State, Power and Conflict - Lecture 10 PDF

2. How did the concept of collective security di er from balance-of-power politics? Is the notion of collective security utopian? If not, how might collective security have worked better during the interwar period? 3. Was World War II inevitable? If so, why, and when? If not, when...

2. How did the concept of collective security di er from balance-of-power politics? Is the notion of collective security utopian? If not, how might collective security have worked better during the interwar period? 3. Was World War II inevitable? If so, why, and when? If not, when and how could it have been avoided? 4. To what extent can the outbreak of World War II be attributed to the personalities of the leaders involved? 5. What might be some lessons of the interwar period that might help policy makers avoid war today? 6. Was Japan irrational to attack the United States? Lecture 10: The Cold War and the Era of Decolonisation Nye & Welch (2013) Chapter 6: The Cold War Acharya & Buzan (2019) Chapter 5: The World after 1945: The Era of the Cold War and Decolonisation Identify the di erent phases of, and major developments during, the Cold War. Understand the logic of the 'balance of terror' (nuclear deterrence). Identify three rival explanations of the Cold War Understand the relation between US hegemony and the Cold War Class discussion: A New Cold War? THE COLD WAR (1945-1989) Start of the nuclear era Period of bipolarity —> USSR and US were the two main powers Coincides with a period of decolonization No direct confrontation ('hot war') between the US and the Soviet Union —> But there were proxy con icts! While the global order still revolved around a system of states, many of the institutions and structures from the previous era remained. CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES FROM THE PRE-1945 WORLD: The Second World War brought about several major changes to both the material and ideational aspects of GIS. The war resulted in a scale of destruction far surpassing that of the First World War and introduced nuclear weapons, which raised the stakes of warfare by making human extinction a tangible threat. The fear of war was a key continuity from the interwar period, but the Cold War largely transformed the structure of international relations. The Decline of Soviet In uence: In the political sector, the Soviet Union initially had considerable in uence, especially in the Third World, where its opposition to colonialism made it appealing. However, internal political struggles, such as the suppression of uprisings in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968), and the split with China, weakened its ideological appeal. By the late 1980s, the Soviet Union's stagnation in both economic and political terms was evident, and capitalism emerged as the dominant global ideology. Overall, the chapter captures the key themes of Cold War international relations, emphasizing the bipolar structure, the transformation in core–periphery relations due to decolonization, and the evolving dynamics between the superpowers and the newly independent Third World countries. A TRULY BIPOLAR WORLD? Western European powers + Japan still 'great' powers (although perhaps not 'super' powers). 136  ff fl fl ff fl  Germany + Japan started to rebuild their economies. Britain + France had nuclear weapons Rise of China Rise of the European Economic Community (EEC) The bipolar world order emerged quickly after 1945, dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union, the two superpowers that had emerged victorious from the war. The rivalry between liberal-democratic capitalism (led by the U.S.) and totalitarian communism (led by the Soviet Union) became the de ning ideological con ict of the era. These two superpowers amassed large nuclear arsenals, and their cease re lines in Europe and Asia marked the boundaries of the Cold War. Traditional great powers, such as Germany, Japan, and Britain, were diminished. Germany and Japan were occupied and subordinated, while Britain’s weakened economy and loss of its empire reduced it to a secondary power. DECOLONIZATION AND THE THIRD WORLD: The process of decolonization reshaped global politics by delegitimizing racism and colonialism as institutions. Over 100 newly sovereign countries from Africa and Asia joined the international system, tripling its membership and giving the previously marginalized periphery a political voice. While the world economy remained divided into core-periphery dynamics, the periphery now had political standing. This shift created a double divide in global politics: East–West (Cold War) and North–South (post-colonialism). The periphery's key theme in international relations from 1945 onward was decolonization. In the three decades following World War II, most of the colonial world gained political independence. Decolonization occurred through both violent and peaceful means, culminating by 1975 in the end of colonialism as a formal structure of unequal core-periphery relations. In the Arab world, nationalism became more militant, especially directed against Israel. In Asia, struggles for independence varied, with armed con icts in places like Indonesia and Vietnam, while other countries, like India, followed more diplomatic paths to freedom. Africa became the center of anti-colonial e orts after the war, with Ghana being the rst sub- Saharan country to gain independence in 1957. Nationalism, anti-colonialism, and regionalism often worked together in the decolonization process. While Western Europe embraced regionalism to prevent further wars, leaders in the Third World saw it as a way to advance independence and sovereignty. Various regional organizations, such as the League of Arab States (1945) and the Organization of African Unity (1963), were formed to promote these goals. At conferences like the Bandung Conference of 1955, Asian and African leaders advocated for decolonization and rejected colonialism, racism, and interventionism. Decolonization led to a signi cant shift in the global order, where the former colonies became known as the Third World. These newly independent states, though politically free, faced economic dependency on their former colonial powers. Their domestic politics were often unstable due to colonial-era borders, which didn’t consider ethnic or cultural divisions, and their economies remained underdeveloped and dependent. At the regional level, newly independent countries had to forge political and economic relationships with their neighbors. Often, colonial boundaries and unresolved political or cultural tensions complicated these e orts. For example, the Middle East and South Asia became con ict-ridden regional security complexes, with little economic cooperation among former colonies. On the global stage, the Third World sought to assert its voice through international organizations (IGOs) like the United Nations, using its numbers to in uence diplomacy. The Group of 77 (G77), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) were formed to challenge Western dominance in global economic and political institutions like the 137  fl fi fi ff ff fl fl fl fi fi  IMF and World Bank. However, institutions like the IMF often enforced structural adjustment programs that worsened conditions in many African nations. Although some Third World countries, like the Asian Tigers, managed to develop rapidly, most faced stalled development due to poor governance, internal con icts, and economic challenges. The Third World states were also at a disadvantage in global nance and trade, which were dominated by the North and powerful transnational corporations. Despite the gains in political sovereignty, many Third World countries struggled to achieve the economic development and modernization they had hoped for. SUPERPOWER INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD: The superpowers competed for in uence in the Third World, using it as a measure of their success in the ideological struggle. Simultaneously, Third World countries played the superpowers against each other to maximize their own leverage. China occupied a unique position, straddling both the East-West and North-South dynamics. Though a developing country, China acted more like a great power and became an independent pole in the geopolitical system. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY DYNAMICS OF BIPOLARITY: While the Soviet Union managed to achieve military parity with the U.S. by the 1970s, particularly in nuclear weapons, its economy was increasingly falling behind. The Soviet economic model, while initially promising in terms of growth and industrial output, failed to keep pace with Western capitalist innovation and consumer production. By the 1980s, the U.S. economy, along with the rising economies of Japan and Western Europe, far outpaced the Soviet Union, signaling the decline of the Soviet model. DIFFERENT PHASES OF THE COLD WAR 1. Prelude (1944-1947) 2. Start of the Cold War (1947-1949) —> was evident, the relationship couldn’t be saved 3. Height of the Cold War (1950-1963) 4. Rise and fall of détente (1963-1979) 5. Renewed Cold War and end (1979-1989) PRELUDE TO THE COLD WAR (1945-1947) Yalta and Potsdam conferences (1945) 'Little Boy' (detonated over Hiroshima, 6-8-1945) and 'Fat Man' (detonated over Nagasaki, 9-8-1945) Japan surrendered on 15-8-1945 (end of WWII in the Paci c). Us possession of the nuclear bomb caused a security dilemma for the Soviet Union. To what extent do the origins of the CW lie in the Russian Revolution? —> start of nuclear era The early Cold War (1945-1963) involved the gradual deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations. Six key issues contributed to this: Soviet actions in Poland, economic strains like the end of lend-lease, and the Americans’ growing realization of Soviet expansionist ambitions. Over time, U.S. policy shifted from cooperation to containment and deterrence, culminating in the full-blown Cold War. START OF THE COLD WAR (1947-1949) Key issues that contributed to the escalation of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, following World War II: 1. Germany and Reparations: At the Yalta Conference, the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed that Germany would pay $20 billion in reparations, with half going to the Soviet Union. However, details on how and when these 138  fl fi fi fl  payments would occur were not resolved. At the Potsdam Conference, the Soviets demanded their $10 billion share, but they wanted it from the western zones of Germany controlled by the U.S., Britain, and France. Harry Truman refused, arguing the Soviets should extract reparations from the eastern zone they occupied. This disagreement led to a growing divide over how to reconstruct Germany, eventually resulting in the creation of a separate currency in West Germany (the deutsche mark) and deeper Soviet control over East Germany. 2. East Asia and Japan: Although the Soviet Union declared war on Japan only in the nal week of the Paci c War, they seized Outer Manchuria, Sakhalin Island, and the Kuril Islands. At Potsdam, the Soviets requested an occupation zone in Japan, which Truman rejected, arguing that the Soviets joined the war too late to deserve one. The Soviets, meanwhile, saw this as hypocritical, especially since the Americans were demanding in uence in Eastern Europe, where Soviet troops were already stationed. 3. Atomic Bomb: The U.S. chose not to share the secret of the atomic bomb with the Soviets. Although Truman dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to quickly end the war with Japan, some revisionist historians argue it also had the e ect of demonstrating U.S. power to the Soviets. When Truman informed Stalin about the bomb at Potsdam, Stalin was unimpressed, though he was already aware of its existence due to Soviet espionage. Stalin rejected the Baruch Plan for international control of nuclear weapons, preferring to develop the Soviet atomic bomb, which succeeded in 1949. 4. Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East: Tensions arose in Iran, where the Soviets refused to withdraw troops after the war, prompting U.S. support for Iran in the United Nations. The Soviets eventually left, but bitterness remained. At the same time, the Soviets pressured Turkey, and communist forces were gaining ground in the Greek Civil War, further alarming the West and fueling fears of Soviet expansion. 5. Ideological Tensions and Containment: Fearing Soviet expansionism, the U.S. implemented a policy of containment. After Britain was too weak to maintain its in uence in the Eastern Mediterranean, the U.S. stepped in, with President Truman advocating for American assistance to Greece and Turkey to protect "free people." This shift in U.S. foreign policy was articulated in the Truman Doctrine. Though George Kennan criticized this moralistic and ideological framing, Truman believed it was necessary to rally domestic support for the new foreign policy direction. 6. Marshall Plan and Soviet Response: The Marshall Plan was introduced in 1947 to provide economic aid to Europe, but the Soviet Union saw it as a threat to their in uence in Eastern Europe and pressured countries like Czechoslovakia to reject U.S. aid. This solidi ed the divide between East and West, contributing to events like the Berlin Blockade and the creation of NATO in response to Soviet actions. 1947 Truman Doctrine!!!!! ('it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures’) —> he had to scare them —> Truman stressed about the collective security (if someone is being attacked, the alleys must answer too) Marshall Plan. 1948 Berlin blockade 1949: Creation of NATO Division of Germany (FRG and GDR) Soviet bomb Mao declares People's Republic of China Escalation and 1949 Shocks: 139  fl fl fl ff fi fi fi  Two major events in 1949—the successful Soviet atomic bomb test and the Communist takeover in China—caused panic in Washington. The Korean War in 1950 further heightened tensions, con rming Western fears of Soviet aggression and leading to a signi cant increase in U.S. defense spending. Stalin’s support for North Korea’s invasion of South Korea reinforced the belief that the Soviets were aggressively expanding communism, although the con ict in Korea arose more from local dynamics than direct Soviet intervention. HEIGHT OF THE COLD WAR (1950-1963) 1950-1953: Korean War —> north korean troops invaded South Korea, then provoking an USA’s reaction 1954: French defeat at Dien Bien Phu (Eisenhower's domino theory —> south Vietnam would fall in north Vietnam’s communism => if USA were not successful in defending their values, there would have been a strong communism rise that challenges their power) 1955: Creation of the Warsaw Pact (after West Germany joined NATO and could rearm militarily) 1956: - Crushing of the Hungarian Uprising —> violently repressed by the Soviet Union - Suez Crisis —> UN + USSR + USA had the same view; some says that is the end of Britain’s great era 1961 - Berlin Wall - failed landing operation (by USA) of Bay of Pigs invasion —> pushed Cuba even more towards communism (100km from Florida = massive threat) 1962 Cuban missile crisis CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS video YT John F Kennedy's response: a naval quarantine —> they only blocked military tools, not food, medicines, etc… Interested in learning more? Graham Allisson (1969) article 'Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.’ —> what were the chances of a war? People weren’t worried about it, but decades later they revealed that there was a high risk (they had a nuclear weapon) RISE AND FALL OF DÉTENTE (1963-1979) - 1964 Tonkin Resolution - 1968 Prague Spring —> more liberal, but then these reforms weren’t well received by Soviet Union’s leaders - 1970 Invasion of Cambodia, Paris Peace talks - 1972 Nixon visits China, SALT I —> Vietnamization of the vietnam war —> train them and give them equipment RENEWED COLD WAR AND END (1979-1989) 1979: Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 1980: Election of Ronald Reagan 1985: Gorbachev becomes General Secretary USSR 1986: Reykjavik summit 1987: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. 1988: USSR withdraws from Afghanistan 1989: Fall of the Berlin Wall 1991: START signed & dissolution Soviet Union DECLINE OF THE SOVIET UNION In this passage, the focus shifts to the decline of the Soviet Union and the contrasting strength of the United States in the latter part of the Cold War. By the 1970s, the Soviet Union's economic weakness was becoming apparent, undermining its claims to lead the future of modernity. Its invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 made it look like an imperialist power, tarnishing its image in the 140  fi      fi fl  Third World. Soviet society, apart from its achievements in sports and culture, seemed dull compared to the vibrant and consumer-oriented capitalist societies. In contrast, the United States emerged as a "full-spectrum superpower." It had a global military reach, as demonstrated in World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam, and through its network of bases and eets. Economically, the U.S. was the core of a global capitalist trading system, which included major economies and penetrated the Third World. Institutions like the OECD, GATT, and IMF formed a global economic framework that communist bloc countries excluded themselves from. By the 1980s, it was clear that the capitalist system, embraced even by China under Deng Xiaoping, was the future of modernity. While the Soviet Union's nuclear parity with the U.S. helped maintain its superpower status, it struggled economically and politically, leading to the collapse of its Eastern European empire and the eventual disintegration of the Soviet Union itself. Meanwhile, American society was appealing globally, o ering individualism, social mobility, and consumerism, despite critiques of U.S. foreign policy. CONTAINMENT US approach to contain communism and the Soviet Union (but not unique to the Cold War). Can be o ensive or defensive Can be done through military power, economic power (trading blocs/sanctions), or soft power (ideas/values).' Example: Vietnam war. Alternatives: isolationinism, detente, rollback? EXPLAINING THE COLD WAR: Debate among historians: 1. Traditionalists 2. Revisionists 3. Post-revisionists EXPLAINING THE COLD WAR: TRADITIONALISM USSR expansionism is to blame for the Cold War. Evidence invoked to support this: At Yalta, the US sought to accommodate Soviet interests, but Stalin did not stick to his promises (e.g. no free elections in Poland). Slow withdrawal from Northern Iran (i.e. the Iran Crisis of 1946) —> US was rst isolationist US pursued a defensive containment strategy. The US was a 'reluctant hegemon’. They argue that Stalin and the Soviet Union were to blame, citing Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe after World War II, such as the takeover of Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade, and support for North Korea in the Korean War. The U.S., initially focused on collective security and universal world order, only reacted defensively to Soviet aggression. A REVISIONIST EXPLANATION OF THE COLD WAR Argument: After WWIl, the US sought to expand its powers and establish global hegemony. It aimed to expand its informal capitalist empire that it had been pursuing since the end of the 19th century. Making the world safe not for democracy but for capitalism. —> US = cause of the Cold War, there wasn’t really bipolarity; Stalin was quite pragmatic, he was satis ed. It was Truman that exaggerated. Writing in the 1960s and 1970s, they blame American expansionism, suggesting that the U.S. sought to establish economic hegemony and feared a repeat of the Great Depression without global markets. They argue that the Marshall Plan was a way to expand American capitalism, and 141  fi ff fl ff fi  the U.S. cut o lend-lease aid and tried to intimidate Stalin after Roosevelt's death, fueling tensions. EXPLAINING THE COLD WAR: REVISIONISM US expansionism is to blame for the Cold War (US sought an 'Open Door' for US capital; economic expansionism requires global hegemony). Stalin more defensive than aggressive (seeking security through a sphere of in uence). - Evidence invoked to support this: Stalin did not support the communists in Greece. USSR was a threat to open-door policy → started the Cold War. NSC-68 (1950) (NATIONAL SECURITY DOCUMENT) 'Our overall policy at the present time may be described as one designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and ourish [.] This broad intention embraces two subsidiary policies. One is a policy which we would probably pursue even if there were no soviet threat. It is a policy of attempting to develop a healthy international community. The other is the policy of “containing" the Soviet system. These two policies are closely interrelated and interact on one another. Nevertheless, the distinction between them is basically valid and contributes to a clearer understanding of what we are trying to do’ —> containing the Soviet Union and expanding capitalism —> Identifying the enemy 'The existence and persistence of the idea of freedom is a permanent and continuous threat to the foundation of the slave society; and it therefore regards as intolerable the long continued existence of freedom in the world. What is new, what makes the continuing crisis, is the polarization of power which now inescapably confronts the slave society with the free.' —> Commitment to globalism 'a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere’ US FOREIGN POLICY Overarching, goal: Creating, expanding and enforcing a US-dominated liberal world order: Open Door Policy serving the interests of America's corporate elite closely intertwined with US government. Policy instruments for American liberal expansionism: Economic, nancial and ideological (soft power), such as Marshall Aid (Keynes was at the conference) Role of institutions and intergovernmental organizations: - IMF, World Bank, GATT/WTO (also consider Bretton Woods!) - United Nations EXPLAINING THE COLD WAR: POST-REVISIONISM Neither the US nor the USSR is to blame. The Cold War was inevitable given the bipolar structure of the international system (anarchy). Realist explanation; security dilemma —> tension were inevitable, there was bipolarity, but hostilities relaxed in other periods of times They assert that neither side was solely to blame, arguing that the bipolar structure of the postwar world made con ict inevitable. With only two superpowers left after World War II, the U.S. and Soviet Union were bound to clash. They also highlight the security dilemma, where each side saw the other's actions as a threat, leading to an escalating spiral of hostility. Re ection on Cold War Tensions: The postrevisionist perspective suggests that while some form of Cold War con ict was likely due to the bipolar structure of the postwar world, the depth of hostility was not inevitable. 142  fl fi ff fl fl fl fl  Misunderstandings, rigid ideologies, and exaggerated threats on both sides deepened the Cold War. Stalin’s paranoia and Truman’s exaggerations both contributed to the escalating tensions. Alternative strategies—such as more pragmatic negotiation—might have reduced the intensity of the early Cold War. WHY DID THE COLD WAR END? Deep causes: Decline of communist ideology (constructivist explanation) —> started to lose its appeal, repression was needed, economy wasn’t really working as promised Failure of Soviet economy (neorealist explanation) —> they could no longer continue: large share of a budget spent on military expenses, they couldn’t take care and hospitalise people anymore Intermediate causes: Soft power of liberal ideas, such as openness and democracy (constructivist explanation) —> economic growth + free speech = appealing Imperial overstretch (neorealist explanatíon) —> Soviet Union was an expansive empire Precipitating causes: Mikhail Gorbachev ambitions to reform communism (perestroika and glasnost = restructuring and more openness) and the notion of common security. —> The Puzzle of a "Cold" War One enduring question is why the Cold War did not escalate into a "hot" war, especially given the extensive military build-up and ideological animosities. Various theories attempt to explain this phenomenon: 1. Learning from History: Some analysts argue that advanced societies learned from the catastrophic consequences of World Wars I and II, developing a reluctance to engage in large- scale con ict. 2. Limited Expansionism: Others contend that the superpowers had limited expansionist goals, which reduced the chances of direct confrontation. 3. Bipolar Stability: The stability of a bipolar world, with only two superpowers, might have inherently reduced the likelihood of con ict, as both sides recognized the dire consequences of war. 4. Nuclear Deterrence: However, the predominant explanation lies in the nature of nuclear weapons and the concept of deterrence. The staggering destructive capacity of nuclear arms fundamentally altered the calculus of warfare, making the prospect of con ict between the United States and the Soviet Union unthinkable. A key theme during this period was the disconnect in historical memory between the North and the South. In the North, the Cold War dominates collective memory, while colonialism is often forgotten or romanticized. In contrast, the South remembers this period primarily as one of decolonization and liberation, with ongoing resentment about colonial exploitation and racism. This divergence in memory fueled tensions between the North and South in global politics, in uencing issues like aid, trade, and human rights. China is highlighted as an "enigmatic outsider" in the Cold War and decolonization narratives. Though not a superpower, China played an independent role, sometimes aligning with the Soviet Union, but later forming a strategic partnership with the U.S. in the 1970s. Under Mao Zedong, China experienced devastating policies like the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, which caused immense su ering. However, in the late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping's reforms shifted China toward capitalist development, positioning it as a future global power while maintaining authoritarian rule. The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, marked by the collapse of the Soviet Union, brought an end to bipolarity and left the U.S. as the sole superpower. The Third World, while politically independent, remained economically weak and lost much of the strategic leverage it had gained during the Cold War. Capitalism triumphed as the dominant global ideology, though not necessarily democracy, particularly in China's case, where authoritarian capitalism became the model for development. The period is de ned by two major outcomes: the end of colonialism and the global dominance of capitalism. 143  fl fl ff fl fi fl  BALANCE OF TERROR Nuclear arms race —> completely changed the face of the war Tranformation of war 1952: H-bomb But is it a usable weapon? = ethical and moral questions Logic of deterrence: Dissuasian through fear —> they destroy each other Follows the BoP-logic. Nuclear deterrence through fear (capability + credibility) Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). —> it makes the world more stable, more rational, but these weapons could be in the wrong hands The Nature of Nuclear Weapons Nuclear weapons have an unparalleled destructive capability. For instance, a 1-megaton nuclear explosion can reach temperatures up to 100 million degrees Celsius, far exceeding the temperature at the sun's core. The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were minuscule compared to modern arsenals, where the explosive power of missiles can exceed that of all bombs used in World War II combined. By the 1980s, both superpowers possessed thousands of nuclear warheads, creating a precarious balance of power. 1. Destruction and Uncertainty: Nuclear explosions carry unpredictable consequences, including the concept of nuclear winter, which posits that widespread destruction could result in global agricultural collapse. However, the extent of such phenomena remains uncertain, as it depends on various factors, including the targets of the bombs. 2. Strategic Stability: Initially, the limited destructive capacity of early nuclear weapons did not compel immediate changes in international relations. The U.S. had only a handful of nuclear bombs in the late 1940s, and while the rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union escalated, neither side could use nuclear threats e ectively without risking annihilation. 3. The Hydrogen Bomb: The development of the hydrogen bomb in 1952 marked a signi cant escalation. This weapon could create far greater destruction and ushered in an era of nuclear deterrence, where the threat of mutual annihilation stabilized the rivalry. Five Political E ects of Nuclear Weapons The emergence of nuclear weapons, especially the H-bomb, resulted in several profound political e ects: 1. Revived Concept of Limited War: While early 20th-century con icts suggested total war was the norm, the second half of the century saw wars like Korea and Vietnam characterized as limited, re ecting the reluctance to engage in nuclear con ict. 2. Crises as Moments of Truth: Instead of wars revealing power dynamics, crises like the Berlin and Cuban missile crises served as high-stakes tests of military power and political resolve, providing insight into the global balance. 3. Deterrence as Key Strategy: Nuclear weapons necessitated a strategic focus on deterrence; nations aimed to project power and instill fear to prevent aggression. The threat of rapid retaliation transformed military strategies. 4. Superpower Prudence: Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union prioritized avoiding direct con ict despite ideological di erences, adhering to a norm of nonuse of nuclear weapons and establishing spheres of in uence. 5. Communication and Treaties: Following the Cuban missile crisis, direct communication channels, such as the "hotline," were established between superpower leaders, leading to a series of arms control treaties aimed at stabilizing the nuclear balance. The Unusability of Nuclear Weapons Despite their destructive capabilities, nuclear weapons were generally viewed as unusable in wartime due to several factors: - Moral Stigma: Since the Hiroshima bomb, a stigma has emerged surrounding the use of nuclear arms, perceived as crossing a moral threshold that conventional weapons do not. 144  ff fl ff ff fl ff fl fl fi fl  - Fear of Escalation: There was a pervasive fear that deploying any nuclear weapon, regardless of its yield, could lead to full-scale nuclear war, a risk deemed unacceptable. Balance of Terror The concept of the "balance of terror" arose during the Cold War, re ecting the unique stability created by the presence of nuclear weapons. This balance was distinct from traditional power dynamics observed in previous eras. The Cold War featured two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—each possessing the capability to destroy the other in minutes, creating a situation where nuclear arsenals acted more as psychological deterrents than as physical instruments of warfare. The revolution in military a airs due to nuclear weapons, which increased the risks of great power war and led to a logic of deterrence. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union sought to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons beyond a small circle of great powers. Deterrence allowed the superpowers to avoid direct con ict, diverting their competition into economic and political arenas, though both faced costly proxy wars—the U.S. in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Nuclear non-proliferation became a key strategy, with both superpowers working to limit the spread of nuclear technology to maintain global stability. Problems of Nuclear Deterrence Nuclear deterrence, a key feature of Cold War strategy, revolved around the concept that the threat of massive retaliation would prevent an adversary from launching an attack. Deterrence altered the dynamics of international relations, emphasizing both capability and credibility in threats. 1. Credibility of Threats: E ective deterrence requires not only the capability to retaliate but also a credible threat. The stakes involved in a potential con ict signi cantly in uence the credibility of these threats. For instance, while the U.S. could credibly threaten retaliation for a nuclear attack, it might lack credibility in a conventional con ict, such as during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 2. Distinguishing Deterrence Levels: There is a di erence between deterring direct attacks on one’s homeland versus extending deterrence to allies. While the U.S. maintained nuclear deterrence against the Soviet Union, it could not apply the same strategy e ectively in regional con icts. Historical Context and Analysis The historical context of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War provides insight into its e ectiveness: - From 1945 to 1949, the U.S. possessed nuclear weapons but did not use them, indicating a self-restraint even before mutual deterrence was established. - In the Korean War and other crises, U.S. leaders refrained from using nuclear weapons, recognizing the potential for escalation and the devastating human cost. The Cuban Missile Crisis The Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 stands as a pivotal moment in understanding nuclear deterrence. Triggered by Khrushchev's attempt to place nuclear missiles in Cuba, this crisis brought the world perilously close to nuclear war. 1. Superiority of U.S. Forces: Despite U.S. superiority in nuclear weapons, President Kennedy refrained from direct military action against the Soviet missile sites, fearing even a minor Soviet retaliation could lead to a catastrophic escalation. 2. Communication and Control: Both Kennedy and Khrushchev experienced a sense of powerlessness in managing their military forces, which were on high alert. This realization highlighted the risk of miscalculation leading to a nuclear exchange. 3. Outcome and Compromise: The resolution of the crisis involved a compromise, where the U.S. agreed to remove missiles from Turkey in exchange for the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. This indicated that nuclear deterrence was e ective, but the outcome also re ected the complexity of the situation, where multiple factors contributed to the resolution. 145  ff fl ff ff fl ff ff fl fl fi fl fl ff fl  Moral Issues of Nuclear Deterrence After the Cuban Missile Crisis, a period of relative ease in Cold War tensions emerged. Key developments included the establishment of direct communication between Washington and Moscow and arms control treaties limiting nuclear tests. 1. Ethical Considerations: The morality of nuclear deterrence raises critical questions. Just war theory emphasizes the need for discrimination between combatants and non-combatants, proportionality in responses, and legitimate self-defense. While low-yield nuclear weapons might theoretically t within just war parameters, the risk of escalation remains a signi cant concern. 2. Historical Re ections: The Cold War demonstrated that nuclear deterrence played a substantial role in preventing con ict. Yet the moral implications of maintaining such a precarious balance are complex, especially as new nuclear states emerge and non-state actors threaten to acquire similar capabilities. Continued Concerns About Weapons of Mass Destruction Despite the Cold War’s end, concerns over weapons of mass destruction remain pressing. The ongoing proliferation of nuclear weapons, alongside the development of chemical and biological weapons, poses signi cant risks to global security. The moral and practical implications of these developments underline the need for continued vigilance and diplomatic e orts to prevent escalation and con ict in the current geopolitical landscape. DETERRENCE AND CONTAINMENT The Cold War did not turn into a hot war largely due to deterrence and containment. Deterrence relied on nuclear arsenals to prevent attacks through the threat of devastating retaliation, extending the traditional balance-of-power logic to the nuclear age. Containment, pioneered by the United States, sought to limit Soviet in uence by surrounding the Soviet Union with U.S. allies and promoting a liberal economic and political world order. Both strategies were central to preventing direct con ict, although their e ectiveness remains debated. After the end pf the Cold War, the number of nuclear weapons decreased dramatically. In the Cold War, the goals of the Soviet Union and the United States were shaped by their distinct political and ideological motivations. Soviet Goals: The Soviet Union’s objectives were primarily tangible or possession-based, aimed at securing territorial control and enhancing its security. This was evident in Stalin's demands at the Yalta Conference for control over Germany and Poland, reminiscent of classic Russian imperialist goals. The Soviets, however, were not expansionist in the same way as Hitler. They sought security through controlled, cautious expansion, rather than reckless conquests. This form of expansion was opportunistic but defensive, as the Soviet Union was more concerned with maintaining a bu er zone to protect itself from external threats. The Soviets were often accused of seeking global domination, but their actions were largely motivated by a desire to protect themselves. However, the security dilemma made it di cult to distinguish between Soviet defensive moves and o ensive ambitions. Soviet expansionism also had an ideological component, as communism sought to liberate the working classes globally, justifying their actions in terms of spreading revolution. U.S. Goals: The U.S. pursued milieu goals, focused on shaping the global environment through ideals like free trade, democracy, and the establishment of international institutions like the United Nations. The U.S. policy of containment had two major ambiguities: 1. Ends: Should the U.S. contain Soviet power or communism? 2. Means: Should the U.S. oppose Soviet expansion everywhere or only in key areas? These ambiguities were central to Cold War U.S. foreign policy. George Kennan advocated for a more selective and diplomatic approach to containment, focusing on balance of power considerations rather than a blanket opposition to communism. For example, the U.S. supported 146  ff fi fl fl fl fi fl ff fl ff ff fi ffi  Yugoslavia, a communist country, to weaken Soviet in uence, even though the Truman Doctrine was framed as defending free people everywhere. However, after the Korean War, U.S. policy shifted toward a more ideological containment of communism, leading to direct interventions like the Vietnam War. Containment and Vietnam War: The Vietnam War (1955–1973) was a key example of U.S. containment in action. The U.S. intervened to prevent communist North Vietnam from taking over South Vietnam, viewing the con ict through Cold War terms. The U.S. feared that the fall of South Vietnam would trigger a domino e ect in Southeast Asia. However, the North Vietnamese saw the war as a continuation of their struggle for independence and self-determination. The U.S. misinterpreted the con ict as purely ideological, underestimating the nationalism driving the North Vietnamese and focusing on containing communism at great cost—58,000 American lives, millions of Vietnamese lives, and $600 billion. The U.S. intervention ultimately failed, as North Vietnam uni ed the country in 1975. Ironically, despite the war, Vietnam later developed good relations with the U.S., underscoring the nationalist, rather than communist, nature of the con ict. Moral Judgment and Consequences of Vietnam: The morality of the Vietnam War is debated based on three criteria: motives, means, and consequences. The U.S. justi ed its intervention with the good intention of saving South Vietnam from communism. However, the consequences—massive loss of life, domestic unrest, and the failure to contain communism—point to recklessness and misguided policy. The legacy of the Vietnam War continues to a ect American foreign policy debates today, highlighting the importance of understanding the historical and ideological context of interventions. Russia's Transformation Post-Cold War After the Cold War, Russia underwent a signi cant shift, abandoning the Soviet planned economy in favor of a path toward democratization and economic liberalization. Initially, the Russian government embraced economic "shock therapy," a rapid transition aimed at swiftly implementing free-market reforms. However, the immediate disruptions caused by this approach led to severe societal challenges, prompting a shift toward a more gradualist strategy. As economic conditions worsened, nationalism within Russia began to resurge, complicating the transition. Theories like that of Michael Doyle propose that if Russia successfully transitioned to democracy, it would likely contribute to global peace, as liberal democracies historically refrain from waging war against one another. However, the trajectory of Russian foreign policy remains uncertain, raising questions about whether it would align with the democratic peace theory or succumb to a resurgence of authoritarianism and nationalism that could challenge the West. A NEW COLD WAR? Some speak of a (possible) new cold war between the US and China. 1. To what extent do you think we can speak of a new Cold War between China and the US? 2. How would this cold war - if it exists - be similar to or di erent from the historical cold war between the US and the USSR? Come up with at least one di erence and one similarity. STUDY QUESTIONS 1. When did the Cold War begin? When did it end? Why? What do realist, liberal, and constructivist approaches contribute to your answers? 2. Was the Cold War inevitable? If so, why and when? If not, when and how could it have been avoided? 3. Why were leaders unable to restore a nineteenth-century-style Concert system after World War II? What sort of system evolved? 4. How important were rst- and second-image considerations in the development of the Cold War? What were the views of American and European leaders on the Soviet Union and its international ambitions? What were Soviet views of the United States and the rest of the West? 147  fl fl ff fi fi ff fi fl fi fl ff ff  5. Some historians argue that the real question is not why the Cold War occurred, but why it did not escalate into a “hot” war. Do you agree? Why didn’t a hot war begin? 6. What is “containment”? How did this American policy emerge, and how was it implemented? What were Soviet responses? 7. How are nuclear weapons di erent from conventional weapons? Has the advent of nuclear weapons fundamentally changed the way countries behave? 8. Is Mueller correct that nuclear weapons are not the cause of the obsolescence of major wars among developed states? What other factors does he consider? 9. Is nuclear deterrence morally defensible? Or, in the words of one theorist, is it morally analogous to tying infants to the front bumpers of automo- biles to prevent tra c accidents on Memorial Day? Might some strategies of deterrence be more ethical than others? 10. What is the signi cance of nuclear weapons to international relations apart from nuclear deterrence? How useful are they? 11. Why did the Cold War end? What roles did hard and soft power play? Lecture 11, Post-Cold War Cooperation & Con ict: Institutions, Power & Strategy Nye and Welch (2013) Chapter 7: Post-Cold War Cooperation, Con ict, Flashpoints. Acharya & Buzan (2019) Chapter 7: The World after 1989: ‘Unipolarity,’ Globalisation and the Rise of the Rest Managing con icts: What is the role of international law and international institutions? The United Nations system & collective security Intra-state con icts and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Three inter-state ashpoints: (1) Arab-Israeli Con ict (2) South China Sea, (3) Taiwan Strait In-class assignment: Con ict in the Middle East This chapter traces the evolution of the Global International System (GIS) from the end of the Cold War to around 2017-18, identifying two distinct phases: "version 1.1," a Western-dominated system that emerged after World War II, and "version 1.2," a post-Western system beginning to take shape in the 2010s. The rst two decades after 1989 saw the high point of the Western-led world order, while the 2010s marked a shift toward a more multipolar system. The chapter begins by discussing continuities and changes from the Cold War era, highlighting the dominance of the West, particularly the U.S., during the 1990s, when Neoliberal capitalism and democratic liberalism seemed triumphant. During this period, the U.S. reasserted its military and economic power, the European Union expanded and integrated, and Japan thrived economically. The collapse of the Soviet Union and China’s shift to market socialism reinforced the U.S.-led unipolarity. Concepts like "unipolarity" and "globalization" captured the mood of the era, as the U.S. stood as the sole superpower and global capitalism appeared unstoppable. Globalization emphasized economic interdependence, weakening the role of nation-states while boosting global governance and economic integration. However, challenges to this dominance emerged, including Russia’s economic decline, China's growing power, and rising nationalism, religion, and identity politics. The resurgence of these forces, along with postcolonial resentments and sometimes violence, complicated the liberal narrative. In some regions, Islam replaced communism as a counterpoint to liberalism. Additionally, the rise of authoritarian capitalism in Russia and China, and their growing assertiveness against Western dominance, marked the beginning of a transition to a new, more complex global order. The liberal optimism of thinkers like Francis Fukuyama, who predicted "the end of history" with liberal democracy's triumph, was soon proven wrong. Finally, the chapter identi es China’s inclusion in the global core as a major shift, signaling the transition from a Western-dominated GIS (version 1.1) to a post-Western system (version 1.2). 148  fl fl fi fl fi fl ff fi fl ffi fl fl