Patrick Henry's Speech at the Virginia Convention 1788 PDF

Patrick  Henry  Speech  in  the  Virginia  Convention,  5  June  1788   Mr.  Chairman—I  am  much  obliged  to  the  very  worthy  Gentleman  [Henry  Lee  of   Westmoreland]  for  his  encomium.  I  wish  I  was  possessed  ...

Patrick  Henry  Speech  in  the  Virginia  Convention,  5  June  1788   Mr.  Chairman—I  am  much  obliged  to  the  very  worthy  Gentleman  [Henry  Lee  of   Westmoreland]  for  his  encomium.  I  wish  I  was  possessed  of  talents,  or  possessed  of  any   thing,  that  might  enable  me  to  elucidate  this  great  subject.  I  am  not  free  from  suspicion:   I  am  apt  to  entertain  doubts:  I  rose  yesterday  to  ask  a  question,  which  arose  in  my  own   mind.  When  I  asked  that  question,  I  thought  the  meaning  of  my  interrogation  was   obvious:  The  fate  of  this  question  and  America  may  depend  on  this:  Have  they  said,  we   the  States?  Have  they  made  a  proposal  of  a  compact  between  States?  If  they  had,  this   would  be  a  confederation:  It  is  otherwise  most  clearly  a  consolidated  government.  The   question  turns,  Sir,  on  that  poor  little  thing—the  expression,  We,  the  people,  instead  of   the  States  of  America.  I  need  not  take  much  pains  to  shew,  that  the  principles  of  this   system,  are  extremely  pernicious,  impolitic,  and  dangerous.  Is  this  a  Monarchy,  like   England—a  compact  between  Prince  and  people;  ⟨which⟩  ⟨with⟩  checks  on  the   former,  to  secure  the  liberty  of  the  latter?  Is  this  a  Confederacy,  like  Holland—an   association  of  a  number  of  independent  States,  each  of  which  retain⟨s⟩  its  individual   sovereignty?  It  is  not  a  democracy,  wherein  the  people  retain  all  their  rights  securely.   Had  these  principles  been  adhered  to,  we  should  not  have  been  brought  to  this   alarming  transition,  from  a  Confederacy  to  a  consolidated  Government.  We  have  no   detail  of  those  great  considerations  which,  in  my  opinion,  ought  to  have  abounded   before  we  should  recur  to  a  government  of  this  kind.  Here  is  a  revolution  as  radical  as   that  which  separated  us  from  Great  Britain.  It  is  as  radical,  if  in  this  transition,  our  rights   and  privileges  are  endangered,  and  the  sovereignty  of  the  States  be  relinquished:  And   cannot  we  plainly  see,  that  this  is  actually  the  case?  The  rights  of  conscience,  trial  by   jury,  liberty  of  the  press,  all  your  immunities  and  franchises,  all  pretensions  to  human   rights  and  privileges,  are  rendered  insecure,  if  not  lost,  by  this  change  so  loudly  talked  of   by  some,  and  inconsiderately  by  others.  Is  this  tame  relinquishment  of  rights  worthy  of   freemen?  Is  it  worthy  of  that  manly  fortitude  that  ought  to  characterize  republicans:  It  is   said  eight  States  have  adopted  this  plan.  I  declare  that  if  twelve  States  and  an  half  had   adopted  it,  I  would  with  manly  firmness,  and  in  spite  of  an  erring  world,  reject  it.  You   are  not  to  inquire  how  your  trade  may  be  increased,  nor  how  you  are  to  become  a  great   and  powerful  people,  but  how  your  liberties  can  be  secured;  for  liberty  ought  to  be  the   direct  end  of  your  Government.  Having  premised  these  things,  I  shall,  with  the  aid  of  my   judgment  and  information,  which  I  confess  are  not  extensive,  go  into  the  discussion  of   this  system  more  minutely.  Is  it  necessary  for  your  liberty,  that  you  should  abandon   those  great  rights  by  the  adoption  of  this  system?  Is  the  relinquishment  of  the  trial  by   jury,  and  the  liberty  of  the  press,  necessary  for  your  liberty?  Will  the  abandonment  of   your  most  sacred  rights  tend  to  the  security  of  your  liberty?  Liberty  the  greatest  of  all   earthly  blessings—give  us  that  precious  jewel,  and  you  may  take  every  thing  else:  But  I   am  fearful  I  have  lived  long  enough  to  become  an  old  fashioned  fellow:  Perhaps  an   invincible  attachment  to  the  dearest  rights  of  man,  may,  in  these  refined  enlightened   days,  be  deemed  old  fashioned:  If  so,  I  am  contented  to  be  so:  I  say,  the  time  has  been,   when  every  ⟨pore⟩  ⟨pulse⟩  of  my  heart  beat  for  American  liberty,  and  which,  I  believe,   had  a  counterpart  in  the  breast  of  every  true  American:  But  suspicions  have  gone   forth—suspicions  of  my  integrity—publicly  reported  that  my  professions  are  not  real— 23  years  ago  was  I  supposed  a  traitor  to  my  country:  I  was  then  said  to  be  a  bane  of   sedition,  because  I  supported  the  rights  of  my  country:  I  may  be  thought  suspicious   when  I  say  our  privileges  and  rights  are  in  danger:  But,  Sir,  a  number  of  the  people  of   this  country  are  weak  enough  to  think  these  things  are  too  true:  I  am  happy  to  find  that   the  Honorable  Gentleman  on  the  other  side  [Henry  Lee  of  Westmoreland],  declares  they   are  groundless:  But,  Sir,  suspicion  is  a  virtue,  as  long  as  its  object  is  the  preservation  of   the  public  good,  and  as  long  as  it  stays  within  proper  bounds:  Should  it  fall  on  me,  I  am   contented:  Conscious  rectitude  is  a  powerful  consolation:  I  trust,  there  are  many  who   think  my  professions  for  the  public  good  to  be  real.  Let  your  suspicion  look  to  both   sides:  There  are  many  on  the  other  side,  who,  possibly  may  have  been  persuaded  of  the   necessity  of  these  measures,  which  I  conceive  to  be  dangerous  to  your  liberty.  Guard   with  jealous  attention  the  public  liberty.  Suspect  every  one  who  approaches  that  jewel.   Unfortunately,  nothing  will  preserve  it,  but  downright  force:  Whenever  you  give  up  that   force,  you  are  inevitably  ruined.  I  am  answered  by  Gentlemen,  that  though  I  might   speak  of  terrors,  yet  the  fact  was,  that  we  were  surrounded  by  none  of  the  dangers  I   apprehended.  I  conceive  this  new  Government  to  be  one  of  those  dangers:  It  has   produced  those  horrors,  which  distress  many  of  our  best  citizens.  We  are  come  hither  to   preserve  the  poor  Commonwealth  of  Virginia,  if  it  can  be  possibly  done:  Something   must  be  done  to  preserve  your  liberty  and  mine:  The  Confederation;  this  same  despised   Government,  merits,  in  my  opinion,  the  highest  encomium:  It  carried  us  through  a  long   and  dangerous  war:  It  rendered  us  victorious  in  that  bloody  conflict  with  a  powerful   nation:  It  has  secured  us  a  territory  greater  than  any  European  Monarch  possesses:  And   shall  a  Government  which  has  been  thus  strong  and  vigorous,  be  accused  of  imbecility   and  abandoned  for  want  of  energy?  Consider  what  you  are  about  to  do  before  you  part   with  this  Government.  Take  longer  time  in  reckoning  things:  revolutions  like  this  have   happened  in  almost  every  country  in  Europe:  Similar  examples  are  to  be  found  in   ancient  Greece  and  ancient  Rome:  Instances  of  the  people  losing  their  liberty  by  their   own  carelessness  and  the  ambition  of  a  few.  We  are  cautioned  by  the  Honorable   Gentleman  who  presides  [Edmund  Pendleton],  against  faction  and  turbulence:  I   acknowledge  that  licentiousness  is  dangerous,  and  that  it  ought  to  be  provided  against:  I   acknowledge  also  the  new  form  of  Government  may  effectually  prevent  it:  Yet,  there  is   another  thing  it  will  as  effectually  do;  it  will  oppress  and  ruin  the  people.  There  are   sufficient  guards  placed  against  sedition  and  licentiousness:  For  when  power  is  given  to   this  Government  to  suppress  these,  or,  for  any  other  purpose,  the  language  it  assumes   is  clear,  express,  and  unequivocal,  but  when  this  Constitution  speaks  of  privileges,  there   is  an  ambiguity,  Sir,  a  fatal  ambiguity;—an  ambiguity  which  is  very  astonishing:  In  the   clause  under  consideration,  there  is  the  strangest  language  that  I  can  conceive.  I  mean,   when  it  says,  that  there  shall  not  be  more  Representatives,  than  one  for  every  30,000.   Now,  Sir,  how  easy  is  it  to  evade  this  privilege?  “The  number  shall  not  exceed  one  for   every  30,000.”  This  may  be  satisfied  by  one  Representative  from  each  State.  Let  our   numbers  be  ever  so  great,  this  immence  continent,  may,  by  this  artful  expression,  be   reduced  to  have  but  13  Representatives:  I  confess  this  construction  is  not  natural;  but   the  ambiguity  of  the  expression  lays  a  good  ground  for  a  quarrel.  Why  was  it  not  clearly   and  unequivocally  expressed,  that  they  should  be  entitled  to  have  one  for  every  30,000?   This  would  have  obviated  all  disputes;  and  was  this  difficult  to  be  done?  What  is  the   inference?  When  population  increases,  and  a  State  shall  send  Representatives  in  this   proportion,  Congress  may  remand  them,  because  the  right  of  having  one  for  every   30,000  is  not  clearly  expressed:  This  possibility  of  reducing  the  number  to  one  for  each   State,  approximates  to  probability  by  that  other  expression,  “but  each  State  shall  at   least  have  one  Representative.”  Now  is  it  not  clear  that  from  the  first  expression,  the   number  might  be  reduced  so  much,  that  some  States  should  have  no  Representative  at   all,  were  it  not  for  the  insertion  of  this  last  expression?  And  as  this  is  the  only  restriction   upon  them,  we  may  fairly  conclude  that  they  may  restrain  the  number  to  one  from  each   State:  Perhaps  the  same  horrors  may  hang  over  my  mind  again.  I  shall  be  told  I  am   continually  afraid:  But,  Sir,  I  have  strong  cause  of  apprehension:  In  some  parts  of  the   plan  before  you,  the  great  rights  of  freemen  are  endangered,  in  other  parts  absolutely   taken  away.  How  does  your  trial  by  jury  stand?  In  civil  cases  gone—not  sufficiently   secured  in  criminal—this  best  privilege  is  gone:  But  we  are  told  that  we  need  not  fear,   because  those  in  power  being  our  Representatives,  will  not  abuse  the  powers  we  put  in   their  hands:  I  am  not  well  versed  in  history,  but  I  will  submit  to  your  recollection,   whether  liberty  has  been  destroyed  most  often  by  the  licentiousness  of  the  people,  or   by  the  tyranny  of  rulers?  I  imagine,  Sir,  you  will  find  the  balance  on  the  side  of  tyranny:   Happy  will  you  be  if  you  miss  the  fate  of  those  nations,  who,  omitting  to  resist  their   oppressors,  or  negligently  suffering  their  liberty  to  be  wrested  from  them,  have  groaned   under  intolerable  despotism.  Most  of  the  human  race  are  now  in  this  deplorable   condition:  and  those  nations  who  have  gone  in  search  of  grandeur,  power  and  splendor,   have  also  fallen  a  sacrifice,  and  been  the  victims  of  their  own  folly:  While  they  acquired   those  visionary  blessings,  they  lost  their  freedom.  My  great  objection  to  this   Government  is,  that  it  does  not  leave  us  the  means  of  defending  our  rights;  or,  of   waging  war  against  tyrants:  It  is  urged  by  some  Gentlemen,  that  this  new  plan  will  bring   us  an  acquisition  of  strength,  an  army,  and  the  militia  of  the  States:  This  is  an  idea   extremely  ridiculous:  Gentlemen  cannot  be  in  earnest.  This  acquisition  will  trample  on   your  fallen  liberty:  Let  my  beloved  Americans  guard  against  that  fatal  lethargy  that  has   pervaded  the  universe:  Have  we  the  means  of  resisting  disciplined  armies,  when  our   only  defence,  the  militia  is  put  into  the  hands  of  Congress?  The  Honorable  Gentleman   said,  that  great  danger  would  ensue  if  the  Convention  rose  without  adopting  this   system:  I  ask,  where  is  that  danger?  I  see  none:  Other  Gentlemen  have  told  us  within   these  walls,  that  the  Union  is  gone—or,  that  the  Union  will  be  gone:  Is  not  this  trifling   with  the  judgment  of  their  fellow-­‐citizens?  Till  they  tell  us  the  ground  of  their  fears,  I  will   consider  them  as  imaginary:  I  rose  to  make  enquiry  where  those  dangers  were;  they   could  make  no  answer:  I  believe  I  never  shall  have  that  answer:  Is  there  a  disposition  in   the  people  of  this  country  to  revolt  against  the  dominion  of  laws?  Has  there  been  a   single  tumult  in  Virginia?  Have  not  the  people  of  Virginia,  when  labouring  under  the   severest  pressure  of  accumulated  distresses,  manifested  the  most  cordial  acquiescence   in  the  execution  of  the  laws?  What  could  be  more  awful  than  their  unanimous   acquiescence  under  general  distresses?  Is  there  any  revolution  in  Virginia?  Whither  is   the  spirit  of  America  gone?  Whither  is  the  genius  of  America  fled?  It  was  but  yesterday,   when  our  enemies  marched  in  triumph  through  our  country:  Yet  the  people  of  this   country  could  not  be  appalled  by  their  pompous  armaments:  They  stopped  their  career,   and  victoriously  captured  them:  Where  is  the  peril  now  compared  to  that?  Some  minds   are  agitated  by  foreign  alarms:  Happily  for  us,  there  is  no  real  danger  from  Europe;  that   country  is  engaged  in  more  arduous  business;  from  that  quarter  there  is  no  cause  of   fear:  You  may  sleep  in  safety  forever  for  [i.e.,  from]  them.  Where  is  the  danger?  If,  Sir,   there  was  any,  I  would  recur  to  the  American  spirit  to  defend  us;—that  spirit  which  has   enabled  us  to  surmount  the  greatest  difficulties:  To  that  illustrious  spirit  I  address  my   most  fervent  prayer,  to  prevent  our  adopting  a  system  destructive  to  liberty.  Let  not   Gentlemen  be  told,  that  it  is  not  safe  to  reject  this  Government.  Wherefore  is  it  not   safe?  We  are  told  there  are  dangers;  but  those  dangers  are  ideal;  they  cannot  be   demonstrated:  To  encourage  us  to  adopt  it,  they  tell  us,  that  there  is  a  plain  easy  way  of   getting  amendments:  When  I  come  to  contemplate  this  part,  I  suppose  that  I  am  mad,   or,  that  my  countrymen  are  so:  The  way  to  amendment,  is,  in  my  conception,  shut.  Let   us  consider  this  plain  easy  way:  “The  Congress,  whenever  two-­‐thirds  of  both  Houses   shall  deem  it  necessary,  shall  propose  amendments  to  this  Constitution,  or,  on  the   application  of  the  Legislatures  of  two-­‐thirds  of  the  several  States,  shall  call  a  Convention   for  proposing  amendments,  which,  in  either  case,  shall  be  valid  to  all  intents  and   purposes,  as  part  of  this  Constitution,  when  ratified  by  the  Legislatures  of  three-­‐fourths   of  the  several  States,  or  by  Conventions  in  three-­‐fourths  thereof,  as  the  one  or  the  other   mode  of  ratification  may  be  proposed  by  the  Congress.  Provided,  that  no  amendment   which  may  be  made  prior  to  the  year  1808,  shall  in  any  manner  affect  the  first  and   fourth  clauses  in  the  ninth  section  of  the  first  article;  and  that  no  State,  without  its   consent,  shall  be  deprived  of  its  equal  suffrage  in  the  Senate.”  Hence  it  appears  that   three-­‐fourths  of  the  States  must  ultimately  agree  to  any  amendments  that  may  be   necessary.  Let  us  consider  the  consequences  of  this:  However  uncharitable  it  may   appear,  yet  I  must  tell  my  opinion,  that  the  most  unworthy  characters  may  get  into   power  and  prevent  the  introduction  of  amendments:  Let  us  suppose  (for  the  case  is   supposeable,  possible,  and  probable)  that  you  happen  to  deal  these  powers  to   unworthy  hands;  will  they  relinquish  powers  already  in  their  possession,  or,  agree  to   amendments?  Two-­‐thirds  of  the  Congress,  or,  of  the  State  Legislatures,  are  necessary   even  to  propose  amendments:  If  one-­‐third  of  these  be  unworthy  men,  they  may  prevent   the  application  for  amendments;  but  what  is  destructive  and  mischievous  is,  that  three-­‐ fourths  of  the  State  Legislatures,  or  of  State  Conventions,  must  concur  in  the   amendments  when  proposed:  In  such  numerous  bodies,  there  must  necessarily  be  some   designing  bad  men:  To  suppose  that  so  large  a  number  as  three-­‐fourths  of  the  States   will  concur,  is  to  suppose  that  they  will  possess  genius,  intelligence,  and  integrity,   approaching  to  miraculous.  It  would  indeed  be  miraculous  that  they  should  concur  in   the  same  amendments,  or,  even  in  such  as  would  bear  some  likeness  to  one  another.   For  four  of  the  smallest  States,  that  do  not  collectively  contain  one-­‐tenth  part  of  the   population  of  the  United  States,  may  obstruct  the  most  salutary  and  necessary   amendments:  Nay,  in  these  four  States,  six  tenths  of  the  people  may  reject  these   amendments;  and  suppose,  that  amendments  shall  be  opposed  to  amendments  (which   is  highly  probable)  Is  it  possible,  that  three-­‐fourths  can  ever  agree  to  the  same   amendments?  A  bare  majority  in  these  four  small  States  may  hinder  the  adoption  of   amendments;  so  that  we  may  fairly  and  justly  conclude,  that  one-­‐twentieth  part  of  the   American  people,  may  prevent  the  removal  of  the  most  grievous  inconveniencies  and   oppression,  by  refusing  to  accede  to  amendments.  A  trifling  minority  may  reject  the   most  salutary  amendments.  Is  this  an  easy  mode  of  securing  the  public  liberty?  It  is,  Sir,   a  most  fearful  situation,  when  the  most  contemptible  minority  can  prevent  the   alteration  of  the  most  oppressive  Government;  for  it  may  in  many  respects  prove  to  be   such:  Is  this  the  spirit  of  republicanism?  What,  Sir,  is  the  genius  of  democracy?  Let  me   read  that  clause  of  the  Bill  of  Rights  of  Virginia,  which  relates  to  this:  3d  cl.  “That   Government  is  or  ought  to  be  instituted  for  the  common  benefit,  protection,  and   security  of  the  people,  nation,  or  community:  Of  all  the  various  modes  and  forms  of   Government,  that  is  best  which  is  capable  of  producing  the  greatest  degree  of  happiness   and  safety,  and  is  most  effectually  secured  against  the  danger  of  mal-­‐administration,   and  that  whenever  any  Government  shall  be  found  inadequate,  or  contrary  to  these   purposes,  a  majority  of  the  community  hath,  an  undubitable,  unalienable  and   indefeasible  right  to  reform,  alter,  or  abolish  it,  in  such  manner  as  shall  be  judged  most   conducive  to  the  public  weal.”  This,  Sir,  is  the  language  of  democracy;  that  a  majority  of   the  community  have  a  right  to  alter  their  Government  when  found  to  be  oppressive:  But   how  different  is  the  genius  of  your  new  Constitution  from  this?  How  different  from  the   sentiments  of  freemen,  that  a  contemptible  minority  can  prevent  the  good  of  the   majority?  If  then  Gentlemen  standing  on  this  ground,  are  come  to  that  point,  that  they   are  willing  to  bind  themselves  and  their  posterity  to  be  oppressed,  I  am  amazed  and   inexpressibly  astonished.  If  this  be  the  opinion  of  the  majority,  I  must  submit;  but  to  me,   Sir,  it  appears  perilous  and  destructive:  I  cannot  help  thinking  so:  Perhaps  it  may  be  the   result  of  my  age;  these  may  be  feelings  natural  to  a  man  of  my  years,  when  the   American  spirit  has  left  him,  and  his  mental  powers,  like  the  members  of  the  body,  are   decayed.  If,  Sir,  amendments  are  left  to  the  twentieth  or  ⟨to⟩  the  tenth  part  of  the   people  of  America,  your  liberty  is  gone  forever.  We  have  heard  that  there  is  a  great  deal   of  bribery  practised  in  the  House  of  Commons  in  England;  and  that  many  of  the   members  raised  themselves  to  preferments,  by  selling  the  rights  of  the  people:  But,  Sir,   the  tenth  part  of  that  body  cannot  continue  oppressions  on  the  rest  of  the  people.   English  liberty  is  in  this  case,  on  a  firmer  foundation  than  American  liberty.  It  will  be   easily  contrived  to  procure  the  opposition  of  one  tenth  of  the  people  to  any  alteration,   however  judicious.  The  Honorable  Gentleman  who  presides  [Edmund  Pendleton],  told   us,  that  to  prevent  abuses  in  our  Government,  we  will  assemble  in  Convention,  recall   our  delegated  powers,  and  punish  our  servants  for  abusing  the  trust  reposed  in  them.   Oh,  Sir,  we  should  have  fine  times  indeed,  if  to  punish  tyrants,  it  were  only  sufficient  to   assemble  the  people.  Your  arms  wherewith  you  could  defend  yourselves,  are  gone;  and   you  have  no  longer  an  aristocratical;  no  longer  a  democratical  spirit.  Did  you  ever  read   of  any  revolution  in  any  nation,  brought  about  by  the  punishment  of  those  in  power,   inflicted  by  those  who  had  no  power  at  all?  You  read  of  a  riot  act  in  a  country  which  is   called  one  of  the  freest  in  the  world,  where  a  few  neighbours  cannot  assemble  without   the  risk  of  being  shot  by  a  hired  soldiery,  the  engines  of  despotism.  We  may  see  such  an   act  in  America.  A  standing  army  we  shall  have  also,  to  execute  the  execrable  commands   of  tyranny:  And  how  are  you  to  punish  them?  Will  you  order  them  to  be  punished?  Who   shall  obey  these  orders?  Will  your  Macebearer  be  a  match  for  a  disciplined  regiment?  In   what  situation  are  we  to  be?  The  clause  before  you  gives  a  power  of  direct  taxation,   unbounded  and  unlimitted:  Exclusive  power  of  Legislation  in  all  cases  whatsoever,  for   ten  miles  square;  and  over  all  places  purchased  for  the  erection  of  forts,  magazines,   arsenals,  dock-­‐yards,  &c.  What  resistance  could  be  made?  The  attempt  would  be   madness.  You  will  find  all  the  strength  of  this  country  in  the  hands  of  your  enemies:   Those  garrisons  will  naturally  be  the  strongest  places  in  the  country.  Your  militia  is  given   up  to  Congress  also  in  another  part  of  this  plan:  They  will  therefore  act  as  they  think   proper:  All  power  will  be  in  their  own  possession:  You  cannot  force  them  to  receive  their   punishment:  Of  what  service  would  militia  be  to  you,  when  most  probably  you  will  not   have  a  single  musket  in  the  State;  for  as  arms  are  to  be  provided  by  Congress,  they  may   or  may  not  furnish  them.  Let  me  here  call  your  attention  to  that  part  which  gives  the   Congress  power,  “To  provide  for  organizing,  arming,  and  disciplining  the  militia,  and  for   governing  such  part  of  them  as  may  be  employed  in  the  service  of  the  United  States,   reserving  to  the  States  respectively,  the  appointment  of  the  officers,  and  the  authority   of  training  the  militia,  according  to  the  discipline  prescribed  by  Congress.”  By  this,  Sir,   you  see  that  their  controul  over  our  last  and  best  defence,  is  unlimitted.  If  they  neglect   or  refuse  to  discipline  or  arm  our  militia,  they  will  be  useless:  The  States  can  do  neither,   this  power  being  exclusively  given  to  Congress:  The  power  of  appointing  officers  over   men  not  disciplined  or  armed,  is  ridiculous:  So  that  this  pretended  little  remains  of   power  left  to  the  States,  may,  at  the  pleasure  of  Congress,  be  rendered  nugatory.  Our   situation  will  be  deplorable  indeed:  Nor  can  we  ever  expect  to  get  this  government   amended,  since  I  have  already  shewn,  that  a  very  small  minority  may  prevent  it;  and   that  small  minority  interested  in  the  continuance  of  the  oppression:  Will  the  oppressor   let  go  the  oppressed?  Was  there  ever  an  instance?  Can  the  annals  of  mankind  exhibit   one  single  example,  where  rulers  overcharged  with  power,  willingly  let  go  the   oppressed,  though  solicited  and  requested  most  earnestly?  The  application  for   amendments  will  therefore  be  fruitless.  Sometimes  the  oppressed  have  got  loose  by   one  of  those  bloody  struggles  that  desolate  a  country.  ⟨But⟩  A  willing  relinquishment  of   power  is  one  of  those  things  which  human  nature  never  was,  nor  ever  will  be  capable   of:  The  Honorable  Gentleman’s  [Edmund  Pendleton]  observations  respecting  the   people’s  right  of  being  the  agents  in  the  formation  of  this  Government,  are  not  accurate   in  my  humble  conception.  The  distinction  between  a  National  Government  and  a   Confederacy  is  not  sufficiently  discerned.  Had  the  delegates  who  were  sent  to   Philadelphia  a  power  to  propose  a  Consolidated  Government  instead  of  a  Confederacy?   Were  they  not  deputed  by  States,  and  not  by  the  people?  The  assent  of  the  people  in   their  collective  capacity  is  not  necessary  to  the  formation  of  a  Federal  Government.  The   people  have  no  right  to  enter  into  leagues,  alliances,  or  confederations:  They  are  not  the   proper  agents  for  this  purpose:  States  and  sovereign  powers  are  the  only  proper  agents   for  this  kind  of  Government:  Shew  me  an  instance  where  the  people  have  exercised  this   business:  Has  it  not  always  gone  through  the  Legislatures?  I  refer  you  to  the  treaties   with  France,  Holland,  and  other  nations:  How  were  they  made?  Were  they  not  made  by   the  States?  Are  the  people  therefore  in  their  aggregate  capacity,  the  proper  persons  to   form  a  Confederacy?  This,  therefore,  ought  to  depend  on  the  consent  of  the   Legislatures;  the  people  having  never  sent  delegates  to  make  any  proposition  of   changing  the  Government.  Yet  I  must  say,  at  the  same  time,  that  it  was  made  on   grounds  the  most  pure,  and  perhaps  I  might  have  been  brought  to  consent  to  it  so  far  as   to  the  change  of  Government;  but  there  is  one  thing  in  it  which  I  never  would  acquiesce   in.  I  mean  the  changing  it  into  a  Consolidated  Government;  which  is  so  abhorrent  to  my   mind.  The  Honorable  Gentleman  then  went  on  to  the  figure  we  make  with  foreign   nations;  the  contemptible  one  we  make  in  France  and  Holland;  which,  according  to  the   substance  of  my  notes,  he  attributes  to  the  present  feeble  Government.  An  opinion  has   gone  forth,  we  find,  that  we  are  a  contemptible  people:  The  time  has  been  when  we   were  thought  otherwise:  Under  this  same  despised  Government,  we  commanded  the   respect  of  all  Europe:  Wherefore  are  we  now  reckoned  otherwise?  The  American  spirit   has  fled  from  hence:  It  has  gone  to  regions,  where  it  has  never  been  expected:  It  has   gone  to  the  people  of  France  in  search  of  a  splendid  Government—a  strong  energetic   Government.  Shall  we  imitate  the  example  of  those  nations  who  have  gone  from  a   simple  to  a  splendid  Government⟨?⟩  Are  those  nations  more  worthy  of  our  imitation?   What  can  make  an  adequate  satisfaction  to  them  for  the  loss  they  suffered  in  attaining   such  a  Government  for  the  loss  of  their  liberty?  If  we  admit  this  Consolidated   Government  it  will  be  because  we  like  a  great  splendid  one.  Some  way  or  other  we  must   be  a  great  and  mighty  empire;  we  must  have  an  army,  and  a  navy,  and  a  number  of   things:  When  the  American  spirit  was  in  its  youth,  the  language  of  America  was   different:  Liberty,  Sir,  was  then  the  primary  object.  We  are  descended  from  a  people   whose  Government  was  founded  on  liberty:  Our  glorious  forefathers  of  Great-­‐Britain,   made  liberty  the  foundation  of  every  thing.  That  country  is  become  a  great,  mighty,  and   splendid  nation;  not  because  their  Government  is  strong  and  energetic;  but,  Sir,  because   liberty  is  its  direct  end  and  foundation:  We  drew  the  spirit  of  liberty  from  our  British   ancestors;  by  that  spirit  we  have  triumphed  over  every  difficulty:  But  now,  Sir,  the   American  spirit,  assisted  by  the  ropes  and  chains  of  consolidation,  is  about  to  convert   this  country  ⟨in⟩to  a  powerful  and  mighty  empire:  If  you  make  the  citizens  of  this   country  agree  to  become  the  subjects  of  one  great  consolidated  empire  of  America,   your  Government  will  not  have  sufficient  energy  to  keep  them  together:  Such  a   Government  is  incompatible  with  the  genius  of  republicanism:  There  will  be  no  checks,   no  real  balances,  in  this  Government:  What  can  avail  your  specious  imaginary  balances,   your  rope-­‐dancing,  chain-­‐rattling,  ridiculous  ideal  checks  and  contrivances?  But,  Sir,  we   are  not  feared  by  foreigners;  we  do  not  make  nations  tremble:  Would  this,  Sir,   constitute  happiness,  or  secure  liberty?  I  trust,  Sir,  our  political  hemisphere  will  ever   direct  their  operations  to  the  security  of  those  objects.  Consider  our  situation,  Sir:  Go  to   the  poor  man,  ask  him  what  he  does;  he  will  inform  you,  that  he  enjoys  the  fruits  of  his   labour,  under  his  own  fig-­‐tree,  with  his  wife  and  children  around  him,  in  peace  and   security.  Go  to  every  other  member  of  the  society,  you  will  find  the  same  tranquil  ease   and  content;  you  will  find  no  alarms  or  disturbances⟨!⟩  Why  then  tell  us  of  dangers  to   terrify  us  into  an  adoption  of  this  new  ⟨form  of⟩  Government?  and  yet  who  knows  the   dangers  that  this  new  system  may  produce;  they  are  out  of  the  sight  of  the  common   people:  They  cannot  foresee  latent  consequences:  I  dread  the  operation  of  it  on  the   middling  and  lower  class  of  people:  It  is  for  them  I  fear  the  adoption  of  this  system.  I   fear  I  tire  the  patience  of  the  Committee,  but  I  beg  to  be  indulged  with  a  few  more   observations:  When  I  thus  profess  myself  an  advocate  for  the  liberty  of  the  people,  I   shall  be  told,  I  am  a  designing  man,  that  I  am  to  be  a  great  man,  that  I  am  to  be  a   demagogue;  and  many  similar  illiberal  insinuations  will  be  thrown  out;  but,  Sir,   conscious  rectitude,  out-­‐weighs  these  things  with  me:  I  see  great  jeopardy  in  this  new   Government.  I  see  none  from  our  present  one:  I  hope  some  Gentleman  or  other  will   bring  forth,  in  full  array,  those  dangers,  if  there  be  any,  that  we  may  see  and  touch   them:  I  have  said  that  I  thought  this  a  Consolidated  Government:  I  will  now  prove  it.  Will   the  great  rights  of  the  people  be  secured  by  this  Government?  Suppose  it  should  prove   oppressive,  how  can  it  be  altered?  Our  Bill  of  Rights  declares,  “That  a  majority  of  the   community  hath  an  undubitable,  unalienable,  and  indefeasible  right  to  reform,  alter,  or   abolish  it,  in  such  manner  as  shall  be  judged  most  conducive  to  the  public  weal.    I  have   just  proved  that  one  tenth,  or  less,  of  the  people  of  America,  a  most  despicable  minority   may  prevent  this  reform  or  alteration.  Suppose  the  people  of  Virginia  should  wish  to   alter  their  Government,  can  a  majority  of  them  do  it?  No,  because  they  are  connected   with  other  men;  or,  in  other  words,  consolidated  with  other  States:  When  the  people  of   Virginia  at  a  future  day  shall  wish  to  alter  their  Government,  though  they  should  be   unanimous  in  this  desire,  yet  they  may  be  prevented  therefrom  by  a  despicable  minority   at  the  extremity  of  the  United  States:  The  founders  of  your  own  Constitution  made  your   Government  changeable:  But  the  power  of  changing  it  is  gone  from  you!  Whither  is  it   gone?  It  is  placed  in  the  same  hands  that  hold  the  rights  of  twelve  other  States;  and   those  who  hold  those  rights,  have  right  and  power  to  keep  them:  It  is  not  the  particular   Government  of  Virginia:  One  of  the  leading  features  of  that  Government  is,  that  a   majority  can  alter  it,  when  necessary  for  the  public  good.  This  Government  is  not  a   Virginian  but  an  American  Government.  Is  it  not  therefore  a  Consolidated  Government?   The  sixth  clause  of  your  Bill  of  Rights  tells  you,  “That  elections  of  members  to  serve  as   Representatives  of  the  people  in  Assembly,  ought  to  be  free,  and  that  all  men  having   sufficient  evidence  of  permanent  common  interest  with,  and  attachment  to  the   community,  have  the  right  of  suffrage,  and  cannot  be  taxed  or  deprived  of  their  property   for  public  uses,  without  their  own  consent,  or  that  of  their  Representatives  so  elected,   nor  bound  by  any  law  to  which  they  have  not  in  like  manner  assented  for  the  public   good.”  But  what  does  this  Constitution  say?  The  clause  under  consideration  gives  an   unlimitted  and  unbounded  power  of  taxation:  Suppose  every  delegate  from  Virginia   opposes  a  law  laying  a  tax,  what  will  it  avail?  They  are  opposed  by  a  majority:  Eleven   members  can  destroy  their  efforts:  Those  feeble  ten  cannot  prevent  the  passing  the   most  oppressive  tax  law.  So  that  in  direct  opposition  to  the  spirit  and  express  language   of  your  Declaration  of  Rights,  you  are  taxed,  not  by  your  own  consent,  but  by  people   who  have  no  connection  with  you.  The  next  clause  of  the  Bill  of  Rights  tells  you,  “That  all   power  of  suspending  law,  or  the  execution  of  laws,  by  any  authority  without  the  consent   of  the  Representatives  of  the  people,  is  injurious  to  their  rights,  and  ought  not  to  be   exercised.”  This  tells  us  that  there  can  be  no  suspension  of  Government,  or  laws  without   our  own  consent:  Yet  this  Constitution  can  counteract  and  suspend  any  of  our  laws,  that   contravene  its  oppressive  operation;  for  they  have  the  power  of  direct  taxation;  which   suspends  our  Bill  of  Rights;  and  it  is  expressly  provided,  that  they  can  make  all  laws   necessary  for  carrying  their  powers  into  execution;  and  it  is  declared  paramount  to  the   laws  and  constitutions  of  the  States.  Consider  how  the  only  remaining  defence  we  have   left  is  destroyed  in  this  manner:  Besides  the  expences  of  maintaining  the  Senate  and   other  House  in  as  much  splendor  as  they  please,  there  is  to  be  a  great  and  mighty   President,  with  very  extensive  powers;  the  powers  of  a  King:  He  is  to  be  supported  in   extravagant  magnificence:  So  that  the  whole  of  our  property  may  be  taken  by  this   American  Government,  by  laying  what  taxes  they  please,  giving  themselves  what   salaries  they  please,  and  suspending  our  laws  at  their  pleasure:  I  might  be  thought  too   inquisitive,  but  I  believe  I  should  take  up  but  very  little  of  your  time  in  enumerating  the   little  power  that  is  left  to  the  Government  of  Virginia;  for  this  power  is  reduced  to  little   or  nothing:  Their  garrisons,  magazines,  arsenals,  and  forts,  which  will  be  situated  in  the   strongest  places  within  the  States:  Their  ten  miles  square,  with  all  the  fine  ornaments  of   human  life,  added  to  their  powers,  and  taken  from  the  States,  will  reduce  the  power  of   the  latter  to  nothing.  The  voice  of  tradition,  I  trust,  will  inform  posterity  of  our  struggles   for  freedom:  If  our  descendants  be  worthy  the  name  of  Americans,  they  will  preserve   and  hand  down  to  their  latest  posterity,  the  transactions  of  the  present  times;  and   though,  I  confess,  my  exclamations  are  not  worthy  the  hearing,  they  will  see  that  I  have   done  my  utmost  to  preserve  their  liberty:  For  I  never  will  give  up  the  power  of  direct   taxation,  but  for  a  scourge:  I  am  willing  to  give  it  conditionally;  that  is,  after   noncompliance  with  requisitions:  I  will  do  more,  Sir,  and  what  I  hope  will  convince  the   most  sceptical  man,  that  I  am  a  lover  of  the  American  Union,  that  in  case  Virginia  shall   not  make  punctual  payment,  the  controul  of  our  custom  houses,  and  the  whole   regulation  of  trade,  shall  be  given  to  Congress,  and  that  Virginia  shall  depend  on   Congress  even  for  passports,  till  Virginia  shall  have  paid  the  last  farthing;  and  furnished   the  last  soldier:  Nay,  Sir,  there  is  another  alternative  to  which  I  would  consent:  Even  that   they  should  strike  us  out  of  the  Union,  and  take  away  from  us  all  federal  privileges  till   we  comply  with  federal  requisitions;  but  let  it  depend  upon  our  own  pleasure  to  pay  our   money  in  the  most  easy  manner  for  our  people.  Were  all  the  States,  more  terrible  than   the  mother  country,  to  join  against  us,  I  hope  Virginia  could  defend  herself;  but,  Sir,  the   dissolution  of  the  Union  is  most  abhorent  to  my  mind:  The  first  thing  I  have  at  heart  is   American  liberty;  the  second  thing  is  American  Union;  and  I  hope  the  people  of  Virginia   will  endeavor  to  preserve  that  Union:  The  increasing  population  of  the  southern  States,   is  far  greater  than  that  of  New-­‐England:  Consequently,  in  a  short  time,  they  will  be  far   more  numerous  than  the  people  of  that  country:  Consider  this,  and  you  will  find  this   State  more  particularly  interested  to  support  American  liberty,  and  not  bind  our   posterity  by  an  improvident  relinquishment  of  our  rights.  I  would  give  the  best  security   for  a  punctual  compliance  with  requisitions;  but  I  beseech  Gentlemen,  at  all  hazards,  not   to  give  up  this  unlimitted  power  of  taxation:  The  Honorable  Gentleman  [Edmund   Pendleton]  has  told  us  these  powers  given  to  Congress,  are  accompanied  by  a  Judiciary   which  will  correct  all:  On  examination  you  will  find  this  very  Judiciary  oppressively   constructed;  your  jury  trial  destroyed,  and  the  Judges  dependent  on  Congress.  In  this   scheme  of  energetic  Government,  the  people  will  find  two  sets  of  tax-­‐gatherers—the   State  and  the  Federal  Sheriffs.  This  it  seems  to  me  will  produce  such  dreadful   oppression,  as  the  people  cannot  possibly  bear:  The  Federal  Sheriff  may  commit  what   oppression,  make  what  distresses  he  pleases,  and  ruin  you  with  impunity:  For  how  are   you  to  tie  his  hands?  Have  you  any  sufficient  decided  means  of  preventing  him  from   sucking  your  blood  by  speculations,  commissions  and  fees?  Thus  thousands  of  your   people  will  be  most  shamefully  robbed:  Our  State  Sheriffs,  those  unfeeling   bloodsuckers,  have,  under  the  watchful  eye  of  our  Legislature,  committed  the  most   horrid  and  barbarous  ravages  on  our  people:  It  has  required  the  most  constant  vigilance   of  the  Legislature  to  keep  them  from  totally  ruining  the  people:  A  repeated  succession   of  laws  has  been  made  to  suppress  their  iniquitous  speculations  and  cruel  extortions;   and  as  often  have  their  nefarious  ingenuity  devised  methods  of  evading  the  force  of   those  laws:  In  the  struggle  they  have  generally  triumphed  over  the  Legislature.  It  is  a   fact  that  lands  have  sold  for  five  shillings,  which  were  worth  one  hundred  pounds:  If   Sheriffs  thus  immediately  under  the  eye  of  our  State  Legislature  and  Judiciary,  have   dared  to  commit  these  outrages,  what  would  they  not  have  done  if  their  masters  had   been  at  Philadelphia  or  New-­‐York?  If  they  perpetrate  the  most  unwarrantable  outrage   on  your  persons  or  property,  you  cannot  get  redress  on  this  side  of  Philadelphia  or  New-­‐ York:  And  how  can  you  get  it  there?  If  your  domestic  avocations  could  permit  you  to  go   thither,  there  you  must  appeal  to  Judges  sworn  to  support  this  Constitution,  in   opposition  to  that  of  any  State,  and  who  may  also  be  inclined  to  favor  their  own  officers:   When  these  harpies  are  aided  by  excise  men,  who  may  search  at  any  time  your  houses   and  most  secret  recesses,  will  the  people  bear  it?  If  you  think  so  you  differ  from  me:   Where  I  thought  there  was  a  possibility  of  such  mischiefs,  I  would  grant  power  with  a   niggardly  hand;  and  here  there  is  a  strong  probability  that  these  oppressions  shall   actually  happen.  I  may  be  told,  that  it  is  safe  to  err  on  that  side;  because  such   regulations  may  be  made  by  Congress,  as  shall  restrain  these  officers,  and  because  laws   are  made  by  our  Representatives,  and  judged  by  righteous  Judges:  But,  Sir,  as  these   regulations  may  be  made,  so  they  may  not;  and  many  reasons  there  are  to  induce  a   belief  that  they  will  not:  I  shall  therefore  be  an  infidel  on  that  point  till  the  day  of  my   death.   This  Constitution  is  said  to  have  beautiful  features;  but  when  I  come  to  examine  these   features,  Sir,  they  appear  to  me  ⟨horridly⟩  ⟨horribly⟩  frightful:  Among  other   deformities,  it  has  an  awful  squinting;  it  squints  towards  monarchy:  And  does  not  this   raise  indignation  in  the  breast  of  every  ⟨true⟩  American?  Your  President  may  easily   become  King:  Your  Senate  is  so  imperfectly  constructed  that  your  dearest  rights  may  be   sacrificed  by  what  may  be  a  small  minority;  and  a  very  small  minority  may  continue   forever  unchangeably  this  Government,  although  horridly  defective:  Where  are  your   checks  in  this  Government?  Your  strong  holds  will  be  in  the  hands  of  your  enemies:  It  is   on  a  supposition  that  ⟨y⟩our  American  Governors  shall  be  honest,  that  all  the  good   qualities  of  this  Government  are  founded:  But  its  defective,  and  imperfect  construction,   puts  it  in  their  power  to  perpetrate  the  worst  of  mischiefs,  should  they  be  bad  men:   And,  Sir,  would  not  all  the  world,  from  the  Eastern  to  the  Western  hemisphere,  blame   our  distracted  folly  in  resting  our  rights  upon  the  contingency  of  our  rulers  being  good   or  bad.  Shew  me  that  age  and  country  where  the  rights  and  liberties  of  the  people  were   placed  on  the  sole  chance  of  their  rulers  being  good  men,  without  a  consequent  loss  of   liberty?  I  say  that  the  loss  of  that  dearest  privilege  has  ever  followed  with  absolute   certainty,  every  such  mad  attempt.  If  your  American  chief,  be  a  man  of  ambition,  and   abilities,  how  easy  is  it  for  him  to  render  himself  absolute⟨!⟩  The  army  is  in  his  hands,   and,  if  he  be  a  man  of  address,  it  will  be  attached  to  him;  and  it  will  be  the  subject  of   long  meditation  with  him  to  seize  the  first  auspicious  moment  to  accomplish  his  design;   and,  Sir,  will  the  American  spirit  solely  relieve  you  when  this  happens?  I  would  rather   infinitely,  and  I  am  sure  most  of  this  Convention  are  of  the  same  opinion,  have  a  King,   Lords,  and  Commons,  than  a  Government  so  replete  with  such  insupportable  evils.  If  we   make  a  King,  we  may  prescribe  the  rules  by  which  he  shall  rule  his  people,  and  interpose   such  checks  as  shall  prevent  him  from  infringing  them:  But  the  President,  in  the  field,  at   the  head  of  his  army,  can  prescribe  the  terms  on  which  he  shall  reign  master,  so  far  that   it  will  puzzle  any  American  ever  to  get  his  neck  from  under  the  galling  yoke.  I  cannot   with  patience,  think  of  this  idea.  If  ever  he  violates  the  laws,  one  of  two  things  will   happen:  He  shall  come  at  the  head  of  his  army  to  carry  every  thing  before  him;  or,  he   will  give  bail,  or  do  what  Mr.  Chief  Justice  will  order  him.  If  he  be  guilty,  will  not  the   recollection  of  his  crimes  teach  him  to  make  one  bold  push  for  the  American  throne?   Will  not  the  immense  difference  between  being  master  of  every  thing,  and  being   ignominiously  tried  and  punished,  powerfully  excite  him  to  make  this  bold  push?  But,   Sir,  where  is  the  existing  force  to  punish  him?  Can  he  not  at  the  head  of  his  army  beat   down  every  opposition?  Away  with  your  President,  we  shall  have  a  King:  The  army  will   salute  him  Monarch;  your  militia  will  leave  you  and  assist  in  making  him  King,  and  fight   against  you:  And  what  have  you  to  oppose  this  force?  What  will  then  become  of  you  and   your  rights?  Will  not  absolute  despotism  ensue?  (Here  Mr.  Henry  strongly  and   pathetically  expatiated  on  the  probability  of  the  President’s  enslaving  America,  and  the   ⟨horrible⟩  ⟨horrid⟩  consequences  that  must  result.)  What  can  be  more  defective  than   the  clause  concerning  the  elections?—The  controul  given  to  Congress  over  the  time,   place,  and  manner  of  holding  elections,  will  totally  destroy  the  end  of  suffrage.  The   elections  may  be  held  at  one  place,  and  the  most  inconvenient  in  the  State;  or  they  may   be  at  remote  distances  from  those  who  have  a  right  of  suffrage:  Hence  nine  out  of  ten   must  either  not  vote  at  all,  or  vote  for  strangers:  For  the  most  influential  characters  will   be  applied  to,  to  know  who  are  the  most  proper  to  be  chosen.  I  repeat  that  the  controul   of  Congress  over  the  manner,  &c.  of  electing,  well  warrants  this  idea.  The  natural   consequence  will  be,  that  this  democratic  branch,  will  possess  none  of  the  public   confidence:  The  people  will  be  prejudiced  against  Representatives  chosen  in  such  an   injudicious  manner.  The  proceedings  in  the  northern  conclave  will  be  hidden  from  the   yeomanry  of  this  country:  We  are  told  that  the  yeas  and  nays  shall  be  taken  and  entered   on  the  journals:  This,  Sir,  will  avail  nothing:  It  may  be  locked  up  in  their  chests,  and   concealed  forever  from  the  people;  for  they  are  not  to  publish  what  parts  they  think   require  secrecy:  They  may  think,  and  will  think,  the  whole  requires  it.  Another  beautiful   feature  of  this  Constitution  is,  the  publication  from  time  to  time  of  the  receipts  and   expenditures  of  the  public  money.  This  expression,  from  time  to  time,  is  very  indefinite   and  indeterminate:  It  may  extend  to  a  century.  Grant  that  any  of  them  are  wicked,  they   may  squander  the  public  money  so  as  to  ruin  you,  and  yet  this  expression  will  give  you   no  redress.  I  say,  they  may  ruin  you;—for  where,  Sir,  is  the  responsibility?  The  yeas  and   nays  will  shew  you  nothing,  unless  they  be  fools  as  well  as  knaves:  For  after  having   wickedly  trampled  on  the  rights  of  the  people,  they  would  act  like  fools  indeed,  were   they  to  publish  and  devulge  their  iniquity,  when  they  have  it  equally  in  their  power  to   suppress  and  conceal  it.—Where  is  the  responsibility—that  leading  principle  in  the   British  government?  In  that  government  a  punishment,  certain  and  inevitable,  is   provided:  But  in  this,  there  is  no  real  actual  punishment  for  the  grossest   maladministration.  They  may  go  without  punishment,  though  they  commit  the  most   outrageous  violation  on  our  immunities.  That  paper  may  tell  me  they  will  be  punished.  I   ask,  by  what  law?  They  must  make  the  law—for  there  is  no  existing  law  to  do  it.  What— will  they  make  a  law  to  punish  themselves?  This,  Sir,  is  my  great  objection  to  the   Constitution,  that  there  is  no  true  responsibility—and  that  the  preservation  of  our   liberty  depends  on  the  single  chance  of  men  being  virtuous  enough  to  make  laws  to   punish  themselves.  In  the  country  from  which  we  are  descended,  they  have  real,  and   not  imaginary,  responsibility—for  there,  maladministration  has  cost  their  heads,  to   some  of  the  most  saucy  geniuses  that  ever  were.  The  Senate,  by  making  treaties  may   destroy  your  liberty  and  laws  for  want  of  responsibility.  Two-­‐thirds  of  those  that  shall   happen  to  be  present,  can,  with  the  President,  make  treaties,  that  shall  be  the  supreme   law  of  the  land:  They  may  make  the  most  ruinous  treaties;  and  yet  there  is  no   punishment  for  them.  Whoever  shews  me  a  punishment  provided  for  them,  will  oblige   me.  So,  Sir,  notwithstanding  there  arc  eight  pillars,  they  want  another.  Where  will  they   make  another?  I  trust,  Sir,  the  exclusion  of  the  evils  wherewith  this  system  is  replete,  in   its  present  form,  will  be  made  a  condition,  precedent  to  its  adoption,  by  this  or  any   other  State.  The  transition  from  a  general  unqualified  admission  to  offices,  to  a   consolidation  of  government,  seems  easy;  for  though  the  American  States  are  dissimilar   in  their  structure,  this  will  assimilate  them:  This,  Sir,  is  itself  a  strong  consolidating   feature,  and  is  not  one  of  the  least  dangerous  in  that  system.  Nine  States  are  sufficient   to  establish  this  Government  over  those  nine:  Imagine  that  nine  have  come  into  it.   Virginia  has  certain  scruples.  Suppose  she  will  consequently,  refuse  to  join  with  those   States:—May  not  they  still  continue  in  friendship  and  union  with  her?  If  she  sends  her   annual  requisitions  in  dollars,  do  you  think  their  stomachs  will  be  so  squeamish  that   they  will  refuse  her  dollars?  Will  they  not  accept  her  regiments?  They  would  intimidate   you  into  an  inconsiderate  adoption,  and  frighten  you  with  ideal  evils,  and  that  the  Union   shall  be  dissolved.  ’Tis  a  bugbear,  Sir:—The  fact  is,  Sir,  that  the  eight  adopting  States  can   hardly  stand  on  their  own  legs.  Public  fame  tells  us,  that  the  adopting  States  have   already  heart-­‐burnings  and  animosity,  and  repent  their  precipitate  hurry:  This,  Sir,  may   occasion  exceeding  great  mischief.  When  I  reflect  on  these  and  many  other   circumstances,  I  must  think  those  States  will  be  fond  to  be  in  confederacy  with  us.  If  we   pay  our  quota  of  money  annually,  and  furnish  our  rateable  number  of  men,  when   necessary,  I  can  see  no  danger  from  a  rejection.  The  history  of  Switzerland  clearly   proves,  ⟨that⟩  we  might  be  in  amicable  alliance  with  those  States  without  adopting  this   Constitution.  Switzerland  is  a  Confederacy,  consisting  of  dissimilar  Governments.  This  is   an  example  which  proves  that  Governments  of  dissimilar  structures  may  be   Confederated;  that  Confederate  Republic  has  stood  upwards  of  400  years;  and  although   several  of  the  individual  republics  are  democratic,  and  the  rest  aristocratic,  no  evil  has   resulted  from  this  dissimilarity,  for  they  have  braved  all  the  power  of  France  and   Germany  during  that  long  period.  The  Swiss  spirit,  Sir,  has  kept  them  together:  They   have  encountered  and  overcome  immense  difficulties  with  patience  and  fortitude.  In   this  vicinity  of  powerful  and  ambitious  monarchs,  they  have  retained  their   independence,  republican  simplicity  and  valour.  (Here  he  makes  a  comparison  of  the   people  of  that  country,  and  those  of  France,  and  makes  a  quotation  from  Addison,   illustrating  the  subject.)  Look  at  the  peasants  of  that  country  and  of  France,  and  mark   the  difference.  You  will  find  the  condition  of  the  former  far  more  desirable  and   comfortable.  No  matter  whether  a  people  be  great,  splendid,  and  powerful,  if  they   enjoy  freedom.  The  Turkish  Grand  Seignior,  along-­‐side  of  our  President,  would  put  us  to   disgrace:  But  we  should  be  abundantly  consoled  for  this  disgrace,  when  our  citizen   should  be  put  in  contrast  with  the  Turkish  slave.  The  most  valuable  end  of  government,   is  the  liberty  of  the  inhabitants.  No  possible  advantages  can  compensate  for  the  loss  of   this  privilege.  Shew  me  the  reason  why  the  American  Union  is  to  be  dissolved.  Who  are   those  eight  adopting  States?  Arc  they  averse  to  give  us  a  little  time  to  consider,  before   we  conclude?  Would  such  a  disposition  render  a  junction  with  them  eligible;  or  is  it  the   genius  of  that  kind  of  government,  to  precipitate  people  hastily  into  measures  of  the   utmost  importance,  and  grant  no  indulgence?  If  it  be,  Sir,  is  it  for  us  to  accede  to  such  a   government?  We  have  a  right  to  have  time  to  consider—We  shall  therefore  insist  upon   it.  Unless  the  government  be  amended,  we  can  never  accept  it.  The  adopting  States  will   doubtless  accept  our  money  and  our  regiments—And  what  is  to  be  the  consequence,  if   we  are  disunited?  I  believe  that  it  is  yet  doubtful,  whether  it  is  not  proper  to  stand  by  a   while,  and  see  the  effect  of  its  adoption  in  other  States.  In  forming  a  government,  the   utmost  care  should  be  taken  to  prevent  its  becoming  oppressive;  and  this  government  is   of  such  an  intricate  and  complicated  ⟨a⟩  nature,  that  no  man  on  this  earth  can  know  its   real  operation.  The  other  States  have  no  reason  to  think,  from  the  antecedent  conduct   of  Virginia,  that  she  has  any  intention  of  seceding  from  the  Union,  or  of  being  less  active   to  support  the  general  welfare.  Would  they  not  therefore  acquiesce  in  our  taking  time   to  deliberate?  Deliberate  whether  the  measure  be  not  perilous,  not  only  for  us,  but  the   adopting  States.  Permit  me,  Sir,  to  say,  that  a  great  majority  of  the  people  even  in  the   adopting  States,  are  averse  to  this  government.  I  believe  I  would  be  right  to  say,  that   they  have  been  egregiously  misled.  Pennsylvania  has  perhaps  been  tricked  into  it.  If  the   other  States  who  have  adopted  it,  have  not  been  tricked,  still  they  were  too  much   hurried  into  its  adoption.  There  were  very  respectable  minorities  in  several  of  them;  and   if  reports  be  true,  a  clear  majority  of  the  people  are  averse  to  it.  If  we  also  accede,  and  it   should  prove  grievous,  the  peace  and  prosperity  of  our  country,  which  we  all  love,  will   be  destroyed.  This  government  has  not  the  affection  of  the  people,  at  present.  Should  it   be  oppressive,  their  affection  will  be  totally  estranged  from  it—and,  Sir,  you  know  that  a   Government  without  their  affections  can  neither  be  durable  nor  happy.  I  speak  as  one   poor  individual—but  when  I  speak,  I  speak  the  language  of  thousands.  But,  Sir,  I  mean   not  to  breath⟨e⟩  the  spirit  nor  utter  the  language  of  secession.  I  have  trespassed  so   long  on  your  patience,  I  am  really  concerned  that  I  have  something  yet  to  say.  The   honorable  member  has  said  that  we  shall  be  properly  represented:  Remember,  Sir,  that   the  number  of  our  Representatives  is  but  ten,  whereof  six  is  a  majority.  Will  these  men   be  possessed  of  sufficient  information?  A  particular  knowledge  of  particular  districts  will   not  suffice.  They  must  be  well  acquainted  with  agriculture,  commerce,  and  a  great   variety  of  other  matters  throughout  the  Continent:  They  must  know  not  only  the  actual   state  of  nations  in  Europe,  and  America,  the  situation  of  their  farmers,  cottagers,  and   mechanics,  but  also  the  relative  situation  and  intercourse  of  those  nations.  Virginia  is  as   large  as  England.  Our  proportion  of  Representatives  is  but  ten  men.  In  England  they   have  530.  The  House  of  Commons  in  England,  numerous  as  they  are,  we  are  told,  is   bribed,  and  have  bartered  away  the  rights  of  their  constituents:  What  then  shall  become   of  us?  Will  these  few  protect  our  rights?  Will  they  be  incorruptible?  You  say  they  will  be   better  men  than  the  English  Commoners.  I  say  they  will  be  infinitely  worse  men,   because  they  are  to  be  chosen  blindfolded:  Their  election  (the  term,  as  applied  to  their   appointment,  is  inaccurate)  will  be  an  involuntary  nomination,  and  not  a  choice.  I  have,  I   fear,  fatigued  the  Committee,  yet  I  have  not  said  the  one  hundred  thousandth  part  of   what  I  have  on  my  mind,  and  wish  to  impart.  On  this  occasion  I  conceived  myself  bound   to  attend  strictly  to  the  interest  of  the  State;  and  I  thought  her  dearest  rights  at  stake:   Having  lived  so  long—been  so  much  honored—my  efforts,  though  small,  are  due  to  my   country.  I  have  found  my  mind  hurried  on  from  subject  to  subject,  on  this  very  great   occasion.  We  have  been  all  out  of  order  from  the  Gentleman  [Edmund  Pendleton]  who   opened  today,  to  myself.  I  did  not  come  prepared  to  speak  on  so  multifarious  a  subject,   in  so  general  a  manner.  I  trust  you  will  indulge  me  another  time.—Before  you  abandon   the  present  system,  I  hope  you  will  consider  not  only  its  defects,  most  maturely,  but   likewise  those  of  that  which  you  are  to  substitute  to  it.  May  you  be  fully  apprised  of  the   dangers  of  the  latter,  not  by  fatal  experience,  but  by  some  abler  advocate  than  me.      Cite  as:  The  Documentary  History  of  the  Ratification  of  the  Constitution  Digital  Edition,   ed.  John  P.  Kaminski,  Gaspare  J.  Saladino,  Richard  Leffler,  Charles  H.  Schoenleber  and   Margaret  A.  Hogan.  Charlottesville:  University  of  Virginia  Press,  2009.  Original  source:   Ratification  by  the  States,  Volume  IX:  Virginia,  No.  2