Police Detective Investigator Promotional Exam 2024 PDF

POLICE DETECTIVE INVESTIGATOR PROMOTIONAL EXAM MONDAY, JULY 1, 2024 0900 HOURS HENRY B. GONZALEZ CONVENTION CENTER 900 E. MARKET ST. HEMISFAIR BALLROOM PHOTO IDENTIFICATION WILL BE REQUIRED NO CELL PHONES, ELECTRONIC DEVICES, HATS, BACKPACKS, BOOKS, FOOD or DRINKS WILL BE PERMITTED IN EXAM ROOM All of the material contained in the study packet provided to candidates is considered to be complete. Any updated materials outside the contents of this packet are not considered for exam purposes (updated and/or amended laws, rules, procedures, etc). Candidates are responsible to check the packet and ensure that all pages are included. Notice to Promotional Candidates A portion of the CCP, Penal Code and SAPD General Manual has been replicated for the convenience of those officers studying for and taking the promotional examination for the rank of Detective Investigator for the City of San Antonio, Police Department. Any errors found in the following material, when compared to the published version, are entirely unintentional. The materials provided for each candidate are meant to be accurate representations of the original documents. Should errors be found, candidates are advised that the materials contained in this packet are the exact same materials supplied to the contracted testing consultant to be used in preparing the promotional examination. Candidates taking the examination are advised to study the materials contained in this packet and be prepared to respond to questions on the examination based on the materials supplied by the Training Academy. The promotional examination will be based on the supplied materials. Any questions related to the materials contained in this packet may be directed to the undersigned. Good luck to all. Captain Robert Vara Training Academy Commander (210) 207-6210 Penal Code PENAL CODE TITLE 2. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY CHAPTER 6. CULPABILITY GENERALLY Sec. 6.01. REQUIREMENT OF VOLUNTARY ACT OR OMISSION. (a) A person commits an offense only if he voluntarily engages in conduct, including an act, an omission, or possession. (b) Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly obtains or receives the thing possessed or is aware of his control of the thing for a sufficient time to permit him to terminate his control. (c) A person who omits to perform an act does not commit an offense unless a law as defined by Section 1.07 provides that the omission is an offense or otherwise provides that he has a duty to perform the act. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 913, ch. 342, Sec. 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1975; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 3, Sec. 1, eff. Feb. 25, 1993; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. (a) Except as Sec. 6.02. REQUIREMENT OF CULPABILITY. provided in Subsection (b), a person does not commit an offense unless he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence engages in conduct as the definition of the offense requires. (b) If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, a culpable mental state is nevertheless required unless the definition plainly dispenses with any mental element. (c) If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, but one is nevertheless required under Subsection (b), intent, knowledge, or recklessness suffices to establish criminal responsibility. (d) Culpable mental states are classified according to relative degrees, from highest to lowest, as follows: (1) intentional; (2) knowing; (3) reckless; (4) criminal negligence. (e) Proof of a higher degree of culpability than that charged Page - 1 - constitutes proof of the culpability charged. (f) An offense defined by municipal ordinance or by order of a county commissioners court may not dispense with the requirement of a culpable mental state if the offense is punishable by a fine exceeding the amount authorized by Section 12.23. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Amended by: Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch. 1219 (H.B. 970), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2005. Sec. 6.03. DEFINITIONS OF CULPABLE MENTAL STATES. (a) A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. (b) A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. (c) A person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. (d) A person acts with criminal negligence, or is criminally negligent, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Page -2 - Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Sec. 6.04. CAUSATION: CONDUCT AND RESULTS. (a) A person is criminally responsible if the result would not have occurred but for his conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient. (b) A person is nevertheless criminally responsible for causing a result if the only difference between what actually occurred and what he desired, contemplated, or risked is that: (1) a different offense was committed; or (2) a different person or property was injured, harmed, or otherwise affected. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Page -3 - PENAL CODE TITLE 2. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY CHAPTER 8. GENERAL DEFENSES TO CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY Sec. 8.01. INSANITY. (a) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the conduct charged, the actor, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, did not know that his conduct was wrong. (b) The term "mental disease or defect" does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1983, 68th Leg., p. 2640, ch. 454, Sec. 1, eff. Aug. 29, 1983; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Sec. 8.02. MISTAKE OF FACT. (a) It is a defense to prosecution that the actor through mistake formed a reasonable belief about a matter of fact if his mistaken belief negated the kind of culpability required for commission of the offense. (b) Although an actor's mistake of fact may constitute a defense to the offense charged, he may nevertheless be convicted of any lesser included offense of which he would be guilty if the fact were as he believed. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Sec. 8.03. MISTAKE OF LAW. (a) It is no defense to prosecution that the actor was ignorant of the provisions of any law after the law has taken effect. (b) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that the actor reasonably believed the conduct charged did not constitute a crime and that he acted in reasonable reliance upon: (1) an official statement of the law contained in a written order or grant of permission by an administrative agency charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in question; or (2) a written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a court of record or made by a public official charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in question. Page - 1 - (c) Although an actor's mistake of law may constitute a defense to the offense charged, he may nevertheless be convicted of a lesser included offense of which he would be guilty if the law were as he believed. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Sec. 8.04. INTOXICATION. (a) Voluntary intoxication does not constitute a defense to the commission of crime. (b) Evidence of temporary insanity caused by intoxication may be introduced by the actor in mitigation of the penalty attached to the offense for which he is being tried. (c) When temporary insanity is relied upon as a defense and the evidence tends to show that such insanity was caused by intoxication, the court shall charge the jury in accordance with the provisions of this section. (d) For purposes of this section "intoxication" means disturbance of mental or physical capacity resulting from the introduction of any substance into the body. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Sec. 8.05. DURESS. (a) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that the actor engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was compelled to do so by threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury to himself or another. (b) In a prosecution for an offense that does not constitute a felony, it is an affirmative defense to prosecution that the actor engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was compelled to do so by force or threat of force. (c) Compulsion within the meaning of this section exists only if the force or threat of force would render a person of reasonable firmness incapable of resisting the pressure. (d) The defense provided by this section is unavailable if the actor intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be subjected to compulsion. (e) It is no defense that a person acted at the command or persuasion of his spouse, unless he acted under compulsion that Page -2 - would establish a defense under this section. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Sec. 8.06. ENTRAPMENT. (a) It is a defense to prosecution that the actor engaged in the conduct charged because he was induced to do so by a law enforcement agent using persuasion or other means likely to cause persons to commit the offense. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment. (b) In this section "law enforcement agent" includes personnel of the state and local law enforcement agencies as well as of the United States and any person acting in accordance with instructions from such agents. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Sec. 8.07. AGE AFFECTING CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. (a) A person may not be prosecuted for or convicted of any offense that the person committed when younger than 15 years of age except: (1) perjury and aggravated perjury when it appears by proof that the person had sufficient discretion to understand the nature and obligation of an oath; (2) a violation of a penal statute cognizable under Chapter 729, Transportation Code, except for conduct for which the person convicted may be sentenced to imprisonment or confinement in jail; (3) a violation of a motor vehicle traffic ordinance of an incorporated city or town in this state; (4) a misdemeanor punishable by fine only; (5) a violation of a penal ordinance of a political subdivision; (6) a violation of a penal statute that is, or is a lesser included offense of, a capital felony, an aggravated controlled substance felony, or a felony of the first degree for which the person is transferred to the court under Section 54.02, Family Code, for prosecution if the person committed the offense when 14 years of age or older; or (7) a capital felony or an offense under Section 19.02 Page -3 - for which the person is transferred to the court under Section 54.02(j)(2)(A), Family Code. (b) Unless the juvenile court waives jurisdiction under Section 54.02, Family Code, and certifies the individual for criminal prosecution or the juvenile court has previously waived jurisdiction under that section and certified the individual for criminal prosecution, a person may not be prosecuted for or convicted of any offense committed before reaching 17 years of age except an offense described by Subsections (a)(1)-(5). (c) No person may, in any case, be punished by death for an offense committed while the person was younger than 18 years. (d) Notwithstanding Subsection (a), a person may not be prosecuted for or convicted of an offense described by Subsection (a)(4) or (5) that the person committed when younger than 10 years of age. (e) A person who is at least 10 years of age but younger than 15 years of age is presumed incapable of committing an offense described by Subsection (a)(4) or (5). This presumption may be refuted if the prosecution proves to the court by a preponderance of the evidence that the actor had sufficient capacity to understand that the conduct engaged in was wrong at the time the conduct was engaged in. The prosecution is not required to prove that the actor at the time of engaging in the conduct knew that the act was a criminal offense or knew the legal consequences of the offense. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 2158, ch. 693, Sec. 24, eff. Sept. 1, 1975; Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 1040, Sec. 26, eff. Sept. 1, 1987; Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 1245, Sec. 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1989; Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 169, Sec. 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1991; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Amended by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 262, Sec. 77, eff. Jan. 1, 1996; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 165, Sec. 30.236, eff. Sept. 1, 1997; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 822, Sec. 4, eff. Sept. 1, 1997; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 1086, Sec. 42, eff. Sept. 1, 1997; Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1297, Sec. 68, eff. Sept. 1, 2001; Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 283, Sec. 52, eff. Sept. 1, 2003. Amended by: Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch. 787 (S.B. 60), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2005. Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch. 949 (H.B. 1575), Sec. 45, eff. Page -4 - September Acts September Acts September Acts September 1, 2005. 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 311 (H.B. 558), Sec. 5, eff. 1, 2009. 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1407 (S.B. 393), Sec. 17, eff. 1, 2013. 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 425 (H.B. 1819), Sec. 7, eff. 1, 2023. Sec. 8.08. CHILD WITH MENTAL ILLNESS, DISABILITY, OR LACK OF CAPACITY. (a) On motion by the state, the defendant, or a person standing in parental relation to the defendant, or on the court's own motion, a court with jurisdiction of an offense described by Section 8.07(a)(4) or (5) shall determine whether probable cause exists to believe that a child, including a child with a mental illness or developmental disability: (1) lacks the capacity to understand the proceedings in criminal court or to assist in the child's own defense and is unfit to proceed; or (2) lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of the child's own conduct or to conform the child's conduct to the requirement of the law. (b) If the court determines that probable cause exists for a finding under Subsection (a), after providing notice to the state, the court may dismiss the complaint. (c) A dismissal of a complaint under Subsection (b) may be appealed as provided by Article 44.01, Code of Criminal Procedure. Text of subsection effective until January 01, 2025 (d) In this section, "child" has the meaning assigned by Article 45.058(h), Code of Criminal Procedure. Text of subsection effective on January 01, 2025 (d) In this section, "child" has the meaning assigned by Article 45A.453(a), Code of Criminal Procedure. Added by Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1407 (S.B. 393), Sec. 18, eff. September 1, 2013. Amended by: Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 765 (H.B. 4504), Sec. 2.154, eff. January 1, 2025. Page -5 - PENAL CODE TITLE 2. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY CHAPTER 9. JUSTIFICATION EXCLUDING CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY SUBCHAPTER A. GENERAL PROVISIONS Sec. 9.01. DEFINITIONS. In this chapter: (1) "Custody" has the meaning assigned by Section 38.01. (2) "Escape" has the meaning assigned by Section 38.01. (3) "Deadly force" means force that is intended or known by the actor to cause, or in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury. (4) "Habitation" has the meaning assigned by Section 30.01. (5) "Vehicle" has the meaning assigned by Section 30.01. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 293, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1997. Amended by: Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1 (S.B. 378), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2007. Sec. 9.02. JUSTIFICATION AS A DEFENSE. It is a defense to prosecution that the conduct in question is justified under this chapter. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Sec. 9.03. CONFINEMENT AS JUSTIFIABLE FORCE. Confinement is justified when force is justified by this chapter if the actor takes reasonable measures to terminate the confinement as soon as he knows he safely can unless the person confined has been arrested for an offense. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Sec. 9.04. THREATS AS JUSTIFIABLE FORCE. The threat of force is justified when the use of force is justified by this chapter. For purposes of this section, a threat to cause death or serious Page - 1 - bodily injury by the production of a weapon or otherwise, as long as the actor's purpose is limited to creating an apprehension that he will use deadly force if necessary, does not constitute the use of deadly force. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Sec. 9.05. RECKLESS INJURY OF INNOCENT THIRD PERSON. Even though an actor is justified under this chapter in threatening or using force or deadly force against another, if in doing so he also recklessly injures or kills an innocent third person, the justification afforded by this chapter is unavailable in a prosecution for the reckless injury or killing of the innocent third person. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Sec. 9.06. CIVIL REMEDIES UNAFFECTED. The fact that conduct is justified under this chapter does not abolish or impair any remedy for the conduct that is available in a civil suit. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. SUBCHAPTER B. JUSTIFICATION GENERALLY Sec. 9.21. PUBLIC DUTY. (a) Except as qualified by Subsections (b) and (c), conduct is justified if the actor reasonably believes the conduct is required or authorized by law, by the judgment or order of a competent court or other governmental tribunal, or in the execution of legal process. (b) The other sections of this chapter control when force is used against a person to protect persons (Subchapter C), to protect property (Subchapter D), for law enforcement (Subchapter E), or by virtue of a special relationship (Subchapter F). (c) The use of deadly force is not justified under this section unless the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is specifically required by statute or unless it occurs in the lawful conduct of war. If deadly force is so justified, there is no duty Page -2 - to retreat before using it. (d) The justification afforded by this section is available if the actor reasonably believes: (1) the court or governmental tribunal has jurisdiction or the process is lawful, even though the court or governmental tribunal lacks jurisdiction or the process is unlawful; or (2) his conduct is required or authorized to assist a public servant in the performance of his official duty, even though the servant exceeds his lawful authority. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Sec. 9.22. NECESSITY. Conduct is justified if: (1) the actor reasonably believes the conduct is immediately necessary to avoid imminent harm; (2) the desirability and urgency of avoiding the harm clearly outweigh, according to ordinary standards of reasonableness, the harm sought to be prevented by the law proscribing the conduct; and (3) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed for the conduct does not otherwise plainly appear. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. SUBCHAPTER C. PROTECTION OF PERSONS Sec. 9.31. SELF-DEFENSE. (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), a person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force. The actor's belief that the force was immediately necessary as described by this subsection is presumed to be reasonable if the actor: (1) knew or had reason to believe that the person against whom the force was used: (A) unlawfully and with force entered, or was attempting to enter unlawfully and with force, the actor's occupied habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment; (B) unlawfully and with force removed, or was Page -3 - attempting to remove unlawfully and with force, the actor from the actor's habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment; or (C) was committing or attempting to commit aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery; (2) did not provoke the person against whom the force was used; and (3) was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity, other than a Class C misdemeanor that is a violation of a law or ordinance regulating traffic at the time the force was used. (b) The use of force against another is not justified: (1) in response to verbal provocation alone; (2) to resist an arrest or search that the actor knows is being made by a peace officer, or by a person acting in a peace officer's presence and at his direction, even though the arrest or search is unlawful, unless the resistance is justified under Subsection (c); (3) if the actor consented to the exact force used or attempted by the other; (4) if the actor provoked the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force, unless: (A) the actor abandons the encounter, or clearly communicates to the other his intent to do so reasonably believing he cannot safely abandon the encounter; and (B) the other nevertheless continues or attempts to use unlawful force against the actor; or (5) if the actor sought an explanation from or discussion with the other person concerning the actor's differences with the other person while the actor was: (A) carrying a weapon in violation of Section 46.02; or (B) possessing or transporting a weapon in violation of Section 46.05. (c) The use of force to resist an arrest or search is justified: (1) if, before the actor offers any resistance, the peace officer (or person acting at his direction) uses or attempts to use greater force than necessary to make the arrest or search; and (2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the Page -4 - peace officer's (or other person's) use or attempted use of greater force than necessary. (d) The use of deadly force is not justified under this subchapter except as provided in Sections 9.32, 9.33, and 9.34. (e) A person who has a right to be present at the location where the force is used, who has not provoked the person against whom the force is used, and who is not engaged in criminal activity at the time the force is used is not required to retreat before using force as described by this section. (f) For purposes of Subsection (a), in determining whether an actor described by Subsection (e) reasonably believed that the use of force was necessary, a finder of fact may not consider whether the actor failed to retreat. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994; Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 190, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1995. Amended by: Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1 (S.B. 378), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2007. Sec. 9.32. DEADLY FORCE IN DEFENSE OF PERSON. (a) A person is justified in using deadly force against another: (1) if the actor would be justified in using force against the other under Section 9.31; and (2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary: (A) to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force; or (B) to prevent the other's imminent commission of aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery. (b) The actor's belief under Subsection (a)(2) that the deadly force was immediately necessary as described by that subdivision is presumed to be reasonable if the actor: (1) knew or had reason to believe that the person against whom the deadly force was used: (A) unlawfully and with force entered, or was attempting to enter unlawfully and with force, the actor's occupied habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment; (B) unlawfully and with force removed, or was attempting to remove unlawfully and with force, the actor from the Page -5 - actor's habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment; or (C) was committing or attempting to commit an offense described by Subsection (a)(2)(B); (2) did not provoke the person against whom the force was used; and (3) was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity, other than a Class C misdemeanor that is a violation of a law or ordinance regulating traffic at the time the force was used. (c) A person who has a right to be present at the location where the deadly force is used, who has not provoked the person against whom the deadly force is used, and who is not engaged in criminal activity at the time the deadly force is used is not required to retreat before using deadly force as described by this section. (d) For purposes of Subsection (a)(2), in determining whether an actor described by Subsection (c) reasonably believed that the use of deadly force was necessary, a finder of fact may not consider whether the actor failed to retreat. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1983, 68th Leg., p. 5316, ch. 977, Sec. 5, eff. Sept. 1, 1983; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994; Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 235, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1995. Amended by: Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1 (S.B. 378), Sec. 3, eff. September 1, 2007. Sec. 9.33. DEFENSE OF THIRD PERSON. A person is justified in using force or deadly force against another to protect a third person if: (1) under the circumstances as the actor reasonably believes them to be, the actor would be justified under Section 9.31 or 9.32 in using force or deadly force to protect himself against the unlawful force or unlawful deadly force he reasonably believes to be threatening the third person he seeks to protect; and (2) the actor reasonably believes that his intervention is immediately necessary to protect the third person. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Page -6 - Sec. 9.34. PROTECTION OF LIFE OR HEALTH. (a) A person is justified in using force, but not deadly force, against another when and to the degree he reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to prevent the other from committing suicide or inflicting serious bodily injury to himself. (b) A person is justified in using both force and deadly force against another when and to the degree he reasonably believes the force or deadly force is immediately necessary to preserve the other's life in an emergency. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Sec. 9.35. CERTAIN MEDICAL TREATMENT PROVIDED TO PREGNANT WOMAN. A physician or health care provider is justified in exercising reasonable medical judgment in providing medical treatment to a pregnant woman as described by Section 74.552, Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Added by Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 913 (H.B. 3058), Sec. 3, eff. September 1, 2023. SUBCHAPTER D. PROTECTION OF PROPERTY Sec. 9.41. PROTECTION OF ONE'S OWN PROPERTY. (a) A person in lawful possession of land or tangible, movable property is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to prevent or terminate the other's trespass on the land or unlawful interference with the property. (b) A person unlawfully dispossessed of land or tangible, movable property by another is justified in using force against the other when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to reenter the land or recover the property if the actor uses the force immediately or in fresh pursuit after the dispossession and: (1) the actor reasonably believes the other had no claim of right when he dispossessed the actor; or (2) the other accomplished the dispossession by using force, threat, or fraud against the actor. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Page -7 - Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Sec. 9.42. DEADLY FORCE TO PROTECT PROPERTY. A person is justified in using deadly force against another to protect land or tangible, movable property: (1) if he would be justified in using force against the other under Section 9.41; and (2) when and to the degree he reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary: (A) to prevent the other's imminent commission of arson, burglary, robbery, aggravated robbery, theft during the nighttime, or criminal mischief during the nighttime; or (B) to prevent the other who is fleeing immediately after committing burglary, robbery, aggravated robbery, or theft during the nighttime from escaping with the property; and (3) he reasonably believes that: (A) the land or property cannot be protected or recovered by any other means; or (B) the use of force other than deadly force to protect or recover the land or property would expose the actor or another to a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Sec. 9.43. PROTECTION OF THIRD PERSON'S PROPERTY. A person is justified in using force or deadly force against another to protect land or tangible, movable property of a third person if, under the circumstances as he reasonably believes them to be, the actor would be justified under Section 9.41 or 9.42 in using force or deadly force to protect his own land or property and: (1) the actor reasonably believes the unlawful interference constitutes attempted or consummated theft of or criminal mischief to the tangible, movable property; or (2) the actor reasonably believes that: (A) the third person has requested his protection of the land or property; (B) he has a legal duty to protect the third person's land or property; or (C) the third person whose land or property he uses Page -8 - force or deadly force to protect is the actor's spouse, parent, or child, resides with the actor, or is under the actor's care. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Sec. 9.44. USE OF DEVICE TO PROTECT PROPERTY. The justification afforded by Sections 9.41 and 9.43 applies to the use of a device to protect land or tangible, movable property if: (1) the device is not designed to cause, or known by the actor to create a substantial risk of causing, death or serious bodily injury; and (2) use of the device is reasonable under all the circumstances as the actor reasonably believes them to be when he installs the device. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 913, ch. 342, Sec. 6, eff. Sept. 1, 1975. Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. SUBCHAPTER E. LAW ENFORCEMENT Sec. 9.51. ARREST AND SEARCH. (a) A peace officer, or a person acting in a peace officer's presence and at his direction, is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to make or assist in making an arrest or search, or to prevent or assist in preventing escape after arrest, if: (1) the actor reasonably believes the arrest or search is lawful or, if the arrest or search is made under a warrant, he reasonably believes the warrant is valid; and (2) before using force, the actor manifests his purpose to arrest or search and identifies himself as a peace officer or as one acting at a peace officer's direction, unless he reasonably believes his purpose and identity are already known by or cannot reasonably be made known to the person to be arrested. (b) A person other than a peace officer (or one acting at his direction) is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to make or assist in making a lawful arrest, or to prevent or assist in preventing escape after lawful arrest if, Page -9 - before using force, the actor manifests his purpose to and the reason for the arrest or reasonably believes his purpose and the reason are already known by or cannot reasonably be made known to the person to be arrested. (c) A peace officer is justified in using deadly force against another when and to the degree the peace officer reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to make an arrest, or to prevent escape after arrest, if the use of force would have been justified under Subsection (a) and: (1) the actor reasonably believes the conduct for which arrest is authorized included the use or attempted use of deadly force; or (2) the actor reasonably believes there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury to the actor or another if the arrest is delayed. (d) A person other than a peace officer acting in a peace officer's presence and at his direction is justified in using deadly force against another when and to the degree the person reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to make a lawful arrest, or to prevent escape after a lawful arrest, if the use of force would have been justified under Subsection (b) and: (1) the actor reasonably believes the felony or offense against the public peace for which arrest is authorized included the use or attempted use of deadly force; or (2) the actor reasonably believes there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury to another if the arrest is delayed. (e) There is no duty to retreat before using deadly force justified by Subsection (c) or (d). (f) Nothing in this section relating to the actor's manifestation of purpose or identity shall be construed as conflicting with any other law relating to the issuance, service, and execution of an arrest or search warrant either under the laws of this state or the United States. (g) Deadly force may only be used under the circumstances enumerated in Subsections (c) and (d). Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Page -10 - Sec. 9.52. PREVENTION OF ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY. The use of force to prevent the escape of an arrested person from custody is justifiable when the force could have been employed to effect the arrest under which the person is in custody, except that a guard employed by a correctional facility or a peace officer is justified in using any force, including deadly force, that he reasonably believes to be immediately necessary to prevent the escape of a person from the correctional facility. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Sec. 9.53. MAINTAINING SECURITY IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY. An officer or employee of a correctional facility is justified in using force against a person in custody when and to the degree the officer or employee reasonably believes the force is necessary to maintain the security of the correctional facility, the safety or security of other persons in custody or employed by the correctional facility, or his own safety or security. Added by Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 512, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1987. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Text of section effective until January 01, 2025 Sec. 9.54. LIMITATION ON USE OF FORCE BY DRONE. (a) In this section: (1) "Autonomous drone" means a drone that operates autonomously through computer software or other programming. (2) "Drone" and "law enforcement agency" have the meanings assigned by Article 2.33, Code of Criminal Procedure. (b) Notwithstanding any other law, the use of force, including deadly force, involving a drone is justified under this subchapter only if: (1) at the time the use of force occurred, the actor was employed by a law enforcement agency; (2) the use of force: (A) would have been justified under another provision of this subchapter; and (B) did not involve the use of deadly force by means of an autonomous drone; and (3) before the use of force occurred, the law Page -11 - enforcement agency employing the actor adopted and submitted to the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement a policy on the agency's use of force by means of a drone, as required by Article 2.33, Code of Criminal Procedure, and the use of force conformed to the requirements of that policy. Added by Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1011 (H.B. 1758), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2021. Amended by: Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 765 (H.B. 4504), Sec. 2.155, eff. January 1, 2025. Text of section effective on January 01, 2025 Sec. 9.54. LIMITATION ON USE OF FORCE BY DRONE. (a) In this section: (1) "Autonomous drone" means a drone that operates autonomously through computer software or other programming. (2) "Drone" and "law enforcement agency" have the meanings assigned by Article 2B.0253, Code of Criminal Procedure. (b) Notwithstanding any other law, the use of force, including deadly force, involving a drone is justified under this subchapter only if: (1) at the time the use of force occurred, the actor was employed by a law enforcement agency; (2) the use of force: (A) would have been justified under another provision of this subchapter; and (B) did not involve the use of deadly force by means of an autonomous drone; and (3) before the use of force occurred, the law enforcement agency employing the actor adopted and submitted to the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement a policy on the agency's use of force by means of a drone, as required by Article 2B.0253, Code of Criminal Procedure, and the use of force conformed to the requirements of that policy. Added by Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1011 (H.B. 1758), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2021. Amended by: Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 765 (H.B. 4504), Sec. 2.155, eff. January 1, 2025. SUBCHAPTER F. SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS Page -12 - Sec. 9.61. PARENT-CHILD. (a) The use of force, but not deadly force, against a child younger than 18 years is justified: (1) if the actor is the child's parent or stepparent or is acting in loco parentis to the child; and (2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is necessary to discipline the child or to safeguard or promote his welfare. (b) For purposes of this section, "in loco parentis" includes grandparent and guardian, any person acting by, through, or under the direction of a court with jurisdiction over the child, and anyone who has express or implied consent of the parent or parents. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Sec. 9.62. EDUCATOR-STUDENT. The use of force, but not deadly force, against a person is justified: (1) if the actor is entrusted with the care, supervision, or administration of the person for a special purpose; and (2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is necessary to further the special purpose or to maintain discipline in a group. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Sec. 9.63. GUARDIAN-INCOMPETENT. The use of force, but not deadly force, against a mental incompetent is justified: (1) if the actor is the incompetent's guardian or someone similarly responsible for the general care and supervision of the incompetent; and (2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is necessary: (A) to safeguard and promote the incompetent's welfare; or (B) if the incompetent is in an institution for his care and custody, to maintain discipline in the institution. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, Page -13 - 1994. Page -14 - PENAL CODE TITLE 4. INCHOATE OFFENSES CHAPTER 15. PREPARATORY OFFENSES Sec. 15.01. CRIMINAL ATTEMPT. (a) A person commits an offense if, with specific intent to commit an offense, he does an act amounting to more than mere preparation that tends but fails to effect the commission of the offense intended. (b) If a person attempts an offense that may be aggravated, his conduct constitutes an attempt to commit the aggravated offense if an element that aggravates the offense accompanies the attempt. (c) It is no defense to prosecution for criminal attempt that the offense attempted was actually committed. (d) An offense under this section is one category lower than the offense attempted, and if the offense attempted is a state jail felony, the offense is a Class A misdemeanor. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 478, ch. 203, Sec. 4, eff. Sept. 1, 1975; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Sec. 15.02. CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY. (a) A person commits criminal conspiracy if, with intent that a felony be committed: (1) he agrees with one or more persons that they or one or more of them engage in conduct that would constitute the offense; and (2) he or one or more of them performs an overt act in pursuance of the agreement. (b) An agreement constituting a conspiracy may be inferred from acts of the parties. (c) It is no defense to prosecution for criminal conspiracy that: (1) one or more of the coconspirators is not criminally responsible for the object offense; (2) one or more of the coconspirators has been acquitted, so long as two or more coconspirators have not been acquitted; (3) one or more of the coconspirators has not been prosecuted or convicted, has been convicted of a different offense, or is immune from prosecution; (4) the actor belongs to a class of persons that by Page - 1 - definition of the object offense is legally incapable of committing the object offense in an individual capacity; or (5) the object offense was actually committed. (d) An offense under this section is one category lower than the most serious felony that is the object of the conspiracy, and if the most serious felony that is the object of the conspiracy is a state jail felony, the offense is a Class A misdemeanor. This subsection does not apply to an offense under Section 76.02. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Amended by: Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 935 (S.B. 1518), Sec. 4, eff. September 1, 2023. Sec. 15.03. CRIMINAL SOLICITATION. (a) A person commits an offense if, with intent that a capital felony or felony of the first degree be committed, he requests, commands, or attempts to induce another to engage in specific conduct that, under the circumstances surrounding his conduct as the actor believes them to be, would constitute the felony or make the other a party to its commission. (b) A person may not be convicted under this section on the uncorroborated testimony of the person allegedly solicited and unless the solicitation is made under circumstances strongly corroborative of both the solicitation itself and the actor's intent that the other person act on the solicitation. (c) It is no defense to prosecution under this section that: (1) the person solicited is not criminally responsible for the felony solicited; (2) the person solicited has been acquitted, has not been prosecuted or convicted, has been convicted of a different offense or of a different type or class of offense, or is immune from prosecution; (3) the actor belongs to a class of persons that by definition of the felony solicited is legally incapable of committing the offense in an individual capacity; or (4) the felony solicited was actually committed. (d) An offense under this section is: (1) a felony of the first degree if the offense solicited is a capital offense; or Page -2 - (2) a felony of the second degree if the offense solicited is a felony of the first degree. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 462, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1993; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Sec. 15.031. CRIMINAL SOLICITATION OF A MINOR. (a) A person commits an offense if, with intent that an offense listed by Article 42A.054(a), Code of Criminal Procedure, be committed, the person requests, commands, or attempts to induce a minor to engage in specific conduct that, under the circumstances surrounding the actor's conduct as the actor believes them to be, would constitute an offense listed by Article 42A.054(a) or make the minor a party to the commission of an offense listed by Article 42A.054(a). (b) A person commits an offense if, with intent that an offense under Section 20A.02(a)(7) or (8), 21.02, 21.11, 22.011, 22.021, 43.02, 43.021, 43.05(a)(2), or 43.25 be committed, the person by any means requests, commands, or attempts to induce a minor or another whom the person believes to be a minor to engage in specific conduct that, under the circumstances surrounding the actor's conduct as the actor believes them to be, would constitute an offense under one of those sections or would make the minor or other believed by the person to be a minor a party to the commission of an offense under one of those sections. (c) A person may not be convicted under this section on the uncorroborated testimony of the minor allegedly solicited unless the solicitation is made under circumstances strongly corroborative of both the solicitation itself and the actor's intent that the minor act on the solicitation. (d) It is no defense to prosecution under this section that: (1) the minor solicited is not criminally responsible for the offense solicited; (2) the minor solicited has been acquitted, has not been prosecuted or convicted, has been convicted of a different offense or of a different type or class of offense, or is immune from prosecution; (3) the actor belongs to a class of persons that by definition of the offense solicited is legally incapable of committing the offense in an individual capacity; or (4) the offense solicited was actually committed. Page -3 - (e) An offense under this section is one category lower than the solicited offense, except that an offense under this section is the same category as the solicited offense if it is shown on the trial of the offense that the actor: (1) was at the time of the offense 17 years of age or older and a member of a criminal street gang, as defined by Section 71.01; and (2) committed the offense with the intent to: (A) further the criminal activities of the criminal street gang; or (B) avoid detection as a member of a criminal street gang. (f) In this section, "minor" means an individual younger than 17 years of age. Added by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 262, Sec. 79, eff. Jan. 1, 1996. Amended by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 1415, Sec. 22(a), eff. Sept. 1, 1999. Amended by: Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 593 (H.B. 8), Sec. 3.49, eff. September 1, 2007. Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 1130 (H.B. 2086), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2009. Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1 (S.B. 24), Sec. 6.03, eff. September 1, 2011. Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 770 (H.B. 2299), Sec. 2.83, eff. January 1, 2017. Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 807 (H.B. 1540), Sec. 51, eff. September 1, 2021. Sec. 15.032. CHILD GROOMING. (a) A person commits an offense if, with the intent that an offense under Chapter 43 or an offense involving sexual activity, the occurrence of which would subject the actor to criminal liability under Chapter 20A, 21, or 22, be committed, the person knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces, or attempts to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce, a child younger than 18 years of age to engage in specific conduct that, under the circumstances surrounding the actor's conduct as the actor believes them to be, would: (1) constitute an offense under Chapter 43 or an offense involving sexual activity the occurrence of which would subject the actor to criminal liability under Chapter 20A, 21, or 22; or Page -4 - (2) make the child a party to the commission of an offense described by Subdivision (1). (b) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree, except that the offense is a felony of the second degree if the actor has previously been convicted of an offense under: (1) Chapter 20A, if the offense involved conduct described by Section 20A.02(a)(7) or (8); (2) Section 21.02; (3) Section 21.11; (4) Section 22.011, if the victim of the offense was a child under 18 years of age; or (5) Section 22.021, if the victim of the offense was a child under 18 years of age. (c) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the actor is under the age of 18 and: (1) the actor engaged in conduct described by Subsection (a) with respect to another child under the age of 18: (A) who is not more than three years older or younger than the actor and with whom the actor had a dating relationship at the time of the offense; or (B) who was the spouse of the actor at the time of the offense; and (2) the conduct occurred only between the actor and the other child described by Subdivision (1). (d) If conduct constituting an offense under this section also constitutes an offense under another section of this code, the actor may be prosecuted under either section but not both sections. Added by Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 93 (S.B. 1527), Sec. 6.01, eff. September 1, 2023. Sec. 15.04. RENUNCIATION DEFENSE. (a) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under Section 15.01 that under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal objective the actor avoided commission of the offense attempted by abandoning his criminal conduct or, if abandonment was insufficient to avoid commission of the offense, by taking further affirmative action that prevented the commission. (b) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under Section 15.02 or 15.03 that under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal objective the actor countermanded his solicitation or withdrew from the conspiracy Page -5 - before commission of the object offense and took further affirmative action that prevented the commission of the object offense. (c) Renunciation is not voluntary if it is motivated in whole or in part: (1) by circumstances not present or apparent at the inception of the actor's course of conduct that increase the probability of detection or apprehension or that make more difficult the accomplishment of the objective; or (2) by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until another time or to transfer the criminal act to another but similar objective or victim. (d) Evidence that the defendant renounced his criminal objective by abandoning his criminal conduct, countermanding his solicitation, or withdrawing from the conspiracy before the criminal offense was committed and made substantial effort to prevent the commission of the object offense shall be admissible as mitigation at the hearing on punishment if he has been found guilty of criminal attempt, criminal solicitation, or criminal conspiracy; and in the event of a finding of renunciation under this subsection, the punishment shall be one grade lower than that provided for the offense committed. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Sec. 15.05. NO OFFENSE. Attempt or conspiracy to commit, or solicitation of, a preparatory offense defined in this chapter is not an offense. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Page -6 - PENAL CODE TITLE 5. OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON CHAPTER 19. CRIMINAL HOMICIDE Sec. 19.01. TYPES OF CRIMINAL HOMICIDE. (a) A person commits criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence causes the death of an individual. (b) Criminal homicide is murder, capital murder, manslaughter, or criminally negligent homicide. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 1123, ch. 426, art. 2, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Sec. 19.02. MURDER. (a) In this section: (1) "Adequate cause" means cause that would commonly produce a degree of anger, rage, resentment, or terror in a person of ordinary temper, sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool reflection. (2) "Sudden passion" means passion directly caused by and arising out of provocation by the individual killed or another acting with the person killed which passion arises at the time of the offense and is not solely the result of former provocation. (b) A person commits an offense if the person: (1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual; (2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual; (3) commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in immediate flight from the commission or attempt, the person commits or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual; or (4) knowingly manufactures or delivers a controlled substance included in Penalty Group 1-B under Section 481.1022, Health and Safety Code, in violation of Section 481.1123, Health and Safety Code, and an individual dies as a result of injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or introducing into the individual's body any amount of the controlled substance manufactured or delivered by the Page - 1 - actor, regardless of whether the controlled substance was used by itself or with another substance, including a drug, adulterant, or dilutant. (c) Except as provided by Subsection (d), an offense under this section is a felony of the first degree. (d) At the punishment stage of a trial, the defendant may raise the issue as to whether he caused the death under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. If the defendant proves the issue in the affirmative by a preponderance of the evidence, the offense is a felony of the second degree. (e) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (b)(4) that the actor's conduct in manufacturing or delivering the controlled substance was authorized under Chapter 481, Health and Safety Code, or other state or federal law. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 1123, ch. 426, art. 2, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Amended by: Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 910 (H.B. 6), Sec. 20, eff. September 1, 2023. Sec. 19.03. CAPITAL MURDER. (a) A person commits an offense if the person commits murder as defined under Section 19.02(b)(1) and: (1) the person murders a peace officer or fireman who is acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty and who the person knows is a peace officer or fireman; (2) the person intentionally commits the murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, burglary, robbery, aggravated sexual assault, arson, obstruction or retaliation, or terroristic threat under Section 22.07(a)(1), (3), (4), (5), or (6); (3) the person commits the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration or employs another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration; (4) the person commits the murder while escaping or attempting to escape from a penal institution; (5) the person, while incarcerated in a penal institution, murders another: Page -2 - institution; or (A) who is employed in the operation of the penal (B) with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination or in the profits of a combination; (6) the person: (A) while incarcerated for an offense under this section or Section 19.02, murders another; or (B) while serving a sentence of life imprisonment or a term of 99 years for an offense under Section 20.04, 22.021, or 29.03, murders another; (7) the person murders more than one person: (A) during the same criminal transaction; or (B) during different criminal transactions but the murders are committed pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct; (8) the person murders an individual under 10 years of age; (9) the person murders an individual 10 years of age or older but younger than 15 years of age; or (10) the person murders another person in retaliation for or on account of the service or status of the other person as a judge or justice of the supreme court, the court of criminal appeals, a court of appeals, a district court, a criminal district court, a constitutional county court, a statutory county court, a justice court, or a municipal court. (b) An offense under this section is a capital felony. (c) If the jury or, when authorized by law, the judge does not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of an offense under this section, he may be convicted of murder or of any other lesser included offense. (d) For purposes of Subsection (a)(1), the actor is presumed to have known the person murdered was a peace officer or fireman if the person was wearing a distinctive uniform or badge indicating the person's employment as a peace officer or fireman. Added by Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 1123, ch. 426, art. 2, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1983, 68th Leg., p. 5317, ch. 977, Sec. 6, eff. Sept. 1, 1983; Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 44, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985; Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 652, Sec. 13, eff. Sept. 1, 1991; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 715, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1993; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 887, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1993; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Page -3 - Sept. 1, 1994; Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 388, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2003. Amended by: Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch. 428 (S.B. 1791), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2005. Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1209 (S.B. 377), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2011. Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1214 (S.B. 719), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2019. Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1057 (S.B. 386), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2023. Sec. 19.04. MANSLAUGHTER. (a) A person commits an offense if he recklessly causes the death of an individual. (b) An offense under this section is a felony of the second degree, except that the offense is a felony of the first degree if it is shown on the trial of the offense that the defendant committed an offense under Section 28.09 and that conduct caused the death of an individual. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Renumbered from Penal Code Sec. 19.04 by Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 1123, ch. 426, art. 2, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 307, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1987. Renumbered from Penal Code Sec. 19.05 and amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Amended by: Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1146 (S.B. 947), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2023. Sec. 19.05. CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. (a) A person commits an offense if he causes the death of an individual by criminal negligence. (b) An offense under this section is a state jail felony. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Renumbered from Penal Code Sec. 19.06 by Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 1123, ch. 426, art. 2, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Renumbered from Penal Code Sec. 19.07 and amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Sec. 19.06. APPLICABILITY TO CERTAIN CONDUCT. This chapter does not apply to the death of an unborn child if the conduct Page -4 - charged is: (1) conduct committed by the mother of the unborn child; (2) a lawful medical procedure performed by a physician or other licensed health care provider with the requisite consent, if the death of the unborn child was the intended result of the procedure; (3) a lawful medical procedure performed by a physician or other licensed health care provider with the requisite consent as part of an assisted reproduction as defined by Section 160.102, Family Code; or (4) the dispensation of a drug in accordance with law or administration of a drug prescribed in accordance with law. Added by Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 822, Sec. 2.02, eff. Sept. 1, 2003. Page -5 - PENAL CODE TITLE 5. OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON CHAPTER 20. KIDNAPPING, UNLAWFUL RESTRAINT, AND SMUGGLING OF PERSONS Sec. 20.01. DEFINITIONS. In this chapter: (1) "Restrain" means to restrict a person's movements without consent, so as to interfere substantially with the person's liberty, by moving the person from one place to another or by confining the person. Restraint is "without consent" if it is accomplished by: (A) force, intimidation, or deception; or (B) any means, including acquiescence of the victim, if: (i) the victim is a child who is less than 14 years of age or an incompetent person and the parent, guardian, or person or institution acting in loco parentis has not acquiesced in the movement or confinement; or (ii) the victim is a child who is 14 years of age or older and younger than 17 years of age, the victim is taken outside of the state and outside a 120-mile radius from the victim's residence, and the parent, guardian, or person or institution acting in loco parentis has not acquiesced in the movement. (2) "Abduct" means to restrain a person with intent to prevent his liberation by: (A) secreting or holding him in a place where he is not likely to be found; or (B) using or threatening to use deadly force. (3) "Relative" means a parent or stepparent, ancestor, sibling, or uncle or aunt, including an adoptive relative of the same degree through marriage or adoption. (4) "Person" means an individual or a corporation, association, limited liability company, or other entity or organization governed by the Business Organizations Code. (5) Notwithstanding Section 1.07, "individual" means a human being who has been born and is alive. (6) "Agricultural land" has the meaning assigned by Section 75.001, Civil Practice and Remedies Code. (7) "Firearm" has the meaning assigned by Section 46.01. (8) "Special investigator" includes an agent of the Page - 1 - United States Department of Homeland Security. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994; Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 790, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1999; Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 822, Sec. 2.03, eff. Sept. 1, 2003. Amended by: Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 112 (S.B. 1258), Sec. 4, eff. September 1, 2019. Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 572 (S.B. 576), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2021. Sec. 20.02. UNLAWFUL RESTRAINT. (a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly restrains another person. (b) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that: (1) the person restrained was a child younger than 14 years of age; (2) the actor was a relative of the child; and (3) the actor's sole intent was to assume lawful control of the child. (c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor, except that the offense is: (1) a state jail felony if the person restrained was a child younger than 17 years of age; (2) a felony of the third degree if: (A) the actor recklessly exposes the victim to a substantial risk of serious bodily injury; (B) the actor restrains an individual the actor knows is a public servant while the public servant is lawfully discharging an official duty or in retaliation or on account of an exercise of official power or performance of an official duty as a public servant; or (C) the actor, while in custody or committed to a civil commitment facility, restrains any other person; or (3) notwithstanding Subdivision (2)(B), a felony of the second degree if the actor restrains an individual the actor knows is a peace officer or judge while the officer or judge is lawfully discharging an official duty or in retaliation or on account of an exercise of official power or performance of an official duty as a peace officer or judge. (d) It is no offense to detain or move another under this Page -2 - section when it is for the purpose of effecting a lawful arrest or detaining an individual lawfully arrested. (e) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that: (1) the person restrained was a child who is 14 years of age or older and younger than 17 years of age; (2) the actor does not restrain the child by force, intimidation, or deception; and (3) the actor is not more than three years older than the child. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 707, Sec. 1(b), 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1997; Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 790, Sec. 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1999; Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 524, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2001. Amended by: Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 440 (H.B. 2908), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2017. Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 351 (S.B. 1179), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2023. Sec. 20.03. KIDNAPPING. (a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly abducts another person. (b) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that: (1) the abduction was not coupled with intent to use or to threaten to use deadly force; (2) the actor was a relative of the person abducted; and (3) the actor's sole intent was to assume lawful control of the victim. (c) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Sec. 20.04. AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING. (a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly abducts another person with the intent to: (1) hold him for ransom or reward; Page -3 - (2) use him as a shield or hostage; (3) facilitate the commission of a felony or the flight after the attempt or commission of a felony; (4) inflict bodily injury on him or violate or abuse him sexually; (5) terrorize him or a third person; or (6) interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function. (b) A person commits an offense if the person intentionally or knowingly abducts another person and uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. (c) Except as provided by Subsection (d), an offense under this section is a felony of the first degree. (d) At the punishment stage of a trial, the defendant may raise the issue as to whether he voluntarily released the victim in a safe place. If the defendant proves the issue in the affirmative by a preponderance of the evidence, the offense is a felony of the second degree. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994; Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 318, Sec. 4, eff. Sept. 1, 1995. Sec. 20.05. SMUGGLING OF PERSONS. (a) A person commits an offense if the person knowingly: (1) uses a motor vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, or other means of conveyance to transport an individual with the intent to: (A) conceal the individual from a peace officer or special investigator; or (B) flee from a person the actor knows is a peace officer or special investigator attempting to lawfully arrest or detain the actor; (2) encourages or induces a person to enter or remain in this country in violation of federal law by concealing, harboring, or shielding that person from detection; or (3) assists, guides, or directs two or more individuals to enter or remain on agricultural land without the effective consent of the owner. (b) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree, except that the offense is: (1) a felony of the second degree if: (A) the actor commits the offense in a manner that Page -4 - creates a substantial likelihood that the smuggled individual will suffer serious bodily injury or death; (B) the smuggled individual is a child younger than 18 years of age at the time of the offense; (C) the offense was committed with the intent to obtain a pecuniary benefit; (D) during the commission of the offense the actor, another party to the offense, or an individual assisted, guided, or directed by the actor knowingly possessed a firearm; or (E) the actor commits the offense under Subsection (a)(1)(B); or (2) a felony of the first degree if: (A) it is shown on the trial of the offense that, as a direct result of the commission of the offense, the smuggled individual became a victim of sexual assault, as defined by Section 22.011, or aggravated sexual assault, as defined by Section 22.021; or (B) the smuggled individual suffered serious bodily injury or death. (c) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution of an offense under this section, other than an offense punishable under Subsection (b)(1)(A) or (b)(2), that the actor is related to the smuggled individual within the second degree of consanguinity or, at the time of the offense, within the second degree of affinity. (d) If conduct constituting an offense under this section also constitutes an offense under another section of this code, the actor may be prosecuted under either section or under both sections. Added by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 1014, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1999. Amended by: Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 223 (H.B. 260), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2011. Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 333 (H.B. 11), Sec. 14, eff. September 1, 2015. Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 572 (S.B. 576), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2021. Sec. 20.06. CONTINUOUS SMUGGLING OF PERSONS. (a) A person commits an offense if, during a period that is 10 or more days in duration, the person engages two or more times in conduct that Page -5 - constitutes an offense under Section 20.05. (b) If a jury is the trier of fact, members of the jury are not required to agree unanimously on which specific conduct engaged in by the defendant constituted an offense under Section 20.05 or on which exact date the defendant engaged in that conduct. The jury must agree unanimously that the defendant, during a period that is 10 or more days in duration, engaged two or more times in conduct that constitutes an offense under Section 20.05. (c) If the victim of an offense under Subsection (a) is the same victim as a victim of an offense under Section 20.05, a defendant may not be convicted of the offense under Section 20.05 in the same criminal action as the offense under Subsection (a), unless the offense under Section 20.05: (1) is charged in the alternative; (2) occurred outside the period in which the offense alleged under Subsection (a) was committed; or (3) is considered by the trier of fact to be a lesser included offense of the offense alleged under Subsection (a). (d) A defendant may not be charged with more than one count under Subsection (a) if all of the conduct that constitutes an offense under Section 20.05 is alleged to have been committed against the same victim. (e) Except as provided by Subsections (f) and (g), an offense under this section is a felony of the second degree. (f) An offense under this section is a felony of the first degree if: (1) the conduct constituting an offense under Section 20.05 is conducted in a manner that creates a substantial likelihood that the smuggled individual will suffer serious bodily injury or death; or (2) the smuggled individual is a child younger than 18 years of age at the time of the offense. (g) An offense under this section is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for life or for any term of not more than 99 years or less than 25 years, if: (1) it is shown on the trial of the offense that, as a direct result of the commission of the offense, the smuggled individual became a victim of sexual assault, as defined by Section 22.011, or aggravated sexual assault, as defined by Section 22.021; or Page -6 - (2) the smuggled individual suffered serious bodily injury or death. Added by Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 333 (H.B. 11), Sec. 15, eff. September 1, 2015. Sec. 20.07. OPERATION OF STASH HOUSE. (a) A person commits an offense if the person knowingly: (1) uses or permits another to use any real estate, building, room, tent, vehicle, boat, or other property owned by the person or under the person's control to commit an offense or to facilitate the commission of an offense under Section 20.05, 20.06, 20A.02, 20A.03, 43.04, or 43.05; or (2) rents or leases any property to another, intending that the property be used as described by Subdivision (1). (b) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor. (c) If conduct that constitutes an offense under this section also constitutes an offense under another law, the actor may be prosecuted under this section, the other law, or both. Added by Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 412 (H.B. 2613), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2019. Page -7 - PENAL CODE TITLE 5. OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON CHAPTER 20A. TRAFFICKING OF PERSONS Sec. 20A.01. DEFINITIONS. In this chapter: (1) "Child" means a person younger than 18 years of age. (1-a) "Coercion" as defined by Section 1.07 includes: (A) destroying, concealing, confiscating, or withholding from a trafficked person, or threatening to destroy, conceal, confiscate, or withhold from a trafficked person, the person's actual or purported: (i) government records; or (ii) identifying information or documents; (B) causing a trafficked person, without the person's consent, to become intoxicated, as defined by Section 49.01, to a degree that impairs the person's ability to appraise the nature of or resist engaging in any conduct, including performing or providing labor or services; or (C) withholding alcohol or a controlled substance to a degree that impairs the ability of a trafficked person with a chemical dependency, as defined by Section 462.001, Health and Safety Code, to appraise the nature of or resist engaging in any conduct, including performing or providing labor or services. (1-b) "Disabled individual" has the meaning assigned by Section 22.021(b). (2) "Forced labor or services" means labor or services, other than labor or services that constitute sexual conduct, that are performed or provided by another person and obtained through an actor's use of force, fraud, or coercion. (2-a) "Premises" has the meaning assigned by Section 481.134, Health and Safety Code. (2-b) "School" means a public or private primary or secondary school. (3) "Sexual conduct" has the meaning assigned by Section 43.25. (4) "Traffic" means to transport, entice, recruit, harbor, provide, or otherwise obtain another person by any means. Added by Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 641, Sec. 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2003. Page - 1 - Amended by: Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 258 (S.B. 11), Sec. 16.01, eff. September 1, 2007. Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 849 (H.B. 1121), Sec. 4, eff. June 15, 2007. Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1 (S.B. 24), Sec. 1.01, eff. September 1, 2011. Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 807 (H.B. 1540), Sec. 21, eff. September 1, 2021. Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 905 (H.B. 3521), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2021. Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1049 (S.B. 1831), Sec. 5, eff. September 1, 2021. Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 93 (S.B. 1527), Sec. 2.01, eff. September 1, 2023. Sec. 20A.02. TRAFFICKING OF PERSONS. (a) A person commits an offense if the person knowingly: (1) traffics another person with the intent that the trafficked person engage in forced labor or services; (2) receives a benefit from participating in a venture that involves an activity described by Subdivision (1), including by receiving labor or services the person knows are forced labor or services; (3) traffics another person and, through force, fraud, or coercion, causes the trafficked person to engage in conduct prohibited by: (A) Section 43.02 (Prostitution); (B) Section 43.03 (Promotion of Prostitution); (B-1) Section 43.031 (Online Promotion of Prostitution); (C) Section 43.04 (Aggravated Promotion of Prostitution); (C-1) Section 43.041 (Aggravated Online Promotion of Prostitution); or (D) Section 43.05 (Compelling Prostitution); (4) receives a benefit from participating in a venture that involves an activity described by Subdivision (3) or engages Page -2 - in sexual conduct with a person trafficked in the manner described in Subdivision (3); (5) traffics a child or disabled individual with the intent that the trafficked child or disabled individual engage in forced labor or services; (6) receives a benefit from participating in a venture that involves an activity described by Subdivision (5), including by receiving labor or services the person knows are forced labor or services; (7) traffics a child or disabled individual and by any means causes the trafficked child or disabled individual to engage in, or become the victim of, conduct prohibited by: (A) Section 21.02 (Continuous Sexual Abuse of Young Child or Disabled Individual); (B) Section 21.11 (Indecency with a Child); (C) Section 22.011 (Sexual Assault); (D) Section 22.021 (Aggravated Sexual Assault); (E) Section 43.02 (Prostitution); (E-1) Section 43.021 (Solicitation of Prostitution); (F) Section 43.03 (Promotion of Prostitution); (F-1) Section 43.031 (Online Promotion of Prostitution); (G) Section 43.04 (Aggravated Promotion of Prostitution); (G-1) Section 43.041 (Aggravated Online Promotion of Prostitution); (H) Section 43.05 (Compelling Prostitution); (I) Section 43.25 (Sexual Performance by a Child); (J) Section 43.251 (Employment Harmful to Children); or (K) Section 43.26 (Possession or Promotion of Child Pornography); or (8) receives a benefit from participating in a venture that involves an activity described by Subdivision (7) or engages in sexual conduct with a child or disabled individual trafficked in the manner described in Subdivision (7). (a-1) Repealed by Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 807 (H.B. Page -3 - 1540), Sec. 62(5) and Ch. 905 (H.B. 3521), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2021. Text of subsection as amended by Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 93 (S.B. 1527), Sec. 2.02 (b) Except as otherwise provided by this subsection and Subsection (b-1), an offense under this section is a felony of the second degree. An offense under this section is a felony of the first degree if: (1) the applicable conduct constitutes an offense under Subsection (a)(5), (6), (7), or (8), regardless of whether the actor knows the age of the child or whether the actor knows the victim is disabled at the time of the offense; (2) the commission of the offense results in serious bodily injury to or the death of the person who is trafficked; (3) the commission of the offense results in the death of an unborn child of the person who is trafficked; or (4) the actor: (A) used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense; (B) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly impeded the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of the trafficked person by applying pressure to the person's throat or neck or by blocking the person's nose or mouth; or (C) recruited, enticed, or obtained the trafficked person from a shelter or facility operating as a residential treatment center that serves runaway youth, foster children, the homeless, or persons subjected to human trafficking, domestic violence, or sexual assault. Text of subsection as amended by Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 452 (H.B. 3554), Sec. 1 (b) Except as otherwise provided by this subsection and Subsection (b-1), an offense under this section is a felony of the second degree. An offense under this section is a felony of the first degree if: Page -4 - (1) the applicable conduct constitutes an offense under Subsection (a)(5), (6), (7), or (8), regardless of whether the actor knows the age of the child at the time of the offense; (2) the commission of the offense results in the death of the person who is trafficked; or (3) the commission of the offense results in the death of an unborn child of the person who is trafficked. Text of subsection as amended by Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 451 (H.B. 3553), Sec. 2 (b-1) An offense under this section is a felony of the first degree punishable by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for life or for a term of not more than 99 years or less than 25 years if it is shown on the trial of the offense that the actor committed the offense in a location that was: (1) on the premises of or within 1,000 feet of the premises of: (A) a school; or (B) an institution of higher education or private or independent institution of higher education, as defined by Section 61.003, Education Code; or (2) on premises or within 1,000 feet of premises where: (A) an official school function was taking place; or (B) an event sponsored or sanctioned by the University Interscholastic League was taking place. Text of subsection as amended by Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 452 (H.B. 3554), Sec. 1 (b-1) An offense under this section is a felony of the first degree punishable by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for life or for a term of not more than 99 years or less than 25 years if it is shown on the trial of the offense that the actor committed the offense in a location that was: (1) on the premises of or within 1,000 feet of the premises of: Page -5 - facility; (A) (B) (C) a school; a juvenile detention facility; a post-adjudication secure correctional (D) a shelter or facility operating as a residential treatment center that serves runaway youth, foster children, people who are homeless, or persons subjected to human trafficking, domestic violence, or sexual assault; (E) a community center offering youth services and programs; or (F) a child-care facility, as defined by Section 42.002, Human Resources Code; or (2) on premises or within 1,000 feet of premises where: (A) an official school function was taking place; or (B) an event sponsored or sanctioned by the University Interscholastic League was taking place. (c) If conduct constituting an offense under this section also constitutes an offense under another section of this code, the actor may be prosecuted under either section or under both sections. (d) If the victim of an offense under Subsection (a)(7)(A) is the same victim as a victim of an offense under Section 21.02, a defendant may not be convicted of the offense under Section 21.02 in the same criminal action as the offense under Subsection (a)(7)(A) unless the offense under Section 21.02: (1) is charged in the alternative; (2) occurred outside the period in which the offense alleged under Subsection (a)(7)(A) was committed; or (3) is considered by the trier of fact to be a lesser included offense of the offense alleged under Subsection (a)(7)(A). Added by Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 641, Sec. 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2003. Amended by: Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 258 (S.B. 11), Sec. 16.02, eff. September 1, 2007. Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 849 (H.B. 1121), Sec. 5, eff. June 15, 2007. Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 1002 (H.B. 4009), Sec. 7, eff. Page -6 - September 1, 2009. Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1 (S.B. 24), Sec. 1.02, eff. September 1, 2011. Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 480 (H.B. 2529), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2017. Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 685 (H.B. 29), Sec. 30, eff. September 1, 2017. Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 858 (H.B. 2552), Sec. 15, eff. September 1, 2017. Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1038 (H.B. 1808), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2017. Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 273 (S.B. 1802), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2019. Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 413 (S.B. 20), Sec. 3.11, eff. September 1, 2019. Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 221 (H.B. 375), Sec. 2.26, eff. September 1, 2021. Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 807 (H.B. 1540), Sec. 22, eff. September 1, 2021. Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 807 (H.B. 1540), Sec. 62(5), eff. September 1, 2021. Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 905 (H.B. 3521), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2021. Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1049 (S.B. 1831), Sec. 6, eff. September 1, 2021. Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 93 (S.B. 1527), Sec. 2.02, eff. September 1, 2023. Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 451 (H.B. 3553), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2023. Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 452 (H.B. 3554), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2023. Sec. 20A.03. CONTINUOUS TRAFFICKING OF PERSONS. (a) A person commits an offense if, during a period that is 30 or more days in duration, the person engages two or more times in conduct that constitutes an offense under Section 20A.02 against one or more victims. (b) If a jury is the trier of fact, members of the jury are Page -7 - not required to agree unanimously on which specific conduct engaged in by the defendant constituted an offense under Section 20A.02 or on which exact date the defendant engaged in that conduct. The jury must agree unanimously that the defendant, during a period that is 30 or more days in duration, engaged in conduct that constituted an offense under Section 20A.02. (c) If the victim of an offense under Subsection (a) is the same victim as a victim of an offense under Section 20A.02, a defendant may not be convicted of the offense under Section 20A.02 in the same criminal action as the offense under Subsection (a), unless the offense under Section 20A.02: (1) is charged in the alternative; (2) occurred outside the period in which the offense alleged under Subsection (a) was committed; or (3) is considered by the trier of fact to be a lesser included offense of the offense alleged under Subsection (a). (d) A defendant may not be charged with more than one count under Subsection (a) if all of the conduct that constitutes an offense under Section 20A.02 is alleged to have been committed against the same victim. (e) An offense under this section is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for life or for any term of not more than 99 years or less than 25 years. Added by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 122 (H.B. 3000), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2011. Amended by: Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 332 (H.B. 10), Sec. 12, eff. September 1, 2015. Sec. 20A.04. ACCOMPLICE WITNESS; TESTIMONY AND IMMUNITY. (a) A party to an offense under this chapter may be required to provide evidence or testify about the offense. (b) A party to an offense under this chapter may not be prosecuted for any offense about which the party is required to provide evidence or testify, and the evidence and testimony may not be used against the party in any adjudicatory proceeding except a prosecution for aggravated perjury. For purposes of this Page -8 - subsection, "adjudicatory proceeding" means a proceeding before a court or any other agency of government in which the legal rights, powers, duties, or privileges of specified parties are determined. (c) A conviction under this chapter may be had on the uncorroborated testimony of a party to the offense. Added by Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 332 (H.B. 10), Sec. 13, eff. September 1, 2015. Page -9 - PENAL CODE TITLE 5. OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON CHAPTER 21. SEXUAL OFFENSES Sec. 21.01. DEFINITIONS. In this chapter: (1) "Deviate sexual intercourse" means: (A) any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person; or (B) the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object. (2) "Sexual contact" means, except as provided by Section 21.11 or 21.12, any touching of the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of another person with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. (3) "Sexual intercourse" means any penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ. (4) "Spouse" means a person to whom a person is legally married under Subtitle A, Title 1, Family Code, or a comparable law of another jurisdiction. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1979, 66th Leg., p. 373, ch. 168, Sec. 1, eff. Aug. 27, 1979; Acts 1981, 67th Leg., p. 203, ch. 96, Sec. 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1981; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994; Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 739, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2001. Amended by: Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch. 268 (S.B. 6), Sec. 1.124, eff. September 1, 2005. Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 631 (H.B. 246), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2021. Sec. 21.02. CONTINUOUS SEXUAL ABUSE OF YOUNG CHILD OR DISABLED INDIVIDUAL. (a) In this section: (1) "Child" has the meaning assigned by Section 22.011(c). (2) "Disabled individual" has the meaning assigned by Section 22.021(b). (b) A person commits an offense if: (1) during a period that is 30 or more days in duration, the person commits two or more acts of sexual abuse, regardless of whether the acts of sexual abuse are committed against one or more victims; and Page - 1 - (2) at the time of the commission of each of the acts of sexual abuse, the actor is 17 years of age or older and the victim is: (A) a child younger than 14 years of age, regardless of whether the actor knows the age of the victim at the time of the offense; or (B) a disabled individual. (c) For purposes of this section, "act of sexual abuse" means any act that is a violation of one or more of the following penal laws: (1) aggravated kidnapping under Section 20.04(a)(4), if the actor committed the offense with the intent to violate or abuse the victim sexually; (2) indecency with a child under Section 21.11(a)(1), if the actor committed the offense in a manner other than by touching, including touching through clothing, the breast of a child; (3) sexual assault under Section 22.011; (4) aggravated sexual assault under Section 22.021; (5) burglary under Section 30.02, if the offense is punishable under Subsection (d) of that section and the actor committed the offense with the intent to commit an offense listed in Subdivisions (1)-(4); (6) sexual performance by a child under Section 43.25; (7) trafficking of persons under Section 20A.02(a)(3), (4), (7), or (8); and (8) compelling prostitution under Section 43.05. (d) If a jury is the trier of fact, members of the jury are not required to agree unanimously on which specific acts of sexual abuse were committed by the defendant or the exact date when those acts were committed. The jury must agree unanimously that the defendant, during a period that is 30 or more days in duration, committed two or more acts of sexual abuse. (e) A defendant may not be convicted in the same criminal action of an offense listed under Subsection (c) the victim of which is the same victim as a victim of the offense alleged under Subsection (b) unless the offense listed in Subsection (c): (1) is charged in the alternative; (2) occurred outside the period in which the offense alleged under Subsection (b) was committed; or (3) is considered by the trier of fact to be a lesser included offense of the offense alleged under Subsection (b). Page -2 - (f) A defendant may not be charged with more than one count under Subsection (b) if all of the specific acts of sexual abuse that are alleged to have been committed are alleged to have been committed against a single victim. (g) With respect to a prosecution under this section involving only one or more victims described by Subsection (b)(2)(A), it is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the actor: (1) was not more than five years older than: (A) the victim of the offense, if the offense is alleged to have been committed against only one victim; or (B) the youngest victim of the offense, if the offense is alleged to have been committed against more than one victim; (2) did not use duress, force, or a threat against a victim at the time of the commission of any of the acts of sexual abuse alleged as an element of the offense; and (3) at the time of the commission of any of the acts of sexual abuse alleged as an element of the offense: (A) was not required under Chapter 62, Code of Criminal Procedure, to register for life as a sex offender; or (B) was not a person who under Chapter 62 had a reportable conviction or adjudication for an offense under this section or an act of sexual abuse as described by Subsection (c). (h) An offense under this section is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for life, or for any term of not more than 99 years or less than 25 years. Added by Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 593 (H.B. 8), Sec. 1.17, eff. September 1, 2007. Amended by: Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1 (S.B. 24), Sec. 6.04, eff. September 1, 2011. Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 685 (H.B. 29), Sec. 31, eff. September 1, 2017. Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1038 (H.B. 1808), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2017. Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 221 (H.B. 375), Sec. 1.01, eff. September 1, 2021. Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 221 (H.B. 375), Sec. 1.02, eff. September 1, 2021. Page -3 - Section 21.06 was declared unconstitutional by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472. Sec. 21.06. HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT. (a) A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex. (b) An offense under this section is a Class C misdemeanor. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Sec. 21.07. PUBLIC LEWDNESS. (a) A person commits an offense if the person knowingly engages in any of the following acts in a public place or, if not in a public place, the person is reckless about whether another is present who will be offended or alarmed by the person's: (1) act of sexual intercourse; (2) act of deviate sexual intercourse; or (3) act of sexual contact. (b) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor, except that the offense is a felony of the third degree if the actor is civilly committed as a sexually violent predator under Chapter 841, Health and Safety Code. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Amended by: Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 739 (S.B. 1232), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2017. Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 351 (S.B. 1179), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2023. Sec. 21.08. INDECENT EXPOSURE. (a) offense if he exposes his anus or any part intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire is reckless about whether another is present or alarmed by his act. A person commits an of his genitals with of any person, and he who will be offended Text of subsection as amended by Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 351 (S.B. 1179), Sec. 3 Page -4 - (b) An offense under this section is a Class B misdemeanor, except that the offense is a felony of the third degree if the actor is civilly committed as a sexually violent predator under Chapter 841, Health and Safety Code. Text of subsection as amended by Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 822 (H.B. 1730), Sec. 1 (b) An offense under this section is a Class B misdemeanor, except that the offense is: (1) a Class A misdemeanor if it is shown on the trial of the offense that the defendant has been previously convicted one time of an offense under this section; and (2) a state jail felony if it is shown on the trial of the offense that the defendant has been previously convicted two or more times of an offense under this section. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1983, 68th Leg., p. 509, ch. 924, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1983; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Amended by: Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 351 (S.B. 1179), Sec. 3, eff. September 1, 2023. Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 822 (H.B. 1730), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2023. Sec. 21.09. BESTIALITY. (a) A person commits an offense if the person knowingly: (1) engages in an act involving contact between: (A) the person's mouth, anus, or genitals and the anus or genitals of an animal; or (B) the person's anus or genitals and the mouth of the animal; (2) fondles or touches the anus or genitals of an animal in a manner that is not a generally accepted and otherwise lawful animal husbandry or veterinary practice, including touching through clothing; (3) causes an animal to contact the seminal fluid of the person; (4) inserts any part of a person's body or any object into the anus or genitals of an animal in a manner that is not a Page -5 - generally accepted and otherwise lawful animal husbandry or veteri

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