Robbins and Malthus on Scarcity, Abundance, and Sufficiency PDF
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University of Gothenburg
Adel Daoud
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This article delves into the sociological analysis of scarcity and related concepts. Through exploring the perspectives of Malthus and Robbins, it examines how these ideas are used. It discusses the sociocultural aspects influencing how scarcity, abundance, and sufficiency are viewed.
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Robbins and Malthus on Scarcity, Abundance, and Sufficiency The Missing Sociocultural Element ajes_741 1206..1229 By ADEL DAOUD* ABSTRACT. The problem of scarcity is often talked about, but it is rarely...
Robbins and Malthus on Scarcity, Abundance, and Sufficiency The Missing Sociocultural Element ajes_741 1206..1229 By ADEL DAOUD* ABSTRACT. The problem of scarcity is often talked about, but it is rarely clearly defined. In this article, two different views of scarcity are outlined: absolute and relative scarcity. These two are respectively exemplified by Malthus’s and Robbins’s views of scarcity. However, both of these views tend to naturalize and universalize scarcity, and thus overlook abundance and sufficiency, which are important states in the social provisioning process. It is argued that this is due to ignorance of the sociocultural causal underpinnings of scarcity, abundance, and sufficiency (SAS). The introduction of these mechanisms enables further conceptual differentiation of SAS (e.g., quasi-, artificial-, natural-). Introduction It is commonly viewed that resources are scarce no matter the situation. There is only a given amount of oil hidden beneath the surface, the production of food is limited, and there are only 24 hours per day to utilize. Conflict, poverty, and anxiety are all consequences of scarcity. In this view, social provisioning is hampered; finite *The author is a doctoral candidate at the Department of Sociology, Gothenburg University, Sweden. E-mail: [email protected]. His research comprises a study of the concept of scarcity, abundance, and sufficiency in economics and sociol- ogy. One of the main interests is to bring these disciplines closer together through the development of these concepts. This includes both theoretical studies as well as empirical investigations (most notably, consumerism and famines). Another research interest, in proximity to this general program, includes the philosophy of science, with a focus on realist stances. The author wishes to thank Bengt Larsson, Freddy Winston Castro, and Richard Swedberg for valuable assistance and comments on previous version of this paper. The author also wishes to acknowledge the valuable insights provided by the editor and the two anonymous referees. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 69, No. 4 (October, 2010). © 2010 American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc. Scarcity, Abundance, and Sufficiency 1207 resources are equated with scarcity, and scarcity is more or less given, a natural element of the human condition. Nevertheless, if we consult the literature on scarcity, a somewhat different picture may emerge. Firstly, it may be claimed that limited resources does not equate with scarcity. Scarcity is a property that emerges in relation to human activity or social provisioning. Secondly, it seems that there are at least two different views of scarcity; namely, absolute and relative scarcity (Barbier 1989). These are, however, implicitly used in the literature and thus need to be further studied. Where this distinction is used explicitly, it mainly corresponds to the difference between human needs and desires (Baumgartner et al. 2006; Raiklin and Uyar 1996). This article will argue that this corre- spondence is not a necessary condition to define these two views. Thirdly, even if scarcity is the most frequently used concept in the literature, the paper will argue that abundance and sufficiency are equally important but neglected states of affairs when it comes to the provisioning process. This argument depends on showing the non- naturalness of scarcity; in other words, its sociocultural underpinnings. These arguments will be unfolded to fulfill the following purpose. The purpose of this article is to explore two different views of scarcity, abundance, and sufficiency (SAS); and the way in which they overlap and vary. These two views will be denominated as absolute SAS and relative SAS. This study will outline the essential features of these two views, which will result in a characterization of absolute and relative SAS. This study will be anchored in the SAS literature. However, for the sake of stringency this paper will mainly use two different accounts to exemplify absolute and relative SAS. Absolute and relative scarcity can be respectively contrasted through Malthus’s and Robbins’s accounts. I believe that Malthus’s account is the most representative of absolute scarcity, not because he focuses on a fundamental human need (food), but because the way he uses the analytical categories is essentially what I mean by absolute scarcity. This claim is also true for Robbins’s account. I believe that his account is a clear example of an analysis of relative scarcity,1 not because he focuses more on human desires, but because the use of the analytical categories is one of relative scarcity. Nevertheless, as will be shown in this paper, absolute 1208 The American Journal of Economics and Sociology and relative SAS is more about how the problem of scarcity is viewed rather than just a categorical distinction. There is an intimate relationship between the issue of SAS and the social provisioning process.. Scarcity is a given, or a postulate, in the mainstream economic conception (Dugger 1996); but from an insti- tutionalist or sociological point of view,2 as resources and wants could be studied endogenously, scarcity then is also, by definition, open for socioeconomic inquiry (Daoud 2007). By the same token, if scarcity is an interesting economic concept to study, it also follows, that abundance and sufficiency are open for investigation. This is especially true when the underlying sociocultural mechanisms of SAS are understood. The article is divided into four sections. The first section discusses the Malthusian approach and its understanding of absolute scarcity. The second section discusses relative scarcity as viewed by Robbins’s approach. The third section explores some of the central relations between absolute and relative scarcity. It is shown that these are not categorical distinctions but are rather elements that provide different focus of the SAS issue. The fourth section highlights some of the underlying sociocultural mechanisms of SAS that have been largely neglected in the outlined approaches. This discussion about the importance of sociocultural mechanism will indicate the need for further research. Malthus and Absolute Scarcity In his 1826 book, An Essay on the Principles of Population, Thomas Robert Malthus laid the theoretical foundation of the conventional wisdom that has dominated the debate, both scientifically and ideo- logically (Harvey 1974), on global hunger and famines for almost two centuries (Kutzner 1991). The increasing food requirements of any given population will sooner or later result in scarcity, and thus hunger and famine. This is the principle of population: Taking the whole earth [... ] and, supposing the present population equal to a thousand millions, the human species would increase as the numbers, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, and subsistence as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. In two centuries the population would be to the means of subsistence as Scarcity, Abundance, and Sufficiency 1209 256 to 9; in three centuries as 4096 to 13, and in two thousand years the difference would be almost incalculable. In this supposition no limits whatever are placed to the produce of the earth. It may increase for ever and be greater than any assignable quantity; yet still the power of population being in every period so much superior, the increase of the human species can only be kept down to the level of the means of subsistence by the constant operation of the strong law of necessity, acting as a check upon the greater power (Malthus 1826: 11). Accordingly, the strong drive for reproduction in relation to the weak expansion of food production possibilities will very rapidly result in a situation of scarcity and thus hunger. This fundamental relation between food requirements and the food production capacity is the ultimate check on population growth. However, there are more imme- diate checks conditioning this fundamental relationship, namely pre- ventative and positive checks. The former refers to the human capacity to reflect on the future consequences of various courses of action. For example, the fact that forming a large family requires more resources tends to discourage individuals from establishing such a family. It also refers to custom and morality in society (e.g. marriage or other traditions and norms that restrict reproduction). Attitude towards contraceptives is another example.3 But the positive checks, as the quotation indicates, are more extreme and involuntary by nature. He argued that: The positive checks to population are extremely various, and include every cause, whether arising from vice or misery, which in any degree contributes to shorten the natural duration of human life. Under this head, therefore, may be enumerated all unwholesome occupations, severe labour and exposure to the seasons, extreme poverty, bad nursing of children, great towns, excesses of all kinds, the whole train of common diseases and epidemics, wars, plague, and famine (Malthus 1826: 15). Even a small unforeseen disruption in this fundamental relation, such as a bad harvest, may cause a severe famine. Consequently, the sum of the preventative and positive checks forms the set of immediate checks on population growth (Malthus 1826: 17). Hence, it is the underlying causal mechanisms of requirements that cause an expo- nential increase in population, while the available quantities are relatively fixed. 1210 The American Journal of Economics and Sociology There are two fundamental categories that define scarcity in the Malthusian approach. The first is food needs, we will denominate this category as food requirements, or more generally requirements (R). The second category refers to the objects that provide direct satisfaction of these requirements, which will be denominate as available quanti- ties (A). There is therefore a fundamental relationship between R and A that determines scarcity, abundance, and sufficiency (SAS). From this, we could derive the following quantitative relationships: Absolute sufficiency: human requirements (R) and available quantities (A) are quantitatively equal: (R = A). Absolute scarcity: human requirements (R) are quantitatively greater than available quantities (A): (R > A). Absolute abundance: human requirements (R) are quantitatively less than available quantities (A): (R < A). These relationships are quantified for one given system; for example, a nation, a region, or even the entire global (the earth). In the case of hunger or famines, aggregate food needs and food production are measured and evaluated. Questions about thresholds, limitations, and the subsistence prospects of a given system are investigated. In its contemporary version (the neo-Malthusian approach), the main thrust of Malthus’s argument is not restricted to foodstuffs, but is rather more general. It could, by the same token, refer to the ultimate limitation in common resources (Hardin 1968), the carrying capacity of nature (Meadows et al. 1972), or it could be as general as the avail- ability of low entropy resources (diffusion of energy, namelys entropic processes) (Georgescu-Roegen 1971). Accordingly, the premise of scarcity and the logic of Malthus are echoed by Hardin in his idea of the tragedy of the commons and his lifeboat ethics. He sets the scene: So here we sit, say 50 people [requirements (R)] in our lifeboat. To be generous, let us assume it has room for 10 more, making a total capacity of 60 [available resources (A)]. Suppose the 50 of us in the lifeboat see 100 others [more requirements (R)] swimming in the water outside, begging for admission to our boat or for handouts. We have several options: we may be tempted to try to live by the Christian ideal of being “our brother’s keeper,” or by the Marxist ideal of “to each according to his needs.” Since the needs of all in the water are the same, and since they can all be seen Scarcity, Abundance, and Sufficiency 1211 as “our brothers,” we could take them all into our boat, making a total of 150 in a boat designed for 60 [A-R relation]. The boat swamps, everyone drowns. Complete justice, complete catastrophe (Hardin 1974: 38). It is with reference to this metaphor that Hardin lays out his argument. The overuse of common resources leads to the scarcity in future supplies (Hardin 1968). Different population checks have to be manu- factured in order to prevent the overuse of resources. It does not matter if it is education or famine; the imperative is the survival of humanity—or the fittest human.4 Along the same lines, Kenneth Boulding (1973) argues that the current world system (economy, society, and nature) has now become a closed system, or rather a system that has reached its limitation. It is not possible, as in the early civilizations, to conquer new territories or resources and thus push the production possibilities frontier further outwards (the expandability of A). In order to solve humanity’s global environmental problems, people cannot simply move from one place to another, and hope to leave these problems behind. Rather, we have to envision the human race living in a spaceship where natural resources have to be used in a cyclical manner. Malthus’s approach is generalized even further by Georgescu- Roegen, one of the pioneers of ecological economics (Daly and Farley 2004). He vindicates Malthus’s statements and criticizes contemporary economics for neglecting this issue: If the entropic process were not irrevocable, i.e., if the energy of a piece of coal or of uranium could be used over and over again ad infinitum, scarcity would hardly exist in man’s life. Up to a certain level even an increase in population would not create scarcity: mankind would simply have to use the existing stocks more frequently (Georgescu-Roegen 1971: 6) The focus on the actual use of low entropy resources, rather than on the alternative use, illustrates one of the crucial differentiating ele- ments between absolute and relative scarcity. A low entropy (nonre- newable) resource is scarce in a different sense than say land (renewable). Both land and coal are limited in amount or extension. Even if a piece of coal and an acre of land have an alternative use as any element of the factors of production, a piece of coal can only be used once, whereas an acre of land can be redistributed or reallocated 1212 The American Journal of Economics and Sociology later on. This shows a fundamental limitation of merely reallocating resources (relative scarcity) because reallocation does not consider the absolute dimensions of a resource. Moreover, using uranium instead of oil, oil instead of coal, and coal instead of real horse power merely exponentially increases the depletion of low entropy resources. Hence, modernization of the means of production, whether it is done via the market or via administrative measures, may merely lead to even more sever depletion of low entropy resources, and thus aggra- vate absolute scarcity. Furthermore, the extraction of natural resources (low entropy) is seen as a necessary act to enable economic growth, but it gradually leads to sever absolute scarcity of natural resources. The total set of low entropy resources (Aentropy) is shrinking, whereas the total set of humanity’s requirements (Rentropy) for low entropy resources is expanding exponentially. This is Herman Daly’s most general absolute scarcity, what he calls “the absolute scarcity of ultimate means.” He writes: Absolute scarcity... refers to the scarcity of resources in general, the scarcity of ultimate means. Absolute scarcity increases as growth in popu- lation and per-capital consumption push us ever closer to the carrying capacity of the biosphere. The concept presupposes that all economical substitutions among resources will be made [this is relative scarcity]. While such substitutions will certainly mitigate the burden of absolute scarcity, they will not eliminate it nor prevent is eventual increase (Daly 1977: 39). Hence, it is in this way that the (neo)Malthusians view the problem of scarcity, which commonly focuses on, but is not limited to, sub- sistence resources such as food, water, and land (Meadows et al. 1972). Figure 1 is a graphical representation of absolute SAS as defined in this study. First, it refers to the quantitative relationship between one kind of A and one kind of R. Second, it captures the underlying possibilities of expanding and shrinking any A-R relation- ship. For example, is it possible to increase the area of arable land to meet the expanding need for food; or why are energy production at a certain level versus energy consumption. Robbins and Relative Scarcity The concept of relative scarcity is found in Robbins’s famous defini- tion of economics, “the science which studies human behaviour as a Scarcity, Abundance, and Sufficiency 1213 Figure 1 One-to-One Relationship: The Problem of Actual Use (Thresholds) A R relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses” (Robbins 1945: 16). The term alternative use (Becker 1971) or substitutability (Baumgartner et al. 2006) is the key to understanding relative scarcity. It is the allocating or distributing act of individuals that is of interest. This could be illustrated with reference to Robinson Crusoe, the isolated economizing individual (Robbins 1945: 10–12).5 Imagine Crusoe living alone on an island, where the satisfaction of his requirements depends only upon the supply of fresh water. Crusoe has four requirements: water for himself for drinking, water for his animals (provides him with milk), water for his hygiene, and some water for his flower garden, which gives him aesthetical pleasure (Menger 2004: 133). Consider two cases. In the first case, where the supply of water on the island is enough to support at least thousands of individuals with needs and wants very similar to Crusoe’s—a situation of abundance. In such a situation, Crusoe would have no reason to economize. Additionally, in this case the subject matter of mainstream economics does not apply. The second case is where the supply of water on the island is scarce in relation to his requirements. In this case, Crusoe is forced to economize and make the best (the optimal) he can of the situation; his well-being and ultimately his existence are threatened. What is the most optimal solution (the rational choice) in terms of using the water efficiently? In principle, the problem is about allocating the limited (scarce) water to his four needs.6 Four different ends are competing relative to a scarce resource. Consequently, some ends have to be 1214 The American Journal of Economics and Sociology Figure 2 One-to-Several Relationship: The Problem of Alternative Use (Allocation) R1 A R2 R3 Rn foregone—but which ones? Even if Crusoe’s example is an unrealistic approximation of real life situations, his case is the model for solving optimization problems under relative scarcity. This kind of optimiza- tion applies regardless of the character of the needs, wants, or ends. Relative scarcity may be illustrated graphically in Figure 2. It is one kind of resource (A) with alternative uses related to n different requirements (Rn). Robbins summarizes the human condition in four essential points: (a) the ends are various; (b) we have the ambition to fulfil these various ends; (c) the time and the means for achieving these ends are limited and capable of alternative application; and (d) the ends differ in importance and can be prioritized (Robbins 1945: 12). Therefore, human beings have to choose. They have to economize. This is the essential economic phenomenon that is the root of mainstream eco- nomics. Robbins writes: when time and the means for achieving ends are limited and capable of alternative application, and the ends are capable of being distinguished in order of importance, the behaviour necessarily assumes the form of choice. Every act which involves time and scarce means for the achievement of one end involves the relinquishment of their use for the achievement of another. It has an economic aspect. (Robbins 1945: 14) To reiterate, it is the alternative use of means that condition the emergence of relative scarcity. Gordon argues, as an exercise in Scarcity, Abundance, and Sufficiency 1215 logic, that this kind economizing problem, the problem of choice, applies not only to this world of finite resource but also to the afterlife (Gordon 1980). Gordon claims, even if time is infinite in length, that ‘... while it would be possible to do everything one wished to do sooner or later, one could not do everything at the same time; one could not, for example, play the harp and go swim- ming simultaneously. Choices would have to be made as to which to do first; that is, time would have to be allocated despite its certain infinite duration. So, everlasting life is not a sufficient con- dition for no scarcity (Gordon 1980: 213). This is similar to Zinam’s concept of internal scarcity (Zinam 1982). Choices have to be made about how to utilize each unit of time. Consequently, all human actions have an economic aspect because they are con- ditioned by alternative conduct or alternative use (Robbins 1945: 28). Nevertheless, Robbins argues that not all means are scarce. This is crucial. To make choices is not necessarily the same thing as the problem of relative scarcity, which questions the validity of Gordon’s and Zinam’s argument. There are things in the world that are abundant such as the air for instance. An individual can have one unit of air without losing a unit of another good (e.g., water, or food). The abundance of air makes it a “free” good. We do not have to sacrifice time or other means in order to acquire a unit of air. In a situation of abundance, Crusoe has both the time and means to fulfil all his requirements; he does not have to economize despite the fact that he must make choices (Robbins 1945: 14–15, 35). This, I argue, shows that a solution to relative scarcity, in Robbins’s term, hinges on choice, but choice as such does not necessarily hinge on the problem of relative scarcity. In general, however, abundance is a rare case according to Robbins. We have a multiplicity of objectives or requirements in relation to limited time and means. There are only 24 hours in the day. Life is short. Nature is stingy: We have been turned out of Paradise. We have neither eternal life nor unlimited means of gratification. Everywhere we turn, if we choose one thing we must relinquish others which, in different circumstances, we would wish not to have relinquished. Scarcity of means to satisfy ends of 1216 The American Journal of Economics and Sociology varying importance is an almost ubiquitous condition of human behaviour (Robbins 1945: 15).7 Robbins is universalizing scarcity by naturalizing it. In the last section of this article, I will argue that this is a problematic position. Robbins argues, therefore, that relative scarcity in the form of the scarcity postulate is the starting point for economics (cf. Becker 1971; Samuelson and Nordhaus 2001; Xenos 1987, 1989). The following definitions summarize the quantitative meaning of relative SAS: Relative sufficiency: A set (R′) which consists of different kinds of requirements, note as R′ = (R1, R2... Rn), in relation to the avail- able quantities (A) with alternative uses that are quantitatively equal: (R′ = A).8 Relative scarcity: A set (R′) which consists of different kinds of requirements, note as R′ = (R1, R2... Rn), in relation to the avail- able quantities (A) with alternative uses that are quantitatively greater: (R′ > A). Relative abundance: A set (R′) which consists of different kinds of requirements, note as R′ = (R1, R2... Rn), in relation to the available quantities (A) with alternative uses that are quantita- tively smaller: (R′ < A).9 The Relationship between Relative and Absolute Scarcity Even if the different approaches to relative and absolute scarcity are comparatively distinct, it seems that the link between them is an intimate one. In reality, a resource may have both an actual and an alternative use; it may be absolutely abundant but relatively scarce and vice versa. For example, there could be more than enough land in order to meet all the food needs of a population (arable land is absolutely abundant in terms of food needs), but land may be needed for the production of housing or industry (relatively scarce in terms of alternative use). Conversely, land may be enough for agriculture, housing, and industry (relative abundance), but still misallocated in terms of agriculture (absolute scarcity), that is, more land is used for housing and industry which generates absolute abundance or over- Scarcity, Abundance, and Sufficiency 1217 production in these sectors and absolute scarcity in agriculture. This example contrasts the concepts of alternative and actual use. It is clear from the definitions of both relative and absolute scarcity that a resource (A) by itself is not enough to be defined as scarce. There must be a want, a need, or a requirement of some sort that stands in a relation to that resource or good. This entails that a limited amount of a good does not say anything about the scarcity character of that good. It is not until it is related to a want or a requirement that it may be denominated as scarce, abundant, or sufficient (SAS). A limited amount of a good simply means that there are given quantities of it. Robbins argues that: the mere limitation of means by itself [is not] sufficient to give rise to economic phenomena. If means of satisfaction have no alternative use, then they may be scarce, but they cannot be economised. The Manna which fell from heaven may have been scarce, but, if it was impossible to exchange it for something else or to postpone its use, it was not the object of any activity with an economic aspect. (Robbins 1945: 13) This passage clarifies the distinction between absolute and relative scarcity.10 It is the meaning of alternative and actual use that is of key importance for understanding this distinction. If there is no alternative use (no opportunity cost), then there is no relative scarcity, and consequently means cannot be economized in Robbins’s terms.11 However, a good may still be scarce in absolute terms (e.g. the Manna which fell from heaven). Conversely, scarcity in the Malthusian sense does not require any alternative use. It is adequate to have a situation in which the quantitative relation is R > A. Herein lays the major difference between absolute and relative scarcity. The first entails a situation of choice between desired alternatives, while the second relates human requirements to their satisfiers and asks about the quantitative nature of this relationship. The first treats A-R as given, whereas the second regards it as changing. The first will seek optimal allocation of A over the whole set R′, whereas the second is more interested in how far A is sufficient over one kind of R. Nevertheless, to actually determine whether a good is scarce in either an absolute or relative sense is an intricate issue, if not an impossible distinction to make when it comes to actual observations. 1218 The American Journal of Economics and Sociology How could a social economist determine the alternative use of a good? According to the marginalists Menger, Jevons, and Walras, a more subjective approach is necessary. The alternative use of a good is determined by the economizing individuals themselves. If a good could satisfy more than one want of an individual’s preferences, then it also carries an alternative use (and thus marginal utility); this is strictly subjectively defined by the individual. However, what if an individual is ignorant about the known causal connections of the consumed good?12 Or more problematically, even if an individual is aware of the causal connections, in a complex reality the unintended consequences of any choice are by definition unknown (Beckert 1996). Furthermore, what about the potential casual connections that have yet to be discovered? These are true and intriguing challenges in the study of relative scarcity. These challenges comprise a broader formulation of the problem of scarcity than Robbins’s formulation because, among other things, it entails the study of alternative futures.13 To determine the actual use of a good seems to be less complicated. It calls for an investigation of how a given resource is used in a particular case. For example, this could entail comparing food pro- duction figures with food; or energy resources with energy consump- tion; or more generally, the carrying capacity of an ecosystem. Nonetheless, contrary to Baumgartner et al., I do not believe that it is fruitful to claim that a good is either relatively scarce or absolutely scarce (Baumgartner et al. 2006; Daly 1977). Both possibilities are probably always present. Some resources have, by virtue of their natural properties in relation to human intersubjectivity and the social provisioning process, higher rates of alternative use (e.g. the factors of production, that is, land, capital, labor, or time, and low entropy resources); others have low rates of alternative use (diamonds, waste, or high entropy resources). Hence, the problems of absolute and relative SAS tend to overlap. The two different approaches emerge because of the different ques- tions asked about a scarcity situation. Table 1 summarizes some ideal-typical characteristics of the different ways of viewing scarcity. In Row 1, the Malthusian problem of scarcity refers to a systemic level (a society, economy, a region, or the global system in totality); Robbins’ Scarcity, Abundance, and Sufficiency 1219 Table 1 An Ideal-Typical Comparison of Absolute and Relative Scarcity Absolute scarcity Relative scarcity 1 Unit of analysis Systemic Individualistic 2 Ontology Materialistic Idealistic 3 Scarcity is...... a relationship between... a relationship one kind of resource (A) Between one kind and one kind of of resource and requirement (R) A-R, several competing (one-to-one) requirements A-(R1, R2,... Rn), (one-to-several) 4 The character A and R are changing Both A and Rn are of A-R over time and space given 5 Main research Defining thresholds Finding optimal problem and final limitations allocation 6 Kind of analysis Causal impacts Rational (optimal) (conclusions) choice 7 Focus Actual use Alternative use (nonsubstitutability) (substitutability) 8 Typical case Carrying capacity of Crusoe-like situations, a system (A) in where an individual relation to human allocates means (A) consumption (R) to a set of competing requirements (R1, R2... Rn) 9 Disciplinary Biology, ecology Economics affinities (neoclassical) 10 The human Scarcity is naturalized Scarcity is naturalized condition and (inevitable) (inevitable) the view of SAS Sufficiency may be Sufficiency is reached in a steady-state normally unattainable economy Abundance is Abundance is normally normally unattainable unattainable 1220 The American Journal of Economics and Sociology main scarcity problem refers to an economizing individual (most notably a person, but could be a household, a firm, an organization).14 In Row 2, the former approach has a more materialistic ontology, whereas the latter is more idealistic because it views scarcity as a relationship between resources with alternative uses (not necessarily empirically manifested or material in its basis) and competing require- ments whose utility is subjectively known only to the individual. In Row 3, to reiterate, absolute scarcity is a relationship between one requirement (R) in relation to its satisfier (A), whereas relative scarcity refers to a relationship between one satisfier (A) relative to competing requirements (Rn). In Row 4, these definitions entail two different views of how to perceive A-R. Absolute scarcity is a problem where both A and R are regarded as changing variables, whereas in relative scarcity these are treated as given factors. In Row 5, the main research problem of relative scarcity is thus to find the optimal allocation of a resource. Conversely, the Malthusian problem is more about defining thresholds in a given system (locally, regionally, or globally). Here an investigator would like to study, for example, the sufficiency of food (or oil) production in relation to food requirements. Thus, this formulation of the research problem seeks to understand the final limitations of some resource. In Row 6, consequently, the kind of analysis or conclusions the Malthusians are interested in is more causal to its nature, that is, what possible effects a given A-R constellation may have on a system (e.g., oil production and consumption); Robbins’s analysis of relative scar- city focuses on the determination of the rational choice of a given situation. It is the optimization of a given resource that is of main interest. In Row 7, in this sense absolute scarcity is a concept that captures the actual use of a resource, whereas relative scarcity captures the alternative use. In Row 8, as a result, a typical case of absolute scarcity could refer to the carrying capacity of a system (nature, society, and the economy); Crusoe-like situations are the typical case of relative scarcity. In Row 9, accordingly, the problem of absolute scarcity is more relevant in disciplines such as biology and (human) ecology, whereas Scarcity, Abundance, and Sufficiency 1221 the problem of relative scarcity is the main focus of neoclassical economics (Baumgartner et al. 2006). Hence, this summary highlights the relevance of both approaches. A more comprehensive study of the environment, society, and the economy will surely require a concep- tual integration of both approaches. In Row 10, however, I argue that the major limitation of both approaches is that they tend to assume that scarcity is natural. This is largely due to an omission of the institutional or sociocultural dimension of SAS, which in turn veils the importance of abundance and sufficiency in socioeconomic theory.15 In addition, the introduc- tion of sociocultural influences may generate further differentiations of the concept of scarcity; besides natural scarcity, we may add quasi- and artificial scarcity (Daoud 2007). In the next section, I want to briefly address the relevance of the sociocultural dimension. Discussion The Importance of Sociocultural Mechanisms To reiterate, one of the major issues built into both approaches, is that they tend to presume that scarcity is natural and universal. Conse- quently, they tend to ignore the possibility of both states of abundance and sufficiency. The naturalness of scarcity emerges because the sociocultural influences on SAS are ignored: NeoMalthusians have pointed out weaknesses both in neoclassical theory and in our present economic system. However, neoMalthusian theory shares the same basic paradigm as the neoclassical one, including its basic misconception—the assumption that scarcity is essential to the human condition and is the driving force behind our present day economy. Both neoclassical and neoMalthusian economists are blind to the fact that scarcity is a social product and, as such, can be abolished through social, especially economic, change (Matthaei 1984: 85). I want to emphasize that this argument does not render scarcity an imaginary or a pseudo problem; it merely highlights the problem of scarcity in its totality, and in its holistic causal connections (Daoud 2007). If scarcity is possible, then abundance and sufficiency are also, by definition, possible.16 This means that scarcity is not univer- 1222 The American Journal of Economics and Sociology sal. This argument suggests that given their importance (Xenos 1989), the concepts of scarcity, abundance, and sufficiency should lie at the center of a conceptual arsenal of general socioeconomic theory, but in an elaborate form beyond the articulations of Malthus and Robbins. Essentially, SAS is a function of A-R, which is in turn affected by at least two major factors, namely, environmental mechanisms (non- human intervention) and sociocultural mechanisms (human interven- tion). Environmental mechanisms are derived from the material basis of a system. They involve the geographic and natural conditions of the area in question (topography, climate, and the like). Sociocultural mechanisms are derived from the social conditions of a system (norms, positions, habits, rules, values, power, etc.) (Archer 1995; Lawson 2003). Accordingly, a socioeconomic approach to SAS would focus more on how parts of this complex relation affect the manifestation of relative and absolute SAS, rather than solely on utility optimiza- tion as in Robbins’s approach or on thresholds as in Malthus’s approach. There are several sociocultural structures or mechanisms that could affect SAS. Institutions (systems of social rules) and habits (Hodgson 1998) may condition how different (re)allocations occur, and determine the availability of resources through property rights (Tchipev 2006). Values and norms will influence and shape the people’s interests and requirements, and consequently their view of SAS (Daoud, forthcoming). Different values such as material, intel- lectual, aesthetical, and ethical, will surely have a causal effect; monks, artists, ordinary citizens, workers, managers will all have relatively different views and experiences of SAS. Force and fraud are an imminent dimension of social life that will affect the con- stellation of any A-R relationship. The power struggle between social groups will be a salient mechanism conditioning SAS (Sartre 1991). In addition, different conceptions of SAS may be at the core of any ideology (Bronfenbrenner 1962; Harvey 1974). A state of abundance is the goal of some emancipatory projects, for example, Marxism (Gowdy 1984); sufficiency for others (Daly and Farley 2004); and the inevitability of scarcity for yet others (Hardin 1974). Hence, these are some sociocultural mechanisms that SAS will be Scarcity, Abundance, and Sufficiency 1223 Figure 3 The Embeddedness of the A-R Relationship A´ R´ Sociocultural mechanisms embedded in, and, therefore, conditioned by (Dugger 1996; Polanyi 1957). This is captured in Figure 3. Even if the focus of this article has been on absolute and relative SAS, these conceptualizations of SAS should not be seen as exhaus- tive. There are other evocative adjectives, besides “absolute” and “relative.” Without a lengthy description, I would like to at least mention a few. For example, in previous work I suggested (Daoud 2007) a further differentiation of absolute SAS, namely, quasi SAS as well as artificial SAS and natural17 SAS. These adjectives indicate the causal character of absolute SAS. Other conceptualizations are internal, external (Zinam 1982), social scarcity (Hirsch 1977), and Post scarcity (Bookchin 1971; Giddens 1990; Gowdy 1984; Keynes 1972). It seems that the common denominator of all these concep- tualizations is the sociocultural element. This shows that any problem of SAS is intrinsically embedded in society and the economy. To summarize, this paper argued that there are different views of scarcity, two of which were the focus of this article. The first view, denominated as absolute scarcity, focuses on the actual use of a resource in relation to a want, a need, or a requirement. This kind of scarcity was exemplified by the Malthusian approach. It provides an 1224 The American Journal of Economics and Sociology account of how the relationship between R and A changes and what causal mechanisms affect this A-R relationship. The problem of alter- native use is not of primary interest to this approach. The second view, relative scarcity, focuses on the alternative use of a resource in relation to competing wants. Robbins’s approach was used to illustrate this kind of scarcity. Moreover, this study has also shown that the definitions of absolute and relative scarcity do not necessarily hinge upon the distinction between needs and desires (Baumgartner et al. 2006; Raiklin and Uyar 1996). Hence, the problem of scarcity could be further differentiated to a number of more nuanced problems. Besides Malthus’s and Robbins’s formulation of the issue, this paper suggested in convergence with others (Dugger and Peach 2009; Galbraith 1958; Sahlins 1998), that the problem of abundance and sufficiency is a socioeconomic problem of high relevance; despite it being ignored by Malthus, Robbins, and mainstream economics. This is probably the case because they tend to downplay the importance of the institutional or sociocultural mecha- nisms underlying SAS, and because they treat them as exogenously determined variables (Dugger 1996).18 Additionally, the economy is intimately linked to the social provi- sioning process, where not only human requirements but also resources are socioculturally conditioned (De Gregori 1987).19 These sociocultural mechanisms both precede and succeed a situation of SAS. In other words, these mechanisms tend to both generate SAS and resolve SAS issues in the socioeconomic system; but they are, of course, not reduced to them. For this reason, different views of SAS tend themselves to condition the emergence of various belief systems, or vice versa. Both Malthus and Robbins sought to promote their ideological conviction based on their respective views of scarcity. On the one hand, liberalism, as a political economic organization, is arguably based on a notion of scarcity, which Robbins promoted (Xenos 1987). On the other hand, Hardin’s lifeboat ethics, which is a kind of social-Darwinian ethic, follows Malthus’s own ideological intentions.20 David Harvey claims that, “[i]t is sometimes forgotten that Malthus wrote his first Essay on the Principle of Population in 1798 as a political tract against the utopian socialist-anarchism of Godwin and Condorcet and as an antidote to the hopes for social progress aroused Scarcity, Abundance, and Sufficiency 1225 by the French Revolution” (Harvey 1974: 258). Moreover, Marx’s rejection of Malthus is itself based on the belief that scarcity is merely a temporary historical specificity (Perelman 1979). However, in order to reach a better socioeconomic understanding of a given situation, we need a clarification of the concept of SAS. This study has sought to contribute to this clarification. Hence, the issue of SAS is embedded in the socio-economic fabric. This is an important conclusion, because it shows, among other things, that economic, political, and social studies are intimately linked through the SAS issue. An institutional or sociological approach to the economy should not repeal the issue of SAS; it should rather embrace it by showing its underlying sociocultural causality (Dugger 1996). Notes 1. Compare this with the concept of relative scarcity in Lee and Keen (2004). This concept is used in a slightly different way in this study. 2. On heterodox economics, see for example, Lee (2009). 3. Contraceptives were, of course, less developed during Malthus’s time. 4. Hardin’s example highlights also the Malthusian problem of two often contradictory rationalities, namely, the rationality of individuals and the inter- nal logic of a system. Therefore, what is rational for an individual is not necessarily rational for a system (e.g., the free rider problem). Moreover, because Robbins departed from methodological individualism, the rationality of the individual will coincide with the rationality of the system. Conversely, Malthus seems to have more of a methodological holistic view, and as a result, individual rationality contradicted systemic logic. I thank one of the referees for making me aware of this important point. 5. As Robbins builds on Menger’s approach, I will use Menger’s Crusoe example. 6. In a system of more than one individual (beyond Crusoe), n individu- als will through their exchange with each other on a free market automatically find an optimal equilibrium in terms of utility. Pareto efficiency is reached when no exchange can enhance general utility. 7. This also exemplifies the naturalness of scarcity, natural scarcity, which could be contrasted to social scarcity (Hirsch 1977). 8. This notations can be exemplified as, a consumers has an given income (which is noted as A) and a list of things he wants or require (R1 = housing, R2 = food, R3 = a new car, etc.). The income (A) is sufficient when it is more or less enough to buy the things the consumer require. The 1226 The American Journal of Economics and Sociology same kind of reasoning applies for other kind of means, time, land, or labour power. See Daoud (forthcoming). 9. The index n ⱖ 2. 10. Similarly, Becker argues that: “When there are no alternatives, there is no problem of choice and, therefore, no economic problem” (Becker 1971: 1). 11. Observe that even if there is an alternative use and thus an opportunity cost, the question “who pays for this cost” is an open ended question. Should the individual who, the social group, or some other third party? Compare to Frédéric Bastiat’s “the parable of the broken window” and the broken window fallacy (Bastiat 2007). 12. The access to information is in itself dependent on the social position of individuals. 13. Compare this problem to Keynes’s concept of “known and unknown probabilities” (O’Donnell 1989: 50 ff.). He also compares the subjectivist view of alternatives to his own approach about probability: “what particular propo- sitions we select as the premises of our argument naturally depends on subjective factors peculiar to ourselves; but the relations, in which other propositions stand to these, and which entitle us to probable beliefs, are objective and logical” (Keynes, cited in Carabelli 1988: 32). 14. However, even if the individual is the starting point of Robbins’s approach (methodological individualism), on the aggregate level and via the market, it is assumed that a general equilibrium will be reached. See footnote six. 15. However, Herman Daly’s approach, which is in agreement with Malthus’s approach, argues in favor of a steady-state economy, which could be understood as more or less a state of sufficiency (Daly 1974). 16. Whether scarcity, abundance, or sufficiency exists in a particular situation is a matter of practical inquiry. 17. By “natural” I mean a situation in which human intervention is very limited or nonexistent; I do not refer to a situation, as Samuelson claims, where “by definition, natural scarcities are such that nothing can be done about them” (Hegeland 1967: 33). 18. A major part, if not all, of the heterodox literature seems to emphasize the importance of the social and cultural factors (Lawson 2003; Hodgson 1998). 19. On the “making of resources,” I want to thank Dr. Stefan Kesting, Faculty of Business, AUT University, for making me aware of this issue. 20. 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