Unit 1.pdf

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES UNIT 1: INTRODUCTION LEGISLATION – MEANING AND PROCESS Introduction : What is Law? It is not easy to give a perfect definition to Law. There are many difficulties to define law properly. Firstly, in all societies, there has been a law in one or the other form, which means difference in law of different societies. The term ‘law’ includes different things in different societies and hence is understood in different sense in different societies. So any definition of law which fails to encompass all these meanings cannot be said to be a good definition. Secondly, different definitions of the same thing can be given if it is viewed from different angles. A definition unable to cover all possible angles would be an imperfect definition. Thirdly, Law grows and develops with the society. In modern times, the development in the society has been tremendously fast and the law is required to cover all new fields. To keep the pace with the advancing society, the scope of law always keeps changing. This is also one of the constraints in defining law. Various schools of law have attempted to define the law from different angles. Some jurists defined law on the basis of its nature, some other have given attention to its source, while others defined law in terms of its effect on society whereas some other jurists have concentrated on the purpose for which law is made. The jurists like Austin, Salmond, Kant, Blackstone, etc gave definition of law. According to Austin – Law is the command of the sovereign which imposes a duty enforced by sanctions. Here command, duty and sanction are the main elements of law. According to Salmond – Law is the body of principles recognised and applied by the state in the administration of justice. In Golf Goans Hotels Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, the SC has observed that the question “what is law” has perplexed many a jurisprude, yet the search for exclusive definition continues. Essential Ingredients of Law: In view of the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Gulf Goans Hotels Co. Ltd, v. Union of India, it is clear that the Law must fulfil the following essentials: i. it must possess a certain form ii. it must contain a clear mandate or an explicit command which may be prescriptive, permissive or penal iii. it must seek to achieve a clearly identifiable purpose and iv. it must be notified or made public in order to bind the citizen. Function of Law: Law governs the relationships between people. It reflects the values of the society. Since the society is dynamic, its realities keep on changing. The law must follow the change and mould itself sympathetically. The change in law is therefore an outcome of a change in social reality. In Surya Baksh Singh v. State of U.P., the SC held that the law is dynamic and not immutable or static. It constantly adapts itself to critically changing compulsions of society. Three organs of the government: The government has to carry out three kinds of functions, i.e., legislative functions, executive functions and judicial functions. Each function is performed through the organs constituted for that purpose. The legislative function is carried out by legislation to make the law. The executive function is to discharged by the executive who controls the administrative departments of the state. The judiciary is the organ which interprets the law and administrative justice. The doctrine of separation of powers is very much essential as it restricts each organ of the government to its own field and rules out the encroachment by one organ into the domain of the other.  The question raised in the case of Keshvananda Bharti and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Anr., was that till what extent the constitution can be amended by the legislature. However, the court held that the doctrine of separation of power is the basic structure of the constitution, and it shall not be violated. After this decision the doctrine was recognised as an integral part of the basic structure of the Indian constitution.  Further in Ram Jawaya v State of Punjab, it was held by the court that even though the doctrine of separation of power is not mentioned in the constitution, but the functions of one organ should not be performed by the other. These organs should exercise its powers beyond what is provided by the constitution.  Even in the case of Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain, it was observed that the basic structure of the constitution cannot be changed even when Article 368 provides the amendment of the constitution. The court further observed that the doctrine in India has a broad sense than that of UK and USA which follow the doctrine in a very rigid manner THANK YOU INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES UNIT 1: INTRODUCTION LEGISLATION – MEANING AND PROCESS Legislation – Meaning The term ‘Legislation’ is derived from two Latin words, ‘legis’ and ‘latum’ The term ‘legis’ means ‘law’ and ‘latum’ means ‘to make’. Therefore the term ‘legislation’ means ‘to make the law’. According to Salmond, ‘the legislation is that source of law which consists of declaration of legal rules by a competent authority’. According to Gray, ‘legislation means the formal utterances of the legislative organs of the society’. Legislation means, the preparing and enacting of laws by local, state or national legislatures. In other contexts it is sometimes used to apply to municipal ordinances and to the rules and regulations of administrative agencies passed in the exercise of delegated legislative functions. Process of Legislation: Legislation is the prime source of law and consists of the declaration of legal rules by a competent authority. Legislation can have many purposes: to regulate, to authorize, to enable, to prescribe, to provide funds, to sanction, to grant, to declare or to restrict. To legislate is to make new law. As such any act having the effect of adding, altering, modifying or amending a law is an act of legislative authority. In India, the law making bodies are Parliament at the central level and Legislative Assemblies and Councils (wherever applicable) at the state level. Parliament consists of two Houses: the Lok Sabha, or “House of the People,” and the Rajya Sabha, or “Council of States.” The process of law making, in relation to Parliament, may be defined as the process by which a legislative proposal brought before it, and then is translated into the law of the land. The basic function of Parliament is to make laws. All legislative proposals have to be brought in the form of Bills before Parliament. A Bill is a statute in draft and cannot become law unless it has received the approval of both the Houses of Parliament and the assent of the President of India. The process of law making begins with the introduction of a Bill in either House of Parliament. A Bill can be introduced either by a Minister or a member other than a Minister. If the Bill is introduced by the Minister, it is called a Government Bill and if it is introduced by a member other than Minister, it is known as a Private Member's Bill. A Bill undergoes three readings in each House, i.e., the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha, before it is submitted to the President. How Bill becomes an Act?  First Reading  Second Reading - Consists of two stages  Third Reading  Reference of Bills to Departmentally Related Standing Committees  Bills Before a Select or Joint Committee  Restriction on Introduction of Certain Categories of Bills in Rajya Sabha  Constitution Amendment Bills  Joint Sitting So far, there have been three occasions when Bills were considered and passed in a Joint Sitting of the Houses of Parliament. Dowry Prohibition Bill, 1960 Banking Service Commission (Repeal) Bill, 1977 Prevention of Terrorism Bill, 2002  Assent to the Bill THANK YOU INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES UNIT 1: INTRODUCTION INTENTION OF LEGISLATURE “the essence of law lies in the spirit, not its letter, for the letter is significant only as being the external manifestation of the intention that underlies it” - Salmond Interpretation: Interpretation means –  to declare what the law “shall be” – is a legislative function  To declare what the law “is” – is a judicial function To interpret a statute’, means to give meaning to it, where the meaning is uncertain, unclear, vague and ambiguous or none as per rules enunciated by courts. A statute is open to construction only when the language used in it is ambiguous and requires interpretation. In Badamilal Dubey v. Chandra Prakash Khairatilal Khanna, it was held that in the process of interpretation of law it is not permissible to add or subtract any word or words. It is not given to courts to alter it. Meaning of Interpretation: In India the law making power vests with the legislature, who enjoys the authority to legislate. Law is enacted by the Legislature with a definite purpose where it opens its mind in the form of a language. Hence every law finds its expression in the language itself. Hence a statute is the formal expression of the will or intention of the legislature. The legislated law or statute law has attained supremacy over all other sources of law. The courts are supposed to administer justice according to the mandate of law enacted by legislature. It is the duty of the courts to apply the letter of the law. ‘Interpretation’ is defined as “the process which is adopted for ascertaining the meaning of writings of intention of the framers of the document”. Interpretation of a legal provision and its application to a set of facts are two different exercises requiring different approaches. Construction is the process of drawing conclusions of the subjects which are beyond the direct expression of the text. The courts draw findings after analysing the meaning of the words used in the text or the statutes. This process is known as legal exposition. There are certain set of facts pending before the court and construction is the application of the conclusion of these facts. In Anurag Mittal v. Shaily Mishra Mittal, the connotation of expression ‘Interpretation’ was explained. It was held that interpretation is a process by which court determines meaning of statutory provision for the purpose of applying it to situation before it. According to Salmond, interpretation or construction is meant, "the process by which the courts seek to ascertain the meaning of the Legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which it is expressed". Difference between Interpretation and Construction: Cooley explained that there is a distinction between the two expressions. Interpretation Construction Interpretation refers to exposing the true Construction, on the other hand, refers to sense of the provisions of the statutes and drawing conclusions from the written texts to understand the exact meaning of the which are beyond the outright expression words used in any text of the legal text. Interpretation refers to the linguistic The purpose of construction is to determine meaning of the legal text. the legal effect of words and the written text of the statute In case where the simple meaning of the In case where the literal meaning of the text is to be adopted, then the concept of legal text results in ambiguity, then the interpretation is being referred to. concept of construction is adopted. To find out the true meaning of the words To draw the real sense of the language used in the language the sense of which the itself which might not be prima facie legislator is intended to convey reflected by the words used in the language Even though there may be some differences between the two, but "in common usage interpretation and construction are usually understood as having the same significance", and both these two expressions are taken as synonyms of each other and also used synonymously. Object and Purpose of Interpretation: The object of interpretation of statutes is to determine the intention of the legislature conveyed expressly or impliedly in the language used. The idea behind this is that the Legislature is not expected to have used the words capable of bearing more than one meaning which leads to alternative constructions. In Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust v. A.G. Syed Mohideen, it was held that the purpose of interpretation is not to make a provision what the judge thinks it should be, but to make it what the legislature intended it to be. Necessity to interpret provision: The question arises is when it becomes necessary to construe a provision? A statute is an edict of the Legislature and the conventional way of interpreting or construing a statute is to seek the "intention" of its maker. A statute is to be construed according "to the intent of those that make it" and "the duty of judicature is to act upon the true intention of the Legislature—the mens or sententia legis”. The expression "intention of the Legislature" refers to the meaning of the words used by the Legislature objectively determined with the guidance furnished by the accepted principles of interpretation. The function of the courts is only to expound and not to legislate. The numerous rules of interpretation or construction formulated by courts are expressed differently by different judges. It is therefore necessary to interpret the statute to find out the real intention of the statute.  The ambiguity of the words used in the statute  Change in the environment  Complexities of the statutes  When legislation doesn’t cover a specific area  Drafting error  Incomplete rules THANK YOU INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES UNIT 1: INTRODUCTION INTENTION OF LEGISLATURE The concept of interpretation of a Statute cannot be static one. Interpretation of statutes becomes an ongoing exercise as newer facts and conditions continue to arise. We can say, interpretation of Statutes is required for two basic reasons viz. to ascertain:  Legislative Language - Legislative language may be complicated for a layman, and hence may require interpretation; and  Legislative Intent - The intention of legislature or Legislative intent assimilates two aspects:  the concept of ‘meaning’, i.e., what the word means; and  the concept of ‘purpose’ and ‘object’ or the ‘reason’ or ‘spirit’ pervading through the statute. In this regard, a Constitution Bench of five Judges of the Supreme Court in R.S. Nayak v A.R. Antulay, has held: “If the words of the Statute are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the Court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the provision. The question of construction arises only in the event of an ambiguity or the plain meaning of the words used in the Statute would be self-defeating.” Again, Supreme Court in Grasim Industries Ltd. v Collector of Customs, Bombay, has followed the same principle and observed: “Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for court to take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions”. When the controversies for construction arises, it is not possible to consult the legislatures to find the answer. The fact is that the difficulties of interpretation arise when the Legislature has had no meaning at all. Then what the Judges have to do is not to determine what the Legislature did mean on a point which was present to its mind, but to guess what it would have intended on a point not present in its mind, if the point had been present. In UOI v Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co Ltd., it was held that the legislative intent in such cases is a fiction representing the attitude of judges in arriving at a solution by striking a balance between the letter and spirit of the statute without acknowledging that they have in any way supplemented the statute. The duty of judges is to expound and not to legislate is a fundamental rule. The intention of the Legislature thus assimilates two aspects: In one aspect it carries the concept of "meaning", i.e., what the words mean and, in another aspect, it conveys the concept of "purpose and object" or the "reason and spirit" pervading through the statute. The process of construction, therefore, combines both literal and purposive approaches. In both Constitutional and statutory interpretation, the court is supposed to exercise discretion in determining the proper relationship between the subjective and objective purposes of the law and help the law achieve its purpose. In Badshah v Urmila Badshah Godse, (2014) the Supreme Court has held that the Legislature, while enacting section 125 CrPC, always intended to give the relief of maintenance to a woman who became the "wife" of a person under circumstances where he had suppressed the factum of his subsisting first marriage from her, even though she may not be his "legally wedded wife". In Poppatlal Shah v State of Madras, each word, phrase or sentence “is to be construed in the light of general purpose of the Act itself”. The external aids are also brought in by widening the concept of ‘context’ “as including not only other enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia, and the mischief which the statute was intended to remedy”. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. If the text is the texture, context is what gives colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. In Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, it was held by the SC that bare mechanical interpretation of the words and application of a legislative intent devoid of concept of purpose will reduce most of the remedial and beneficent legislation to futility. THANK YOU INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES UNIT 1: INTRODUCTION INTENTION OF LEGISLATURE Case Analysis: In construing enactments such as those prescribing a period of limitation for initiation of proceedings where the purpose is only to intimate the people that after lapse of a certain time from a certain event, a proceeding will not be entertained and where a strict grammatical construction is normally the only safe guide, a literal and mechanical construction may have to be disregarded if it conflicts with some essential requirement of fair play and natural justice which the Legislature never intended to throw overboard. In State of Punjab v Qaisar Jehan Begum, the Supreme Court applied the golden rule to modify the meaning of the provision to include the start of the limitation period from the date of receiving the notice of award. Similarly, in a taxing statute, provisions enacted to prevent tax evasion are given a liberal construction to effectuate the purpose of suppressing tax evasion although provisions imposing a charge are construed strictly, there being no a priori liability to pay a tax, and the purpose of a charging section being only to levy a charge on persons and activities brought within its clear terms In Mohd. Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano Begum case related to interpretation clause 3(b) of section 127 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which makes the provision for maintenance to a wife The court in Secretary, TN Wakf Board v Syed Fatima Nachi, clearly showed that the clause 3(b) was inserted with a view not to change the Muslim Personal Law. But surprisingly later another Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Daniel Latifi v. UOI, came to the conclusion that Parliament did nothing of that kind and the Act instead of nullifying the decision in Shah Bano "actually and in reality, codifies as stated in Shah Bano's case." Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar - Sections 7 and 8 of Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908. In State of Rajasthan v. Prakashchand, it was held that Judges have more freedom in interpreting the Constitution, but this freedom also has to be contained within permissible limits for "the Constitution does not give unlimited powers to anyone including the judges of all levels" and it is necessary for protecting judicial independence that judges remain "circumspect and self-disciplined in the discharge of their judicial functions.“ The rules of interpretation are not rules of law and are not to be applied like the rules enacted by the Legislature in an Interpretation Act. In Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Corp of Calcutta While applying the rules, it must be kept in view that as the rules are not binding in the ordinary sense like a legislation, "they are our servants and not masters. They are aids to construction, presumptions or pointers. Not infrequently one rule points in one direction, another in a different direction. In Maunsel v Olins, (1975), According to Lord Simon, in each case we must look at all relevant circumstances and decide as a matter of judgment what weight to attach to any particular rule". The utility of the rules of interpretation is based on the theory that the Legislature in formulating its legislation keeps the rules in view so that it may not be misunderstood by the courts. As Lord Du Parcq said "There is an inevitable interaction between the methods of parliamentary drafting and the principles of judicial interpretation". However, the rules enunciated by courts are not binding on the Legislature and if the Legislature does not follow them, the court's duty is not to misinterpret the law. THANK YOU INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES UNIT 1: INTRODUCTION TYPES OF LEGISLATION Types of legislation Legislation means the laying down of legal rules either by a sovereign or by a subordinate authority. It lays down the rules for the future and without reference to anu actual dispute. It includes every expression of the will of the legislature. Salmond divides legislation into two types:  Supreme Legislation  Sub-ordinate Legislation The different kinds of Subordinate Legislation include: Colonial Legislation Executive Legislation Judicial Legislation Municipal Legislation Autonomous Legislation PARTS OF LEGISLATION:  Commencement  Preamble  Title  Definition Clause  Sections  Saving Clauses  Illustrations  Schedules  Repeals  Explanatory Notes  Executive Powers  Amending Acts  Consolidated Acts THANK YOU INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES UNIT - 1: INTRODUCTION Cont.… BASIC RULES OF INTERPRETATION  Sententia Legis  Ex Visceribus Actus  Ut res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat Introduction: A set of rules have been framed to govern the process of interpretation. According to Salmond, the rules are rough principles or guidelines. These rules, though well settled today, are liberal and flexible in nature but have guiding force behind them. An interpretation in disregard to these principles cannot survive in the eye of law. For the purpose of interpretation there are few basic rules applied by the court when any absurdity or confusion arises in the statutory provision.  Sententia Legis (Logical Interpretation / True intention of the legislature)  Ex Visceribus Actus (Statute must be read as a whole)  Ut res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat (Let the thing be more valued than it perishes) Sententia Legis (True intention of the legislature) Introduction: The legislature enacts the law with a definite object in its mind, which is called as ‘intention’. The legislature expects that the law enacted by it shall be understood by the courts in its true spirit and shall be administered in accordance with the intention with which the statute has been framed so as to advance the purpose. The object of the court in interpreting a statute is to find out the intention of the legislature as expressed in the statute. A statute is an edict of legislature. It is the duty of Judicature to act upon the true intention of the legislature. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. This is guided by the Maxim “Sententia Legis”. Meaning: “Sententia Legis” means logical interpretation’ to find out the ‘true intention of legislature’. Intention of the legislature always serves as reference to the meaning of words used by legislature which are objectively determined. Definition: When the judge look into the meaning, object and purpose of the word, it is called Sententia legis.  The intention of legislature shall have two aspects –  “Meaning’’: That which tell what the words mean.  “Purpose and Object”: That which includes purpose and object of enacting the statute According to Salmond, the duty of the judicature is to discover and to act upon the true intention of the legislature under the Maxim, ‘sententia legis’ or mens legis Importance: i. It empowers the judges to interpret and to construe the provisions of statute according to the will and wish of the general public. ii. It makes the laws passed by the parliament practicable. iii. It interprets the words for the convenience of the general public Guiding Lines to Frame Intention of Legislature are: i. The context (pari materia - external aid to interpretation) ii. The subject matter. iii. The effects and consequences. iv. The spirit or reason of the law. When Judges use this Maxim: The judges use this maxim in the following reasons: i. When there is some ambiguity. ii. When there is uncertainty. iii. When there is any confusion. Then the judges will look into the meaning, object and purpose of that word Requirements for Application of Sententia Legis: i. The statute must be passed by the parliament. ii. Sententia legis applies to all the inclusions and do not apply on exclusions. iii. Alterations cannot be made. iv. Repeal cannot be made. v. One cannot touch any exempted clause and immunities. Supreme Court Guidelines for Interpretation (or) Settled Principles of Interpretation: 1. The court must start with the presumption that legislature did not make a mistake. 2. The court must adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature. 3. If there is a defect or an omission of the words used by the legislature, the court must as much as possible, by literal reading produce an intelligible result. Case Laws: In Ram Krishan v. State of Delhi, the appellant was convicted of the offence of abetting criminal misconduct by a public servant by offering him a bribe, which the officer however did not accept. Under sec. 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, a public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct in the discharge of his duty, if he, by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. It was argued that the intention of the Act was to create by means of clause (d) an offence different from a single act of bribery, that, before it can be made applicable, there must be proof that the public servant adopted corrupt or illegal means, that is, a bribe was forced out of an unwilling person. Rejecting the contention, it was held that: ‘We have primarily to look at the language employed and give effect to it’. In Board of Mining Examination v. Ramjee, a regional inspector recommended the suspension of the certificate of a shot-firer in a colliery and the Board, acting on the recommendation and after considering the explanation of the respondent, cancelled the certificate. Holding that there was no irregularity the Court held that, ‘In social welfare legislation, literal construction is not commended, but the court must look to the object and purpose of legislation. Merely because the inspector did not first suspend the respondent and then report to the Board but made that recommendation, there is no violation of Regulation 26 of the Coal Mines Regulations’. A liberal construction should be given to a provision dealing with persons who are socially, economically and educationally backward (Ganu Ram v. Rikhi Ram Kaundal) Social Welfare Legislation should receive a liberal and beneficent construction. In A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, it was observed that the court should read the provision as it is and can neither rewrite it to suit its convenience nor can read it in such a manner as to render to some extent. Keeping all this in view, the courts may look for sententia legis. Conclusion: Logical interpretation means Sententia Legis, which means to bring out the true meaning of law. The term Sententia legis gives liberty to the courts to go beyond the lateral meaning of the words. Whenever there is a problem as to the meaning of a particular word expressed in the statute then the courts can apply the logical interpretation as bring out the true meaning of the words expressed in the statute. The logical interpretation is based on the belief that the words used may have different meaning than the maker has thought to be, there may be a chance of miscommunication then the courts are at the liberty to peep in to the true nature of words so expressed. THANK YOU INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES UNIT - 1: INTRODUCTION Cont.… BASIC RULES OF INTERPRETATION Ex Visceribus Actus Ex Visceribus Actus (Statute must be read as a whole) An important principle of interpretation is that the statute should be read as a whole. The meaning of the maxim is that ‘every part of the statute must be construed within the four corners of the Act’. In other words, no provision should be interpreted in isolation. Whenever the language of a provision is ambiguous and open to alternative constructions due to uncertainty of meaning of the words used therein, the provision has to be read as a whole in its context. In State of West Bengal v. Union of India 1964, the Supreme Court observed that to determine the intent of legislature, not only particular section of the statute should see, but whole statute should be read to determine true intention and to discover the purposes of the legislature The statute must be read as a whole, the previous state of the law, other statutes in pari materia, the general scope of the statute, and the mischief it is to remedy, is the basic context of any statute. The elementary rule states that the intention of the Legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole. A question of construction only arises when one side submits that a particular provision of an Act covers the facts of the case and the other submits that it does not or it may be agreed, but the difference arises to its application. The conclusion that the language is plain or ambiguous can only be truly arrived at by studying the statute as a whole. Each section must be construed as a whole, whether or not one of the parts is a saving clause or a proviso. Application of the principle of Ex visceribus actus This principle has been applied in number of cases. While constructing any provision of law, the statute must be read as a whole and every section, sub-section or clause must be interpreted with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act. It must also be taken into consideration that every word used in the language is presumed to have been inserted with a specific purpose. Therefore, each word must be given effect to and none of them should be ignored or discarded while construing a provision. In S.A. Venkataraman v. State, the appellant, who was a public servant, was dismissed after a departmental enquiry and was thereafter prosecuted and convicted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. As there was no sanction under Section 6 of the Act, it was contended that a court could not take cognizance of the offence. In Workmen v. Dimakuchi Tea Estate, the services of an assistant medical officer of the respondent were terminated and the workmen raised a dispute which was referred to the Industrial Tribunal. "Industrial dispute" is defined in Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as a dispute, among other things, between employers and employees in connection with the non-employment of any person. On the question whether the dispute in relation to a person who was not a workman within the meaning of the Act still fell within the scope of Section 2(k)? In State of Rajasthan v. Noor Mohammad, the respondent submitted an application to the Regional Transport Authority for the grant of a stage-carriage permit on an inter-regional and inter-State route. The Regional Transport Authority declined to consider the application, because, by a resolution of the State Transport Authority, the State Transport Authority had taken over the functions of the Regional Transport Authority with regard to inter-State routes. THANK YOU INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES UNIT - 1: INTRODUCTION Cont.… BASIC RULES OF INTERPRETATION Ex Visceribus Actus Case Analysis: Manohar Lal v. State of Punjab: The appellant, who was a shopkeeper, was convicted for contravening the provisions of Section 7(1) of the Punjab Trade Employees Act, 1940. Under the Act, he was required to keep his shop closed on the day which he had chosen as a "closed day". He contended that the Act did not apply to his shop as he did not employ any stranger but alone, worked in the shop. In support of the contention, he relied on the long title which reads: An Act to limit the hours of work of Shop-Assistants and Commercial Employees and to make certain regulations concerning their holidays, wages and terms of service. It was held that: The long title no doubt indicates the purpose of the enactment, but can- not obviously, control the express operative provisions of the Act. Motipur Zamindary Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar: The question was whether sugarcane fell within the term "green vegetables" in Entry 6 of the Schedule and was therefore exempt from assessment to sales tax under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947. It was held: The word 'vegetables' in taxing statutes is to be understood as in common parlance, that is, denoting class of vegetables which are grown in a kitchen garden or in a farm and are used for the table. If that is the meaning of the word 'vegetables', sugarcane cannot fall within the entry. Municipal Council, Tirupathi v. Tirumalai Tirupathi Devasthanam: The question was whether a choultry intended for convenience of pilgrims visiting the temple was exempt from property tax under Section 83(1) (b) of the Madras District Municipality Act, 1920. Conclusion: It may be concluded that while construing any provision of law, the statute must be read as a whole and every section, sub-section or clause must be interpreted with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act. Therefore each word must be given effect to and none of them must be ignored while constructing a provision. THANK YOU INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES UNIT - 1: INTRODUCTION Cont.… BASIC RULES OF INTERPRETATION Ut res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat Ut res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat: The maxim ‘Ut res Valeat quam Pereat’, is a rule of construction which literally means the ‘construction should give effect to the rule rather than destroying it’. Meaning: Ut res magis valeat quam pereat is a Latin legal maxim that translates to “let the thing be more valued than it perishes” or “it is better for a thing to have an effect than to be made void.” This principle is commonly applied in the interpretation of statutes and legal documents. For example, when there are two constructions possible from a provision, of which one gives effect to the provision and the other renders the provision inoperative. The former which gives effect to the provision is adopted and the latter is discarded. This principle must be applied by courts except in the rare cases when there is absolute absurdity of language. When the presumption of the constitution fails, then the statutes cannot be rendered valid or operate accordingly. Purpose of maxim: The purpose of the legal maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat is to ensure the effective and meaningful application of laws and legal provisions. It emphasises that when interpreting statutes or legal documents, the courts should adopt an interpretation that preserves their functionality and intent, rather than an interpretation that renders them meaningless or ineffective. In India this legal maxim is used with the following meaning – ‘it is better for a thing to have effect than to be made void. It is better to validate a thing than to invalidate it. In CIT v. Distributors, Baroda (P.) Ltd., it was held that no part of the statute can just be ignored by saying that the legislature enacted the same not knowing what it was saying. It is to be assumed that the legislature deliberately used that expression and it intended to convey the same meaning. In Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1965) SC, there was a dispute over the interpretation of Section 39 of the Electricity Act, 1910. The appellant had been found guilty of stealing electricity from the Punjab State Electricity Board under Section 39 of the Electricity Act. The respondent had also taken action against him under Section 379 of IPC. In his appeal, the appellant did not contend the fact that he had committed theft but argued that his conviction was unlawful due to certain statutory provisions. Section 39 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 stated that ‘anyone who dishonestly abstracts, consumes or uses energy would be considered to have committed theft under IPC. Therefore, according to Section 39, a person found guilty would be punished under Section 379 of IPC’. Section 50 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 outlined the procedure for prosecution and stated that ‘no prosecution could be initiated against anyone for an offence under the Act unless it was done by the order of the Government, an Electrical Inspector or a person who was affected by the offence’. The appellant argued that he could not be convicted under Section 39 because the required procedure for prosecution, as specified in Section 50, had not been followed. He claimed that his prosecution was flawed and legally invalid because it had not been initiated by the Government, an Electrical Inspector or an affected person. The Supreme Court ruled that since the offence was related to the Electricity Act and not the Indian Penal Code, the procedure outlined in Section 50 must have been adhered to. Consequently, the appellant’s conviction was overturned. In this case, the Court applied the doctrine of ‘ut res magis valeat quam pereat,’ ensuring that the interpretation adopted did not render Section 50 ineffective and pointless. D. Salbaba v. the Bar Council of India (2003) SC, the Supreme Court had to interpret Section 48AA of the Advocates Act, 1961. Facts of case: The petitioner, who was a physically challenged advocate, also operated an STD booth that was allotted to him under the quota for handicapped persons. He faced a complaint alleging professional misconduct. On February 20, 2001, the Bar Council of India instructed him to surrender the booth, but he did not comply within the specified timeframe. On March 31, 2001, the Bar Council of India issued an order directing the State Bar Council to remove the advocate’s name from the roll of advocates. The advocate later surrendered the booth and filed a review petition against the Bar Council’s order. However, his petition was dismissed on August 26, 2001, citing that it was filed beyond the time limit. The advocate appealed this decision to the Supreme Court. Section 48AA of the Advocates Act allowed for the review of the Bar Council of India’s decision or order within 60 days from the date of that order. The crucial question was whether the interpretation of “sixty days should be from the date of that order”? The Supreme Court, in line with the doctine of ‘ut res magis valeat quam pereat,’ ruled that the phrase “sixty days from the date of that order” should be understood as the date when the order was communicated to or when the advocate had actual or constructive knowledge of the order that he wanted to review. By interpreting Section 48AA in this manner, the Court made it more effective in ensuring fairness. As a result, the Supreme Court set aside the Bar Council of India’s order and the advocate’s enrolment was reinstated. Conclusion: The legislature doesn’t use ambiguous or insignificant words in a provision or statute, and therefore, while interpreting any word or terms in a statute a construction that makes the statute operative and the words pertinent must be preferred to the one that renders the words ineffective, void and useless. Lord Denning in the case of Fawcett Properties v. Buckingham County Council, (1960), has stated that “when a statute has some meaning even though it is obscure, or several meanings, even though there is little to choose between them, the courts have to say what meaning the statute is to bear, rather than reject it as a nullity.” THANK YOU INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES UNIT - 1: INTRODUCTION Cont.… BASIC RULES OF INTERPRETATION Ut res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat Case Analysis and Problem Solving  Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1965)  D. Salbaba v. The Bar Council of India (2003) In Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1965) SC, there was a dispute over the interpretation of Section 39 of the Electricity Act, 1910. The appellant had been found guilty of stealing electricity from the Punjab State Electricity Board under Section 39 of the Electricity Act. The respondent had also taken action against him under Section 379 of IPC. In his appeal, the appellant did not contend the fact that he had committed theft but argued that his conviction was unlawful due to certain statutory provisions. Section 39 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 stated that ‘anyone who dishonestly abstracts, consumes or uses energy would be considered to have committed theft under IPC. Therefore, according to Section 39, a person found guilty would be punished under Section 379 of IPC’. Section 50 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 outlined the procedure for prosecution and stated that ‘no prosecution could be initiated against anyone for an offence under the Act unless it was done by the order of the Government, an Electrical Inspector or a person who was affected by the offence’. The appellant argued that he could not be convicted under Section 39 because the required procedure for prosecution, as specified in Section 50, had not been followed. He claimed that his prosecution was flawed and legally invalid because it had not been initiated by the Government, an Electrical Inspector or an affected person. The Supreme Court ruled that since the offence was related to the Electricity Act and not the Indian Penal Code, the procedure outlined in Section 50 must have been adhered to. Consequently, the appellant’s conviction was overturned. In this case, the Court applied the doctrine of ‘ut res magis valeat quam pereat,’ ensuring that the interpretation adopted did not render Section 50 ineffective and pointless. D. Salbaba v. the Bar Council of India (2003) SC, the Supreme Court had to interpret Section 48AA of the Advocates Act, 1961. Facts of case: The petitioner, who was a physically challenged advocate, also operated an STD booth that was allotted to him under the quota for handicapped persons. He faced a complaint alleging professional misconduct. On February 20, 2001, the Bar Council of India instructed him to surrender the booth, but he did not comply within the specified timeframe. On March 31, 2001, the Bar Council of India issued an order directing the State Bar Council to remove the advocate’s name from the roll of advocates. The advocate later surrendered the booth and filed a review petition against the Bar Council’s order. However, his petition was dismissed on August 26, 2001, citing that it was filed beyond the time limit. The advocate appealed this decision to the Supreme Court. Section 48AA of the Advocates Act allowed for the review of the Bar Council of India’s decision or order within 60 days from the date of that order. The crucial question was whether the interpretation of “sixty days should be from the date of that order”? The Supreme Court, in line with the doctine of ‘ut res magis valeat quam pereat,’ ruled that the phrase “sixty days from the date of that order” should be understood as the date when the order was communicated to or when the advocate had actual or constructive knowledge of the order that he wanted to review. By interpreting Section 48AA in this manner, the Court made it more effective in ensuring fairness. As a result, the Supreme Court set aside the Bar Council of India’s order and the advocate’s enrolment was reinstated. Conclusion: The legislature doesn’t use ambiguous or insignificant words in a provision or statute, and therefore, while interpreting any word or terms in a statute a construction that makes the statute operative and the words pertinent must be preferred to the one that renders the words ineffective, void and useless. Lord Denning in the case of Fawcett Properties v. Buckingham County Council, (1960), has stated that “when a statute has some meaning even though it is obscure, or several meanings, even though there is little to choose between them, the courts have to say what meaning the statute is to bear, rather than reject it as a nullity.” THANK YOU INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES UNIT - 1: INTRODUCTION Cont.… GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION  Literal Rule  Golden Rule  Mischief Rule  Harmonious Construction Introduction: The basic characteristics of enacted law is its authoritative form. The authority of enacted law lies in its letters or words as well as in its spirits. There are certain general principles of interpretation which have been applied by Courts from time to time, and various methods of statutory construction have fallen in and out of favour. Some of the important general rules of interpretation which are also referred to as the Primary Rules of Interpretation are:  Literal / Grammatical rule of interpretation  Golden Rule of Interpretation  Mischief Rule  Harmonious Construction LITERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION Literal / Grammatical Rule of Interpretation: Literal Rule of Interpretation is otherwise called as Grammatical Rule / Plain meaning Rule of Interpretation. In construing statutes, the cardinal rule is to construe its provisions Literally and grammatically giving the words their ordinary and natural meaning. The first and foremost step in the course of interpretation is to examine the language and the literal meaning of the statute The primary rule is to interpret words as they are and there should be no additions or substitution of words in the construction and interpretation of statutes. Understanding the Literal Rule: The literal rule may be understood subject to the following conditions –  Statute may itself provide a special meaning for a term, which is usually to be found in the interpretation section.  Technical words are given ordinary technical meaning if the statute has not specified any other.  Words will not be inserted by implication.  Words undergo shifts in meaning in course of time.  It should always be remembered that words acquire significance from their context. In Suthendran v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, the question was related to Section 14(1) of the Immigration Act, 1971, which provides that ‘a person who has a limited leave’ under this Act to enter or remain in the United Kingdom may appeal to an adjudication against any variation of the leave or against any refusal to vary it. This principle is applied in Bharat Aluminium Co v Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc, where a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 applies to arbitrations taking place outside India. Section 2(2), which is in Part I of the Act came for interpretation. In this case, the Constitution Bench prospectively overruled the decision of a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading SA & Anr, which had held that provisions of Part I would apply to international commercial arbitrations held outside India unless the parties, by agreement, express or implied, exclude all or any of its provisions. The principle that the words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense, and construed according to their grammatical meaning unless such construction leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the object of the statute to the contrary. Explanation of the Rule: In the statement of the rule, the “natural", "ordinary", "literal", "grammatical" and "popular" are employed almost interchangeably". When it is said that words are to be understood first in their natural, ordinary or popular sense, what is meant is that the words must be ascribed that natural, ordinary or popular meaning which they have in relation to the subject matter with reference to which and the context in which they have been used in the statute. In Benarsi Krishna Committee v Karmyogi Shelters Pvt Ltd, a strict literal interpretation was given to section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which provides that an application for setting aside an arbitral award may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award. The Supreme Court held that the word "party" in this provision means a person who is party to the arbitration agreement as indicated in section 2(1)(h) of the Act, and would not include an advocate, who is an agent of the party. In Ramavtar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax officer, a question arose before the Supreme Court as to the meaning of the word "vegetable" occurring in C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 which was interpreted by the Supreme Court. In Motipur Zamindari Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, a question arose as to whether sugarcane fell within the term of green vegetable in Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947. The Supreme Court observed that betel leaves or Sugarcane could not be given a technical, dictionary or botanical meaning when its ordinary and natural meaning is clear and unambiguous. The interpretation for ‘vegetable’ is done by the court and held that either betel leaves or sugarcane will not fall in the category of vegetable, hence liable for sales tax. Exact meaning preferred to loose meaning: There is a presumption that words are used in an Act of Parliament correctly and exactly and not loosely and inexactly. This principle was approved and followed in Mayor, Councillors and Burgesses v Taranaki Electric Power Board, by the Privy Council where the question was as to the true meaning of the word "adjoining". It was pointed out that the exact meaning of the word was "conterminous" (having a common boundary) as distinguished from its loose meaning of "near" or "neighbouring". The former meaning was, therefore, preferred. Technical words to be understood in technical sense: While interpreting the provisions of the legislation relating to a particular trade, business, profession, art or science, words having a special meaning in that context are understood in that sense only. Such a special meaning is called as the technical meaning. Example: Taxing Statutes where the goods liable for taxation will be mentioned in its technical sense only. Application of rule of technical words in technical sense - In Labour Inspector, Hyderabad v. Chittapur Stone Quarrying Co. Pvt. Ltd., the SC interpreted the words “Employment in stone breaking or stone crushing", mentioned in item 8 of the Schedule to the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. The court observed that the expression ‘stone breaking or stone crushing’ means that common rock is reduced to fragments by mechanical means—such fragments being marketed and used for profit. In view of this, it was held that the removal of thick layers of limestone by breaking, which are cut into slabs for flooring stones, is not stone breaking or stone crushing operation in common sense. Legal sense of words – When words acquire a technical meaning because of their consistent use by the Legislature in a particular sense or because of their authoritative construction by superior courts, they are understood in that sense when used in a similar context in subsequent legislation. This is also sometimes referred to as the legal sense of such words. In State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerly and Co., the SC construed the expression “Taxes on sale of goods”, as they occur in Entry 48, List II of government of India Act, 1935. It was held that the words “sales of goods” have been used in legal sense which comprise two essentials: (a) agreement to sell a movable property for a price (b) property passing therein, pursuant to that agreement. Therefore, supply of materials under a building contract does not amount to sale. Conclusion: The rule of literal interpretation/construction is considered to be the most strong and safe rule due to the following presumptions:  that the language of the statute speaks of the mind of legislature  that the legislature knows English grammar and is well conversant with the rules thereof and as such what is conveyed by the language, the same was intended  that the legislature does not commit mistake  that the legislature has inserted every word mindfully and intentionally and there is no defect in the phraseology. THANK YOU INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES UNIT - 1: INTRODUCTION Cont.… GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION Literal Rule of Interpretation Explanation of the Rule: In the statement of the rule, the “natural", "ordinary", "literal", "grammatical" and "popular" are employed almost interchangeably". When it is said that words are to be understood first in their natural, ordinary or popular sense, what is meant is that the words must be ascribed that natural, ordinary or popular meaning which they have in relation to the subject matter with reference to which and the context in which they have been used in the statute. In Benarsi Krishna Committee v Karmyogi Shelters Pvt Ltd, a strict literal interpretation was given to section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which provides that an application for setting aside an arbitral award may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award. The Supreme Court held that the word "party" in this provision means a person who is party to the arbitration agreement as indicated in section 2(1)(h) of the Act, and would not include an advocate, who is an agent of the party. Case Analysis and Problem Solving: Ramavtar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax officer: A question arose before the Supreme Court as to the meaning of the word "vegetable" occurring in C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 which was interpreted by the Supreme Court. Motipur Zamindari Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar A question arose as to whether sugarcane fell within the term of green vegetable in Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947. The Supreme Court observed that betel leaves or Sugarcane could not be given a technical, dictionary or botanical meaning when its ordinary and natural meaning is clear and unambiguous. The interpretation for ‘vegetable’ is done by the court and held that either betel leaves or sugarcane will not fall in the category of vegetable, hence liable for sales tax. Exact meaning preferred to loose meaning: There is a presumption that words are used in an Act of Parliament correctly and exactly and not loosely and inexactly. This principle was approved and followed in Mayor, Councillors and Burgesses v Taranaki Electric Power Board, by the Privy Council where the question was as to the true meaning of the word "adjoining". It was pointed out that the exact meaning of the word was "conterminous" (having a common boundary) as distinguished from its loose meaning of "near" or "neighbouring". The former meaning was, therefore, preferred. Technical words to be understood in technical sense: While interpreting the provisions of the legislation relating to a particular trade, business, profession, art or science, words having a special meaning in that context are understood in that sense only. Such a special meaning is called as the technical meaning. Example: Taxing Statutes where the goods liable for taxation will be mentioned in its technical sense only. Application of rule of technical words in technical sense - In Labour Inspector, Hyderabad v. Chittapur Stone Quarrying Co. Pvt. Ltd., the SC interpreted the words “Employment in stone breaking or stone crushing", mentioned in item 8 of the Schedule to the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. The court observed that the expression ‘stone breaking or stone crushing’ means that common rock is reduced to fragments by mechanical means—such fragments being marketed and used for profit. In view of this, it was held that the removal of thick layers of limestone by breaking, which are cut into slabs for flooring stones, is not stone breaking or stone crushing operation in common sense. Legal sense of words – When words acquire a technical meaning because of their consistent use by the Legislature in a particular sense or because of their authoritative construction by superior courts, they are understood in that sense when used in a similar context in subsequent legislation. This is also sometimes referred to as the legal sense of such words. In State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerly and Co., the SC construed the expression “Taxes on sale of goods”, as they occur in Entry 48, List II of government of India Act, 1935. It was held that the words “sales of goods” have been used in legal sense which comprise two essentials: (a) agreement to sell a movable property for a price (b) property passing therein, pursuant to that agreement. Therefore, supply of materials under a building contract does not amount to sale. Conclusion: The rule of literal interpretation/construction is considered to be the most strong and safe rule due to the following presumptions:  that the language of the statute speaks of the mind of legislature  that the legislature knows English grammar and is well conversant with the rules thereof and as such what is conveyed by the language, the same was intended  that the legislature does not commit mistake  that the legislature has inserted every word mindfully and intentionally and there is no defect in the phraseology. THANK YOU INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES UNIT - 1: INTRODUCTION Cont.… GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION Golden Rule of Interpretation Golden Rule of Interpretation – Introduction: Golden Rule is a modified form of literal rule. The Golden rule or British rule, is a form of statutory interpretation that allows a judge to depart from a word's normal meaning in order to avoid an absurd result. It is a compromise between the literal rule and the mischief rule. Like the literal rule, it gives the words of a statute their plain, ordinary meaning. Golden rule may be used in two ways – Firstly, it is applied most frequently in a narrow sense where there is some ambiguity or absurdity in the words themselves.  Lee v. Knapp - where the interpretation of the word "stop" was involved as mentioned under Road Traffic Act, 1960 Secondly, golden rule is used in a wider sense, to avoid a result that is obnoxious to principles of public policy, even where words have only one meaning.  Bedford v. Bedford In R v. Allen, 1872, the defendant was charged with an offence of bigamy under section 57 of ‘offence against person act 1861’. The statute states that “whoever being married, shall marry any other person during the lifetime of husband or wife is guilty of an offense.” Under the literal rule of interpretation of this section, the offense would be impossible to commit since the civil law will not recognize a second marriage and an attempt to marry in such circumstances would not be recognized as a valid marriage. The Court applied the golden rule and held that the word marriage should be interpreted as ‘to go through a marriage ceremony.’ The defendant was convicted and held guilty. The golden rule of Interpretation is really a modification of literal rule? Yes, the golden rule of interpretation is a modification of the literal rule of interpretation. Where the literal rule lays emphasis on the literal meaning of the words used in legal language, the golden rule interprets the words in such a way that the absurdities and anomalies of literal interpretation are avoided. The golden rule modifies the language as well as the grammar of the words used in statutes and other documents of interpretation, thus providing the actual meaning of the words. It brings forth the context in which the words have been used in a particular stance. It must be kept in mind that the golden rule of interpretation can only be used when there is no correct grammatical construction possible. The legal language is sometimes composed of such words that do not provide a noticeable meaning, and to determine the latent meaning the golden rule is used. The judges of the courts must be aware of the consequences of interpreting the statutes using the golden rule, and it must only be used where it is absolutely necessary. The modern approach of using the rules of interpretation is to have a purposeful construction, i.e., to bring into light the object of the legislation. In New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bihar, the Supreme Court held that the enactments within a statute must ordinarily be understood in a way that furthers the object of the statute as well as that of the legislature, and if two constructions of the same enactment exist, the court will adopt the one that advances remedy and suppresses any mischief. In U. P. Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Brij Kishore, the Apex Court held that the meaning of the term ‘landless person’ under Section 14 of the Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1953, signified ‘landless labourers’ only, and not ‘landless businessmen’. The object of the Act was to provide land to labourers engaged in agriculture, and not to businessmen. THANK YOU INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES UNIT - 1: INTRODUCTION Cont.… GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION Golden Rule of Interpretation Golden Rule of Interpretation in India – Case Analysis According to the Golden Rule, the Courts in order to find out the intention of the legislatures from the word used in the Statues, give the words their original and natural meaning. The Supreme Court applied the Golden Rule of Interpretation in Golakanath’s Case, and held that the Parliament cannot amend the constitution affecting the provision under part III of the Constitution (Fundamental Rights).  State of Punjab v. Qaiser Jehan Begum – The limitation period as per Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894  Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar – In constructing section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, the Supreme Court laid down that the crucial date on which the age of the offender had to be determined is not the date of offence, but the date on which the sentence is pronounced by the trial court In Lee v. Knapp, (1967), section 77(1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1960 provided that “a driver causing accident shall stop after the accident”, the interpretation of the word “stop” was in question. In this case, the driver of the motor vehicle stopped for a moment after causing an accident and then ran away. Applying the golden rule the court held that the driver had not fulfilled the requirement of the section, as he had not stopped for a reasonable period so as to enable interested persons to make necessary inquiries from him about the accident at the spot of accident. Conclusion: When interpreting statutes, clear, unambiguous and ordinary language should be given effect in order to align with the legislative intent. In cases where words have multiple meanings, the interpretation should strive for balance and discretion, avoiding inconsistent or inconvenient outcomes. Any interpretation leading to injustice or rendering the statute meaningless and illogical should be avoided. THANK YOU INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES UNIT - 1: INTRODUCTION Cont.… GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION Mischief Rule of Interpretation Mischief Rule of Interpretation: (Heydon’s case) – The mischief rule is a rule of statutory interpretation that attempts to determine the legislator's intention. The main aim of this rule is to determine the "mischief and defect" that the statute in question has set out to remedy, and what ruling would effectively implement this remedy. The mischief rule is a rule that judges can apply in statutory interpretation in order to discover the legislator’s intention. The mischief rule was established in Heydon’s Case in 1584. It was held that the mischief rule should only be applied where there is ambiguity in the statute. Under the mischief rule the Court’s role is to “suppress the mischief and advance the remedy”. The Courts while applying the principle tries to find out the real intention behind the enactment. This rule thus assists the court in identifying the proper construction of statutory wording according to the original intention of the legislators. The rule thus enables the consideration of four matters in construing an Act: i. What was the law before the making of the Act? ii. What was the mischief or defect for which the common law did not provide? iii. What remedy did the parliament came up with to resolve and cure the distress of the Act? iv. What is the true reason of the remedy? It is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly established in England as far back as 1584 when Heydon's case was decided. Heydon’s case is considered a landmark case as it laid down the mischief rule of interpretation of statutes. Facts of the Heydon’s case Case Analysis:  Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar – Construction of Article 286 of the Constitution  Smith v. Huges, 960 WLR 830 – Construction to sec 1(1) of Street Offences Act, 1959  Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1965 SC 871 – Construction to section 418 of Delhi Corporation Act, 1902 Many cases were interpreted by the judiciary by applying the Mischief Rule Advantages: It focuses on the parliament’s intention behind making the law. It allows judges to apply their minds. It allows judges to consider the social and technological changes. It allows for parliamentary sovereignty. It helps avoid unjust results. Disadvantages: It is difficult to decipher the parliament’s intention. It is considered as an outdated rule of interpretation. It makes the law uncertain. It is said to be undemocratic as it gives too much power to the judiciary which is an unelected branch of the government. Conclusion: In conclusion, the mischief rule stands as a beacon of judicial interpretation, guiding courts to discern the true intent of legislation and apply it judiciously. Through centuries of legal evolution and the adjudication of landmark cases, such as Heydon's Case and modern instances like Smith v. Hughes and Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration, the mischief rule has demonstrated its enduring relevance and significance. THANK YOU INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES UNIT - 1: INTRODUCTION Cont.… GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION Mischief Rule of Interpretation Mischief Rule of Interpretation: (Case Analysis) Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar – Construction of Article 286 of the Constitution After referring to the state of law prevailing in the provinces prior to the Constitution as also to the chaos and confusion that was brought about in inter-State trade and commerce by indiscriminate exercise of taxing powers by the different provincial Legislatures founded on the theory of territorial nexus SR Das CJI, proceeded to say, "It was to cure this mischief of multiple taxation and to preserve the free flow of inter-State trade or commerce in the Union of India regarded as one economic unit without any provincial barrier that the constitution-makers adopted Article 286 in the Constitution". The rule was again applied by the Supreme Court in similar context while construing the changes brought about by the Constitution 46th Amendment Act, 1982. It is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly established Statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered: 1st - What was the common law before the making of the Act, 2nd - What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide, 3rd - What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth, and 4th - The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy Case Analysis: Royal College of Nursing v DHSS The Royal College of Nursing brought an action challenging the legality of the involvement of nurses in carrying out abortions. The Offences against the Person Act 1861 makes it an offence for any person to carry out an abortion. The Abortion Act 1967 provided that it would be an absolute defence for a medically registered practitioner (i.e. a doctor) to carry out abortions provided certain conditions were satisfied. Advances in medical science meant surgical abortions were largely replaced with hormonal abortions and it was common for these to be administered by nurses. It was held that, it was legal for nurses to carry out such abortions. The Act was aimed at doing away with back street abortions where no medical care was available. The actions of the nurses were therefore outside the mischief of the Act of 1861 and within the contemplate defence in the 1967 Act. Case Analysis: Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1965 SC 871 – Construction to section 418 of Delhi Corporation Act, 1902 Facts of the case: The members of a raiding party led by the Licensing Inspector of the Delhi Corporation having taken into custody 25 or 30 stray cattle. While taking them to the cattle pound, they received injuries as they were belaboured with lathis by the three appellants and their friends. Issues of the case - Section 418 of Delhi Corporation Act, 1902 authorised the corporation to round up the cattle grazing on the government land. The authorities rounded up the cattle belonging to Kanwar Singh. The words used in the statute authorised the corporation to round up the abandoned cattle. It was contended by Kanwar Singh that the word ‘abandoned’ means the loss of ownership and those cattle which were round up belonged to him and hence, was not abandoned. The court held that the mischief rule had to be applied and the word abandoned must be interpreted to mean let loose or left unattended and even the temporary loss of ownership would be covered as abandoned. Many cases were interpreted by the judiciary by applying the Mischief Rule. Few cases are -  Smith v. Huges, 960 WLR 830 – Street Offences Act, 1959  Elliot v Grey - Road Traffic Act 1930  Brown v. Brown - Matrimonial Causes Act 1963  RMDC v. Union of India – Prize Competition Act, 1955 Conclusion: In conclusion, the mischief rule stands as a beacon of judicial interpretation, guiding courts to discern the true intent of legislation and apply it judiciously. Through centuries of legal evolution and the adjudication of landmark cases, such as Heydon's Case and modern instances like Smith v. Hughes and Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration, the mischief rule has demonstrated its enduring relevance and significance. THANK YOU INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES UNIT - 1: INTRODUCTION Cont.… GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION Harmonious Construction Harmonious Construction The dictionary meaning of the word ‘Harmony’ means an ‘agreement of opinion’. The term ‘Harmonious Construction’ therefore refer to such a construction by which harmony or oneness amongst various provisions of an enactment is arrived at. When the words of a statutory provision bear more than one meaning and there is a doubt as to which meaning should prevail, then such meaning should be adopted by which the words best harmonise with the subject and object of the enactment. Rules of Harmonious Construction: When there is a conflict between two or more provisions of the law, they should be followed in such way that maximum benefit can be obtained and no rule need to be violated in the process of following other one. It is a sound rule of interpretation that Courts must try to avoid a conflict between the provisions of Statute. A statute must be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. It is the duty of the Courts to avoid conflict between two provisions, and whenever it is possible to do so to construe provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise. Where in an enactment, there are two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect may be given to both. This type of construction is known as the “rule of harmonious construction”. Such a construction has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between a section and other parts of the statute. Origin of Doctrine of Harmonious Construction The Doctrine of Harmonious Construction has its origins in court interpretations of various cases. Its creation can be traced back to the first amendment to the Constitution of India, particularly the landmark case of Sri Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India, (AIR 1951 SC 458). This case revolved around a conflict between Part III (Fundamental Rights) and Part IV (Directive Principles of State Policy) of the Indian Constitution. In this case, the court applied the Harmonious Construction Rule to resolve the disagreement. It concluded that Fundamental Rights, which are rights granted against the State, could be limited under certain circumstances and modified by Parliament to align with constitutional provisions. Both sets of rights were given equal importance and it was established that Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy are complementary aspects that must work together for the greater good. The Supreme Court further held that the Fundamental Rights enforce limitation over both the legislature and executive power. They are not sacrosanct and the Parliament can amend them to bring them in conformity with the Directive Principles. THANK YOU INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES UNIT - 1: INTRODUCTION Cont.… GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION Harmonious Construction Application of Harmonious Construction for interpretation of statutes: Case Analysis Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore (1957) The trustees of Sri Venkataramana temple filed a suit under Section 92 of CPC, 1908, challenging the exclusion of Harijans from Hindu temples after the enforcement of Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act (Madras V of 1947). They claimed the temple was private and exclusively for Gowda Saraswath Brahmins, exempt from the Act. The Government disagreed. The Supreme Court clarified the interpretation of the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act, Article 25(2)(b) and Article 26(b) of the Constitution. It held that Article 25(2) broadly governed both Articles and Article 26(b) should be read in light of Article 25(2)(b). Sirsilk v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (1963) In the Sirsilk Company case, a dispute arose between the company, the Government of Andhra Pradesh and their employees. The matter was taken to an Industrial Tribunal, which issued its award in September 1957. The award was to be published in the Official Gazette of the Government of Andhra Pradesh. However, both the corporation and the employees jointly requested that the award not be published because they had already resolved their dispute amicably. The government declined this request, leading the parties to file a writ application with the High Court to stop the publication of the award. The Supreme Court recognised the conflict between Section 17 and Section 18 of the Act and aimed to preserve the Act’s primary purpose by applying the principle of Harmonious Construction. Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1993) A writ petition was filed challenging whether the ‘Right to life’ under Article 21 also covers and guarantees the right to education to all the citizens of India, and the right to education here also includes professional education or degree. The Supreme Court held that the right to basic education was inferred by the Right to life under Article 21 when read with Article 41 of the directive principle on education. The Court also referred to Article 45 and inferred that there is no fundamental right to education for a professional degree that emanates from Article 21. The provisions of Part III and Part IV are supplementary and complementary to each other and that the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles should be interpreted harmoniously as they form the social conscience of the Indian Constitution. K.M. Nanavati v. The State of Maharashtra (1961) In this case, the conflict between the executive and the judiciary, the Supreme Court applied the principle of harmonious construction. It held that Article 161 and the Governor’s suspension order were not applicable when a case was sub-judice or pending before the court. Conclusion: The Doctrine of Harmonious Construction is a legal principle used to interpret conflicting or seemingly contradictory provisions within laws or statutes in a way that reconciles them and gives effect to all provisions, without rendering any of them meaningless. It aims to achieve a harmonious balance between different legal provisions while upholding the overall intent and purpose of the law. In essence, the Doctrine of Harmonious Construction ensures that legal provisions are interpreted in a way that minimises inconsistency and promotes a comprehensive and coherent understanding of the law’s intent, allowing different provisions to work together harmoniously. THANK YOU INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES UNIT - 1: INTRODUCTION Cont.… Subsidiary Rules of Interpretation  Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius  Ejusdem Generis  Contemporanea Expositio  Reddendo Singula Singulis Subsidiary Rules of Interpretation  Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius  Ejusdem Generis Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius: The rule “Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius” is a Latin phrase which means that ‘express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another’ (Express – Mention, Implied – Exclusion). This is one of the rules used in interpretation of statutes. The phrase indicates that items not on the list are assumed not to be covered by the statute. When something is mentioned expressly in a statute it leads to the presumption that the things not mentioned are excluded. For example,  “Weekends and public holidays” exclude ordinary weekdays.  If a Statute refers to Lions and Tigers it only refers to Lions and Tigers and will not include Leopards’ or any other wild animals. At the same time, general words in a statute must receive a general construction, unless the statute is specifying some special meaning to the general words, because many things are put into a statute and it is not to be assumed that anything not specifically included is excluded from the statute. There are 2 conditions which need to be fulfilled cumulatively in order to apply this maxim for interpretation of statutes –  The list of words appearing in a statute should be specific in nature and Condition  Those specific words should not be followed by general words. The literal meaning of this maxim was discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of GVK Industries Ltd. vs. ITO 332 ITR 130 (SC) which is as follows: The express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another This maxim indicates that when something is expressly mentioned in a statute, it leads to the presumption that the things which are not specified in the statute are excluded. Accordingly, this maxim is based on the rule: Express mention and implied exclusion. In Parbhani Transport Coop. Society v. Regional Transport Authority, AIR 1960 SC 801, it was held that the maxim cannot be applied when the language of the Statute is plain with clear meaning. In R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, it was held to exclude the father of an illegitimate child from rights under immigration law at that time, because the definition section specifically mentioned the mother alone. In Shree Durga Distributors v. State of Karnataka, the Supreme Court relied on punctuation for deciding that the entry in Karnataka VAT Act, 2003, exempting "animal feed and feed supplements namely, processed commodity such as poultry feed, cattle feed, pig feed, fish feed, prawn feed, shrimp feed" is exhaustive and does not apply to dog feed and cat feed. It was held that, if one considers the items mentioned will apply to feeds of animals which are edible by human beings and therefore, do not apply to dog feed and cat feed. It is also one of the rare cases where Exclusio Unius rule seems to be applicable. Ejusdem Generis: Ejusdem Generis is a Latin term which means "of the same kind”. The Supreme Court defined ejusdem generis as ‘a situation where the specific words are followed by general words in a statutory enumeration’, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words. Example: If a law refers to automobiles, trucks, tractors, motorcycles and other motor-powered vehicles, "vehicles" would not include airplanes, helicopters, etc, since the list was of land- based transportation. If there is any ambiguity in the meaning of the general words, then this doctrine is applied that provides the general words which follow the specified words will be restricting to the same class of the specified words. Ejusdem Generis is not a rule of law, but a rule of construction to provide courts to find out the true intention of the legislatures. Objectives: To understand the meaning of the statutory interpretation.  To understand the meaning of “Ejusdem Generis”.  To study the applicability and the non-applicability of the doctrine of Ejusdem Generis.  To study the cases where this doctrine was applied and where not.  To examine whether the Courts are using this doctrine in a proper manner or not. Hypothesis: For the application of this doctrine the general words must follow the specific words and the specific words must necessarily constitute a genus/class  There must be an intention of the statute for restricting the general word to the genus/class of the specified words it follows.  As this doctrine has to be used very cautiously by the Courts but sometimes the Courts may not use this doctrine properly and apply it where it is not necessary thus defeating the purpose of the statute and causing a miscarriage to Justice. In UP State Electricity Board v. Harishankar, SC held that the following conditions must exist for the application of this rule – 1. The statue contains an enumeration of specific words 2. The subject of the enumeration constitutes a class or a category 3. The class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration 4. A general term is present at the end of the enumeration 5. There is no indication of a different legislative intent Justice Hidayatullah explained the principles of this rule through the following example – In the expression, “books, pamphlets, newspapers, and other documents”, private letters may not be held included if “other documents” be interpreted ejusdem generis with what goes before. But in a provision which reads, “newspapers or other documents likely to convey secrets to the enemy”, the words “other documents” would include documents of any kind and would not take their meaning from newspaper. Ishwar Singh Bagga v. State of Rajasthan 1987, where the words “other person”, in the expression “any police officer authorized in this behalf or any other person authorized in this behalf by the State government” in Section 129 of Motor Vehicles Act, were held not to be interpreted ejusdem generis because the mention of a single species of “police officer” does not constitute a genus. It can be seen that this rule is an exception to the rule of construction that general words should be given their full and natural meaning. It is a canon of construction like many other rules that are used to understand the intention of the legislature Exceptions to the rule of Ejusdem generis: If the preceding term is general, the rule of Ejusdem generis will not apply. When the particular and specific words exhaust the whole genus, there is nothing ejusdem generis left The general term shall not be restricted in meaning by the specific words Application of rule of Ejusdem Generis: This rule has been applied effectively by the Courts in the following cases: In A.G. v. Brown, Section 43 of Customs (Consolidations) Act, 1876, was construed in which the words "arms, ammunition or gun powder or any other goods" were employed. It was held that the words "any other goods" refer to goods similar to arms and ammunition or gun powder.  Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, 1965 AIR 1167  M/s Siddeshwari Cotton Mills Private Limited v. Union of India, 1989 AIR 1019 Cases where court refused to apply the rule: In Jiyajirao Cotton Mills Ltd. v. MPEB, the Supreme Court construed Section 49 (3) of Electricity Supply Act, 1948, by virtue of which the Electricity Board is empowered to fix different tariffs for supply of electricity to any person having regard to geographical position of any area, the nature of supply and purpose for which supply is required and any other relevant factors. The Supreme Court refused to apply the rule of ejusdem generis as no genus was formed for restricting the meaning of general words "any other relevant factors". Conclusion: General words in a statute should be taken ordinarily in their usual sense. General words, even when they follow specific words, should ordinarily be taken in their general sense, unless a more reasonable interpretation requires them to be used in a sense limited to things Ejusdem Generis with those specifically mentioned. If, however, the particular words exhaust the whole genus, the general words must be understood to refer to some larger genus. Noscitur A Sociis It is a Latin Phrase. Noscere means to know and sociis means association. Thus, Noscitur a Sociis means knowing from association.  Meaning of a word is to be judged by the company it keeps.  Unclear word or phrase should be determined by the words immediately surrounding it.  If multiple words having similar meaning are put together, they are to be understood in their collective.  Questionable meaning of a doubtful word can be derived from its association with other words.  This principle needs a word or phrase or even a whole provision that stands alone has a clear meaning. Where it can be used:  When the associated words have similar meaning.  When the intention of legislator is not clear.  When the words have disjoint meaning. A doctrine or rule of construction, the meaning of an unclear or ambiguous word (as in a statute or contract) should be determined by considering the words with which it is associated in the context. The meaning of an unclear word or phrase should be determined by the words immediately surrounding it. Under the doctrine of “noscitur a sociis” the questionable meaning of a word or doubtful words can be derived from its association with other words within the context of the phrase. Relying on the above doctrine, the apex court in Pradeep Agarbatti v. State of Punjab, with reference to the Punjab Sales Tax Act, held that the word, “perfumery’’ means such articles as used in cosmetics and toilet goods viz, sprays, etc but does not include ‘Dhoop’ and ‘Agarbatti’. This is because in Schedule ‘A’ Entry 16 of Punjab Sales Tax Act reads as “cosmetics, perfumery & toilet goods excluding tooth paste, tooth powder, kumkum & soap.” Alamgir v. State of Bihar [AIR 1959 SC 436] The interpretation of the word ‘detained’ under S.498 of Indian Penal Code was involved. In this case the woman, who was a married woman, voluntarily left her husband and started living with the appellant. Prosecution under S.498 IPC was lodged against the appellant. The Supreme Court held that the word ‘detain’ would ordinarily mean detention against will, but under this section it has to be construed in the light of other words in its company. This means that detained should be interpreted with reference to expression taken, entices and conceals without consent of the husband. S.498 protects the right of the husband who has been deprived of the company of his wife and in the light of this object also the expression detains must mean keeping a woman without the permission of her husband. The woman’s consent under this provision is, therefore, meaningless. Ejusdem generis: A Facet of noscitur a sociis Ejusdem generis is a legal concept that is related to another concept called noscitur a sociis. In simple terms, noscitur a sociis means that a word in law or rule gets its meaning from the words around it. So, when you see a word in a law, you should understand what it means by looking at the other words nearby. Ejusdem generis is like a part of noscitur a sociis. It comes into play when there are both general words and specific words in a law or rule. In such cases, the court can’t just look at the general words on their own. Instead, it need to consider them in the context of the specific words that are also there. Conclusion: While both ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis are principles used for interpreting ambiguous terms in legal documents, there is a difference between Ejusdem Generis and Noscitur a Sociis in terms of focus, application and purpose. But both Ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis help ensure clarity and consistency in legal interpretation THANK YOU INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES Subsidiary Rules of Interpretation  Contemporanea Expositio  Reddendo Singula Singulis Contemporanea Expositio: Contemporaneous exposition is the best and strongest in law or document, is the one given by the people who made it or signed it. It also means that the meaning that people have been using for a long time is probably the right one, even if the words have a different meaning in everyday language.  The best way to construe a document is to read it as it would read when made.  If it is clearly established that an enactment has been wrongly interpreted time and again, the court should correct the past mistakes and construe it correctly.  It is said that the best exposition of a statute or any other document is that which it has received from contemporary authority.  The maxim is based on the principal as stated by Salmond that “the essence of law lies in the spirit, not its letter for the letter is significant only as being the external manifestation of the intention that underlies it”. This maxim was exercised in JK Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd v Union of India, when the Collector Central Excise held JK Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills in default for not paying central excise on the yarn used as an intermediary raw material for fabric production. The Mills claimed Contemporanea exposito and appealed that levy of excise on yarn and other fabrics is applicable only when it is removed from the factory premises, and not if it is utilised in intermediary stages. However, the Supreme Court dismissed the appellants’ plea, presenting their judgement by holding the Mills liable for the payment of excise. In reaching this judgement, the apex court referred the decision in KP Varghese v The Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam. In this judgement, the maxim was appropriately applied, considering that there was ambiguity in the relied case as a word had two possible constructions. This was untrue for JK Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd v Union of India, where the maxim was pleaded in the absence of an ambiguity, with the consequence of their plea being rejected. This maxim is also applied by the courts in  National Textile Corporation, New Delhi, and another v Swadeshi Mining and Manufacturing Co Ltd, Lucknow  Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Gram Panchayat, Pimpri Waghere  In R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antuley, Section 21 of Indian Penal Code 1860 was construed by referring to the principle of contemporanea expositio and it was held that a Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) is not a public servant as defined in the section. Limitations of the Maxim: The usage and practice can be used in interpretation when the language is ambiguous. If the language is unambiguous, it cannot be used.  Useful only for ancient Acts, and cannot be used for modern Acts.  Cannot be used to substantiate an implied report or quasi repeal an Act. Reddendo Singula Singulis: The maxim is derived from Latin words "reddendo" (referring), "singula" (each), and "singulis" (to each). Reddendo singula singulis is a Latin legal principle which means "referring each to each". When applied to statutory analysis, Reddendo Singula Singulis means that qualifying or limiting words and phrases should be applied only to the words or phrases they modify, and not to others. When a list of words has a modifying phrase at the end, the phrase refers only to the last word. Example - firemen, policemen and doctors in a hospital. Here, “in a hospital” only applies to doctors and not to firemen or policemen. The reddendo singula singulis principle concerns the use of words distributively. Illustration:  A typical application of this principle is where a testator says ‘I devise and bequeath all my real and personal property to B’. The term devise is appropriate only to real property. The term bequeath is appropriate only to personal property. Accordingly, by the application of the principle reddendo singula singulis, the testamentary disposition is read as if it were worded ‘I devise all my real property, and bequeath all my personal property, to B’.  Similarly, in the expression ‘I will eat and drink bread and milk’, the word ‘eat’ shall apply to ‘bread’ and the word ‘drink’ shall apply to ‘milk’. In Bishop v. Deakin, the application of the rule is furnished in the construction of section 59(1) of the Local Government Act, 1933 which reads: "A person shall be disqualified for being elected or being a member of a local authority if he has within five years before the day of election or since his election been convicted of any offence and ordered to be imprisoned for a period of not less than three months without the option of fine". In the section, the language involves for two matters -  First, what is to be disqualification for election? and,  Secondly, what is to be disqualification for being a member after election? The language also provides for two penalties –  first, conviction within five years before the day of election; and  secondly, conviction since election. It was, therefore, held that a conviction prior to election although a disqualification for the election was not a disqualification for continuing to be a member and if the election was not challenged by election petition within the time limited therefore, the member did not vacate his seat. In K.V. Kamath v. Rangappa Baliga & Co. AIR 1969 SC 504, the Supreme Court applied this rule - Proviso to Article 304 of the Constitution reads: ‘Provided that no Bill or Amendment for the purpose of clause (b) shall be introduced or moved in the Legislature of a State without the previous of the president. It was held by the SC that the word ‘introduced’ referred to ‘Bill’ and the word ‘moved’ to ‘Amendment’. THANK YOU

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