Interest Groups Outline Topic 4 PDF Fall 2024

Copyrighted material Students enrolled in Professor Bond’s POLS 206 class may make a copy for personal use, but it may not be reproduced or sold Topic 4 Interest Groups Lecture 4.1: What Is an Interest...

Copyrighted material Students enrolled in Professor Bond’s POLS 206 class may make a copy for personal use, but it may not be reproduced or sold Topic 4 Interest Groups Lecture 4.1: What Is an Interest Group? Why Do Interest Groups Form? Lecture 4.2: What Are the Effects of Interest Group Activity on U.S. Politics?  Copyrighted material Students enrolled in Professor Bond’s POLS 206 class may make a copy for personal use, but it may not be reproduced or sold Lecture 4.1 What Is an Interest Group? Why Do Interest Groups Form? Definition of Interest Group A formal organization of persons who – Share common attitudes (or concerns) on some matter, and – make demands on others in society to promote or protect that matter Not all groups are interest groups—emphasis on shared attitude or concern – e.g. people with red hair are not an interest group unless members come to share attitudes – NAARHP (National Association for the Advancement of Red Headed People) Not all interest groups make demands on others in society – e.g., members of a Scuba diving club share interests (friendships, organized dives, discounts) – If members engage in collective action to promote group interests, they become political – Interest groups pursue two types of goals 1. Seek new benefits, & 2. Defend existing benefits – More effective on #2—inherent conservative advantage (conservative = maintain status quo) – Why? Policy change requires success at multiple decision points; change can be stopped at any one Why are there Interest Groups? First Amendment: – “Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, & petition Govt. for redress of grievances” – Interest group activities are a type of political participation protected by the Constitution Americans generally have pejorative views of interest groups – “Narrow special interest” (common description in popular press) – “Pressure groups” (even early political scientists) Yet, most Americans belong to or are closely associated with some interest group – Figure 6.1: Percentage of Americans Affiliated with Voluntary Organizations – I predict that all of you belong to & contribute to collective action of an interest group – Example (empirical evidence)  Copyrighted material Students enrolled in Professor Bond’s POLS 206 class may make a copy for personal use, but it may not be reproduced or sold FIG. 6.1: PERCENTAGE OF AMERICANS AFFILIATED WITH VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS Why do people Form & Join Interest Groups? Initial assumptions Early studies focused on benefits of joining groups (Arthur Bentley 1908; David Truman 1951) – Material benefits Tangible benefits Discounts on goods or services – Solidary benefits Intangible benefits Pleasure of socializing with like-minded people – Purposive benefits Transcend the individual & the group Aimed at benefiting others – Implicit theory (did not use these concepts): people engage in collective action because it is rational Rational choice = one that gives me the greatest utility (maximum benefits at minimal cost) People form & join interest groups if benefits > costs (time, effort, money) Why do people Form & Join Interest Groups? Rational choice theory Public Goods & Free Rider Problem applied to Interest Groups (Mancur Olson 1965) – Public Goods Non-excludable—cannot be withheld from anyone (even free riders who pay none of the cost) – Each individual’s share of the total cost is trivial & won’t be noticed if withheld Non-rivalrous—one person’s enjoyment does not prevent others from benefiting  Copyrighted material Students enrolled in Professor Bond’s POLS 206 class may make a copy for personal use, but it may not be reproduced or sold – Free Riders Group activities (collective action) to influence govt. to pass laws benefitting group’s interest Laws (i.e., government coercion) are public goods Rational not to join a group to produce public goods (even if benefits > costs) What explains the enormous number of groups & why millions of Americans join them? – Overcoming the Free Rider Problem Selective benefits – Material & solidary benefits – Available only to members who pay dues Government coercion – Force people to contribute to providing the public good – Closed shop—mandatory union membership – Mandatory professional membership (AMA, ABA) – Student services fees Social ostracism – Effective only in small groups (members notice a “free rider”; scorned as a “freeloader”) – And Texas A&M What’s Aggie for “free rider”? Two-percenter! Why do people Form & Join Interest Groups? Other theories Other Theories (no lecture, get from book, pp. 196-203) – Pluralist Theory Latent (unorganized) interests “spontaneously” organize – To take advantage of an opportunity – In response to threat Can’t explain how latent groups overcome the free rider problem – By-Product & Exchange Theory Very similar to Mancur Olsen’s theory but emphasizes leadership Groups form as a result of a deal—an exchange—between – A group “entrepreneur” & an unorganized interest – Individuals with common interest join in exchange for selective benefits  Copyrighted material Students enrolled in Professor Bond’s POLS 206 class may make a copy for personal use, but it may not be reproduced or sold – Niche Theory Applies biological concepts to interest groups – Population ecology—study of how animals interact w/ environment – Carrying capacity—ability to support various species that compete resources – Partitioning environment into niches increases carrying capacity – Various species occupy a small niche to minimize competition from similar species Explains explosive growth of groups—partitioning into small segments representing narrower & narrower interests Lecture 4.2 What Are the Effects of Interest Group Activity on U.S. Politics? Interest Group Activities (collective action) Lobbying—any activity to influence public policy to promote or protect group interests – Direct Lobbying Direct contact with policy maker One-on-one meeting; testify at committee hearing; letters & e-mail – Indirect Lobbying Work thru intermediaries Constituents; influential people in the district Bacardi Rum’s Triple Bank Shot  Copyrighted material Students enrolled in Professor Bond’s POLS 206 class may make a copy for personal use, but it may not be reproduced or sold “BACARDI NEEDS YOUR HELP. Importance: High” Gov. Bush Reveals Lobby Effort : Documents Show Intervention in Trademark Case of GOP Donor By Thomas B. Edsall Friday, October 18, 2002; Page A12 Florida Gov. Jeb Bush (R) has released documents outlining a sustained lobbying campaign by his office on behalf of a major Republican donor, which included efforts to get political appointees of Pres. Bush to overrule career employees at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). The disclosures, prompted by a Freedom of Information request from the Florida Democratic Party, add new details about the time and effort the governor and several top aides devoted to the matter, which centers on a trademark battle between Bacardi Rum and a foreign rival. The inch-high pile of documents indicate that the process began early this year and gained momentum with an April 18 e-mail to Gov. Bush from Jorge Rodriguez-Marquez, Bacardi's vice president for corporate communications. With a subject line reading "BACARDI NEEDS YOUR HELP. Importance: High," Rodriguez-Marquez complained about "U.S. government bureaucrats.'' He added, "Someone needs to tell PTO to stop interfering.'' Four hours later, Bush forwarded a copy to his chief of staff, Kathleen Shanahan, with the comment, "this is ridiculous. let us discuss. Jeb Bush." His e-mail set in motion a process that involved Shanahan; Nino Oviedo, who runs Florida's Washington office; Melissa Freedman, who works in the D.C. office; James E. Rogan, a former California congressman named by President Bush to head the U.S. patent office; Rogan's deputy, Jon W. Dudas, a political appointee; and such career PTO lawyers and staffers as Eleanor Meltzer and Lynne Beresford, according to the documents. A March 18 e-mail from Freedman to Oviedo describes Dudas making sure that Bush and Bacardi were content with the process. "Jon Dudas, from PTO, called... to make sure the meeting we had with Eleanor Meltzer and himself has been helpful," it said. For months, Rodriguez-Marquez pressed for action. On May 10, for example, he [Bacardi] e-mailed Oviedo and Freedman: "If someone could have the determination and power to “stop legal career bureaucrats from fabricating delays, this adverse and unfortunate government intervention”... would end." On May 13, he e-mailed Freedman: "Now it is time for those career bureaucrats at PTO who are not happy that Bacardi is right to move out of the way and let justice be finally delivered." The lobbying by Rodriguez-Marquez and Gov. Bush's office, according to two sources close to the case, succeeded in winning the removal of a PTO lawyer who had been temporarily assigned to handle procedural questions and who had issued one ruling against Bacardi's interests. A PTO spokeswoman denied that political pressure was involved in the transfer of David M. Mermelstein. She said he was taken off the case because his assignment was temporary. Mermelstein declined to comment. The new details prompted an angry response from lawyers representing Bacardi's adversary in the trademark dispute, Havana Club Holdings S.A., a joint venture between the Cuban enterprise Havana Club Holdings and Pernod Ricard, a French firm. They are fighting for control of the brand name "Havana Rum." Charles Sims, Havana Club Holdings's lawyer, said, "Bacardi's attempt to bring political influence to bear on a matter that is supposed to be decided by administrative law judges on rules of law is grossly improper. The law bars ex-parte communications," he said, referring to communications involving only one party to a dispute. On June 13, two weeks after Bacardi gave the Florida GOP $50,000, Jeb Bush wrote to Rogan on behalf of Bacardi. He asked Rogan to "take quick, decisive action" to resolve the trademark dispute in Bacardi's favor. Rodriguez-Marquez said in a statement that the company's requests for help from the governor "have nothing to do with political contributions.... Florida businesses and citizens expect they may turn to the Governor's office when their legitimate and legally resolved issues are in jeopardy." Elizabeth Hirst, spokeswoman for Jeb Bush, said campaign contributions played no role in the governor's actions. "When Governor Bush makes a decision,'' she said, "he is working of behalf of all the people of this state.” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43470-2002Oct17.html accessed 10-18-02 Targets of Interest Group Lobbying – Their own membership—united front – Other groups Coalitions based on common, overlapping interests Logrolling – coalitions of uncommon interests – “you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours”  Copyrighted material Students enrolled in Professor Bond’s POLS 206 class may make a copy for personal use, but it may not be reproduced or sold – Political parties – Public Opinion – Congress – President & executive branch – Courts Test cases Amicus curiae briefs Power & Influence of Interest Groups in American Politics Mostly a conservative force – Seldom powerful enough to push through big changes – Often powerful enough to block change & preserve status quo Multiple decision points Big policy change requires winning at each point Blocking change requires winning at only one point Facilitate 2-way flow of communication between citizens & government – Aggregate & communicate demands from citizens to government – Watch what government does & report back to members Biased information Useful to members who have the same bias  Copyrighted material Students enrolled in Professor Bond’s POLS 206 class may make a copy for personal use, but it may not be reproduced or sold Table 6.2: Interest Group Ratings of Some Members of Congress Liberal Groups Conservative Groups ADA ACLU AFL-CIO LCV COC CFG FRC ACU DEMOCRATS Rep. James Clyburn (SC-5), Minority Whip 90 79 97 94 58 12 0 4 Rep. Hakkem Jeffreis (NY-8), Minority Leader 100 83 100 91 55 18 0 4 Sen. Charles Schumer (NY), Majority Leader 100 67 100 100 50 5 0 9 Sen. Richard Durbin (IL), Majority Whip 95 82 100 100 50 5 0 9 Sen. Elizabeth Warren (MA) 75 86 100 100 40 19 0 9 Sen. Amy Klobuchar (MN) 100 64 100 100 50 5 0 5 Sen. Bernie Sanders (VT) 95 86 100 100 40 26 0 9 Sen. Joe Manchin (WV) 45 52 87 43 70 28 50 36 Democratic Median 95 81 100 100 50 18 0 9 REPUBLICANS Rep. Mike Johnson (LA-4), Speaker of the House 0 4 16 3 92 58 100 80 Rep. Steve Scalise (LA-1), Majority Leader 15 6 5 0 90 60 100 90 Rep. Thomas Emmer (MN-6), Majority Whip 0 18 16 0 75 69 100 76 Sen. Mitch McConnell (KY), Minority Leader 0 5 0 14 90 53 100 82 Sen. John Thune (SD)Assist. Majority Leader 5 10 0 14 90 57 100 82 Sen. Chuck Grassley (IA) 5 18 0 0 80 84 100 82 Sen. John Barrasso (WY) 0 19 0 7 70 77 100 86 Sen. Susan Collins (ME) 35 60 56 69 88 34 36 44 Republican Median 0 10 0 3 88 58 100 82 Groups regulate each other through countervailing power – Scrutinize opponents & report negative information e.g., business vs. labor; pro-life vs. pro-choice Organization, resources, & vigorous debate from all sides – Effective only if interests are organized on both sides Some interests not organized Most effective strategy: – Contain scope of conflict (Schattschneider 1960); work w/ allies behind the scenes – Most success at getting small, narrow benefits w/ no organized opposition or public attention