Inter-Korea Conflict (Unresolved) PDF

Inter-Korea Con ict (Unresolved) Behavior Decisions fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fl fi fi The frst signifcant decision in this Northeast Asia combined civil war and interstate con ct for mastery of the Korean Peninsula was the 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 271 launching of the Korea...

Inter-Korea Con ict (Unresolved) Behavior Decisions fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fl fi fi The frst signifcant decision in this Northeast Asia combined civil war and interstate con ct for mastery of the Korean Peninsula was the 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 271 launching of the Korean War by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) [North Korea] on June 25, 1950. The war, in which a very large contingent of People’s Republic of China (PRC) ‘Volunteers’ later fought alongside North Korea, and the USA served as the main actively engaged ally of the Republic of Korea (ROK) (South Korea), ended in July 1953. Both Koreas, supported by their principal patrons, decided to end the fghting via an armistice that has been sustained and largely respected by the two Koreas for 64 years, though the DPRK verbally renounced the armistice on several occasions, most recently in March 2013. North Korea: Decisions and Decision-Makers The DPRK made several major decisions following the end of the Korean War. Its most important post-war strategic decision was a general policy change, not a choice on a specifc con ct issue: in the mid-1960s, North Korea decided to shift the emphasis in the allocation of its national resources from economic development to defense, a policy change with profound consequences for its foreign policy, economic development, and the Inter-Korea con ct, because it remained in effect until recently. The next two North Korea major decisions related to the highly controversial issue of nuclear weapons, with implications for the persistence of both the Inter-Korea and North Korean Nuclear interstate con cts. One decision occurred early in the Inter-Korea con ct: the DPRK decided in 1959 to launch a nuclear weapons program by signing a nuclear cooperation treaty with the USSR, following the USA–South Korea decision to introduce nuclear weapons into the Korean Peninsula in 1957. The other major decision by North Korea on nuclear weapons occurred 36 years later: in 1993, it declared that it was withdrawing from the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, which it had signed largely under Soviet pressure. This decision was a catalyst to the unresolved North Korean Nuclear con ct but it was also an important con ctsustaining act in the InterKorea Con ct. In sum, North Korea’s behavior toward its South Korea adversary and rival since their formation as independent states in 1948, largely at the behest of their patrons, the USSR and the USA, refected a general, though not often proclaimed, decision to manifest hostility to, and mistrust of, its South Korea rival, though not without brief periods of cooperation in the shared goal of a re-united Korean Peninsula. The principal North Korean decision-makers throughout this protracted con ct were the three members of the politically dominant 272 M. BRECHER family in the DPRK: Kim Il Sung, the founder and frst ruler of this Communist state, 1948–1994; his son and successor, Kim Jong Il, 1994–2011, and his son, Kim Jong-un, the leader since 2011. Each had a small coterie of advisers, but only the frst of the three Kim rulers was known to have rivals within the Korea Workers Party until the late 1960s. While their formal authority derived from their multiple roles as the central fgure in all the key state institutions, the ruling Party, the military establishment, and the governmental regime, their power fowed, and continues, from an institutionalized three-generation family dynastic system of succession. North Korea: Decision Process Like most authoritarian, as well as democratic regimes, the governmental structure of North Korea comprises an executive branch headed by the President of the DPRK, a legislature, the Supreme People’s Assembly, and a judiciary. However, power is concentrated in the ruling Workers Party of Korea (WPK) and, within it, the Politburo, as was the case in all ruling Communist parties. Ultimately, power has resided in the Supreme Leader, as enshrined in the DPRK 1972 constitution. Although little is known of its actual decision-making process, it is generally assumed that Kim Il Sung, his son, Kim Jong Il and, currently, his grandson, Kim Jong-un, is the supreme decision-maker on all important issues of public policy. Formally, this is legitimized by the Supreme Leader’s multiple offcial roles: president of the DPRK, chairman of the People’s National Assembly, First Secretary of the WPK Central Committee and Politburo, head fi fi fi fi fi of the Central Military Commission, etc. There are consultations with other Party leaders, military commanders, and technical specialists, including Foreign Ministry offcials; but substantive decisions on all aspects of inter-Korea relations, as in all major policy issues, are made by the incumbent Supreme Leader. South Korea: Decisions and Decision-Makers Like the DPRK, the ROK made many strategic decisions relating to their con ct, some of great importance. The frst was the decision of its frst President, Syngman Rhee, on the day of North Korea’s attack, June 25, 1950, to seek instant USA military aid, both American forces and weapons. The response was immediate, in the form of a USA-led UN Command, with a predominance of American troops and, over time, the contribution of military aid by many states. The ROK decision and the 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 273 USA response escalated during the next three years, generating an alliance between the two states that has been a crucial element in the power confguration of East Asia during the past six decades. The next strategic South Korea decision, also made by President Rhee (1948–1961), was to accept President Eisenhower’s recommendation to introduce USA-controlled nuclear weapons into South Korea, even though such an act violated a provision of the Korean War Armistice Agreement that prohibited the dispatch of new arms into the Korean Peninsula. The nuclear weapons were dispatched in January 1958 and remained in South Korea until 1991, long before the frst DPRK nuclear test in 2006. (In light of the successful DPRK third nuclear test in February 2013 and further tests in 2014–2017, there has been a modest revival of South Korea interest in the re-acquisition of nuclear weapons to offset North Korea’s impressive achievements in nuclear weapons technology.) A third major decision by South Korea, with profound consequences for the DPRK/ROK rivalry and con ct, occurred soon after the ouster of President Rhee in a 1961 coup that brought General Park Chung Hee to power: the decision was to concentrate South Korea’s material resources on economic development, especially industrialization, the opposite of North Korea’s policy decision later in the 1960s to shift resources from economic development to national security. Among the consequences of this dual policy shift has been South Korea’s impressive economic growth, achieving the status of a world-class economy, while North Korea became increasingly dependent on economic aid from China while vastly increasing its military power. A notable consequence for the inter-Korea con ct was an increasingly active debate in South Korea on the wisdom of persisting with the long-established governmental concentration on economic development, captured by the motto of South Korea’s long-serving second president, Park Chung Hee, ‘economic construction frst, reunifcation later.’ The growing evidence of North Korea’s burgeoning nuclear weapons capability by 2017 reinforced this debate in South Korea, but without any decision. Nonetheless, there were several attempts by South Korean political leaders to initiate a dialogue with North Korea on reunifcation, in 1972, 1992, 2000, and 2007. The most notable was South Korea’s President Kim Dae Jung’s policy initiative, the ‘Sunshine Policy.’ His decision—to reach out to Kim Jong Il, then the DPRK Supreme Leader, in 1998—was the tangible expression of a general policy decision by South Korea’s president, to change South Korea’s long-established ‘hard line’ of persistent con ct to a ‘softer 274 M. BRECHER line’ of cooperation and persuasion. It had limited success: summit meetings between the two Koreas in June 2000 and October 2007, along with modest cross-border trade, a small number of family reunifcations, and the opening of a tourist area in the southern part of North Korea. The ROK initiative ended abruptly in 2008, with the election of President Lee Myungbak, who restored the long-standing hardline prior to Kim Dae Jung’s “Sunshine Policy.” A reversion to the softer line was announced by the newly elected President of South Korea, Moon Jae-in, in 2017. South Korea: Decision Process The ROK [South Korea] political structure and its decision process were more complex than its counterparts in the DPRK [North Korea]. Three phases are evident in the changing character of South Korea’s political system: Phase I, civil authoritarian rule, First and Second Republics (1948–1961); Phase II, Military rule (1961–1987); Phase III, Westernstyle democracy since 1987. Syngman Rhee, who dominated the frst phase as President of the Republic of Korea (ROK) , was a domineering religious-political leader who was actively engaged in foreign policy decision-making, including all issues relating to the inter-Korea con ct. No other ROK politician in that phase could rival or effectively challenge Rhee’s control of fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fl fi fi decision-making on issues in which he had defnite views. During the second phase, Park Chung Hee was the pre-eminent leader, no less authoritarian than Rhee, but more inclined to seek expert advice. The Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) and the Korean National Security Council (KNSC), both organizations modeled on their USA counterparts, were infuential in the decision-making process on all foreign policy and Inter-Korean issues. Phase III witnessed a broadening of the decision-making group and process, with the bureaucracy, interest groups, the media and public opinion often active participants in shaping decisions on a wide range of issues, including those relating to, and impinging on, the Inter-Korean con ct. In sum, economic development, modernization, and urbanization transformed South Korea’s economy, society, and political system in the 1990s and beyond, changing the decision process from a narrow, individual ruler-based process to a much broader, typical Western democratic political process. However, on major issues, among them, relations with the DPRK and the InterKorea con ct, the infuence of an activist president has remained signifcant, as evident in the ‘Sunshine Policy’ initiative of President Kim 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 275 Dae Jung (1998–2003), continued by his successor, Roh Moo-Hyun (2004–2008), and the reversal of that policy by President Lee Myungbak (2008–2013), in turn reversed by Moon Jae-in (2017). InterKorea Con ct: Con ct-Sustaining Acts Political Hostility This was the most frequent type of con ct-sustaining acts in the inter-Korea con ct. They began very soon after the independence of the two Korean states, the Republic of Korea (ROK), South Korea, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), North Korea, in 1948. The ROK, under its long-time authoritarian, anti-Communist president, Syngman Rhee (August 1948–April 1960), denied recognition to North Korea (the DPRK) and, with USA support, secured UN recognition of the ROK as the sole Korea state. From November 1949 until June 1950, there were frequent ROK (President Rhee) statements of its intention to invade North Korea. Since the end of the Korean War (1953), the ROK refused formal relations with the DPRK and, in October 1953, it signed a Mutual Defense treaty with the USA, clearly aimed at North Korea. In 1968, during the North Korea/ USA crisis created by the DPRK naval capture of the USS Pueblo, Rhee’s successor-president, General Park Chung Hee, reiterated the ROK’s longstanding commitment to unilateral military acts to overthrow the DPRK regime. From 1976 to 1992, and resumed after a 1-year suspension, the ROK engaged in an annual, high-pro e, non-violent military act that contributed much to sustaining the inter-Korea con ct, the (often large-scale) joint ‘Team Spirit’ military exercise with USA forces stationed in South Korea. This ROK con ct-sustaining policy toward its North Korea Communist neighbor continued, with varying intensity of politically hostile statements, until 1998. A decade of ‘Sunshine Policy’ (1998– 2008), introduced by President Kim Dae Jung (1998–2003) and continued by his successor, Roh Moo-Hyun (2003–2008), aimed at peaceful reconciliation with the DPRK. This accommodation policy was reversed by President Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013). The DPRK reciprocated the ROK’s (South Korea’s) politically hostile acts, beginning with the assertion of its sole legitimacy as the custodian of Korea statehood, in 1948 and during the next 68 years. Like the ROK, it secured great power patrons, but somewhat later— Mutual Assistance treaties with the USSR and Mainland China (PRC) in 1961. In 1962, North Korea (DPRK) publicly abandoned the goal 276 M. BRECHER of peaceful unifcation with South Korea and reverted to violence as the DPRK preferred strategy to achieve Korean unity. Its long-time leader, Kim Il Sung, frequently contributed con ct-sustaining acts by proclaiming that revolutionary forces in both Koreas would achieve unifcation, without excluding the resort to violence. During the ‘Poplar Tree’ crisis with the USA in 1976, he termed war inevitable and placed DPRK armed forces on high alert. Moreover, North Korea frequently attempted to incite anti-government uprisings in South Korea. Long before the ROK’s ‘Sunshine Policy,’ it rejected South Korea’s proposals for summit meetings to pursue the goal of peaceful unifcation, to which both Koreas paid lip service. During the decade of ‘Sunshine Policy’ (1998–2008), a summit meeting of the leaders of the two Koreas was held in Pyongyang, the DPRK capital, in 2000, and economic aid from the much richer and economically developed South Korea to North Korea visibly increased. However, the accommodation was short-lived. Lee Myung-bak became the ROK president in 2008 and reversed the ‘Sunshine Policy’ of his two fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi predecessors. In 2009, the DPRK conducted its second nuclear test (the frst was in 2006). Two North Korearelated military incidents in 2010, the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel, with 46 casualties, and artillery fre on a South Korean island near North Korea’s coast, contributed to the reescalation of the hostile environment in the Inter-Korea con ct. As noted above, the election of a conciliatory president in South Korea indicated a return to the ‘Sunshine Policy’, vis-a-vis North Korea. Violence—This dominated the con ct-sustaining activity in the early years of the InterKorea con ct, with enormous casualties by all of the participants in the 1950–1953 Korean War: According to the data from the US Department of Defense, the United States suffered 33,686 battle deaths, along with 2830 non-battle deaths during the Korean War and 8176 missing in action. Western sources estimate the PVA (PRC) had suffered between 100,000 to 1,500,000 deaths (most estimate some 400,000 killed); while the KPA (DPRK) had suffered between 214,000 and 520,000 deaths (most estimate some 500,000). Between some 245,000 to 415,000 South Korean civilian deaths were also suggested, and the entire civilian casualties during the war were estimated from 1,500,000 to 3,000,000 (most sources estimate some 2,000,000 killed). Data from offcial Chinese sources, on the other hand, reported that the PVA had suffered 114,000 battle deaths, 34,000 nonbattle deaths, 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 277 340,000 wounded, 7600 missing and 21,400 captured during the war. Among those captured, about 14,000 defected to Taiwan, while the other 7110 were repatriated to China. Chinese sources also reported that North Korea had suffered 290,000 casualties, 90,000 captured, and a “large” number of civilian deaths. In return, the Chinese and North Koreans estimated that about 390,000 soldiers from the United States, 660,000 soldiers from South Korea, and 29,000 other UN soldiers were “eliminated” from the battlefeld. (Reported from multiple offcial sources by Wikipedia) There were no other full-scale wars in the Korean Peninsula during this lengthy unresolved protracted con ct. Rather, frequent incidents of low intensity and short duration were the norm since 1953, for example, the attempted DPRK assassination of ROK President Park Chung Hee, modeled on January 21, 1968, the shooting-down of a USA reconnaissance plane in 1969 (EC-121 crisis), the axe-murder of two USA soldiers in 1976 (the Poplar Tree Crisis), and the 2010 DPRK fring on a ROK military installation near its border, noted earlier. The exception was the sinking of a ROK warship in 2010, with the death of 46 ROK sailors, but the immense human losses and material damage of the Korean War remained a profound memory and infuence for the peoples of the two Koreas for a very long period. Verbal Hostility—As in the unresolved North Korean Nuclear con ct, the two principal adversaries in this closely related con ct between the two Koreas engaged in a frequent and, often, intense exchange of hostile invective during almost all of the Inter-Korea con ct as well—anticommunism, on the part of the ROK, anti-capitalism and the ROK alliance with the USA, on the part of the DPRK. Propaganda from both sides was shrill, harsh, and condemnatory of ‘the other,’ each blaming its adversary for all of the failures to achieve a genuine accommodation and to facilitate the shared goal of unifcation of the Korean peninsula, along with intense hostility to the ideology and the economic and political systems of its irreconcilable enemy. However, notwithstanding the frequency and intensity of the verbal diatribes, the impact of an array of verbal hostility acts, while undoubtedly sustaining the con ct, was less infuential than acts of political hostility and the traumatic memory of the Korean War. The latter intensifed the consciousness of the havoc that would be wreaked by another Korean War, with the DPRK in possession 278 M. BRECHER of a growing stockpile of nuclear weapons, and both adversaries confronting an existential threat, with diffcult-to-imagine consequences. Economic Discrimination —In the absence of substantive inter-Korean economic relations during most of this Korean con ct, the scope for con ct-sustaining acts was very limited. It was non-existent as a technique for the DPRK to cause, or threaten to cause, economic damage to the ROK. However, the reverse fow, that is, the ability of the ROK to sustain—or reduce the intensity of—their Con ct with the DPRK was very considerable. On some crucial occasions, it did facilitate the temporary accommodation process between the two Koreas by meaningful economic gestures. A notable illustration was South Korea’s offer to construct low-enrichment nuclear reactors that would provide North Korea with vitally needed electricity that would enable it to suspend its rapidly expanding nuclear enrichment fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi program that was causing consternation for the USA and other Western states, as well as the ROK, thereby contributing to a rare agreement between the DPRK and its primary enemies, the USA and the ROK—the 1994 Agreed Framework (AF). Another notable example of economic cooperation as a means of achieving con ct reduction has been the ROK provision of food aid during periods of near or actual famine in North Korea. Still another illustration was the fow of ROK economic assistance to the DPRK during the decade of the former’s ‘Sunshine Policy’ (1998–2008). And fnally, the creation of a very large economic cooperation zone at the border between the two Koreas, facilitating employment for a large number of North Koreans, has assisted the tension reduction process. By contrast, an implied threat by the South Korea president to suspend the fow of food and to close the border economic zone at the height of the 2010 crisis over the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel with heavy loss of life, though not implemented, proved to be a sharp con ct-sustaining act in the economic domain. However, this type of con ct-sustaining acts has been the least important of the four techniques available to the Inter-Korea adversaries. Inter-Korea: Con ct Management and Attempts at Con ct Resolution Korean War There have been many attempts to manage and resolve this Northeast Asia protracted con ct since its onset in 1948, when the two states in 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 279 the Korean Peninsula, the DPRK, North Korea, and the ROK, South Korea, were created by agreement between the USA and the USSR. The frst major effort at con ct management took the form of a cease-fre and armistice negotiations and agreements, and battlefeld outcomes, during the three lengthy phases of the Korean War (1950–1953), leading to temporary reductions of violence and, ultimately, virtual elimination of major violence between the two Koreas during the past 6 decades. Korean War, Phase I (June 25–September 30, 1950): There were four con ct actors during this phase, the two Koreas (principal adversaries), the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the United States. The war began on June 25, when large-scale North Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel, the unoffcial border between the two Koreas since 1948. By the end of September, UN forces, commanded by USA General Macarthur, restored control of South Korea south of the 38th Parallel to the ROK government. Korean War, Phase II (September 30, 1950–July 10, 1951): There were fve con ct actors in this phase, the two Koreas, the PRC, the USA, and the USSR. This phase began with the crossing of the 38th Parallel by South Korea and USA forces. By June 1951, the battlefeld stabilized around the 38th Parallel, and a cease-fre and armistice negotiations began on July 10. Korean War, Phase III (April 16–July 27, 1953): There were four con ct actors in the third and last phase of the Korean War—the two Koreas, the PRC and the USA. This phase began with a new offensive by PRC-North Korean forces, in the midst of discussions about a cease-fre taking place at Panmunjom, in the Demilitarized Zone. An Armistice Agreement was signed on July 27, 1953, terminating the Korean War. That Agreement, despite frequent violations over the decades, continues to defne the formal legal status of relations between North and South Korea 64 years later. Inter-Korea Con ct: Further Attempts at Con ct Management and Con ct Resolution Many of the efforts to manage and resolve the Inter-Korea con ct since the end of the Korean War were initiated in bilateral negotiations 280 M. BRECHER by the two Koreas. Among the agreements between the two principal adversaries in this protracted con ct, some oral, others followed by cooperative behavior, six merit attention for their promise and outcome: their July 4 Joint Communiqué, 1972–1973; their Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation, 1991–1993; their Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 1992–1993; their Summit Meeting and June 15 Joint Declaration, 2000; their Summit Meeting and October 4 North-South Declaration, 2007; and South Korea’s ‘Sunshine Policy,’ 1998–2008. 1972 Joint Communiqué—Talks by the dominant Korean leaders in 1971, Kim Il Sung (DPRK) and Park Chung Hee (ROK), who rarely met face-to-face and reportedly loathed each other, led to their Joint Communiqué on July 4, 1972. This formalized their verbal agreement on three principles designed to achieve their goals—peaceful unifcation, tension reduction, and reconciliation of their different ideologies and political systems. The guiding principles were as follows: independent achievement of unifcation, without any foreign involvement or constraints; its attainment by peaceful means; and the shared objective of national unity as one people. However, this attempt at con ct resolution, like fi fi fi all its successors, was aborted: North Korea withdrew from the follow-up negotiations on August 23, 1973, apparently because the two leaders held different interpretations of the Communiqué’s three principles and were unwilling to make commitments to their implementation (Chang 1996, 246–247). 1991–1992 North-South Korea Basic Agreement—The prelude to this agreement was a declaration by South Korean President Roh Tae Woo in July 1988, at the beginning of South Korea’s transition from an authoritarian to a democratic political system: he enunciated a more specifc six-point Korean unifcation policy than the 1972 Communiqué which, after extensive negotiations, became the core of the Basic Agreement. Signed on December 13, 1991, with effect from February 19, 1992, this agreement re-affrmed the three principles set out in the 1972 Joint Communiqué; declared the intent of the two Koreas to end political and military confrontation and attain national reconciliation; agreed to reject armed aggression, to reduce tensions between them and to establish peace; and renewed their oft-stated commitment to the re-unifcation of families separated by the Korean War, and the 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 281 promotion of common interests and the prosperity of the Korean people. Implementation of the Basic Agreement began but faltered and later failed, for several reasons. One was the revival of the annual South Korea–USA “Team Spirit” military exercises, always anathema to North Korea’s leadership. Another reason was its timing: implementation of the Basic Agreement became enmeshed with the frst North Korea Nuclear Crisis in 1993–1994, when the DPRK declared its intent to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The third and most basic obstacle was the starkly different DPRK and ROK ideologies and their divergent conceptions of a desired outcome: for South Korea, the goals were a single and complete re-unifed Korean state, with a democratic political system and a market economy; for North Korea, the objectives were a lower-stage federation of the two Korean states, in which the DPRK would retain its Communist political system and command economy. Thus, like most verbal agreements between the two Koreas, the ambitious Basic Agreement was aborted. 1992–1993 Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula—Issued on January 20, 1992, with effect from February 19, it specifed a commitment by the two Koreas not to manufacture, receive, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons and not to possess nuclear re-processing and uranium enrichment facilities. Verifcation of the implementation of these commitments and, more generally, denuclearization was to be achieved by a North-South Joint Nuclear Control Commission. However, this attempt at interKorea con ct management via a bilateral inspection regime was thwarted in 1993 by several developments: failed meetings between the two Koreas on the implementation of their Joint Declaration on Denuclearization the previous year; North Korea’s refusal in 1993 to grant a request by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for inspection of its suspected nuclear facilities; and North Korea’s threat the same year to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime, to which it was committed since it signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, under USSR pressure—the Soviet Union no longer existed in 1993. 2000 North Korea–South Korea Summit Meeting and Their June 15 Joint Declaration—The DPRK (North Korea) leader, Kim Jong Il and the ROK (South Korea) president, Kim Dae Jung, held a Summit meeting in Pyongyang on June 13–15, 2000. In a Joint Declaration, 282 M. BRECHER they declared their agreement: to resolve the issue of reunifcation of the two Koreas on their own initiative; to permit an exchange of visits by members of Korean families that had been separated by the Korean War, on August 15, 2000; and to arrange an exchange of long-term prisoners in the two states. They also indicated a mutual recognition that both of their preferred constitutional-political solutions for a reunifed Korean Peninsula—a lower-stage federation [najundangueuiyonbangje-an], for the DPRK, and a federation [yonhapje-an], for the ROK—contained common features and agreed to promote the shared goal of reunifcation that would be based on those common elements. The Declaration also called for greater economic cooperation between the two Koreas and proposed a dialogue among offcials to implement the terms of their Declaration without delay. As with virtually all the preceding bilateral attempts at con ct management and con ct resolution noted above, the Joint Declaration of 2000 remained a conciliatory, vague verbal commitment by the two principal adversaries. More signifcant, Kim Jong Il’s acceptance of Kim Dae Jung’s reciprocal invitation in fi fl fl fi June 2000 to visit Seoul “at an appropriate time” was never implemented. 2007 North Korea–South Korea Summit Meeting and Their October 4 Joint Declaration This Joint Declaration by Korea’s then-leaders, Kim Jong Il (DPRK) and President Roh Moo-hyun (ROK), repeated the general verbal commitments expressed in the Joint Declaration 7 years earlier by Kim Jong Il and the thenPresident of South Korea, Kim Dae Jung, initiator of the ROK’s “Sunshine Policy” in 1998, notably their shared goals—reunifcation, on their own initiative, greater economic cooperation, and an end to military hostilities. However, this Joint Declaration went beyond, with several specifc commitments by the two Korea leaders. One was “to work together to advance the matter of having the leaders of the three or four parties directly concerned [the two Koreas, the PRC and the USA] to convene on the Peninsula and declare an end to the war,” that is, to transform the Armistice regime since the end of the Korean War in 1953 to a formal peace agreement. This politically and symbolically signifcant provision of the Joint Declaration was not implemented. Nor were other commitments in the 2007 Joint Declaration: “to create a special peace and cooperation zone in the West Sea,” in Haeju, a port town in southwestern North Korea, along with a joint fshing zone, maritime peace 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 283 zone, and a special economic zone, and “to work together to implement smoothly” two verbal agreements on the signifcant controversial issue of nuclear weapons in North Korea, their Joint Statement of September 19, 2005 and the February 13, 2007 Agreement framed at the Six Party Talks on North Korea’s active nuclear weapons program. There were also verbal commitments on the construction of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, freight rail services between Munsan and Bongdong, shipbuilding facilities, and projects in agriculture, medical services, and environmental protection. Since South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy” was still intact, optimism about a new era of cooperation between the two Koreas was refected in the 2007 Joint Declaration. However, the optimism was short-lived—the election of Lee Myung-bak as South Korea President in 2008 led to the abandonment of its “Sunshine Policy,” which made provisions of the 2007 Declaration irrelevant. 2000–2008 South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy” The one partial success in Korean efforts to achieve con ct resolution was a South Korean (ROK) unilateral initiative to attain the positive goals expressed in the several agreements and declarations by leaders and regimes noted above. The tangible, innovative, high-pro e “Sunshine Policy” by South Korea’s President Kim Dae Jung (1998–2003) took the form of a dramatic ‘opening’ to the DPRK), with two dimensions—vitally needed economic aid to North Korea from South Korea, including the Hyundai Project of investment, and closer political relations. Kim Dae Jung’s visit to Pyongyang in 2000 for a summit conference with the DPRK leader, Kim Jong Il, was an important symbolic element of the “Sunshine Policy,” aimed at reconciliation and, ultimately, peaceful reunifcation of the two Koreas. Leaders of the DPRK and the ROK were long committed to these objectives, though they held fundamentally different conceptions of the preferred type of political system, economic system, and ideology that should prevail in a reunited Korean Peninsula. Although South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy” toward North Korea proved to be of limited duration, it demonstrated promise and substantial ful lment for a decade (1998–2008): this policy was sustained by Kim Dae Jung’s successor, Roh Moo-Hyun (2003–2008). The policy led to four notable achievements. One was the initiation of a successful summit meeting between the leaders of the Korean adversarial states in 2000. Another was the beginning of limited trade between the DPRK and the ROK, after a halfcentury of economic isolation. A third was the opening of 284 M. BRECHER the Mt. Kumgang tourist area to South Korean visitors. And the fourth, which resonated among the aged segment of both North and South Korean populations, was the beginning of a limited reunifcation of families that had been separated by the Korean War. In 2008, South Korea’s policy toward the DPRK reverted to the predominant ‘hard line’ espoused and practiced by the Republic of Korea (ROK)’s political leaders during the frst half-century of this protracted con ct (1948–1998), notably by its frst two long-term authoritarian presidents—Syngman Rhee (1948–1960) and Park Chung Hee (1962– 1979). The reversal from the “Sunshine Policy” to a hard-line policy occurred in 2008, with the election of a conservative political leader, Lee Myung-bak as President of the Republic of Korea (2008–2013), partly in response to the vigorous nuclear weapons program of the DPRK, highlighted fi fl fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fl fl fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi by its frst nuclear weapon test in 2006, followed by much more sophisticated nuclear weapon tests in 2009, 2013, 2014, 2016, and 2017. A return to the soft-line policy was pledged by the newly elected South Korean President in 2017. In sum, the negative record of bilateral and unilateral attempts at con ct management and con ct resolution in the Inter-Korea con ct, with the partial exception of the “Sunshine Policy,” was deeply rooted in the ideological con ct that dated to the creation of two Korean states in 1948. That enduring con ct between the two parts of a homogeneous nation reescalated from 1993 onward primarily because of the DPRK’s initially covert entry into the select group of nine nuclear weapon states—the USA, the USSR-Russia, the UK, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and the DPRK—intensifying the longstanding rivalry between the two Koreas. Inter-Korea: Third-Party Attempts at Con ct Management and Resolution There have also been several notable third-party attempts at con ct management and con ct resolution focused on the Korean Peninsula, mainly by the two patrons of the principal adversaries in this con ct, the United States, patron of South Korea, and China, patron of North Korea. One of these efforts was ultimately successful—the lengthy process that led to the termination of the Korean War (1950–1953), noted above. The USA indicated its wish for a cease-fre in December 1950, six months after the outbreak of full-scale war. The USSR, not a direct participant in that war but the major initial supplier of arms to the 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 285 DPRK, did so six months later. The USA and China, the two major patrons of the two Korea belligerents, played the decisive role in sustaining the Korean War; but they were also instrumental in initiating and persisting in its de-escalation, culminating in the July 1953 Armistice Agreement, which ended the longest and most violent phase of this unresolved con ct. While many hostile acts—violent and non-violent— have occurred in the relations between North and South Korea during the past 6 decades, noted in the analysis of con ct-sustaining acts, the Armistice regime has been, and continues to be, an effective deterrent to a recurrence of major inter-Korea violence since 1953. As such, the third-party-engineered Armistice Agreement has been a highly successful achievement in con ct management. A promising but only partly ful led development, four decades after the Korean War, combined third party and bilateral attempts at both con ct management and con ct resolution in the two unresolved con cts that currently co-exist and reinforce each other, the Inter-Korea and the North Korean Nuclear con cts: this was the October 1994 Agreed Framework between the DPRK and the USA, with other participants, the ROK and Japan, initiated and sustained by the USA (Clinton Administration) and North Korea (during Kim Il Sung’s lengthy leadership). Like all the bilateral agreements between the two Koreas between 1972 and 2000 noted above, aimed at resolution of the Inter-Korea con ct, the 1994 Agreed Framework, multilateral in form but essentially a bilateral agreement in content between North Korea and the United States, became a terminal victim of escalating distrust between these two adversaries, consigned to ‘what might have been’ in 2002. Like the 1994 Agreed Framework, noted above, the primary focus at its ‘on-again-offagain’ high-pro e successor in attempted con ct management and con ct resolution, the Six Party Talks, which unfolded in six Rounds from late August 2003 to midApril 2009, when the DPRK announced that it would no longer participate in this forum and would not be bound by its previous agreements, was the controversial issue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, not the Inter-Korea con ct. Inter-Korea Con ct: Causes of Non-Resolution The Inter-Korea con ct, like its close conceptual and empirical con ct relative, the North Korean Nuclear Con ct, has not been resolved. The Model on Con ct Resolution will be tested here by focusing on the 286 M. BRECHER following question: have any, some or all of the six postulated ‘most likely’ causes of interstate protracted con ct resolution been present in the Inter-Korean con ct during the 70 years since its onset in 1948? Exhaustion—Although there was abundant evidence of acute exhaustion by the population of both the DPRK and the ROK at the end of the Korean War in 1953, that condition was suffcient for partial resolution only, in the form of the Armistice Agreement—which remains in force 64 years later, though occasionally under severe threat to its persistence, not complete resolution of their interstate con ct. Moreover, inter-Korean violence since 1953 has been episodic, mostly high-pro e incidents initiated by North Korea, but minimal in intensity and casualties, except for the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel, with the fi fi fl fl fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi loss of 46 South Korean naval personnel in 2010, the cause of, and responsibility for, that incident which remains formally unclear. The people of North Korea have endured several periods of exhaustion, but all resulted from famines and general economic privation resulting from governmental economic policy and foreign-imposed sanctions, not from the enduring con ct with South Korea. By contrast, the ROK, South Korea, enjoyed a ‘qualitative leap’ in economic development and prosperity from the 1970s onward. While its population has been subject to periodic increases in stress, especially since the DPRK demonstration of a nuclear weapons capability in its many nuclear tests (2006, 2009, 2013, 2014, 2016, and 2017) the largest test in September 2016, that triggered stiffer UN Security Council economic sanctions 2 months later), and other evidence of a missile capability superior to that of its South Korea rival (though vastly inferior to the nuclear weapon and missile capability of South Korea’s patron, the USA), there is no evidence of collective exhaustion among the population of South Korea, deriving from a threat to survival or of grave damage from its adversary in this con ct. In sum, the absence of collective exhaustion by North or South Korea since the end of the Korean War contributed to its nonresolution thus far. Changes in the Capability Balance—Throughout the Inter-Korea con ct, the principal adversaries have been relatively equally matched in war-making capability. The DPRK’s armed forces were larger than those of the ROK, but the latter possessed superior conventional weapons, in both quantity and quality, provided consistently by its patron, the United States, since the beginning of the Korean War. During the last 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 287 decade, since its frst nuclear weapon test in 2006, North Korea acquired a modest nuclear weapon capability. However, in this domain, too, the longstanding USA ‘boots on the ground’ military presence in South Korea and the near-permanent military alliance between the USA and the ROK, with the signifcantly larger USA nuclear weapons capability, served as an effective deterrent thus far against North Korea’s resort to nuclear weapons in a foreseeable future war with South Korea. This relative balance of military power on the Korean Peninsula made a full-scale war designed to unify the two Korean states by force since 1953 highly unlikely. Moreover, the ROK has possessed a vastly superior economic capability to sustain a war against its rival since the 1970s; and, as the more satisfed Korean state, the ROK is less likely to initiate a war of reunifcation. In sum, the absence of a decisive superiority in overall accessible military capability by the two Korean states also contributes to the persistence, that is, nonresolution, of the Inter-Korea con ct. Domestic Pressures —There is no reliable evidence within the civil authoritarian Kim family political regime in the DPRK of internal pressures for a mutually acceptable resolution of the Inter-Korea con ct. The promise of several high-pro e verbal agreements with the ROK, in favor of peaceful con ct resolution and re-unifcation—the 1972 Joint Communiqué, the 1992 Basic Agreement, and the 2000 Joint Declaration—was not ful led, as noted above. The sole indicator of a conceivable DPRK interest in a shared con ct resolution agreement was the reputed offer in 1980, by North Korea’s ‘founding father’ and supreme leader from 1948 to 1994, Kim Il Sung, for a federation between the two independent Korean states. This would have been essentially a verbal, not a substantive, change, for it would permit both North Korea and South Korea to retain their distinctive political and economic systems, ideologies, and armed forces. In South Korea, as noted above, there was one highly visible manifestation of domestic pressure in favor of genuine con ct resolution, a policy goal that was expressed in the ‘Sunshine Policy’ and implemented by two ROK presidents (1998–2008). Moreover, South Korea’s political leaders frequently advocated re-unifcation in the form of a unifed “one nation, one state, one system, and one government” in the fnal stage, a Korea federal state, with substantial autonomy for its two parts. This advocacy has long been the primary purpose of the ROK Government’s Ministry of Reunifcation, accompanied by the expectation that the 288 M. BRECHER unifed state would adopt the political system of democracy and a market economy, modeled on the United States, which have always been anathema to the DPRK leadership. In sum, the only signifcant manifestation of domestic pressure for peaceful con ct resolution was South Korea’s ‘Sunshine Policy,’ pursued for a decade in a 70-year unresolved con ct. The absence of such pressures was an additional cause of its persistence. External Pressures —There is considerable evidence of foreign fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi pressures on the principal adversaries—the DPRK and ROK, North and South Korea—by the USA, China, and the UN, and by a group of states with diverse but substantive interests in con ct resolution in the Korean Peninsula, Japan and Russia, along with China and the USA. As indicated above, in the discussion of Third-Party Efforts at Con ct Management and Resolution, the most tangible expression of pressure by the patrons of the DPRK (China) and the ROK (United States) was their role in generating the Armistice Agreement that ended the Korean War in July 1953 and their role in initiating and sustaining the Six Party Talks from 2003 to 2009. Since 1993, most external pressures for con ct resolution of Korea-related con cts have focused on the resolution of the North Korean Nuclear con ct, not the con ct between the two Koreas. This is evident in the UN–USA response to the frst interstate crisis related to the North Korean nuclear weapons program (1993), culminating in the DPRK-USA Agreed Framework (1994), discussed above, as well as the Six Party Talks from 2003 to 2009, and the UN and US condemnation of North Korea’s reported nuclear weapons tests thus far (2006, 2009, 2013, 2014, 2016, and 2017), joined by China’s infrequent public criticism of the DPRK’s third and ffth nuclear tests. Only one of these manifestations of external pressure, the 1994 Agreed Framework, registered (short-term) progress on the elusive path to con ct resolution of the North Korean Nuclear con ct (from 1994 to 2002); had this been sustained, it would have greatly assisted, but would not have been synonymous with, the resolution of the wider, multi-issue Inter-Korea con ct. Together, resolution of both Koreabased interstate con cts would have brought peace to the Korean Peninsula. Reduction in Discordance of Objectives—Notwithstanding several accommodative initiatives that led to cooperation by the principal adversaries in the Inter-Korea con ct for considerable periods—the USA role in the process that generated the Agreed Framework (1994–2002), that 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 289 included cooperation between North and South Korea on the crucial issue of energy, the cooperative USA–China role, with the active participation of the two Koreas, in creating the Six Party Talks (2003–2009), and South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy” toward North Korea (1998–2008), the two principal adversaries in the InterKorea con ct have been consistently rigid on their core objectives. For the DPRK, the primary goal has been the reunifcation of the two Koreas in a centralized Communist state modeled on the pre-1990 Soviet Union, with all aspects of public policy monopolized by the Communist Party, except for a brief indication by the DPRK’s ‘founding father,’ Kim Il Sung, of a willingness to consider a federation [more accurately, a confederation] of two independent Korean states which would retain ultimate control over their economic and political systems, with a symbolic transfer of functions and authority to the confederation. This idea was never fully developed or seriously considered by either of the Korean states. For South Korea, both during its lengthy period of an authoritarian anti-Communist political system (1948–1987), and throughout its democratic phase, during the past 30 years, the objective has been unifcation of the two Koreas into a democratic political system, with a limited autonomy for its two constituents, and a market economy. There has been no reduction in discord on this core issue. Decline in Con ct-Sustaining Acts—Despite infrequent gestures of concern for human rights, notably occasional episodes of limited family reunifcation visits, the norm in relations between North and South Korea has been deep-rooted mutual distrust of the other Korea’s intentions and frequent displays of verbal and physical threatening acts. That norm clearly indicates the absence of a decline in con ct-sustaining behavior of the two Korea adversaries toward their rival for mastery of the Korean Peninsula. The con ct has been—and continues to be—profound 70 years after its onset. In sum, only one of the six ‘most likely’ causal conditions favorable to con ct resolution of the Inter-Korea con ct, postulated in the Con ct Resolution Model, namely, External Pressures, was evident in the quest for resolution of that interstate protracted con ct. The absence of fve of the six ‘most likely’ conditions for resolution of the Inter-Korea con ct— Exhaustion by the principal adversaries, the two Korea states, since the end of the Korean War, the lack of qualitative change in their Balance of Capability, Domestic Pressures for resolution, Reduction in Discordance of 290 M. BRECHER their Objectives, and Decline in Con ct-Sustaining Acts—indicates strong negative support for the theoretical rationale of the Resolution Model. Substantively, three long-term signifcant incompatibilities for the fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi principal adversaries, the DPRK and the ROK, have reinforced the absence of fve ‘most likely’ conditions for con ct resolution as causes of the continuing persistence of this con ct. One is the profound differences in their ideological moorings, Communism and Juché (self-reliance) in North Korea, anti-Communism and Democracy in South Korea. Another source is the fundamental differences in their political and economic systems, an authoritarian political structure, dominated by a de facto monarchical family and an overwhelmingly state-controlled economy in North Korea, contrasting with a traditional authoritarian political regime during the frst four decades of South Korea’s statehood (1948–1987), transformed to a Western-type democratic political regime, and a USA-type market economy in South Korea. While the leadership in both Koreas has been committed to re-unifcation from the onset of their con ct in 1948, both have consistently envisaged a united Korea in which their ideology, political structure, and economic system would prevail. These ideological and institutional incompatibilities have been reinforced by personal enmity between some of the pre-eminent leaders of the two Koreas, especially the frst dominant North Korea leader, Kim Il Sung, who ruled the DPRK from 1948 to 1994, and Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee, the ROK presidents from 1948 to 1960, and 1961–1979: their personal enmity, accentuated by ideological hostility and political rivalry, dated to the later years of Japan’s colonial rule over Korea from 1910 to 1945. Although impossible to verify, it is hypothesized here that, if all six ‘most likely’ conditions for protracted con ct resolution—collective exhaustion, changes in the capability balance, domestic pressures for resolution, external pressures for resolution, reduction in discordance of objectives, and a decline in con ct-sustaining acts—along with the three substantive incompatibilities—ideology, political structure, and economic system, discussed above—had obtained for the two principal state adversaries, the presence of the ‘most likely’ conditions would have triumphed over the incompatibilities, and con ct resolution would have been achieved. This hypothesis could be tested for the Inter-Korea con ct (and other interstate con cts manifesting these or similar incompatibilities), if and when the six ‘most likely’ conditions existed simultaneously 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 291 in a protracted con ct, along with the three incompatibilities. The likelihood of this pattern occurring is currently remote. Reconciliation Logically, reconciliation between-among adversaries in an interstate con ct follows con ct resolution, just as resolution follows successful con ct management. This three-stage process—con ct management—of specifc hostile episodes, crises, or issues, followed by con ct resolution—of all the basic disputes—and then by con ct reconciliation —is discernible in very few post-World War I protracted con cts, notably France/Germany, Ecuador/Peru, and, to some extent, Egypt/Israel and Israel/Jordan. As evident in the discussion of these cases elsewhere (Brecher 2016 L), these con cts experienced con ct management of several crises and wars, notably: fve interstate crises in the 1920s and 1930s, culminating in World War II, for the France/Germany con ct; four interstate crises from 1935 to 1991, culminating in the 1995 Cenepa War, for the Ecuador/Peru con ct; and 11 interstate crises from 1948 to 1973, culminating in the 1973 October-Yom Kippur War, for the Egypt-Israel segment of the Arab/Israel interstate con ct. In all three cases, successful con ct management led to peace agreements and con ct resolution, followed by varying degrees of reconciliation—active (France-Germany), moderate (Ecuador/Peru), and passive (Egypt-Israel and Israel-Jordan). There are, however, exceptions to this three-stage linear process leading to con ct resolution. The Inter-Korea con ct is a prominent illustration. During most of this unresolved con ct, there have been unmistakable indicators of a mutual interest in, and acts of, reconciliation between North and South Korea, the principal adversaries, without con ct resolution. The quest for reconciliation took the form of verbal commitments to peace, reunifcation, and reconciliation by government leaders of the DPRK and the ROK, as evident in their 1972 Communiqué, 1992 Basic Agreement, 2000 Joint Declaration, and 2007 Joint Declaration. Moreover, the last of these expressions of amity was an integral part of the active implementation of South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy” from 1998 to 2008, which included tangible acts of fraternal aid to the people of North Korea during and after a time of troubles, the famines and economic deterioration of the 1990s. These conciliatory acts occurred despite the absence of a formal peace agreement or other forms of con ct resolution during more than six fi fi fi fi fi fi fi decades after the 292 M. BRECHER costly, divisive, and stalemated Korean War, which ended with only an Armistice Agreement in 1953, still in force 65 years later. More signifcant, the frequent outbursts of verbal condemnations of alleged hostile acts by one or both of the principal adversaries, or of verbal threats of hostility against the adversary, were frequently accompanied or followed by conciliatory acts by one or both Korean adversaries. What seems to have made this possible was the special character of the adversaries in this con ct: their populations were members of the same nation, sharing a common history, language, and kinship. Thus, while experiencing a devastating interstate war (1950–1953) and a lengthy con ct between two independent states since 1948, it was also a civil war between two segments of the Korean nation. Thus, notwithstanding profound differences in ideology and political and economic systems, the population of the more prosperous and economically developed South Korea often contributed food and other forms of economic aid to the people of North Korea during periods of famine and other sources of distress. This kinshipdriven behavior was often refected in attempts, sometimes successful, to facilitate reunions of families that had been separated during the Korean War. A recent expression of this conciliatory behavior, after a lapse of more than 3 years in which these reunions were suspended by the DPRK (2010-early 2014), was a public appeal for improved relations by the North Korean leader on New Year’s Day 2014, followed by his agreement in principle, in early February, to a resumption of family reunions between people in the two Koreas separated since the end of the Korean War, though without a specifc date. In the absence of resolution of the Inter-Korea protracted con ct, it is not surprising that full reconciliation between North and South Korea remains elusive: even among the vast majority of 20 resolved interstate con cts that have been active for some or all of the years since the end of WWI, most with deep historical roots, very few have achieved genuine reconciliation, measured by Auerbach’s imaginative but demanding seven-stage Reconciliation Pyramid (2009). Yet some progress in the Inter-Korea con ct is evident. The leadership and large segments of the elites in both North and South Korea, as well as the attentive public in South Korea, are well-acquainted “with clashing narratives” (Stage 1 of the Reconciliation Pyramid); that is, they “acknowledge the other’s narrative…” more so in the post-1987 open society of South Korea than in the closed society of North Korea (Auerbach 2009, 304–305). 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 293 One can also infer, from the meetings and direct negotiations between leaders (Kim Il Sung and Park Chung Hee in 1971–1972, Kim Jong Il and Kim Dae Jung in 2000), and from their verbal and formal commitments and concessions to each other, that the Korean leaders “Acknowledge the Other’s Narratives, Without Necessarily Accepting Them as True” [Ibid.‚ 305] (Stage 2 of the Reconciliation Pyramid). In 1971–1972, the DPRK “Supreme Leader” for most of the period of this protracted con ct (1948–1994), Kim Il Sung, acknowledged that North Korea would no longer demand a complete withdrawal of USA forces from South Korea as a pre-condition of negotiations between the two Koreas. The same leaders also formally agreed on peaceful unifcation of their states, tension reduction, and reconciliation of their ideologies and political systems, with the shared objective of national unity as one people, and these principles were re-affrmed, as noted in the above discussion of the fve communiqués and agreements by Korean leaders from 1972 to 2000. The fact that these formal agreements were not implemented does not nullify their “acknowledgement of the Other’s Narratives…”. “Expressing Empathy for the Other’s Plight” [Ibid., 307] (Stage 3 of the Reconciliation Pyramid) which is uncommon in identity con cts, has been evident on frequent occasions by large segments of South Korea’s population, in words and deeds, including the granting of material aid to North Koreans, especially during periods in which famines ravaged the North Korean economy and society, as noted. Little is known of the attitude of North Koreans to South Koreans. However, a strong feeling of kinship with the population of the other Korea can be inferred; that is, on both sides of their ‘iron curtain’ the population at large regards ‘the other’ as part of one Korean people. Thus, Stage 3 of the Pyramid seems to have been ascended by South Koreans and, likely, by the silent majority of North Korea’s population. There is no evidence that any of the other four stages of Reconciliation has been achieved: “Assuming (at Least) Partial Responsibility for the Other’s Alleged Plights” (Stage 4); “Expressing Readiness for Restitution or fi fi fi Reparations for Past Wrongs” (Stage 5); “Publicly Apologizing and Asking for Forgiveness for Past Wrongs” (Stage 6); and “Striving to Incorporate Opposite Narratives into Accepted Mutual Accounts of the Past” (Stage 7) [Ibid., 307–311]. Are the two Korean adversarial states likely to ascend these advanced stages of reconciliation once interstate con ct resolution has been attained? 294 M. BRECHER In the absence of any evidence, one must suspend judgment. However, except for the France/Germany protracted con ct, the states and peoples of North Korea and South Korea are probably the best prepared, psychologically and ethnically, to achieve the ‘great leap’ to Stages 5 and 6 of the Reconciliation Pyramid, with Stage 7—and genuine reconciliation—at some undefnable point in the post-con ct resolution phase of their complex relations.