Theories of International Relations PDF

THEORIES 0F INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES AND METHODS ❖ How can we begin to study international relations? ❖ IR scholars want to understand why international events occur in the way they do. Why did a certain war break out? Why did a certain trade agreement benefit one nation more...

THEORIES 0F INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES AND METHODS ❖ How can we begin to study international relations? ❖ IR scholars want to understand why international events occur in the way they do. Why did a certain war break out? Why did a certain trade agreement benefit one nation more than another? Why are some countries so much richer than others? ❖ These “why” questions can be answered in several ways. One kind of answer results from tracing the immediate, short-term sequences of events and decisions that led to a particular outcome. For instance, the outbreak of war might be traced to a critical decision made by a particular leader. This kind of answer is largely descriptive—it seeks to describe how particular forces and actors operate to bring about a particular outcome.  Another kind of answer to “why” questions results from seeking general explanations and longer-term, more indirect causes. For example, a war outbreak might be seen as an instance of a general pattern in which arms races lead to war (or some such hypothesis). This kind of answer is theoretical because it places the particular event in the context of a more general pattern applicable across many cases. ❖ Understanding IR requires both descriptive and theoretical knowledge. It would do little good to only describe events without being able to generalize or draw lessons from them. Nor would it do much good to formulate purely abstract theories without being able to apply them to the finely detailed and complex real world in which we live. Different IR scholars emphasize different mixes of descriptive and theoretical work. Like other disciplines, IR includes both basic and applied research. ❖ Perhaps because of this complexity and unpredictability, IR scholars do not agree on a single set of theories to explain IR or even on a single set of concepts with which to discuss the field. Traditionally, the most widely accepted theories—though never unchallenged by critics—have explained international outcomes in terms of power politics or “realism.” But there are many theoretical disagreements—different answers to the “why” questions—both within realism and between realists and their critics. Throughout these discussions, no single theoretical framework has the support of all IR scholars. A.THEORIES ❖ Political scientists develop theories or frameworks both to understand the causes of events that occur in international relations every day and to answer the foundational questions in the field. ❖ Although there are many contending theories, some of the more prominent theories are developed in depth in this class: liberalism and neoinstitutional liberalism, realism and neorealism, and radical perspectives whose origins lie in Marxism. Also introduced is the newer theory of constructivism. ❖ Theorizing fits individual events and cases into larger patterns, allowing us to generalize about global politics. Indeed, when theorists look at individual events, they should always ask, in the words of two international relations specialists: “Of what is this an instance?” Theory thus simplifies the messy complexity of reality by pointing to only those factors that theorists believe are important. ❖ Theory is a set of hypotheses postulating the relationship between variables or conditions advanced to describe, explain, or predict phenomena and make prescriptions about how positive changes ought to be engineered to realize particular goals and ethical principles. ❖ Theory consists of abstract, simplified, and general propositions that answer “why” and “how” questions such as “why do wars begin?” or “how do collective identities shape our behavior?” Most theory involves an effort to explain and/or predict actors’ behavior in global politics. Theory is built on assumptions – initial claims that must be accepted without further investigation – that lead theorists to point to particular features of global politics. For example, many analysts construct theories based on the assumption that people are rational. ❖ There are two kinds of theory: empirical and normative. Empirical theory deals with what is. ▪ It is based on facts that can be observed either directly or indirectly through history books, memoirs, and documents. ▪ We use empirical theory to answer questions about how actors behave and what the consequences of their actions are. ▪ Examples of empirical propositions would be: “Suicide bombers are used by groups that are weaker than their adversaries” and “suicide bombings cause society to lose faith in the government’s ability to provide security.” ▪ These statements are empirical because researchers can collect and organize facts (data) about which groups conduct suicide bombings and on the political consequences of their bombings. ▪ Moreover, other researchers can evaluate these theories by collecting their own data. ▪ In other words, these propositions are testable.  Normative theory. But those who study global politics are also interested in evaluating whether what actors do or cause to happen is right or wrong, and whether they should or ought to act as they do. ▪ Answers to such questions constitute normative theory, which explains what is right and wrong or moral and immoral. ▪ Such theory tends to take the form of a claim, rather than a proposition, and it cannot be tested because it is based on beliefs, logic, and values. ▪ An example of a normative claim would be that the use of suicide bombers as an instrument of policy is immoral. ▪ There is no way to test the accuracy or the morality of this proposition. ▪ There are those who believe that using suicide bombers to kill innocents is never right and there are those who believe it is justified, at least in some circumstances. ▪ Numbers and statistics will rarely sway people to change deeply held opinions on such matters. ❖ In addition, theory serves three primary purposes: prediction, explanation, and prescription. Predictive theory is empirical, forecasting what will happen under a specific set of circumstances. ▪ Much theory in global politics predicts. In other words, its main purpose is to generalize from the specific without making a leap of imagination. ▪ For example, some scholars have observed that states with democratic governments tend not to use war to settle disputes with other democracies, but, instead, use peaceful methods of dispute resolution like negotiation, mediation, and diplomatic pressure. ▪ In their theory, these researchers predict that democracies will not go to war with one another.  Explanatory theory identifies causes of events and answers the difficult “why” questions. ▪ It, too, is always empirical: it involves leaps of imagination, often triggered by observations of reality. ▪ One notable example is the theory of gravity. According to Sir Isaac Newton’s theory of gravity was inspired by his observing an apple fall from a tree. ▪ His leap of imagination was that the force that brought the apple to the ground (gravity) might be the same force that kept the moon in its orbit around the earth. ▪ As in the case of gravity, for the most part, explanatory theory asserts general propositions, and those who apply the theory can use those propositions to explain specific instances. ▪ For example, Newton’s general ideas about gravity could be applied to the Sun and other planets, as well as to the moon. ▪ In global politics, Stephen Walt wanted to explain the formation of military alliances.  ▪ The basis of his theory was that states will enter alliances to balance against a common threat (the prevailing theory at the time was that states would balance against a stronger power, even if it did not seem to pose an imminent threat). ▪ He then applied his theory to alliances among states in the Middle East. ▪ Others have applied it to other regions of the world as well. Although good explanatory theories may permit good predictions, predictive theory need not explain. Prescriptive theory. Theory is also used for the purpose of prescription. ▪ Prescriptive theory recommends the adoption of particular policies to realize objectives. ▪ It combines both empirical and normative elements and recommends the adoption of particular policies to realize objectives. ▪ Here ought and should are used to indicate the correct course of action if one wishes to achieve a particular end.  ▪ Here is an example of a prescriptive proposition: “If the United States wishes to prevent the loss of jobs in its domestic textile industry to other countries, it should raise tariff barriers to imported textiles.” This statement is empirical because it proposes that low tariffs (a form of tax) on imported textiles are correlated with a loss of American jobs in the textile industry. Data can be collected to evaluate the accuracy of the proposed relationship. The statement is also normative because it argues that the government should raise tariffs if it wants to reduce job losses. In sum, each kind of theory has its own uses: empirical theory may be used for explanation, prediction, or prescription (what to do to achieve desired outcomes), whereas normative theory tends to be employed only for prescription. ❖ It is important to remember that theory is a tool researchers use to understand the complex reality of global politics because it simplifies reality and points to the relatively few factors that it regards as most important. Moreover, researchers use certain rules and procedures to build good theory and evaluate its accuracy.  These rules and procedures are known as methodology. People sometimes confuse theory with methodology. In practice, however, the two are quite different. ▪ Theory attempts to answer questions of whether things will happen and why they do so, but methodology describes the rules and procedures used to evaluate and test a theoretical proposition. One methodology might involve the use of statistical inference to make predictions. Researchers who adopt this methodology use quantitative measures to achieve precision and clarity. An alternative methodology might employ qualitative measures like detailed historical case studies to bring precise detail to the theory. B. LEVELS OF ANALYSIS ❖ What should we use as the major unit of analysis in international politics? Should we focus upon the actions and attitudes of individual policy makers? Or might we assume that all policy makers act essentially the same way once confronted with similar situations, and therefore concentrate instead on the behavior of states? Could we remove ourselves even further from individuals and examine international politics from the perspective of entire systems of states? Or, should we regard the world as a single “global village,” composed not of states, but of more than 5 billion individuals organized into different kinds of communities, associations, and transnational networks? ❖ Each level of analysis—individual, state, systemic, or global—will make us look at different things, so the student must be aware of the differences among them.  Some International Relations scholars suggest four levels of analysis: ▪ the individual level, ▪ the domestic level (the state), ▪ then the interstate level, ▪ and the global level 1) The first level (the individual) attempts to highlight and understand how persons and their characteristics (alone or in groups) impact policy (part of the decision-making process). ▪ Individual level analysis is further broken down into factors that affect policy: cognitive, emotional, and psychological ones. Biological factors may also matter. ▪ Gender is another biopolitical facet. ▪ Finally, individual and group perceptions are very important. If a person is part of a group, other influences can come into play, such as “groupthink” and roles. Analyzing the characteristics of individual leaders is another approach to individual-level analysis. ▪ This is idiosyncratic analysis: how did an individual’s personal traits influence or shape his or her decisions? This can be very important because an individual’s characteristics “are crucial to the intentions, capabilities and strategies of a state”.  ▪ Many other politically relevant concepts enter into idiosyncratic individual analyses: personality, physical and mental health, ego and ambition, one’s political history and personal experiences, perceptions, and operational reality (this includes leaders’ worldviews). ▪ Leaders have formal and informal powers, and each has his or her own leadership capabilities -- a group of characteristics relevant to a chief executive’s authority. 2) Analysis at the state level explores how the structure and operations of a government affect decisions and policies. The type of government matters (the continuum from liberal democracy to authoritarian state), as does the kind of situations the state faces (crisis versus non-crisis), the kinds of policies under consideration, and the impact the policies could have domestically and on interstate or international relations. How the bureaucracies (career political personnel and their offices) function can be significant. One cannot ignore the influences of interest groups and legislatures, either. How interested the public is in international affairs can make a difference, too, along with how public opinion is aligned to policies. It is important to remember, especially in relation to a state’s foreign policy, that it often reflects its political culture. 3) The last level of analysis, the system-level, is focused on the external conditions and pressures that shape a country’s practices and policies. There are specific structural characteristics that are included in system-level analysis: ▪ what is the organization of authority? ▪ Is the international system anarchical or hierarchical? ▪ Further: Is it: unipolar (with only one state as most powerful), bipolar (two great powers), or multipolar?  THEORIES 0F INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS- 2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY ❖The academic study of International Relations existed only in embryo before the First World War. In the second half of the nineteenth century when the social sciences as we know them today began to be differentiated, when ‘Economics’ emerged out of Political Economy as an allegedly scientific field of study, and when ‘Sociology’ and ‘Politics’ and ‘Social Theory’ came to be seen as addressing different agendas, ‘International Relations’ remained unidentified as a discrete focus for study. Instead, what we nowadays think of as International Relations was for the most part seen as simply one facet of a number of other disciplines (History, International Law, Economics, Political Theory) although political scientists addressed the field rather more systematically than had previously been thought to be the case. It was not until the slaughter of 1914–18 persuaded a number of influential thinkers and philanthropists that new ways of thinking about international relations were required that the field of IR emerged. Liberal Internationalism and the Origins of The Discipline ❖The destruction on the battlefields of 1914–18 produced a sequence of reactions. The first response of many was to assign personal responsibility for the carnage – in Britain and France the Kaiser was widely blamed and ‘Hang the Kaiser’ became a popular cry, although after the war no serious attempt was made to reclaim him from his exile in the Netherlands.  Even during the conflict, more thoughtful people quickly came to the conclusion that this was an inadequate response to the causes of war. ▪ While Germany might bear a greater responsibility than some other countries, there was something about the system of international relations that was culpable, and a variety of different thinkers, politicians and philanthropists gave thought as to how to change the system to prevent a recurrence. ▪ Most of these individuals were American or British (and, in fact, the discipline of International Relations remains to this day largely a product of the English-speaking world, although, happily, this may not be the case for much longer). ▪ The dominant mood in France was for revenge against Germany, while in Russia the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 posed a challenge to the very idea of international relations. ▪ In Germany the ideas of British and American thinkers were eagerly adopted at the hour of her defeat, which led to widespread disillusion when these ideas were only imperfectly realized at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919. ▪ Britain and America were the homes of the new thought, partly because these two countries were less devastated by the war than others, and thereby, perhaps, more willing to look beyond the immediate issues, but also because the anarchic nature of world politics seemed particularly unfortunate to those nurtured by the liberal traditions of the two English-speaking powers.  ▪ Given this latter point, the new thinking that was produced in Britain and America is conveniently summarized as ‘liberal internationalism’ – the adaptation of broadly liberal political principles to the management of the international system. In the United States these ideas were espoused by the President himself, Woodrow Wilson, and set out in the Fourteen Points speech of January 1918, in which America’s war aims were specified. ❖ Liberal internationalism offered a two part diagnosis of what went wrong in 1914 and a corresponding two-part prescription for avoiding similar disasters in the future. The first element of this diagnosis and prescription concerned domestic politics. ▪ A firm liberal belief was that the ‘people’ do not want war; war comes about because the people are led into it by militarists or autocrats, or because their legitimate aspirations to nationhood are blocked by undemocratic, multinational, imperial systems. ▪ An obvious answer here is to promote democratic political systems, that is, liberal- democratic, constitutional regimes, and the principle of national self-determination. The rationale is that if all regimes were national and liberal-democratic, there would be no war.  This belief links to the second component of liberal internationalism, its critique of pre-1914 international institutional structures. ▪ The basic thesis here was that the anarchic pre-1914 system of international relations undermined the prospects for peace. ▪ Secret diplomacy led to an alliance system that committed nations to courses of action that had not been sanctioned by Parliaments or Assemblies (hence the title of the Union for Democratic Control). ▪ There was no mechanism in 1914 to prevent war, except for the ‘balance of power’ – a notion which was associated with unprincipled power-politics. ▪ What was deemed necessary was the establishment of new principles of international relations, such as ‘open covenants openly arrived at’, but, most of all, a new institutional structure for international relations – a League of Nations. ▪ The aim of a League of Nations would be to provide the security that nations attempted, unsuccessfully, to find under the old, balance of power, system.  ▪ The balance of power was based on private commitments of assistance made by specific parties; the League would provide public assurances of security backed by the collective will of all nations – hence the term ‘collective security’. The liberal belief in a natural harmony of interests led as a matter of course to a belief in the value of education. ▪ Education was seen as a means of combating the ignorance that is the main cause of a failure to see interests as harmonious, and thereby can be found one of the origins of International Relations as an academic discipline. ▪ Thus, in Britain, philanthropists such as David Davies, founder of the Woodrow Wilson Chair of International Politics at University College Wales, Aberystwyth – the first such chair to be established in the world – and Montague Burton, whose eponymous chairs of International Relations are to be found at Oxford and the London School of Economics, believed that by promoting the study of international relations they would also be promoting the cause of peace. ▪ Systematic study of international relations would lead to increased support for international law and the League of Nations.  ▪ Thus it was that liberal internationalism became the first orthodoxy of the new discipline although, even then, by no means all scholars of International Relations subscribed to it – international historians, for example, were particularly skeptical. ❖ In short, as the 1930s dawned it seemed at least possible that a new and better system of international relations might be emerging. As no one needs to be told, this possibility did not materialize: the 1930s saw economic collapse, the rise of the dictators, a series of acts of aggression in Asia, Africa and Europe, an inability of the League powers led by Britain and France to develop a coherent policy in response to these events, and, finally, the global war that the peace settlement of 1919 had been designed to prevent. Clearly these events were catastrophic in the ‘real world’ but they were equally damaging in the world of ideas. THE ‘GREAT DEBATES’ IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY ❖From the Peloponnesian War, through European poleis to ultimately nation states, Realist trends can be observed before the term existed. Likewise the evolution of Liberal thinking, from the Enlightenment onwards, expressed itself in calls for a better, more cooperative world before finding practical application – if little success – after The Great War. It was following this conflict that the discipline of International Relations (IR) emerged in 1919. Like any science, theory was IR’s foundation in how it defined itself and viewed the world it attempted to explain, and when contradictory theories emerged clashes inevitably followed. These disputes throughout IR’s short history have come to be known as ‘The Great Debates’, and though disputed it is generally felt there have been four, namely ‘Realism/Liberalism’, ‘Traditionalism/Behaviouralism’, ‘Neorealism/Neoliberalism’ and the most recent ‘Rationalism/Reflectivism’. All have had an effect on IR theory, some greater than others, but each merit analysis of their respective impacts. 1. Realism/Liberalism The carnage of the First World War was principally responsible for the upsurge in Liberal thinking. ▪ With Woodrow Wilson at the vanguard, the belief that conflict could be tamed and eventually vanquished through institutional order was applied with the creation of the League of Nations. ▪ As ambitious as it was ill-fated, the League was immediately undermined by the failure of the American legislature to ratify participation in an organization that at least during its formative years enjoyed considerable public support. ▪ Given that Realists had a long historical narrative of power-plays and conflicts from which to draw, it was little wonder they questioned the views of Liberals during the later Inter-War period, labelling them Idealists or Utopians. ▪ Just as Liberals regarded Realists as far too pessimistic about change and lacking in imagination to see the possibilities of cooperation and extension of law, diplomacy and security, so did Realists see their idealistic opponents as dangerously naïve. ▪ Though Realists generally agreed that morality should be observed and even advanced, they felt these were best incubated in domestic environments made secure thanks to the state’s power. Loading security guarantees onto the weak shoulders of international bodies was seen as dangerous, given the risks posed to national survival if such arrangements failed. 2. Traditionalism/Behaviouralism Taking place in the 1960’s, this was essentially a methodological debate revolving around the belief of Behaviouralists that IR could only advance itself by applying the methods of naturalist science. ▪ They believed that the field was too dominated by historians, who they labelled Traditionalists (or Classicists), who took the view that IR should be developed through more interpretive historicist methods. ▪ Behavioralist focus was on the observation of systems and that those analyses, and any subsequent hypotheses and/or implying of causality, should be subject to empirical testing, mainly via falsification. That way knowledge in IR could be progressively built up, allowing for greater intuitions and progress in theory development. ▪ The battle lines were drawn between the likes of Hedley Bull on the Traditionalist side, and Morton Kaplan on the Behavioralist. ▪ Though acknowledging the swift rise of scientific methods in America, Traditionalists maintained that the ebbs and flows of global politics were necessarily interpretive, as one could not impose a neat system on a field with so many variables. ▪ For Behaviouralists, a theory that was not falsifiable was not a theory at all, more a subjective notion to be believed or disbelieved as suited.  ▪ Behaviouralism was also critiqued over what its perceived weaknesses could bring to IR study. ▪ It had roots in positivism and so strict application would mean rejecting factors that could not be measured, such as human perception and motivation and would also prevent the development of normative theories since they focused on empirically non- testable ‘what ought to be’. 3. Neorealism/Neoliberalism Realism retained its dominant position, but real-world events such as the Vietnam conflict and the Oil Crisis forced it to reassess its core tenets. ▪ Kenneth Waltz’s 1979 Theory of International Politics aimed to reboot Realism, moving it on from a foundation in human nature towards a Structural Realism more associated with the international system, where Waltz recognized that units, i.e. nation states, could indeed co-act in such an anarchical environment, but that their functional similarities or differences would still determine the extent of such relations (1979, p. 104). ▪ Realism also took on a more scientific quality compared to past groundings in philosophy, history and human nature. It moved away from the kinds of generalized reflections Kaplan had criticized and towards precise statements and a vision of theory as advocated by Behavioralists, earning it the label of Neorealism.  Behaviouralism’s impact also developed Liberalism’s precision and focus in what it sought to analyze, principally on how institutions could influence state behavior through complex interdependence. ▪ Such integration scholarship emerged through the 1940’s and 1950’s, taking on a more regional tone in the 1960’s before a third transnational stage was advocated by Neoliberal institutional theorists. ▪ Chief among them were Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, who wished to emphasize the effects transnational relations had on the interstate system, especially in areas of national sovereignty, foreign policies, the challenges posed to international organizations and the impacts such a paradigm would have on equality balance between states and indeed the very study of IR. ▪ Neoliberalism edged closer to Neorealism with this acceptance of an anarchical system and state egoism, just as the latter came to accept interrelated entities espoused by the former. ▪ While Neorealism viewed IR through a prism of competitive relations, Neoliberalism acknowledged this but also advocated the mutual benefits for states through greater cooperative relations 4. Rationalism/Reflectivism This most recent Debate, emerging in the mid-Eighties, is arguably one of the most serious. ▪ On one side Rationalists, inclusive of Realist and Liberalist positions, are positivistic in methodology, and while accepting the complexities of the social world, prefer to measure and analyze what can be observed. ▪ The opposition Reflectivists reject these positivist methods of knowledge generation, preferring interpretive and subjective study and a belief that values cannot be separate from observation. Given Rationalist paradigms have emerged through supposedly flawed and biased positivistic methodology, Reflectivists reject that system and any theorizing within it. Reflectivism includes such alternative approaches to IR theory as post- modernism, feminism, constructivism and critical theory (with emancipatory positions such as anti-colonialism capable of falling under the umbrella of the latter).  THEORIES 0F INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REALISM (1) ❖ Realism’ is a term that is used in a variety of ways in many different disciplines. In International Relations, political realism is a tradition of analysis that stresses the imperatives states face to pursue a power politics of the national interest. Political realism, Realpolitik, ‘power politics’, is the oldest and most frequently adopted theory of international relations. Realists emphasize the constraints on politics imposed by human selfishness (‘egoism’) and the absence of international government (‘anarchy’), which require ‘the primacy in all political life of power and security’. ❖ Realism is an image of international relations based on four principal assumptions. First, states are the principal or most important actors in an anarchical world lacking central legitimate governance. ▪ States represent the key units of analysis, whether one is dealing with ancient Greek city-states or modern nation-states.  ▪ The study of international relations is the study of relations among these units, particularly major powers as they shape world politics (witness the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War) and engage in the costliest wars (World Wars I and II). ▪ Realists who use the concept of system usually refer to an international system of states. What of non-state actors? International organizations such as the United Nations may aspire to the status of independent actor, but from the realist perspective, this aspiration has not in fact been achieved to any significant degree. ▪ Realists tend to see international organizations as doing no more than their member states direct. ▪ Multinational corporations, terrorist groups, and other transnational and international organizations are frequently acknowledged by realists, but the position of these non-state actors is always one of lesser importance. States remain the dominant actors. ▪ Rationality and state-centrism are frequently identified as core realist premises. Second, the state is viewed as a unitary actor. ▪ For purposes of theory building and analysis, realists view the state as being encapsulated by a metaphorical hard shell or opaque, black box. We need not look much inside this shell or black box. ▪ A country faces the outside world as an integrated unit. Indeed, a common assumption associated with realist thought is that political differences within the state are ultimately resolved authoritatively such that the government of the state speaks with one voice for the state as a whole.  ▪ The state is a unitary actor in that it is usually assumed by realists to have one policy at any given time on any particular issue. Third, given this emphasis on the unitary state-as-actor, realists usually make the further assumption for the purpose of theory building that the state is essentially a rational (or purposive) actor. ▪ A rational foreign policy decision-making process would include a statement of objectives, consideration of all feasible alternatives in terms of existing capabilities available to the state, the relative likelihood of attaining these objectives by the various alternatives under consideration, and the benefits or costs associated with each alternative. ▪ Following this rational process, governmental decisionmakers select the alternative that maximizes utility (maximizing benefit or minimizing cost associated with attaining the objectives sought) or at least achieves an acceptable outcome. ▪ The result is a rank ordering of policy preferences among viable alternatives. ▪ Statesmanship thus involves mitigating and managing, not eliminating, conflict; seeking a less dangerous world, rather than a safe, just, or peaceful one. Ethical considerations must give way to ‘reasons of state’ (raison d’état). ▪ ‘Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states’ (Morgenthau).  ▪ As a practical matter, the realist is aware of the difficulties in viewing the state as a rational actor. ▪ Governmental decisionmakers may not have all the factual information or knowledge of cause and effect they need to make value-maximizing decisions. ▪ The process may well be clouded by considerable uncertainty as decisionmakers grope for the best solution or approach to an issue. ▪ They also have to deal with the problem of human bias and misperception that may lead them astray. ▪ In any event, the choice made—if not always the best or value-maximizing choice in fact—is at least perceived to be a satisfactory one. It is a satisficing or suboptimal choice—less than a value-maximizing choice, but still good enough in terms of the objectives sought. ▪ The assumptions of states being both unitary and rational actors are particularly important in the application of game theory and other rational choice methods to deterrence , arms control, balance of power, the use of force, and other studies of interest to realists. Fourth, realists assume that within the hierarchy of issues facing the state, national or international security usually tops the list. ▪ Military and related political issues dominate world politics. A realist focuses on actual or potential conflict between state actors and the use of force, examining how international stability is attained or maintained, how it breaks down, the utility of force as a means to resolve disputes, and the prevention of any violation of its territorial integrity. ▪ To the realist, military security or strategic issues are sometimes referred to as “high politics,” whereas economic and social issues typically are viewed as less important or “low politics.” ▪ Indeed, the former is often understood to dominate or set the environment within which the latter occurs. ▪ Given the state’s objectives, goals, or purposes in terms of security, it seeks and uses power (commonly understood in material terms as capabilities relative to other states), which is a key concept to realists as is the balance of power among states. ▪ The structural realist (or neorealist) puts particular emphasis on the security implications of the distribution of power (or underlying structure) of the international system of states: unipolar (one great power), bipolar (two great powers), or multipolar (three or more great powers). ▪ States use the power they have to serve their interests or achieve their objectives. To most realists, the struggle for (or use of) power among states is at the core of international relations. ▪ In the words of Hans J. Morgenthau: “International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim or means to an end.”  The important point is that from the standpoint of methodology, the image of a unified, rational state is truly an assumption, not a description of the actual world. ▪ Realists who embrace positivism use such assumptions to build theories, not describe reality. The image of the unified, rational state is, therefore, the starting point for realist analysis, not a concluding statement. As an image of politics, then, realism focuses on power and power politics among states. ❖ Realists can be further distinguished by the intensity and exclusivity of their commitment to core realist premises. Here we can think of a continuum of positions. ‘Radical’ realists exclude almost everything except power and self-interest from (international) politics. The Athenian envoys to Melos in Thucydides’ History express such a view, but it is held by few if any international theorists. ‘Strong’ realists stress the predominance of power, self- interest and conflict but allow modest space for politically salient ‘non-realist’ forces and concerns. Carr, Morgenthau and Waltz, the leading realists of their generations, all lie in this range of the continuum. As Carr puts it, ‘we cannot ultimately find a resting place in pure realism’.  ▪ Weak realism gradually shades into something else. At some point (non- realist) ‘hedges’ outweigh the (realist) ‘core’. Conversely, analysts operating from other perspectives may appeal to characteristically realist forces and explanations that ‘hedge’ their own theories. ‘Weak’ or ‘hedged’ realists accept the realist analysis of the ‘problems’ of international politics but are open to a wider range of political possibilities and see more important elements of international relations lying outside the explanatory range of realism. INTELLECTUAL PRECURSORS AND INFLUENCES Thucydides ❖ Thucydides (471–400 b.c.) is usually credited with being the first writer in the realist tradition as well as the founding father of the international relations discipline. Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War (431–404BC) chronicles twenty-one years of war between Athens and Sparta (and their respective allies) in the fifth century B.C. ❖ In 424 b.c., during the eighth year of the Peloponnesian War, he was elected an Athenian general. While stationed in Thrace, he failed to prevent the Spartan capture of a city and was punished with twenty years of exile. As a member of one of the more notable Athenian families, Thucydides spent the rest of the war observing events, traveling, and interviewing participants. ❖ The task Thucydides set for himself, however, was much more ambitious than simply describing what was occurring. Particular events were dealt with in great and vivid detail, but his goal was to say something significant not only about the events of his own time, but also about the nature of war and why it continually recurs. He was less interested in the immediate causes of the Peloponnesian War than he was in the underlying forces at work. ❖ Why did war break out between Athens and Sparta? What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta [i.e., this was the underlying cause of the war]. Thus, according to Thucydides, the real or underlying cause of the war was fear associated with a shift in the balance of power—a systems-level explanation. Sparta was afraid of losing its preeminent role in the Hellenic world and therefore took countermeasures to build up its military strength and enlist the support of allies (security dilemma). Athens responded in kind. In the ensuing analysis, the situations, events, and policies Thucydides described lend themselves to comparison with such familiar notions as arms races, deterrence, balance of power, alliances, diplomacy, strategy, concern for honor, and perceptions of strengths and weaknesses.  Thucydides’ emphasis on fear as a cause of the Peloponnesian War, fear that resulted from the increase in Athenian power relative to that of Sparta, is echoed throughout history. As statesmen perceive the balance of power to be shifting in their disfavor, they make efforts to rectify the situation that in turn causes fear, suspicion, and distrust on the part of their rivals. One could quite easily substitute for Athens and Sparta other historical examples such as France and Britain in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Napoleonic France and the rest of Europe in the early nineteenth century, Germany and Britain after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, and the Soviet Union and the United States in the four decades following World War II. In all such historical examples, a good case can be made that fear is a dominant characteristic and a motivating factor for arms races and war itself. ❖ One reason Thucydides is deemed a scholar of international relations, however, is that the cause of fear he identifies is not so much innate or basic human nature as it is the nature of interstate politics. Concerning a world in which no superordinate or central authority exists to impose order on all states (whether ancient city-states or modern states often encompassing large expanses of territory), Thucydides relates in a classic statement of Realpolitik how Athenians emphasized the overriding importance of power in such a world: “The strong [Athens] do what they have the power to do and the weak [the islanders on Melos] accept what they have to accept.” Put even more directly: the strong do what they will; the weak do what they must! Although fear may lead to war, power and capabilities relative to that of others determine the outcome. THEORIES 0F INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REALISM (2) Machiavelli  The Italian political philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) drew heavily from his study of ancient, especially Roman, writings.  Like Thucydides, Machiavelli wrote of the importance of personality on politics, power, balance of power, formation of alliances and counteralliances, and the causes of conflict between different city-states.  His primary focus, however, was on what present-day writers refer to as national security.  For Machiavelli, survival of the state (identified with the ruling prince) was paramount. The prince could lose his state by not coping effectively with both internal and external threats to his rule.  The German term Realpolitik , so central to realist thought, refers to power and power politics among states.   Machiavelli’s most famous work, The Prince , is a practical manual on how to gain, maintain, and expand power—the stuff of Realpolitik. It is dedicated to the ruler of Florence at that time, Lorenzo de Medici.  One of the more controversial parts of Machiavelli’s thesis is the notion that the security of the state is so important that it may justify certain acts by the prince that would be forbidden to other individuals not burdened by the princely responsibility of assuring that security.  The end—security of the state—is understood to justify any means necessary to achieve that end. Machiavellianism (or Machiavellism) has been condemned by many who consider such a view to be immoral.  In fact, Machiavelli never wrote that “the end justifies the means.” What he did write was “ si guarda al fine ”—that in decisions and actions the prince should look for or anticipate consequences—wise counsel it would seem, but by no means an assertion that the end justifies any means as he has customarily been (mis)interpreted.  Drawing from Machiavelli, Max Weber and others have argued that the actions of statesmen do (or should) follow a code of conduct different from that of the average citizen. Thus, it has been observed that there are two separate and distinct ethics: first, conventional religious morality concerned with such matters as individual salvation (the ethics of ultimate ends) and, second, by contrast, the moral obligations of rulers who must take actions to provide for national security (the ethics of responsibility).  Following this interpretation, one can understand Machiavelli’s view that rulers should be good if they can (good or harmless in the conventional sense) but be willing to cause harm if necessary (consistent with their obligations as rulers).  Indeed, princes put soldiers in harm’s way when they go into battle and these soldiers, in turn, wreak harm upon their adversaries. Machiavelli expressed such choices as invoking male (pronounced mah-leh)—the Italian word used to describe evil, harm or negative consequences associated in this context with the decisions and actions of princes. Although a prince may not wish to be hated, Machiavelli argues “it is much safer to be feared than to be loved, if one must choose.” Although the prince may be criticized for being harsh, this is acceptable to Machiavelli so long as the prince keeps his subjects united and loyal. These are the sorts of arguments that have given Machiavellianism a negative connotation, but followers of Machiavelli would respond that the ultimate goal meant to justify particular policies is the security of the state (and its people), not just the security of an individual ruler.  Machiavelli wrote of the world as it is, not the world as it should or ought to be. That is one reason modern political theorists refer to him as a realist.   Ethics or moral norms and the real-world politics he observed are in separate domains.  His advice to the prince, following this interpretation, was based on an analysis of history, and of what actually occurs in the political realm, not on abstract ethical principles.  For Machiavelli, in an amoral (if not immoral) world, what meaning, after all, does the preaching of conventional morality have? Indeed, an extreme statement of realist thinking is that considerations of power and power politics are the only relevant factors.  Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that Machiavelli did not encourage rulers to engage in harmful activity or use violence for its own sake.  In numerous passages, he advises the prince not to be needlessly cruel because this may eventually undermine his rule.   The yardstick one should use is how a particular policy contributes to the security and stability of the state.  Indeed, as reading the last few chapters of The Prince makes clear, Machiavelli’s prescription for Italian security was to be found in unifying the country, thus not only avoiding armed conflict among cities and alliances of cities against one another, but also dissuading interventions or attacks by outside powers, namely, France and Spain. Hobbes  The political philosophy of the Englishman Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) was developed during the first fifty turbulent years of the seventeenth century.  After attending university in Oxford, Hobbes became a tutor to the son of a nobleman, and throughout his life he remained associated with the family.  Identified as a Royalist in a struggle between parliamentarians and the crown, Hobbes left for France in 1641 at a time when Parliament was asserting its power against the monarchy.   For three years, he tutored a future monarch, the son of Charles I, the latter executed in 1649 during the English civil war. Publishing his famous work Leviathan, Hobbes returned to England in 1651, pledging loyalty to the newly established republican or parliamentary regime.  Indeed, marking the end of divine right of kings, Leviathan — the first general theory of politics in English—provided that either a monarch or an assembly (i.e., parliament) could be tasked by the people to assure their security as the primary responsibility of government.  Like Machiavelli and Thucydides, Hobbes had a pessimistic view of human nature, which has particularly influenced both the work of classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau and structural realists like Kenneth Waltz.  Hobbes was informed by his own life experiences. As with others, his life and safety were in jeopardy in the 1640s during the English civil war.  His primary focus in Leviathan was domestic politics, and his goal was to make the strongest case possible for the necessity of a powerful, centralized political authority to establish and maintain the order essential to human security in society.  To illustrate his philosophical points, Hobbes posited hypothetically that prior to the creation of society, human beings lived in a “state of nature”—a condition of war of “every one against every one.”  There was in this state of war “a continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”  Hobbes did not argue that such a state of nature had ever really existed. To him, the state of nature was the result of a thought experiment—imagining what the world would be like without governmental authority or any other social structure.  Accordingly, he was interested in showing how people could escape from this hypothetical situation—a state of war of everyone against everyone else—by agreeing to place all power in the hands of a sovereign or Leviathan (a biblical, beastly metaphor used by Hobbes that refers to state authority, or the supreme ruler, either a monarch or parliament) that would end the anarchy of the state of nature, using power to maintain order so essential to daily life.  If governmental authority did not already exist, it would have to be created. In his words: “There must be some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant.”  Without order, he argued, civilization and all its benefits are impossible—no economic development, art, knowledge, or anything else of value.  Hobbes’s impact on the realist view of international relations stems from an image of states as if they were individuals in a mythical state of nature.  Although his focus in Leviathan is on domestic societies, his observations are also considered relevant to international politics and have had a major impact on realism, particularly his assessment of why conflict and violence between individuals or states are to be expected.  In the absence of a sovereign or central, superordinate authority, the anarchic world described by Hobbes is a rather dismal one.  Because in international politics as in the state of nature there is no Leviathan or superordinate authority with power to impose order, we find a condition of anarchy.   For survival, states are left to their own devices in a world in which each state claims to be sovereign, each with a right to be independent or autonomous with respect to one another. As anarchy prevails in the state of nature, so too is anarchy a dominant characteristic of international politics.  In such a world states use power to make their way. Power politics complete with alliances and counteralliances are the order of the day. Without a Leviathan (or, in the language of contemporary international relations literature, a leading or hegemonic power or world state that can maintain order), suspicion, distrust, conflict, and war are seemingly inevitable. There being “no common power”- the absence of any social contract among (or authority over) them—states must fend for themselves.  As with Machiavelli’s understandings, this rather negative image of international politics offered by Hobbes is central to realist thought. We also find power and balance-of-power politics framed in Machiavellian or Hobbesean terms in English School, writings as one source of order in international or world society.  Carr  Many students of international relations consider Edward Hallett Carr’s The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919– 1939 a classic. Although Carr can be viewed as an intellectual precursor for realists and, a forerunner of the present-day English School, his work transcends narrow classification in that he has also been influential, as has Grotius, on the thinking of certain authors whom we would label liberals or neoliberal institutionalists.  The Twenty Years’ Crisis is no exception in that it was completed in the summer of 1939 with the shadow of war looming over Europe.  As with other authors we have discussed, Carr was less interested in apportioning blame to particular leaders for the imminent onset of World War II than he was in attempting “to analyse the underlying and significant, rather than the immediate and personal, causes of the disaster.”   Unless this were done, he argued, we would fail to understand how war could break out twenty short years after the signing of the Versailles Treaty in 1919. He dedicated his book “to the makers of the coming peace.” In attempting to understand “the more profound causes of the contemporary international crisis,” echoes of Thucydides can be discerned. Carr, for example, placed a great deal of emphasis on the role of fear in explaining World War I.  Throughout The Twenty Years’ Crisis, Carr refers to the impact of Machiavelli and Hobbes on realist thinking.  Although his work is best known as a critique of utopian or idealist thought, which dominated the fledgling discipline of international relations after World War I, Carr also challenges the more extreme versions of realism that posit the divorce of morality from politics in international relations.   He argues that sound political thought must be based on elements of both utopia (i.e., values) and reality (i.e., power).  Where utopianism has become a “hollow and intolerable sham,” serving merely as a disguise for the privileged, the realist provides a service in exposing it.  Pure realism, on the other hand, can offer nothing but “a naked struggle for power which makes any kind of international society impossible.” Hence, for Carr, politics is made up of two elements, inextricably intertwined: utopia and reality—values and power.  Consistent with classical-realist understandings that go beyond just power and interest, more than a third of the book is devoted to such Grotian topics as the role of morality in international relations, the foundations of law, the sanctity of treaties, the judicial settlement of international disputes, peaceful change, and the prospects for a new international order.   Because Carr critically assessed the strengths and weaknesses of utopianism as well as realism, he can be viewed as an important influence on many contemporary international relations theorists, both realists and nonrealists. Particularly given his insightful critique of proposed liberal solutions to the problems of re-creating international order following World War I, he remains relevant to the post–Cold War era in which liberal solutions have been suggested to deal with globalization. Hans Morgenthau We will discuss his ideas in Classical Realism.  This brief overview of the intellectual precursors of contemporary realism illustrates a distinct realist preoccupation with armed conflict or war. A concern with the causes and consequences of conflict helps to explain why the realist perspective is held by statesmen throughout the world:  Over the centuries leaders have engaged in the very battles and struggles described by authors from Thucydides to Morgenthau. Realism, from the statesman’s point of view, is indeed realistic as it tends to correspond to personal experiences both in diplomacy and in war.  Among realists, there are two basic concepts that traditionally have been the foci of analysis at the state and international levels: power and balance of power among states—often referred to as a system in which states are the principal actors. THEORIES 0F INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REALISM-3 VARIANTS OF REALIST THEORY ❖ Realism was born and raised in Europe and essentially reflects 19th-century European Realpolitik, yet the tradition grew up in the United States, where it has been among the dominant traditions for a very long time. To a considerable degree, European academic émigrés were instrumental in transferring the tradition from Europe to the United States During the 20th century, the realist tradition has generated three main currents of thought: classical realism, neorealism and neoclassical realism. ❖ Classical realism took off during the 1930s, established itself during the 1950s, and managed to maintain its prominent position until the 1980s, that is, until neorealism gradually began to be seen to represent the tradition. ❖ Under the label of neoclassical realism, however, there has been a realist life after neorealism – less coherent perhaps, yet nonetheless very much ‘alive and kicking’ and therefore having an important impact on the contemporary research agenda. ❖ For this reason, it is important not to stop the account of the tradition some decades ago, when the most important neorealist work was published (Waltz 1979). The currents have since developed in parallel, thus demonstrating that they – despite their labels – are more than just different phases but have existed alongside one another. A. CLASSICAL REALISM ❖ The first realist current has been called political realism and retrospectively labeled classical realism. Its origins are often traced to E. H. Carr (1939) and Hans Morgenthau’s (1946) critique of the liberal tradition. In order to properly understand the significance of classical realism, however, we ought to pay attention to the fact that the 1930s and 1940s were characterized by a range of realist publications, including Martin Wight (1946/1977) and Georg Schwarzenberger (1941) in Europe.  In the United States, Reinhold Niebuhr (1932) and Frederick Schuman (1937) represented classical realism. Carr’s criticism of what he labelled ‘utopian liberalism’ does not constitute a realist theory as such. Rather, his book highlights a number of realist characteristics and perfectly demonstrates how such features can be employed in a devastating critique of other traditions, particularly certain aspects of early 20th-century liberal thinking, such as the false promises of the League of Nations. ❖ Classical realism comprises a large number of theorists and can only be described as a rich current, particularly thriving before newer social science techniques were developed. ❖ Classical realism is first and foremost a blend of political theory, IR theory and historical analysis. ❖ The classical realists contributed significantly to the development of the discipline. ❖ John Herz (1950) coined the term ‘security dilemma’, and Henry Kissinger analysed – before he became US Secretary of State – the classical 19th-century European multipolar order in A World Restored (1957). ❖ Raymond Aron (1967), though a contested realist, was among the main figures attempting to theorize international relations and explain the causes of war. ❖ In the following, three illustrative examples – on Hans J. Morgenthau, Inis Claude and George Kennan – provide further detail regarding important aspects of classical realists. Hans J. Morgenthau and Classical Realism ❖ Hans J. Morgenthau (1904–1980) remains one of the most influential IR theorists. In many ways he exemplifies those classical realists who came before him due to his emphasis on a holistic approach to IR that encompasses all the levels of analysis to include the impact of human nature, the blurring of the distinction between society and the international system, and a concern for justice. His writings were heavily influenced by Hobbes and Machiavelli. ❖ According to Morgenthau (1965), men and women are by nature political animals: they are born to pursue power and to enjoy the fruits of power. Morgenthau speaks of the animus dominandi, the human ‘lust’ for power.  The craving for power dictates a search not only for relative advantage but also for a secure political space—i.e., territory— to maintain oneself and to enjoy oneself free from the political dictates of others. The ultimate political space within which security can be arranged and enjoyed is, of course, the independent state. Security beyond the state and between states is impossible. The human animus dominandi inevitably brings men and women into conflict with each other. That creates the condition of power politics which is at the heart of Morgenthau’s realism. ▪ ‘Politics is a struggle for power over men, and whatever its ultimate aim may be, power is its immediate goal and the modes of acquiring, maintaining, and demonstrating it determine the technique of political action’. ▪ Here, Morgenthau is clearly echoing Machiavelli and Hobbes. If people desire to enjoy a political space free from the intervention or control of foreigners, they will have to mobilize and deploy their power for that purpose. ▪ That is, they will have to organize themselves into a capable and effective state by means of which they can defend their interests. The anarchical system of states invites international conflict which ultimately takes the form of war. ❖ Morgenthau posited six principles of political realism: 1) “politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature”; Politics is rooted in a permanent and unchanging human nature which is basically self-centered, self-regarding, and self- interested. According to classical realism, because the desire for more power is rooted in the flawed nature of humanity, states are continuously engaged in a struggle to increase their capabilities. The absence of the international equivalent of a state’s government is a permissive condition that gives human appetites free reign. In short, classical realism explains conflictual behavior by human failings. Particular wars are explained, for example, by aggressive statesmen or by domestic political systems that give greedy parochial groups the opportunity to pursue self-serving expansionist foreign policies. For classical realists international politics can be characterized as evil: bad things happen because the people making foreign policy are sometimes bad. 2) In international politics, “interest [is] defined in terms of power”; Politics is ‘an autonomous sphere of action’ and cannot therefore be reduced to morals (as Kantian or liberal theorists are prone to do). Yet he also made the point that “the essence of international politics is identical with its domestic counterpart. Both domestic and international politics are a struggle for power.... The tendency to dominate, in particular, is an element of all human associations....” Not unlike Thucydides and other ancient Greeks, Morgenthau had essentially a tragic view of international relations. While he may have developed the above precepts to help guide statesmen through the rocky shoals and dangers of IR, he realized all too well that history is replete with examples of individuals and the states they represented making a grab for international dominance—alliances and balances of power failed to keep the peace. The temptation to overturn existing power arrangements and norms of international conduct strongly pulled at leaders whether of ancient Athens, Rome, absolutist France, Imperial Germany, or Hitler’s Third Reich. 3) Interest defined as power is not endowed with a meaning that is fixed once and for all: “the kind of interest determining political action depends on the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated”; Self-interest is a basic fact of the human condition. International politics is an arena of conflicting state interests. But interests are not fixed: the world is in flux and interests can change. Realism is a doctrine that responds to the fact of a changing political reality. 4) There is “tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful political action,” but that as a practical matter “universal moral principles... must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place”; The ethics of international relations is a political or situational ethics which is very different from private morality. A political leader does not have the same freedom to do the right thing that a private citizen has.  That is because a political leader has far heavier responsibilities than a private citizen. The leader is responsible to the people (typically of his or her country) who depend on him or her; the leader is responsible for their security and welfare. The responsible state leader should strive to do the best that circumstances permit on that particular day. That circumscribed situation of political choice is the normative heart of classical realist ethics. 5) “Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation [such as the United States] with the moral laws that govern the universe”; Realists are therefore opposed to the idea that particular nations can impose their ideologies on other nations and can employ their power in crusades to do that. Realists oppose that because they see it as a dangerous activity that threatens international peace and security. Ultimately, it could backfire and threaten the crusading country. 6) “Interest defined as power” is an understanding that gives international politics a separate standing and thus emancipates it from other fields of study. Following from this perspective, some scholars give Morgenthau credit, among others, for helping establish the legitimacy of international relations as a separate discipline within political science—and not just a part of history, international law, or philosophy. ❖ The 1960s saw classical realism coming under increasing scrutiny. Scholars who disagreed with Morgenthau and other classical realists on substantive grounds studied their work to find inconsistencies and contradictions. SUMMARY The main cause of state behavior is human nature It uses all levels of analysis (Individual, systemic and state levels) Multipolar systems are more stable Power is an end in itself. All states want as much power as possible. (Human nature) THEORIES 0F INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REALISM-4 VARIANTS OF REALIST THEORY B. NEOREALISM  The realist worldview was revived and revised with the publication of Kenneth Waltz’s 1979 Theory of International Politics, which replaced Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations.  Waltz argues that systems are composed of a structure and their interacting units. Political structures have three elements:  an ordering principle (anarchic or hierarchical),  the character of the units (functionally alike or differentiated),  and the distribution of capabilities.  Waltz argues that two elements of the structure of the international system are constants:  the lack of an overarching authority means that its ordering principle is anarchy,  and the principle of self-help means that all of the units remain functionally alike.  Accordingly, the only structural variable is the distribution of capabilities, with the main distinction falling between multipolar and bipolar systems.  One difference between classical realism and neorealism is their contrasting views on the source and content of states’ preferences. In contrast to classical realism, neorealism excludes the internal makeup of different states.  Morgenthau’s seminal statement of classical realism‘ relied on the assumption that leaders of states are motivated by their lust for power. Waltz’s theory, by contrast, omits leader’s motivations and state characteristics as causal variables for international outcomes, except for the minimal assumption that states seek to survive.  In addition, whereas classical realism suggested that state strategies are selected rationally, Waltz is more agnostic. According to Waltz, state behavior can be a product of the competition among states, either because they calculate how to act to their best advantage or because those that do not exhibit such behavior are selected out of the system.  Alternatively, states’ behavior can be a product of socialization: states can decide to follow norms because they calculate it to their advantage or because the norms become internalized.  Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (1979) seeks to provide a scientific explanation of the international political system.  He takes some elements of classical realism as a starting point—e.g., independent states existing and operating in a system of international anarchy.  Waltz’s neorealist approach does not provide explicit policy guidance to state leaders as they confront the practical problems of world politics.  That is presumably because they have little or no choice, owing to the confining international structure in which they must operate.  But he departs from that tradition by giving no account of human nature and by ignoring the ethics of statecraft.  His explanatory approach is heavily influenced by economic models. A scientific theory of IR leads us to expect states to behave in certain predictable ways.  In Waltz’s view the best IR theory is one that focuses centrally on the structure of the system, on its interacting units, and on the continuities and changes of the system.  In classical realism, state leaders and their international decisions and actions are at the center of attention.  In neorealism, by contrast, the structure of the system that is external to the actors, in particular the relative distribution of power, is the central analytical focus. Leaders are relatively unimportant because structures compel them to act in certain ways. Structures more or less determine actions. By ignoring unit-level variables, Waltz aims to identify the persistent effects of the international system.  The international political outcomes that Waltz predicts include  that multipolar systems will be less stable than bipolar systems;  that interdependence will be lower in bipolarity than multipolarity;  and that regardless of unit behavior, hegemony by any single state is unlikely or even impossible. Waltzian structuralism  Structural realism attempts to ‘abstract from every attribute of states except their capabilities’ in order to highlight the impact of anarchy and the distribution of capabilities. ‘International structure emerges from the interaction of states and then constrains them from taking certain actions while propelling them toward others’. Therefore, despite great variations in the attributes and interactions of states, there is a ‘striking sameness in the quality of international life through the millennia’. Hierarchy and anarchy are the two principal political ordering principles. Units either stand in relationships of authority and subordination (hierarchy) or they do not (anarchy). ‘Hierarchy entails relations of super- and subordination among a system’s parts, and that implies their differentiation’  Anarchic orders, however, have little functional differentiation. Every unit must ‘put itself in a position to be able to take care of itself since no one else can be counted on to do so’.  Differences between states ‘are of capability, not function’. ‘National politics consists of differentiated units performing specified functions. International politics consists of like units duplicating one another’s activities’.  If all international orders are anarchic, and if this implies minimal functional differentiation, then international political structures differ only in their distributions of capabilities. They are defined by the changing fates of great powers. More abstractly, international orders vary according to the number of great powers. Balancing  The central theoretical conclusion of structural realism is that in anarchy states ‘balance’ rather than ‘bandwagon’.  In hierarchic political orders, actors tend to ‘jump on the bandwagon’ of a leading candidate or recent victor, because ‘losing does not place their security in jeopardy’ (1979: 126).  ‘Bandwagoners’ attempt to increase their gains (or reduce their losses) by siding with the stronger party. In anarchy, however, bandwagoning courts disaster by strengthening someone who later may turn on you.  The power of others – especially great powers – is always a threat when there is no government to turn to for protection. ‘Balancers’ attempt to reduce their risk by opposing the stronger party.  Weak states have little choice but to guess right and hope that early alignment with the victor will bring favourable treatment. Only foolish great powers would accept such a risk.  Instead, they will balance, both internally, by reallocating resources to national security, and externally, primarily through alliances and other formal and informal agreements. Prisoners’ dilemma, relative gains and cooperation  Anarchy and egoism greatly impede cooperation. The Prisoners’ Dilemma offers a standard formal representation of this logic.  Imagine two criminals taken in separately by the police for questioning. Each is offered a favorable plea bargain in return for testimony against the other. Without a confession, though, they can be convicted only of a lesser crime. Each must choose between cooperating (remaining silent) and defecting (testifying against the other).  Imagine also that both have the following preference ordering: (1) confess while the other remains silent; (2) both remain silent; (3) both confess; (4) remain silent while the other confesses. Assume finally that their aversion to risk takes a particular form: they want to minimize their maximum possible loss.  Cooperating (remaining silent) rewards both with their second choice (conviction on the lesser charge). But it also leaves the cooperator vulnerable to the worst possible outcome (serving a long prison term – and knowing that your partner put you there). Each can assure himself against disaster by confessing (defecting).  The rational choice thus is to defect (confess) even though both know that they both could be better off by cooperating. Both end up with their third choice, because this is the only way to assure that each avoids the worst possible outcome.  Conflict here does not arise from any special defect in the actors. They are mildly selfish but not particularly evil or vicious.  Far from desiring conflict, both actually prefer cooperation. They are neither ignorant nor ill informed.  In an environment of anarchy, even those capable of mastering their own desires for gain and glory are pushed by fear towards treating everyone else as an enemy.  Herbert Butterfield calls this ‘Hobbesian fear’.  The ‘security dilemma’ has a similar logic. ‘Given the irreducible uncertainty about the intentions of others, security measures taken by one actor are perceived by others as threatening; the others take steps to protect themselves; these steps are then interpreted by the first actor as confirming its initial hypothesis that the others are dangerous; and so on in a spiral of illusory fears and “unnecessary” defenses’.   Anarchic pressures towards balancing and against cooperation are reinforced by the relativity of power.  The relativity of power requires states to ‘be more concerned with relative strength than with absolute advantage’.  Bandwagoning seeks absolute gains, aligning early with a rising power to gain a share of the profits of victory.  Balancing pursues relative gains. Relative gains concerns dramatically impede cooperation. One must consider not only whether one gains but, more importantly, whether one’s gains outweigh those of others (who, in anarchy, must be seen as potential adversaries). Polarity  How does polarity, the number of great powers in a system, influence international relations? Unipolarity has become a hot topic since the end of the Cold War. Structural logic suggests that unipolarity is unstable.   Balancing will facilitate the rise of new great powers, much as a rising hegemon (e.g. Napoleonic France) provokes a ‘grand coalition’ that unites the other great powers.  But whatever the resilience of unipolarity, while it persists hegemony (and resistance to it) will give international relations a very different character from systems with two or more great powers.  Schweller (1998) has shown that tripolar systems have a distinctive structural logic. And systems with very many or no great powers – the two are effectively equivalent – have a different structural logic than multipolar systems with a few (four, five, or a couple more) great powers.  Systems with a one, two, three, or a few great powers are monopolistic or oligopolistic. Those with many or no great powers are more like competitive markets.  Most of the attention, however, has focused on the differences between bipolar and multipolar orders.  For example, conflicts in the periphery pose little threat to the general bipolar balance. In multipolar systems, where power is divided among more actors, a change in the periphery of the same absolute magnitude may have a noticeable impact on the general balance.  Waltz claims that states ‘at minimum, seek their own preservation and, at maximum, drive for universal domination’ (survival). But even if states seek only survival, without knowing who holds which particular capabilities and their intentions – as well as who we are and what we value – we simply cannot say whether there is a threat against which to balance. Thus Stephen Walt (1987), one of Waltz’s leading students, has introduced balance of threat theory: states balance not against (all) external capabilities but against threats, which are defined as much by intentions as by capabilities. Unfortunately, realism has had very little to say about threats. THEORIES 0F INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REALISM-5 VARIANTS OF REALIST THEORY C. DEFENSIVE STRUCTURAL REALISM  Defensive structural realism developed, but is distinct, from neorealism.  Defensive structural realism shares neorealism’s minimal assumptions about state motivations.  Like neorealism, defensive structural realism suggests that states seek security in an anarchic international system – the main threat to their well-being comes from other states.  There are three main differences between neorealism and defensive structural realism. First, whereas neorealism allows for multiple microfoundations to explain state behavior, defensive structural realism relies solely on rational choice. Second, defensive structural realism adds the offense–defense balance as a variable.   This is a composite variable combining a variety of different factors that make conquest harder or easier. Defensive structural realists argue that prevailing technologies or geographical circumstances often favor the defense, seized resources do not cumulate easily with those already possessed by the metropole, dominoes do not fall, and power is difficult to project at a distance.  Accordingly, in a world in which conquest is hard it may not take too much balancing to offset revisionist behavior. Third, combining rationality and an offense–defense balance that favors the defense, defensive structural realists predict that states should support the status quo.  Expansion is rarely structurally mandated, and balancing is the appropriate response to threatening concentrations of power. In contrast to neorealism, this is a dyadic, not automatic, balance of power theory – linear, not systemic, causation operates.  Rationalism and an offense–defense balance that favors the defense means that states balance, and balances result.  Perhaps the best-known variant of defensive structural realism is Steven Walt’s ‘balance of threat’ theory. According to Walt, ‘in anarchy, states form alliances to protect themselves. Their conduct is determined by the threats they perceive and the power of others is merely one element in their calculations.’ Walt suggests that states estimate threats posed by other states by their relative power, proximity, intentions, and the offense– defense balance. Hence, defensive realists suggest that states should seek an ‘appropriate’ amount of power. If states do seek hegemony, it is due to domestically generated preferences; seeking superior power is not a rational response to external systemic pressures. D. OFFENSIVE STRUCTURAL REALISM  Offensive structural realists disagree with the defensive structural realist prescription that states look for only an ‘appropriate’ amount of power.  The flagship statement, Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, argues that states face an uncertain international environment in which any state might use its power to harm another.  Under such circumstances, relative capabilities are of overriding importance, and security requires acquiring as much power compared to other states as possible (Labs 1997).  The stopping power of water means that the most a state can hope for is to be a regional hegemon, and for there to be no other regional hegemons elsewhere in the world.  In the same vein as Waltz, Mearsheimer regards the behaviour of states as shaped if not indeed determined by the anarchical structure of international relations.  He differs from Waltz, however, whom he characterizes as a ‘defensive realist’ i.e., someone who recognizes that states must and do seek power in order to be secure and to survive, but who believe that excessive power is counterproductive, because it provokes hostile alliances by other states.  For Waltz, it does not make sense, therefore, to strive for excessive power beyond that which is necessary for security and survival. Mearsheimer speaks of Waltz’s theory as ‘defensive realism’.  Mearsheimer agrees with Waltz that anarchy compels states to compete for power. However, he argues that states seek hegemony, that they are ultimately more aggressive than Waltz portrays them.  The goal for a country such as the United States is to dominate the entire system, because only in that way could it rest assured that no other state or combination of states would even think about going to war against the United States. All major powers strive for that ideal situation.   But the planet is too big for global hegemony. The oceans are huge barriers. No state would have the necessary power.  Mearsheimer therefore argues that states can only become the hegemon in their own region of the world. In the Western hemisphere, for example, the United States has long been by far the most powerful state.  No other state—Canada, Mexico, Brazil—would even think about threatening or employing armed force against the United States.  Regional hegemons can see to it, however, that there are no other regional hegemons in any other part of the world. They can prevent the emergence and existence of a peer competitor.  According to Mearsheimer, that is what the United States is trying to ensure. That is because a peer competitor might try to interfere in a regional hegemon’s sphere of influence and control.  According to Mearsheimer, all states want to become regional hegemons. He refers to his theory as ‘offensive realism’, which rests on the assumption that great powers ‘are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony as their final goal’.  Mearsheimer’s theory makes five assumptions: the international system is anarchic; great powers inherently possess some offensive military capability, and accordingly can damage each other; states can never be certain about other states’ intentions; survival is the primary goal of great powers; and great powers are rational actors. From these assumptions, Mearsheimer deduces that great powers fear each other, that they can rely only on themselves for their security, and that the best strategy for states to ensure their survival is maximization of relative power.  In contrast to defensive structural realists, who suggest that states look for only an ‘appropriate’ amount of power, Mearsheimer argues that security requires acquiring as much power relative to other states as possible.  Mearsheimer argues that increasing capabilities can improve a state’s security without triggering a countervailing response. Careful timing by revisionists, buck-passing by potential targets, and information asymmetries all allow the would-be hegemon to succeed. Power maximization is not necessarily self-defeating, and hence states can rationally aim for regional hegemony.  Mearsheimer argues that ultimate safety comes only from being the most powerful state in the system. However, the ‘stopping power of water’ makes such global hegemony all but impossible, except through attaining an implausible nuclear superiority. The second best, and much more likely, objective is to achieve regional hegemony, the dominance of the area in which the great power is located. Finally, even in the absence of either type of hegemony, states try to maximize both their wealth and their military capabilities for fighting land battles.  In order to gain resources, states resort to war, blackmail, baiting states into waging war on each other while standing aside, and engaging competitors in long and costly conflicts.  When acting to forestall other states’ expansion, a great power can either try to inveigle a third party into coping with the threat (i.e. buck-pass) or balance against the threat themselves.  While buck-passing is often preferred as the lower-cost strategy, balancing becomes more likely, ceteris paribus, the more proximate the menacing state and the greater its relative capabilities.  In addition to moving Mearsheimer’s focus to the regional level, the introduction of the ‘stopping power’ of water also leads to his making different predictions of state behavior depending on where it is located.  While the theory applies to great powers in general, Mearsheimer distinguishes between different kinds: continental and island great powers, and regional hegemons.  A continental great power will seek regional hegemony but, when it is unable to achieve this dominance, such a state will still maximize its relative power to the extent possible.  An insular state, ‘the only great power on a large body of land that is surrounded on all sides by water’, will balance against the rising states rather than try to be a regional hegemon itself. Accordingly, states such as the United Kingdom act as offshore balancers, intervening only when a continental power is near to achieving primacy.  The third kind of great power in Mearsheimer’s theory is a regional hegemon such as the United States. A regional hegemon is a status quo state that will seek to defend the current favorable distribution of capabilities.  Mearsheimer’s theory provides a structural explanation of great power war, suggesting that ‘the main causes are located in the architecture of the international system’.  What matters most is the number of great powers and how much power each [great power] controls’. Great power wars are least likely in bipolarity, where the system only contains two great powers because there are fewer potential conflict dyads: imbalances of power are much less likely and miscalculations leading to failures of deterrence are less common. While multipolarity is, in general, more war-prone than bipolarity, some multipolar power configurations are more dangerous than others.  Great power wars are most likely when multipolar systems are unbalanced; that is, when there is a marked difference in capabilities between the first and the second states in the system such that the most powerful possesses the means to bid for hegemony. Mearsheimer hypothesizes that the three possible system architectures range from unbalanced multipolarity’s war- proneness to bipolarity’s peacefulness, with balanced multipolarity falling somewhere in between. THEORIES 0F INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REALISM-6 VARIANTS OF REALIST THEORY E. RISE AND FALL REALISM  Rise and fall realism sees the rules and practices of the international system as being determined by the wishes of the leading (i.e. most powerful) state.  Since considerable benefit accrues to the leader, other great powers seek this pole position. Rise and fall realism explains how states first rise to and then fall from this leading position, and the consequences of that trajectory for foreign policies.  In particular, the approach is concerned with the onset of great power wars that often mark the transition from one leader to the next. The microfoundation that explains this behavior is rational choice.  Given a narrowing of the gap between the first- and the second-ranked states, the leader will calculate the need for preventive action. Failing that, the challenger will opt for a war to displace the current leader.  Perhaps the best (and best-known) work in the rise and fall tradition is Robert Gilpin’s War and Change in World Politics. Gilpin suggests that ‘the fundamental nature of IR has not changed over the millennia. International relations continue to be a recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of anarchy.’  Domestic and international developments lead to states growing at different rates, and as states rise and fall relative to one another, conflict ensues.  States choose to engage in conflict because they calculate that the benefits of doing so exceed its costs.  In particular, because the international system is created by and for the leading power in the system, changes in power lead to conflict over system leadership.  Gilpin suggests that these dynamics have always applied to relations among states, and hence his framework is applicable to a wide swathe of human history.  Organski’s (1968) power transition theory also argues that differential rates of growth cause wars over system leadership.  Power transition theory was introduced by A. F. K. Organski and originally presented as part of his textbook, World Politics (1958).  The theory was further refined by Organski and Jack Kugler (1980), who examine the behaviour of great powers and theorize the causes of war. Reflecting on the stability of the international order and the causes of war is a conventional realist preoccupation. However, power transition theory is distinctly different from much of realist theory.  In Margit Bussmann and John R. Oneal’s succinct formulation, power transition theory ‘is constructed on three fundamental claims:  the internal growth of nations influences international politics,  world politics is characterized by hierarchy rather than anarchy,  and relative power and evaluations of the international status quo are important determinants of interstate wars’.  In contrast to balance of power theory, power transition theory claims that instability is most likely when relative parity characterizes the relations among potential competitors. The set-up of power transition theory is a pyramid of power, with a dominant power on top and other great powers, among them a potential future challenger, lower in the pyramid. Stability is secured if the satisfied great powers align themselves with the dominant power. Instability is likely if a dissatisfied challenger great power reaches rough parity with the dominant power.  In the first place, the logic of power transition theory has been illustrated by historical examples. The emergence of Germany as a great power at the beginning of the 20th century and the emergence of the USSR as a superpower after World War II are two oft-cited examples. F. NEOCLASSICAL REALISM  There has been an attempt recently to frame a realist theory that combines within one analytical framework the best elements of neorealism with those of classical realism.  Like the versions of realism already discussed, this one rests upon the assumption that IR is basically an anarchical system. It draws upon neorealism, and that of Waltz in particular, by acknowledging the significance of the structure of the international state system and the relative power of states. It also draws upon classical realism, and Morgenthau and Kissinger in particular, by emphasizing the importance of leadership and foreign policy.  Neoclassical realism departs from both of these basic realist approaches, however, by attempting to come up with a realist theory that can respond positively to some of the arguments associated with liberalism.   In part responding to what were perceived as the antireductionist excesses of neorealism, neoclassical realism suggests that what states do depends in large part on domestically derived preferences. For example, Schweller insists that acknowledging and including different state motivations best serve realism.  Neoclassical realists stress a wider range of revisionist motives than classical realism’s earlier reliance on human nature: ‘things happen in world politics because some actors – thanks to domestic structure and institutions, ideology, and ambitions – practice disruptive and predatory strategies’.  One prominent version of neoclassical realism is Schweller’s (1993, 1994, 1996, 1998) ‘balance of interests’ theory, which develops a typology based on whether states are primarily motivated by, and the extent of, their fear and greed. Thus, states rationally decide foreign policies depending on a combination of power and interests.  In addition to emphasizing the distinction between status quo and revisionist states, neoclassical realists also focus on the domestic ‘transmission belt’ connecting resource endowments and power (Schweller 2006: 6).  Neoclassical realists agree that material capabilities and the distribution of power are the starting points for an analysis of international outco