Constitutional Law Outline Fall 2024 PDF

Judicial Review =============== Federalism ========== The Nature and Scope of National Power -------------------------------------- ### **Federal Powers and McCulloch v. Maryland** #### **How to interpret federal authority generally (short answer: *very broadly* in order to effectuate the [broad...

Judicial Review =============== Federalism ========== The Nature and Scope of National Power -------------------------------------- ### **Federal Powers and McCulloch v. Maryland** #### **How to interpret federal authority generally (short answer: *very broadly* in order to effectuate the [broad purposes] that the Constitution has vested in the federal govt):** - **Federal Government**: Limited to **enumerated powers** in the Constitution. - Must find specific constitutional authority for federal action. - **States' Powers**: Any unenumerated power defaults to the states. - **Example**: Federal government cannot prosecute for **murder**, as it is not enumerated. - **Hamilton's Justifications**: - **Tax Collection**: Bank increases money supply and provides a medium for tax payments. - **Borrowing Money**: Facilitates government loans. - **Regulating Trade**: Stabilizes currency for interstate commerce and prevents trade disruptions. #### **Marshall's Historical Argument** - **First Bank (1791)**: Established by the **First Congress**, many of whom were framers of the Constitution. - Opposed by Jefferson/Madison but supported by Hamilton and signed by Washington. - **Re-chartering**: - **War of 1812**: Demonstrated the necessity of the bank, converting previous opponents (e.g., Madison). - Charter lapsed but re-established due to national need. #### **Source of Federal Power** - **Marshall's Rebuttal to Maryland**: - States claim: Federal power comes from a league of states, making it subordinate. - Marshall's view: - Federal power derives from **the people**, not state governments. - The Constitution was ratified by the **people through state conventions**, creating a national sovereign. #### **Implied Powers Doctrine** - **Constitution's Nature**: - Constitution cannot list all powers; it is **broad and principled**, not a statute or contract. - **Implied Powers**: Derived as necessary to achieve constitutional ends. - **Example**: - **Enumerated Power**: Establishing post offices. - **Implied Powers**: Carrying mail and punishing mail theft. - **10th Amendment**: \"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.\" - Omission of the word **"expressly"** suggests a broader view of federal powers. #### **\"Necessary and Proper\" Clause** - \"The Congress shall have Power To make all Laws which shall be **necessary and proper** for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers **vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States**, or in any Department or Officer thereof.\" - Maryland's Argument: - "Necessary" means **absolute physical necessity**. - Marshall's Rebuttal: - **"Necessary" has degrees**, not limited to indispensable means. - Federal government must adapt flexibly to achieve its duties. - **Ends and Means**: - If the **end is constitutional**, the means must be **appropriate, plainly adapted, and not prohibited**. - Marshall's opinion did not assert that the bank was constitutionally required, instead emphasized whether the bank is "necessary and proper" is a decision for another branch to make, and as long as the measure is conducive to constitutional ends, it suffices for judicial review. #### **Debates on Constitutional Means** - **Congress**: The proper forum for debating permissible means to achieve constitutional ends. - **Judicial Standard**: Courts should defer as long as means are consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. - **Legitimacy Test**: If the end is legitimate, within the Constitution\'s scope, and the means are appropriate, they are **constitutional**. ### **Prez Jacksons veto to the rechartering of national bank, anchored in reasoning from McCulloch v. Maryland** - **Context:** The Supreme Court decision established key principles about the federal government's powers under the Constitution. - President Jackson\'s veto message on re-chartering the national bank builds on McCulloch's implications. - Jackson\'s **departmentalist theory** of constitutional interpretation. - Challenges to judicial precedent and authority. ### **Departmentalism:** - 1\) Each governmental branch (executive, legislative, judiciary) interprets the Constitution independently. - 2\) Supreme Court decisions are not binding on other branches, only [persuasive]. - **Precedent as practice:** - Congress has addressed the bank issue multiple times with conflicting outcomes. - Public opinion supports his veto. - **Judicial Precedent:** - The judiciary can declare measures unconstitutional but cannot remove Congress's or the Executive's [discretion] to act. ### ***McCulloch*'s Key Principles and Prez Jackson's Interpretation** - **\"Necessary and Proper\" Clause:** - **Marshall's view in McCulloch:** - The term \"necessary\" admits degrees (e.g., conducive or helpful measures suffice). - The judiciary should not interfere in legislative or executive determinations of necessity. - **Prez Jackson's adaptation:** - Emphasizes that defining \"necessary and proper\" remains the legislature's and executive's responsibility. - Views judicial precedent as advisory, not authoritative. ### **The Supremacy Clause and State Power** **Linchpin for *[McCulloch v Maryland]* and [ *Gibson v Ogden*]:** - Whether the federal statute is itself valid, and if so, does it conflict with a state statute? - If the federal statute is valid and conflicts with a state statute, the federal statute wins = Supremacy Clause **Taxation and Federal Authority:** - States like Maryland taxed the Bank of the U.S. to destroy it (\$15,000 tax). - But what if people in states like NY wanted Bank of US? - Marshall's opinion: - **\"The power to tax involves the power to destroy.\"** - **Representation Theory:** - States cannot burden federal entities without undermining national unity. If states could pick what federal laws to follow this would hinder the will of people in other states that want the federal law - National government represents all people, ensuring fairness. - States acting independently could impose undue burdens without representing broader national interests. - This theory explains why - it is appropriate for national govt to govern local and - why appropriate for SCOTUS to solve this political dispute ### **Political Questions Doctrine** - **Examples of Non-Justiciable Constitutional Clauses:** - **Guarantee Clause (Article IV, Section 4):** - Ensures a \"republican form of government.\" - What constitutes a \"republican\" government? - Courts have avoided defining its scope, labeling it a **political question, so its up to other branches** - **High Crimes and Misdemeanors Clause (also left to political branches):** - **Impeachment power:** - No judicial precedent defining \"high crimes and misdemeanors.\" - Political branches (Congress) interpret this clause independently. - Gerald Ford's assertion: Congress can impeach for any reason deemed appropriate. - Political branches act within their discretion but remain guided by constitutional principles. (even with partisanship influence ofc) - **Judicial Role:** Courts resolve disputes but may defer to political branches on certain constitutional provisions. - Constitutionality is not solely a judicial question. \-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-- ### **[Departmentalism and Presidential Non-Enforcement]** - **Presidential Non-Enforcement:** Presidents often sign laws but refuse to enforce unconstitutional provisions. - **Theory of Judicial Review:** Presidents may independently interpret the Constitution, but courts ultimately resolve disputes. - **Dellinger Memo:** many situations where the president must choose what is constitutional - Encourages careful weighing of constitutional issues before enforcement decisions. - Non-enforcement can reflect thoughtful constitutional judgment. - **Walter Dellinger**: Head of the **Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)** during the Clinton administration. - **DOJ has 2 Fxs**: - 1\) Represents the United States in litigation. - **2) Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)**: **Functions**: Advise the executive on legal issues. - ***Kinkopf's Background**:* - *Worked at OLC during the drafting of the memo in 1994.* - *Returned to OLC in 2021 for two years.* #### **Hypothetical Example: Flag Burning or Kneeling Laws** - **Scenario**: Congress passes a law criminalizing kneeling during the National Anthem. Should he sign? - **Arguments Against**: - Likely violates the **First Amendment** (Supreme Court precedent exists on flag burning). - **Arguments For**: - **Departmentalism**: Each branch of government interprets the Constitution independently. - President may view the Supreme Court's First Amendment rulings as incorrect. - The President is not bound by Supreme Court rulings when deciding whether to sign anti-kneeling law. - If the law is signed, courts are expected to strike it down based on precedent. - Judicial review provides the final word on constitutionality. - **Presidential Oath and Take Care Clause** - **Oath of Office**: Requires the President to uphold the Constitution. - Signing a law [believed] to be unconstitutional risks violating this oath. (so he can say he believed constitutional) - **Take Care Clause**: - Obligation to ensure laws are faithfully executed. - Failure occurs if the President [knowingly] enforces or endorses an unconstitutional statute. - But if stricken down, the Prez can score political points (or if he refuses to sign he can suffer politically) - **Practical Real World Examples -** - **Omnibus Bills**: Congress often bundles provisions into large bills (e.g., defense funding). - Presidents may need to sign despite unconstitutional provisions to avoid broader consequences (e.g., defunding the military). But refuse to enfore unconstitutional provisions - **Example: HIV Military Ban:** National Defense Authorization Act included a provision barring HIV-positive individuals from military service. - **Presidential Response**: - Declared the provision unconstitutional in a **signing statement**. - Enforced the law selectively (against sympathetic plaintiffs that DOJ would take their side) to provoke judicial review. - **Outcome**: Congress caved and repealed the ban before courts could rule. The Commerce Power ------------------ **Big Rule:** {#big-rule.ListParagraph} ------------- Congress can regulate interstate commerce because it is an enumerated power and as long as it doesn't violate any other parts of the Constitution. {#congress-can-regulate-interstate-commerce-because-it-is-an-enumerated-power-and-as-long-as-it-doesnt-violate-any-other-parts-of-the-constitution..ListParagraph} -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - [1^st^ Theory:] under this enumerated power Congress can regulate: 1. **Channels of interstate commerce.** 2. **A) Instrumentalities of commerce** (e.g., roads, phones, the internet). A. **Persons or things in IC** 3. **Economic activities in the aggregate** with substantial effects on interstate commerce. Congress only needs **rational basis** to determine this. a. **Economic Activity:** in Raich SCOTUS defines as production, distribution and consumption (but be careful w this one) b. **Inactivity** cannot be regulated (see Sebelius ACA case) - they can't force you to buy something - [2^nd^ Theory:] **Non-economic activities:** - Can only be regulated if **necessary and proper** component to support a **broader economic regulatory scheme**. ### History: Crisis and Resolution Shift in Judicial Philosophy: - **Pre-1937**: - Narrow interpretation of federal power under the Commerce Clause. - Struck down New Deal legislation (e.g., **Hammer v. Dagenhart**, **Schechter Poultry**). - **Post-1937**: - Broader interpretation. - Deference to Congress's legislative judgment. ### **Specific Congressional Power under Commerce Clause (interstate commerce)** - **Enumerated Powers**: Congress must justify actions under specific constitutional powers. - **Commerce Clause (an enumerated power)**: - Congress' most important regulatory power (power to tell ppl what they can/can't do - Taxing and spending power "more important" but don't force ppl to do things - Frequently cited for regulating interstate activities, including controlled substances. #### **Example = Federal Marijuana Laws:** Prohibits marijuana possession under the **Controlled Substances Act**. - **State Contradictions**: Many states and D.C. have legalized marijuana possession. - **DOJ Practice**: Federal authorities often decline to enforce marijuana bans in these jurisdictions. - **2 Legal Questions**: - How can the DOJ selectively enforce laws? - Is Congress's authority under the **Commerce Clause** sufficient to justify federal marijuana prohibition? - Does growing marijuana for personal use fall under Congress's authority to regulate interstate commerce? #### **Gibbons v. Ogden (1824)** (How to interpret a specific federal authority? **Short Answer:** Broadly in order to make sure that the Court doesn't interfere with the ability of Congress to do its job) - **Case Summary**: - **Conflict**: Two parties, Gibbons and Ogden, operated ferry services between New York and New Jersey. - **Ogden**: Held a **New York State licensed monopoly** for steamboat services. - **Gibbons**: Held a **federal license** to operate steamboats - **Issue**: The **New York monopoly law** conflicted federal law. - **Validity of Federal law** granting Gibbons a license was upheld. - **Marshall's Approach**: - Mirrors his reasoning in **McCulloch v. Maryland**: - **Federal Power** derives from the **people**, not a league of states. - **Strict Construction Debate**: - Rejects overly narrow interpretations of constitutional terms. - Words should be understood **broadly** in their **ordinary usage** plus the **purposes for which they were conferred** in order to promote those ends - **Key Question**: Does the New York monopoly violate Congress's power to regulate **interstate commerce \>\>\>Marshall's Answer**: Yes. **Legal Framework** 1. Is the federal law valid? 2. **Supremacy Clause**: - If the federal law is valid, it overrides conflicting state laws. - If invalid, the state law (New York monopoly) prevails. ##### Commerce Clause Authority (Article I, Section 8): - Grants Congress power to regulate commerce: - **With foreign nations**. - **Among the states** (**interstate commerce)**. - **With Indian tribes**. #### **Arguments in Favor of New York Monopoly** 1. **Narrow Commerce Definition**: a. Argues commerce means only the **buying and selling of goods**, not navigation so ferry operations (navigation) are not part of commerce. #### **Marshall's Rebuttal = Broad Definition of Commerce**: - Includes **all commercial intercourse**, including navigation. All things that get paid for, not just the exchange of goods. - **Interstate Commerce**: - Ferry services between New York and New Jersey are **interstate** by nature. - Federal regulation is appropriate. #### **Limits of Congressional Power** - **Commerce \"[Among] the States\"**: - Refers to commerce that **affects multiple states**. - Does not include **purely internal state commerce** unless it impacts other states. - Example: Commerce \"wholly within a state\" (e.g., local bake sales) is excluded unless it affects interstate commerce. #### **Hypothetical: Bake Sale with Marijuana Brownies** - **Scenario**: A bake sale in Georgia selling marijuana brownies without crossing state lines. **Key Question**: Can Congress regulate under the Commerce Clause? - **Analysis under Marshall's Rule**: - Local commerce is excluded **unless it affects other states.** - Selling brownies locally would not constitute **interstate commerce** unless it influences markets in other states. #### **Broader Implications** - **Internal Commerce Impacting Other States**: - Even commerce within one state may fall under federal regulation if it affects the **economy or interests** of other states. ### **Limits on Congress's Power Under the Commerce Clause** - **Context**: Early U.S. history saw minimal federal regulation of commerce. - By the late 1800s, industrialization (e.g., railroads) integrated the economy, prompting federal intervention. Early regulation targeted monopolies. #### U.S. v. E.C. Knight (Sugar Trust Case) [E.C. Knight reflected artificial distinctions now largely discarded. ] - **Facts**: - **Background -** Congressional Action: [Sherman Antitrust Act] aimed at monopolies. - The **American Sugar Refining Company** acquired 98% of U.S. sugar refining capacity. - Federal government sued, arguing the monopoly violated the Sherman Act. - **Supreme Court's Ruling (narrow view of commerce)**: The monopoly was **not commerce**, but **manufacturing**, and thus outside federal regulation. - **Reasoning**: - **Manufacture vs. Commerce**: - Manufacturing is a [local activity distinct from the act of commerce.] - Federal regulation applies only to commerce directly between states. - **Doctrine of Local Authority**: Activities like manufacturing belong to **state authority**, not federal. - So only the states have the power to regulate against monopolies of this nature. **Critiques of this decision:** - **Commercial Intent**: Refining sugar was inherently for sale in interstate markets, impacting commerce directly. - **Artificial Distinctions**: Separating manufacturing from commerce ignores economic realities. - **Impact on Monopolies**: Allowed monopolies to flourish under state protection. ### **Federalism and State Autonomy** #### **Pros of Federalism:** 1. **Liberty**: a. States and federal government compete, preventing concentrated power (e.g., fear of tyranny). 2. **Customization**: b. States tailor laws to local values and priorities. 3. **Proximity to People**: c. State governments are closer to citizens, enhancing representation. #### **Cons of Federalism:** 1. **Inconsistency**: a. Different states have conflicting laws (e.g., marriage, labor laws). 2. **Inefficiency**: b. Businesses face challenges navigating varying state regulations. 3. **Race to the Bottom**: c. States may compete to lower standards (e.g., child labor, environmental protections). 4. **Collective Action Problems**: d. States may fail to address issues (e.g., monopolies, pollution) that affect the nation as a whole. 5. **Liberty:** **Civil Rights History**: Federalism often used to justify segregation and slavery. States' smaller, homogeneous populations facilitated oppression of minorities. **Modern Examples**: States allowed same-sex marriage before federal recognition, but many resisted, creating disparity. #### Commerce Clause and Federal Power Expansion - Evolving Interpretation: - Cases like Gibbons v. Ogden and Champion v. Ames show a trend toward broader federal authority over interstate commerce. #### Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case) (Congress' Power is Plenary) ##### Federal Legislation: Congress passed a law prohibiting interstate lottery ticket sales. - **Issue**: Did Congress have the authority to regulate this under the Commerce Clause? - **Supreme Court's Decision -** **Commerce Clause Authority**: - \"The power of Congress to regulate commerce among the States is **plenary,** is complete in itself, and is subject to **no limitations except** such as may be **found in the Constitution**.\" - Therefore, the power extends to prohibition of goods involved in interstate commerce if it serves a legitimate purpose, such as protecting public morals, Congress can regulate interstate commerce to promote public welfare. - **Implications:** - **Moral Regulation**: While states traditionally regulate morals (e.g., gambling), Congress may act when interstate commerce is involved. - **Federal Power Expansion**: Established precedent for regulating activities with interstate implications. ### **Federal and State Roles in Regulating Morality** #### **Federal Power Restrictions:** Congress cannot outlaw activities like gambling or monopolies purely based on morality. Authority **must derive from enumerated powers** in the Constitution (e.g., Commerce Clause). Through CC Congress authorized to regulate interstate prostitution(immoral commercial transaction), interstate shipping of eggs (really for public health, but eggs are sold). #### **State Power has Broad Authority:** States can regulate public health, safety, and morals without enumerated limitations. States can outlaw gambling purely for moral reasons. #### BUT\.... #### Caminetti v. United States (1917) (instrumentalities of interstate commerce) ##### Facts: A man transported his mistress across state lines (California to Nevada) for an adulterous weekend. - **Issue**: Could Congress criminalize such actions under the Commerce Clause? ##### Supreme Court Decision: - **Ruling**: Yes, Congress could regulate such activity. - **Reasoning**: - Crossing state lines involves using **instrumentalities of interstate commerce** (e.g., roads, railroads). #### Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918) (local issue and goods not inherently harmful LATER OVERRULED by US v Darby Lumber Co. ) - Federal prohibition on interstate shipment of goods produced with child labor. - **Issue**: Did Congress have authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate child labor conditions? - **Supreme Court Ruling**: No, the law was unconstitutional. - **Reasoning**: - **Local vs. National**: - Child labor conditions were a **local issue** under state jurisdiction. - Congress cannot use interstate commerce to equalize working conditions across states. - **Harm Distinction**: - Unlike lottery tickets or adulterated food, **the goods themselves (produced by child labor) were not harmful**. ##### Key Arguments: 1. **Pro-Federal Regulation**: a. Goods produced by child labor entered **interstate commerce**, affecting the national market. b. Economic competition created a "race to the bottom" in labor standards. 2. **Against Federal Regulation**: c. The harm (child labor) occurred **before goods entered interstate commerce**, making it a state issue. d. Congress lacked authority to address purely local labor practices. ##### Justice Holmes's Dissent in Hammer v. Dagenhart - **Key Points**: - **Commerce Clause is Plenary**: Congress's power over interstate commerce includes regulating goods entering the market. - **Congress's Motive is Irrelevant**: Congress's reason for using its Commerce Clause authority does not limit its scope. - **National Impact**: Interstate commerce creates a **national economic market**, justifying federal intervention. ### **Then: Great Depression and the New Deal** - **Economic Crisis**: Widespread unemployment, homelessness, and starvation led to demands for federal action. - **Roosevelt's New Deal**: Series of federal laws aimed at regulating prices, wages, and labor conditions, like NIRA\.... #### Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935)(Indirect v direct effect on IC intro) ##### Facts: - **Schechter Brothers**: Operated a poultry slaughterhouse in Brooklyn. - Challenged the NIRA, which allowed the President to approve industry codes setting wages, hours, and working conditions. - **Issue**: Could Congress regulate local slaughterhouses under the Commerce Clause? - **Supreme Court Ruling**: No, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) was unconstitutional. 1. **For Regulation**: a. The poultry industry's supply chain significantly impacted the interstate market. Congress could regulate activities that **affect interstate commerce**. 2. **Against Regulation**: b. The effect on interstate commerce was **indirect** since the business was local. Local activities fell under state authority. - **Reasoning**: - The poultry operation was purely **local** (Brooklyn-based, no interstate commerce). - Congress's authority extends only to activities with a **direct effect** on interstate commerce. Here it was **indirect** - The court did not make clear here where the line is for what is direct or indirect effect on interstate commerce. #### Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (1936) (Direct v Indirect Effects) ##### **Facts:** A large coal company produced coal for the national market. - **Issue**: Could Congress regulate wages and working conditions under the Commerce Clause? - **Supreme Court** **Ruling**: No, federal regulation of local labor conditions exceeded Congress's power. - **Reasoning**: - The relationship between labor conditions and interstate commerce was **indirect**. - **Direct vs. Indirect Effects**: - Congress may regulate activities with **direct effects** on interstate commerce but not those with indirect effects. ##### **Direct vs. Indirect Effects:** - **Direct Effects**: - Immediate, with no intervening steps (e.g., railroad safety directly impacts interstate travel). - **Indirect Effects**: - Mediated by choices or actions of others (e.g., wage increases may or may not raise coal prices). - **Justice Cardozo's Dissent in Carter Coal** - **Key Points**: - Degree matters: Large-scale industries with significant interstate impact should fall under federal regulation. - Rejected rigid distinctions between direct and indirect effects. ### **Key Takeaways from the evolution of Commerce Clause Interpretation from *Camanetti* to *Carter v Coal*** - **Commerce Clause Interpretation**: - Early 20th-century cases emphasized **direct effects** on interstate commerce. **Local activities** were generally left to state regulation unless they clearly impacted the national market. - **Proximate Cause Analogy**: - Determining the scope of federal power mirrors tort principles of causation (e.g., direct vs. proximate causes) ***But this will be shaped further in later cases!!*** ### Current Doctrine: Retrenchment? ### **History: Supreme Court\'s Stance on Economic Legislation Under New Deal Pressure** - **Trend (1900-1937)**: The Supreme Court struck down economic legislation from both **federal** and **state governments**: - Federal: Found unconstitutional under Commerce Clause interpretations. - State: Struck down under the **Contracts Clause** or **Due Process Clause**. - **Criticism of the Court**: Accused of using the Constitution to uphold a **laissez-faire, free-market ideology**. Perceived as imposing its economic views rather than neutrally interpreting the law. - **1930s Context**: - The **Great Depression** created demand for sweeping economic reforms. - New Deal legislation aimed to regulate and stabilize the economy. - **Court Opposition**: struck down key New Deal laws, e.g., **Schechter Poultry**, **Carter v. Carter Coal**. - Court Packing Plan **Proposed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1937)**: - Add a new Supreme Court justice for every justice over 70. - Goal: Shift the Court to support New Deal legislation. - **Congressional Reaction**: - Democrats controlled Congress but opposed the plan, citing judicial independence. - \"Switch in Time That Saved the Nine\": - Justice Owen Roberts shifted his vote, forming a majority to uphold New Deal laws. - Landmark Case: **NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.** (1937). - Court upheld federal regulation of labor relations under the Commerce Clause. ### **Shift in Judicial Philosophy: [Substantial Effects Doctrine]** - **1937-1942**: Court transitioned from **activism** to **deference** regarding federal economic legislation. - Adopted the **Hughes Doctrine**: - Federal authority over activities affecting interstate commerce **depends on degree and impact.** #### United States v. Darby Lumber Co. (1941) (Substantial Effects Doctrine) - **Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938**: Established **minimum wages** and **maximum hours** for workers. - Prohibited interstate commerce of goods produced under substandard labor conditions. - **Facts:** - **Defendant**: Darby Lumber Co., a Georgia-based business. - **Violation**: Failure to comply with FLSA labor standards. - **Supreme Court Decision:** 1. **Overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918)**: a. Court dismissed earlier ruling that limited federal power over local labor. b. Held that **Congress could regulate substandard labor conditions** to protect interstate commerce 2. **Congress's Authority**: c. Power to regulate interstate commerce includes the ability to **prohibit harmful practices**, regardless of whether the harm occurs **before or during** interstate commerce. **Implications:** - Congress can regulate activities that **substantially affect i**nterstate commerce. - even without regard to interstate movement like prohibiting goods across state lines. - **10th Amendment Reinterpretation**: - Declared to be a **truism** ("all is retained that has not been granted" duh), providing **no substantive limits on federal power**. - Court affirmed that powers not granted to Congress remain with the states, but this does not restrict the scope of enumerated federal powers #### Wickard v. Filburn (1942) (doesn't matter if nature of activity is commerce, if SE then Congress can reach it) - **Agricultural Adjustment Act**: - Imposed production quotas on farmers to **stabilize crop prices and prevent market oversupply.** - **Facts:** - **Defendant**: Roscoe Filburn, an Ohio dairy farmer. - **Violation**: Grew more wheat than his quota allowed for personal use, not for sale. - **Supreme Court Ruling:** 1. **Substantial Effects Doctrine**: a. Even [purely local, non-commercial activitie]s could be regulated if they **substantially affect interstate commerce**. b. Filburn's excess wheat **reduced his reliance on the market, impacting interstate supply and demand.** 2. **Congressional Power**: c. Expanded interpretation of the Commerce Clause to include regulation of **indirect effects** on commerce. ### **Commerce Clause Doctrine (Post-1937)** #### **Key Principles:** 1. **Broad Authority**: a. Congress can regulate activities that directly or indirectly affect interstate commerce. 2. **Motive Irrelevant**: b. Congress's reasoning for regulation is not subject to judicial scrutiny. 3. **10th Amendment as a Truism**: c. Does not impose substantive limitations on federal power under the Commerce Clause. **Examples of Congressional Authority:** - Prohibit interstate shipment of goods produced under exploitative labor conditions. - Impose production limits on agricultural commodities to stabilize markets. ### **Conclusion of Judicial Evolution** - The Court moved from strict limitations on federal power (e.g., Hammer) to a broad interpretation supporting economic regulation. - Cases like **Darby** and **Wickard** laid the foundation for the modern understanding of the Commerce Clause. - The **New Deal era** marked a decisive shift toward deference to Congressional authority in matters of economic regulation. ###### **Congress' Mechanisms for Regulation**: 1. **Supply-Side Regulation**: Limit production (e.g., quotas under Agricultural Adjustment Act). 2. **Demand-Side Regulation**: Purchase excess goods (e.g., government buying surplus wheat or cheese). 3. **Direct Price Regulation (doesn't usually work)**: Congress can set prices but typically opts for indirect methods. ### **Aggregate Effects Doctrine** Congress can regulate local activities if, **in the aggregate, they have a substantial effect** on interstate commerce. #### **Wickard v. Filburn:** - Farmer Filburn grew wheat for personal use, claiming no impact on interstate commerce. - Court ruled that **cumulative home production of wheat** could affect market prices, justifying federal regulation. **(also can apply to weed)** ### **Rational Basis Standard:** Courts will uphold Congress\'s actions if there is a **reasonable justification** for believing the activity affects interstate commerce. - Congress does not need absolute proof---just a **plausible connection** to interstate commerce. ### **Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Commerce Clause** - **Title II** prohibits [discrimination] in **public accommodations** (e.g., hotels, restaurants). #### **Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States:** a. Motel [served interstate travelers]. b. Court upheld regulation under the Commerce Clause due to its impact on interstate commerce. #### Katzenbach v. McClung (Ollie's Barbecue): c. Restaurant sourced food from [suppliers receiving goods from interstate commerce]. d. Aggregate effect of discrimination justified federal regulation. #### **Key Takeaway:** - Even activities that appear **local** can be regulated if their **economic effects aggregate** into a substantial impact on interstate commerce. ### **Role of the 14th Amendment (equal protection) vs. Commerce Clause** #### **Commerce Clause Advantage:** - Broader reach: Covers private businesses with interstate connections. #### **14th Amendment Limitation:** - Applies [only to **state actions**], [not private] discrimination. - Justice Department chose Commerce Clause as a more **viable legal foundation**. ### **Commerce Clause vs. Police Power** #### **General Police Power:** - Reserved for **states**: Regulates health, safety, and morals unless explicitly preempted by federal law. #### **Commerce Clause:** - Functions as a **federal regulatory tool**, but nearly indistinguishable from a police power due to its broad scope post-1937. #### **Concerns:** - **Limits on Federal Power**: - Difficult to articulate, as **almost all activities can be connected to interstate commerce.** ### **Erie Doctrine (1938) and Federal Restraint** - **Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins (1938)**: - Court declared there is no **general federal common law**. - Part of the broader shift toward **judicial restraint**. - Reflects the S[upreme Court's retreat from activism]: - Courts no longer create law without clear statutory or constitutional authority. - Deference given to Congress's decisions in areas like commerce regulation. - Both reflect a philosophy of **deference to legislative authority** and **limiting judicial intervention**. **The Framework for Judicial Review of Congressional Authority under the Commerce Clause** ### **U.S. v. Lopez (1995) and the Limits of Federal Power** ### **Facts of the Case:** - **Law**: Gun-Free School Zones Act. - Prohibited possession of firearms within **1,000 feet of a school**. - **Defendant**: Alfonso Lopez, a high school senior.Brought a gun to school and was prosecuted under federal law. - Lopez argued the law was **unconstitutional** under the **Commerce Clause**. - **Central Question**: Does the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceed Congress's power to regulate under the Commerce Clause? - **Justice Rehnquist\'s Opinion** - **Enumerated Powers Principle:** - The federal government is one of **limited and enumerated powers**. Constitution does not grant the federal government a **general police power**. - **Federalism**: Some areas, like criminal law and education, are traditionally left to the **states**. - Asserts that **Commerce Clause power** has limits, even though its scope has been broadly interpreted. **Framework for Commerce Clause Analysis** Justice Rehnquist identified **three categories** Congress can regulate under the Commerce Clause: **Category 1: Use of Channels of Interstate Commerce** - **Definition**: Congress can regulate the physical **routes** through which commerce flows. - Examples: Highways, waterways, railroads - **Cases Cited**: - **Heart of Atlanta Motel**: Discrimination in public accommodations interferes with interstate commerce. - **Darby**: Congress may regulate goods moving through interstate channels, even if the purpose is moral or economic. **Category 2: (ALOT OF OVERLAP with Cat 1 -- so Kinkopf doesnt care about differentiating the two)** B. **Instrumentalities of Interstate Commerce: Congress can regulate the tools and modes** of commerce. - Examples: Planes, trains, automobiles, mail, telephone lines, internet C. **Persons or things in Interstate Commerce:** Person moving in interstate commerce **Category 3: Activities That Substantially Affect Interstate Commerce** - **Definition**: Congress can regulate ECONOMIC **local activities** if, in the **aggregate**, they have a **substantial economic effect** on interstate commerce. - Examples: Agriculture (**Wickard v. Filburn**), labor standards (**Darby**). - **New Limitation Introduced**: **Economic vs. Non-Economic Activity**: - Only **economic activities** that substantially affect interstate commerce may be regulated. ### **Application to Gun-Free School Zones Act** **Issue:** Does gun possession in a school zone substantially affect interstate commerce? **Majority Opinion:** Justice Rehnquist emphasized the distinction between **economic** and **non-economic** activity: - **Gun possession** is **non-economic**. - **No direct connection** between possessing a gun in a school zone and **interstate commerce**. - Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce Clause because it regulated non-economic activity. - Concerned with protecting **state autonomy** in areas like: - **Criminal law**. - **Education**. - **Family law** (e.g., marriage, child custody). **Rational Basis Argument:** - **Dissent's View** (Justice Breyer): - Cited 150 studies linking **gun violence** to decreased educational quality and economic harm. - Claimed Congress had a **rational basis** for concluding gun possession affects interstate commerce. - **Rehnquist's Response**: - Acknowledged the rational basis but rejected the regulation of **non-economic** activity under the Commerce Clause - **Rational Basis Review** - **Lopez Case Findings**: - The statute did not regulate **economic activity** and thus failed the rational basis test. ### **Precedent and Federalism** - Asserted all prior cases involved **economic activity**: - **Wickard v. Filburn**: Commercial farming was inherently economic. - **Heart of Atlanta Motel**: Serving interstate travelers was an economic enterprise. - Declined to follow **dicta** from earlier cases suggesting a broader scope (like in Wickard v Filburn saying even if it was not economic-Justice Jackson) for the Commerce Clause. **Federalism Concerns:** - Fear of unlimited federal power: - If Congress could regulate **non-economic activity**, there would be **no limits** to federal authority. - Example: Regulating marriage or child-rearing as they affect the economy in the aggregate. ### **Economic vs. Non-Economic Activity - Why the Distinction Matters:** - Protects **state sovereignty**: - Criminal law, education, and family law are **traditional areas of state authority**. - **Economic Activities**: - Can be aggregated to show a substantial effect on interstate commerce. - **Non-Economic Activities**: - Cannot be aggregated; therefore, Congress cannot regulate them under the Commerce Clause. - Justice Rehnquist emphasized the need for **limits on federal power**: - Without distinctions between **economic** and **non-economic** activities, there would be **no meaningful limit**. **Lopez and this Distinction Reaffirmed a Limit** **on federal power**: - The decision marked a shift from the expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause seen since the New Deal. ### **Jurisdictional Element (how Congress could craft laws within their authority under the Commerce Clause)** - **Definition**: A component of a statute tying it to Congress\'s constitutional authority. - E.g., Congress could prohibit possession of guns in school zones if those guns had moved in **interstate commerce**. - Historically, **100% of guns** had moved in interstate commerce (as of 1996). - **Broad Scope**: - Laws could include provisions like: - Prohibiting guns if **any component** of the firearm had moved through interstate commerce. - If Lopez had possessed the gun as part of a **drug trade**: could arguably qualify as **economic** activity - Cited cases: **Ollie's Barbecue** and the **Lake Nixon Social Club** showed Congress's reach over even minor interstate commerce connections. - BUT LOPEZ does virtually nothing to define **distinction b/w economic and non-economic activity** ### **Defining economic vs non-economic activity** #### United States v. Morrison **Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)** - **Findings by Congress**: Studies established that gender-motivated violence had a **substantial economic effect**. They established a rational basis that gender motivated violence, in the aggregate, had a substantial economic effect on IC. Despite findings, VAWA was struck down. **Key Issues** 1. **Economic vs. Non-Economic Activity**: Gender-motivated violence is **not economic activity**, even if it has **economic effects**. 2. **Jurisdictional Element**: Lacking jurisdictional elements linking **specific acts to interstate commerce** limits Congress's authority. 3. **Court's Reasoning**: a. Congress may not regulate non-economic activities under the Commerce Clause. This reinforced Lopez's precedent. #### Gonzales v. Raich 1. **Federal Prohibition under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA)**: a. California's **Compassionate Use Act** conflicted by allowing homegrown marijuana for medical use. b. Supreme Court upheld the CSA's authority over homegrown, medicinal marijuana. 2. **Non- Economic Activity Rationale**: c. Non-economic activities like home production can impact interstate markets by: i. Inadvertently entering the **illegal market**. ii. Undermining federal prohibition efforts **(which is a comprehensive economic regulatory regime meant to regulate all narcotic and pharmaceutical sales)** d. **Necessary and Proper Clause**: iii. Regulating homegrown marijuana is **necessary** for enforcing broader federal drug policy (Ensures the **effectiveness of the CSA**.) 3. **Definition of economic activity** (Webster's Dictionary) (be careful with this one): e. Includes **production, distribution**, and **consumption**. **Conflict with Lopez**: - Gun possession under Lopez was deemed non-economic. Consuming a gun is buying it and toting it. - Marijuana consumption in Raich is considered economic. - **Danger of Overreach**: Applying Raich's broad definition invalidates Lopez's limits. ### **Rehnquist's Commerce Clause Framework Tweaked:** - 1^st^ Theory: Congress can regulate: 1. **Channels of interstate commerce.** 2. **A) Instrumentalities of commerce** (e.g., roads, phones, the internet). **B) Persons or things in IC** 3. **Economic activities in the aggregate** with substantial effects on interstate commerce. Congress only needs **rational basis** to determine this. c. **Economic Activity:** in Raich SCOTUS defines as production, distribution and consumption (but be careful w this one) d. **Inactivity** cannot be regulated (see Sebelius ACA case) - they can't force you to buy something - 2^nd^ Theory: **Non-economic activities:** - Can only be regulated if **necessary and proper** component to support a **broader economic regulatory scheme**. ### **Necessary and Proper Clause** #### US v. Comstock - The case addresses the federal statute authorizing the **civil commitment** of **sexually dangerous persons** post-incarceration. - Issue: **Is this within Congress's authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause?** 1. **Court's Reasoning**: a. Congress has broad authority to **manage prisoners** under the Necessary and Proper Clause. b. Reasonable for Congress to protect society from **dangerous individuals** even after release. 2. **State Concerns**: c. States **delegate** this responsibility to the federal government. d. States often avoid handling these individuals due to costs and logistical burdens. ### **Dissenting Views** **Necessary and Proper Clause**: a. Dissenters questioned whether the Necessary and Proper Clause **alone** suffices to authorize the statute. Concerned about federal overreach into **state sovereignty**. b. Emphasized the need for a **clear connection** to an **enumerated power** in the Constitution. c. Necessary and Proper clause simply says Congress has the authority to make laws that are necessary and proper for carrying into execution of the powers of the federal government. **BUT YOU NEED AN ENUMERATED POWER** ### **Enumerated Powers Connection -- Majority\'s Response:** a. Federal prisoners are incarcerated due to valid exercises of **enumerated powers**, such as: i. **Commerce Clause** (e.g., drug-related crimes). ii. **Postal Power** (e.g., use of the mail for illegal activities). iii. **Military Power** (e.g., offenses involving armed services). ### **Standard Applied** 1. **Rational Basis Test**: a. The statute must have a **rational relationship** to a **legitimate goal** under an enumerated power. b. Connection: Civil commitment is a **logical component** of managing federal prisons. c. Managing sexually dangerous individuals is part of ensuring public safety post-incarceration. 2. **10th Amendment** Concerns: d. \"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.\" e. The statute accommodates state sovereignty: i. States are offered the **opportunity to take custody** before federal intervention. ii. However, most states prefer federal management due to cost and resource burdens. #### NFIB v. Sebelius (Affordable Care Act Case) (economic activity vs. inactivity) - **Primary Issue**: Constitutionality of the **individual mandate** requiring individuals to purchase health insurance. - Additional Provisions: - **Guaranteed Issue**: Insurers must cover individuals regardless of pre-existing conditions. - **Community Rating**: Insurers cannot charge premiums based on individual health conditions. 1. **Purpose**: a. Addresses the \"death spiral\": i. Without the mandate, only sick individuals buy insurance, causing premiums to rise, pushing healthy individuals out of the market, leading to further premium increases. b. Mandate ensures **broad participation** in the insurance pool, stabilizing premiums. 1. **Arguments Presented**: The federal government claimed the mandate was permissible under the **Commerce Clause**. a. Chief Justice Roberts **rejected this argument,** ruling the mandate could not be justified as regulating **economic activity**. i. **Reasoning (Dicta)**: The mandate compelled individuals to enter the market, which goes beyond regulating existing market activity. 2. **Court's Focus**: b. The ruling did not rest on the Commerce Clause. c. Instead, the mandate was upheld under Congress's **taxing power**. **Necessary and Proper Clause: Comstock Comparison to Sebelius**: a. In **Comstock**, the Necessary and Proper Clause supported the **civil commitment** statute as a **logical component** of managing federal prisoners. b. **Key Refinement**: Congress can regulate **economic activity**, not **inactivity.** The **Constitution** does not explicitly limit Congress's regulation to activity: i. **Textual argument**: **\"create\"** and **\"regulate\"** as separate powers ii. **Precedent Analysis**: All prior Commerce Clause cases regulated **activity** 1. **Novelty Argument**: a. Congress has never required individuals to engage in commerce. b. Roberts suggests this absence implies a lack of authority. iii. **Slippery Slope Concern**: If Congress can compel purchases, it could mandate any behavior (e.g., buying **broccoli**) 2. Roberts argues such power would fundamentally alter the federal-state relationship. - **Economic vs. Non-Economic Activity (separate distinction)**: - Activities like **possessing guns** (Lopez) and **gender-motivated violence** (Morrison) are **non-economic**. - Activities like **growing marijuana** (Raich) are **economic** because they impact a broader market. ### **Necessary and Proper Clause ("mystifying logic used here" -- Kinkopf)** - **Application to the Affordable Care Act**: - The **individual mandate** could be seen as a necessary and proper component of a broader **economic regulatory regime** (e.g., health insurance market). **Why not like *Raich*?** - **Roberts\'s says may be necessary but NOT \"Proper\"**: - Roberts claims the mandate is not **\"proper\"** because it transforms the federal-state relationship. - The mandate is not **incidental** or **narrow in scope** (although gov argues it is incidental) - Congress creates the predicate for its necessary action. (but its only bc Congress has decided to ban market for marijuana that its necessary and proper for Congress to ban homegrown consumption of weed) **Hypothetical: Undetectable Plastic Firearms**: - **Scenario**: Congress criminalizes [possession] of undetectable firearms ANYWHERE - **Economic Activity**: Similar to cases involving regulated economic activities (e.g., marijuana), but possession of a firearm does not involve consumption in the same way. - *Lopez* says possession of gun is NOT an economic activity, so here likely not EA and thus outside of Congress's commerce power - Congress might regulate the production of undetectable guns as an economic activity. - **Channels and Instrumentalities**: - Regulation could extend to sensitive places like airports and schools (but here it's ANYWHERE)\... sooo - **Rational Basis**: Congress doesn't need direct evidence of harm; it suffices that harm is rationally anticipated. ### Other Limits: Federalism, State Sovereignty, and Federal Regulatory Power: **Anti- Commandeering Doctrine** Congress can commandeer the judiciary of a state but cannot commandeer the executive or the legislature of the state. - **Core Takeaway**: - Anti-commandeering doctrine preserves the **direct relationship** between federal government and citizens, ensuring state autonomy and sovereignty. **Commandeering Doctrine and Its Limits** **1^st^ Ask:** Is this a generally applicable law or does it apply only to the states? - If generally applicable, then it applies to private actors and states actors, so not regulating the state as a sovereign (99% of cases). - BUT in 1% it gets tricky when the law only applies to states. - You must determine if the law regulates the states as **a)** sovereigns forcing them to administer a regulation on behalf of fed (commandeering) or **b)** as objects (not commandeering) - **What Congress Cannot Do**: Regulate the states as sovereigns, in order to use their sovereignty to effectuate a federal regulatory program - Force states to regulate or enforce federal programs (e.g., background checks in *Printz* where the Congress required sheriffs to regulate individuals ability to buy a gun **on behalf of a federal program** [interfering with the sovereign privity between the direct relationship of federal government and U.S. citizens], [ and between state governments and state citizens.] - Compel states to legislate or regulate on behalf of federal law (e.g., waste management in *New York v. United States*). - **What Congress Can Do**: Regulate states as **objects** of regulation - Regulate states as **objects** of regulation, not instruments of federal policy (e.g., *Reno v. Condon*, regulating state-held data like driver\'s licenses). not a violation of the anti commandeering doctrine, because it does not seek to regulate the state\'s sovereignty. It doesn\'t seek to use the state\'s sovereignty on behalf of a federal regulatory program. - Offer **incentives** for voluntary state participation in federal programs. - Create general law that applied to private employers and states as employers, not as sovereigns, *Garcia* (1985): Upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) as applicable under the Commerce Clause because it was a general law that applied to private employers and states as employers, not as sovereigns, but in NY v US and Printz the law only applied to states. So Printz doesn't overrule Garcia. - The federal government can impose reporting requirements on states, such as submitting data to a missing child database, because Congress has authority over issues like kidnapping that involve interstate commerce. This does not violate the anti-commandeering doctrine if states are required to share **pre-existing data.** [However, requiring states to collect new information constitutes a sovereign function and violates the doctrine.] The key distinction is that the federal government may regulate states as objects of the regulation but cannot use them as intermediaries to implement federal programs, preserving the principle of dual sovereignty and the direct citizen-sovereign relationship. #### #### Evolution of Anti Commandeering Doctrine: #### ***National League of Cities v. Ussery*** (traditional areas of state concern \... like state employees) - Overruled by Garcia **Claimants:** National League of Cities challenges amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). **FLSA**: Regulates wages, hours, and employment rights. States argued it infringed on their ability to structure employment relationships in **traditional areas of state concern (wages of state employees).** **Court\'s Decision:** The Supreme Court held that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause authority by applying FLSA amendments to **state employees.** 1. **Commerce Clause Framework**: Satisfied but\.... 2. **Rehnquist's Reasoning**: a. Interprets the **10th Amendment** implying that the federal government cannot impair the ability of the states to structure relationships with employees in areas of traditional state concern. b. Examples of [traditional state functions]: i. Police, fire prevention, sanitation, public parks, and recreation. #### Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority **Issue**: Does Congress's Commerce Clause authority extend to apply FLSA provisions to state and local governments? **Ruling**: Overrules *National League of Cities*. - Holds that the Commerce Clause gives Congress authority to regulate state employees. **Reasons for Overruling:** 1. **Unworkable Standard** a. Determining **\"traditional state functions\"** is impractical. i. Lacks legal clarity, inviting judicial [activism ] 2. **Inconsistent with Federalism Principles** (states can protect themselves from fed overreach procedurally) b. Justice Blackmun asserts federalism is **procedurally protected** through the political process, not judicial intervention. **Political Safeguards of Federalism:** - **Electoral College**: Ensures states have a voice in presidential elections - **Equal Senate Representation**: Each state, regardless of size, has two senators - **Decentralized Party System**: - State political actors influence federal representatives. - Governors and state officials hold leverage through endorsements and lobbying - **Redistricting Power**: - States control congressional districts, influencing federal representation - **States lobby the federal govt.** **Justice Rehnquist's Dissent:** - Federalism is a constitutional principle, not a political preference. - Predicts a **return** to principles outlined in *National League of Cities*. - Asserts that substantive protections for states are necessary to prevent federal overreach. - Open Question: Do we return? - **Post-Garcia Landscape**: - States must rely on **political mechanisms** to protect sovereignty. - Judicial intervention is limited to ensuring procedural safeguards. - IOW: After *Garcia*, states are subject to federal legislation enacted within an enumerated federal power, must rely on the political process to oppose legislation they dislike, and cannot expect the courts to intervene in their protection as long as procedural requirements are met. #### Gregory v. Ashcroft **Issue:** Is it unconstitutional to apply the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) to state court judges? **Ruling**: States may exclude judges from ADEA protections if doing so aligns with state policies. 1. **Congress's Authority**: a. [Regulating employment discrimination] falls under Congress's **Commerce Clause power**. b. **Economic Activity**: i. Employment practices constitute economic activity. ii. Age discrimination in employment substantially affects interstate commerce in the aggregate 2. **Application to States**: c. Applying ADEA to states is within federal authority under the Commerce Clause. d. **Statutory Interpretation:** the ADA **doesn't** apply here so there is no constitutional question. (there was an exemption for individuals on a policymaking level=judges) e. However, federal laws that interfere with state-specific policies (e.g., judicial qualifications) face scrutiny. f. **Clear Statement Rule (Will not ask us on final)**: i. Federal statutes must clearly state their intention to impair state functions. This rule reflects federalism\'s constitutional value. ii. **Problems**: **Bias Toward Federalism**: Non-neutral, favors state sovereignty over federal authority. **Potential Conflict**: Undermines the Supremacy Clause, which affirms federal law as supreme over state law (*McCulloch v. Maryland*; *Gibbons v. Ogden*). iii. **Defenses**: Federalism is a constitutional principle supported by provisions like: - **10th Amendment**: Reserved powers to states. - **Joinder Clause**: Requires state consent for territorial changes. - **Senate Representation**: Equal representation of states. #### New York v. United States (1992)(Anti-Commandeering) **Rule: Prohibition on Commandeering**: a. **Key Principle**: Congress cannot compel states to enforce federal programs (*Anti-Commandeering Doctrine*). - **Context**: States face issues with low-level radioactive waste disposal due to constitutional restrictions on state regulation (*Dormant Commerce Clause*). states can\'t discriminate against out of state commodities (each state has to share its space for waste disposal from other states). - **Federal Legislation**: A cooperative framework requiring states to meet waste disposal targets. - Three provisions: - **Surcharge on Out-of-State Waste** (constitutional). - **Access Restrictions:** forbid out of state waste (constitutional). - **Take-Title Requirement**: States must assume ownership of waste if targets aren't met ([unconstitutional]). 1. **Permissible Incentives**: b. Congress may incentivize state participation (e.g., funding or regulatory choice). c. States retain the option to accept or reject federal terms. 2. **Prohibition on Commandeering**: d. **Key Principle**: Congress cannot compel states to participate in federal regulatory programs (*Anti-Commandeering Doctrine*). e. The take-title provision violates this by forcing states to assume liability for waste. f. **Justification for Anti-Commandeering** 1. **Accountability Argument**: a. Federal laws must clearly place responsibility on the federal government. b. Forcing states to act obscures accountability and undermines democratic processes. c. Citizens may blame state officials for federal mandates. 2. **Federal Supremacy vs. State Sovereignty**: d. The Supremacy Clause gives federal law priority, but it doesn't grant Congress the authority to compel state governments. **Implications** - **Voluntary Compliance**: States may participate in federal regulatory programs voluntarily but cannot be coerced. - **Regulatory Choice**: Congress can regulate directly if states opt out of participation. ### **Revisiting Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority** **Key Holding in Garcia**: States are subject to federal labor laws like the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) as long as Congress acts within its enumerated powers. Does New York Overrule Garcia? 1. **Preservation of Federal Power**: a. Congress can still directly regulate state activities (e.g., wage laws under the FLSA). 2. **Limitation Introduced**: b. Federal government cannot compel states to administer federal programs or policies. **Remaining Authority Post-New York** **RULE:** - States are protected from **federal coercion, commandeering state legislatures into adopting federal regulatory programs**. - However, federal labor standards like the FLSA remain enforceable as **direct federal regulations and Congress can commandeer things like state judicial officers**. - Garcia is still good law. New York only involves a law that **regulates states AS states acting as sovereigns**, as opposed to a law that applies to **states generally acting as employers** #### **Printz v. United States (Anti-Commandeering of State's Executive)** **Central Issue**: Can Congress commandeer a state\'s executive to enforce federal law? - Example: *Printz v. United States* as the leading case on commandeering. **Overview**: The **Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act** required interim background checks for gun purchases until a federal database was established by AG. Congress mandated **Chief Law Enforcement Officers (CLEOs)** (e.g., sheriffs) to conduct these checks temporarily. **Accountability Problem**: Sheriffs performing checks might receive public blame for restrictions imposed by federal law so accountability shifted unfairly from Congress to state officers. **Unfunded Mandates**: Federal government imposed financial and administrative burdens on states without compensating them. **Court's Holding**: Congress **cannot commandeer state executives** to enforce federal law. **Reasoning:** Violates principles of federalism and state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment. Here the voluntary (retain autonomy) vs involuntary(they are not sovereign) distinction is crucial. **Also Commandeering Disrupts Dual Sovereignty and Federalism Principles** - **Dual Sovereignty Framework** (32:09): - Citizens relate directly to: - **Federal government** as U.S. citizens. - **State governments** as state citizens. - **Commandeering disrupts this balance**: - Forces states to act as intermediaries for federal enforcement, undermining autonomy. **Necessary and Proper Clause Analysis** - **Commerce Clause Authority**: - Congress can regulate gun sales under its **Commerce Clause** power - **Necessary and Proper Clause**: Allows Congress to choose enforcement mechanisms that are "necessary" (helpful, and conducive to implement the fed law). - **BUT Limitation (from *Sebelius* and *Comstock*)**: - Enforcement mechanisms **must be \"proper\".** - **Improper Mechanisms**: Violating structural provision of the Constitution like federalism or state sovereignty. #### **VII. Implications for Garcia and Sovereign Immunity** - **Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Authority** (1985): - Upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) as applicable under the Commerce Clause because it was a general law that applied to private employers and states as employers, not as sovereigns, but in *NY v US* and *Printz* the law only applied to states. So *Printz* doesn't overrule *Garcia. But practically, see sovereign immmunity* - **Sovereign Immunity(WILL NOT TEST US ON THIS)**: - *Seminole Tribe v. Florida* (1996): States cannot be sued in federal court without consent, even for federal question cases (1:06:08). - *Alden v. Maine* (1999): Extended sovereign immunity to state courts, barring federal causes of action against states in their own courts. - **Practical Impact**: - Although *Garcia* is not formally overruled, states are shielded from enforcement due to sovereign immunity. - **Exceptions to Sovereign Immunity** 1. **Congressional Power under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment**: a. Congress can enforce 14th Amendment protections, overriding state sovereign immunity. 2. **Bankruptcy Clause**: b. Allows limited federal authority over states in bankruptcy cases. C. Spending Power {#c.-spending-power.ListParagraph} ----------------- - **Congress\'s Spending Power**: A critical power enabling Congress to influence national behavior and priorities. Spending power allows incentivization through funding. **Congress may impose whatever requirements, conditions it wants that operate with the funding, within the program, but when it makes conditions that are outside that funding**, not on how the funds are being spent, not within the program, t**hen we have to do this analysis about whether the state\'s choice is a voluntary or whether the state is being coerced.** **Spending Limitations** Congress can **condition spending** if it satisfies 4 specific criteria: - **Promotes General Welfare**: Deferential to Congress's judgment. (Porkbarrel spending is arguably unconstitutional but no court can uphold that) - **Unambiguous Terms**: States must clearly understand conditions. - **Related to Federal Interest**: Conditions must be germane to the purpose of the funds. (even if attenuated, the standard is a rational basis) - **No Constitutional Bar**: Conditions cannot violate the Constitution - like discrimination or by commandeering. It can be impermissible commandeering if the funding condition is coercive. ***Dole* = 0.5% of the state's entire budget was permissible but NFIB v. *Sebelius***: **10%+ = coercive**. Coercive conditions, such as threatening large portions of state budgets, are unconstitutional **Textual Limits** 1. **General Welfare Clause**: Congress can only spend for the **general welfare**, but the meaning of this clause is ambiguous and broadly interpreted. 2. **Constitutional Prohibitions**: a. Spending **cannot lead to unconstitutional outcomes** (e.g., cruel punishment) (3:42--3:55). b. Spending **cannot conflict with specific constitutional amendments** (e.g., First Amendment rights) (40:00). ### **South Dakota v. Dole (1987) (5:37--23:06)** - **Facts**: Congress withheld 5% of federal highway funds from states with a drinking age under 21. - **Key Issues**: - Could Congress require states to adopt a drinking age under the **Commerce Clause**? No, due to anti-commandeering and state sovereignty , but they could establish a national drinking age, but the 21^st^ amendment gave regulatory power of alcohol to the states - So Congress used **spending power** instead, linking funds to state compliance. This is an INDIRECT, and acceptable as long as 4 requirements are met: - **Supreme Court Decision**: - Congress can **condition spending** if it satisfies specific criteria: - **Promotes General Welfare**: Deferential to Congress's judgment. (Porkbarrel spending is arguably unconstitutional but no court can uphold that) - **Unambiguous Terms**: States must clearly understand conditions. - **Related to Federal Interest**: Conditions must be germane to the purpose of the funds. (even if attenuated, the standard is a **rational basis**) - **No Constitutional Bar**: Conditions cannot violate the Constitution - like discrimination or by commandeering. It can be impermissible commandeering if the funding condition is cooercive. **Here 0.5% of the state's entire budget was permissible** #### NFIB v. Sebelius (2012) - **Facts**: Affordable Care Act expanded Medicaid; states refusing compliance risked losing all Medicaid funds. - **Key Issues**: Was the condition coercive? Losing **100% of Medicaid funds (10% of total state budget)** was deemed a \"gun to the head\" and **impermissibly coercive** (48:36--49:58). - **Supreme Court Decision**: - Coercion analysis hinges on the **proportion of state budgets** at stake: - **South Dakota v. Dole**: 0.5% = permissible. - **NFIB v. Sebelius**: 10%+ = coercive. Separation of Powers ==================== - **Separation of Powers**: - Horizontal SOP: Power divided among the **legislative**, **executive**, and **judicial** branches. - Vertical SOP (federalism): Power divided between the **federal government** and **state governments** **Constitutional Basis** - Article I: **Legislative power** vested in Congress. - Article II: **Executive power** vested in the President. - Article III: **Judicial power** vested in the Supreme Court. - While not explicitly mentioned, separation of powers is implied in the **Constitution's structure**. **Federalist Papers** - **Purpose**: Defend the Constitution against critics during ratification debates - **Relevant Papers**: - **Federalist No. 47**: Balancing powers between branches to avoid tyranny. - **Federalist No. 48**: Critique of \"parchment barriers\" as insufficient to prevent power encroachments. - **Federalist No. 51**: Advocates internal structure where **ambition counteracts ambition**. ### **Federalist No. 47: Separation vs. Checks and Balances** - **Misconception**: Complete separation of powers is unnecessary and impractical. - **Reality**: - SOP means no branch should hold the **entire power** of another branch. - **Partial agency**: Branches can comingle and have limited roles in another\'s domain (e.g., presidential veto on legislation, Senate confirmation of exec appts). ### **Federalist No. 48: Parchment Barriers** - **Definition**: Written boundaries in a constitution (laws or \"parchment\") to limit encroaching spirit of power. - **Critique**: Insufficient to prevent encroachment---action is needed. So where should the control be focused? The LEGISLATIVE. ### **Federalist No. 51: Checks and Balances** - **Ambition Counteracting Ambition**: - Human nature is inherently ambitious; power structures must channel this ambition productively. - **Institutional rivalry ensures one branch cannot dominate.** - **Legislative Predominance**: - The legislature holds significant power (e.g., taxation, spending). - Madison warns it is the branch most likely to encroach on others, bc legislature's power is broad and not well defined (while Prez is narrow and well defined) - *"Legislature is everywhere, drawing power into its impetuous vortex"* **[Modern Challenges to Separation of Powers]** **Role of Political Parties** - Madison underestimated the impact of **political parties**: - Party loyalty often supersedes institutional loyalty. - **Consequences**: - Reduced rivalry between branches when controlled by the same party. - Increased gridlock when branches are divided by party. #### Steel Seizure Case (Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer) - **Facts**: Korean War required high steel production. Steelworkers threatened a strike; President Truman seized steel mills via executive order and directed Sec of Commerce to keep running. - **President's Justification**: **Emergency powers** under the **executive vesting clause (All executive powers shall be vested in Prez)** and **commander-in-chief powers**. - **Issue**: Did Truman's actions exceed constitutional authority? - **Majority Opinion (Justice Black)** - **Formalism (not the rule that persists)**: - Emphasizes categorical boundaries of power. - Ensures separation of powers through strict adherence to roles. - Clearly categorize powers as **legislative**, **executive**, or **judicial**. - Truman's action was legislative (seizing private property), which only Congress can authorize. - Why was the power a legislative power? Bc He says so. **Concurring Opinion (Justice Frankfurter)(not the rule that persists)** - **Taff-Hartley Act prohibits the prez from exercising this power**, according to the legislative history and the negative inference from the statute (it didn't say anything about it, but since Congress considered it, it [as if] it enacted a prohibition BUT if it was put in, then Prez could veto. Sooo it's not "as if". - **Precedent and Practice**: - Rejected Truman's claim based on historical practice, because here there is [no authorized declared war by Congress]. - Only **systematic, unbroken practice** with congressional acquiescence supports presidential authority. **Concurring Opinion (Justice Jackson) (the rule that persists)** **Jackson Framework (SOP Qs on Foreign or Millitary Affairs)** 1. **President acting with Congressional authorization:** a. President\'s power is at its **zenith**. b. **Example:** The president can exercise all constitutional powers [**plus**] powers Congress grants. c. [Rare] circumstances Prez power could exceed limits: Example, if the power is denied to **the entire federal government, Congress included (e.g., Lopez** case, Congress didnt have power re guns in schools so prez/AG couldnt prosecute or violation of an individual right) d. Caution: declaring war doesn't inherently authorize the Prez to seize property, so that could be 1 or 2. Remember "continuum" 2. **President acting without Congressional guidance:** a. No statute saying Prez "may", and none saying "may not" b. Described as a **"zone of twilight."** c. Depends on **specific facts** and **contemporary imponderables**. 3. **President acting against Congressional prohibition:** a. **Lowest ebb of power.** b. [Rare circumstances] where the the president could still prevail, but **only** if Congress attempts to infringe on **express constitutional powers** aka **conclusive and preclusive powers** c. The President must prove that their power is both **exclusive** and **preclusive**, meaning it precludes Congress from legislating on the matter. But their power more commonly OVERLAPS. d. **Constitutional Unicorns**: a. **Pardoning power**: Congress cannot revoke a presidential pardon (no matter what, even if prez abuses this power and takes bribes) b. **Veto power**: Congress cannot eliminate this presidential authority. - **Hold**: Truman's action fell into the third tier**---illegal.** Truman's actions fell within Category 3 because they contradicted Congress's implicit will, in the Taft Hartley Act (agreeing in part with Frankfurter) AND the p**owers of war are not given to the Commander in Chief preclusively, they are shared.** - Also Jackson says vesting clause does not mean there is inherent power of the executive in emergencies. Constitution does not speak on emergency powers, rather framers were hostile against prez having emergency powers. It all comes down to if Congress has authority on the subject and shares power. - Take Care Clause: take care clause is not a power. It\'s not necessary and proper clause for the executive branch, which is the way the executive branch loves to read the Take care clause. It\'s a duty, not ability to dispense of the laws. ### Congress v President in the Domestic Sphere **[Delegation and Legislative Veto]** **Non-Delegation Doctrine**: Congress cannot delegate its legislative power to another branch. **Reality**: Delegations are permissible with an **"intelligible principle"** ("in the national interest") guiding agency actions in rulemaking. Example: *Whitman v. American Trucking Association* upheld broad delegations based on this standard. **[Legislative Veto]** #### INS v. Chadha **Facts**: Congress reserved a legislative veto to override the Attorney General's decision on immigration case (to deport Chadha). **Court's Ruling**: Struck down the veto as unconstitutional. **Reason:** It bypassed **bicameralism** and **presentment**, because this is a **legislative action** because it has the purpose and effect of altering legal rights, duties and obligations outside the legislative sphere. **Conflict**: The Attorney General's authority to make the same legislative decision was upheld, creating a tension in Justice Burger's reasoning. By that logic his decision should go through bicam and presentment. But Berger says when AG does it, its not legislative. ### Prosecutorial Discretion #### United States v. Cox (1965) - 5^th^ Circuit -- Key Points 1. **Facts**: A grand jury in Mississippi voted to indict two Black witnesses for perjury in a voting rights case. The U.S. Attorney, under orders from the Attorney General, refused to sign the indictment due to insufficient evidence and concerns about perpetuating racial oppression. Judge Cox held the U.S. Attorney in contempt for refusing to proceed. 2. **Issues**: a. Can a grand jury compel a U.S. Attorney to prosecute? b. Does the executive branch have exclusive prosecutorial authority? 3. **Ruling**: c. **Prosecutorial Discretion**: The executive branch, via the Attorney General and U.S. Attorneys, has exclusive authority over prosecution decisions, including whether to sign an indictment. d. **Separation of Powers**: Judicial interference in prosecutorial decisions violates the separation of powers. e. **Grand Jury's Role**: Limited to determining probable cause; it cannot compel prosecution. 4. **Significance**: This case reinforced **prosecutorial discretion** as a core executive function and clarified that the grand jury cannot override the executive's authority. It also upheld the constitutional principle of **separation of powers** by limiting judicial influence over executive decisions. ### **Prosecutorial Discretion and Separation of Powers** 1. **Core Question**: Is prosecution an **executive**, **judicial**, or **legislative** function? 2. **Statutory Basis**: a. **Title 28, U.S. Code**: i. Vests prosecutorial authority in the Attorney General and U.S. Attorneys. b. Congress has delegated prosecutorial functions to the executive branch. c. Congress cannot **mandate prosecution** due to separation of powers BUT WHY? ii. The US, through the attorney general has uncontrollable discretion. 1. But through Con law or statute? 2. Doesn't say the "executive branch" just the US. #### U.S. v. Nixon **Facts**: Archibald Cox (fired then replaced later Leon Jaworski, who only removable for cause) served as **Special Counsel** as Watergate scandal errupting. Special Counsel appointed by AG because there is a conflict of interest when investigating Prez and close associates a. Investigation revealed the existence of White House tapes documenting Oval Office conversations. b. Nixon resisted the subpoena for the tapes, citing **executive privilege**. 1. **Key Legal Issues**: c. **Justiciability**: Nixon argued the case was an intra-branch dispute, not reviewable by courts. With Prez holding "uncontrollably all prosecutorial power". Can't sue yourself. No case or controversy. i. Court says it is adverse and there is a controversy d. **Executive Privilege**: ii. Nixon claimed an **absolute privilege** over presidential communications. iii. The court rejected absolute privilege, holding it was **qualified** and subject to judicial review. 1. It must be weighed against competing interests of judicial power (thin claim) 2. Recognizes executive privilege, and thereby communications privilege is a constitutional necessity in order for Prez to hear candid advice to do his job, BUT 3. **Judicial Authority**: The judiciary has the final say on constitutional matters, including the scope of executive privilege. 4. **So they do a Balancing Test**: a. Privilege must be weighed against the need for evidence in criminal proceedings. b. But Justice Burger's reasoning here is thin, because there exists other privileges that preclude evidence from coming in. c. Kinkopf: the REAL reason is because subpoenas have the power of a statute passed by Congress. So the real balancing is Prez vs Congress/Judiciary. **Nixon loses because we are in Category 3 of Jackson framework** e. **Outcome**: iv. Nixon was ordered to release the tapes, as the judicial process outweighed his claim of privilege. ### **Presidential Immunity and legal proceedings against sitting or former presidents: Trump Week** ### **Presidential Immunity in Civil Cases** - Nixon and Civil Lawsuit: Hypothetical lawsuit for discriminatory firing at BLS. Nixon orders firing of Jews. **Presidential Immunity Framework** - ***Nixon v. Fitzgerald (1982)*:** Presidents have **absolute immunity** from personal civil liability for actions taken within the scope of office. - Rationale: Prevent chilling effects on presidential decision-making. - Immunity applies even to unlawful acts conducted within office scope. - ***Clinton v. Jones (1997):*** Immunity does not extend to **unofficial acts** or **pre-presidential conduct.** - Example: Sexual harassment allegations against Clinton for actions as governor. - Supreme Court allowed the lawsuit to proceed while Clinton was president. **Balancing Presidential Immunity** - **Factors Considered by the Court:** - **Distraction:** Lawsuits divert the president's attention from duties. - **Stigma:** Allegations harm public perception and diplomatic credibility. - **Impairment of Official Duties:** Immunity needed to avoid chilling or distortion to **presidential official actions** while in office (this mattered the most and was the difference b/w *Fitzgerald* and *Jones,* according to Jones Court) - **Clinton vs. Nixon Rationale:** - **Clinton's conduct:** Pre-presidential and unofficial, hence not immune. - **Nixon's conduct:** Related to official duties, hence immune. - Question remains: [While sitting], what are official acts vs unofficial acts? ### **Criminal Proceedings and Presidential Subpoenas** - **United States v. Nixon (1974):** Presidents must comply with compulsory court processes like subpoenas in criminal proceedings. - Example: Watergate tapes case. - Rationale: Specific need for evidence in criminal cases outweighs privilege. #### **Trump v. Vance** - **Key Points:** - a New York grand jury, as part of a criminal investigation, issued a subpoena to Mazars USA, LLP, President Trump\'s accounting firm, seeking access to his personal and corporate financial records, including tax returns. The subpoena was issued by Cyrus Vance Jr., the Manhattan District Attorney, investigating potential violations of state law. - President Trump challenged the subpoena in federal court, arguing that as a sitting president, he was absolutely immune from state criminal processes and that the subpoena was overly broad and issued in bad faith. - **Trump argues for a) absolute immunity** and then as fallback**, b) heightened protection standard** (as opposed to regular citizens) - **Distinction between federal and state criminal proceedings.** - **Supremacy Clause:** Argues [states] cannot impair [federal] functions. - **Impairment of Official Duties** - **Political Harassment:** Concerns of politically motivated state prosecutions. - **Supreme Court Ruling:** - Injunction is denied and Prez does not have **absolute immunity**. It is not necessary or proper under Art 2 and Supremacy Clause. - **Heightened Protection standard** rejected. Trump's records spanned pre-presidential and after, but burdens of production can be accommodated, and they are personal records not related to official acts as president, (so more like *Jones*) - **SOP Impairment Standard applied:** Constitutionally forbidden impairment of the executive\'s ability to perform its constitutionally mandated functions. - **Does the compulsory process [unduly impair] the president from performing his constitutionally assigned functions?** - **Sometimes Courts say "unduly impair" and sometimes "prevent"** - **Functional Analysis used - Determined with Balancing Test:** Consider executive branch impairment of constitutionally assigned functions vs. complying with the subpoena. - Court upheld the principle that compliance does not unduly impair presidential duties. - Presidents subject to the same rules as private citizens for personal documents. ### **Congressional Subpoenas for Presidential Records** **Congressional Powers and Subpoenas** - **Scope of Authority:** Congress can issue subpoenas for legislative purposes for ANY subject(no limit). They can hold in contempt for noncompliance (subpoena to Biolab company to appear before Congress). Two ways to handle contempt: - Inherent contempt: jail under Capitol - Criminal proceeding by US Attorney on behalf of Congress - **Derived Power from Commerce Clause:** Congress may regulate economic activities that in the aggregate have a substantial effect on IC. (like hazardous materials being produced by Biolab.) - **Courts do not question Congress's motives** if a legislative purpose is plausible (Grandstanding versus legitimate legislative interests) #### **Trump v. Mazars Case** - Congress sought Trump's financial records. He asked for heightened standard of review - **Claim:** Documents necessary for legislative reforms (e.g., money laundering, election security). - **Key Question:** Is heightened protection needed for a sitting president's records? - **Court\'s Decision:** - Not giving Trump heightened standard of review. Also, not applying the standard of review Congress requested (normal person standard). The Court does give a **heightened protection**. - **Balancing Test:** Limits harassment risk while preserving Congress\'s investigatory powers. - Rejects absolute immunity but grants **heightened protection** for presidential documents. ### **Presidential Immunity and Prosecution** - **Topic:** Examining the extent and limits of **presidential immunity** from prosecution. - **Key Questions:** - Can a [sitting] president be indicted? - Moss Memo: regardless if actions pre presidency or while. - How does this align with separation of powers principles? ### **Framework for Analysis** #### Moss Memo (2000) - OLC in DOJ - an opinion that the DOJ/Executive follows **Standard for Determination:** Assess whether the challenged action (e.g., indictment) disables the president from performing constitutional functions. **Balancing test**: Weighing **Executive burdens** vs. **Legislative and judicial interests.** **Burdens on the Executive** 1. **Incapacitation:** a. Imprisonment would render the president unable to perform duties. 2. **Stigma and Public Perception:** b. Domestic and international effectiveness impaired. 3. **Distraction:** c. Legal defense **diverts attention** from governance. **Balancing Countervailing Interests** - **Judicial and Legislative Concerns:** - **Rule of Law:** Ensures no one, including the president, is above the law. - **Retribution and Deterrence:** Core principles of criminal law. - **Practical Challenges:** Delayed prosecution risks: - **Statute of Limitations** expiring. - **Evidence degradation** over time. **Arguments Supporting Temporary Immunity for Sitting Presidents** - **Statute of Limitations Concerns Mitigated:** - Options like **equitable tolling** or Congressional extensions might address statute of limitations issues. - **Impeachment Clause:** Provides a mechanism for immediate accountability. If really pressing, impeach and remove then prosecute constitutionally. - **Rule of Law and Retribution is Delayed, Not Denied (most heavily weighed by Court):** - Prosecution resumes post-term, preserving accountability. - **OLC Conclusion:** - A sitting president cannot be indicted or prosecuted but can face **prosecution after office.** **Critical Perspectives** - the delay creates **unequal treatment under the law.** - **Stigma and distraction** were deemed insufficient concerns in *Clinton v. Jones* for civil suits. #### Presidential Immunity from Criminal Prosecution for [Acts Taken in Office ] #### Trump v. United States - **Indictment Charges:** - False elector schemes - urged VP to change results - DOJ misuse to further voting conspiracies. - January 6th riot and obstruction of votes. - Pressuring state officials to change elections results (e.g., Georgia call). - **Court's Categorization Presidential Actions:** Differentiates **official** vs. **unofficial acts.** - **Unofficial Acts:** - No immunity. - Example: Pre-presidential or personal conduct unrelated to duties. - **Official Acts:** "anything within the outer perimeter of the office" - **Exclusive & Preclusive Presidential Authority:** - **Absolute immunity** for actions within preclusive, exclusive authority, because no other branch is authorized to act within the subject - Pardons, veto - investigation and prosecution power (bc John Roberts says so, but never before held) - so accepting bribe in order to drop prosecutions can conceivably be. Kinkopf: i think its wrong, but it's the rule - **Constitutionally Shared or Statutory Authority:** - **At least presumptive immunity, maybe absolute**, subject to further judicial review later. So the court remanded to treat with presumptive, and to see if absolute **[Hypothetical Scenarios where a Pres could say "I was doing these personal acts to aid me in my job"]** - **FEMA Aid Manipulation:** - President orders FEMA to withhold aid for certain states for partisan gain. - This is different than using DOJ, under the preclusive authority - Court MAYBE views this under **shared statutory authority**, invoking **presumptive immunity**. - So next Q is whether the presumption will hold, so we do a balance to determine if indictment interests of the judiciary would interfere with Prez authority to supervise the executive branch (apparently preclusive authority). But the Court only gives general guidance and sends to lower court to decide on case specific details: - Does it interfere with the president\'s performance of constitutional functions? - Is it somehow justified by an overwhelming interest on the other side? - **President Shooting Spouse:** - Determination depends on: - **Official vs. Unofficial Act:** "as long as it\'s within the outer perimeter of the office" - Burden is on prosecutor that it is manifestly and palpably beyond the president's authority - you cannot say that just because it\'s beyond the scope of the president\'s authority, that it\'s an unofficial act or