Blame Games in Crises: 2018 Dutch Transport Wagon Accident PDF

CHAPTER 1 Introduction On 20 September 2018, a horrible accident took place in Oss, the Netherlands. An employee of a day-care centre was using an electric transport wagon (a so-called stint) to transport children from the day-care facility to primary school. The stint is popular with Dutch day-care...

CHAPTER 1 Introduction On 20 September 2018, a horrible accident took place in Oss, the Netherlands. An employee of a day-care centre was using an electric transport wagon (a so-called stint) to transport children from the day-care facility to primary school. The stint is popular with Dutch day-care centres because it allows easy transportation of the children. On 20 September 2018, however, a stint collided with a train, killing four children and severely injuring a child and the employee driving the transport wagon. The shock of this tragedy reverberated through the country. In response to this tragedy, the Minister of Infrastructure and Water Management Van Nieuwenhuizen announced that it was no longer allowed to use the stint—this to the dismay of day-care centres which heavily relied on the electric transport wagon to transport children.1 It looks, though, as if the minister’s decision was not based on the wish to ensure the safety of the public. Instead, the decision to prohibit the usage of the stint seemed to be informed by the need to shift attention away from the minister, the ministry, and the inspection agency (Inspectie 1 Henley, J. (2018, 20 September). Four children killed as train hits vehicle at Dutch level crossing fifth child and woman driving electric wagon critically injured in collision in Oss. The Guardian. Retrieved November 6, 2018 from https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2018/sep/20/four-children-killed-as-train-hits-cargo-bike-at-dutch-level-crossing. Van Heerde, J., Zuidervaart, B. (2018, 1 November). Minister onder vuur om Stint. Trouw, Section Nederland, p. 8. Van Heerde, J. (2018, 5 October). Weerstand tegen het wegverbod voor stints. Trouw, Section Nederland, p. 10. © The Author(s) 2020 S. L. Resodihardjo, Crises, Inquiries and the Politics of Blame, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17531-3_1 1 2 S. L. RESODIHARDJO Leefomgeving en Transport (ILT)) which should have kept an eye on these transportation vehicles but had failed to do so. By claiming that the stint was unsafe, the transport wagon could be prohibited even though at the time that decision was made, no real evidence existed which supported this claim.2 RTL Nieuws’ reconstruction of the events makes for interesting reading. The Dutch broadcasting station’s reporting shows how the government had been warned in 2011 about these types of vehicles. Yet, the inspection agency had failed to keep an eye on these transport devices—in fact, it did not even know it had to keep an eye on the stint. Moreover, no clear regulations had been made for these new types of vehicles. Consequently, panic broke out. There was a pressing need to get rid of the stint. “From that moment on, the Minister, Secretary-General, Director-General, director, [civil servants], and lawyers worked on a laundry operation: all the dirt[y laundry] from the past needed to be aired as quickly as possible, but in a measured way so that it would not stand out too much. Quick actions were needed to ensure that mistakes from the past would not [negatively affect] the current minister and civil servants.”3 Prohibiting the stint was made difficult by the fact that there was no evidence at the time that the stint was unsafe. But there was such a need within the Ministry to prohibit the stint that “evidence was manipulated in order to create reasonable ‘doubt.’”4 Amongst other things, actors creatively copied and pasted from an investigative report by the Dutch Forensic Institute into the stint while the inspection agency had also influenced this investigation. Creative writing was also used when it came to the company’s response to the questions raised about the safety of their product as that response was either ignored or misrepresented in government documents. Moreover, an incorrect police report—which the police 2 Vugts, Y., Klein, P. (2018, 29 October). Reconstructie Een giftige cocktail: vier dode kinderen, paniek en House of Cards. RTL Nieuws. Retrieved November 6, 2018 from https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/artikel/4466311/een-giftige-cocktail-vier-dodekinderen-paniek-en-house-cards. 3 Vugts, Y., Klein, P. (2018, 29 October). Reconstructie Een giftige cocktail: vier dode kinderen, paniek en House of Cards. RTL Nieuws. Retrieved November 6, 2018 from https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/artikel/4466311/een-giftige-cocktail-vier-dodekinderen-paniek-en-house-cards. 4 Vugts, Y., Klein, P. (2018, 29 October). Reconstructie Een giftige cocktail: vier dode kinderen, paniek en House of Cards. RTL Nieuws. Retrieved November 6, 2018 from https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/artikel/4466311/een-giftige-cocktail-vier-dodekinderen-paniek-en-house-cards. 1 INTRODUCTION 3 and the ministry knew to be incorrect—on another alleged stint related accident experienced by an employee of another day-care centre was used even though that day-care centre and its employee had made it clear that the report did not truthfully depict the incident. Additionally, a rule was fabricated that companies needed to inform the ministry when changing aspects of these types of vehicles such as a more powerful battery.5 At the time of writing, it is not known what the causes were of the incident and how this blame game ended. The plot was thickening though as a day-care centre went to court to object to the stint’s prohibition, but the court upheld the minister’s decision.6 Questions were raised about the extent to which the minister had misinformed parliament.7 A research organization (TNO) was asked to investigate the stint.8 This investigation, in turn, allowed the Minister of Infrastructure and Water Management to say that “until the results [of this investigation] are known, I will not make any decisions.”9 Meanwhile, the inspection agency told a newspaper that it lacked the capacity to inspect everything10 and the company which 5 Vugts, Y., Klein, P. (2018, 29 October). Reconstructie Een giftige cocktail: vier dode kinderen, paniek en House of Cards. RTL Nieuws. Retrieved November 6, 2018 from https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/artikel/4466311/een-giftige-cocktail-vier-dodekinderen-paniek-en-house-cards. 6 Van Heerde, J. (2018, 5 October). Weerstand tegen het wegverbod voor stints. Trouw, Section Nederland, p. 10. ‘Nieuwe regels voor de Stint zijn nodig.’ (2018, 2 November). De Telegraaf, Section Binnenland, p. 8. Uitspraak kort geding. Kinderopvang verliest kort geding: rijverbod stint blijft van kracht. (2018, 1 November). RTL Nieuws. Retrieved November 6, 2018 from https://www. rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/nederland/artikel/4470621/kinderopvang-verliest-kort-gedingrijverbod-stint-blijft-van. 7 Van Heerde, J., Zuidervaart, B. (2018, 1 November). Minister onder vuur om Stint. Trouw, Section Nederland, p. 8. Mebius, D. (2018, 2 November). Stint-storm is voor even geluwd. De Volkskrant, Section Ten Eerste, p. 3. ‘Nieuwe regels voor de Stint zijn nodig.’ (2018, 2 November). De Telegraaf, Section Binnenland, p. 8. 8 Van Heerde, J. (2018, 19 October). Stints gaan de komende maanden de weg nog niet op. Trouw, Section Nederland, p. 11. 9 Uitspraak kort geding. Kinderopvang verliest kort geding: rijverbod stint blijft van kracht. (2018, 1 November). RTL Nieuws. Retrieved November 6, 2018 from https://www. rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/nederland/artikel/4470621/kinderopvang-verliest-kort-geding-rijverbodstint-blijft-van. 10 Pas na drama ILT-onderzoek. (2018, 30 October). De Telegraaf, Section Binnenland, p. 9. 4 S. L. RESODIHARDJO produced the stint had to file for bankruptcy.11 In December, TNO concluded its investigation into the stint: it was deemed to be an unsafe transportation device. Consequently, the minister announced that her decision to prohibit the stint was now final.12 The blame game following the tragic accident exhibits all the elements of a classic blame game: actors try to shift the blame to the company which produced the stints, there are already hints of internal strife between government actors (e.g. whether or not the inspection agency had shared certain information with the ministry), there are hints of excuses (e.g. the inspection agency told the media it did not have enough resources to do its job), and an inquiry is used to temporarily stop the decision-­ making process. Blame games are nothing new. Crises are often followed by questions about what happened and how this could have happened as well as whether someone is responsible for what happened. The accountability phase following a crisis thus consists of two elements: understanding what happened so one can learn from the crisis in order to prevent its recurrence and determining whether someone is responsible for what happened. The learning part is often facilitated by an inquiry aimed at investigating the events, pointing out what went wrong, and providing a list of recommendations to avoid a similar crisis from happening again. Ideally, the investigation is thorough and looks at the underlying causes of the crisis and the lessons and recommendations of the inquiry are then implemented (Greenwood 1998; Elliott and Smith 2006; Birkland 2009; Elliott 2009). The second element is focused on determining whether someone should be blamed and, if so, who that will be. This process is known as the blame game. Now I realize that the concept of blame game carries a negative connotation for some readers as they will perceive blame games as processes where self-serving actors dodge responsibility and shift blame to, for instance, unsuspecting subordinates. A valid perception considering the example described above where it seems as if various actors are trying to do their best to protect themselves at the expense of others. 11 Misérus, M. (2018, 29 October). Fabrikant Stint vraagt faillissement aan. De Volkskrant, Section Ten Eerste, p. 1. 12 Stint definitief van de weg, oorzaak ongeval onduidelijk. (2018, 14 December). Trouw, Section Binnenland, p. 10. 1 INTRODUCTION 5 Despite the negative association with the word blame game, I decided to use the word in this research for two reasons. First, if I were to use a different word to describe blame games—e.g. to be held accountable— then this could lead to confusion throughout the book because I would be using the same word (accountability) to describe a specific phase of crisis management (the accountability phase which consists of learning and blame games) and to describe a part of the process within that phase (people being held accountable). That is why I decided to use the commonly accepted concept of blame games. The second reason for sticking with the concept of blame games has to do with the fact that blame games entail more than just holding people accountable. As I will show in the next chapter, blame games are complex framing processes where debate in society leads to a commonly shared definition of the event (that yes this was indeed a crisis) and a commonly shared acknowledgement of the avoidable harm caused by the crisis. This shared problem definition will also address the cause(s) of the crisis and thus whether someone or an organization can be held responsible for what happened. These blamed actors will then either accept, deflect, shift, or minimize the blame they are facing. Depending on how society receives these blame responses (favourably or not), the blame game will either come to a conclusion or continue. The concept of blame games therefore not only refers to that specific point in time when actors are trying to pass the buck to someone else. It also refers to the framing contest which determines, for instance, whether blame should be assigned and whether that blame can be assigned to an actor or whether we are dealing here with an act of God—in which case the blame game will come to a halt. So despite the fact that some of the readers will perceive the concept of blame game in a negative light, it does best describe the whole process from start to finish. Having said that, there is a problem with blame games and that problem is actually the reason why I wrote this book. In recent years, blame games have become more prominent in the accountability phase of crisis management. Nowadays, media, politicians, and the public are quickly outraged, searching almost frantically for someone who can be blamed for what happened while demanding quite easily someone’s resignation (cf. De Vries 2004; Weaver 2018; Hinterleitner and Sager 2019). This focus on finding a culprit can be detrimental for the learning part of the accountability stage because people will be less willing to open up if anything they say can be used against them. After all, learning requires openness. It 6 S. L. RESODIHARDJO requires a willingness to share information about mistakes that have been made—mistakes which might have led or contributed to the crisis. But if divulging any information leads to calls for resignation, then people will not be willing to share information—information which can be vital in understanding how the crisis came about and how it can be prevented in the future (May 1992; Weick and Sutcliffe 2007; Choularton 2001; SulitzeanuKenan 2010; Stark 2010; Kuipers and ’t Hart 2014; Brändström 2016; Guerin et al. 2018). In an ideal world, there is room for both a blame game and for learning as both are crucial elements of a responsive democracy. This, however, requires a balanced accountability phase. Too much focus on finding a culprit can result in a hostile environment where people do not feel safe to share vital information. Conversely, a society where actors can get away with murder by just saying sorry also hinders the learning process because no one will have an incentive to dig deeper and find the underlying reasons why something went wrong. Consequently, only superficial learning will take place. Both types of unbalanced accountability will have a negative impact on a society’s capability to learn and thus prevent future mishaps. An unbalanced accountability phase could therefore lead to a society which is not resilient, that is, not capable of bouncing back from crises, because proper learning cannot take place (Resodihardjo et al. 2018b). The aim of the book is to provide information about how blame games work. This will help the audience of a blame game as well as the participants therein to better understand why some crises result in the search for a culprit while others do not and why some responses to allegations of blame are more favourably met than others. Having a better understanding of blame games allows for a better management of the blame games and, hopefully, a more balanced accountability phase where learning no longer takes a backseat. It is, however, impossible to write an all-encompassing book on blame games as blame games are complex cases where so many variables (such as political and societal context, prior reputation, upcoming elections, and even holidays) have an impact on how the blame games evolve. Though blame game research is gaining traction, there is still much to be learned. Having said that, the theories and cases explored in this book do help to provide insight into what happens during a blame game as various theories from a range of disciplines are connected in the theoretical chapters (Chaps. 2 and 3) and the detailed description and analysis of the three cases improves our understanding of how blame games evolve. 1 INTRODUCTION 7 In the next chapter, theories on blame games will be addressed. The chapter starts with an explanation of the importance of perceptions and framing during blame games. These perceptions consist of negativity bias and risk and causal perceptions. Negativity bias is a concept which describes humans’ tendency to give more weight and meaning to things that (could) go wrong than to things that (could) go well. Combine that with the fact that people are more and more risk averse and that they demand government to step in and make sure that they are safe and one can understand how people are becoming less inclined to accept risks. Considering the lower tolerance for and acceptance of crises, it is not surprising that crises are quickly followed by public outcries. However, for an event to be labelled as a crisis, there needs to be a shared understanding of that event. This is where the framing contest within blame games starts because if you are able to influence this discussion and achieve a shared definition that the event was not a crisis, the blame game will not take off. If the event is defined as a crisis, then various variables (such as the level of harm resulting from the crisis, the cause of the crisis, and the prior reputation of actors) influence who is going to be blamed for what happened and how much blame these actors will receive. Following the explanation of how blame is attributed, strategies to deal with blame will be described. According to the literature, an adequate response to blame matches the level of blame one is facing: low levels of blame allow you to respond in quite a defensive manner whereas higher levels of blame require a more accommodative response. The concept of a staged retreat is also introduced: actors are likely to stay as defensive as possible until that response no longer works. Only then will they become more accommodative in their response. One of the blame responses described in Chap. 2 is appointing an inquiry. A number of blame game authors merely state that appointing inquiries is a useful tactic. There is, however, much more to be said about inquiries: why they are established in the first place, what their functions are within the crisis management process, and how actors can try to influence inquiries. Moreover, an inquiry which was initially established to get an issue off the agenda can actually become influential and set the agenda in terms of recommendations that need to be implemented. Such an inquiry—also known as a catalytic inquiry—is, however, quite rare. Most of the times, inquiries will have less impact on the policy making process. But they can have quite an impact on how the blame game unfolds—hence the focus on inquiries in Chap. 3. 8 S. L. RESODIHARDJO In Chap. 4, I draw and extend on existing publications (Resodihardjo et al. 2012, 2016, 2018a) to study three blame game cases in order to further our understanding of how blame games evolve in reality. All three cases revolve around festivals where something awful happened and where the mayor was one of the key players in the blame game. The three cases are the 2009 Sunset Grooves festival (Hoek van Holland/Rotterdam, the Netherlands), the 2010 Love Parade (Duisburg, Germany), and the 2014 monster truck accident (Haaksbergen, the Netherlands). In the first case, the mayor—being officially responsible for public safety—could stay in office; in the second case, Duisburg citizens used a new state law to vote their mayor out of office; and in the third case, the mayor resigned. In each case, reality was more complex than expected by theory and idiosyncratic factors appeared to be crucial. In the first case, for instance, a more accommodative response to blame did not result in a decrease of the mayor’s and police chief’s blame levels while length of tenure affected the blame game outcome. In the second case, the mayor could not voluntarily resign because that would negatively affect his pension; a new state law had to be implemented which allowed citizens to vote their mayor out of office. And in the third case, the mayor experienced an unsolvable conflict between his role of a caring mayor and his role as administrator which affected how his citizens perceived him. These and various other factors influenced the three blame games. In the concluding chapter, the determinative impact of such case-specific details results in the creation of a more detailed overview of the variables influencing the way in which a blame game evolves. This overview results also in a number of avenues for future research. References Birkland, T. A. (2009). Disasters, lessons learned, and fantasy documents. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 17(3), 146–156. Brändström, A. (2016). Crisis, accountability and blame management: Strategies and survival of political office-holders (Vol. 44). Stockholm: CRISMART. Choularton, R. (2001). Complex learning: Organizational learning from disasters. Safety Science, 39(1–2), 61–70. De Vries, M. S. (2004). Framing crises: Response patterns to explosions in fireworks factories. Administration & Society, 36(5), 594–614. Elliott, D. (2009). The failure of organizational learning from crisis – A matter of life and death? Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 17(3), 157–168. 1 INTRODUCTION 9 Elliott, D., & Smith, D. (2006). Cultural readjustment after crisis: Regulation and learning from crisis within the UK soccer industry. Journal of Management Studies, 43(2), 289–317. Greenwood, J. (1998). The role of reflection in single and double loop learning. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 27(5), 1048–1053. Guerin, B., McCrae, J., & Shepheard, M. (2018). Accountability in modern government: What are the issues? A discussion paper. London: Institute for Government. Hinterleitner, M., & Sager, F. (2019). Blame, reputation, and organizational responses to a politicized climate. In T. Bach & K. Wegrich (Eds.), The blind spots of public bureaucracy and the politics of non-coordination (pp. 133–150). Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Kuipers, S., & ’t Hart, P. (2014). Accounting for crises. In M. Bovens, R. E. Goodin, & T. Schillemans (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of public accountability (pp. 589–602). Oxford: Oxford University Press. May, P. J. (1992). Policy learning and failure. Journal of Public Policy, 12(4), 331–354. Resodihardjo, S. L., Van Eijk, C. J. A., & Carroll, B. J. (2012). Mayor vs. police chief: The Hoek van Holland riot. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 20(4), 231–243. Resodihardjo, S. L., Carroll, B. J., Van Eijk, C. J. A., & Maris, S. (2016). Why traditional responses to blame games fail: The importance of context, rituals, and sub-blame games in the face of raves gone wrong. Public Administration, 94(2), 350–363. Resodihardjo, S. L., Meijer, M., & Carroll, B. J. (2018a). Het monstertruckdrama in Haaksbergen en het vertrek van burgemeester Gerritsen. Tijdschrift voor Veiligheid, 17(3), 3–18. Resodihardjo, S. L., Van Genugten, M., & Ruiter, M. N. (2018b). A theoretical exploration of resilience and effectiveness requirements’ compatibility in formal and permanent emergency networks. Safety Science, 101, 164–172. Stark, A. (2010). Legislatures, legitimacy and crises: The relationship between representation and crisis management. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 18(1), 2–13. Sulitzeanu-Kenan, R. (2010). Reflection in the shadow of blame: When do politicians appoint commissions of inquiry? British Journal of Political Science, 40(3), 613–634. Weaver, R. K. (2018). The nays have it: How rampant blame generating distorts American policy and politics. Political Science Quarterly, 133(2), 259–289. Weick, K. E., & Sutcliffe, K. M. (2007). Managing the unexpected: Resilient performance in an age of uncertainty (2nd ed.). San Francisco: Jossey Bass. CHAPTER 2 Framing and Blaming Before we delve deeper into how blame games work, it is important to keep in mind that blame games are basically framing contests. First, since people perceive reality differently, a framing contest will start to determine whether the event was a crisis or not. Second, framing plays a role in attributing blame since a shared understanding of the frequency of the crisis (one-off event or a symptom of a bigger crisis) and the level of harm caused by the crisis will determine who will be blamed and how much blame these actors will receive. Lastly, the blame game itself is also a framing contest where actors use rhetoric to try to redirect or minimize the level of blame they are facing (Gephart 1993; Stone 1997; Brändström and Kuipers 2003; De Vries 2004; Boin et al. 2009). Considering the importance of perceptions and framing, it comes as no surprise that the first section of this chapter addresses these two. The attribution of blame is discussed in the second section. In the third and final section, I will provide an overview of how one can deal with blame—either by actions taken prior to a crisis or during a blame game—and explain how to choose an appropriate blame response. 2.1   Perceptions and Framing Blame games do not appear out of the blue. If you look carefully, you can detect signs that a blame game is about to start. These signs consist of perceptions and framing. People have perceptions regarding reality. These © The Author(s) 2020 S. L. Resodihardjo, Crises, Inquiries and the Politics of Blame, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17531-3_2 11 12 S. L. RESODIHARDJO perceptions are informed, amongst other things, by people’s negativity bias and their risk and causal perceptions—all three act as lenses through which people perceive the information they receive. Since people perceive reality differently, they will try to convince others of the correctness of their perception. If they are successful, a general consensus on what the problem exactly is will be established. This shared problem definition will then determine whether there will be a public outcry for heads to roll. To convince others that their perception of reality is the right one, they will use framing tactics. Both perceptions and framing will be addressed in this section. 2.1.1  Perceptions When it comes to perceptions and blame games, negativity bias and risk and causal perceptions play an important role as they influence how people process the information they receive and thus come to a certain perspective on reality. Negativity bias, for instance, affects which type of information (positive or negative) people will pay more attention to. Psychological research has shown that people attach more importance to negative than to positive events. That basically means that if something bad happens, people will tend to forget the positive news they received about this organization or person so far. Instead, they will focus on the bad news (Lau 1985; Weaver 1986; Rozin and Royzman 2001; James et al. 2016). Politicians are well aware of this phenomenon and they will take steps to ensure that they cannot be blamed if something goes wrong. One of these steps is to not claim any credit for creating a policy because if that policy fails, then people will remember that the politician took credit for this policy and they will then blame the politician for the failing policy (Weaver 1986; McGraw 1991; Hood et al. 2009; Hinterleitner and Sager 2015). Risk and causal perceptions also affect the way in which people perceive the world. We live in a risk society. The way in which we manufacture products makes it more likely that something bad will happen. Industrialization and the way in which we deplete our natural resources have thus increased the number of risks we are facing in society (Shrivastava 1995) and people are becoming more aware of the fact that they are surrounded by risks (Power 2004). Within a risk society, it is not just this perception of realistic and unrealistic risks (i.e. risks that we think we should be afraid of even though they are not real) (Bache et al. 2015) that is of 2 FRAMING AND BLAMING 13 importance, but also the fact that humans are now less tolerant of these risks (Boin et al. 2018). People want to live in a safe society and expect government to make sure that they do. If something does happen, then someone must be blamed for that (Brändström and Kuipers 2003). This is where causal perceptions come into play. Because if actors are able to convince others that they had no control over the events—and thus did not cause or contribute to the crisis—then these actors are able to avoid being blamed for the events (Stone 1997). Claiming that the unfortunate event was the result of an act of God, however, is no longer quite as acceptable as it once was because people’s causal perceptions have shifted. Nowadays, a lot of people think that most events can be shaped by human actions and are thus no longer in the hands of God. Hence the belief that if something goes wrong, humans (i.e. government) could have prevented or minimized the event (Power 2004; Kuipers and ’t Hart 2014; Dodds 2015). Flooding, for instance, is now usually perceived to be a result of government failing to build and maintain dykes (cf. Hartman and Squires 2006). This does not mean that no one refers to an act of God anymore—some insurance companies, for example, did so when faced with the volcanic outburst in Iceland which played havoc with airplane travel—but the references to an act of God are becoming less frequent (Burgess 2012; Dodds 2015). All in all that means that if something does go wrong, there is a strong expectation that government should have done something to avoid the disaster from happening (cf. Boin et al. 2009). Negativity bias and risk and causal perceptions thus shape the way in which information about events is processed. But in order for these lenses to become active, people need to receive information in the first place. After all, without information detailing that something has happened, no opinion about these events can be formed. This is where the media comes into play. It used to be that crises could take place without the rest of the country knowing about it, especially if the crises took place in remote areas where means of communication were destroyed through, for instance, a storm. Nowadays, however, there are TV channels and internet sites solely focused on bringing us the news. Combined with the rise of social media— which allows people to quickly communicate about events—this has not only led to an increase of the speed in which news is shared with the public, but also changed the way in which the public perceives these events (Roberts 2010). “[T]he infosphere is clearly being transformed and in the 14 S. L. RESODIHARDJO process is profoundly altering the American public’s awareness and perception of crises. Two obvious changes are in immediacy and vividness of awareness: Americans now become alerted to crises more quickly, and have a stronger appreciation of the human costs of a crisis, than ever before” (Roberts 2010, p. 91). Negativity bias and risk and causal perceptions help to explain why people are so quick to ask the question of who is responsible. This trend is reinforced by the changes in which information is spread: the 24-hour news cycle results not only in an ever-increasing number of events that the public are informed about, but also in the public being informed very quickly. Combined, these trends could help to explain why it sometimes feels as if one public outcry for heads to roll is quickly followed by yet another public outcry for resignations. 2.1.2   Framing Negativity bias and risk and causal perceptions will act as lenses through which the information people receive will be analysed. Based on that analysis, people will create their own perception of what is going on. However, people can perceive situations differently. If people find it particularly important to convince others that their perception is the correct one, a debate will ensue in which they will use framing techniques— such as stressing the severity of the problem or emphasizing the frequency of the incidents—to show that their perception of the issue is indeed the one that needs to be supported by everyone. Such a debate could thus result in a shared understanding of what is going on. A shared problem definition will make it easier to take action because a problem definition not only contains what the problem is all about, but also what its cause(s) and solutions are (Rochefort and Cobb 1994; cf. Stone 1997). Framing is important even before a blame game starts because being able to sway the debate in one direction or the other will have an impact on whether a blame game will ensue or not. After all, if actors are able to convince everyone involved that no crisis took place, then no blame game will start. Note though that not all actors are trying to avoid blame games. Some actors will try their best to ensure that the general consensus is that the event was indeed a crisis, since labelling an event as a crisis results in a sense of urgency which, in turn, will create room to propose and implement reform measures (Keeler 1993; Boin et al. 2009). 2 FRAMING AND BLAMING 15 Now the reason why it is possible to hold a debate on the nature of the event is because it is quite rare that an event is clearly a crisis in and by itself. More often than not, an event needs to become defined as a crisis (’t Hart 1993). A debate will therefore start in which society tries to find a shared definition of the event either being a crisis or not. If the event is defined as a crisis, then questions will be raised about the cause of the crisis and whether someone was responsible for what happened. If the event is defined as a non-crisis, no blame game will start (Brändström and Kuipers 2003; Boin et al. 2009; Hood et al. 2016). It therefore comes as no surprise that one of the tactics listed in the blame game literature is to deny that there is a crisis (Benoit 1997; Bovens et al. 1999; Hood 2002; Coombs 2007a; Hood et al. 2009). This tactic can work but it could also backfire in those cases where an event is clearly a crisis. No one would argue, for instance, that a tsunami and its devastating toll on society does not constitute a crisis. Trying to define such an event as a non-crisis could actually harm your position as you might be perceived as being out of touch with reality (Boin et al. 2009). It is therefore important to get a good read of the situation so you can ascertain whether using the tactic of denying that there is a crisis is a viable option or not. Framing is not only important in determining whether the event was a crisis—and thus whether a blame game should start. Framing is also important when it comes to the attribution of blame since framing is also involved when people are defining the extent to which actors are responsible for the crisis, the extent of the harm caused by the crisis, and whether the crisis was incidental or a symptom of a much bigger problem. The latter influences who is going to be blamed whereas the former two affect how much blame actors will receive. These and other factors influencing how much blame actors will face will be discussed in the next section. 2.2   Attributing Blame Now that we know when a blame game could start—if an event is defined as a crisis—we can turn our attention to who is going to be blamed and how much blame that actor is going to receive. Understanding blame attribution not only helps you to understand how the blame game works but also helps you to select the right blame response when facing blame. Hence there is the need to describe blame attribution in such detail. 16 S. L. RESODIHARDJO Who is going to be blamed is largely determined by the way in which the event is further defined: either as a one-off crisis or as a symptom of an endemic crisis. If the general consensus is that the crisis was a one-off event, it is quite likely that blame will be attributed to actors at the operational level such as an individual employee or an agency responsible for implementing policies. If, however, the general consensus is that this new event is proof of a bigger crisis, then the blame will focus on actors at the political or strategic level such as a minister (Brändström and Kuipers 2003). It is important to keep in mind that a blame game is not a static process. The fact that at one point a shared understanding has been reached that the crisis was a one-off event and actor X is to be blamed does not mean that that perception of reality remains stable for the remainder of the blame game. On the contrary, new information can come to the fore which shows that indeed mistakes were made at the operational level, but that these mistakes could only be made through errors at the political level—in which case blame either spreads or shifts to include actors at the political level (De Vries 2004). Consider, for instance, the fire in a detention centre at Schiphol airport on 26 October 2005. The fire killed 11 people, and numerous others were injured. The fire started in a cell. When rescuing the person locked up in this cell, prison guards left the door of this cell open, thereby allowing the fire to spread. An investigation revealed, amongst other things, that the prison guards had not received proper training and were unfamiliar with the emergency plans—plans which happened to be insufficient anyway. As a consequence, prison guards did not know what to do in case of fire. These findings resulted in the resignation of the Minister of Justice as he was responsible for prison services. Additionally, the investigation showed that the building was not built in accordance with various regulations. Consequently, the Minister responsible for the Government Buildings Agency resigned as well. Lastly, the investigation showed that the municipality of Haarlemmermeer—where the detention centre is located— had granted building and usage permits even though the municipality did not have enough information to make an informed decision whether these permits should be granted. The third and last person to resign over this crisis was therefore the mayor of Haarlemmermeer (Dutch Safety Board 2005).1 1 Kritiek blijft overeind in rapport Schipholbrand. (2006, 21 September). Trouw; Donner en Dekker treden af na rapport. (2006, 21 September). De Volkskrant; Burgemeester Haarlemmermeer dient ontslag in. (2006, 21 September). De Volkskrant. 2 FRAMING AND BLAMING 17 Who is going to be blamed can thus change over time—just like how much blame they will receive. The level of blame one can face depends on the effectiveness of the blame game strategies used to deal with blame (see the next section); new information which sheds new light on what happened; and four other factors: the extent to which actors are perceived to be responsible for the crisis, whether the negative effects of the crisis are seen as avoidable, what the actor’s reputation was prior to the crisis, and whether similar incidents happened before. When the general perception is that an actor caused or contributed to a crisis by either doing something or failing to do something, then this actor will face a lot of blame. Conversely, if the crisis is seen as something which was outside of the actor’s control and the actor’s (in)actions did not exacerbate the situation, then this actor’s blame levels will remain low (Stone 1997; De Vries 2004; Coombs 2007a, 2007b; Boin et al. 2009; Hood 2011). If a crisis does not result in any negative effect, that is, it does not result in any harm, then no one will be looking for someone to blame. If, however, the crisis did result in harm and this harm could have been avoided, then people will start their search for a culprit. How much blame actors will receive depends on the extent of the damage. The more avoidable harm the crisis caused, the more actors will be blamed for what happened (McGraw et al. 2011; Hood 2011). An actor’s reputation prior to the crisis will also affect the level of blame they will face. If an actor’s reputation was already damaged prior to the crisis, then it will be easier for others to attack this actor. In other words, a damaged reputation makes actors more susceptible to blame (Coombs and Holladay 2006; Coombs 2007a, 2007b; Hinterleitner and Sager 2019; for a contrasting view, see Brändström 2016, p. 124). The last factor influencing the level of blame actors will face is prior occurrence of a similar crisis. If a similar crisis happened before, then actors could have learned from this event and thus could have prevented a recurrence. As a result, they will be facing a lot of blame. In contrast, if the crisis has never happened before, actors could not have learned from previous events and thus will face lower blame levels (Coombs 2007a, 2007b). In short, numerous factors influence how much blame people will receive and their blame level will fluctuate during a blame game. Effective presentational strategies, for instance, should result in lower blame levels. In contrast, ineffective presentational strategies or new information coming to the fore could increase the level of blame one is facing. 18 S. L. RESODIHARDJO Table 2.1 A ‘blame barometer’ used for coding daily media stories (Hood et al. 2009, p. 718)a Level General description 1. Very calm or fair Salience Stance of ‘usual suspects’ (habitual opponents) Either benign neglect or favourable reactions from media, legislature, and other forums 2. Fairly Broadly favourable, with calm criticisms in the form of ‘background noise’ in isolated sources with limited coverage 3. Mixed coverage, with Mid-­ criticisms given range moderate attention in mainstream forums 4. Largely negative points Stormy given substantial coverage in mainstream sources High and Muted favourable or low and neutral Low and Point scoring at fairly neutral fairly low level 5. Very stormy High and negative Overwhelmingly negative points given saturation coverage, with ‘legs’ (i.e., expectations of continuance) Medium and mixed Medium to high and mainly negative Typical accountability calls on responsible officeholders Either low or as objects of praise Some calls for information or explanation Active, with limited criticism coming from neutrals and supporters too Joined by non-trivial criticism from the ranks of normal loyalists Calls for serious inquiries, special debates, etc., as well as explanations Calls for independent inquiries and remedies as well as explanations Overshadowed by Calls for critics drawn from resignations as normal loyalists and well as remedies, payroll supporters etc. a Reprinted from the original journal (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2009) with permission of John Wiley & Sons Hood et al. (2009) discern five levels of blame one could be facing ranging from non-existent to very stormy. These levels are listed in Table 2.1. The lowest level of blame describes a situation where journalists are reporting in a neutral or even positive manner about an actor and where the actor faces no calls for explanation or information. If media reports remain mainly neutral but there are some low-level rumblings where people want to know more about what happened, then the blame level shifts to the second level of blame. The third level of blame is reached when calls for information become more serious—people ask for inquiries, 2 FRAMING AND BLAMING 19 Members of Parliament (MPs) request emergency debates—and the attention in the media becomes more negative. The fourth level of blame is characterized by a combination of quite negative media attention, calls for independent inquiries, demands for solutions, and some criticism from people who are normally the actor’s allies. The highest level of blame occurs when the media attention is mostly if not completely negative, the actor’s allies are starting to really question the actor’s performance, and there are demands for the actor’s resignation. 2.3   How to Deal with Blame Now that we understand who is going to be blamed and how much blame they will receive, it is time to turn our attention to the way in which actors can deal with blame. In this section, three blame game strategies will be introduced: policy strategies, agency strategies, and presentational strategies. The latter strategy becomes active during a blame game whereas the former two strategies are strategies which already need to be in place before the crisis starts. Since this book focuses on the strategies employed during blame games, the proactive strategies will only be briefly described. The presentational strategies will be addressed in more detail by describing a number of presentational strategies, listing the presentational strategies studied for this research, and explaining how to select an appropriate presentational strategy when facing blame. 2.3.1  Proactive Strategies Within the literature, a distinction is made between strategies implemented prior to and during a crisis. Basically, the idea is that proactive (or anticipatory) strategies implemented before a crisis occurs could help you to either deflect and/or minimize blame if a blame game starts following the crisis. Only if these strategies fail or were not in place do you need to rely on presentational strategies—that is, the strategies used during the blame game (Hood et al. 2009; Hinterleitner and Sager 2019). The proactive strategies consist of policy strategies and agency strategies. Policy strategies basically mean that you have policies in place to which you can refer in case of potential blame. If someone wants to blame you, your response will be to say that you, your organization, or employees cannot be blamed since existing policies or standard operating procedures were followed (Hood et al. 2009; Hood 2011 cf. Hinterleitner and 20 S. L. RESODIHARDJO Sager 2019). The use of standard operating procedures and protocols “makes it harder for the functionaries concerned to be blamed for arbitrariness, favouritism, corruption, double standards, or poor personal judgement” (Hood 2011, p. 93). One way for the police to deflect any accusations of racism while doing stop and searches would be to implement a policy which clearly states that every nth person needs to be stopped and searched. One could then argue that since every nth person is going to be stopped and searched, the selection of citizens is based on randomness and not on racism. The literature, however, points to a potential flaw of this policy strategy when it comes to using this strategy in the field of risk management. Risk management focuses on the operational aspects of an organization (identifying risks, figuring out how to prevent risks from happening, and what to do if a risk manifests) and its reputation (how to ensure that a risk which has come true does not damage the organization’s reputation). There is a danger that organizations will focus too much on their reputation management, resulting in the creation of numerous risk policies and protocols that are only in place to deflect potential blame in the case a crisis does happen—these regulations and protocols do not actually help to prevent risks from becoming reality. Moreover, if an organization is too focused on risk management as a way to protect its own reputation, that focus could lead to less attention and less resources to implement the organization’s original tasks, to inflexibility, and to “abandoning services, such as advice, that carry substantial potential for blame” (Hood 2002, p. 33; Power 2004; Hinterleitner and Sager 2019). The second proactive strategy is the agency strategy. Agency strategies consist of “all the attempts officeholders and organizations make to deflect or limit blame by creative allocation of formal responsibility, competency, or jurisdiction among different units and individuals” (Hood 2011, p. 67). An agency strategy could, for example, revolve around creating distance between the organization which makes policy—such as a ministry—and the organization which implements the policy—such as an agency. The idea being that ministers can dissolve themselves from any blame by pointing out that they merely created the policy while the problem lies with the executive agency which failed to implement the policy properly (Hood 2002, 2011; Power 2004; Bache et al. 2015; James et al. 2016; Hinterleitner and Sager 2019). Again, this strategy has its drawbacks. For one, the implementing organizations might refuse to accept the blame (Hood 2002; Hinterleitner and 2 FRAMING AND BLAMING 21 Sager 2019). For another, this strategy might be seen as ministers passing the buck to someone else. This happened in the case of Home Secretary Howard and his response to two serious prison escapes—the first in September 1994 when six prisoners (five of which were IRA terrorists) escaped from the Special Secure Unit at Whitemoor Prison and the second escape in January 1995 when three prisoners escaped from Parkhurst Prison (a prison located on an island) and remained at large for a couple of days on the island. Howard’s response was to shift blame to Director General Lewis—head of the Prison Service of England and Wales which had become an executive agency on 1 April 1993. Howard fired Lewis because the Learmont inquiry into the second escape showed that responsibility lay with the agency and that no “policy decision of mine, directly or indirectly, caused the escape.”2 From the start of the crisis, however, the distinction between making policy and implementing policy had been suspect. Following the first escape, for instance, The Times published an article stating that “[t]he creation of executive agencies, operating at a distance from ministers, was supposed to make public services more efficient and less political. In this case, it has simply made blame easier to shift around the machine”3 (Resodihardjo 2009). 2.3.2  Presentational Strategies If the proactive (or anticipatory) strategies do not work sufficiently or if these strategies were absent, then actors will be facing blame. Actors will then rely on presentational strategies to minimize, deflect of shift blame (Hood 2002, 2011). These strategies are mostly rhetoric in nature with the exception of strategies such as resignation, financial compensation, and appointing an inquiry. The literature is rife with examples of presentational strategies and it is impossible to list every one of them. I will therefore not attempt to provide the ultimate list of presentational strategies. Instead, I will first describe a variety of examples to give you an idea of what this strategy actually entails before introducing a table listing the presentational strategies used to investigate the three blame game cases. A strategy which was already mentioned earlier is denial. During a blame game, a lot of things can be denied. For starters, one could deny that there was a crisis. If the existence of a crisis cannot be denied, one 2 3 House of Commons, Prison Service, (16.10.1995) 30–43, p. 31. The Times (1994, 14 September). Who Goes There? The Times, Section Editorials, p. 15. 22 S. L. RESODIHARDJO could still deny that the crisis was severe by downplaying the effects of the crisis. If that does not work, one could always deny any responsibility for the crisis by claiming that one acted in response to someone else’s actions (provocation), by claiming not to have caused the crisis (combat causality), by claiming not to have been informed about what happened (defeasibility), and/or by claiming an inability to influence the events (defeasibility as well). In response to allegations of responsibilities, actors can also try to shift the blame to someone else. Blame shifting or scapegoating is a variation on the denial strategy because it focuses on denying any responsibility while pointing the finger to another actor. One could try to shift the blame to someone outside of the organization or someone inside the organization—such as a subordinate. Blame is also quite often shifted to predecessors who, for instance, implemented a set of austerity measures which resulted in the executive agency being unable to do its job. Hence, it is the predecessor’s fault that the crisis was not prevented. Sometimes actors try to shift the blame to the victims—though one can wonder the wisdom of such a strategy considering the fact that we live in a risk society where people expect government to ensure their safety. Another denial strategy is attacking the actor who is attacking you. One could, for instance, threaten to sue, emphasize that the allegations are politically motivated or demand proof from the attackers that you are indeed the one to be blamed (Benoit 1997; Bovens et al. 1999; Hearit 2001; McConnell 2003; Coombs 2007a; Hood et al. 2009). Besides the denial strategies, there are numerous other strategies at one’s disposal. One could, for instance, appoint an inquiry. This allows actors to show that they are taking steps in response to allegations without actually acknowledging any responsibility. In fact, it allows them to show that they too are concerned about what happened, but that more information is needed before one can make a correct assessment of what happened and who was responsible (if indeed someone can be held responsible). At the same time, establishing an inquiry helps to depoliticize the situation as it drops off the agenda for a while. Appointing an inquiry also helps to evade annoying questions as one could refuse to answer any media and political questions using the argument that inquiries need to be able to do their job unhindered. Moreover, when experts are heading an inquiry instead of politicians, there is less danger that the inquiry’s report will result in (forced) resignations (Bovens et al. 1999; McConnell 2003; Hood et al. 2009; Boin et al. 2009; Brändström 2016). 2 FRAMING AND BLAMING 23 One could also try to minimize the extent to which one can be blamed by making excuses. An excuse, for example, could focus on the fact that the organization had no or little control over what happened because the train delays were caused by an unexpected amount of fallen leaves. Justification can also be used to minimize blame. Examples of justification include stating that you thought you acted in the best interest of others (such as the general public) or “claiming that the victims deserved what they received” (Coombs 2007a, p. 140; McGraw 1990; Bovens et al. 1999; Hood et al. 2009). Once responsibility has been established, one can still use presentational strategies to ensure that blame levels do not get too high. One could, for instance, offer financial compensation or take remedial action by firing an employee or changing policy. Offering apologies and asking for forgiveness (also known as mortification) can be a helpful strategy when actors apologize because they want to apologize and not because they were forced to apologize. When actors offer generous apologies where they acknowledge their own mistakes, then this apology can have “a cushioning effect on the debate (…) [by robbing] the opposition of the opportunity to attack” (Brändström 2016, p. 126; Benoit 1997; Bovens et al. 1999; Coombs 2007a). There are also presentational strategies that cannot be used on their own because the public might perceive these strategies as self-serving. These strategies are, for instance, aimed at bolstering the reputation of the blamed actor by reminding the audience of the blamed actor’s excellent past performance or by explaining how much (local) society has benefitted from the actor’s actions and/or policies. Additionally, actors can claim that they do not deserved to be blamed because they are a victim as well (victimage). And lastly, actors who are facing blame can take actions to ensure the continuous support of their stakeholders by, for instance, commending their stakeholders (ingratiation). To avoid the perception of self-centeredness, these strategies need to be used in tandem with one of the previously mentioned presentational strategies (Benoit 1997; Hearit 2001; Ihlen 2002; Coombs 2007a). There are thus numerous presentational strategies that actors can choose from when facing blame. Although the summary presented here does not address every possible presentational strategy—as it is impossible to provide such a list—it does provide a good overview of the most often mentioned presentational strategies in the blame game literature and 24 S. L. RESODIHARDJO Table 2.2 Some basic strategic options for officeholders facing media firestorms: Denial and admission of problem and responsibility (Hood et al. 2009, p. 698)a A: Problem Denial PD B: Problem Admission but Responsibility Denial (PA + RD) C: Problem and Responsibility Admission (PA + RA) A1. Pure denial (‘crisis, what crisis?’) B1. Open stance on who is responsible (announce or agree to investigation to determine who is responsible, without accepting responsibility) B2. Assert others to be responsible (blame victims, other agents, predecessors, successors, subordinates, superordinates, colleagues, etc.) B3. Admission of some responsibility, but denial of major or ultimate responsibility (e.g., by offering ‘wrong kind of snow’ excuses or admission of only partial or ‘technical’ but not substantial responsibility) C1. Explanation-only response, offering some account of what went wrong, but not accepting culpability A2. Qualified denial (admission that there is some problem but denial that it is serious or significant (e.g., through justificatory arguments) A3. Denial plus counterattack (portrayal of critics as whingers, knockers, politically motivated etc., assertion that onus of proof rests on critics, threats of lawsuits, dismissals of moles and leakers, and other sanctions) C2. Institutional action-­ taking response, offering institutional apology, compensation, remedial action (e.g., dismissal or disciplining of subordinates) C3. Admission of personal culpability (which may include resignation or an acknowledgement of error accompanied by an expression of determination to stay on and sort out the situation) a Reprinted from the original journal (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2009) with permission of John Wiley & Sons therefore offers us a good idea of how actors can respond to blame. To investigate actors’ blame responses during a blame game, we used Hood et al.’s (2009) overview of presentational strategies to code actors’ blame responses (Resodihardjo et al. 2012, 2016, 2018). As outlined in Table 2.2, the codes assigned to actors’ responses ranged from A1 (pure denial) to C3 (admission of personal culpability). What is interesting about Hood et al.’s article (2009) is the fact that their work allows researchers to code not just blame responses, but also blame levels (see Table 2.1). Researchers interested in understanding how blame games work can compare the blame responses to the blame levels in order to determine whether blame responses resulted in a decrease in blame levels. If so, that would 2 FRAMING AND BLAMING 25 indicate that the chosen presentational strategy was the appropriate one. This raises the question which presentational strategy one should choose when facing blame since an inappropriate response will result in an increase in blame levels. This question will be addressed in the next subsection. 2.3.3  Using Which Strategy When It is impossible to say with certainty which presentational strategy to use when facing a particular blame level. Although each blame game shares certain characteristics, each case is also a unique combination of, for instance, the type of crisis, the level of harm caused by the crisis, the prior reputation of the main players in the blame game, the victims, and the perception of the victims. This makes it difficult to say with certainty how to respond when facing blame. Having said that, the literature does point out to three things that could help to inform actors when to choose which presentational strategy: (1) the possibility of strategies backfiring, (2) the use of multiple strategies simultaneously, and (3) staged retreat. It is important to keep in mind that presentational strategies can backfire. A risky strategy, for instance, would be to deny responsibility even though you know full well that you are responsible. When the truth comes out, then your reputation and credibility will be severely damaged (Benoit 1997). Furthermore, the public might perceive inquiries as a whitewash if, for instance, actors try to control the investigation too much (McConnell 2010). Lastly, apologizing could open the door to lawsuits (Benoit 1997). However, fear of lawsuits should not solely drive a blame response as it could result in a legally correct but non-emphatic response which only further angers the public. There are also presentational strategies that cannot be used on their own because the public might perceive these strategies as self-serving. These strategies are aimed at bolstering the reputation of the blamed actor, explaining that the blamed actor is a victim as well of what happened (victimage), and commending the blamed actor’s stakeholders (ingratiation). To avoid the perception of self-centeredness, these strategies need to be used in tandem with one of the previously mentioned presentational strategies (Benoit 1997; Coombs 2007a). Sometimes it makes sense to use multiple strategies at the same time— and not just in the case of presentational strategies that might be perceived as egoistical (Benoit 1997; Coombs 2007a). It could be a smart move, for 26 S. L. RESODIHARDJO attack the appointing apology with attacker an inquiry resignation Defensive Accommodative Fig. 2.1 Examples of presentational strategies located on a defensive-­ accommodative continuum based on Ihlen (2002, p. 190) and Hood et al. (2009, p. 698) instance, to combine denial with remedial action to show that steps are taken to minimize the effects of the crisis and to ensure it will not happen again (Hearit 2001). The question then remains which presentational strategy should be used when. To answer this question, one needs to keep in mind that presentational strategies range from very defensive to very accommodating. Presentational strategies can therefore be placed on a defensive-­ accommodative continuum depending on how defensive/accommodative a presentational strategy is (see Fig. 2.1) (Ihlen 2002; cf. Benoit 1997; Bovens et al. 1999; Coombs 2007a; Hood et al. 2009). Ideally, actors select a presentational strategy from this continuum that fits with the level of blame they are facing. When an actor is facing high levels of blame, a response which is too defensive will only angry the public further and thus result in higher blame levels. Conversely, a response which is too accommodative considering the low blame levels might result in people wondering why the blamed actor was so accommodating and thus result in requests for inquiries. A blame response should thus fit the level of blame one is facing otherwise the blame level will only further increase. The selection of a presentational strategy is also influenced by the fact that actors want to avoid blame as much as possible. Acknowledging that there is a problem opens the door to blame. Actors will therefore be reluctant to admit that there is a problem. If it is impossible to deny that there is a problem, then they will try, for instance, to deny that the problem is severe. When it is no longer possible to use any of the problem denial strategies, then actors will move away from the most defensive strategies, but still remain somewhat defensive as they will acknowledge that there is a problem but will deny that they are responsible. Only when these strategies 2 FRAMING AND BLAMING 27 fail, will actors move towards the accommodative end of the defensiveaccommodative continuum by selecting strategies where they accept both the fact that there is a problem and that they are (to some extent) responsible. This shifting from problem denial to problem admission but responsibility denial and then to problem and responsibility admission (see also Table 2.2) is also known as a staged retreat (Hearit 2001; Hood et al. 2009, 2016). So in short, actors need to find a presentational strategy that nicely fits with the blame level they are facing. But at the same time, they will initially prefer a defensive approach. Only when that approach does not work and blame levels remain high or are even increasing will actors become more accommodative. 2.4   Conclusion In this chapter, I explained how blame games come about and how actors can respond to blame. The study of blame games is gaining popularity and numerous studies on blame games have been published in recent years. Each publication has furthered our understanding of how blame games work by addressing, for instance, the role of social media (Schwarz 2012), auditing (Skærbæk and Christensen 2015), and multi-level governance structures (Bache et al. 2015) in blame games. Various types of crises have also been investigated, ranging from a tsunami (Brändström et al. 2008) to terrorist attacks (Olmeda 2008) and from malfunctioning examination systems (Hood et al. 2009) to a flooding (Bytzek 2008). In this book, the focus is on blame games following festivals where something went horribly wrong. Before we can move to these cases, however, there is one presentational strategy which deserves more attention: appointing an inquiry in times of trouble. Considering the immense impact an inquiry can have on the way in which the blame game evolves and what its outcome will be, it is worth taking a closer look at this strategy. That is why the next chapter is solely about inquiries following crises. 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