Lecture 3, Part 2 - Criminal Justice & Law PDF

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CleanestKoala2320

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Wayne State University

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criminal law constitutional law bill of rights fifth amendment

Summary

This lecture discusses criminal justice and law, focusing on the Bill of Rights and related case studies, such as Miranda v. Arizona and Gideon v. Wainwright. The lecture covers the Fifth Amendment's protections against self-incrimination and double jeopardy, the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel and a speedy trial, and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive bail and cruel and unusual punishment.

Full Transcript

SPEAKER 0 Greetings everyone. Today we are going to conclude our discussion on criminal justice and the law. I'm going to continue discussing the Bill of rights that most directly impact the criminal justice process that we're going to discuss the Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, Eighth Amendment,...

SPEAKER 0 Greetings everyone. Today we are going to conclude our discussion on criminal justice and the law. I'm going to continue discussing the Bill of rights that most directly impact the criminal justice process that we're going to discuss the Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and conclude with a very brief discussion, again highlighting the 14th amendment. So the Fifth Amendment of the United States reads, as no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when an actual service in time of war or public danger, nor shall any person be subject to the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be witness against himself, nor be deprived of my liberty or property without due process of law. Nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation. So the Fifth Amendment protects against quite a few things. Uh, as you just heard. Um, one of which is self-incrimination. So this means that in court, defendants do not have to testify against themselves. And I'm sure you've either heard or even said, um, yourself that you plead the fifth. This also extends to your right to remain silent when questioned by police, which was a precedent set by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v Arizona in 1966. The facts of this case are such, um. This case was actually a consolidation of four cases, and each of which the defendant confessed guilt after being subject to a variety of interrogation techniques without being informed of his Fifth Amendment rights during an interrogation. But specifically with regard to Miranda, on March 13th, 1963, he was arrested in his house and brought to the police station, where he was questioned by police officers in connection with the kidnaping and rape. After two hours of interrogation, the police obtained a written confession from Miranda. The written confession was admitted into evidence at trial, despite the objection of the defense attorney and the fact that the police officers admitted they had not advised Miranda of his right to have an attorney present during interrogation. So the jury found Miranda guilty and on appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed and held that Miranda's constitutional rights were not violated because he did not specifically request counsel. So the question before the court was, Does the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination extend to the police interrogation of a suspect? And in a fight for ruin for Miranda, the United States Supreme Court ruled that police must advise suspects of their right to remain silent and to obtain an attorney during interrogations while in custody. As you heard, the Fifth Amendment also protects against being tried for the same crime twice in the same jurisdiction. You refer to this as double jeopardy, so double jeopardy forbids the defendant from being tried again for the same crime. This does not, however, mean that someone cannot be tried at the state level and federal level, meaning someone can be tried at the state level, found not guilty, and then tried at the federal level. If a federal crime was in fact committed. An example of this would be the officers involved in the Rodney King beating. So all four officers involved in the Rodney King incident were charged with assault with a deadly weapon and excessive use of force by a police officer in Los Angeles County, California. Despite horrific video evidence captured by a bystander with a personal video camera, the officers were acquitted on all charges. They were all, however, charged in federal court for civil rights violations, and two of the four officers were found guilty of set charges. So because they were charged in two different levels of um jurisdiction, one being state, one being federal um. They were able to be tried twice, but they could not be tried again in the state court because they were acquitted on the charges initially. Uh, the Sixth Amendment of the um, Bill of rights is also highly important to criminal justice processing. The Sixth Amendment reads, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused still enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the state and district, wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations, to be confronted with the witnesses against him. To have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have assistance of counsel for his defense. Again, sixth amendment is packed with quite a few different, um, elements and protections that defendants might want to enjoy. So the right to counsel in federal cases was established in 1938, but in 1963, when Clarence Gideon was convicted of a felony breaking and entering in Florida, the precedent did not apply to cases originating in the state court. So hopefully you watched that brief documentary, um, on Gideon Wainwright and got a sense of the importance of his role in shaping, uh, defense counsel for indigent defendants subsequent to his appeal to the Supreme Court. Um, but in Gideon, you know, he was a poor four time felon. He had no more than an eighth grade education and certainly no legal training. Again, he was accused of breaking and entering and stealing coins from a jukebox and alcohol from a pool hall. He was convicted of that of those offenses and sentenced to five years in prison. Upon his conviction, he appealed to the United States Supreme Court. And again, if you listened or watched the the documentary, he said in layman's terms when he read the Sixth Amendment, um, he felt that he should have been, uh, provided counsel during his, his trial. And so, you know, the facts of the case, um, are as such. Uh, Clarence Earl Gideon was charged in Florida state court with a felony breaking and entering when he appeared in court without a lawyer getting requested that the court appoint one for him. According to the Florida state law, however, an attorney may only be appointed to an indigent defense. Pardon me. Indigent defendant in capital cases, so the trial court did not appoint one. Gideon represented himself in trial. He was found guilty and sentenced to five years in prison. Gideon filed a habeas corpus petition, uh, in the Florida Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court's decision violated his constitutional right to be represented by counsel. The Florida Supreme Court denied his, uh, habeas corpus relief. And so the question before the United States Supreme Court was, does the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal cases extend to felony defendants in state court? And in a unanimous decision for Gideon? The court ruled that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a right to assistance of counsel applies to criminal defendants in a state court by way of the 14th Amendment. The court held that it was consistent with the Constitution to require state courts to appoint attorneys for defendants who could not afford to retain counsel on their own. The court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of council is a fundamental and essential right, made obligatory upon the states by the 14th Amendment. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right to the assistance of counsel and all criminal prosecutions, and requires courts to provide counsel for defendants unable to hire counsel unless the right was completely and intelligibly waived. If someone can waive the right to counsel if they want to, but if they don't. The court is supposed to, um, provide counsel for them. So upon winning his Supreme Court challenge, Gideon was not immediately released. Instead, he was detained in a local jail and destined for it until a new trial. Upon retrial with representation, he was found not guilty. His case led to all defendants facing six months or more in jail, having the right to counsel even if they could not afford an attorney. At the time of Gideon, the Sixth Amendment only applied to federal cases. Although 37 states had adopted it. Um, 13 states had not, and Florida was one that had not. If you recall, in Florida, um, defendants in capital cases were provided counsel, meaning cases in which they could receive the death penalty. Um, subsequent to this, um, this ruling, over 5000 prisoners in Florida were affected. 5300 petitioners, um, petitioned for relief, were filed after Gideon, meaning people who had been sentenced to institutionalization but did not have representation. 5300 petitions were filed filed for relief. A thousand prisoners were released as a result. UNKNOWN Of this ruling. SPEAKER 0 The Sixth Amendment also guarantees a speedy and public trial, but not for all cases. So in 1996, the Supreme Court heard Louis versus the United States, in which Ray Lewis, a mail handler for the United States Postal Service, was observed opening several pieces of mail and pocketing the contents. Subsequently, Lewis was charged with two counts of obstructing the mail, where each charge carries a maximum authorized prison sentence of six months. Lewis requested a jury trial. Denying his denying his request, the magistrate judge ordered a bench trial, explaining that because she would not sentence him to more than six months imprisonment, he was not entitled to a jury trial. The district court affirmed, and affirming the Court of Appeals, noted that the Sixth Amendment jury trial, uh right, pertains only to those offenses for which the legislature has authorized a maximum penalty over six months imprisonment. The court continued that because each offense charge was petty and character. The fact that Lewis was facing more than six months imprisonment and the aggregate did not entitle him to a jury trial. The court also reasoned that because the offenses characterization as petty or serious determined the right to a jury trial, a trial judge's self-imposed limitation on sentencing could not deprive a defendant of that right. And so the question before the court is, does a defendant whom is prosecuted in a single proceeding for multiple petty offenses have a constitutional right to a jury trial, where the aggregate prison term authorized for the offenses exceeds six months, and then secondarily, may a defendant who would otherwise have a constitutional right to a jury trial be denied that right, because the presiding judge has made a pretrial commitment that the aggregate sentence imposed Impose will not exceed six months. And in A72 opinion for the United States, the court held that no jury trial right exists where a defendant is prosecuted for multiple petty offenses. Justice O'Connor wrote for the court that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to a jury trial does not extend to petty offenses, and its scope does not change where a defendant faces a potential aggregate prison term in excess of six months for the petty offenses charged. Because the court ruled that no jury trial right exists where a defendant is charged with multiple petty offenses. It did not reach the second question. So this right to a speedy and public trial by jury, um, does not pertain to all cases according to the United States Supreme Court. Perhaps you've seen this, uh, tragic, uh, documentary or read about the tragedy. Um, but the the guarantee for a speedy and public trial can also be complicated by the bail process. So kind of the underlying philosophy of the Sixth Amendment is it seeks to eliminate instances in which a defendant sits in jail, awaiting trial for extended periods of time. Right. Because we have to recognize that while waiting in jail for trial, that person is being punished. Um, it also, um, seeks to keep the proceedings above board, right in the public's view. So having a trial by jury, by one's peers, people on the jury keep things in order. But the Kalief Browder story highlights the shortcomings of the system and how prosecutors can actually manipulate the process. At age 16, he was arrested for allegedly stealing a backpack, but he always maintained his innocence even when offered plea deals that would have led to him being freed. He refused to admit to something that he did not do. His family was poor, so he could not afford to post bail. He spent roughly 1100 days in Rikers Island jail. Um, one of the most notorious, um, and worst jails in the country. So Rikers Island is an island off, uh, Manhattan in New York City. Uh, approximately 700 of those days were spent in solitary confinement. After three years of delays, his case was dismissed and he was released. So he was punished for three years for a crime that he was never convicted of. I think we should think about that. Two years after his release, he tragically took his life due to the trauma he endured and Rikers Island as a result of abuse from prisoners and guards, as well as the impact of solitary confinement. So shook by the story. Jay-Z produced the Netflix documentary on this tragic event, and it's well worth a watch if you haven't already seen it. Um goes into much more detail than the cursory overview that I just, um, provided you. But this idea of a right to a speedy, um, trial by jury. You know, I guess speedy is in the eye of the beholder. And again, the bail setting process can complicate these these these issues. Um, for sure. Um, the Sixth Amendment also guarantees a defendants case is heard by an impartial jury. Okay, so again, this only applies to defendants facing more than six months in jail or prison and does not apply to individuals facing multiple petty offenses. Um, but for those that are facing six months or more in jail or prison. Um, they have the right to trial by jury. Um, and for as an example of, you know, the understand the impartiality of juries. Um, it may not always, um, be considered by all to be impartial as an example for the Rodney King trial. The jury pool of 260 people included only a half dozen African Americans and five of those who had interest in serving on the jury. The attorney for one of the officers used a peremptory challenge to strike one, uh, of the black, one of the potential black jurors to make it to the jury box. So a peremptory challenge results in the exclusion of a potential juror without the need for the attorney to provide any reason. And, both the prosecution and the defense are only allotted so many peremptory challenges. So the jury ended up being composed of ten white jurors, one biracial male, one Latino, and one Asian American. And so thinking about, um, Rodney King being a black male, um, the idea that this jury, uh, resembled a jury of his peers is somewhat, um, hard to accept, given that the jury did not look like Mr. King. Doesn't mean they all have to look like him, but it should at least conform to the racial composition of the jurisdiction within which, um. The case is being tried. And that is not was not the case in this proceeding. I'm moving on to the Eighth Amendment. Um, the Eighth amendment reads excessive bail should not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. So I think when most people hear about the Eighth Amendment, they only think about cruel and unusual punishment. But it also prohibits excessive. So while bail is not guaranteed, if bail is warranted, it has to be set at a reasonable rate. What is reasonable, you might ask? Well, that's a good question. In 1951, in stack v Boyle, the United States Supreme Court said bail set before a trial at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill the purpose of assuring the presence of the defendant is excessive under the Eighth Amendment. That leaves a little bit of a murky test, if you will. Um, what does reasonably mean, um, in terms of evaluating that against the defendant's ability to pay? Um, but I think it's important to highlight that bail does not have to be unreasonably high to result in really bad outcomes. Kalief Browder his bail was set at $800 and he couldn't post it, uh, which resulted in him sitting in jail for three years prior to trial again, most of which was in solitary confinement, only for the prosecution to drop the case due to a lack of evidence. So most people would point to $800 and say, well, that doesn't seem unreasonable. Um, but for some people situations it may be unreasonable in the context of their ability to post bail. So bail doesn't have to be set at 10,000, or 50,000, or $100,000 for it to result in someone remaining behind bars until they are tried again. The eighth Amendment, um, prohibits against excessive fines. Um, again, fines can be imposed for criminal behavior, but the fines should be set at a reasonable rate. And again, this begs the question of what is reasonable. And again, we can look to the Supreme Court for some guidance on the issue. In 1997, the court heard, uh, United States versus Vatican, and in this case, during a routine check of departing international flight passengers. Customs officers discovered $357,144 on the person of the petitioner, in addition to charging him under 31 U.S.C. section 5316 of attempting to leave the United States with an unreported sum in excess of 10,000 cash. The government also sought forfeiture of the entire $357,144 under 18 U.S.C. section 982, providing that the deliberate violation of section 5316 shall result in forfeiture of any property involved in such offense after having its forfeiture claim rejected in both a District Court and in ninth court. Ninth Ninth Circuit Court um as excessively unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted the government certiorari, so the Supreme Court said, we're going to hear your case. And so the question before the the court was, is the forfeiture of the cash, uh, a sum involved in the offense of a failure to report property in the excess of $10,000 while attempting to leave the country, a violation of the Eighth Amendment's excessive fines clause. And so, have you ever traveled the country? And if you've ever been questioned, um, they'll usually ask you if you're carrying any cash in excess of $10,000. Right. In this case, the petitioner said no. Then they searched the petitioner for whatever reason and found that he did. And so in A54 um opinion, the court ruled that the government's ability to extract fines is limited by the excessive fines clause. The forfeiture of currency, when ordered for a violation of a reporting statute, is a punitive measure which constitutes a fine under the Eighth Amendment. Noting the importance of making punishments proportional to their crimes, the court reminded that currency transportation is generally permissible. The petitioner's failure to do so within statutory reporting guidelines was neither related to other illegal activity, nor did it result in a loss to the government. Therefore, the forfeiture of the entire sum would be grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense. Thus, the court is signaling that excessive is predicated on proportionality. So essentially the court is saying that yeah, the petitioner should have told the customs officer that he was leaving the country with that amount of money, but he didn't. But in failing to do so, he wasn't trying to commit any other crimes. And so taking the entire sum of the money was disproportionate to the criminal act that he engaged in, which was not reporting how much money was taken out of the country. So again, the court is signaling that excessive is predicated on proportionality. But then there's this. So I assume to some of you that this might seem like, uh, an excessive fine, you know, $500 a day for failing to cut your grass. Um, might seem a bit, uh, excessive to some. Interestingly, um, the, um, uh, petitioner here, uh, Mr. Ficken lost in state court and then appeal to the 11th Circuit in the United States Court of Appeals. And as you can see here, these are just some excerpts from the the transcript. You can read the whole thing. It's just it's only ten pages long if you follow that URL. But anyway, it says this appeal concerns whether James Pickens complaint about the process afforded to him by the city of, uh, Dunedin when it find him $500 a day for failing to mow his lawn, fails as a matter of law, and whether that fine was unconstitutionally excessive. And so the court goes on to note that the fine was not excessive. Um, and to determine whether a fine is grossly disproportionate, they noted, we consider whether the defendant falls into the class of persons at whom the criminal statute was principally directed, other penalties, um, authorized by the legislature, and the harm caused by the defendant Because Fishkin has asserted that his fame is grossly disproportional to the offense of repeatedly violating the overgrowth ordinance. We will apply the Speranza framework even though there is no criminal defendant and no criminal statute involved here. So it says the second factor is the most important. A fine that falls within the range authorized by the legislature enjoys a strong presumption of constitutionality. Fiction cannot overcome the strong presumption of constitutionality of his fine. Florida law permits a $500 a day fine for repeat violations of municipal ordinances. So fishing's fine is almost certainly not excessive. He is also within the class of persons regulated by the statute, because he is a repeat violator of the ordinance prohibiting grass exceeding ten inches testimony established that overgrown grass may draw snakes, rats and other vermin, and may affect property values and make property appear abandoned and even if under the final factor, repeatedly having overgrown grass is not particularly harmful, the fine is not excessive in light of the other two factors, and in conclusion, we affirm the summary judgment in favor of the city. So the court says, look, the guy, uh, failed to to cut his lawn, uh, seemingly not giving consideration to the context that he was out of town, um, dealing with family matters and that the person he hired to cut the grass, um, passed away. And so they said, yeah, no, this is this is completely, completely within within. Right. And so, again, I think it's important just because, um, we have a precedent that says something is should be a certain way, doesn't mean that it's always applied that way. And again. difficult nature of studying criminal justice is that people's perceptions of topics vary wildly. So some people in here might not have an issue with this ruling, while others may look at this and say, wow, that seems a little bit disproportionate. $30,000 for failing to cut your grass. Um, seems like a pretty hefty, hefty fine. Others in here might say no, it's completely normal. Um, the Eighth Amendment also prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. So this concept is not, uh, necessarily easily defined. But in trope versus Dulles in 1957, the court signaled what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. So the facts of this case are as such. In 1944, United States Army Private Albert Tropp escaped from a military stockade at Casablanca, Morocco following his confinement for a disciplinary violation a day letter later, he willingly surrendered to an army truck headed back to Casablanca. Despite testifying that he decided to return to the stockade when he was picked up, a general court martial convicted him of desertion, and sentenced him to three years at hard labor, loss of all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge. In 1952, he applied for a passport. His application was denied under section 401 G of the amended 1940 Nationality Act, on the ground that he lost his citizenship due to his conviction and dishonorable discharge for wartime desertion. After failing to obtain a declaration declaratory judgment that he was a U.S. citizen from both a district and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals trope appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which granted society. So the question before the court was, did section 401 of the amended 1940 Nationality Act allow for an unconstitutional punishment by authorizing the expatriation of a citizen convicted of wartime desertion? And in A54 ruling in favor of trope, the court noted that after finding section 401, G of the amended act was penal in nature since it punished convicted deserters with naturalization. The court held that expatriation was barred by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual penal remedy. Citizenship, the court stated, is not a license that expires upon misbehavior. Rather, it can only be voluntarily renounced by express language and or conduct. Since Trump did not involve himself in any way with a foreign state, so as to demonstrate disloyalty to the United States. His court martial conviction of desertion did not justify his expatriation. So I said yes, this was cruel and unusual punishment. And Chief Warren went on to lay out a test for cruel and unusual punishment in this case, and noted punishments may be declared unconstitutional for either being disproportionate to the offense, or comparable to a form of torture through the infliction of physical or psychological pain. So again, we see this idea of disproportionality popping up or fines disproportional to the offense. Is bail disproportionate to excuse me, the offense is, um, the punishment disproportionate to the offense. Um, the Supreme Court has weighed in on whether conditions of confinement, um can be, um, cruel and unusual as well. Um, determining whether they fall under the Eighth Amendment purview. And so in 2011, in Brown versus Platt, the court, um, heard a case involving overcrowding. And so the prison law office in Berkeley, California, filed a class action lawsuit in April 2001 on behalf of the petitioners, petitioners and other prisoners, alleging that California prisons were in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, which bans cruel and unusual punishment. Following a lengthy trial, a special panel of three federal judges determined that serious overcrowding in California's 33 prisons was the primary cause for violations of the Eighth Amendment. The court ordered the release of enough prisoners so that the inmate population would come within 137.5% of the prisoners total design capacity. Pardon me. Of the prison's total design capacity, that amounts to between 38,000 and 46,000 inmates being released. And so the question before the court was, does the court ordering requiring California to reduce its prison population to remedy unconstitutional conditions in its correctional facilities, violate the Prison Litigation Reform Act? And in A54 decision, the court affirmed the decision of the special panel. The majority wrote the court mandated population limit is necessary to remedy the violation of prisoners constitutional rights and is authorized by the PL, r A, or the Prisoner Prison Litigation Reform Act. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, in which he admonished the majority for affirming what is perhaps the most radical injunction issued by a court in our nation's history an order requiring California to release the staggering number of 46,000 convicted criminals. Justice Samuel Alito filed a separate dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, in which he wrote that the Constitution does not give federal judges the authority to run state penal systems, so clearly there was a lack of consensus on this. This case is represented by the five four decision. But I think the important thing to to note here is that conditions of confinement can be and are considered cruel and unusual, depending on the circumstances. And so if we look at the the image on the right hand side here, we see the gymnasium in San Quentin State Prison, which is in California in 2007 that was filled with nearly 400 double bunk beds where inmates were living. And so you think about a gymnasium that's supposed to provide a space for people to have exercise and perhaps decompress as best they can in those conditions, is now housing nearly 800 additional inmates. It's situations like this that, um, have led to, uh, many different conditions of confinement being challenged under the Eighth Amendment. And overcrowding is just just one of them. So as we conclude, um, I want you to think about what, you know, the equal protection clause from the 14th amendment, uh, should mean and whether it's offered. Okay, so remember, the 14th amendment was passed in 1868. It was supposed to provide equal protection under the law to all. Yet we know minorities experienced a law differently than whites. Rich experience the law differently than poor. And men oftentimes experience the law differently than women. And I'll point to two recent cases. Um, both of these cases are disgusting, and both of the rapists should have received much stiffer penalties. Um, but if you're not familiar with, uh, with these cases, on the left hand side, we have Cori Baity, um, Vanderbilt, Vanderbilt University football player. Vanderbilt is in, um, Nashville, Tennessee. Vanderbilt is, uh, a very strong private university. It's often referred to as the Harvard of the South, who engaged in a rape of a young woman. On the right hand side, we have, uh, Brock Turner, who was a Stanford student at the time. Stanford is Palo Alto, California, also a very exclusive school, Strong school. And Brock Turner, also, um, Was involved in the rape of a young woman. Yet Corey was sentenced to 15 years in prison for his involvement, and Brock Turner was sentenced to six months in jail for his involvement. And as you if you're not familiar with these cases, if you, you know, read about them, which I encourage you to do. Um, don't engage in mental gymnastics to try to justify the differences in punishment handed down. You know, don't brush it off as the events took place in different jurisdictions. So one was in Tennessee. Obviously, one was in California. Um, don't brush it off as Brock engaged in this, uh, act alone, whereas Cory did not. Don't brush it off, as prosecutors had, uh, available differences and available evidence. Also don't brush it off as only concerning equality for. The two villains in the case. What about the justice for the victims? How does the system provide equal justice for victims in cases like this? On one hand, the victim perpetrator received 15 years, on the other, the victims perpetrator receive six months. Um, and so what does equality mean? And question whether or not the current system provides equal protection to victims, to defendants currently. It's also interesting, if you look at this, how the two perpetrators are depicted in their news stories. Um, clearly Brock Turner is in, um, coat and tie, whereas Corey Beatty is depicted in a prison or jail jumpsuit. Right. Just little differences that we see in how people are portrayed, uh, and who are involved in criminality are portrayed, can really influence how people perceive them. Right. And their level of culpability and their level, um, of remorse, things of that nature. So that concludes our discussion on criminal justice and the rule of law. As always, if you have any questions or comments, feel free to post an announcement or something in the discussion board in canvas or email me.

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