IPIR Griffiths PDF

Introduction This book is an introduction to the diverse worldviews that underpin contemporary Inter- national Relations (IR) theory. In this chapter, I explore both the reasons for such diversity and two responses to it. The first response, conquest, opposes diversity and seeks to priv- ilege one p...

Introduction This book is an introduction to the diverse worldviews that underpin contemporary Inter- national Relations (IR) theory. In this chapter, I explore both the reasons for such diversity and two responses to it. The first response, conquest, opposes diversity and seeks to priv- ilege one particular worldview. The second response, coexistence, is one that finds no good reason to privilege a particular worldview, and attributes a positive value to diversity and pluralism. The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I distinguish between two dimensions of a worldview and between worldviews and theories. Second, I provide a brief histor- ical overview to account for the proliferation of worldviews in the field and the lack of consensus regarding the appropriate criteria for comparing and evaluating the merits of competing worldviews. Finally, I set out the main arguments associated with conquest and coexistence between competing worldviews. Worldviews and theories in IR A worldview is a broad interpretation of the world and an application of this view to the way in which we judge and evaluate activities and structures that shape the world. ‘In simpler terms, our worldview is a view of the world and a view for the world’ (Phillips and Brown 1991: 29). Worldviews have two interdependent dimensions. The first dimension is ontological. Worldviews contain fundamental assumptions and presuppositions about the constitutive nature of IR. Such assumptions or beliefs are our most fundamental thoughts about the nature of ‘reality’ in this particular domain or field of activity. As Dessler (1989: 445) points out, ‘an ontology is a structured set of entities. It consists not only of certain designated kinds of things but also of connections or relations between them.’ Worldviews do not reflect the world. Rather, they re-present it, not only constraining our vision but also enabling us to develop a language of concepts and terms that in turn make it possible to talk intelligibly about IR. As Gunnell (1987: 34) argues, worldviews ‘are not instruments for understanding given objects. To describe, explain, or evaluate something is to appeal, at least implicitly, to an articulation of what kind of thing it is’. The second dimension of worldviews is evaluative, providing the basis for judging and prescribing institutional arrangements and principles of conduct with regard to or within the para- meters of IR. The importance of the distinction, and the relationship between ontology and advocacy, has been noted by the philosopher Taylor (1971: 160) in the context of political Worldviews and IR theory 9 or Canada or the United States. Modernity, among other things, is an ethos of reason and a belief in the growth of reason to control our environment so that it fulfills human purposes and contributes to the sum of our collective well-being. Suffering, of course, does not correlate with territorial boundaries, but the political capacity to respond to it usually does. Our cosmopolitan moral sentiments are constantly frustrated by our particularistic political identity as citizens and as nationalists. We enjoy the fruits of political community as rights-bearing citizens within the state. In contrast, our obligations to humanity are thin (Walzer 1994), a pale reflection of natural law. Within the form of the state, historical progress is conceived along a temporal dimension, whereas the arbitrary spatial division of IR guarantees some degree of power politics among states. Within the state, the universal rights of citizenship are, in principle, available to ‘all’, yet that same universality depends crucially on the ability of the state to exclude outsiders (Walker 1993). And so it goes, on and on. This is our existential and historical condition, and the fate of the territorial state is central to that condition. In the final three chapters of the book, therefore, we descend from some of the lofty heights of IR theory explored in the first ten chapters, and consider the centrality of the state from three angles, state-making, states, and economic globalization, and the role of the state in contemporary normative IR theory. A central theme that emerges from these three chapters is the increasing ‘disaggregation’ of the state form in IR (Sørensen 2004), and how that transformation exacerbates the existential tragedy of IR. While students of IR have always recognized a hierarchy of state formations, their contemporary manifestation is bewildering in its complexity and lack of susceptibility to purposive guidance. The student of IR theory is thus confronted with a dual task, to assess the adequacy of each worldview to shed light on the ontological tragedy of the enduring human condition, and to assess its prescriptive or evaluative dimension in light of the changing state of the state. Conclusion Worldviews are necessary. They frame the domain of IR and provide the conceptual language and fundamental assumptions (both ontological and evaluative) on the basis of which specific phenomena and patterned relationships are explained via theory. Contem- porary IR theory exhibits a wide variety of competing worldviews. To be sure, they are not all mutually exclusive. Productive conversations can take, and have taken, place between realists and liberals over the dynamics of cooperation among states and the conditions for regime maintenance in a variety of issue areas. Critical theory emerged from Marxism. Whilst it is presented here as a distinctive worldview, feminism is a multidimensional worldview in which liberals, radicals, and poststructuralists engage in dialogue with one another. Similarly, there is much overlap between Marxism, critical theory, and postco- lonialism. ‘The English School’ is distinctive in that its members explicitly recognize a legitimate plurality of ‘traditions of international thought’. It is not difficult to find further areas of actual and potential overlap. Nonetheless, as I have argued in this introductory chapter, neither conquest nor complete convergence between worldviews is likely in the foreseeable future. IR theory in the twenty-first century is therefore inextricably pluralistic. This situation is a cause neither for alarm nor for celebration in the name of diversity for the sake of it. I have suggested that a worldview on worldviews, or perspective on perspectives, is necessary in order to assess the merits of alternative worldviews. An appropriate starting point, I believe, is to recognize IR as an extreme manifestation of human tragedy. The 10 Martin Griffiths question then becomes, to what extent does each worldview provide us with important insights into the dynamics of tragedy and empower us, if not to overcome it, at least to ameliorate its effects? This book is an introduction to the diverse ways in which IR theory can assist ‘us’ in answering this central question.