Legislative Branch Of The Philippines PDF

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH The present Congress of the Philippines, created under the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, represents a return to bicameralism after almost a decade of experimenting with the unicameral Batasang Pambansa (National Legislature) that was mandated by the 1973 C...

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH The present Congress of the Philippines, created under the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, represents a return to bicameralism after almost a decade of experimenting with the unicameral Batasang Pambansa (National Legislature) that was mandated by the 1973 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. When President Aquino assumed office through what is now known as the EDSA Revolution or People Power Revolution, she declared the 1973 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines without force and effect by virtue of her exercise of revolutionary powers. Exercising the same powers, she promulgated the Freedom Constitution, which was in effect until the ratification of a new constitution (i.e. the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines). The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, crafted by some 50 delegates appointed by President Aquino through the exercise of revolutionary powers under the Freedom Constitution restored the presidential system of government together with a bicameral Congress of the Philippines, which consists of the House of Representatives and Senate. Upon its restoration, the Congress of the Philippines proceeded to its 8th Congress (1987–1992), taking up where it left off during the 7th Congress, when Martial Law was declared. Presently, the Congress of the Philippines is in its 13th Congress (2004– 2007). The Senate, as the upper chamber, is composed of 24 senators elected at-large (Section 2, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines). It is headed by a President who is elected from among its members. To qualify for election as senator, one must be a. a natural-born citizen ; b. on the day of the election, he must be 35 years of age or older, c. able to read and write; d. a registered voter; and e. a Philippine resident for not less than 2 years preceding the day of the election.( Section 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines). Senators each serve a 6-year term and can only be elected to two consecutive terms. After two consecutive terms, senators are barred from running for another consecutive term. However, after 6 years from the end of a senator’s two consecutive 6-year terms, a former senator can run for a senate post again. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which a senator is elected (Section 4, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines). The House of Representatives is composed of district representatives and party-list representatives. The former are elected directly by qualified constituencies of specific political and territorial units. The latter are elected at-large and indirectly, through the parties they represent, which are qualified to participate in party-list elections and are able to garner the requisite percentage of votes (Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines) as provided in RA 7941 (Party List Law). Congress can increase the number of districts nationwide and thus the number of district representatives. Party-list representatives, by constitutional mandate, should constitute 20% of the total membership of the House (including the total number of party-list representatives). To date, in the 13th Congress (2004–2007), 212 district representatives and 24 party-list representatives constitute the total membership of the House. To qualify for election as a member of the House of Representatives, one must be: a. a natural born citizen of the Philippines; b. at least 25 years of age on the day of the election; c. able to read and write; d. a registered voter in the district in which he or she would be elected (except party-list representatives); and, e. a resident therein for at least 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election. Representatives each serve a term of 3 years (Section 6 and Section 7, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines) and can only be elected to serve three consecutive terms. After the third consecutive 3-year term, a representative cannot be elected for another consecutive term. Individuals seeking reelection must wait 3 years from the day their three consecutive 3-year terms ended before running for election again as representatives of their districts. Like senators, voluntary renunciation of their office for any length of time shall not interrupt the continuity of service for the full term for which they were elected. A vacancy created by the death or permanent incapacity of a senator or representative may be filled through a special election. Anyone elected through such special election shall serve only the unexpired term of his or her predecessor. Salaries of legislators are determined by law. Any increase in their compensation can take effect only after the expiration of the term of the legislators approving such an increase. This limitation does not include allowances and other emoluments. The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines also mandates that records and books of accounts of Congress be open to public scrutiny. COA, empowered to audit such books, is tasked to publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenditures of every member of Congress. Records and books of accounts of Congress are not, however, readily accessible even to members of Congress. Recently, some members of the House demanded transparency in the management of the accounts of the House, specifically regarding the matter of additional supervisory or management-level appointments. Their call for opening the books was not favorably acted upon by the Committee on Accounts. Annual publication of itemized expenditures of Congress members, however, was faithfully complied with. Members of Congress, while Congress is in session, enjoy the privilege of immunity from arrest. This privilege covers civil arrests and arrests for criminal offenses punishable by not more than 6 years of imprisonment, and the privilege of speech and debate that shields a legislator from being made to account in any place other than Congress for remarks made while the legislature is in session or in connection with legislative duties. Slanderous remarks in a private conversation with another person are not covered by this immunity, and a member may be called to account for these remarks by his colleagues and punished for disorderly behavior, when warranted. Upon assumption of office, members of Congress are required to make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests, and they must notify the chamber to which they belong of potential conflicts of interest that may arise from their authorship and filing of proposed legislation (Section 12, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines) to prevent members from using their positions for ulterior purposes and dispel suspicions of impropriety in the performance of their functions. Members of Congress cannot hold any other offices or be employed in or by the Government or any government subdivision, agency, or instrumentality (including government-owned or –controlled corporations or their subsidiaries) during their term without forfeiting their seats. Any such other office that is held is known as incompatible office. Furthermore, members of Congress cannot hold any office that may have been created or the emoluments of which were increased during the term for which they were elected. These offices are known as forbidden office. Holding another office is not prohibited, but simultaneously holding another office and a seat in Congress is prohibited. Legislators may hold other government offices, but they must forfeit their seats in Congress (Section 13, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines; Adaza vs. Pacana (135 SCRA 431). This forestalls the possibility of a legislator owing loyalty to another branch of government, which could prejudice the independence of Congress and infringe upon the doctrine of separation of powers. Holding offices that are considered extensions of legislative positions or are in aid of legislative duties are, however, allowed. Membership in the electoral tribunals is allowed by the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. As to forbidden office, the intent is to prevent legislators from using their position to secure their future in government by creating lucrative positions and ensuring their appointment thereto during their incumbency. Congress members are also prohibited from personally appearing as counsels before courts of justice or before electoral tribunals or quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, to prevent members from exerting undue influence on the tribunals or bodies before which they appear (Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines). This issue was raised in the celebrated Vizconde Massacre trial, which involved the appearance therein of Senator Renato Cayetano as private counsel for the plaintiff. Personal appearance alone is proscribed by the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. Lawyer-legislators can engage in their profession and provide legal services to anyone with a pending case before any judicial or administrative body, but they cannot personally appear in trials and/or hearings related thereto. That the undue influence of legislators on judicial proceedings can be prevented simply by inhibiting their personal appearance before judicial and administrative bodies is, however, doubtful. Legislators are similarly prohibited from having financial interests in any contract with the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof (including government- owned or -controlled corporations) or any franchise or special privilege granted by any of these during legislators’ terms in office. Legislators are also prohibited from intervening in any matter before any office of the Government for pecuniary benefit. These prohibitions are intended to prevent legislators from taking advantage of their position to amass financial gain or profit from government service (Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines). Under Article VI, Section 16 (3), of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, the Senate and the House have the power to determine the rules of their proceedings; punish their members for disorderly behavior; and, with the concurrence of two thirds of all members, suspend (for a period not exceeding 60 days) or expel a member. Congress alone can determine what constitutes disorderly behavior, and its determination cannot be judicially reviewed. The senate and house committees on ethics and privileges have jurisdiction over all matters relating to the discipline of members, and only upon their recommendation would a chamber vote be held to determine whether or not to impose disciplinary action on any member. Finding members guilty of and punishing them for disorderly behavior depends on the ability of complainants to secure enough votes in the committee and in plenary to adopt such a finding and approve the imposition of disciplinary action. Without a consensus of the minority and majority, members generally avoid disciplining their colleagues accused of disorderly behavior. Powers of Congress Congress exercises legislative and non legislative powers (Cruz, 1998). Legislative power includes lawmaking, appropriation, and taxation. The power of investigation and oversight are inherent to the power of lawmaking. Non legislative power includes the power to canvass presidential elections, declare war, concur with treaties and amnesties, propose constitutional amendments, and impeach officials (Section 4, Article VII; Section 23, Article VI; Section 21, Article VII; Section 1, Section 2, and Section 3, Article XVII; and Section 3, Article XI, of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines). From express powers granted by the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Congress derives its implied powers, such as the power to punish for contempt in legislative investigations. Legislative Power Legislative power is the power to enact laws and is exercised through the approval of a bill that, upon such approval, becomes a law or statute. The power to make laws includes the power to amend and repeal them. The legislative process, briefly, is as follows: “Bills are introduced or filed by members of the House or Senate in respective chambers (According to Section 24, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, a bill may be introduced either in the House or in the Senate. Bills concerning the same subject may also be filed simultaneously and separately in the House and Senate. Bills concerning appropriation, revenue, or tariffs; bills authorizing increases in the public debt; bills of local application; and bills that are private must originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. The Senate, however, may propose or concur with amendments.). Each bill must relate to only one subject, and this subject should be expressed in the title (Section 26 (1), Article VI, of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines). Bills then undergo first readings in plenary, where their numbers and titles and the names of the authors are read. The speaker or senate president thereafter refers bills to the appropriate committees for study. Bills may be tabled or dispatched in committees or recommended for approval, with or without amendments or in consolidation with other bills of the same nature and/or purpose. In the latter case, bills are reported through committee reports (A committee prepares a report on a bill only if a committee decides to recommend a bill for approval by the House) and are deliberated upon by the Committee on Rules, which decides whether or not bills should be calendared for second readings. On second reading, a bill is read in its entirety, on the floor by the chair of the sponsoring committee and its authors, and subjected to debate and amendments as warranted. Amendments may be submitted by the committee or by individual members. Thereafter, the bill is subjected to voting on second reading. When approved on second reading, the bill is printed in its final form, and copies are distributed to the members at least 3 days before the same can be calendared for third reading. A bill can be recommitted to the committee of origin any time before its approval on third reading (According to Section 26 (2), Article VI, of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, a bill must undergo three readings, on three separate days, except when the president certifies that bill as urgent to meet a public calamity or emergency). On third reading, no further debate or amendment is allowed. Members register their vote and may explain their votes in such manner as allowed by the rules of each chamber. After approval on third reading, the bill is transmitted to the other chamber, where it undergoes the same process (If a chamber has a counterpart bill to a bill passed by the other chamber and these bills have conflicting provisions, a bicameral conference committee composed of representatives from each chamber is formed to harmonize the conflicting provisions. Thereafter, a conference committee report is prepared for ratification or approval by both chambers). If approved by the other chamber, the bill is enrolled and printed as finally approved by Congress and transmitted to the president for final approval. The president may sign the bill into law or veto it.  Should the president fail to act on a bill within 30 days of receiving it, that bill is deemed to have lapsed into law. If the bill is vetoed, the bill may still become a law if Congress decides to override the veto by a two-thirds vote of all its members.” The power of legislative investigation This power, as provided in Section 21, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines is inherent in the legislative power and an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function (Watkins vs. United States, 354 S 178 ) with its exercise coextensive with the range of legislative power (McGrain vs. Doherty [273 US 135]). Legislative power includes lawmaking, representation, consensus building, legitimizing, policy clarification, and legislative oversight (Davidson et al. 1987). Lawmaking is the traditional task of deliberating the actual content of policies; representation is the process of articulating the demands or interests of various constituencies; consensus building is a bargaining process through which various constituency demands are aggregated in such a way that no significant constituency is severely or permanently disadvantaged; legitimizing is the ratification of a measure or policy in a way that is appropriate, acceptable, and authoritative; policy clarification involves the identification, publicizing, or ventilation of policy concerns and issues; and legislative oversight is the review of the implementation of laws or legislative policies to either alter fundamental policies or introduce equity in their application (Davidson et al. 1987). The purposes of congressional investigations are roughly classified into three categories: (i) those whose purpose is obtaining information bearing upon legislation; (ii) those that examine the operations of the executive and administrative branches with a view to determining their efficiency; and (iii) those that seek primarily to inform and mold public opinion (Rivera 1962). Each chamber has rules governing inquiries in aid of legislation. Anyone who fails or refuses to attend a legislative investigation upon proper summons may be punished for contempt of court (Arnault vs. Nazareno, 87 Phil 29, ). Questions that may be raised in a legislative inquiry need not be relevant to any pending measure. They need only be germane to the subject matter of the investigation, as the proceedings may result in a proposed legislation based on the findings of the investigating committee. In effect, virtually nothing is immune from legislative investigation. Under the Rules of the House governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, not even the filing or pendency of a case before any court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial or administrative body can stop or abate any inquiry. Legislative power also embraces the power to summon heads of executive departments to appear and be questioned before Congress in plenary sessions on any matter pertaining to their departments, through the conduct of a question hour (Section 22, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines). Like the power of investigation, this power strengthens legislative oversight or congressional watchfulness over an executive department to ensure that laws are effectively implemented and enable the legislature to formulate remedial measures, should laws fail to respond to the needs they were intended to address. Power of Appropriation According to Section 25, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Congress may not increase the budget recommended by the president for the operation of the Government. Congress can, however, reduce the same, provided that the budget of the Judiciary will not be reduced to a level lower than the preceding year’s appropriations (Section 3, Article VIII, of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines). Moreover, to be valid, an appropriation must be for a public purpose and not for the benefit of any private individual or interest. The sum authorized to be released must be determinate or determinable. Even discretionary funds should be disbursed for public purposes only and supported by appropriate vouchers. According to the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, however, the president, the president of the Senate, the speaker of the House of Representatives, the chief justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. But any transfer of funds from one branch or department to another by the president subverts the doctrine of separation of powers and the will of the Legislature that enacted the measure. The president does not have the power to appropriate or to change the appropriations approved by Congress through a general appropriations act. Only Congress can make such transfers through an appropriations law. Power of Taxation Congress alone exercises the power of taxation. Members decide what to tax, how to tax, and how much tax will be imposed. The president only exercises such tax powers as may be delegated by Congress. Without legislative authorization, the president cannot increase or reduce taxes or diminish or expand the coverage of tax laws. The power of taxation is circumscribed by constitutional mandates stating that taxation shall be uniform, equitable, and progressive (Section 28 (1), Article VI, of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines). Uniformity in taxation means that people or things belonging to the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. Equality in taxation means that the tax imposed should be determined on the basis of the value of the property taxed. To be equitable means that the tax burden should be imposed on the basis of a taxpayer’s capacity to pay. A progressive system of taxation is essentially an equitable system of taxation and is suited to the economic conditions of the people. War Power and Power of Concurrence Congress, by a vote of two thirds of both houses, in joint session assembled, voting separately, has the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war (Section 23 (1), Article VI, of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines). The war power of Congress proceeds from a recognition that war has already begun or has been provoked by the enemy, and Congress is only affirming its existence. Any amnesty granted by the president and any treaty or international agreement the president entered into in behalf of the Government becomes valid and effective only upon concurrence of at least two thirds of all the members of the Senate (Section 19 and Section 21, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines). The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines does not distinguish between a treaty and an international agreement. Both are subject to the power of concurrence of Congress through the Senate. This underlies controversies on the validity of the Mutual Logistics and Support Agreement between the United States and the Philippines. Billed as an executive agreement, it is, nonetheless, an international agreement that, under the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, requires Senate concurrence to be valid. Impeachment Power Cruz (1998) writes that impeachment is a method of national inquest into the conduct of public men. In reality, however, except where there is a strong public outcry against the respondent the decision to impeach is usually blocked by a protective majority on the basis of partisan or pragmatic considerations. As noted earlier, it is a fact of Philippine political history that no single President, or Vice-President has ever been impeached. Politics may also provoke the impeachment of an official who has incurred the hostility of the party in power, or even a hyperactive minority. In the Philippines, the impeachable officers are the president, vice-president, members of the Supreme Court, members of constitutional commissions, and the ombudsman (Section 2, Article XI, of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines). The list is exclusive and may not be increased or reduced by legislative enactment. The grounds for impeachment are culpable violation of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, treason, bribery, other high crimes, graft and corruption, or betrayal of public trust. Culpable violation of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines is the willful, wrongful, and intentional disregard of the same. Treason is committed by any person who, owing allegiance to the Philippine Government, levies war against it or adheres to its enemies, giving them aid and comfort (Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code (Republic of the Philippines 1938). Bribery is committed by a public officer who agrees to perform any act, whether or not constituting a crime; refrains from performing an act that he or she is officially required to perform, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift, or present received by him or her, personally or through the mediation of another; or accepts gifts offered to him or her by reason of his or her office (Article 210 and Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code (Republic of the Philippines 1938). The term “other high crimes” refers to offenses that are of so serious and enormous a nature as to strike at the very life of the orderly workings of the Government. Graft and corruption are understood in the context of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. Betrayal of public trust is a new ground for impeachment intended as a catch-all provision to cover all offenses unbecoming a public functionary that are not punishable under criminal statutes, such as inexcusable negligence of duty, tyrannical abuse of authority, cronyism, favoritism, and obstruction of justice (Volume 2, p.272 of the Records of the Constitutional Convention). The House of Representatives has the sole power to initiate impeachment by a vote of at least one third of its members. Under the House Impeachment Rules following the Supreme Court ruling in the case of Francisco, et al. vs. the House of Representatives (General Record [GR] No. 160261,10 November 2003), impeachment is initiated when the complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice. Within 1 year from the time impeachment is initiated, no impeachment complaint can prosper against the same official. An impeachment complaint may be filed through a verified complaint of a member of the House or through a verified complaint of any citizen that is endorsed via a resolution by a member of the House. These complaints are processed by the Committee on Justice, which determines the sufficiency in form and substance of such complaints. If it is found sufficient in form and substance, the impeachment complaint is endorsed by the House through the articles of impeachment that the House then transmits to the Senate, which has the power to try and decide the impeachment case. For an impeachment complaint to be directly transmitted to the Senate, serving already as the articles of impeachment, the complaint must be subscribed to and signed by at least one third of the members of the House upon its filing.47 In the impeachment trial, the House, through a committee of 11 members (selected from among those who voted in favor of the impeachment), acts as the sole prosecutor in the impeachment case (The impeachment complaint against President Joseph Estrada, which was directly transmitted as articles of impeachment to the Senate through the action of then Speaker Manuel Villar, was not subscribed to and signed by one third of the total members at the time it was filed, as required by the House Impeachment Rules. Said complaint was appropriately filed as a complaint accompanied by a resolution of endorsement of a House member, which requires a finding of sufficiency in form and substance by the Committee on Justice, and approval by the House in plenary before it could be transmitted, together with the articles of impeachment, to the Senate). When the president is on trial, the chief justice of the Supreme Court presides but shall not vote. A conviction requires the concurrence of two thirds of all members of the Senate. Impeachment proceedings are judicial and penal in character. Thus, the rights of the accused to due process and against self-incrimination must be respected. The Rules of Court, while not strictly applicable, are, nonetheless, observed. As in ordinary criminal actions, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary for conviction (Cruz 1998). A judgment of conviction is not subject to judicial review. The official so convicted is not subject to the pardoning power of the president. Power to Amend the Constitution. Amendments to or revision of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines may be proposed by Congress by a vote of three fourths of all its members. By a vote of two thirds of all its members, Congress can call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention. Amendments refer to piecemeal changes, while revision entails a wholesale rewriting of the document. Any amendment or revision must be ratified by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite, which shall be held not earlier than 60 days or later than 90 days after the approval of such amendment or revision. The Legislative Process: Before the enactment of a law, the following procedures should be followed: a. Introduction or sponsorship This stage presents a bill or measure for its introduction by any member of both houses. b. First Reading The number and title of the bill is read. c. Reference to the House Committee The bill or measure is referred by the Senate President or the Speaker of the House to a proper committee. The committee may sit on the bill, recommend for approval, or “kill” the bill/measure. Consolidation of similar bills/measures are also taken. d. Second reading The bill is scheduled for second reading. It is read entirely, debated upon and amended, when necessary. This is regarded as the most significant stage in the process. e. Printing and Distribution If in the second reading, the bill is approved, it is now printed in its final form or text , distributed to members of either house three days before the next stage, which is the third reading. f. Third Reading The members of either house register their votes. It may be for or against the bill/measure THE PROBLEM WITH IMPEACHMENT When the highest officials of the government are accused of graft and corruption, they can be removed from office through impeachment. The Constitution lists the following impeachable officials: the President, the Vice President, justices of the Supreme Court, officials of the Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman. The following are among the grounds for impeachment: 1. Culpable violation of the Constitution 2. Bribery 3. Graft and corruption 4. Betrayal of public trust The impeachment filed against former president Joseph Estrada proved to be an informative and educational experience for Filipinos. They learned about the previously untested process of removing from office high-ranking officials charged with wrongdoing. The 1987 Constitution gives the House of Representatives the sole power to initiate impeachment proceedings, which start with a verified complaint that may be filed by a congressman or any citizen. An appropriate committee hears the case and reports its recommendation through a resolution that must be affirmed by at least one-third of the House membership. In Estrada’s case, the House took the other option: the verified complaint was signed by one-third of the House’s members, an act which amounted to automatic approval and constitution of the Articles of Impeachment. The Articles were then sent to the Senate, which has the exclusive power to investigate and decide impeachment cases. Its members acted as judges and the chamber was presided over by the chief justice of the Supreme Court. While the impeachment complaint against Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was nipped in the bud by majority of the members of the lower house, mostly of whom belong to the majority block. Ironically, the other officials against whom impeachment proceedings have been initiated are the chief anti-corruption official himself, Obudsman Aniano Desierto and COMELEC Commissioner Luzviminda Tancangco. Three impeachment complaints have been filed against Desierto during his seven year term, the last two in his last years in office and within months of each other. These complaints, however, were still within bounds of the Constitutional provision that limits impeachment complaints to only one per year. The second impeachment complaint against Desierto was filed in late 2001, the third in early 2002. In all these “few” cases, Congress has been criticized for its failure to use its power of impeachment. These made the public think that the House has no moral and political will to exact accountability from erring public officials. The intricacies of filing and initiating impeachment proceedings do not have public appreciation. Technical requirement that must be fulfilled is perceived by most people to render the whole process unreal. Without a resolution of endorsement from a house member, a verified complaint for impeachment cannot be filed, as in the case of the impeachment complaint of Linda Montayre and the People’s Coalition against President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Even when impeachment complaints are properly filed, requisite formal procedures must be complied with to make the process legitimate and effective. Moreover, Congress is a political, not a judicial, body. Therefore, partisan, political, or pragmatic considerations come into play. The ruling party or coalition may be protective of a member or a leader of its political fraternity, or initiating impeachment proceedings against a particular official may not be politically expedient. This political pragmatism has resulted to lack of accountability, hence, lack of government’s credibility to reform itself. CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEE The public is powerless against the abuse of the powers that lawmakers have at their disposal. The public’s only recourse would be the Ethics Committees of both the Senate and the House of Representatives – the two of a handful bodies tasked in implementing the public policy on the code of conduct of people who manage the well being of the country. The House and Senate have exclusive power to discipline their respective members. The hearings of this Committee are triggered by resolutions seeking investigations into reports of wrongdoing by the legislator’s colleagues. History shows, however, that this Committee, whether in the Senate or the House, repeatedly failed to act on lawmakers’ misdeeds. One of the more controversial cases to go before the House Ethics Committee was that of Nueva Ecija Rep. Nicanor de Guzman in the 1990s. He was accused of smuggling into the country from the United States hundreds of firearms which were hidden inside a balikbayan box. The public outcry forced the committee to summon de Guzman for an inquiry. But the lawmaker jumped the gun on the committee by resigning his seat. The courts later found de Guzman guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment for gun running. He served time, but was released years later due to failing health. As a rule, the house, through the Ethics Committee, glosses over its members’ misdeeds or launches token investigations of them, but hardly metes out any sanctions or penalties. Twice in the past, the Committee has failed to investigate allegations of bribe taking. In 1996, Quezon City Rep. Michael Defensor claimed to have received a P200,000 bribe from Benpres Holdings, the parent company of First Philippine Holdings, which was vying for a contract to rehabilitate the North Luzon Expressway. The house Ethics Committee investigated the allegation, but the inquiry turned into a investigation of Defensor himself, who backed down from his allegations, saying he could not go against a giant like Benpres, which also owns the broadcast network ABS-CBN and the utilities firm Meralco. In 2000, party-list representatives Renato Magtubo and Etta Rosales accused the House leadership of giving each congressman bribes amounting to as much as P500,00 in exchange for approval of the Omnibus Power Bill. Both lawmakers sought an independent investigation of their allegations and refused to recognize the Authority of the House Ethics Committee, saying that the majority of the 25-member committee were likely recipients of the payola. No independent investigation of the matter was ever conducted. In November 2001, the House Ethics Committee investigated five congressmen who had been named in a news report as alleged recipients of P2 million each from telecommunications companies Globe and Smart, which were then being probed by the House Committee on Transportation and Communication for their plan to reduce the number of tree messages allowed to subscribers. Instead of interrogating the lawmakers, the committee picked on the writer of the story, journalist Tita Valderrama, and forced and forced her to divulge her sources. Worse, instead of inhibiting themselves from the hearing, three of the five lawmakers took turns interrogating Valderrama and forcing her to reveal her sources. Even while the hearings were in progress, one of them filed a libel suit against Valderrama and her paper, The Journal. Valderrama, whose editors initially refused to allow her to appear for fear she would only be ridiculed and who have to be subpoenaed themselves to appear before the committee, refused to respond to the lawmaker’s questions. They invoked their right against self-incrimination in light of the libel suit. Since the investigation was getting nowhere, the House Ethics Committee decided to end it, but not the filing of the libel suit. At the Senate, the Ethics Committee failed to investigate Senators John Osmena and Tessie Aquino-Oreta who publicly admitted to having received a P1 million each as their share in former President Estrada’s winnings from a high-stakes game of mahjong with cronies. The two lawmakers claimed they gave their balato to charity, and made a show of giving the money back. Reacting to a public outcry that the two lawmakers be investigated, the Senate Ethics Committee said it was looking into the possibility of an inquiry to the balato fiasco. It never did conduct an investigation. In late 2001, the Senate Ethics Committee cleared Senator Rene Cayetano of the allegation that he had profited from the sale of stocks of BW Resources at a time when the Senate was already investigating the firm for alleged insider trading. Dante Tan, a crony of former president Joseph Estrada, headed BW Resources at the time. During Estrada’s impeachment trial, Cayetano himself admitted having invested in BW and having raked in profits of P60 to P70 million pesos. The Senate ethics Committee launched an investigation into Cayetano’s impropriety, but it eventually dropped it and cleared the Senator, purportedly because the Committee could not get Tan to appear and substantiate the allegation. These actions rendered Congress vulnerable to public condemnation as a so-called old boys’ club that will not punish or exact accountability from one of their own and as an enclave of the powerful who can ignore the law. The Blue Ribbon Committee Oversight power of the legislature is intended to ensure effective implementation of laws and enable Congress to adopt appropriate remedial measures should laws fail to address the needs and concerns they are intended to address. Oversight power embraces the power of investigation and the power of requiring department heads to appear before Congress and answer queries on matters concerning their departments through the conduct of the question hour. Legislative oversight, thus, can facilitate early discovery and institution of remedial measures against fraud, graft, corruption, inefficiency, and mismanagement. It guarantees that accountability in implementing policies of the government and or the use of public funds are observed as honestly and responsibly as expected from people who are tasked to implement the purposes of governance. The power of legislative investigation provided in Section 21, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines is inherent in the legislative power and an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function with its exercise coextensive with the range of legislative power. The purposes of congressional investigations are roughly classified into three categories: (i) those whose purpose is obtaining information bearing upon legislation; (ii) those that examine the operations of the executive and administrative branches with a view to determining their efficiency; and (iii) those that seek primarily to inform and mold public opinion (Rivera 1962). Its hearings, however, have been branded as inquisitorial, with committee members accused of playing up to the media and abusing their powers, rather than trying to get to the bottom of the issues. Public perception is that legislative investigations are conducted for purposes other than exacting from government officials and agencies concerned, accountability in the performance of their duties and in the use of public resources. Solons are seen as using investigations for grandstanding, to get back at those who earned their displeasure, or to wangle concessions, financial or otherwise, from parties subjected to investigation. And this public perception is not without “scientific” basis. Of the 991 resolutions filed in the 11th Congress seeking legislative inquiry, only 70 were reported out. This means that of the total number of investigations conducted, a mere 7% thereof were completed or resulted in specific findings relative to the subject of the inquiry. Of the 70 reports, 22 were archived, which means that Congress is not pursuing any legislative action on the matters investigated. These findings indicate that most legislative investigations do not result in concrete legislative action or policy recommendations on the concerns and issues investigated. Over the years, the Blue Ribbon Committee has shamed many public servants or private individuals whom it summoned to testify. Former Senator Rene Saguisag once said of the body: “The Constitution really authorizes investigation in aid of legislation. However, I have been the most vocal senator about the way we use, or misuse, this power. I’d have thought we would be more sparing in our use of it. And we would be more prepared when we summon people for questioning. But we seem to be merely badgering the people we invite.” And the perceived usurpation by the legislature of powers constitutionally vested in the executive or judiciary branches (through its oversight function) has resulted to the recent issuance of Executive Order 464 that forbids cabinet members and other officials under the Executive from appearing before Congress and testifying without the approval of the President. This has incensed Congress that claims the right to exercise “oversight” and claims that a necessary entailment of this right is the right to secure the compulsory attendance even of members of the Cabinet to answer questions of Congress. It is an issue the Philippine Supreme Court must still resolve whether or not under the present constitution and government mechanisms, Cabinet members can be summoned by Congress and made to respond to queries. Legislature and the National Purse Congress has at its disposal a number of tools with which to check on graft and corruption in the executive branch. An example is the budget process, which in theory gives lawmakers an opportunity to review how a particular government agency seeking approval for funding spent the previous year’s fund, and whether it deserves next year’s fund. In reality, however, lawmakers use the budget process for their own purposes. An example would be the Budget Law of 1989, in which lawmakers allowed the appropriation of funds for the vaguely worded “miscellaneous and extraordinary expenses” – a clear sign of their intention to breach their duty to observe fiscal accountability. Much of the decision – making that goes into crafting the national budget comes from Congress, specifically the House of Representatives where the President first submits his or her budget for approval. The Constitution states: “All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.” Although the final word on the budget belongs to the President, disagreements between Congress and the Chief Executive have not been difficult to iron out. Overtime, Congress has repeatedly displayed its immense powers over the national purse, especially the lawmakers’ power to allocate public funds for themselves. The PCIJ book Pork and Other Perks tells the story of the budget deliberations for the year 1998, when the country was reeling from the devastation caused by the 1997 financial crisis. Finance officials had proposed an austere budget that would enable government to save P1 billion. After passing through Congress, government ended up bracing for a deficit because the law-makers had given themselves an almost 200-percent increase in pork barrel funds. The power to make congressional insertions has allowed lawmakers to get away with such abuses. In 1996, news reports revealed how the House committee on appropriation, the committee in charge of budget deliberations, gave itself huge cuts from the budget labeled as Congressional Initiative Allocations, supposedly a fund intended for projects to benefit the lawmakers’ constituents. That year, the committee chairperson allocated P3 billion for himself. The Commission on Appointments Another tool that is misused by the legislature is its power to scrutinize and to approve or reject persons named by the President to key positions in government – a power that could have been used to guarantee accountability by people appointed in sensitive posts in the executive branch. This is done through the Commission on Appointments or CA, which is composed of 25 members – 13 from the Senate and 12 from the House of Representatives. It reviews the nominations of Cabinet appointees, as well as colonels and higher-ranking military officials, and the top brass of the Department of Foreign Affairs. During its confirmation hearings, the CA entertains objections and criticisms from the public of officials under scrutiny and then votes to either confirm or reject them. Presidential nominees, in ensuring proper accountability, are supposed to submit to the CA a variety of documents detailing, among others, their personal background, educational attainment, and statements of assets and liabilities. The CA’s Appointments Review and Investigation Division, or ARID, also prepares a report on the nominee for the CA members’ perusal. But a PCIJ investigation found that CA members hardly bother to read documents pertaining to a candidate and shows interest in a presidential nominee only when they need favors from him or her. The fate of a presidential nominee is usually determined, not by the Commission on Appointments itself, but by whoever is president, with the help of members of the ruling party in the CA.  LEGISLATING BEYOND THE WILL OF THE “LEGISLATURE” One other way in which accountability is lost in the legislative chambers is when the “final form” of bills is determined through conference committees to smooth out interchamber policy differences. The priorities of the two chambers generally differ as they tackle common legislative agenda. Different sets of measures from the common agenda are given priority by the Senate and the House. In many instances, instead of simply proposing amendments to house bills received, senators file their own counterpart bills, thus, further protracting the process. Gaining credit for the authorship of bills may be causing these maneuvers, especially when the bills at issue are popular and would generate substantial public impact and voter support. The Senate has also been exercising a virtual veto on many local bills (bills affecting specific localities or local interests only), as most of those transmitted to the Senate end up not being acted upon. Indeed, the Senate may approve or reject local bills, but it should officially act on every local bill transmitted to it, to enable proponents in the House to undertake remedial action, since the interests of local constituencies are at stake. Bicameral conference committees harmonize conflicting provisions of bills on the same subject matter approved by the Senate and the House. As in the Absentee Voting Bill, policy dissonances can be very pronounced. That compromises are eventually forged affirms the viability of conference committees as tools to smooth out interchamber policy differences. However, in many instances, conference committees introduce into the final version of a bill such provisions that were never contemplated or contained in the original bills. And most of the time this “final” version of the bill gets approved. Thus, conference committees have been tagged as virtual third chambers legislating beyond the will of the Senate and the House.