GOV 1790 Final Exam Study Guide PDF

C: Unipolarity and its discontents - Hegemony and the Liberal International Order - Kindleberger, “Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy” - Hegemonic stability theory – international order provided as a public good in the internati...

C: Unipolarity and its discontents - Hegemony and the Liberal International Order - Kindleberger, “Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy” - Hegemonic stability theory – international order provided as a public good in the international system - Fazal, “The Return of Conquest? Why the Future of Global Order Hinges on Ukraine” - Norm = standard of appropriate behavior; changes, dependent on identity - Russia invading Ukraine challenged the norm of self-determination - Important implication – if you let the norm be broken, what does that imply for the future? Borders become less secure worldwide - Anti-Americanism - Datta, “The Decline of America’s Soft Power in the United Nations” - Negative relationship between anti-Americanism + America’s soft power - Correlation between increasing anti-American sentiment and decrease in in-line votes with the US in the UN general assembly - Flynn et. al, “Building Trust: the Effect of US Troop Deployments on Public Opinion in Peru” - Military deployments for humanitarian purposes improve perceptions of the US military and government in the host country - Areas in Peru receiving more non-disaster aid → less anti-Americanism - The Rise of China - Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” - 6 possible directions for China’s rise - Realist optimists = China’s power limited, pessimist = China’s power rising - Liberal optimist = interdependence, pessimist = authoritarian regime - Constructivist optimist = softening (institutional contact), pessimist = hardening (shocks and crises) - Nathan and Scobell, “How China Sees America: The Sum of Beijing’s Fears” - Clash between US and China based around China’s perception of US intentions as bad and not in China’s interest – won’t be hegemon unless US withdraws - Four rings - China - domestic stability and territorial integrity threatened - Neighbors sharing borders (14) - no overlap in core national interests - Surrounding geopolitical regions (6) - complex security problems - World beyond immediate neighborhood - need to gain market access - Nationalism in East Asia - Ko, “Not So Dangerous? Nationalism and Foreign Policy Preference” - Popular nationalism = public phenomenon where nationalistic populace’s preferences emerge and manifest - Nationalism; break down identity by celebrating self or distancing from other - Adverse foreign policy preferences (hawkish) stoked when invoking nationalism irt negative historical memory (the Other)  - Masterson, “Catching Fire: How National Humiliation Spreads Hostile Foreign Policy Preferences on Chinese Social Media” - National humiliation = powerful force for stoking hawkish FP sentiment; distinct dimension to Chinese nationalism - Nationalism matters due to emotional contagion – emotions spread within identity groups → emotional aggregation, creates shift in policy preferences - NATO and Alliances - Meijer and Brooks, “Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Own Security if the U.S. Pulls Back” - If US withdraws, Europe can’t achieve strategic autonomy vs. Russia due to strategic cacophony (threat perception) + defense capacity shortfalls - US as the hegemon in NATO, facilitate cooperation + contain cacophony - Izumikawa, “Network Connections and the Emergence of the Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System in East Asia” - Hub-and-spokes system: US in E. Asia due to social exchange theory (reluctance to strengthen ties between spokes when US already provides) - Interconnected web: NATO, all actors engaging with each other D: The logics of political violence - Terrorism - Mueller, “Six Rather Unusual Propositions About Terrorism” - 1. Terrorism generally only has limited direct effects - 2. Costs of terrorism come from fear + subsequent overreaction - 3. Terrorism industry is a major part of the terrorism problem - 4. Policies should focus on reducing fear + anxiety, not the actual terror - 5. Doing nothing (or avoiding overreacting) after an attack is acceptable - 6. Despite US overreaction, campaign on terror is going really well - Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism” - Terrorists as rational strategic actors with political objectives - Choose timing + targets, have broadly nationalist goals - Cheap talk won’t work; use terrorism as costly signal to coerce govs - Suicide terrorism rising bc it works – get concessions from the government - Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy” - Seek social solidarity, not explicit political goals; develop strong ties - Consistent + stable goals → protean political goals, terrorist fratricide, never-ending terrorism - Evaluate options → reflexively uncompromising, terrorism as a first resort - Superior political return → coercive ineffectiveness, anonymous attacks - Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism” - Terrorism = costly signaling; too weak to impose directly, get gov reaction - Attrition = convincing gov of power and resolve - Spoiling = ruining trustworthiness with gov - Intimidation = convincing pop of power to punish them - Outbidding = convincing pop of resolve vs. other groups  - Provocation = trustworthiness w/ pop by inducing gov to overreact - Counterinsurgency and Asymmetric Conflict - Malkasian, “The Obama Administration and the Decision to Surge” - Counterinsurgency = fighting against a non-state actor that is engaging in insurgent activities - Difficult for many reasons - Eating soup with a knife – teaching militaries to do things they weren’t trained for (opportunity costs!) - Differential interests – clash between US and locals - Credible commitment problem – interests of foreign intervening powers in ending an insurgency is lower than the interests of the insurgents themselves to keep fighting - Byman, “A War They Are Both Losing: Israel, Hamas and the Plight of Gaza” - COIN cares about civilians, violence management = American casualties - Not solving problems/rebuilding gov, just degrading other sides - Hamas: hurt own cause, military infrastructure destroyed - Israel: hasn’t beat Hamas, no exit strategy → forever war E: Arms control-alt-delete - Nuclear Weapons - Waltz, “More May Be Better” - Nuclear proliferation is a good thing - 1. International politics is a self-help system - 2. Nukes make miscalculation difficult – war less likely to occur - 3. New nuclear states will feel the constraints felt by current ones - Key assumption: states primarily rely on their own power and capabilities to ensure survival; nukes + mutually-assured destruction as a deterrent - Sukin, “Credible Nuclear Security Commitments Can Backfire: Explaining Domestic Support for Nuclear Weapons Acquisition in South Korea” - Unwanted use theory = as credibility of a nuclear security guarantee increases, so does support in the client state for nuclear acquisition - Can’t decrease alliance strength or constrain the ally - To avoid unwanted use of nuclear weapons, client state will take the acquisition of nuclear weapons into their own hands - Drones and Emerging Technologies - Schwartz et. al, “Do Armed Drones Counter Terrorism, Or Are They Counter Productive? Evidence from 18 Countries” - Very effective in counterterrorism – disrupt + degrade terrorist orgs - Optimist: reduce country’s vulnerability by disrupting + degrading - Pessimist: provoke higher levels of terrorism by causing civilian blowback + empowering low-level militants w/ greater preferences for violence - Lin-Greenberg, “The Remote Revolution: Drones and Modern Statecraft” - Remote revolution = shift in how states compete on the international stage ← tech reducing the human cost of military operations - More frequent confrontations, but remain low in intensity - Moral hazard effect = lower cost→might take actions they otherwise wouldn’t - Increased incidence logic (lower threshold) + surge in shootdowns - Escalation control effect = limit intensity, prevent broader conflicts - Restrained retaliation logic + tempered targeting logic -