/30/2008 11:01:02 AM Process Black  Political Theory An Introduction Edited by Rajeev Bhargava Ashok Acharya Bhargava~00_Prelims.indd iii 4/30/2008 11:01:02 AM Process Black  Copyright © Rajeev Bhargava and Ashok Acharya, 2008 Licensees of Pearson Education in South Asia No part of this eBook may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without the publisher’s prior written consent. This eBook may or may not include all assets that were part of the print version. The publisher reserves the right to remove any material in this eBook at any time. ISBN 9788131706251 eISBN 9788131775875 Head Office: A-8(A), Sector 62, Knowledge Boulevard, 7th Floor, NOIDA 201 309, India Registered Office: 11 Local Shopping Centre, Panchsheel Park, New Delhi 110 017, India Bhargava~00_Prelims.indd iv 4/30/2008 11:01:03 AM Process Black  Contents Preface xi PART – I WHAT IS POLITICAL THEORY AND WHY DO WE NEED IT? 1. What Is Political Theory? | Rajeev Bhargava 2 Introduction 3 What Is Theory 5 The Distinctiveness of Theory? 8 Cosomologies and Common Sense 12 What Is Political? 14 Points for Discussion 16 2. Why Do We Need Political Theory? | Rajeev Bhargava 18 Introduction 19 The Big Questions of Human Life 19 The Emergence of Western Modernity 21 Explaining Human and Non-human Nature 21 Understanding Humans 23 The Difference Between the Human and Non-human Worlds 23 Decline of Political Theory? 27 Types of Political Theories 29 Little Theories, Grand Theories 31 Cosmologies and Political Theory 33 History of Political Thought and Political Theory 34 Points for Discussion 36 Bhargava~00_Prelims.indd v 4/30/2008 11:01:03 AM Process Black  vi CONTENTS PART – II CONCEPTS 3. Liberty | V. Sriranjani 40 Introduction 41 Meaning 41 Evolution of the Concept 41 Classification: Negative and Positive Liberty 48 Liberty and Other Concepts 52 The Concept of Liberty in India 54 Points for Discussion 57 4. Equality | Ashok Acharya 58 Introduction 59 Evolution of the Concept 60 Why Equalize? 65 Equality of What? 66 In Conclusion: The Politics of Equality 72 Points for Discussion 72 5. Justice | Krishna Menon 74 Introduction 75 The Issue of Distributive Justice 76 Procedural Justice 77 John Rawls: Justice as Fairness 78 Limitations of Rawls’ Theory of Justice 80 Communitarian Critique 81 Feminist Critique 82 Justice, Capabilities, and Freedom: Amartya Sen’s Extension of John Rawls’ Theory of Justice 83 End-State Theories 84 Feminist Accounts of Justice 85 Conclusion 86 Points for Discussion 86 6. Rights | Papiya Sengupta Talukdar 88 Introduction 89 The Idea of Rights 89 Theories of Rights 93 Human Rights 98 Some Recent Debates on Rights 99 Conclusion 104 Points for Discussion 104 Bhargava~00_Prelims.indd vi 4/30/2008 11:01:03 AM Process Black  CONTENTS vii 7. Democracy | Janaki Srinivasan 106 Introduction 107 The Concept 107 Direct Participatory Democracy 109 Liberal Democracy 111 Objections to Democracy 116 Perspectives on Democracy 118 Key Debates in Democratic Theory 124 Conclusion 128 Points for Discussion 128 8. Citizenship | Anupama Roy 130 Introduction 131 What Do We Mean by Citizenship? 131 Historical Development of the Concept of Citizenship 132 T. H. Marshall: Equal and Universal Citizenship 137 Limits of Liberal Citizenship: Uniformity and Generality 138 The Search for Alternatives 139 New Contexts and Changing Concerns: Multiculturalism and Globalization 141 Conclusion 146 Points for Discussion 146 9. Power | Nivedita Menon 148 Introduction 149 Conceptions of Power 149 Power as Exploitation 151 Authority, Legitimacy and Hegemony 152 Feminist Theories of Power 154 Foucault on Power 155 Conclusion 157 Points for Discussion 157 10. Sovereignty | Krishna Menon 158 Introduction 159 Historical Evolution of Sovereignty 159 Theories of Sovereignty 160 The Changing World and the Concept of Sovereignty 165 Conclusion 168 Points for Discussion 168 11. State | Swaha Das 170 Introduction 171 What Is the State? 171 Bhargava~00_Prelims.indd vii 4/30/2008 11:01:03 AM Process Black  viii CONTENTS The Modern State 172 What the State Is Not: Civil Society and the Nation 175 Justifying the State 176 Human Nature 176 The State of Nature and the Social Contract 177 Utilitarianism 178 The Neutral State: Liberalism 178 The Class State: Marxism 179 The Patriarchal State: Feminism 183 Governmentality: Foucault on the State 183 Recent Debates: Challenges to the Sovereignty of the State 184 Points for Discussion 186 12. Civil Society | Mohinder Singh 188 Introduction 189 Historical Evolution of the Idea of Civil Society 190 Civil Society in Early Liberal Political Theory 190 Rise of Political Economy and the Enlightenment Concept of Civil Society 193 Critiques of the Enlightenment Concept of Civil Society 196 Contemporary Revival of the Concept of Civil Society 199 Civil Society in the Post-colonial Context 200 Modernity and Civil Society in Post-colonial States: Critical Issues 201 Conclusion 204 Points for Discussion 204 13. Property | Mohinder Singh 206 Introduction 207 The Extent and Limits of Property Rights 207 The Concept of Property in Political Theory 208 Property in Ancient and Medieval Political Thought 208 Modernity and the Concept of Property 210 Developments in the 20th Century: Socialism, Welfarism, Libertarianism 218 Gender and Property Rights: Feminist Perspectives on the Concept of Property 220 Points for Discussion 222 14. Gender | Nivedita Menon 224 Introduction 225 Sex Is to Nature as Gender Is to Culture 225 Male/Female in the Non-West 227 Developments in the Sex/Gender Distinction in Feminist Theory 228 Masculinity 232 Points for Discussion 233 Bhargava~00_Prelims.indd viii 4/30/2008 11:01:03 AM Process Black  CONTENTS ix PART – III IDEOLOGIES 15. Liberalism | Ashok Acharya 236 Introduction 237 A Brief History 237 Classical Liberalism 238 Contemporary Liberalism 240 The Foundations of Liberalism 241 Conclusion 242 Points for Discussion 242 16. Socialism | Sunalini Kumar 244 Introduction 245 Responses to Inequality 245 The Problem: Capitalism 246 The Socialist Alternative 248 Socialist Schemes: Old and New 251 Conclusion 255 Points for Discussion 256 17. Nationalism | Sunalini Kumar 258 Introduction 259 The History of an Idea 260 Non-European Nationalism 264 Theoretical Questions 265 Analysis and Critique 268 Conclusion: The Future of an Idea 269 Points for Discussion 271 18. Secularism | Rajeev Bhargava 274 Introduction 275 Secularism: The Broad Definition 275 Political Secularism 276 Crisis for Secular States 281 Theocracy, States with Established Religions and Secular States: A Normative Comparison 282 An Alternative Conception: Indian Secularism 288 Is Secularism a Christian and Western Doctrine? 295 Conclusion 296 Points for Discussion 297 PART – IV POLITICAL ARGUMENTS 19. Affirmative Action | Ashok Acharya 298 Introduction 299 Bhargava~00_Prelims.indd ix 4/30/2008 11:01:03 AM Process Black  x CONTENTS Justice and Social Disadvantage 300 Defining Affirmative Action 301 Affirmative Action in India 303 The Limits of Affirmative Action 305 Points for Discussion 307 20. Freedom of Speech and the Question of Censorship | Aarti Sethi 308 Introduction 309 Speech and the ‘Lesser Harm’ Hypothesis 310 Freedom of Expression and the Search for Truth 310 Freedom of Speech and its Relation to Self-government 312 Free Speech and Tolerance 313 The Autonomy Defence of Free Speech 314 What Do We Do with Hate Speech? 315 Conclusion 318 Points for Discussion 319 The Editors and the Contributors 320 Index 322 Bhargava~00_Prelims.indd x 4/30/2008 11:01:04 AM Process Black  Preface This introductory book is meant primarily to help Indian students learn to do and evolve an Indian political theory. This is a bold and somewhat controversial objective and requires elaboration. Indian universities tend generally to be lukewarm to social and political philosophy, partly because of a lack of interest in normative issues but also because of certain features of mainstream, academic political philosophy. Notwithstanding the occasional universal content, the form of mainstream political philosophy (MPP) is largely parochial. MPP takes little inspiration from non-Western societies, makes hardly any references to their problems and takes scant notice of how cross-cultural issues acquire a distinct inflection in different cultures. Most of the examples discussed in MPP have no immediate relation to these societies. Besides, there are few non- Western philosophers who could be role models for an Indian student. These difficulties are compounded by the unavailability of good political theory journals. No wonder that Indian academics evince disinterest in political philosophy and Indian students, though enthused by political philosophy, do not display self-confidence or competence at it. How do we transform this condition? Do we need and can we evolve an Indian political theory? Allow me to clarify straightaway that by Indian political theory I do not mean a theory born out of and reflecting the ‘genius’ of Indians, or something uniquely Indian. Neither the editors nor any of the contributors to this volume believe in this kind of political theory. We do believe, however, that if we are engaged in our social and political practices and are pro- perly concerned about issues that grow out of them, if we reflect on them and if creatively use the multiple traditions of theorizing regardless of where they are born, then something like an Indian political theory, a political theory with a distinctive contextual flavour, is bound to emerge. The difference between this political theory and political theory in other parts of the world, particularly in Europe and in the United States, may be tiny. But since the devil is in the small detail, these little differences are bound to make a big difference to how our own political theory is shaped. A bit of personal history might help illustrate and extend my point further. I have taught political theory for 25 years. If I draw from this experience, I may divide this period into two phases. In the first phase, say between 1979 and 1989, political theorists were generally Bhargava~00_Prelims.indd xi 4/30/2008 11:01:04 AM Process Black  xii PREFACE obsessed with reading and thinking about Western texts.We were commentators, at best, analysts of texts that make up the canon of Western political philosophy or that emerge out of the context of Western societies. In this period, I frequently heard a complaint from some of my own students and several colleagues: what is the applicability or relevance of political theory? I used to find this refrain odd, tiresome and, frankly, very irritating. It was particularly frustrating to find a change in the attitude of good students. Several of them who glowed with enthusiasm in their class and took optional courses in political theory in their MA began to show indifference or impatience when they moved up to do their M.Phil. Never failing to mention how much they enjoyed our classes, they shied away from doing political theory. An unbridgeable gap opened up between us as two camps were forged, one for political theory and the other against it. But with hindsight, I feel that this division grew from a collective inability to understand the complex nature and function of political theory. Neither camp really properly dis- tinguished two different questions: (a) What is the relevance of political theory? (b) what is the relevance of the kind of political theory that then occupies many of us? The fact is that a general scepticism about political theory must be kept entirely separate from the more specific scepticism directed against particular kinds of political theorizing. The pro- political theory camp should have realized that they ended up defending not only the more worthwhile and relevant forms of political theory but also its considerably less-significant variants. The anti-political theory camp made the same mistake and quite sweepingly attacked not merely the largely indefensible versions but even their indispensable cousins. What was the point of endlessly explicating what this or that Western thinker said or meant? No doubt, this is a small component of studying and teaching political theory, but is this all there is to this important human practice? Even if we were interested only in normative issues, why could we have not turned to a sustained defence of democracy, of the autonomy of institutions, of what it means to have a committed judiciary or bureaucracy? Why were we not able to properly distinguish an honourable religious sensibility from an ignoble communal assertion? Why were we unable to distinguish different forms of equality or justifiable inequalities from those which were morally illegitimate? Why had we not constructed a proper moral argument in favour of affirmative action or minority rights? Why were only platitudes on secularism available to us? Why had we forgotten the moral worth of many of our constitutional provisions? By the end of the1980s, the climate, I am pleased to report, began to change and by the early 1990s, in what from a purely personal point of view is the second phase, several of us were beginning to get an idea of what kind of political theory is necessary and relevant to our context. In short, a new kind of political theory was taking birth. This textbook is written in this period of transition, in a phase when the world of a purely Western-oriented political theory is dying and a new political theory rooted in our own world is emerging. This textbook would never have seen the light of day had I not moved to the University of Delhi (DU). In Jawaharlal Nehru University ( JNU), somehow its need was never felt as acutely. In DU, it was experienced instantly and with lightning urgency. So, when Kamini Mahadevan, the ever patient commissioning editor of Pearson Education approached me Bhargava~00_Prelims.indd xii 4/30/2008 11:01:04 AM Process Black  PREFACE xiii with a proposal to write a textbook, I jumped at what I thought was a terrific idea. Alas, I also knew that I did not have the time to do so. I first proposed that we should get some- one to tape classroom lectures. This did not happen. Instead, we agreed to give a small remuneration to a group of students who were to take down notes with the unambiguous objective of seeing their handiwork transformed into a textbook. The result, I must confess, was pretty disastrous, though I would never know whether it was due to the poor quality of my teaching or the even poorer note-taking ability of students. It took just three classes for me to realize that my original proposal was unworkable. I then suggested that we have other editors—Ashok Acharya, who agreed, and Nivedita Menon, who tried hard to find time for the work it entailed but could not—and put together a team of contributors. The two criteria of inclusion were (a) they should have fresh experience of teaching particularly in an undergraduate college, which effectively meant that they should be from the University of Delhi; and (b) that they should work in a democratic spirit as a team loosely knit together by the unity of the purpose outlined above. No specific guidelines were given by the editors to the contributors. The only relevant instruction was that all must adopt the point of view of a good teacher. Good teachers enable students to enter the conceptual world of the text, to see the point of view of its author, and provide the broader context within which it is written. They are able to draw students into the loop of the argument, where there is one, and to help understand an issue from the inside of both its defenders as well as its opponents. Good teachers must connect well with students, something assisted by a conversational style, though one that is not entirely informal. They do so by a rich use of examples from their own context. Given this simple but clear understanding of good teaching and despite the knowledge of an unbridgeable gap that stretches between the written and oral text, our attempt was to try and replicate face-to-face teaching in the textbook. Other qualities of good teachers were also kept in mind. For instance, though they never cease to be political, they are always careful not to be over-ideological. This is particularly important in the case of political theory. Indeed, it is important that teachers not wear their politics on the sleeve, if only on grounds of prudence. No one in the class must feel that the teacher has erected such an ideological wall in the course of teaching that it cannot be breached. But what if students themselves create such a wall? To my mind, the tone, demeanour and stance of the teacher, indeed his entire manner of teaching should be such that it enables students to themselves break it. Teachers must create an open space not only between themselves and the students but also amongst students so that every viewpoint can be articulated, discussed, debated, and collectively deliberated. An over-ideologically charged teacher may temporarily carry some students along, may even convert a few, but would eventually fail because of an unwillingness to create an open space for conversation. This textbook marks an attempt to re-create this flavour of the classroom—an open space for conversation and argument—inside its covers. In the last instance, though, this book is driven by one unflappable motivation: to make available to good students the textbook they deserve. These books must not only be accessible but also be something to which a student can easily relate. We realize that Bhargava~00_Prelims.indd xiii 4/30/2008 11:01:04 AM Process Black  xiv PREFACE we may not succeed in stopping every single student from relying on kunjis but we hope that a majority of them would not lean only on them. We are guided by the belief that the eventual purpose of the text is to contribute in a small way to help each student to do a bit of political theorizing on her/his own. Political theory is increasingly becoming inter-disciplinary. It is, therefore, our hope that this book will be read not only by students and, I dare say, teachers of political science, but also historians, sociologists, anthropologists, economists, even natural scientists—anyone interested in socio-political concepts, arguments and perspectives. This book is dedicated to all the students from whom the editors and contributors have learnt during the course of their teaching. Rajeev Bhargava Bhargava~00_Prelims.indd xiv 4/30/2008 11:01:04 AM Process Black  PART I What Is Political Theory and Why Do We Need It? Bhargava~01_Chapter_01.indd 1 3/29/2008 11:02:21 AM Process Black  C H A P T E R 1 What Is Political Theory? Rajeev Bhargava CHAPTER OUTLINE Introduction 3 What Is Theory? 5 The Distinctiveness of Theory 8 Cosmologies and Common Sense 12 What Is Political? 14 Points for Discussion 16 Bhargava~01_Chapter_01.indd 2 3/29/2008 11:02:28 AM Process Black  WHAT IS POLITICAL THEORY? 3 INTRODUCTION A cursory glance at the newspaper brings us face-to-face with dozens of political issues. The Supreme Court pronounces that there should be no reservations in private colleges, university students demonstrate against the government to demand the proper implementation of the Rural Employment Guarantee Act (REGA), women’s organizations complain bitterly about the unequal treatment of women and girls in our society, trade- union leaders condemn police brutality against workers, animal-right activists demand better protection for endangered species of tigers, the prime minister apologizes to the Sikh community for moral indifference and neglect by the Congress Government at the time of the 1984 massacre of Sikhs, the government gives up the sale of public sector units (PSUs), the Rajya Sabha passes a bill to grant Hindu women an equal right in ancestral property, the chief minister of Gujarat insists that Gujarati identity and pride is wounded by opponents of the Sardar Sarovar project. What in your opinion makes all these issues political? Do all these issues have some one thing in common which defines them as political? Consider the examples that refer to reservations, REGA, the massacre of Sikhs, equal rights to women in ancestral property and the sale of PSUs. All these refer to some institution of the state: the judiciary, the gov- ernment, the legislature, the office of the prime minister. They also refer to the decision- making power of these institutions. Does it follow that the term ‘political’ refers to any public agency with the power or authority to take decisions? Notice, too, that all these decisions possess the potential to have an impact on almost every member of the society in question. Even when a particular decision appears to target a specific group, it relates to and has an impact on other groups. Does the term ‘political’ then refer to the common power to take decisions about the common life of a society? It would be a mistake to confine this term only to this common power of state institutions. Consider once again the example of women’s organizations protesting against the exclusion or unequal treatment of women. On the understanding of ‘political’ arrived thus far, this action of a group of women is not political. Why so? Because women’s organizations are clearly not part of the state. But, surely, on any intuitive understanding of a political act, such a protest by a women’s group is political. If so, this must compel us to change or broaden our understanding of the term ‘political’. This protest is political not merely because it is a collective act by a group against some continuing social practice or an earlier decision of the government but also because the very object of this protest, namely the unequal treatment of women, is part of what we understand by the term ‘political’. And why is this so? Because to treat women unequally is to exercise power over them—men make women do things which, left to themselves, they may not do. This exercise of power is also part of what we mean by ‘political’. Bhargava~01_Chapter_01.indd 3 3/29/2008 11:02:28 AM Process Black  4 POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION A closer look at most of the examples points to another feature of the political. The pol- itical is that domain or dimension of our collective life where we fight for our interests, make claims (including moral claims) on each other, where important and urgent issues are contested. But demands, claims, protests and complaints cannot but generate conflict. The political, it appears, is inherently conflictual. Finally, we might look at the political in a still different sense. Implicit in almost every example is a vision of a future world, one where all are equal, or where even animals are treated with some respect, or where force is replaced by deliberation and so on. The political, then, is also where new worlds are imagined. Clearly, the term ‘political’ has no fixed or unique meaning. It has multiple, though related meanings. One objective of these introductory chapters is to enhance our understanding of the political and to draw the attention of the reader to its multiple meanings. Our second task is to understand what we mean by the term ‘theory’. Though not easy, it is important that this be done so that eventually we can put the terms ‘political’ and ‘theory’ together and have a better grasp over what is meant by political theory. Consider once again the examples in the first paragraph. Many of us have an opinion on most of these issues. Some of us are interested in seeking an explanation of the actions of the police, the Supreme Court and the government. Are there any motives behind the actions of these agencies? Do their actions serve the interest of the entire community or the narrow interests of a class or perhaps a tiny political elite? For instance, some might argue that the issue of a ‘Gujarati’ identity is used to further the interests of rich peasants. Others may claim that identity is a non-issue, that the real motive underlying every public action is class interest. The academically minded amongst us may claim that there exist structural reasons underlying these actions. For example, the slow implementation of REGA might be due to systemic institutional biases hidden from the consciousness of power wielders. Is doing political theory the same, then, as explaining an act, practice, event or process? This does not appear to be so. Although explaining is part of political theory, surely, it is not the whole of it. And this, for two different reasons. First, because an explanatory statement does not on its own constitute a theory. If I say that I fell down because I stumbled unknowingly upon a stone, I have offered an explanation of why I fell down, but have I offered a theory of what has happened? Or, if I said that the United States has invaded Iraq in order to have easy access to oil, I would have offered some explanation of why the United States government acted the way it did. But is this the same as articulating a theory of it? No. Why so? Second, although explaining may be part of theorizing, it is not the whole of it. There are other functions of theory. For example, theories offer justifications of actions. Take the examples of the first paragraph again. Some of us might silently condemn equal rights to women in ancestral property or justify police brutality. Others may disagree. They might denounce police action as violative of the most basic human rights or rejoice that equality now covers an important gender issue that had hitherto been neglected. These justificatory statements do not constitute theory but they may be its crucial components. Moreover, in denouncing police action, we are necessarily evaluating it negatively. All justifications presuppose evaluation. Behind these evaluative judgments are deeper issues. Bhargava~01_Chapter_01.indd 4 3/29/2008 11:02:28 AM Process Black  WHAT IS POLITICAL THEORY? 5 Why should women and men be treated as equals? What is the appropriate response of the government to mass-killings? What is the connection between ensuring employment to everyone and social justice? What is the proper function of the police in a modern democratic state? Workers are beaten up, apparently for disobeying the state? But why should we obey the state at all? Why should we be law-abiding citizens? Similarly, we might ask; why should tigers who sometimes turn man-eaters still be protected? Such questions have to do with right and wrong, good and bad, in short, with ethics and morality, with the normative. Admittedly, answers to these questions may not on their own constitute theory, but what additional features are necessary for them to be deemed theoretical? As theory, political theory must share features with theories of other phenomenon. It may even have some features in common with theories of the physical or the biological world. However, by virtue of being political theory, it must possess characteristics that are distinctive. Some of these distinctive features separate it from theories of nature but not from theories pertaining to human affairs more generally. But its truly distinctive features must flow from its focus on the political. In what follows, therefore, we outline the more general features of any theory and in particular elucidate features of a theory of human condition and action. In order to do so, we relate theory to and differentiate it from other forms of systematic reflections such as art, literature and religious worldviews. Finally, we ask the question what is political and outline the specific features of political theory. WHAT IS THEORY? Humans as Concept-bearing Animals Let us begin with some truisms. No one denies that we are physical creatures, part of the physical universe and subject to the same laws as any physical object. Nor will anyone deny that unlike purely physical objects, but like other biological creatures, we are sentient creatures: we breathe, we eat, we grow and have sensory experiences. However, what dis- tinguishes us from most, though not all, biological creatures, is that we are concept- bearing animals. As conceptual creatures, we are born in a world that is already arranged thoughtfully in particular ways. Consider the following. A child is told to sit on a chair. From a purely physical point of view, chairs are just wood, nothing else. But it would be odd to tell the child to sit on a piece of wood. What we wish to convey to the child is that a particular piece of wood when crafted in a particular manner serves a particular purpose, that it is something on which we sit or with which we can do certain things such as eating, reading, writing, talking and so on. It is these purposes that we wish to convey to the child, purposes which would not exist unless conceptually formulated. This is true not only of objects—such as chairs, tables, blackboards, chalk, the classroom in the school building— but also of human beings themselves. A student interacts with the person standing in front of the blackboard and talks to her not as if she is any odd person but as one who is there Bhargava~01_Chapter_01.indd 5 3/29/2008 11:02:28 AM Process Black  6 POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION to perform a certain role, that of a teacher. Once again, no teaching is possible unless all of us already have a rough idea of the social role of students and teachers. The same is true of bus conductors, drivers, ticket inspectors, shopkeepers, government officials and so on. A society cannot function without these elementary understandings and so every child is initiated into the social world by an informal instruction in these concepts. Unlike the purely physical, chemical or the biological world, the human world is conceptual through and through. Plants and most lower order animals live in this world and sense it, but by virtue of living the world through concepts, humans do not merely have sensory experience. Because their experience is mediated by images, concepts and representations, we might say that human experience is always thoughtful. Humans do not merely live but have a thoughtful experience of living—what we might call lived experience. Concepts Embedded in Practices As hinted above, most concepts that we use in everyday living are not formally learnt in the classroom but are acquired by participating in various practices. Since we use concepts, we may liken them to tools but this should not lead us to think that we have mental boxes in our head from which we pick them out as and when we need them. Much of our conceptual understanding is available to us as a practical skill or is directly embedded in practices. We are not even aware most of the time that we possess this skill or understanding. This may appear implausible to you at first. But really, the matter is quite simple. Several activities you do routinely are not thoughtless but are mostly absent in the stream of your consciousness. (How many times do you really interrupt the flow of your activity and think?) You just do them without explicitly thinking about them, just as the bus driver changes gears without first asking himself whether or not he should. You see the object in front of you as a table or a book and you understand that what you are doing is sitting at the table and reading. When we see a person entering the poll booth and approaching the ballot box, we understand that he is voting. This understanding is direct and practical, not inferred from something that first takes place in your consciousness. It is usually the same with people and social rela- tionships. We might call this an embedded understanding of things, practices, people and relationships. Human Expressions All humans have the ability not only to have thoughtful experiences but to express these thoughts in different media. A child experiences a piece of wood as a chair or a table but she may express this experience in a drawing, by representing these objects on paper. An actor, a mime artist or a dancer may use her body to say the same thing. A photographer may use the camera for the same purpose. There are multiple ways of expressing an experience, some word-dependent and others not. Besides, we may express this experience in words Bhargava~01_Chapter_01.indd 6 3/29/2008 11:02:28 AM Process Black  WHAT IS POLITICAL THEORY? 7 to other people: ‘Hey! I see a table there.’ Or I may express it to myself, privately, ‘That’s a table, isn’t it?’. So, some of these expressions are in the outer world, in public spaces and some may occur inside, privately as ideas in our heads. These private expressions may be called subjective reflections, a kind of mirroring of the world in our own heads. Ad hoc and Systematic Reflections All expressions, including subjective reflections, may occur randomly, on the spur of the mo- ment or be arranged systematically. All of us, from time-to-time have spontaneous and random reflections. The chalk with which I unthinkingly and effortlessly write on the black- board keeps crumbling one day. When that happens, I may interrupt the flow of my action, examine the chalk and ask if I could not have a chalk of better quality. I have an embedded understanding of what a chalk is and practical knowledge of what is to be done with it; but confronted with a piece of chalk literally melting in my fingers into dust, I may think to myself, just what it is made of, whether it really is what it is meant to be. ‘Is this really a piece of chalk?’ Such, random thoughts may occur and then disappear for no ostensible reason, but they arise invariably when there is an unexpected interruption of my activities, when I am faced, for example, with a problem. Word-dependent and Word-independent Reflections Suppose then, that I don’t let this thought disappear: I engage with it, indeed pursue it obsessively. Suppose that I now examine not merely the chalk in hand but the entire box, indeed not just one but all the boxes bought by the department of my college, and arrive at the conclusion that the entire lot is defective. I identify the manufacturer and begin to look at the quality of other lots used elsewhere. Quite obviously, I have begun a kind of sustained and systematic empirical enquiry. When I write a report on chalk produced by the manufacturer, it becomes an expression of systematic reflection on an issue selected for sharper focus. A report is systematic and word-dependent. But humans have the ability to systematically reflect and express themselves in a variety of non-linguistic media. Systematic expressions and reflections on the world and on ourselves are also found in music, sculpture, painting, dance, pottery, architecture and so on. A filmmaker or a painter may reflect on the human condition, on a social environment, on the problems of a society in transition, on the predicaments of modernity or on the futility of war but without deploying words to convey their meaning. Have you seen the paintings in Ajanta caves? Or Madhubani and Worli paintings? Or a replica of the Spanish painter Pablo Picasso’s Guernica? Many of you may have heard Amir Khan’s rendering of Bhairavi or Kumar Gandharva’s rendering of Bhim Palasi. These, too, are systematic reflections. Other forms of systematic reflections use language but in interestingly different ways. Bhargava~01_Chapter_01.indd 7 3/29/2008 11:02:29 AM Process Black  8 POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION Varieties of Word-dependent Reflections Word or language-dependent systematic expressions or reflections can also be accomplished in multiple modes, in interestingly different ways. The essay is one form; a written dialogue is another, poetry is yet another. Newspaper articles, a mixture of short description and analysis, provide another form. A record of one’s experience in a village, the ethnography of a good anthropologist is a systematic expression of collective lived experiences. Folk tales, moral fables, myths and legends, epic poetry, short stories and novels are all systematic reflections. What has all this got to do with theory? I propose that theory, too, be seen as a particular form of language-dependent systematic expression different from, but related to, other forms of systematic reflections on the world. Like other expressions, a theory articulates in a particular medium a conceptual world lived practically by a specific set of human agents. Moreover, it does so in its own distinctive way. What marks a theory out from other language-dependent systematic expressions? I propose that there are six such features, four of which it necessarily shares with philosophy and two that are specific to it. THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF THEORY The first feature is an almost obsessive and self-conscious concern with the internal structure of concepts, with how concepts relate to one another and come in clusters, and how in turn, they mark their own boundaries. A philosopher or a theorist—for my purpose I will often use these terms interchangeably—focuses on the meaning of words, on the different ways in which the words are used so that she can eventually answer questions, such as ‘what is justice?’ What is the meaning of the phrase ‘social revolution’ and how is it different from ‘social reform’ or ‘social engineering?’ What is the core idea of freedom, if there is one? What are the different interpretations of this core idea? What is the relationship between freedom and equality? And, between freedom, equality, and justice? What distinguishes power from influence, force, violence or persuasion? In ordinary life we use words more or less unself-consciously and we are not normally compelled to ask such questions. But philosophers must raise these questions and understand them in a particular way. When asked what ‘Time’ is, we don’t expect philosophers to look at their watches and tell us the precise time of the day. Philosophers are expected to convey to us what the meaning of time is and what it is for us to live in time. Likewise, if a philosopher is asked a question about basic needs, he is not expected to supply us with a list of our most urgent desires but rather to make us understand how needs are different from ordinary desires and what the distinction is between our most inescapable and significant needs and others that at least temporarily we may live without. As long as our purpose is served, we don’t ordinarily care whether a word is used literally or metaphorically, or both. Poets, novelists, essayists use words self-consciously and with extreme care, but it is not their business to elucidate why they have chosen to use this ra- ther than some other word or to make explicit connections between different concepts. Bhargava~01_Chapter_01.indd 8 3/29/2008 11:02:29 AM Process Black  WHAT IS POLITICAL THEORY? 9 The job of a philosopher and insofar as philosophy is part of theory, the job of a theorist is to accomplish precisely this. A full-blooded sensitivity to the entire web of concepts and a commitment to its articulation is the first feature of theory. Let me illustrate this further with an example. Suppose that someone gives a call for freedom: ‘We should all be free’. What are people to make of this call? For a start they must understand what it means to be free. Once they have understood the meaning, or rather, the different meanings of freedom, they may ask why they should be free or at least why they should be free in this rather than in some other sense. To be free of, or from, something is to get rid of it. What you wish to get rid of must be something that you evaluate negatively. In the literature on freedom such things that you wish to get rid of are usually called con- straints. So, to be free is to be free from constraints. But what is the nature of these constraints? Surely, our ideas of freedom will depend upon our understanding of what these constraints are. Are these constraints purely physical? Take the paradigmatic example of freedom: a man is in chains. Get rid of the chains and he is free. The same is true of birds in a cage. The cage imprisons, restricting the flight of the bird, that which it is most prone to doing and is its nature. To set the bird free is to get rid of the cage. In the same way prisoners are set free when they are released. Have you noticed that our notion of constraint may already have changed with this last example? For at issue here is not merely the idea of physical but of legal constraints. A person may have been put behind bars because he has been caught stealing. He stole because he was physically free to steal and yet he was imprisoned because it is illegal to do so. Appropriating a thing that by law belongs to another is illegal and it is because of the presence of this legal constraint that the man was put in jail. To be free then is to be free not just from physical but from legal constraints. Is this all there is to freedom? Notice that both physical and legal constraints are external to the agent. Can a person be unfree not because of the presence of physical and legal constraints—there may be none—but by virtue of psychological barriers, obstructions that are present within his mental make-up. So, consider a slave who is set free and who is now pronounced as formally equal to his former master. Suppose that they both compete in an open exam, and while the former master always does well, the former slave simply cannot perform. Centuries of slavery have taken away from him the basic self-confidence required for a good performance. He is unable to achieve his objectives not because of physical or legal constraints but due to internal psychological ones. A conception of freedom in purely physical or legal terms is unable to capture the mechanism of unfreedom which is at work here. We can similarly talk about constraints which are neither purely external nor purely internal but a bit of both—I mean social constraints. A person is physically and legally free to enter the higher education system. He has done well in his school examinations, well enough to get a place in a decent college. But higher education is costly. There are no sub- sidies or scholarships. The person is confident that he would do well and he has every reason to feel so. And yet, he cannot get higher education. He is severely handicapped by his relative poverty which is a major socio-economic constraint on what he wishes to do. Implicit in this is a still different conception of freedom: freedom from not merely physical, legal and psychological but also socio-economic constraints. Bhargava~01_Chapter_01.indd 9 3/29/2008 11:02:29 AM Process Black  10 POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION Hitherto we have focused on constraints. However, our conception of freedom changes with our ideas about what we should do once freed from constraints. Some argue that it is enough that we are able to fulfil whatever we happen to currently desire. So, if I desire to smoke and no constraints exist to prevent me from doing so, then I am free. Others argue that by a focus on current unevaluated desires we misunderstand what is really at issue in discussions of freedom. Such people work with a less instrumentalist, more robust conception of reason and argue that one is free only when there is absence of constraints and a real opportunity to do what we evaluate to be good for us. On this view, if information that cigarettes are gravely injurious to health is available to us but we continue to both desire smoking and fulfil this desire, then we are not really being free. We are not free because we succumb to a habit or addiction, completely bypassing, ignoring or evading what our reason says is good for us. To fall prey to one’s current unevaluated desires, in this view, is to be in a state of unfreedom. Freedom is a condition of leading a life and of doing things that are evaluated to be good for us, to fulfil desires that are judged to be worth having in the first place. This view slowly leads to the idea that freedom is identical with self-realization. The detailed elaboration of different conceptions of freedom is one task of political theory. The other one is to reason why we should choose one rather than the other conception; why, if at all, one conception is better than others. This brings me to the second distinctive feature of theory or philosophy, i.e. that it is a rational enterprise, where the term rational is understood very broadly to mean that the conclusion arrived or hinted at has some discernable structure of reasons behind it. To say this is not to imply that philosophers or theorists do not rely on instincts, emotions, or flashes of insight. Nor does it mean that a philosophical or theoretical enquiry must pos- sess a definite argumentative structure of the kind made familiar by logicians, although some philosophies and theories may have some such pattern. However, it does mean that philosophers and theorists are not satisfied with bland assertions, the flat announcement of a claim or the presentation of a readymade proposal. When they make an assertion or proposal, they must state why they do so. In other words, they must give a reason. Indeed, they cannot be satisfied with providing one reason and stopping the process of questioning at this point. There can be a reason for a reason already supplied and a reason for the rea- son for the initial reason. In other words, whether stated explicitly or not there is a chain of reasons that is discernable in a theoretical or philosophical work. Does this mean that we can reach the final reason, a reason beyond which there is no reason—the foundation of all reasons? Some philosophers appear to be obsessed with this idea of ultimate cause or justification of an event or act. But I doubt if we humans can ever get to the bottom of all things. Take the example of scientific theories. Suppose that it is claimed that water is a com- pound. This must be backed by some evidence demonstrating that it is composed of two elements: hydrogen and oxygen, and that this composition is not a mere mixture of features of both but rather a new substance with features of its own. Furthermore, this evidence must itself be supported by more general claims about the mechanism by which such a process takes place. Similarly, suppose that it is proposed that all children must Bhargava~01_Chapter_01.indd 10 3/29/2008 11:02:29 AM Process Black  WHAT IS POLITICAL THEORY? 11 be provided elementary education, and suppose in answer to the question ‘Why?’ it is asserted that education is a fundamental right, then it must also be argued that at least in modern times there is a connection between education, employment, and a life of dignity and, further, that a dignified life is a crucial component of human well-being and so on. This rational structure of theories, their internal requirement that they persistently ask for reasons makes them, albeit with some qualifications, subversive—with the potential to transform societies. The rational component of theory also illuminates another of its important features, namely, its aspiration to truth and objectivity. This claim must be made very cautiously but clearly. The truths that theories, particularly social and political theories, aspire to are not valid for all times and all places. The truth of most theories is context-dependent and therefore limited to specific times and places. Only the very exceptional theories have a reach that cuts across time and space. Nor is this very achievable but limited truth in any way final. We must rid ourselves of the illusion that like God, we humans can stand outside all perspectives and attain God-like objectivity or an eternal truth of the matter. The truth that we achieve is dependent on the collective reasoning of human beings and even if all rational persons can agree at any given point of time that they have arrived at the truth of a certain matter, new information or a flaw in an argument detected much later by other reasonable beings can force us to revise our earlier truth-claims. Human knowledge can neither altogether escape subjective viewpoints nor be imprisoned within the subjective biases of wealthy classes, powerful political blocs or even intellectuals. Such views may pass off as knowledge for sometime but sooner or later their limitations are bound to come to light. We might, then, arrive at some acceptable version that can be rightfully claimed as the truth of the matter, an achievement not possible without the use of reason, although reason alone cannot help us attain it. A fourth feature of philosophy/theory is that it is committed to unearthing the background assumptions and presuppositions of our statements, beliefs, actions and practices. For ex- ample, the force of gravity is presupposed by all our situated action. We don’t always articulate this nor are many of us aware that this is so. Yet, without the force of gravity, embodied persons cannot exist on this earth. Similarly, when we set out to attend a class we make many assumptions which remain in the background, as part of our pre-reflective understanding. For example, the classroom is exactly where we left it on the previous day, that the teacher would arrive to take the class, that at least some other students would be present, that the teacher will give the lecture in a language that we speak or understand and so on. All of us exist, think and act with these assumptions and presuppositions but do not always articulate them. To take another example, in 17th century England, politicians had begun to think and speak of politics without appeal to religious principles. But frequently, they did not acknowledge this. It was left to Hobbes to articulate these new background assumptions and to show that it was possible to conduct politics in a purely secular manner. Thus, within rea- sonable limits, philosophers and theorists are committed to articulating these background assumptions and presuppositions. Bhargava~01_Chapter_01.indd 11 3/29/2008 11:02:29 AM Process Black  12 POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION The fifth feature of theory—and here philosophy and theory may begin to diverge—is this. A theory aspires to some degree of generality and abstraction. It does so because it aims to cover a wide variety of related but disparate phenomena. This does not mean that all theories must be universal in scope. But it does mean that a theory cannot deal only with a concrete particular, something in the singular. Thus, we have a theory of motion that applies equally to planets as it does to rolling stones. Such a theory has a very high degree of generality appropriate to the object of its study. There cannot be a theory exclusively for rolling stones. Likewise, we could have a descriptive study of Indian nationalism or an empirical study of the causes of Indian nationalism. But, it is unlikely that we will have a theory of nationalism that applies to India and to India alone. Finally, a sixth feature of theories, one that is a product of modern conditions and has emerged more particularly with the birth of modern science, has to be mentioned. Modern theories cannot be purely speculative and must pass through and then transcend the empirical world. They cannot bypass the empirical world altogether. This feature is related to the point mentioned above. The data collected by the sciences, the collective lived ex- periences of a people captured in the work of insightful observers, socially engaged thinkers or consummate social scientists cannot be ignored by theorists. These general and intercon- nected reflections must take into account all of these. For this very reason a theory must be simultaneously rooted in and transcend the lived experience of a people, the collective prac- tices of a society, and the embedded understandings and common sense of a community. There is no theory if there is mere description of lived experience and common sense, but we have theory only in name if theoretical propositions are altogether disconnected from experience, practices and the data collected by sound empirical enquiries. Let me sum up. A theory is a form of systematic reflection with six features. (a) Con- ceptual sensitivity, (b) rational structure, (c) aspiration for a humanly achievable truth and objectivity, (d ) generality, (e) an explicit mandate to unearth assumptions and presup- positions, and ( f ) strong non-speculative intent—the need not to bypass results of micro- enquiries into the particular. It is not identical to any one feature but must possess all six. Thus, a theory must be distinct from ad hoc reflections, speculation, empirical enquiry into the particular, rich insights, imaginative but fictive prose and other related narratives. It must also be distinguished from ideology, worldview and cosmology—a point that will emerge more clearly below. A rare specimen of theory may be universalist or reach the foundation, but on the whole, the constitutive features of a theory do not include a com- mitment to foundationalism or universalism. COSMOLOGIES AND COMMON SENSE I have used the terms ‘embedded understandings’ and ‘common sense’ above. Let me re- mind the reader what I mean by them. I made a distinction between conceptually organized lived experience and reflection on that experience. This distinction presupposes that though conceptual, lived experience may not be present in our consciousness. We may use our concepts in practice but be unable to speak about them, quite like a skilful cook who can Bhargava~01_Chapter_01.indd 12 3/29/2008 11:02:29 AM Process Black  WHAT IS POLITICAL THEORY? 13 make delectable dishes without quite being able to tell us how. (Conversely, the possession of a good recipe book is not sufficient to make a good cook.) By embedded understanding, I mean, this practical knowledge that remains pre-reflective and inarticulate. It is an under- standing we acquire by being initiated into the practices of a society. The term ‘commonsense’ is broader and covers embedded understanding but also, at the very least, our spontan- eous and ad hoc reflections, including reflections that are closely aligned to our practices, which might be called practical reflections. It usually also includes stories, epics, folk tales, legends, myths that have been passed on from one generation to another and with the help of which we make sense of and evaluate the entire universe. Such nearly systematic but non-theoretical reflections which knit together in a seamless web the physical, biological, social, mental and spiritual worlds may be called cosmologies. Cosmologies frequently in- form and become part of a society’s common sense. If this is true of the relationship between cosmologies and common sense, can it also be true of the relationship between theories and commonsense? Can theories shape and inform our common sense? Though they can do so (indeed, good theories must aspire to do so), the two remain and perhaps must remain distinct entities. The common sense of a society is the collective possession of an entire people. A theory is a specialized activity or product dependent on and generated by specific skills. Does this mean that theorizing is an elite activity from which the common man will remain forever estranged? I don’t think so. First, distance does not mean estrangement. Many cricket lovers in India have never played cricket. Some do play it but quite badly. Still others play well but are not exceptional.But all of them can love or admire the skills of a Sachin Tendulkar or Azharuddin. In some ways they are distant from them but surely no one can claim that distance here necessarily means estrangement. Second, and more importantly, though the practice of theory involves skills, these can be acquired, in principle, by anyone who has some talent and a lot of op- portunity and commitment. Just as cricket is not the preserve of a special class or caste of people, so also theory is not the monopoly of a particular kind of people.To think so is to be committed to a deplorable and outdated form of casteist Brahminism.We must avoid both the view that theory is the monopoly of the special, naturally talented or genetically endowed group and the claim that it is available effortlessly to the masses.To the objection that there is a sense in which everyone is a philosopher or a theorist, an appropriate response is to draw the distinction between having a philosophy/theory and doing it. Though all of us have a philosophy, we do not all do philosophy. Everyone may have a systematic world- view, a theory of the world, a philosophy, but it does not follow that all these are the result of his or her own theorizing philosophizing. The emphasis on the distance between theory/philosophy and common sense as also between theory and practice should not be misunderstood or exaggerated. As I pointed out earlier, there is also a close relationship between theory and common sense and between theory and practice. As we will see in Chapter 2, the most fundamental questions asked by philosophers are the same to which answers are implicit in our practice and in common sense. A philosophy of the human world articulates what is already implicit in human practice. In this sense and unlike what many believe, philosophy is down-to-earth. Yet, it Bhargava~01_Chapter_01.indd 13 3/29/2008 11:02:29 AM Process Black  14 POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION is also up there. It takes flight and is up there because like other systematic reflections— and this close relationship between theory and the arts is equally worth emphasizing—it frequently tries to do more than merely describe human practice. It also attempts to explain and justify it in general terms and less directly to endorse, modify or change it. WHAT IS POLITICAL? The term ‘political’ has multiple meanings. The first goes back to classical Greece and is derived from the word ‘polis’ which literally means the city, but is better, more properly understood as a place with a common world or even more simply, a community. ‘Pol- itical’, then, pertains to whatever is done within or by the community. More specifically, it refers to decision making within and about the community. Decision making itself has a specific connotation. To be political, to live in the polis, as Hannah Arendt tells us, means that everything is to be decided through words and persuasion and not through force and violence. The term ‘political’ then points to a specific mode of decision making—by words, not force. However, the term ‘political’ also refers simultaneously to what decisions are about. When we use the term ‘political’ in this first sense, we speak not merely about life but necessarily about the good life of a community. Thus, we may ask, given that we live by a certain conception of the good life, who is to be a member of the community and why, who is to rule, i.e. take fundamental decisions about the community and for what reasons, how resources are to be distributed, to whom and why. In this conception, as we can see, the empirical and the normative are completely intermeshed. Nor has the distinction emerged in this context between political and social spheres. Nothing that we now consider to be merely social, i.e. falling between the public-political and the private-household is outside the political. On this classical view then, there is no distinction between social and political theory. Political theory is about how and with what justification decisions are made con- cerning the good life in a community. Over a period of time and particularly with the advent of modernity, the meaning of the term ‘political’ appears to have changed. To understand this change let us go back to what I said above. In classical Greece, the term ‘political’ had to do with fundamental decision making about the affairs of the community. To make decisions, however, one must first have the power to do so. If the entire community is involved in decision making, then decision making presupposes the collective power of the entire community. The term ‘political’ then may also refer to this collective power, to the use of this power to make decisions, and political science or philosophy may be viewed as the study of this collective power. How- ever, as is well known, even in Greek societies, decisions were not made by everybody. Power was not exercised by everyone. Slaves, women and aliens were excluded from the decision-making process. One might then say that decisions about the entire community were taken by some, only by excluding others from the processes within which they were made. Some people had the power to make decisions about everyone only on condition that they also exercised power over some others. Of course, this can be said only with hind- sight. People living at that time did not see their own condition as we now describe it. Bhargava~01_Chapter_01.indd 14 3/29/2008 11:02:29 AM Process Black  WHAT IS POLITICAL THEORY? 15 With the advent of modernity, this meaning of the term ‘power’ became far more explicit. Indeed, the classical meaning of power as the collective capacity to decide about the com- munity was almost completely obscured and replaced by the second meaning of power as the capacity of some people to act in a manner that thwarts the significant interest of others, that marginalizes and excludes them, so that they are left with no ability or capacity to take decisions about themselves or about the whole community. Power came simply to mean power over others. Correspondingly, the term ‘political’ refers to this power over others. Political science, then, came to mean an empirical enquiry into the exercise of this power. And political theory, the most general reflection on the processes, mechanisms, institutions, and practices by which some people are excluded by others from significant decision making. Yet another related meaning emerged under conditions of modernity when major sites of decision making were relatively separated from the rest of society and were concentrated in a specific set of institutions designated by the term ‘state’ (this is related to the point that a new concept of the social emerged which was distinguished from the political). If politics, considered as a comprehensive enquiry, is the study of decision-making power, then the birth of the modern state naturally implied that the major object of study of political science and political theory is the state. Indeed, the term political was itself identified with anything pertaining to the state rather than to the entire society. Political science and political theory studied the institutions of the state—the government, the judiciary, the bureaucracy, the military, the police and so on. Sociology and social theory, on the other hand, studied all those structures, processes and institutions that fell outside the state. Some people con- tinued to believe that a study of the state was the study of how power was exercised on behalf of and in the interest of all the individuals who make up a particular society. Others, cynical of this view, saw political science and political theory as the study of how these institutions take major decisions on behalf of a small elite or the dominant class to the ex- clusion of the interests of the subordinate classes or subaltern people. To summarize, the term ‘political’ has multiple meanings: (a) The collective power to take decisions about every aspect of the good life in the community. Notice that ‘political’ here refers both to power and to ethical values. (b) The power of some groups to control or subordinate others in order to realize not the good of the entire community but their own narrow interests. In short, to get others to do things that might go against their own interest. Here, the term ‘political’ is used to relate power and self-interest. It also refers to power embodied in a separate institutional apparatus, i.e. the state and, therefore, (c) to state power used to realize the common good/values, or (d) state power used to exercise dom- ination by one group over others. But how can (a) or (c) coexist with (b) or (d)? How can the entire community take decisions when a group excludes others from collective decision making? Well, in this case we might say that a split has occurred between the empirical and the normative. The subordinate group may be excluded from decision making but may have the desire to forge a new world where everybody is involved in taking decisions about shared interests and values. Then (a) and (c) become normative/ethical notions capturing something which is hitherto unrealized Bhargava~01_Chapter_01.indd 15 3/29/2008 11:02:29 AM Process Black  16 POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION or realized very marginally while (b) and (d) capture what really exists on the ground. A final meaning is related to but still different from how we have hitherto conceived (a). The reader may have noticed that so far (a) refers to the good life of the community, to values of specific communities. But what if we begin to use the term ‘political’ for values common to the entire humanity in abstraction from both power and specific communities? What if it refers to values common to all living species? Here, polis coincides with cosmopolis. So (a) splits into two and gives us a fifth meaning of the political. This meaning, (e), refers to values common to the entire humanity, even all living species. Recall that the political sphere may also include the art of imagining new values and devising new worlds. Therefore, (e) is maximally abstracted from really existing lives. Thus, today, we use the term ‘political’ in each of the five senses and as both an empirical and a normative concept. Political theory then is a particular form of word-dependent systematic reflection on any or all of the following: (a) the collective power to take decisions about the good life of a community, (b) the mechanisms by which power is exercised by one group over another, (c) the use of state power to achieve the good of the community, (d) the use of the state by one group to exercise power over another, and (e) on the values by which a particular community governs its life. Finally, ( f ) there can be a grand political theory that reflects on the general condition of the entire human kind or the values by which the entire humanity may govern its life. Points for Discussion 1. A child complains to his father that he has got fewer chocolates than his brother. Women’s organ- izations complain to the state that women are often given unequal pay for the same job. Are both these acts political? 2. Can you think of things in the world which are not ‘concept-bearing’? Is concept-bearing a unique feature of human beings? Can you think of worldviews which reject this idea? 3. Do you think that even in our ordinary life we are frequently engaged in explaining