Limited Nuclear War 1950s-1970s PDF

30/11/2023 Limited War among Nuclear States and/or Limited Nuclear War 1950s-1970s BA WMD DR SUSAN MARTIN 1 1 REST OF TERM 8 December: Questions, Review, Conclusion Term One Exam: Monday, 11 December, 13:00-15:00, King’s Bldg K1.28 2 1 30/11/2023 TERM TWO New classroom: Waterloo FWB 2.46 (On 16 Feb,...

30/11/2023 Limited War among Nuclear States and/or Limited Nuclear War 1950s-1970s BA WMD DR SUSAN MARTIN 1 1 REST OF TERM 8 December: Questions, Review, Conclusion Term One Exam: Monday, 11 December, 13:00-15:00, King’s Bldg K1.28 2 1 30/11/2023 TERM TWO New classroom: Waterloo FWB 2.46 (On 16 Feb, we are in Waterloo FWB 3.146.) Teaching for Term Two starts on Friday 12 January 12 Jan: CBN at the End of the Cold War (We will pick up the use of CW in the Iran Iraq War here) 3 WHAT DID YOU FIND IN THE DOCUMENTS? 4 4 2 30/11/2023 SETTING THE STAGE 1945-1949 American nuclear monopoly 1949 first Soviet nuclear test Eisenhower presidency: ‘New Look’ strategy, underpinned by American nuclear superiority, relies on nuclear weapons to deter the Soviets --and possibly even to fight a war But as mutual vulnerability to nuclear strikes develops (and as Soviet forces approach ‘parity’ to the US), the credibility of nuclear deterrence and how to increase it is debated 5 5 LIVING UNDER MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION Is a punishment-based deterrence strategy workable, particularly when that punishment would be mutual? Or do you need the ability to fight and win war (including nuclear war) in order to be able to deter an aggressor? If you need to be able to fight, can you use nuclear weapons short of an all-out nuclear exchange? >>>limited war and limited nuclear war options and strategies 6 6 3 30/11/2023 BERNARD BRODIE AS CITED BY ROSS, PP 25-46 “At a time when the opponent will be able to do to our cities and countryside whatever we might threaten to do to his, the whole concept of ‘massive retaliation’... will have to be openly recognized as obsolete.” “When we are talking about an unrestricted general war we are talking about a catastrophe to which there are no predictable limits”; a threat of this is only useful to deter attacks on vital interests. “Our present-day diplomacy based on the deterrent value of our great atomic power is in danger of being strait-jacketed by fear of the very power we hold.” “If total war is to be averted, we must be ready to fight limited wars with limited objectives—if for no other reason than that limited objectives are 7 always better than unlimited disaster.” 7 WHAT WAS BEING ASSUMED ABOUT THE OTHER SIDE The worry was that the Soviet Union would not be deterred by the US nuclear retaliatory capability— in particular, that the Soviets might undertake conventional actions, including actions in Western Europe [nuclear deterrence fails to deter an attack by the aggressor, the USSR] And that the US itself would be deterred from initiating nuclear use by the Soviet ability to carry out a nuclear strike against it [nuclear deterrence acts to prevent retaliation by the defender, the US] 8 8 4 30/11/2023 ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT OTHER SIDE CONT. Deterrence by punishment deters aggressor if: (probability of punishment) * (cost of punishment) > (probability of success) * (benefits of aggression) Deterrence by punishment fails to deter aggressor if: (probability of punishment) * (cost of punishment) < (probability of success) * (benefits of aggression) Soviets seen as highly motivated to change status quo (high benefits)—and in effect, more motivated to change it than the US would be to defend it Soviets seen as less sensitive to costs—particularly to 9 societal costs 9 SO TO MAKE DETERRENCE WORK Some analysis argued that the US needed to find a way to respond to Soviet aggression-and thus deter such aggression—that did not involve the initiation of all out nuclear war >>>>>> limited war (e.g. increasing conventional capabilities/flexible response) >>>>>>limited nuclear war (limited use of nuclear weapons without all out escalation) >>>>>> other ways of increasing credibility of nuclear retaliation (particularly for extended deterrence) 10 10 5 30/11/2023 LIMITED WAR/LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR Did the conventional superiority of the Soviet Union challenge the ability of the US to deter war, once the USSR had a retaliatory nuclear capability? Under what conditions (if any) can a conflict between nuclear states be kept at the conventional level? Under what conditions (if any) can a nuclear conflict between states be kept limited? Did these conditions exist in the Cold War? 11 11 CONCEPTS Limited War Limited Nuclear War Escalation (and Different Escalation Pathways) Escalation Dominance Flexible Response Communication, Command, Control and Intelligence (C3I) -- and whether to target Other? 12 12 6 30/11/2023 WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO LIMIT ‘Limiting’ war is in some sense the opposite of escalation If you want to keep a war limited, you want to keep it from escalating to a higher level of conflict 13 13 ESCALATION ‘Escalation can usefully be defined as an increase in the intensity or scope of conflict that crosses threshold(s) considered significant by one or more of the participants. Conflicts can intensify or expand in many ways, such as through attacks on targets previously considered to be off-limits, opening new theaters of operations against an enemy, or employing weapons not previously used in the conflict…. However, not every increase or expansion of violence is escalatory: Escalation occurs only when at least one of the parties involved believes that there has been a significant qualitative change in the conflict as a result of the new development’ (Morgan et al 2008, 8). Also worth remembering that escalation can be ‘a deliberate policy objective, an unintended side effect of policy, or purely accidental’ (Morgan et al 2008, 8). 14 14 7 30/11/2023 ‘LIMITED’ WAR -- LIMITED HOW? (ROSS DRAWING ON OSGOOD) Limit aims (so do not require utmost military effort, can negotiate resolution) Means employed Number of participants Geographic area Selected targets Temporal scope Extent of disruption (economic, social, political) 15 15 AND HOW TO LIMIT—HOW TO PREVENT ESCALATION? Need to understand how adversary understands current thresholds and not cross them (either deliberately, inadvertently, or accidentally) ? How you reach an understanding of such thresholds with an adversary while at war? Can you develop clear policies that are communicated in such a way that if accidents happen, they will be understood as accidents? 16 16 8 30/11/2023 ONE POSSIBLE EXAMPLE IN 1943, and American ship in the port of Bari, Italy was struck during a German bombardment. The ship was carrying 100 tons (2000 mustard bombs)—part of a stockpile to be used in retaliation if Germany initiated chemical warfare. The ship was hit, and the mustard gas was released in the air and water. I’ve seen this sighted as an example of where escalation was avoided. But in looking this up, I discovered that escalation was avoided not because of trust and communication, but because the US and the UK decided to keep the presence of mustard a secret—thus comprising the care of both civilians and military service people who were injured by the chemical agent. 17 17 THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS Can nuclear weapons have a role beyond ‘existential deterrence’ and/or deterring the use of nuclear weapons in relations among nuclear states? Can nuclear weapons be used as an instrument of national policy vis-à-vis other NWS, to advance goals other than deterrence of an attack on vital interests or of the use of nuclear weapons? Yes: leads to policies that focus on Manipulation of risk and/or development of specific forces structures certain military forces will allow this) And/or development of capabilities for limited nuclear war No: leads to Emphasis on nuclear danger, which avoiding escalation, limiting aims, enhancing crisis stability, etc. Depending on ‘how far down’ the escalation ladder nuclear deterrence is understood to be effective, can lead to increasing conventional capability, to policies for limited (conventional) war 18 18 9 30/11/2023 THE CASE FOR LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR ‘Rested in no small part on a dual reality—the impossibility of total victory and the possibility of total defeat—and represented, as well, an attempt to escape the dilemma inherent in that reality.’ (Ross 2728, emphasis added) Dilemma was that in a world of mutual assured destruction, we seemed to be faced with a choice of: ‘all or nothing’, ‘holocaust or humiliation’, ‘suicide or surrender’ or ‘sudden destruction or slow defeat’ (Ross, 29) Fear of self-deterrence 19 19 UNDERLYING THE ARGUMENTS ARE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT: Efficacy of deterrence by punishment versus deterrence by denial The utility of nuclear weapons and their suitability for deterrence by denial (war-fighting), deterrence by punishment, etc. The likelihood of conflict and war The adversary and its aims The importance of the nuclear force balance The importance of the conventional force balance 20 20 10 30/11/2023 AND THE QUESTION THE WORK ON LIMITED WAR POSES IS: Was it possible in the Cold War to escape from the dilemma inherent in a world of more than one nuclear power—as Ross puts it, the impossibility of total victory and possibility of total defeat? 21 21 HOW ARE THE LIMITS IN LIMITED WAR ESTABLISHED? Limits have to be recognisable to all parties to the conflict Limits have to be in the interest of all parties to the conflict Limits have to be robust—so that they do not fail when mistakes are made (e.g. a weapon hits an unintended target) How likely is it that such limits can be created among adversaries during an armed conflict? 22 22 11 30/11/2023 AND WHAT DO YOU LIMIT? Do you limit ends--aims and objectives? Do you limit the weapons used (e.g. no nuclear weapons)? Or do you limit how weapons are used, what targets are hit, etc? 23 23 CAN WE LIMIT ENDS? Literature on limited nuclear war suggests that limited objectives is primary characteristic of limited war, and opened up the possibility that unlimited means (e.g. nuclear weapons) could be used for limited ends (see Ross,31-32, also including 40) >>focus on limiting ends, and possibility of limited NUCLEAR war But Brodie argued that limiting ends and means is connected: ‘We want to keep war limited simply because total war as it would be fought today and in the future against a well-armed adversary is simply too unthinkable, too irrational to be borne.’ >>>the need to limit means is why we limit ends Ross agrees with Brodie: ’Contrary to the assertions of Kissinger and Osgood [and other work favourable to limited nuclear war], it is the necessity of employing limited means that dictates the pursuit of limited ends, not limited objectives that dictate the employment of limited means.’ (Ross 40 24 24 12 30/11/2023 CAN WE LIMIT MEANS--NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LIMITED WAR? Can you and the adversary agree on and distinguish between tactical versus strategic weapons? (See Ross, e.g. 42) By size of weapon? By target? What about collateral damage or bombs that go off target? Can you and your adversary agree on, and distinguish between, tactical versus strategic targets? How do we classify the use of conventional forces against nuclear weapons—as a conventional or nuclear strike? 25 25 STRATEGIES: FLEXIBLE RESPONSE seeks to deter through a range of military capabilities that allow response to any attack at the appropriate level— conventional, theatre nuclear or strategic nuclear; Because possibility of uncontrolled escalation exists, adversary faced with unacceptable risk, causing him to cease attack and withdraw Tries to complicate adversary’s calculations about whether it can win, and put onus on him to escalate to where risks get out of control, so adversary has to ask: “If I ratchet the conflict up, then what happens next, and where will it end?” [For NATO’s decision on adoption of flexible response, see https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a680116a.pdf] 26 26 13 30/11/2023 STRATEGIES: ESCALATION DOMINANCE With a strategy of Escalation dominance a nuclear power forces an opponent to back down because it has the power to beat the adversary at further levels of conflict; relies upon superiority at various levels of conflict to ensure one’s own ability to win. As Colin Gray and Keith Payne put it in their famous “Victory is Possible” article in 1980, “an adequate U.S. deterrent posture is one that denies the Soviet Union any plausible hope of success at any level of strategic conflict.” (Quoted by Fitzsimmons) 27 27 STRATEGIES—FR EXAMPLE Flexible response (Versus Escalation dominance) Example from Aaron Miles: If deterrence failure leads to military conflict between the United States and Russia, Russia’s leaders will have to decide whether to seek victory by engaging in more destructive forms of warfare. A successful U.S. flexible response strategy leaves Russia uncertain as to whether escalation would actually deliver victory, but confident that it would bring greater danger its own interests. Russia would then see three plausible outcomes: Russia wins, the United States wins, or things get out of control and everyone loses. Uncertain of which it would be, Russia is less likely to escalate. 28 28 14 30/11/2023 STRATEGIES-ED EXAMPLE (Flexible response Versus) Escalation dominance Example from Aaron Miles: In a conflict between the United States and North Korea, the Kim regime would similarly face a decision about whether to escalate. A successful U.S. escalation dominance strategy would mean the United States and its allies have the firepower to defeat North Korea in any type of conflict. Ideally, North Korea would then see defeat as the only plausible outcome. Confident that the United States possesses the means to prevail, North Korea is less likely to escalate. 29 29 WHAT IF WE JUST STAY AT THE CONVENTIONAL LEVEL? C A N WE L I M I T M E A N S T H A T WA Y ? 30 30 15 30/11/2023 SOME ESCALATION PATHWAYS FROM CONVENTIONAL TO NUCLEAR CONFLICT Inadvertent escalation (e.g. Castillo) Entanglement and blurring of attacks on conventional versus nuclear forces Accidental or unauthorised use (e.g. Castillo, Mahnken) Risk increased if pre-delegation part of strategy to counter pre-emptive or counterforce attacks Deliberate use Crisis instability--Incentive to use nuclear weapons first if fear conventional counter-force attacks against nuclear forces (e.g. Castillo) First use to signal resolve and/or achieve limited objectives (e.g. Mahnken) First use if losing conventional war (e.g. Castillo, Mahnken) Early limited nuclear option (LNO) LNOs as last report Use of nuclear weapons to counter conventional force Flexible response, up to attacks on adversary nuclear forces (? If include conventional attacks on nuclear forces here) 31 31 VIEWS OF US OFFICIALS (FROM MICHAEL KREPON, ‘WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT’ ARMS CONTROL WONK OCTOBER 29, 1018) “You use a small one, then you go to a bigger one. I think nuclear weapons are nuclear weapons and we need to draw the line there.” — George Shultz (US Sec of State, 1982-1989) “I don’t think there’s any such thing as a tactical nuclear weapon. Any nuclear weapon used at any time is a strategic game changer.” — James Mattis (US Sec of Defense, 2017-18) “Fundamentally, it is unlikely that there is such a thing as a limited nuclear war, and preparing for one is folly.” — William Perry US Sec of Defense, 1994-97) 32 32 16 30/11/2023 ROSS ON LIMITED WAR ‘Today, as in the past, the most effective way to limit..[war] in what remains a nuclear age is to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons’ (Ross, 42) 33 33 Questions? 34 34 17