Pols 316 Notes #2 PDF

Pols 316 Notes #2: Alford and Hibbing– genes and the environment in terms of political opinion Conventional wisdom on where political opinions come from: ○ Experience, environment, socialization, etc. (nurture) Makes sense But doesn’t leave mu...

Pols 316 Notes #2: Alford and Hibbing– genes and the environment in terms of political opinion Conventional wisdom on where political opinions come from: ○ Experience, environment, socialization, etc. (nurture) Makes sense But doesn’t leave much room for choice or personality Author claims: ○ Genetics have a large impact on political attitudes Nature rather than nurture ○ Model = genes → biology → preferences on “bedrock issues” → stances on particular issues at particular times Biological predispositions to think in certain ways? How to evaluate: ○ Twin studies Identical (monozygotic) share 100% of genes Fraternal (dizygotic) share 50% of genes If “nature” doesn’t matter, then identical twins shouldn’t be any more likely to have similar political attitudes than fraternal twins If genes do matter, identical twins should be more likely to have similar political attitudes Heritability = (MZ - DZ)*2 The key assumption in these studies is that the environmental factors are the same whether twins are identical or fraternal The “nurture” part is the same But how similar are the environments actually? One BIG and potentially important difference between the two types of twins is that identical twins HAVE AN IDENTICAL TWIN Does this affect things? ○ Sibling studies (adoptive vs non-adoptive siblings) Issue positions are typically more highly influenced by genetics than partisanship in general Implications? ○ Political change over time at the macro level. How do you explain this if genetics are key to political attitudes? Loving and Smith (aftermath of Jan. 6th) Key question: did the January 2021 insurrection at the capitol cause people to change the party with which they were registered? ○ Data (from florida registration records): Jan 2021 and Jan 2017 records 2017 records are helpful as a baseline (there’s always some extent of party switching so this helps us determine the IV- if jan 6th actually caused the party switch)  Republicans were four times more likely to switch parties than democrats (despite the fact that they were both small percentages in total) They mostly switched to NPA (independent) or minor party ○ NOT to the opposing major party Most elderly group was the least likely to switch Among republicans, the most frequent voters were the most likely to switch Surprising because we’d think the most engaged republicans would identify the most strongly with the party and therefore be loyal Did the changes in party registration last or did they switch back to their previous party by the next year? ○ Only 5% of the people switched back to their old party ○ The vast majority stayed where they switched to Is the occurrence of Jan 6th going to cause a period or cohort effect? ○ Too early to tell Is democracy important? ○ Survey prompt: “democracy may have problems, but it is the best system of government” 74% of all respondents agree to some extent (somewhat or strongly) The younger generations increasingly respond with less agreement Gen z still has 59% total agreement, but it is less than all the previous generations They’re the least satisfied with democracy White americans are most likely to say democracy is best under all circumstances Higher family incomes and higher education also most likely to say that ○ Those on the opposite spectrums (low family income / education) might think that democracy isn’t benefiting them Chapter 6: Public Opinion & Democratic Stability This chapter is a lot more relevant now than it has been in recent years Things vital to democratic regimes: ○ Democratic values– tolerance of opposing views and support for the rules of democracy Bill of rights, majority rule, minority rights ○ Social consensus regarding values and goals ○ Trust in fellow citizens and trust in government / sense of efficacy (trust that our voices are at least heard, our vote counts) ○ Certain kinds of personalities among citizens and leaders Support for democratic values in the abstract (usually supported) vs intolerance of unpopular groups (in reality)  People are less tolerant when they feel threatened Americans seem to have become more tolerant over the years ○ But maybe the specific groups mentioned in those questions are no longer as threatening as they used to be Ex: people are less threatened by communists now Is this because people have become more tolerant, or because we’re past the cold war? Intolerant beliefs vs intolerant behavior Important factors: ○ Agreement on the rules / procedures of democracy (democratic values) But who defines what counts as a minority right? The majority? Minorities don’t get the rights until the majority votes May have been an increase in tolerance but it depends on the measure used ○ Democratic elitism- the belief or idea that a select group of individuals, who are deemed to be more knowledgeable, should make a decision on behalf of society as a whole If we are so intolerant, how does our democracy survive? Perhaps elites (including officeholders) are tolerant (maybe because of education?) Evidence is mixed… sometimes elites aren’t tolerant! ○ Pluralistic intolerance- people don’t agree enough on which groups should be suppressed for it to be a problem when citizens can't agree on who to repress, political leaders are free to act on their own preferences ○ Decline in trust of government Why? Media coverage of politics? Postmaterialist values? People who don’t trust the government are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories, etc. Trust in elected officials vs bureaucrats, etc. ○ Social consensus on fundamental beliefs Constitutional order, legal process of change, satisfaction with economic order, belief that hard work will pay off, connectedness with one’s lot ○ Political efficacy Internal- you know how to engage with the government and be active External- you’re opinion affects policy or is at least counted when decisions are made Generally, more efficacy → more political trust and engagement ○ Social trust– about fellow citizens, not government Social capital (associational membership, etc.) ○ Political personalities: Authoritarian personality  Tend to be high in conventionalism, anti-intraception (dislike of subjectivity / imagination), superstition, ethnocentrism ○ Associated with racism and political intolerance Measurement: is difficult to distinguish personality from ideology Milgram experiment (obedience to authority) Rise of affective polarization (not necessarily about policy / ideology– just negative affect) ○ Social sorting (and overlapping of social groups with partisanship) Common perception that democracy is under threat ○ Small percentage of americans think violence is justified for political purposes Actual political violence is rare ○ 40% see the opposing party as “evil” NOT based on policy ○ Voters generally don’t punish candidates of our own party if they violate democratic norms Chapter 7: Group Differences in Public Opinion **for the exam, it’s important to have a good feeling for the major cross-group differences and trends that you can see in tables and charts ○ STUDY THE TRENDS IN BOOK ○ Not going to be asked: how many percentage points different are _____ and ____ on *insert topic* Where does public opinion come from? ○ Family ○ Experience / knowledge ○ Genes? ○ Party ID / ideology ○ Social groups “Social reference groups” Group theory of politics (achens and bartels) Social class ○ Higher income people / higher education people lean a little more left / libertarian (left on social issues) Ex: pro abortion rights ○ More income = more likely to vote democratic (2016) This is a flip from what it used to be (lower income people used to always vote more democratic) Education ○ More education = more internationalist opinions ○ More education levels = more democratic generally  Why is it important to “control for other factors”? Race Both the majority of whites and blacks are opposed to “preferences for blacks in hiring and promotion” (affirmative action) ○ But when the question changes to “affirmative action programs needed ‘as long as there are no rigid quotas’”, 78% of blacks agree (only 48% of whites agree) Large differences on economic issues, smaller differences on “moral issues” Age ○ Older generally more conservative But we can’t tell if it’s a life-cycle effect or a generational effect ○ large gaps on marijuana legalization, same-sex marriage, paying close attention to poltics Modest gap in ideology Religion ○ Highest in US and Canada ○ Evangelicals tend to be more republican / conservative Mormons Mainline protestants are considerably less republican ○ “Nones” (atheist / agnostic) tend to be more democratic / liberal Black protestants ○ Catholics are more democratic, but more conservative ○ It’s important to note that despite these comments ^^^, it’s rare for one position to have overwhelming support within a religious group Even evangelicals have a substantial amount of democrats ○ Jewish americans, black protestants, and “nones” = left ○ Mainline protestants and catholics = center ○ Evangelical protestants and mormons = right Region / geography ○ South USED to be much more conservative, and they still are, but only slightly ○ Obviously there was the party switch around the civil war time Gender ○ Women generally more liberal 5-10% more likely to vote democratic Single women drive this ○ Modest and fairly stable gender gap in partisanship^^ ○ On political knowledge tests, men tend to score higher But partially because they guess more ○ Gender difference is pronounced on force / violence & compassion, but not on other issues (including “gender issues”)  Race, ethnicity, and partisanship: ○ White americans have a majority in the republican party ○ Hispanic and black individuals gravitate more towards the democratic party Czaja and Medenica: ○ Study of race & public opinion is NO LONGER solely about black and white americans Latinos, asian americans, recent immigrants, etc. Multi-racial identities Changing demographics Geography also matters ○ Categorizing race and ethnicity Race is socially constructed Race vs phenotype ○ Racial group membership / categorization 3/5ths compromise ○ Racial group identity- awareness of belonging to a certain group and psychological attachment to that group ○ Racial group consciousness- in-group identification with a set of ideological beliefs about one’s group’s social standing Involves believing collective action should be taken to achieve group’s goals Coming together to improve group’s social standing ○ Diversity vs solidarity African americans have become more diverse in terms of class and income Why is it still overwhelmingly democratic? “Linked fate”(michael dawson)- your personal fate is linked to what happens to fellow members of your racial / ethnic group ○ Mental shortcut on how to act politically ○ Their success depends on the success of the group ^^Black utility heuristic- make decisions based on what’s best on the group Social constraint- process of enforcing the norms of compliance with group-based expectations / political behavior Perceptions of linked fate among white americans has started to affect voting behaviors more often now Methodological challenges Geographic distribution of races Group identity and consciousness ○ Not always seen as relevant until it is politicized ○ People start to see it as relevant when they experience / witness discrimination or shared living conditions  ○ Descriptive representation ○ Downsides? “Captured” groups Essentialism? Partisan identification and immigrants ○ Length of residence ○ Mobilization How can they vote Race relations: ○ Threat hypothesis- competition → resentment and prejudice Vote against candidate of “threatening” group Ex: threat hypothesis for immigrants Threat of taking jobs ○ Contact hypothesis- familiarity / exposure → understanding and appreciation of group Shared values / interests Less prejudice the more you’re exposed Implicit attitudes (perez) ○ People vary in their degree of implicit attitudes ○ Individual differences predict people’s judgements and behavior (often independently from explicit attitudes) ○ ALL attitudes are unobserved (both implicit and explicit), but there are differences Explicit: verbalized evaluations of objects or ideas Controlled Self-aware Implicit: basic affective (like / dislike) evaluations of objects or ideas Evaluations made rapidly and without deliberation Triggered automatically before higher-order mental processes occur ○ Automaticity- unintentional, lack of control, efficiency, lack of awareness ○ Measuring implicit attitudes: Individuals should be able to more quickly identify words with positive connotations as pleasant / good after viewing objects they have positive affect towards Affective priming (AP): how much faster one responds to negative stimuli following a (sometimes subliminal) prime than positive stimuli following that same prime Implicit association test (IAT): similar to AP, but subjects are exposed to two attitude objects Affect misattribution procedure (AMP): based on proportion of stimuli judged as positive or negative ○ Validity and reliability  Validity- does our measure capture what we’re trying to measure (and not some other construct) Reliability- does repeated measurement provide the same results each time AP usually provides lower reliability than IAT or AMP Predictive validity- does the measure do a good job at predicting other attitudes and/or related behavioral outcomes The above measures usually do ○ Are implicit attitudes really attitudes? Attitudes or cultural knowledge? Familiarity? ○ Are they really different from explicit attitudes? When concern about self-presentation is low, correlation between explicit and implicit often increased Explicit attitudes more susceptible to social desirability bias than implicit attitudes ○ Suggestions for research Use more varied subject pools Not just student Use online experiments ○ Where do implicit attitudes come from? Youth studies, personality studies, environmental determinants, media ○ Boundaries of awareness Source awareness, content awareness, impact awareness Racial discrimination Police officers Chapter 8 APO – The Media True or False: Until recently, the norm in the US has been for media to be objective and unbiased ○ FALSE Colonial times ○ Publishing was very expensive and few could afford them ○ Aimed at partisan elites ○ Printing process was time consuming and labor intensive ○ Emergence of political parties Created the partisan (popular) press evolving of newspapers: ○ Electoral politics unstable… What does that mean for papers? Try to make profits off of mass readership rather than party subsidization Need for larger audiences (and larger potential audiences due to increased literacy) ○ Era of commercial media Cheaper and easier prints  ○ Watergate was a high point for the objective press (albeit a low point for the nation’s politics) ○ 24/7 news ○ Prof. journalists vs news commentators ○ Competition for viewers (and profits) Amount of information vs quality of coverage (depth, etc.) Horse race coverage Ideological diversity vs lack of moderate coverage Ex: MSNBC moving left No middle news Media bias ○ Liberal political bias among journalists, radio/tv news, etc. Most of them are liberal (at least more liberal than the general public) But are they expressing this in their work? ○ Conservative political bias within editorials and endorsements Owners / advertisers of commercial media lean right ○ Commercial (corporate) biases Profit motive Competition for audience, reluctance to alienate audience, advertisers Consequence: getting “infotainment” than professional news reporting ○ Style > substance Sensationalism: negative and adversarial (oppositional) biases, extremity bias (exaggerating stories for attention) ○ Using exciting stories and conflict for audience attention ○ Media news is not always a snapshot of “reality” Murder vs property crime, etc. Framing ○ News reporting (supposed to be neutral and objective) vs investigative reporting vs editorials / commentary (supposed to be opinionated) ○ There’s a lot more negative reporting than positive Increasingly ○ Public trust in the media has also generally declined Though democrats tend to trust it more so still than republicans or independents Era of interpretive journalism / fragmented media Models of media effects ○ Early research expected to find that the media affected politics a lot But this was not the finding People kinda already had their minds made up based on partisanship, selective exposure, confirmation bias, etc. ○ Media messages and policy preferences Agenda setting– how effective is it?  Turns out, the least politically sophisticated / knowledgeable who are most responsive to agenda-setting Other studies claim the effects may be stronger on moderately politically sophisticated people ○ They have more awareness, but can still be swayed because they’re not TOO stuck in their own opinions Who influences what the media chooses to cover? The media as cue-givers ○ Priming (suggesting agendas and evaluations for information encountered later) ○ Framing (considering how information is presented) Ex: welfare… systematic unemployment or personal failures? ○ Minimal effects model- media only marginally affects public opinion ○ Modest effects- news media can affect people but only in certain contexts Effects are often short-lived Increasing media choice widens gaps in political knowledge and turnout ○ Cable TV, internet → increasing media choice “Chance encounters” with political information decline (information effect) Those already interested in politics can get info easier (interest effect) Information affect + interest effect = widening knowledge gap Network news used to be the only way to get information at one point People who have increasing media available to them will receive more news (become more knowledgeable) and hence be more likely to turn out, in contrast to those who don’t have access to all that media What makes some people prefer entertainment over the news? ○ SES? Partisanship has a large effect on accuracy of factual knowledge (bartels) ○ How does this affect polarization? Does it drive it, or is it a result of it? Media content and opinions: ○ TV network news May have some impact on opinions but it’s hard to establish causality But what’s definitely true is that horse-race coverage has become the prominent form of news ○ The fox news effect: conservatism among watchers Is this because fox news made them more conservative or because conservative people started watching fox (because of their ideological platform) Small effect on elections (in the republican direction) ○ Talk radio Self-selection issues ○ Newspapers [editorial] endorsements  Republican slant ○ In contrast to liberal news reporting ○ The internet Liberals read more about politics on the internet than conservatives Reinforcement of existing views vs persuasion from new information Social media: how much is “siloing” (algorithms only showing people things that align with their existing views) Surveys show most people get diverse political messages, but re-tweets and reposts might be more slanted Social media might be less siloed than in “real life” Fake news News media usage and political knowledge ○ Reading (including on the internet) seems to inform people more than watching the news Campaign advertising and public opinion ○ Ads often provide more policy information than the news (which is just horse race) ○ Even people who don’t watch the news see political ads Battleground vs non-battleground states Battleground states get a lot more ads Uneven distribution Goidel et al: rigged election claims and consequences ○ Negative ads work when paired with secondary media exposure ○ Lower trust is associated with support for outside candidates Lower trust is also associated with lower turnout Need to balance effects ○ Rigged election claims do not always result in a decreased turnout It’s contingent on partisanship ○ Additive model: people believing fraud would occur and that the media were biased were more likely to vote Sides et al: the daily donald show ○ He got a majority of free coverage in the 2016 election Always saying controversial things and was much more newsworthy than other candidates ○ Even if the coverage was often negative… “bad publicity is better than no publicity” The negative, controversial stuff only affected his ratings temporarily, and then he was back up And then after nominations have been made (for primaries), people usually support their party’s candidate Party-driven sorting ○ The “invisible primary” – there’s usually already a popular candidate so what’s the point Trump was a “pre-existing celebrity”  ○ Left other candidates “gasping for air” ○ Kinda shows that money doesn’t matter that much Jeb bush paid for so much more ad time, but trump still got all that he did (and won) ○ Other candidates didn’t attack trump much at first because they didn’t see him as an actual threat But if campaign ads only matter “a little,” why do campaigns spend so much on them? ○ Well, we already know a little shift can be significant in an election ○ But also it could be a bit of a prisoner’s dilemma type situation They can both save money by each not putting out ads But they can’t trust that the other person won’t, so they have to– and then it usually results in the election stands staying around the same anyways (same as if they both just didn’t spend on ads) Polarization Importance of measurement Causality? ○ Correlation does not equal causation ○ Does x affect y, or does y affect x? Or both? ○ Is there a third variable that affects both x and y? ○ If you can’t just run randomized controlled trials / experiments, you have to use: Statistical controls Rule out alternative explanations Natural experiments / field experiments What is political polarization? ○ The extreme positions getting more extreme and less and less middle positions Types: ○ Policy polarization = extreme attitudes on specific policies become more common over time Larger variance (more spread) and bimodality ○ Ideological polarization Liberal vs conservative “left “ vs “right” Not so much in the middle Related to general orientation towards politics / government ○ Partisan polarization / partisan sorting = polarization organized around parties Republican vs democrat Not as many independents Behavior is more closely tied to political identity Can occur with or without ideological polarization ○ Affective polarization Partisanship vs ideological polarization ○ You can identity with the republican party and still be a moderate ○ Partisanship: psychological attachment, social identification, “teams”  Not necessarily about policy preferences, attitudes, or ideology But it might AFFECT ideological polarization Elite polarization vs mass polarization ○ Elites- office holders, party officials, policy intellectuals, activists, etc. ○ Mass public- voters and citizens ○ Elite and mass polarization don’t always go together Sorting vs ideological polarization ○ Sorting- citizens get “sorted” into political parties that match their preferences or ideological leanings Party-driven: choosing ideology / changing ideology to match party they identify with Ideology-driven: choosing parties that align with their preferences / ideology ○ Ideological consistency / belief constraint (converse)- one’s preferences on an issue can predict their preferences on other issues Who is polarized? ○ Members of congress (& state legislatures) are very ideologically polarized ○ Currently, we’re near a high There has been increasing ideological polarization in congress since the mid-1960s (low polarization 1940s-1960s) Measuring elite polarization: Roll call votes, party voting scores (% of votes that match the majority of their party) ○ Hard to compare over time or narrow down to specifics Interest group scores: interest groups pick a number of roll call votes and “tally” the percentage of times that each member votes the “right way,” according to the interest group ○ Not a broad measure because interest groups are specified on their issues ○ Can be “lumpy” (a lot of 0s and 100s) ○ Hard to compare over time ○ Votes counted may be strategically selected to “prove” polarization Today, we usually use roll call votes, but with ideal point estimation: ○ Spatial model of voting ○ Assume that members of congress have ideological positions, and predict “ye” or “nay” votes based on which vote will put their result closer to their ideal point The most common is DW-NOMINATE Can calculate party means / medians ○ Ideal points are not just personal preferences. They are based on partisanship, constituency preferences, etc. Not what’s in their “heart of hearts”  ○ Usually pretty stable for legislators over time ○ Predictive over a wide variety of issues Other measures: ○ Surveys of legislation (NPAT) Recent decades, low response rates, validity? Campaign contributions / bill cosponsorship There’s not often DW NOMINATE scores for people running against incumbents ○ Text analysis ○ More belief constraint / ideological thinking among legislators than the public ○ Ideological polarization among citizens has not increased nearly as much, and any notable increase didn’t start until much later (1990s) ○ Almost all scientists agree that citizens have been better sorted into the two major parties ○ Abramowitz vs fiorina Why is polarization bad? ○ Conflict, gridlock, lack of compromise Unproductive ○ BUT, it might lead to voters having clearer choices (a pro), increased accountability (a pro), might lead to calls to address social problems (a pro) Responsible party theory– parties should have distinct platforms to give people choices ○ Could lead to violence (bad) What issues divide congress the most? ○ These days… all of them ○ In the 1960s, sovereignty and international affairs were consensus issues, but not anymore Are both parties responsible for polarization? ○ Republicans are slightly more extreme in their polarization (according to DW-NOMINATE) They have become more conservative than democrats have become more liberal (though both are moving) ○ Not much movement among white democrats, but more-so black / latino / etc democrats Are state legislatures polarized? ○ Yes (over the last 20 years) Why is it important that at both the federal and state levels, polarization is similar in lower and upper houses ○ Gerrymandering? ○ If gerrymandering were causing polarization, the senate shouldn’t be polarized (because there’s 2 per state and no variability), but it is Are the courts polarized? ○ Yes, but not as much as since 2000 or so  Is the media polarized? ○ Very difficult to define bias in the media Scholars tend to measure “slant” Is the public polarized? ○ Major debate in political science ○ Expression of extreme policy positions hasn’t changed that much ○ Partisan sorting – a strengthening of the association between party ID and policy positions – has occurred Fiorina = sorting and polarized choices Traces of polarization come from elites Average american holds mostly moderate opinions Vs Abramowitz = polarization amongst the engaged and well-informed At a rate similar to elites but a little delayed ○ Both authors are trying to measure ideological polarization ^^ What they want to know is if members of the public have more extreme policy positions than they used to ○ Fiorina: Extreme positions are not much more common than they used to be Lack of bimodality Lack of growth in correlation between positions on different issues Actually some increasing agreement on some issues (civil rights, etc.) Small but growing disagreements between democrats and republicans Argued that there was not much polarization among the public, and thus no culture war Had five claims: “Moderateness” of the public Partisan polarization is almost entirely an elite phenomenon Differences between red and blue states aren’t that large Social cleavages are modest (we’re less different than we think) Polarization of elites depresses voter turnout His claim was warmly accepted by the public / mass media because it appealed to the populist ethos of the nation They don’t want to think the country is divided ○ Abramowitz: Argues that fiorina is wrong, and that we should focus on the citizens that care and have knowledge Things are very different among the engaged and informed But is he demonstrating this convincingly? It’s clear that partisan sorting has increased… but does it transfer to ideological polarization? ○ Evidence that sorting has occurred:  Ideology-driven sorting (selecting party based on views) vs party-driven (selecting positions based on partisanship) Party view does not align with our ideal view of democracy Panel data suggests party-driven sorting is more prominent Party moves first, public moves later Awareness and importance of partisan issue differences may matter Increasing correlation between party ID and issue positions Show that ideological thinking has increased But is this the same as polarization? His response / data regarding partisan polarization: Large proportions of democrats are on the liberal side, and large portions of republicans are on the conservative side Increasing difference in presidential approval by party Increasing difference in mean ideology by party Regarding regional polarization: Party ID is very different in red and blue states ○ As well as issue positions Presidential elections are less competitive at the state level (because they’re usually red or blue) ○ Is the public moderate? We know most people are keen to select the middle of the road option when offered. Maybe they want to downplay their opinions But it could also be the case that they just don’t KNOW or CARE Many moderates might not be committed to moderate viewpoints ○ Is there a “culture war” ? Issues like abortion, homosexuality, and gun rights are only slightly more bimodal than economic issues Economic issues are generally more important when voting Story may be different for affective polarization (increasing dislike of members of the partisan/ideological outgroup) ○ “Affect,” not ideology ○ Increasing affective polarization over time May be driven by economic ideology Can increased discriminatory behavior Role of partisan sorting ○ Religious polarization: Biggest divide is between religious and secular votes Largest divide on issues like abortion, but other issues too ○ Polarization and participation:  Lots of participation in 2004 The more ideologically extreme & knowledgeable people were more likely to participate ○ Summary: lack of consensus on mass polarization. Sorting is clear, but is it really polarization? Is sorting worrisome? What are the CAUSES of polarization? (mccarty chapter 5) Polarization low from the 1930s to 1960s ○ Consensus on expanded role of federal government (depression & WWII) ○ Income growth, new deal democratic coalition, ethnic homogeneity Was polarization in the 19th century similar to polarization today? ○ Dramatic rise in wealth inequality, intense partisan competition for control of government ○ Different party stances: republicans favored centralization, civil rights, etc. Southern realignment ○ Pre realignment = one party (democratic) south, three party US Northern & southern democrats cooperated on presidential nominations ⅔ rule meant candidates friendly to southern democrats Goldwater candidacy 1964 → south solidly republican by 1972 South was a slave region ○ Cause of realignment = push for civil rights by northern dems → republican elites in south oppose this → conservative southerners move to republican party But change may have started a little earlier than that ○ White southerners became strongly republican ○ Racially conservative whites in the south left the democratic party earlier Correlation between economic inequality and polarization ○ Seem to move in tandem ○ Both shot up in the mid 1970s ○ But we can’t see which comes first ○ Recent evidence shows that inequality polarized state legislatures Reducing polarization may require reducing inequality? ○ Biggest factor according to mccarty Party leaders and polarization ○ Polarization → extreme leadership in legislatures Extreme leaders have incentives to foster polarization Evidence is mixed but mostly positive ○ Agenda control Majority party controls agenda Probably doesn’t account for that big of a shift in polarization ○ Rising competition for congressional majorities Low polarization when one party was dominant Now, elections are more competitive Little incentive to work with opposing party on legislation  ○ gridlock Majority power uses power to keep minority party at bay ○ Direction of causation? Maybe it’s the other way around ○ Why don’t more moderates run for congress then? primaries. Extremists vote most in primaries and they would never get elected from the start Mccarty suggests evidence for this is not all that strong, though Reduced influence of moderates on policy Female candidates tend to be more moderate Implications for representation? If they won more, congress might be more moderate Is the media responsible? ○ Maybe modest effects ○ Selective exposure ○ Persuasion Newspaper slant mattered much less than the level of information on opinions Less reading → less knowledge ○ Relative entertainment preference (and availability) Few true echo chambers Extreme sites don’t have that much readership Evidence for modest effects ^^ ○ Media market / congressional district congruence More coverage of legislator → better representation More coverage → less partisan voting ○ Media might depolarize people in some cases Nationalization of media Can connect AND divide people Machine learning (algorithms) and microtargeting of ads Some evidence suggests affective polarization grows faster among people who DON'T use social media Is the US unique with polarization? ○ Comparatively high level of polarization compared to other countries per elite and voter placement of parties, but not per self-placements of party constituents Does electoral law affect legislative polarization? (chapter 6) Suggestions: gerrymandered districts, partisan primaries, campaign finance How much does polarization reflect geographic sorting? ○ Geographic sorting- liberal democrats represent liberal districts and conservative republicans represent conservative districts ○ Divergence- democratic and republican legislators represent otherwise identical districts in increasingly extreme ways  Support of author Legislative polarization reflects mostly divergence Suggests that drawing more moderate districts WONT reduce polarization Gerrymandering doesn’t cause polarization Doesn’t produce safe districts We know this because the senate has polarized the same way as the house ○ There’s no redistricting in the senate house members with one or two districts have become more extreme ○ They can’t redistrict, and the trend still shows, so it busts the theory of gerrymandering Distribution of partisanship across districts is similar to counties May be responsible for 10-15% of polarization maximum Do partisan primaries cause polarization? ○ Primary electorates aren’t that different from regular / moderate ○ Different primary systems don’t seem to result in more moderate candidates, so no Campaign finance? ○ While labor unions donate mainly to democrats, corporations donate to both (aka not ideologically) ○ Individual donations (vs PACS, etc.) Much more ideological States with no legal limits on individual contributions have more extreme legislators Individual contributions really have the potential to polarize elected officials ○ These candidates need money to run campaigns States with fewer limits on PAC contributions are LESS polarized Do not influence polarization that much ○ Weak parties might actually be contributing to polarization Median voter theorem (competition?) ○ Alternate view: parties are basically coalitions of interest groups that demand more extreme politics Would a different electoral system reduce polarization? ○ Duverger’s law- when you use plurality rule (winner takes all), electoral systems tend to support only two parties Two party system, binary choices → polarization Might depress turnout (at least for the lesser informed / engaged and thus lesser ideologically extreme) There should be an incentive to moderates in the two-party system Multi-party proportional representation systems might foster extreme parties  ○ Ranked Choice Voting? Still winner takes all but more of a process Voters rank. If candidate gets majority of first-place votes, they win. If not, the last ranked candidate is dropped and the process is repeated Might advantage moderates, reduce negativity, raise turnout Evidence is mixed Turnout is sometimes REDUCED, especially among racial and ethnic minority groups theoretically, simpler methods would increase turnout more Polarization on BLM (Boudreau et al): ○ Broad conclusion: broad bipartisan support for BLM and the proposals to address police violence ○ Information about groups that support or oppose these proposals polarizes partisans’ opinions Polarization doesn’t happen among supporters of BLM ○ Democrats and even republicans who support BLM express high levels of support for the proposals regardless of the information they receive ○ Elites are polarized on the issue but the public is (mostly) not How does this fit into the “elite polarization drives mass polarization” narrative ? The four P’s of politics: ○ When we talk about translating preferences into policy, we need to focus more on procedures / rules ○ Players ○ Preferences ○ Policies ○ Procedures: When thinking about how legislation is passed, we often think about the median voter (whether median constituent or median legislator) Median voter theorem- in a majority rule election, the median voter’s preference with beat any other option ○ The candidate with the ideological position closest to the median voter (usually less extreme on the spectrum) will win ○ Population of voters doesn’t need to have normally-distributed preferences. The theorem works no matter what Doesn’t have to be in the middle of the ideological spectrum Depends on who turns out, what the distribution is, etc. Why it’s so powerful  ○ Necessary conditions Only two options Single-policy dimension Majority rules voting Voters with single-peaked preferences Everyone votes ○ Gives us a way to predict outcomes Works better for predicting legislators than the general public because members of congress usually think more ideologically than the general public High stakes, clearly defined and well-understood procedures ○ Suggests there should be an incentive to be more moderate ○ Proportion of people who are very unhappy with the outcome is minimized, and proportion who is happy is maximized The proper role for the public (lippmann) = electing representatives “We must abandon the notion that the people govern… we must say that the popular will does not direct continuously but that it intervenes occasionally” ○ By the occasional mobilizations as a majority, people support or oppose individuals (and vote) Congress: the electoral connection (mayhew): ○ What drives members of congress is that they want to get re-elected It’s their main goal Indicates mayhew would not be a fan of term limits ○ Candidates won’t care about their constituents wants if they don’t have to worry about getting re-elected Subgoals to do this, however, include: Advertising ○ Build a brand name ○ Want to convince voters they have strong personal characteristics Credit claiming ○ Particularized benefits Emphasizing benefits to certain subgroups Want to be able to take credit for things that would make voters vote for them Position taking ○ Addressing the full chamber ○ Statements to the media  ○ Roll-calls ○ Incumbent advantage Easier to pursue those subgoals Easier to build a brand name if you’re in the news all the time, easier to take credit for things if you’re already in legislation, etc. APO Chapter 9: Elections as Instruments of Popular Control Do voters act rationally? ○ Certain conditions must be met if they want to: Candidates must offer meaningful choices and carry out campaign pledges Voters should be at least somewhat well-informed and vote for the candidate that takes the positions most similar to their own Leaders will be most responsive to citizens when they realize citizens can throw them out of office (through re-election) Political campaigns and the voter ○ Party ID is the most important factor Only a small percentage of partisans “defect” to the other candidate in elections Independents play a large role in elections ○ But citizen’s preferences aren’t the only thing that determines the election TURNOUT (% of voting age / eligible population / registered voters) is important Candidates shouldn’t just try to convince voters to vote for them, but also just to turn out! It is important how you measure turnout, though ○ Voting turnout dropped when voting age was dropped to 18 (young people aren’t as likely to vote) ○ Most commonly used: % of voting eligible Doesn’t count those incarcerated, etc. Turnout has varied widely over american history ○ In general, more highly-educated, wealthier people are more likely to vote Voter’s paradox: why don’t people vote → why DO people vote? ○ B = the differential benefit you get if your candidate wins Utility (preferred candidate winning) - utility (other candidate winning) ○ p = the probability that your vote will make or break a tie As the size of the electorate goes up, p usually decreases Usually a VERY small number ○ C = cost of voting Working, kids, things to do, time taken to learn about candidates, etc.  ○ V = expected utility of voting (vs not voting) You will get the benefits / disbenefits whether you vote or not. ○ V = p*B - C Most people will get a negative V number. So why do a lot of people still vote? Adding the “D” variable (sense of civic duty) ○ V = p*B - c +D Maybe it will push it to be positive? But this is not terribly satisfactory from a social-scientific view While this equation ^^ might be wrong, it’s not useless. ○ Highlights potential confounds to voting turnout, such as costs Time polls are open, registration struggles, etc. Closer races (p) have higher turnout, high stakes elections (B) have higher turnout too ○ Reasons people do vote (outside of rational choice) Social influence Simply when people ask you! ○ Could be a friend, family member, celebrity, or even political representative / party Mobilization They have the resources to do so Way to get to the polls, etc. Sense of duty The normal vote- the expected vote if 90% of partisans stick with their party and independents split evenly ○ If elections deviate from the normal vote, itis due to short-term partisan forces In individual districts, candidate quality and strong campaigns can also cause a difference from the expected normal vote How do the less-informed affect elections? ○ Campaigns will offer overly simplistic arguments to appeal to these voters More likely to be persuaded (less stuck in their beliefs) ○ Televised ads have strong but short-lived effects on voting preferences Psychological priming What about the normal vote in non-presidential elections? ○ Often much more lopsided Not as close as presidential But some districts are close Close elections = more party money going to campaigns and more campaigning in general  Floating voters ○ Inattentive vs uninformed (related but not the same) Easier to reach inattentive, but easier to sway uninformed ○ Low overall info in campaigns = less informed not being swayed either way and reverting back to partisanship ○ High overall info in campaigns = ??? (12/5) ○ More change over time among the less informed / floater voters Less likely to be swayed by partisanship and more likely to be swayed by campaigns But the turnout is also low among these voters Policy issues: ○ Partisanship drives a lot of what goes on in elections, but do people still vote based on policy? ○ In order to vote based on policy, voters have to be AWARE of policies and policy differences between candidates Voters also have to care about the issues Why people vote for who they vote for ○ Trying to avoid cognitive dissonance Psychological need to maintain consistency between opinions and actions ○ Projection If you don’t know a candidate’s positions but you like them, you’ll just assume they’re the positions you like ○ Rationalization If you like a candidate, you adopt the same policy preferences as them ○ Irrational voting? Shark attacks and college football losses = hurting the incumbent? Horrible weather = lower turnout These things are NOT related to the candidate but may affect voting decisions ○ At the end of the day though, it’s the power of partisanship Influences on voting ○ Partisanship ○ State of the economy ○ Attractiveness of candidate Candidate evaluations can be tricky but seem to explain some deviations from the normal vote ○ Issue proximity ○ Campaign strategies Sides et al (2018) Chapter 8: Highlights the importance of procedures ○ Puts focus on certain states (swing states) Was the 2016 election really about voter anger? (common explanation among commentators)  Two fundamentals in clinton’s favor = economy & evaluations of obama (generally good) Third fundamental = partisanship ○ Meant election would probably be close Overall: ○ Trump did well among white voters with lower levels of formal education Also higher turnout among those individuals ○ Attitudes about race and immigration actually mattered more than economic circumstances (at least the author says) ○ Trump won because it was a blend of usual and unusual factors Identity being unusually important Racial identity, etc. Measured economic anxiety when voting (and likelihood to vote for certain candidates) ○ But all questions were about personal financial situation, AKA pocketbook voting But we know a lot of people vote sociotropically However, racial resentment was pretty strongly correlated with sociotropic economic evaluations Drop in black turnout & “the sleeping giant” – latino voters ○ Clinton didn’t do better than obama with blacks or latinos The highest glass ceiling ○ Clinton did not rally the women as much (in terms of turnout) as trump rallied the men Importance of electoral system choice (norris ch 8): Proportionality (how reflective of population it is) is typically higher under higher district margins (how many people get elected per district) Regional / smaller parties do better under plurality and majority runoff ○ Second largest parties get disadvantages by majority runoff Parties in government have a strong tendency to prefer the status quo electoral system (the current system) ○ They got elected by that system, so they want to maintain it Classification of systems: ○ Plurality / Majoritarian Plurality elections “First past the post” “Winner takes all” Single member districts, each voter has one vote Bad for minor / minority parties unless they are highly concentrated in one area Second ballot majority runoff Alternative vote Preference voting / rank votes Need majority to win, but if nobody gets majority first time, the candidate with least vote gets out and we re-do the vote  ○ Semi-proportional systems Cumulative vote, limited vote Single transferable vote Parties put forth as many candidates as they think can win in each district ○ But if they put forth too many, the votes will be spread too thin ○ Proportional representation systems Party list system Vote for party, not candidate ○ Party will place candidate after Open list: voters select party and rank candidates within that party Closed lost: party leadership determines order of candidates, and voters only get to choose party Electoral formulas: highest average Normative evaluation of electoral systems: ○ Government effectiveness Strong, single-party governments Majoritarian systems promote this ○ Responsive and accountable government In a two-party system, small swing in votes can cause major change in legislature Incentives or constituency service ○ Fairness to minor parties Proportional systems are better at this Majoritarian systems penalize small parties Many “wasted” votes ○ Social representation Class, race, gender Descriptive representation (representation based on experiences rather than characteristics) Proportional systems better at this Consequences of electoral systems ○ Party system Duverger’s law: plurality rule favors two party systems while proportional representation favors multi-party systems ○ Proportionality of votes to seats PR increases proportionality (vs plurality or majority) ○ Single-party vs coalition governments Majoritarian systems are better at providing stable and responsive single-party governments ○ Incentives for casework Higher in single-member districts  No worries about credit being spread between multiple people or taken… if you help someone out, YOU take credit for it ○ Electoral turnout Higher in PR systems More people feel close to a party Executive choice: parliamentary vs presidential ○ Parliamentary: elect rep separately than in the election for legislature Usually the winning party chooses a “prime minister” ○ Presidential: president is elected by voters / electoral college ○ Some systems are in between the two ^^ Legislative elections: majoritarian vs proportional representation ○ Majoritarian Almost always have single-member districts Usually plurality voting rules ○ Proportional Multi-member districts District magnitude = number of representatives per district Usually based on votes for parties rather than votes for candidates Various rules / formulas for translating votes to seats ○ Ex: highest averages ○ Mixed systems Additional member system: some legislators elected through plurality, some elected through closed-lists (PR) RULES ARE NOT NEUTRAL Chapter 10: The Public and Its Elected Leaders: Why elections and not lotteries? ○ Lotteries would be more representative ○ BUT a lot of concerns here What incentives do they have to act in the interest of the people? There’s no re-election… What makes elections work: ○ Think Mayhew… ○ Also think adam smith: self-interested behavior can be good for society ○ Also think collective action problems Elections as mitigating agency loss in a principal-agent problem Elections force legislators to pay attention to what their constituents want Why elections DON’T work perfectly: ○ Money in politics Makes legislators maybe pay attention to huge donors more Breaks electoral connection ○ Rules and procedures ○ Intra-party issues  Party constraints (keeping members from doing what they might want to do / deviating sometimes)