HR OPS EXPERIENCE PG. 10-17.pdf

By Lt. Bill Ross It was the last night on company for Lt. Bob Cloud; he was retiring the next day. Sometime after 2000 hours, the tones went off in Station 2. As we were heading to the trucks, the dispatcher said the address: 240 Parsons Avenue, State Highway Patrol Building, on a report of a fire w...

By Lt. Bill Ross It was the last night on company for Lt. Bob Cloud; he was retiring the next day. Sometime after 2000 hours, the tones went off in Station 2. As we were heading to the trucks, the dispatcher said the address: 240 Parsons Avenue, State Highway Patrol Building, on a report of a fire with multiple calls. This was a strong indication that there would be a fire when we arrived. E-3 was on the east side of the station and made it out first, with L-2, R-2, E-2, and Batt-1 close behind. On my arrival, we circled the building and gave a run-down of a working fire on the top floor of a six-story heavy timber construction building. Due to the type of building and the size of the fire present, the Chief called for a second alarm. The building was being renovated and was soon to become the Columbus Health Department. Because of these renovations, some of the building's systems were out of service at the time of the fire, including the standpipe system. The building was built in the 1890s and was the former State Highway Patrol building. Since it was a state building, CFD did not conduct building inspections or do walk-throughs. The layout was learned on the fly. As E-3 crew worked through the building from north to south looking for the stairwell, we were advised that the FDC and stand-pipe system were down. My thought at that point was to find the stairs and ascend to the fifth floor, unpack our high-rise pack, and stretch it back down the stairs to be pieced in from the next arriving companies. Our high-rise hose, SB nozzle with stacked tips, and a stand-pipe bag that we no longer needed since the stand-pipe was out of service. S ferent assignments upon arrival. E-2 and L-2 were directed to the rear to begin fire attack, and R-2 was assigned to search. We had to wait for additional companies to arrive to complete our stretch and put water on the fire. This is where it got interesting. None of the incoming crews heard our request to piece in the line we had stretched in the stairwell, or they already had a plan of their own and were executing that. Needless to say, our line was not completed until well into the fire. I watched two different , and into the fire area only to be driven out due to the extreme fire conditions. By this time our SCBAs had been breathed down to the alarm bell, and we retreated to the resource floor for new cylinders. I met BN-3 Chief Devine on the resource floor and talked to him he said he would make it happen. By the time that line was completed the fire was beyond hand line control; crews were then backed out and ladder pipes were used for the knock down. The fire progressed into the next morning with a call-in of the next unit coming on duty. The lessons learned from this operation are as follows: 1. Make sure everyone is on the same page. We were thinking high-rise operations, and other companies were thinking residential hand line tactics. Second Edition 01/11/22 2 2. Based on our current SOPs, E-3, E-2, and L-2 should have teamed up to form the Fire Attack Group. We would have had plenty of hose to make the stretch and the manpower to piece it into the engines at street level. 3. Just because you have a standpipe does not mean you will use it. 4. If we wanted our line pieced in, we should have done it ourselves. It would have taken ted wye. 5. With no rescue problem, we could have used L-2 as an elevated waterway. After the Fire, Columbus Health Department Night of the fire, building undergoing renovation Second Edition 01/11/22 3 By Lt. Tim Wyckoff In early 2017, I was still a firefighter riding OOC, just prior to my promotion. While working at Station 1 on a beautiful weekend day, we were sent to 111 N. 4th St. (commonly known as the AT&T building). At 0925, we had just finished checking the trucks and were headed upstairs when they sent out a Fire Alarm at the building. As we pulled up, we were met by the building maintenance members who quickly stated that the alarm was a false and we could cancel, which we did. At 0939, a second run was dispatched to the same address, except this time it was a report of a fire. As we walked into the lobby, everyone who looked like they belonged in the building was talking at a ridiculous pace, to anyone who even looked like a firefighter. This was the first indication that something was wrong. The second indication was that the building engineers explained that AEP was switching them from an old electrical underground transformer to a new one, and the electric to the entire building was down. The fire occurred while they were trying to start their back-up generators. The head of maintenance also explained that since the electric was down and they had no backup power, they had no working elevators, no fire pump, and nothing in the building was working. He also explained that two other members of his team would meet us on the 14th floor; they were trying to put the fire out. At this point we had a lot of unknowns and very little we could actually confirm. Unknown fire problem, unknown rescue problem, and unknown water and access issues. Adding to the list of problems was that we had only arrived with a single engine and single ladder both at minimum staffing; the second engine was dealing with a mechanical issue which developed after we took the alarm. Second Edition 01/11/22 4 The new high-rise SOP had recently been developed and put in place, but we felt the best option at the time was to re-con the situation and get some realistic idea of how bad the situation was. We could then either escalate the alarm situation or de-escalate the response. We elected to climb the stairs (the only option), begin to set up the operations floor, and begin to set up for the rest of the event. As we headed for the stairwell, M-1 established lobby control and began to collect additional information for the later arriving companies. On the way up the stairs, we updated the incoming companies, reported the floors we were at, and attempted to maintain contact with the IC. At the 7th floor we were all pretty tired. With so many unknowns about the situation, we felt that getting to the fire floor ASAP was necessary to gather good information and to make sure we were in the right stairwell to make the attack, if in fact there was a fire. We elected to create a small gear cache on the landing between 7 and 8 and continue up with more speed. Upon reaching the 13 th floor, we checked the hallway and stairwell for smoke; we then went to 14 and did the same. The hallway and adjoining large room were clear except for a slight haze, but the adjoining room had two sets of double doors back-toback. The first set was open, but the second set was closed. When I opened the door, black smoke was banked down to the floor and fire rolled across the ceiling. I immediately shut the door! I then returned to the stairwell, where I was met by the rest of my crew who had reached the top of the steps. I quickly conferred with Capt. Anderson, advised him of what we had, and sent my nozzle-man back to retrieve the rest of the gear. We radioed out to command to advise him we had a working fire, and that we would be establishing the initial attack group. We also advised him we were connecting to the standpipe and preparing for the attack. While waiting for the gear, we emptied several extinguishers on the burning generator and the pit below it; this helped the situation but did not put the fire out completely. After hearing on the radio, the driver from E-1 made the connection to the FDC outside, secured a water supply from E-9, and began pumping water into the system. The engine driver had gone to see if they could get the fire pump running with the maintenance personnel and re-con the extent of the problem. It is important to note here that as soon as we had the line flaked out and were preparing to connect the hose, the nozzle-man from E-9 opened the standpipe valve to flush the connection; we had water. We made the decision to use the standpipe connection on the fire floor and the hallway available to stretch the line and lay it out. We selected this outlet due to the size of the fire and the protection afforded us by the multiple sets of doors between us and the fire. At this point, the incident de-escalated quickly. We were able to get the line in a good spot to cool the room and the generator and put the fire out. L-1 was able to complete the search of the immediate area; by that time, we were quickly met by companies arriving from the lobby, who then took over and allowed us to take a break. Second Edition 01/11/22 5 This fire did not go perfectly, but there are plenty of lessons to take away from the event. We had several members on this fire who did jobs that normally would not have been designated to them. They performed really well under the circumstances, making the event far less serious than it could have been. Big lessons to me: 1. Spend a little more time in the lobby to gather information and set up a stronger command structure with clear objectives. 2. If you encounter problems with building systems, especially elevators or the fire pump, consider upgrading the alarm or calling for additional resources. 3. Review the lobby control objectives with every member and attempt to designate a lobby control company early in the incident. 4. Flush the connection; we did and had no issues but it is easy to forget in the excitement of the event. 5. If you are climbing the steps to the attack, consider removing your helmet and hood and hanging them on your coat. Open your coats to increase ventilation and reduce firefighter fatigue. 6. Firefighters need to have one free hand to assist in climbing the stairwell by grabbing the railing. 7. Officers should consider carrying more than one radio with spare batteries for monitoring multiple talk-groups, or as an extra to use if one goes dead. 8. Officers should also consider carrying a large marker in their pocket. This could be used to mark areas you have entered, or to create make-shift accountability boards in or near the stairwell on the walls if necessary. 9. Call for help early. Second Edition 01/11/22 6 By Lt. Shawn McConnell It was approximately 0640 hrs on the morning of March 19th, 2019. E-8, L-8, E-15, and BN-1 were dispatched on a Fire Alarm to 1445 E. Broad St. It was an address well known by the crews, as we had taken many runs to the building and had conducted several training sessions over the years. This building presents some unique challenges, since it does not have sprinklers or standpipes. It also has a large setback from the street, and limited access for apparatus. The building is a 6story mid-rise residential apartment building with three different wings (A, B, and C). Constructed in 1938, the building is well built and very compartmentalized, essentially bullet proof. The residents are comprised of mostly elderly occupants. I was riding as the officer of E-15, and as we were making our way up Nelson Rd. the dispatcher reported that this was now going to be a working fire assignment. The dispatcher informed crews en route that they had received multiple calls, reporting that there was a fire on one of the upper floors. Given the time of day, I knew that there was going to be a high life hazard as most occupants would still be sleeping. As E-15 was turning onto Broad, E-8 arrived on scene and Lt. Doug Adkins gave a rundown. E-8 reported heavy fire showing from a 3rd floor window in the C wing, and requested a second alarm be started. E- initial plan of attack was to stretch the bed of 1 up the stairs to the fire floor. Responding crews were very familiar with the building due to the extensive pre-planning and trainings that had been conducted here. Eknew that with the engine parked in front of the building top floor and all apartments within the building. Crews would be able to the maximize the length of the hose via a well stretch vertically up the center of the open stairwell. Captain Brian Rosko on L-8 that shift, reported that there was heavy smoke and multiple victims exiting the rear stairwell on the back side of Building C. Recognizing that the initial medical response would not be enough, he requested five additional medics be added for treatment and transport. L-8 pulled in via the west driveway in order to set up their aerial for rescue. E-15 backed into the scene via the east driveway to E-8; this was done so we could ne out to the hydrant on the opposite side of Broad St. By performing a reverse lay, we could quickly secure a . This presented its own challenges as citizens on their way to work that morning continually drove over the supply line. BN-1 had realized en route that Broad Street would need to be shut down and had called for CPD to direct traffic away from the scene. With the initial assignment in position, incoming companies would now be faced with limited access to the building. Second Edition 01/11/22 7 As the pump operator and one member of E-15 established a water supply, the other member and I headed up to help E-8 crew with the hose advancement. Lt. Adkins had made entry ahead of the line to recon the fire floor and ensure that the door to the fire apartment was closed. While his crew was deploying the line to the front door and getting ready to make entry, I was assessing the scene and fire conditions. I met with Captain Rosko, and we briefly discussed performing a transitional attack prior to E-8 crew advancing the initial line inside. At this point, fire was now auto-exposing from the fire apartment on three and into the fourth floor above. I directed E-8 crew to bring their hose line over and flow water into the third floor window since it was already charged. At the same time, my other firefighter from E-15 was pulling E-8 litz line as well. This would allow us to continue to flow water into the fire apartment from the exterior, freeing up the initial attack line to advance into the structure. With the blitz line taking over the transitional attack, Evia the stairwell to the fire floor. The transitional attack had worked well in darkening down the fire and keeping it from extending beyond the initial fire apartment to the fourth floor. Captain Rosko announced the strategy over the radio to keep all companies informed of the change in tactics from transitional to interior. Once E-8 and L-8 had the fire knocked down, they radioed out informing the crews on scene they had water on the fire and an all clear in the fire apartment. E-15 crew moved inside to start search and evacuation of the floors above with L-15 and E-9. Lt. Adkins was reporting that there were heavy smoke conditions on the floors above due to the open stairwell. We ascended the stairs searching for victims and simultaneously getting an all clear on the floors above. Occupants were forced to self-evacuate down the attack stairs due to the rear/evacuation stairwell being full of smoke as well. When possible, crews made the decision to have some occupants shelter in place as it would be safer than the smoke-filled stairwells. Ventilation was eventually set up in the stairwells and conditions improved. With the improved conditions in the stairwells, E-15 was able to evacuate a man and his dog who otherwise were about to be rescued via L. Overall, the fire went fairly well due to the adaptability of the crews on scene. KEY TAKEAWAYS: 1. Adaptability of crews. Although we trained and pre-planned for a fire in this building, it was not executed exactly the way we had trained. Due to the fire being on a lower floor and the fire extending up the exterior, the decision to perform a transitional attack was the right call. Fast water on the fire allowed the bulk of the fire to be knocked down, giving crews time to advance to the third floor fire apartment and evacuate occupants. 2. Size-up and call for additional alarms. Crews recognized the high life hazard upon arrival and the call for a 2nd Alarm in their rundown was made early. Based on an obvious working fire and the potential need for evacuation and treatment of multiple victims, calling for resources early will get you the crews needed to adapt and overcome as situations arise. 3. Water supply. Second due engines should always be ready to reverse lay to the hydrant to maximize their water supply. This also gives you the added benefit of pumping in series should the first engine fail. The need for pressure in a high-rise will generally be greater Second Edition 01/11/22 8 than a typical house fire. This can be especially true when the building does not have any fire protection systems in place. 4. Shelter in place. If the conditions allow for sheltering occupants in place, this is a great alternative to evacuating during the initial fire attack. There is no need to put occupants in danger or expose them to hazardous conditions if they can safely stay in their apartments until the fire is under control. However, consideration has to be given for the occupants above the fire as CO can build rapidly if ventilation is not performed in a timely manner. 5. Accountability. On an incident like this there were multiple crews performing numerous tasks in the building at the same time. Incident Command did a great job of setting up divisions and groups to manage and track crews while in the hazard zone. Second Edition 01/11/22 9