FIL120 Test 2 Week 7 PDF

“One of the biggest challenges posed by all three normative theories above, is their emphasis on the centrality of the individual when deciding whether a moral act is right or wrong. This emphasis on individualism does not sit well with most African cultures, as these locate the morality of actions...

“One of the biggest challenges posed by all three normative theories above, is their emphasis on the centrality of the individual when deciding whether a moral act is right or wrong. This emphasis on individualism does not sit well with most African cultures, as these locate the morality of actions within a particular group of persons.” – Mangena “The point is that the concepts of justice and happiness may cut across all cultures but the idea of placing an individual person at the centre of justice and happiness can be problematic, especially within communitarian cultures such as those that the author is familiar with. In these communitarian cultures mentioned above, justice does not reside in the individual – it resides in the community of which the individual is part. In sub-Saharan Africa, the ideas of reason, spirit and desire which, in Platonic terms, define justice in the individual, project the individual as being part of a community. Thus, reason, spirit and desire exist as assets of the community and not as elements that make up an individual.”- Mangena “Dialogue is twoway communication, where the persons involved in the dialogue do not have to hold the same views on a particular subject, but must have different points of view on issues of mutual concern”- Mangena. Osikhena defines dialogue as the “effective communication between human persons aimed at a shared understanding of reality”. In Shona society, however, the dialogical process does not only involve human beings, it also has a spiritual dimension. For Osikhena, a dialogical moral theory does not consider the individual to be an isolated being. As long as he or she is born in a community of living people and is in interaction with people upholding varying moral intuitions, the individual cannot universalise his or her moral thoughts Ethics and Morality Even though morality is the subject matter of ethics, it is most often used interchangeably with ‘ethics’. In spite of the philosophical inquiries or analyses undertaken by individual moral philosophers regarding morality (i.e., the morality of a society or people)— analyses which often result in diverse positions or conclusions—nevertheless, the basic features, the core elements of the morality of a society, those moral principles and values that actually guide and influence the lives of a people, remain pretty much what they are or have been. Even though the moral beliefs and circumstances of their own societies constitute the immediate focus of their philosophical activities—for human experience is most directly felt within some specific social or cultural context—nevertheless, moral philosophers do not think or imply at all that the results of their reflective activities are to be tethered to their own societies as such. In the light of our common humanity, which speaks to the common sentiments, purposes, responses, hopes, and aspirations of all human beings in respect of certain situations, the conclusions of their reflections would, surely, have implications for the capacious community of humankind, for the universal human family. Thus, moral principles and rules may emerge from or evolved by a particular human society; even so, they are principles that can—and do—apply to all human societies inasmuch as they respond to basic human needs, interests, and purposes. Even though a theoretical (or, academic) distinction can be made between morality as constituted by the moral beliefs and principles that a group of people abides by in their daily lives (let us refer to this kind of morality as morality1) and morality or ethics as comprising the reflections of moral thinkers on human conduct, on morality1 (let us refer to the reflective enterprise regarding morality as morality2), nevertheless, to the extent that morality2 provides a clarification and better explanation and understanding of morality1, it can be said that the two terms, morality and ethics, refer essentially to the same moral phenomenon—human conduct—and, thus, can be used interchangeably. African Words for Ethics i. When a speaker of the Akan language wants to say, “He has no morals”, or, “He is immoral”, or “He is unethical”, “His conduct is unethical”, he would almost invariably say, “He has no character” (Onni suban). ii. The statement, “He has no morals”, or “He is unethical”, is expressed by a speaker of the Ewe language as, nonomo mele si o (which means “He has no character”). iii. In Yoruba language and thought the word iwa means both character and morality (it also means ‘being’ or ‘nature’). iv. In Igbo language of Eastern Nigeria, the word agwa, meaning character, is used in such a statement as “he has no morals” (onwe ghi ezi agwa). i. In Shona, the language spoken by a substantial majority of the people of Zimbabwe, the word tsika means ‘ethics’ or ‘morality’. But when they want to say of a person that “He has no morals”, or “He is unethical”, they would often use the word hunhu which directly means ‘character’. Thus, Haana hunhu means “He has no character”, “He is not moral”, “He is unethical”. ii. In South Sotho, a language spoken widely in Lesotho and southern Zimbabwe (Matebeleland), there are no words that are the direct equivalents of ‘ethics’ or ‘morality’. References to the moral or ethical life or behavior are made using words that mean behavior or character. Thus, moral statements such as “he has no morals” or “his action is unethical” will be expressed by words such as maemo—which means character or behavior: thus, maemo a mabe means “he has a bad character”, “his behavior (action) is unethical.” When a person behaves (or acts) in ways that are morally right, they would say “he has a good character”, using the words lokileng or boitswaro, both of which mean good character or good behavior. In Akan, for instance, pa or papa means good and bone means bad or evil. Thus, the expression onipa bone means a bad person. A bad person is said to be a person with a bad character, suban bone. When a person is known to be honest or generous or compassionate, he would be judged by the Akan as a good person, by which they mean that he has a good character (suban). A person would be judged as having a bad character if he is considered dishonest, wicked, or cruel. Good character is the essence of the African moral system, the linchpin of the moral wheel. In general, society satisfactorily fulfills its duty of imparting moral knowledge to its members through moral education of various forms, including, as in African societies, telling morallyfreighted proverbs and folktales to its younger members. The Notion of Character as Central to African Ethics Being made aware of the moral principles and rules of the society is one thing, Being able to lead a life consonant with the moral principles is quite another. An individual may know and may even accept a moral rule, such as, say, it is wrong to cheat the customs. But he may fail to apply this rule to a particular situation; he is, thus, not able to affect the transition from knowledge to action, to carry out the implications of his moral belief. This is indicative of bad character The ability to act in accord with the moral principles and rules of the society requires the possession of a good character. It is from a person's character that all his or her actions—good or bad—radiate: the performance of good or bad acts depends on the state of one's character. Thus, the Yoruba maxim (proverb): ‘Good character is a person's guard.’ A person is responsible for the state of his or her character, for character results from the habitual actions of a person. An Akan maxim - “one is not born with a bad ‘head’, but one takes it on from the earth.” The maxim means, among other things, that a bad habit is not an inborn characteristic; it is one that is acquired. Character is defined by the Akan thinkers in terms of habits, which result from a person's deeds or actions: ‘character comes from your actions’ (or deeds: nneyee), says an Akan traditional thinker. Persistent performance of a particular action will produce a certain habit and, thus, a corresponding character. To acquire virtue, a person must perform good actions, that is, morally acceptable actions so that they become habitual. The action or deed that led to the acquisition of a newly good habit must be persistently performed in order to strengthen that habit; in this way- virtue (or, good character) is acquired. Over time such an acquired virtue becomes a habit. Moral Personhood The various societies found in traditional Africa routinely accept this fact that personhood is the sort of thing which has to be attained, and is attained in direct proportion as one participates in communal life through the discharge of the various obligations defined by one's stations. It is the carrying out of these obligations that transforms one from the itstatus of early child-hood, marked by an absence of moral function, into the person-status of later years, marked by a widened maturity of ethical sense—an ethical maturity without which personhood is conceived as eluding one. (Ifeanyi Menkiti, 1984: 176) The concept of a person in African thought embodies ethical presuppositions. The word used for “person” in the Akan language is onipa. But the word onipa also means “human being” and the plural form of it means “people”. Thus, the word onipa is an ambiguous word. In the Akan society, when an individual's conduct very often appears cruel, wicked, selfish, ungenerous or unsympathetic, it would be said of that individual that “he is not a person” (onnye onipa). In Yoruba language the word eniyan means a person. It can be said of some human individual that ‘he or she is not a person’ (Ki i se eniyan). Such a comment is a “judgment of the moral standing of the human being who is thus determined to fall short of what it takes to be recognized as such” (Gbadagesin, 1991: 27). The Akan statement onnye onipa and the Yoruba statement Ki i se eniyan both underline a conception of moral personhood. 1. Even though that individual is said not to be a person, he is nonetheless acknowledged as a human being, not a beast or fish. It is pretty clear that the statement implies a distinction between the concept of a human being and the concept of a person: an individual can be a human being without being a person. 2. There are certain fundamental norms and ideals to which the conduct of a human being, if he is a person, ought to conform, that there are moral virtues that an individual has the capacity to display in his conduct and ought to display them. The reason for the judgment that an individual is not a person if he behaves or does not behave in a certain way is that that individual's actions and behavior are considered as falling short of the ideals and standards of personhood. Their rights as a human being or as a citizen or that people in the community should cease to demonstrate a moral concern for them or display the appropriate moral virtues in their treatment of them; only that they is not considered a morally worthy individual. TO BE A PERSON “he is a person,” means ‘he has a good character’, ‘he is generous’, ‘he is peaceful’, ‘he is humble,’ ‘he has respect for others.’ A profound appreciation of the high standards of the morality of an individual's behavior would elicit the judgment, “he is truly a person,” (oye onipa paa!). While children are actual human beings and are members of the human community, they are not actual persons yet; they are persons only potentially and will attain the status of personhood in the fullness of time when they are able to exercise their moral capacity and make moral judgments. Personhood is not innate, but earned. Every individual is capable of becoming a person inasmuch as he has capacity for virtue—for performing morally right actions—and should be treated (at least potentially) as a morally responsible agent. A ‘good’ person The human being is endowed with moral sense and, so, has the capacity for both virtue and vice; his judgment on some moral issue could go either direction: direction of the good or direction of the evil. Thus, the notion of moral neutrality is preserved. The human being can then be held as a moral agent: not that his virtuous character is a settled matter, but that he is capable of virtue, and hence, of moral achievement, and can, thus, achieve personhood. Tiboa Akan notion of tiboa: conscience, moral sense—a sense of right or wrong. This is a conception of an inner urge relevant to moral practice. Tiboa is held, among other things, as creating a sense of guilt in the individual, convicting him or her of wrong deeds. Since response to a moral rule is ultimately an individual or private affair, the notion of tiboa (conscience) is of great importance to our moral life. It is by virtue of tiboa that the notion of self-sanctioning in moral conduct becomes intelligible. Because of its power to induce a sense of guilt, tiboa is held to influence the individual's moral choice, decision, response, and attitude. The Humanistic Foundations of African Morality Some scholars: Religion so deeply permeates all spheres of African life. It cannot be distinguished from nonreligious aspects of life. In the African traditional life there are no atheists. The African cultural heritage is intensely and pervasively religious. The connection between African ethics and religion has been taken by most scholars to mean that African moral values and principles derive from religion, implying that African morality is, thus, a religious morality. However, there are other scholars: deny the religious basis of the moral systems of the societies they studied. Kwasi Wiredu observed that “the Akan moral outlook is thus logically independent of religion” (Kwasi Wiredu in H. Odera Oruka and D. A. Masolo, 1983: 13). Godfrey Wilson wrote that “Among the Nyakyusa the ideas of social behaviour are not connected with religion, nonetheless they exist” and, after mentioning the moral virtues of the Nyakyusa, he added that “But the positive, ideal statement of these virtues is not made in religious terms”. Unlike Islam or Christianity, the traditional, that is, indigenous, African religion is not a revealed religion whereby divine truth is revealed to a single individual who becomes the founder. It is true that African religious experience certainly features mystical or highly spiritual encounters between human beings (that is, priests, priestesses, diviners, etc.) and spiritual beings. Such encounters occur in divinations, spirit mediums, communication with the dead, and other forms of the mystical experience. But, it may be noted, such mystical or spiritual encounters or contacts take place in an atmosphere that was already religious; they are some of the manifestations of African religion, of African spirituality. Spirituality - a heightened form of religiosity reached by certain individuals in the community who have, or claim to have, mystical contacts with the supernatural, the divine. Even though ‘spiritual messages’ may be received by the practitioners of traditional African religion, such messages appear to be too few and far between to constitute an adequate basis for a coherent ethical system. Moreover, the moral character of such ‘messages’ would, in a non-revealed religious context, have to be judged by the people themselves on the basis of their own moral insights. This is a telling point that implies the independence (autonomy) of the moral attitudes of the people with regard to the conduct of the spiritual beings. The behavior of a supernatural being is thus subject to human censure. …it is possible for a deity to issue commands that can be considered unethical by the practitioners of traditional religion. Rather than regarding African ethics as religious (or, religious-based), it would be more correct to regard African religion as ethical. Good/Evil, Right/Wrong in African Ethics When put to traditional sages (thinkers) of some Akan communities in Ghana the question, how do we come to know that ‘this action’ is good and ‘that action’ is evil? no one responded that an action is good or evil because God (Onyame) had said so or that Onyame had told us so. Reveals an undoubted conviction of a humanistic—a non-supernatural—origin of moral values and principles. Banyarwanda - “That is good (or evil) which tradition has defined as good (or evil)”. What is good is constituted by the deeds, habits, and behavior patterns considered by the society as worthwhile because of their consequences for human welfare. The ‘goods’ would include such things as generosity, honesty, faithfulness, truthfulness, compassion, hospitality, happiness, that which brings peace, justice, respect, and so on. Each of these actions or patterns of behavior is supposed or known to bring about social wellbeing. Good or moral value is determined in terms of its consequences for humankind and human society. All this can be interpreted to mean that African morality originates from considerations of human welfare and interests, not from divine pronouncements. Actions that promote human welfare or interest are good, while those that detract from human welfare are bad. It is, thus, pretty clear that African ethics is a humanistic ethics, a moral system that is preoccupied with human welfare. Therefore, it is important to inquire concerning the African standard of judgment, what makes some things good and others bad. [Edwin] Smith replies that the norm of right and wrong is custom; that is, the good is that which receives the community's approval; the bad is that which is disapproved. The right builds up society; the wrong tears it down. One is social; the other anti-social (Malcolm J. McVeigh, 1974: 84). Right conduct is relative always to the human situation and morality is oriented not from any absolute standards of honesty or truth but from the social good in each situation. Conduct that promotes smooth relationships, that upholds the social structure, is good; conduct that runs counter to smooth social relationships is bad (J. D. and E. J. Krige in Forde, 1954: 78). The greatest happiness and good of the tribe was the end and aim of each member of the tribe. Now, utility forms part of the basis of perhaps all moral codes. With the Bantu, it formed the basis of morality…it was utilitarian. This was the standard of goodness, and in harmony with, and conformity to, this end must the moral conduct be moulded. The effect of this, of course, was altruism (S. M. Molema, 1920: 116). Humanity and Brotherhood These two concepts, humanity and brotherhood, feature prominently in African social and moral thought and practice. They are among the moral or human values that constitute the basic—perhaps the ultimate—criteria that not only motivate but also justify human actions that affect other human beings. ‘Brotherhood’ has come to refer to an association of men and/or women with common aims and interests. African ethical conceptions: if we are human, we are (must be) brothers, in a capacious, comprehensive sense of the word ‘brother’ (to be discussed shortly). The Akan maxim: ‘In human flesh there is no edge of cultivation—no boundary’. The maxim invites us to realize, is not so in the cultivation of the friendship and fellowship of human beings; the boundaries of that form of cultivation are limitless. For, humanity is of one kind; all humankind is one species, with shared basic values, feelings, hopes, and desires. Even though the African people traditionally live in small communities and are divided into different ethnic or cultural groups and into clans and lineages with complex networks of relationships, nevertheless, they perceive humanity to embrace all other peoples beyond their narrow geographic or spatial confines, to constitute all human beings into one universal family of humankind. The common membership of one universal human family constitutes (should constitute) a legitimate basis for the idea of universal human brotherhood (or unity) A human being can be related only to another human being, not to a beast. Implicit in the African perception of humanity is the recognition of all persons, irrespective of their racial or ethnic backgrounds, as brothers. A practical translation of the idea of brotherhood leads to such social and moral virtues as hospitality, generosity, concern for others, and communal feeling. ‘The human being is more beautiful than gold.’ (onipa ye fe sen sika) What the maxim is saying, therefore, is that a human being is to be enjoyed for his or her own sake. To enjoy a human being for his/her own sake means you should appreciate his value as a human being and demonstrate that appreciation by showing compassion, generosity, and hospitality. To enjoy a human being also means you should recognize the other person as a fellow individual whose worth as a human being is equal to yours and with whom you undoubtedly share basic values, ideals, and sentiments. the main intent of the maxim is to point out the worth of a human being and the respect that ought to be given to her by virtue of her humanity. Recognition of the worth of a human being is, according to the maxim, more important than caring for wealth. The Notion of the Common Good The common good is not a surrogate for the sum of the various individual goods. It does not consist of, or derive from, the goods and preferences of particular individuals. It is that which is essentially good for human beings as such, embracing the needs that are basic to the enjoyment and fulfillment of the life of each individual. If the common good were the aggregate of individual goods, it would only be contingently, not essentially, common and, on that score, it would not be achieved in a way that will benefit all the individuals in a society. There should be no conceptual tension or opposition between the common good and the good of the individual member of the community, for the common good embraces the goods—the basic goods—of all the members of the community. There is no human being who does not desire peace, security, freedom, dignity, respect, justice, equality, and satisfaction. It is such a moral, not a weird, notion embracive of fundamental goods—goods that are intrinsic to human fulfillment and to which all individuals desire to have access—that is referred to as the common good. Institutions of various kinds—legal, political, economic, moral and others—are set up in pursuit of certain commonly shared values and goals, that is, a common good which a human society desires to achieve for all of its members. Social, Not Individualistic, Ethics A humanistic morality, whose central focus is the concern for the welfare and interest of each member of community, would expectably be a social morality which is enjoined by social life itself. A traditional Akan thinker asserted in a previously quoted proverb that says that ‘When a human being descends from the heavens, he [or she] descends into a human town [or, a human society].’ The point of the maxim is that the human being is social by nature. Being a member of the human community by nature, the individual is naturally related or oriented toward other persons and must have relationships with them. The natural sociality or relationality of human beings would—and should—prescribe a social ethic, rather than the ethic of individualism. Individualistic ethics that focuses on the welfare and interests of the individual is hardly regarded in African moral thought. The well-being of man depends on his fellow man. (onipa yieye firi onipa) There are occasions when the demonstration by another person (or other persons) of goodwill, sympathy, compassion, and the willingness to help can be a great boost to a person's attempts to achieve his goals, to fulfill his life. Man is not a palm-tree that he should be complete (or, self sufficient). (onipa nye abe na ne ho ahyia ne ho) The proverb points up the inadequacies of the human being that make it impossible for him to fulfill his life, socially, economically, emotionally, psychologically, and so on. It is only through cooperation with other human beings that the needs and goals of the individual can be fulfilled. With his self-sufficiency whittled away by man's natural condition, the individual requires the succor and relationships of others in order to satisfy his basic needs. A social ethic that recognizes the importance of the values of mutual help, goodwill, and reciprocity is the kind of ethic that will counter the lack of human self-sufficiency in respect of talents and capacities and in many ways help realize his basic needs