Cues to Deception PDF

Psychological Bulletin Copyright 2003 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 2003, Vol. 129, No. 1, 74 –118 003...

Psychological Bulletin Copyright 2003 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 2003, Vol. 129, No. 1, 74 –118 0033-2909/03/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0033-2909.129.1.74 Cues to Deception Bella M. DePaulo James J. Lindsay University of Virginia University of Missouri—Columbia Brian E. Malone Laura Muhlenbruck, Kelly Charlton, and University of Virginia Harris Cooper University of Missouri—Columbia Do people behave differently when they are lying compared with when they are telling the truth? The combined results of 1,338 estimates of 158 cues to deception are reported. Results show that in some ways, liars are less forthcoming than truth tellers, and they tell less compelling tales. They also make a more negative impression and are more tense. Their stories include fewer ordinary imperfections and unusual contents. However, many behaviors showed no discernible links, or only weak links, to deceit. Cues to deception were more pronounced when people were motivated to succeed, especially when the motivations were identity relevant rather than monetary or material. Cues to deception were also stronger when lies were about transgressions. Do people behave in discernibly different ways when they are Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1986; Zuckerman & Driver, lying compared with when they are telling the truth? Practitioners 1985), but the number of additional estimates was small. Other and laypersons have been interested in this question for centuries reviews have been more comprehensive but not quantitative (see (Trovillo, 1939). The scientific search for behavioral cues to Vrij, 2000, for the most recent of these). In the present review, we deception is also longstanding and has become especially vigorous summarize quantitatively the results of more than 1,300 estimates in the past few decades. of 158 cues to deception. These estimates are from 120 indepen- In 1981, Zuckerman, DePaulo, and Rosenthal published the first dent samples. comprehensive meta-analysis of cues to deception. Their search We define deception as a deliberate attempt to mislead others. for all reports of the degree to which verbal and nonverbal cues Falsehoods communicated by people who are mistaken or self- occurred differentially during deceptive communications com- deceived are not lies, but literal truths designed to mislead are lies. pared with truthful ones produced 159 estimates of 19 behavioral Although some scholars draw a distinction between deceiving and cues to deception. These estimates were from 36 independent lying (e.g., Bok, 1978), we use the terms interchangeably. As samples. Several subsequent reviews updated the Zuckerman et al. Zuckerman et al. (1981) did in their review, we limit our analysis (1981) meta-analysis (B. M. DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985a; to behaviors that can be discerned by human perceivers without the aid of any special equipment. We also limit our review to studies of adults, as the dynamics of deceiving may be markedly different in children (e.g., Feldman, Devin-Sheehan, & Allen, 1978; Lewis, Bella M. DePaulo and Brian E. Malone, Department of Psychology, Stanger, & Sullivan, 1989; Shennum & Bugental, 1982). University of Virginia; James J. Lindsay, Laura Muhlenbruck, Kelly Charl- ton, and Harris Cooper, Department of Psychology, University of Missou- ri—Columbia. Predicting Cues to Deception: Previous Approaches Bella M. DePaulo is now a visiting professor at the Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Barbara. James J. Lindsay is Ekman and Friesen (1969) now at the Department of Psychology, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities Campus. Kelly Charlton is now at the Department of Psychology, In 1969, Ekman and Friesen published the first influential the- University of North Carolina at Pembroke. oretical statement about cues to deception. They described two This article was reviewed and accepted under the editorial term of broad categories of cues, leakage cues and deception cues. Leak- Nancy Eisenberg. We thank Barry Schlenker for providing many insightful age cues reveal what the liars are trying to hide—typically, how suggestions and Charlie Bond, Tim Levine, and Aldert Vrij for answering they really feel. Anticipating the self-presentational perspective countless questions about their data and ideas. Many others also responded that would become important later, Ekman and Friesen (1969) to our inquiries about theoretical or empirical issues, including Jack noted that the operation of display rules (i.e., culturally and so- Brigham, Mark deTurck, Paul Ekman, Tom Feeley, Klaus Fiedler, Howard cially determined norms for managing facial expressions of emo- Friedman, Mark Frank, Dacher Keltner, Randy Koper, Bob Krauss, Steve McCornack, Maureen O’Sullivan, Ron Riggio, Jonathon Schooler, and tions) can result in leakage cues. For example, when deceivers try June Tangney. to squelch the facial expression of an emotion they are trying to Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Bella M. conceal, the resulting expression—a micro affect display—may be DePaulo, P.O. Box 487, Summerland, California 93067. E-mail: briefer than it is ordinarily, but the nature of the affect may still be [email protected] identifiable. If instead the facial expression is so brief that the 74  CUES TO DECEPTION 75 emotion cannot be discerned, then the resulting micro affect dis- Cognitive Aspects of Deception play functions as a deception cue. Deception cues indicate that deception may be occurring, without indicating the nature of the Zuckerman et al. (1981) conceptualized lying as a more cogni- information that is being concealed. Almost all of the cues that tively complex task than telling the truth. Liars, they claimed, need have been reported in the literature are deception cues. to formulate communications that are internally consistent and Ekman and Friesen (1969) described various conditions under consistent with what others already know. The greater cognitive which liars would be especially likely to succeed in their deception challenges involved in lying (relative to truth telling) were pre- attempts (e.g., perhaps by evidencing fewer or less obvious cues). dicted to result in longer response latencies, more speech hesita- Their formulation was based on the psychology of both the liars tions, greater pupil dilation, and fewer illustrators (hand move- and the targets of lies as they relate to each other. For example, ments that accompany and illustrate speech). they predicted that success is more likely when the salience of deception is asymmetrical such that the liars are focused on getting Attempted Control of Verbal and Nonverbal Behaviors away with their lies while the issue of deception is not salient to the targets or that the liars are focusing primarily on deceiving Liars’ attempts to control their behaviors so as to maintain their while the targets are simultaneously trying to deceive and detect deception can paradoxically result in cues that instead betray it. deceit. For example, liars’ behaviors may seem less spontaneous than truth tellers’. Also, liars’ inability to control all aspects of their behavior equally effectively could result in verbal and nonverbal Zuckerman et al. (1981) discrepancies. Zuckerman et al. (1981) began their formulation with the widely accepted premise that no one behavior or set of behaviors would Ekman (1985/1992) ever be found that always occurs when people are lying and never occurs any other time. Instead, they argued, the search should be Ekman (1985/1992) described two major categories of cues, for the kinds of thoughts, feelings, or psychological processes that thinking cues and feeling cues. Liars who prepare their deceptions are likely to occur more or less often when people are lying inadequately or who cannot keep their stories straight produce compared with when they are telling the truth and for the behav- inconsistencies that betray their deceits. Those who overprepare ioral cues that may be indicative of those states. They then delin- produce stories that seem rehearsed. If liars need to think carefully eated four factors that could be used to predict cues to deception: about their lies as they tell them, they may speak more slowly than generalized arousal, the specific affects experienced during decep- truth tellers. These are all thinking cues. tion, cognitive aspects of deception, and attempts to control be- Ekman’s (1985/1992) more important contribution, however, havior so as to maintain the deception. was his conceptualization of the role of emotions in deceiving. By understanding the emotions that liars are experiencing, Ekman Arousal argued, it is possible to predict behaviors that distinguish liars from truth tellers. For example, the cues indicative of detection appre- Citing the research and theory available at the time on the hension are fear cues. These include higher pitch, faster and louder psychophysiological detection of deception, Zuckerman et al. speech, pauses, speech errors, and indirect speech. The greater the (1981) proposed that liars may experience greater undifferentiated liars’ detection apprehension, the more evident these fear cues arousal than truth tellers. That arousal could be evidenced by liars’ should be. For example, liars should appear more fearful as the greater pupil dilation, increased blinking, more frequent speech stakes become higher and the anticipated probability of success disturbances, and higher pitch. However, Zuckerman et al. (1981) becomes lower. also acknowledged that autonomic responses that seem character- Similarly, liars who feel guiltier about their lies, such as those istic of deception may be explained by the specific affects expe- who are lying to people who trust them, should show more rienced while lying without invoking the notion of diffuse arousal. behavioral indicators of guilt. Ekman (1985/1992) noted that guilt cues have not been clearly determined, but they could include cues Feelings While Lying to sadness such as lower pitch, softer and slower speech, and downward gazing. To the extent that liars experience guilt about lying or fear of Liars’ feelings about lying are not necessarily negative ones. getting caught lying, behaviors indicative of guilt and fear are Ekman (1985/1992) suggested that liars sometimes experience shown more often by liars than truth tellers. Zuckerman et al. “duping delight,” which could include excitement about the chal- (1981) suggested that liars might fidget more than truth tellers, and lenge of lying or pride in succeeding at the lie. This delight could they may also sound more unpleasant. They also suggested that become evident in cues to excitement such as higher pitch, faster guilt and anxiety could become apparent in liars’ distancing of and louder speech, and more use of illustrators. The duping delight themselves from their deceptive communications. Drawing from hypothesis has not yet been tested. Wiener and Mehrabian’s (1968; see also Mehrabian, 1972) ac- Ekman (1985/1992) pointed out that emotions become signifi- count of the verbal and nonverbal cues indicative of distancing cant not only when liars feel apprehensive, guilty, or excited about (which they called nonimmediacy), Zuckerman et al. (1981) pre- their lies but also when liars are experiencing emotions that they dicted that liars would communicate in more evasive and indirect are trying to hide or when they are faking emotions that they are ways than truth tellers and that they would maintain less eye not really experiencing. The particular cues that signal lying de- contact with their interaction partners. pend on the particular emotions that the liars are experiencing and 76 DEPAULO ET AL. simulating. For example, people who are only pretending to be in more strategic behaviors, which are behaviors used in the enjoying a film would show fewer genuine enjoyment smiles and pursuit of high level plans. more feigned smiles than people who really are enjoying a film. These differences in smiling would not be predicted if the feelings The Present Approach to Predicting Cues to Deception: that people really were experiencing or just pretending to experi- A Self-Presentational Perspective ence were, for example, feelings of pain instead of enjoyment. From this perspective, cues to emotions that liars are trying to hide In 1992, B. M. DePaulo described a self-presentational perspec- or to simulate cannot be combined across all studies in the liter- tive for understanding nonverbal communication. Her formulation ature. Instead, the relevant subset of studies must be selected (e.g., was not specific to the communication of deception. In this sec- only those in which liars are hiding or simulating enjoyment). This tion, we further articulate her perspective, incorporating subse- is also a perspective that eschews the notion of undifferentiated quent research and theory and specifying the implications of a arousal and instead argues for the study of specific emotions self-presentational perspective for the prediction of cues to decep- (Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983; Levenson, Ekman, & tion. We begin with a review of the incidence and nature of lying Friesen, 1990). in everyday life and a comparison of the lies people typically tell in their lives with the lies studied in the research literature on deception. Buller and Burgoon (1996) From a communications perspective, Buller and Burgoon (1996) Lies in Social Life argued that to predict the behavior of deceivers, it is important to Lying is a fact of everyday life. Studies in which people kept consider not just individual psychological variables such as moti- daily diaries of all of their lies suggest that people tell an average vations and emotions but also interpersonal communicative pro- of one or two lies a day (B. M. DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; B. M. cesses. Reiterating Ekman and Friesen’s (1969) point about the DePaulo, Kashy, et al., 1996; Kashy & DePaulo, 1996; see also importance of multiple roles, Buller and Burgoon noted that when Camden et al., 1984; Feldman, Forrest, & Happ, 2002; Hample, people are trying to deceive, they are engaged in several tasks 1980; Lippard, 1988; Metts, 1989; Turner et al., 1975). People lie simultaneously. They are attempting to convey their deceptive most frequently about their feelings, their preferences, and their message, and at the same time, they are continually monitoring the attitudes and opinions. Less often, they lie about their actions, target of their deception for signs of suspiciousness and then plans, and whereabouts. Lies about achievements and failures are adapting their behavior accordingly. Although these multiple de- also commonplace. mands can prove challenging at first, compromising effectiveness Occasionally, people tell lies in pursuit of material gain, per- at maintaining credibility, “these difficulties should typically dis- sonal convenience, or escape from punishment. Much more com- sipate over time as participants acquire more feedback, attempt monly, however, the rewards that liars seek are psychological further repairs, and gain greater control over their performance” ones. They lie to make themselves appear more sophisticated or (Buller & Burgoon, 1996, p. 220). They therefore predicted that more virtuous than they think their true characteristics warrant. “deceivers in interactive contexts should display increasing imme- They lie to protect themselves, and sometimes others, from disap- diacy and involvement, pleasantness, composure, fluency, and proval and disagreements and from getting their feelings hurt. The smooth turn taking over the course of the interaction” (Buller & realm of lying, then, is one in which identities are claimed and Burgoon, 1996, p. 220). They also noted that patterns of behavior impressions are managed. It is not a world apart from nondeceptive vary with factors such as the deceivers’ expectations, goals, mo- discourse. Truth tellers edit their self-presentations, too, often in tivations, and relationship with the targets and with the targets’ pursuit of the same kinds of goals, but in ways that stay within degree of suspiciousness, so that there would be no one profile of boundaries of honesty. The presentations of liars are designed to deceptive behaviors. mislead. One of the moderator variables for which Buller and Burgoon There are only a few studies in which people have been asked (1996) made predictions is deceivers’ motivations. A number of how they feel about the lies they tell in their everyday lives (B. M. taxonomies of motivations for deceiving have been proposed (e.g., DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; B. M. DePaulo, Kashy, et al., 1996; Camden, Motley, & Wilson, 1984; B. M. DePaulo, Kashy, Kirk- Kashy & DePaulo, 1996). The results suggest that people regard endol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996; Hample, 1980; Lippard, 1988; their everyday lies as little lies of little consequence or regret. They Metts, 1989; Turner, Edgley, & Olmstead, 1975), and some are do not spend much time planning them or worrying about the quite complex. For example, Metts (1989) described four catego- possibility of getting caught. Still, everyday lies do leave a ries of motives (partner focused, teller focused, relationship fo- smudge. Although people reported feeling only low levels of cused, and issue focused) and 15 subcategories. Buller and Bur- distress about their lies, they did feel a bit more uncomfortable goon considered three motivations: instrumental, relational (e.g., while telling their lies, and directly afterwards, than they had felt avoiding relationship problems), and identity (e.g., protecting the just before lying. Also, people described the social interactions in liar’s image). They predicted that liars would experience more which lies were told as more superficial and less pleasant than the detection apprehension when motivated by self-interest than by interactions in which no lies were told. relational or identity goals. As a result, instrumentally motivated Interspersed among these unremarkable lies, in much smaller liars exhibit more nonstrategic behaviors (unintentional behaviors numbers, are lies that people regard as serious. Most of these lies that Buller & Burgoon, 1996, have described as arousal cues). are told to hide transgressions, which can range from misdeeds Those liars were also predicted by Buller and Burgoon to engage such as cheating on tests to deep betrayals of intimacy and trust,  CUES TO DECEPTION 77 such as affairs (B. M. DePaulo, Ansfield, Kirkendol, & Boden, illegitimate. From this discrepancy between what liars claim and 2002; see also Jones & Burdette, 1993; McCornack & Levine, what they believe to be true, we can predict likely cues to deceit. 1990; Metts, 1994). These lies, especially if discovered, can have serious implications for the liars’ identities and reputations. Implications of the Deception Discrepancy Two implications of the deception discrepancy are most impor- Lies in Studies of Cues to Deception tant: First, deceptive self-presentations are often not as convinc- In the literature on cues to deception, as in everyday life, lies ingly embraced as truthful ones. Second, social actors typically about personal feelings, facts, and attitudes are the most common- experience a greater sense of deliberateness when their perfor- place. Participants in studies of deception might lie about their mances are deceptive than when they are honest. These predictions opinions on social issues, for example, or about their academic are the starting point for our theoretical analyses. There are also interests or musical preferences. Sometimes emotions are elicited qualifications to the predictions, and we describe those as well. with video clips, and participants try to hide their feelings or simulate entirely different ones. The literature also includes lies Deceptive Self-Presentations Are Not as Fully Embraced about transgressions, as in studies in which participants are in- as Truthful Ones duced to cheat on a task and then lie about it. There are a few studies (Hall, 1986; Horvath, 1973; Horvath, Jayne, & Buckley, The most significant implication of the deception discrepancy is 1994) of lies about especially serious matters, such as those told by that social actors typically are unwilling, or unable, to embrace suspects in criminal investigations, and one study (Koper & Sahl- their false claims as convincingly as they embrace their truthful man, 2001) of the truthful and deceptive communications of peo- ones (cf. Mehrabian, 1972; Weiner & Mehrabian, 1968). Several ple whose lies were aired in the media (e.g., Richard Nixon, Pete factors undermine the conviction with which liars make their own Rose, Susan Smith). cases. First, liars, in knowingly making false claims, may suffer moral qualms that do not plague truth tellers. These qualms may account for the faint feelings of discomfort described by the tellers Self-Presentation in Truthful and of everyday lies (B. M. DePaulo, Kashy, et al., 1996). Second, Deceptive Communications even in the absence of any moral misgivings, liars may not have the same personal investment in their claims as do truth tellers. The prevalence of self-presentational themes in the kinds of lies When social actors truthfully describe important aspects of them- that people most often tell and in their reasons for telling them selves, their emotional investment in their claims may be readily suggests the potential power of the self-presentational perspective apparent (B. M. DePaulo, Epstein, & LeMay, 1990). Furthermore, for predicting cues to deception. Following Schlenker (1982, 2002; those self-relevant claims are backed by an accumulation of Schlenker & Pontari, 2000), we take a broad view of self- knowledge, experience, and wisdom that most liars can only presentation as people’s attempts to control the impressions that imagine (Markus, 1977). Liars may offer fewer details, not only are formed of them. In self-presenting, people are behaving “in because they have less familiarity with the domain they are de- ways that convey certain roles and personal qualities to others” scribing, but also to allow for fewer opportunities to be disproved (Pontari & Schlenker, 2000, p. 1092). From this perspective, all (Vrij, 2000). deceptive communications involve self-presentation—so do all In sum, compared with truth tellers, many liars do not have the truthful communications. moral high ground, the emotional investment, or the evidentiary Fundamental to the self-presentational perspective is the as- basis for staking their claims. As a result, liars relate their tales in sumption, based on our understanding of the nature of lying in a less compelling manner, and they appear less forthcoming, less everyday life, that cues to deception ordinarily are quite weak. pleasant, and more tense. There are, however, conditions under which cues are more appar- ent. As we explain, such moderators of the strength of deception cues can be predicted from the self-presentational processes in- Deceptive Self-Presenters Are Likely to Experience a volved in communicating truthfully and deceptively. Greater Sense of Deliberateness Than Truthful Ones Cues to deliberateness. When attempting to convey impres- The Deception Discrepancy sions they know to be false, social actors are likely to experience a sense of deliberateness. When instead people are behaving in Lies vary markedly in the goals they serve and in the kinds of ways they see as consistent with their attitudes, beliefs, emotions, self-presentations enacted to achieve those goals. Yet this vast and self-images, they typically have the sense of “just acting diversity of lies is united by a single identity claim: the claim of honesty. From the friend who feigns amusement in response to the 1 joke that actually caused hurt feelings to the suspect who claims to We could have described our theoretical formulation as impression management rather than self-presentation. Impression management in- have been practicing putts on the night of the murder, liars succeed cludes attempts to control the impressions that are formed of others, as well in their lies only if they seem to be sincere.1 However, this claim as impressions formed of oneself (e.g., Schlenker, 2002). We chose self- to honesty does not distinguish liars from truth tellers either. Truth presentation because of the central role in our formulation of the impres- tellers fail in their social interaction goals just as readily as liars if sion of sincerity conveyed by the actor. Even when people are lying about they seem dishonest. The important difference between the truth the characteristics of another person, the effectiveness of those lies depends teller’s claim to honesty and the liar’s is that the liar’s claim is on their own success at appearing sincere. 78 DEPAULO ET AL. naturally.” They are presenting certain roles and personal qualities more characteristic of truth tellers than of liars (Malone, DePaulo, to others, and they expect to be seen as truthful, but they do not Adams, & Cooper, 2002). Especially confident and skilled liars ordinarily experience this as requiring any special effort or atten- may do just that, and succeed (cf. Roney, Higgins, & Shah, 1995). tion. Our claim is not that people acting honestly never experience However, it may be more commonplace for people who are mis- a sense of deliberateness. Sometimes they do, as for example, leading others to adopt the defensive goal of trying not to get when the thoughts or feelings they are trying to communicate are caught (e.g., Bell & DePaulo, 1996; B. M. DePaulo & Bell, 1996). difficult to express or when the stakes for a compelling perfor- Liars pursuing this strategy may try to avoid behaving in the ways mance are high; however, the focus of their deliberateness is that they think liars behave. One risk to this strategy is that some typically limited to the content of their performance and not its of their beliefs about how liars behave may be wrong. For exam- credibility. Liars usually make an effort to seem credible; truth ple, social perceivers typically believe that liars cannot stay still; tellers more often take their credibility for granted (B. M. DePaulo, they expect them to fidget, shift their posture, and shake their legs LeMay, & Epstein, 1991).2 (Malone et al., 2002; Vrij, 2000). In trying to avoid these move- Deliberate attempts to manage impressions, including impres- ments (either directly or as a result of the higher level goal of sions of credibility, are attempts at self-regulation, and self- trying not to give anything away), liars may appear to be holding regulation consumes mental resources (Baumeister, 1998). Social back. A sense of involvement and positive engagement would be actors who are performing deceptively may experience greater lacking. self-regulatory busyness than those who are performing honestly. Deliberate attempts by liars at controlling expressive behaviors, Even when the attempted performance is the same (e.g., conveying such as attempts to control thoughts and feelings, can be the seeds enthusiasm), the self-regulatory demands may be greater for the of their own destruction (e.g., B. M. DePaulo, 1992; B. M. De- liar. Enthusiasm flows effortlessly from those who truly are expe- Paulo & Friedman, 1998). One route to failure is to try to regulate riencing enthusiasm, but fakers have to marshal theirs. Liars can be expressive behaviors, such as tone of voice, that may not be so preoccupied with the task of reminding themselves to act the part amenable to willful control (e.g., Scherer, 1986). It is possible, for that truth tellers are not just role-playing but living. example, that people’s attempts not to sound anxious would result Other thoughts and feelings could also burden liars more than in an even higher pitched and anxious sounding tone of voice than truth tellers (Ekman, 1985/1992). These include thoughts about would have resulted if they had not deliberately tried to quiet the whether the performance is succeeding, feelings about this (e.g., sounds of their insecurity. Another path to self-betrayal is to direct anxiety), and feelings about the fabricated performance (e.g., guilt) efforts at expressive control at the wrong level (Vallacher & or about discreditable past acts that the liar is trying to hide. Wegner, 1987; Vallacher, Wegner, McMahan, Cotter, & Larsen, To the extent that liars are more preoccupied with these intru- 1992). For example, social actors who ordinarily convey convinc- sive mental contents than are truth tellers, their performance could ing impressions of sincerity and friendliness may instead seem suffer. For example, they could seem less involved and engaged in phony if they deliberately try to smile and nod. In focusing on the interaction, and any attempts at cordiality could seem strained. specific behaviors, they may be unwittingly breaking apart the People busy with self-regulatory tasks, compared with those who components of the well-practiced and established routine of acting are not so busy, sometimes process concurrent information less friendly (e.g., Kimble & Perlmuter, 1970). The process may be deeply (Gilbert & Krull, 1988; Gilbert, Krull, & Pelham, 1988; akin to what happens to experienced typists who try to focus on the Richards & Gross, 1999) and perform less well at subsequent location of each of the characters on the keyboard instead of typing self-regulatory tasks (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, in their usual un-self-conscious way. Finally, if some behaviors are 1998; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998). One potential impli- more controllable than others, or if liars only try to control some cation of this regulatory depletion may be that liars fail to notice behaviors and not others, discrepancies could develop. some of the ways in which the targets of their lies are reacting (cf. In sum, we predicted that to the extent that liars (more than truth Butterworth, 1978). (This is contrary to Buller & Burgoon’s, 1996, tellers), deliberately try to control their expressive behaviors, assumption that liars monitor targets closely for feedback.) An- thoughts, and feelings, their performances would be compromised. other implication is that liars’ busyness could compromise their They would seem less forthcoming, less convincing, less pleasant, attempts to generate detailed responses of their own. and more tense. One likely response to the offending thoughts and feelings liars Moderators of the strength of cues to deliberateness. As the experience is to try to control them. For example, liars can try not motivation to tell a successful lie increases, liars may redouble to think about their blemished past or the insincerity of their their deliberate efforts at self-regulation, resulting in an even more ongoing performance. However, attempts at thought suppression debilitated performance (B. M. DePaulo & Kirkendol, 1989; B. M. can backfire, resulting in even greater preoccupation with those thoughts (Wegner, 1994). Attempts to regulate emotional experi- 2 ences can also augment rather than dissipate the targeted feelings Certain deceptive exchanges are so often practiced that they, too, (e.g., Wegner, Erber, & Zanakos, 1993) and increase physiological unfold in a way that feels effortless (e.g., looking at the baby picture activation (Gross, 1998; Gross & Levenson, 1993; Richards & proffered by the proud parents and exclaiming that the bald wrinkled blob is just adorable). Lies told in these instances may be guided by what Bargh Gross, 1999). (1989) described as goal-dependent automaticity. Although they may not The primary target of liars’ efforts at self-regulation, though, is feel like deliberate lies, the critical intent to mislead is clearly present. The probably not their thoughts and feelings but their overt behaviors. flatterer would feel mortified if the parents realized he or she thought the In theory, liars could adopt the goal of trying to appear honest and baby was hideous. It is in part because the sense of deliberateness is critical sincere, which in some instances could involve trying to behave in to people’s sense of having lied that these exchanges are so often unrec- the generally positive and friendly way that they believe to be ognized as lies.  CUES TO DECEPTION 79 DePaulo, Kirkendol, Tang, & O’Brien, 1988; B. M. DePaulo, The Formulation of Deceptive and Stone, & Lassiter, 1985b; see also Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, in press). Nondeceptive Presentations We tested this proposed moderator of cues to deception by com- paring the results of studies in which inducements were offered for The self-regulatory demands we have just described are those success at deceit with studies in which no special attempts were involved in executing the deceptive and nondeceptive perfor- made to motivate the participants. mances. Earlier descriptions of deceptive communications focused As we have noted all along, identity-relevant concerns are primarily on the processes involved in formulating lies. We con- fundamental to deceptive and nondeceptive communications. They sider those next. As we elaborate below, we reject the argument that lies are necessarily more difficult to construct than truths. Still, appear even in the absence of any special motivational induction. we predicted that lies would generally be shorter and less detailed Such concerns can, however, be exacerbated by incentives that are than truths. In doing so, we drew from the literatures on the use of linked specifically to people’s identities and images. In the liter- scripts as guides to storytelling, the differences between accounts ature we are reviewing, identity-relevant motivators include ones of events that have or have not been personally experienced, and in which skill at deception was described as indicative of people’s lay misconceptions about the nature of truthful communications. competence or of their prospects for success at their chosen ca- reers. Other identity-relevant motivators raised the self- presentational stakes by informing participants that their perfor- Cues to the Formulation of Lies mances would be evaluated or scrutinized. Compared with other Previous formulations have typically maintained that it is more kinds of incentives such as money or material rewards, identity- difficult to lie than to tell the truth because telling lies involves the relevant incentives are more likely to exacerbate public self- construction of new and never-experienced tales whereas telling awareness, increase rumination, and undermine self-confidence. the truth is a simple matter of telling it like it is (e.g., Buller & All of these factors can further disrupt performance (e.g., Baumeis- Burgoon, 1996; Miller & Stiff, 1993; Zuckerman et al., 1981; but ter, 1998; Carver & Scheier, 1981; B. M. DePaulo et al., 1991; see McCornack, 1997, for an important exception). We disagree Wicklund, 1982; Wine, 1971; see also Gibbons, 1990). Conse- with both assumptions—that lies always need to be assembled and quently, tellers of identity-relevant lies seem especially less forth- that truths can simply be removed from the box. When the truth is coming, less pleasant, and more tense. They also tell tales that hard to tell (e.g., when it would hurt the other person’s feelings), seem less compelling. then a careful piecing together of just the right parts in just the In sum, our predictions were that cues to deception would be right way would be in order. But even totally mundane and stronger and more numerous among people who have been moti- nonthreatening truths can be conveyed in a nearly infinite variety vated to succeed in their self-presentations than for those who have of shapes and sizes. For example, in response to the question “How not been given any special incentive. This predicted impairment was your day?” on a day when nothing special happened, the would be even more evident when incentives are identity relevant answer could be “Fine,” a listing of the main events (but, what than when they are not. counts as a main event?), or a description of a part of the day. Even Qualifications. There are two important qualifications to our in the latter instance, there is no one self-evident truth. As much discussion of the effects of deliberate attempts at self-regulation. work on impression management has indicated (e.g., Schlenker, One is that an increase in self-regulatory demands does not always 1980, 1985), presentations are edited differently depending on result in a decrement in performance. When attempts at self- identity-relevant cues, such as the teller’s relationship with the regulation shift the focus of attention away from negative self- other person and the interaction goals. Yet all of this editing can relevant thoughts (Pontari & Schlenker, 2000) or from the indi- occur within the bounds of truthfulness. vidual components of the task (Lewis & Linder, 1997), Truths, then, are not often prepackaged. But lies can be. A performance can improve. teenage girl who had permission to spend the night at a girlfriend’s home but instead went camping with a boyfriend may have no The second is that the self-regulatory demands of lying do not difficulty spinning a tale to tell to her parents the next morning. For always exceed those of telling the truth. For example, honest but example, she can easily access a script for what spending the night insecure actors may be more preoccupied with thoughts of failure at a girlfriend’s home typically involves. Or, she could relate her than deceptive but cocky ones. In addition, for most any social best friend’s favorite story about an evening at the home of a actor, the telling of truths that impugn the truth teller’s character or girlfriend. Lies based on scripts or familiar stories are unlikely to cause pain or harm to others may pose far greater self-regulatory be marked by the signs of mental effort (described below) that may challenges than the telling of lies about the same topics. characterize lies that are fabricated. The teller of scripts and of Finally, it is important, as always, to bear in mind the nature of familiar stories may also be less likely to get tangled in contradic- the lies that people tell in their everyday lives. Most are little lies tions than the liar who makes up a new story. that are so often practiced and told with such equanimity that the Even prepackaged lies, however, may be shorter and less de- self-regulatory demands may be nearly indistinguishable from the tailed than truthful answers. Liars working from scripts may have demands of telling the truth. Therefore, we expected the conse- only the basics of the scripted event in mind (e.g., Smith, 1998), quences of deliberate self-regulation that we have described to be and liars who have borrowed their stories have at hand only those generally weak and that stronger effects of attempted control details they were told (and of those, only the ones they remember). would be evident in studies in which participants were motivated All lies, whether scripted, borrowed, or assembled anew, could to get away with their lies, particularly if the motivations were be shorter and less detailed than truthful accounts for another identity relevant. reason: The truthful accounts are based on events that were actu- 80 DEPAULO ET AL. ally experienced, whereas the lies are not. The literature on reality truth and that truth tellers who are not concerned about their monitoring (e.g., Johnson & Raye, 1981) suggests ways in which credibility may not be defensive about admitting their uncertain- memories of past experiences or perceptions (i.e., memories based ties. Consequently, truth tellers may express self-doubts, claim on external sources) differ from memories of experiences that were they do not remember things, or spontaneously correct something imagined (i.e., memories based on internal sources). This perspec- they already said, whereas liars would scrupulously avoid such tive can be applied to the prediction of cues to deception only by admissions of imperfection. The stories told by liars, then, would extrapolation, because reality monitoring describes processes of be too good to be true. remembering whereas deception describes processes of relating Liars can also fail if they know less than their targets do about (Vrij, 2000). In relating a story, even a truthful one, people often the topic of the deceit. The babysitter who claims to have taken the fill in gaps and in other ways create a more coherent tale than their kids to the zoo and relates how excited they were to see the lion, memories actually support. Nonetheless, deceptive accounts may would be undone by the parent who knows that there are no lions differ from truthful ones in ways that weakly parallel the ways in at that zoo. The man suspected of being a pedophile who points to which memories of imagined experiences differ from memories of his service as leader of his church’s youth group may believe he is externally based experiences. If so, then truthful accounts would painting a picture of a pillar of the community, whereas instead he be clearer, more vivid, and more realistic than deceptive ones, and has unwittingly described just the sort of volunteer work that is a they would include more sensory information and contextual cues. favorite of known pedophiles (Steller & Kohnken, 1989; Un- Deceptive accounts, in contrast, should be more likely to include deutsch, 1989; Yuille & Cutshall, 1989).3 references to cognitive processes such as thoughts and inferences made at the time of the event. The conventional wisdom that lies are more difficult to formu- Moderators of Cues to the Formulation of Lies late than truths is most likely to be supported when liars make up Factors that alter the cognitive load for liars are candidates for new stories. Lies that are fabricated mostly from scratch are likely moderators of cognitive cues to deception. We consider two such to be shorter and more internally inconsistent than truths and to be moderators in this review: the opportunity to plan a presentation preceded by longer latencies. Signs of mental effort may also be and the duration of that presentation. evident. These could include increases in pauses and speech dis- Liars who have an opportunity to plan their difficult lies, relative turbances (Berger, Karol, & Jordan, 1989; Butterworth & to those who must formulate their lies on the spot, may be able to Goldman-Eisler, 1979; Christenfeld, 1994; Goldman-Eisler, 1968; generate more compelling presentations (e.g., H. D. O’Hair, Cody, Mahl, 1987; Schachter, Christenfeld, Ravina, & Bilous, 1991; & McLaughlin, 1981; Vrij, 2000). Because they can do some of Siegman, 1987), more pupil dilation (E. H. Hess & Polt, 1963; their thinking in advance, their response latencies could be shorter Kahneman, 1973; Kahneman & Beatty, 1967; Kahneman, Tursky, and their answers longer. However, mistakes that follow from Shapiro, & Crider, 1969; Stanners, Coulter, Sweet, & Murphy, misconceptions about the nature of truthful responses would not be 1979; Stern & Dunham, 1990), decreased blinking (Bagley & averted by planning and may even be exacerbated. Manelis, 1979; Holland & Tarlow, 1972, 1975; Wallbott & We think that, in theory, cues to deception could occur even for Scherer, 1991), and decreased eye contact (Fehr & Exline, 1987). the simplest lies. For example, when just a “yes” or “no” answer People who are preoccupied with the formulation of a complex lie is required, a lie could be betrayed by a longer response latency in may appear to be less involved and expressive, as well as less instances in which the truth comes to mind more readily and must forthcoming. be set aside and replaced by the lie (Walczyk, Roper, & Seeman, Unfortunately, in the literature we are reviewing, liars were in press). However, we believe that the cognitive burdens gener- almost never asked how they came up with their lies, and truth ally would be greater when a short answer would not suffice and tellers were not asked how they decided which version of the truth that cues to deception would therefore become clearer and more to relate (e.g., a short version or a long one). In the only study we numerous as the duration of the response increases. For example, know of in which liars were asked about the origins of their lies lies may be especially briefer than truths when people are expected (Malone, Adams, Anderson, Ansfield, & DePaulo, 1997), the most to tell a story rather than to respond with just a few words. Also, common answer was not any we have considered so far. More than half the time, liars said that they based their lies on experiences from their own lives, altering critical details. With this strategy, 3 Statement Validity (or Reality) Analysis was developed initially by liars may be just as adept as truth tellers at accessing a wealth of Undeutsch (1989) to assess the credibility of child witnesses in cases of details, including clear and vivid sensory details. alleged sexual abuse. The overall assessment includes an evaluation of the Still, even the most informed and advantaged liars may make characteristics and possible motives of the child witness. It also includes a mistakes if they share common misconceptions of what truthful set of 19 criteria to be applied to transcripts of statements made by the accounts really are like (Vrij, Edward, & Bull, 2001). For example, witness (Steller & Kohnken, 1989). This analysis of witness statements, if liars believe that credible accounts are highly structured and called Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA), was subsequently applied coherent, with few digressions or inessential details, their accounts to the analysis of statements made by adults in other kinds of criminal proceedings and in experimental research (e.g., Yuille & Cutshall, 1989). may be smoother and more pat than those of truth tellers. The All of the characteristics discussed in this section of our review, from the embedding of a story in its spatial and temporal context and the excessive structure and coherence of accounts to the typical characteristics relating of the specifics of the conversation may provide a richness of criminals or crimes related by people who do not realize their signifi- to the accounts of truth tellers that liars do not even think to cance, are drawn from CBCA, though some of the interpretations are our simulate. Liars may also fail to appreciate that memory is fallible own. The use of CBCA to analyze statements made by adults is contro- and reporting skills are imperfect even when people are telling the versial (e.g., Vrij, 2000).  CUES TO DECEPTION 81 liars who are experiencing affects and emotions that they are trying work, would have little to fear from the discovery of that hidden to hide may be more likely to show those feelings when they need information. to sustain their lies longer (cf. Ekman, 1985/1992). People may fear detection not only because of the nature of the behavior they are hiding but also because of the implications of The Role of Identity-Relevant Emotions in Deceptive and being perceived as dishonest (Schlenker, Pontari, & Christopher, Nondeceptive Presentations 2001). The blemishes in perceived and self-perceived integrity that could result from a discovered deception depend on factors such as People experience the unpleasant emotional state of guilt when the justifiability of the deceit and are often quite minimal. But even they have done something wrong or believe that others may think utterly trivial lies told in the spirit of kindness, such as false that they have (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). Even reassurances about new and unbecoming hairstyles, have identity more aversive is the feeling of shame that occurs when people fail implications if discovered. For instance, the purveyors of such to meet their own personal moral standards (Keltner & Buswell, kind lies may be less often trusted when honest feedback really is 1996; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996; see also Scheff, desired. 2001). Some lies, especially serious ones, are motivated by a desire Across all of the lies in our data set, we expected to find weak to cover up a personal failing or a discreditable thought, feeling, or cues to anxiety and negativity. For example, liars may look and deed (e.g., B. M. DePaulo, Ansfield, et al., 2002). Yet those who sound more anxious than truth tellers (Slivken & Buss, 1984) and tell the truth about their transgressions or failings may feel even speak less fluently (Kasl & Mahl, 1965; Mahl, 1987) and in a greater guilt and shame than those whose shortcomings remain higher pitch (Kappas, Hess, & Scherer, 1991; Scherer, 1986). They hidden by their lies. If the behavior of truthful transgressors was may also blink more (Harrigan & O’Connell, 1996), and their compared with that of deceptive transgressors, cues to these self- pupils may be more dilated (Scott, Wells, Wood, & Morgan, 1967; conscious emotions would be more in evidence for the truth tellers, Simpson & Molloy, 1971; Stanners et al., 1979). Relative to truth if they distinguished them from the liars at all. In most studies, tellers, liars may also make more negative statements and com- however (including all of the studies of transgressions included in plaints, sound less pleasant, and look less friendly and less attrac- this review), liars who had transgressed were compared with truth tive. In a moderator analysis comparing lies about transgressions tellers who had not. For those comparisons, then, we expected to with other kinds of lies, we expected to find more pronounced find that liars, compared with truth tellers, showed more shame distress cues in the lies about transgressions. and guilt cues. There is no documented facial expression that is specific to Convergent Perspectives on the Strength guilt; therefore, we expected to find only more general cues to of Cues to Deceit negativity and distress (Keltner & Buswell, 1996; Keltner & Harker, 1998). Shame, however, does seem to have a characteristic Our self-presentational perspective has led us to reject the view demeanor that includes gaze aversion, a closed posture, and a that lie telling is typically a complicated, stressful, guilt-inducing tendency to withdraw (Keltner & Harker, 1998). process that produces clear and strong cues. Instead, we believe Lies about transgressions, though, are the exceptions, both in that most deceptive presentations are so routinely and competently everyday life and in the studies in this review. The more common- executed that they leave only faint behavioral residues. Fiedler and place lies cover truths that are not especially discrediting. For Walka (1993) offered a similar point of view. They argued that example, people may not feel that it is wrong to have an opinion ordinary people are so practiced, so proficient, and so emotionally that differs from someone else’s or to hide their envy of a cowork- unfazed by the telling of untruths that they can be regarded as er’s success. In most instances, then, we did not, on the basis of the professional liars. Therefore, they also expected to find mostly hidden information alone, expect to find more guilt cues in liars only weak links between verbal and nonverbal behaviors and the than in truth tellers. telling of lies. Bond, Kahler, and Paolicelli (1985), arguing from By definition, though, there is a sense in which all liars are an evolutionary perspective, drew a similar conclusion. Any bla- candidates for experiencing guilt and shame, as they all have done tantly obvious cues to deceit, they contended, would have been something that could be considered wrong: They have intention- recognized by human perceivers long ago; evolution favors more ally misled someone. Truth tellers have not. It is important to note, flexible deceivers. however, that liars do not always feel badly about their lies, and truth tellers do not always feel good about their honesty. In fact, Methodological Implications of the liars often claim that in telling their lies, they have spared their Self-Presentational Perspective targets from the greater distress that would have resulted had they told the truth (B. M. DePaulo, Kashy, et al., 1996). Our self-presentational perspective suggests that social actors Guilt and shame are not the only emotions that have been try to convey particular impressions of themselves, both when hypothesized to betray liars. Fear of being detected has also been lying and when telling the truth, and that social perceivers rou- described as responsible for cues to deception (e.g., Ekman, 1985/ tinely form impressions of others. We have conceptualized the 1992). We believed fear of detection would also vary importantly ways in which lies could differ from truths in terms of the different with factors such as the nature of the behavior that is covered by impressions that deceptive self-presentations could convey. For the lie. Liars would fear detection when hiding behaviors such as example, we hypothesized that liars would seem more distant than transgressions, which often elicit punishment or disapproval. But truth tellers. One way to assess differences in distancing is to code the more typical liars, those who claim that their movie preferences the many behaviors believed to be indicative of nonimmediacy, match those of their dates or who conceal their pride in their own such as the use of the passive rather than the active voice, the use 82 DEPAULO ET AL. of negations rather than assertions, and looking away rather than Predicted Moderators maintaining eye contact. This approach, which is the usual one, has the advantage that the behaviors of interest are clearly defined and A number of perspectives, including the self-presentational one, objectively measured. However, for many of the kinds of impres- maintain that cues to deception, when combined across all lies, sions that social actors attempt to convey, the full range of behav- will be weak. However, several factors are predicted to moderate iors that contribute to the impression may be unknown. For ex- the strength of the cues. From a self-presentational point of view, ample, Wiener and Mehrabian (1968; Mehrabian, 1972) have cues to negativity and tension should be stronger when lies are described a precise set of behaviors that they believed to be about transgressions than when they are not. The self-presentation indicative of verbal and nonverbal immediacy and have reported formulation also maintains that cues will be clearer and more some supportive data. However, others who have discussed im- numerous when told under conditions of high motivation to suc- ceed, especially when the motivation is identity relevant. Buller mediacy and related constructs have included other cues (e.g., and Burgoon (1996), in contrast, predicted stronger cues when the Brown & Levinson, 1987; Fleming, 1994; Fleming & Rudman, liars’ motives are instrumental. They also predicted more pleas- 1993; Holtgraves, 1986; Searle, 1975). This raises the possibility antness, immediacy, composure, and fluency with increasing that social perceivers, who can often form valid impressions even interactivity. from rather thin slices of social behavior (e.g., Ambady & The self-presentation model predicts that for social actors who Rosenthal, 1992), can discriminate truths from lies by their sub- have an opportunity to plan their performances, compared with jective impressions of the constructs of interest (e.g., distancing) those who do not, response latency will be a less telling cue to just as well, if not better, than can objective coding systems (cf. deception. Also, as the duration of a response increases, cues to B. M. DePaulo, 1994; Malone & DePaulo, 2001). To test this deception will be more in evidence. Finally, the model predicts possibility, we used objective and subjective measurement as that cues assessed by subjective impressions will more powerfully levels of a moderator variable in analyses of cues for which discriminate truths from lies than the same cues assessed multiple independent estimates of both levels were available. objectively. A predicted moderator of cues to deception can be tested only if the moderator variable can be reliably coded from the information Summary of Predictions that is reported and if multiple estimates of the relevant cues are available for each of the levels of the moderator. Some of the Predicted Cues predictions generated by the perspectives we have reviewed could not be tested, and that obstacle limited our ability to evaluate each The self-presentational perspective predicts five categories of of the perspectives comprehensively. The self-presentational per- cues to deception. First, liars are predicted to be less forthcoming spective, for example, points to the potential importance of a than truth tellers. The model predicts they will respond less, and in number of moderators we could not test, such as the communica- less detail, and they will seem to be holding back. For example, tor’s confidence and focus of attention and the emotional impli- liars’ response latencies would be longer (an indication of cogni- cations of the truths or lies for the targets of those messages. The tive complexity in the Zuckerman et al., 1981, model) and their self-presentational perspective, as well as the formulations of speech would be slower (a thinking cue in Ekman’s, 1985/1992, Ekman (1985/1992) and Buller and Burgoon (1996), all suggest formulation). Second, the tales told by liars are predicted to be less that the liar’s relationship with the target may be another important compelling than those told by truth tellers. Specifically, liars moderator of cues to deception (see also Anderson, DePaulo, & would seem to make less sense than truth tellers (e.g., there would Ansfield, 2002; Levine & McCornack, 1992; Stiff, Kim, & be more discrepancies in their accounts), and they would seem less Ramesh, 1992). However, the number of studies in which the liars engaging, less immediate, more uncertain, less fluent, and less and targets were not strangers was too small to test this moderator. active than truth tellers. Zuckerman et al. (1981) predicted that discrepancies would occur as a result of attempted control, and Ekman (1985/1992) regarded them as a thinking cue. Less imme- Method diacy (more distancing) was described as a possible cue to detec- tion apprehension and guilt by Ekman (1985/1992) and Zucker- Literature Search Procedures man et al. (1981), and it was regarded as a strategic behavior by We used literature search procedures recommended by Cooper (1998) to Buller and Burgoon (1996). retrieve relevant studies. First, we conducted computer-based searches of The self-presentational perspective also predicts that liars will Psychological Abstracts (PsycLIT) and Dissertation Abstracts Interna- be less positive and pleasant than truth tellers, as is also suggested tional through September of 1995 using the key words deception, deceit, by the description of cues to guilt and apprehensiveness put forth lie, and detection and combinations of those words. Second, we examined by Ekman (1985/1992) and Zuckerman et al. (1981). The fourth the reference lists from previous reviews (B. M. DePaulo et al., 1985a; prediction of the self-presentational perspective is that liars will be Zuckerman et al., 1981; Zuckerman & Driver, 1985). Third, we reviewed more tense than truth tellers. Some cues to tension, such as higher the reference lists from more than 300 articles on the communication of deception from Bella M. DePaulo’s personal files and the references lists pitch, have sometimes been conceptualized as indicative of undif- from any new articles added as a result of the computer search. Fourth, we ferentiated arousal (e.g., Zuckerman et al., 1981). Finally, the sent letters requesting relevant papers to 62 scholars who had published on self-presentational perspective alone predicts that liars will include the communication of deception. We also asked those scholars to continue fewer ordinary imperfections and unusual contents in their stories to send us their papers in the coming years. We repeated our computer than will truth tellers. search in October of 1999. No other reports were added after that date.  CUES TO DECEPTION 83 Criteria for Inclusion and Exclusion of Studies Appendix A. We categorized most of the 158 cues into the five categories that followed from our theoretical analysis. To determine whether liars are We included reports in which behavior while lying was compared with less forthcoming than truth tellers, we looked at cues indicative of the behavior while telling the truth. Behaviors that were measured objectively, amount of their responding (e.g., response length), the level of detail and as well as those based on others’ impressions (e.g., impressions that the complexity of their responses, and the degree to which they seemed to be social actors seemed nervous or evasive), were all included. Physiological holding back (e.g., pressing lips; Keltner, Young, Heerey, Oemig, & indices with no discernible behavioral manifestation (e.g., galvanic skin Monarch, 1998). To explore whether liars tell less compelling tales than response, heart rate) were not included, nor were senders’ (i.e., social truth tellers, we examined cues indicating whether the presentations actors’) reports of their own behaviors. We excluded reports that were not seemed to make sense (e.g., plausibility), whether they were engaging (e.g., in English and reports in which the senders were not adults (i.e., under 17 involving), and whether they were immediate (e.g., eye contact) instead of years old). We included data from adult senders in reports of children and distancing. Self-presentations that fell short on characteristics such as adults if we could compute effect sizes separately for the subset of the data certainty, fluency, or animation may also seem less compelling, so we in which both the senders and the judges were adults. We excluded reports included those cues, too. In the third category, we included cues indicating in which senders role-played an imagined person in an imagined situation whether liars are less positive and pleasant than truth tellers, and in the because we were concerned that the imaginary aspects of these paradigms fourth, we collected behaviors indicating whether liars are more tense than could sever the connection between social actors and their self- truth tellers. Finally, in the last category, we determined whether deceptive presentations that is important to our theoretical analysis. self-presentations included fewer ordinary imperfections and unusual con- There were several reports from which we could not extract useful data. tents than truthful ones by examining cues such as spontaneous corrections For example, Yerkes and Berry (1909) reported one experiment based on and descriptions of superfluous details. just one sender and another based on two. Studies comparing different For clarity, we assigned a number, from 1 to 158, to each cue. Cue kinds of lies without also comparing them with truths (e.g., di Battista & numbers are shown along with the cue names and definitions in Appendix Abrahams, 1995) were not included. Studies describing individual differ- A. The last column of Table 1 lists all of the cues reported in each study ences in cues to deception that did not also report overall differences and the number of estimates of each. between truths and lies (e.g., Siegman & Reynolds, 1983) were also excluded. A series of reports based on the same independent sample (e.g., Buller, Burgoon, Buslig, & Roiger, 1996, Study 2) were excluded as well. Variables Coded From Each Report (For a detailed explanation, see B. M. DePaulo, Ansfield, & Bell, 1996). From each report, we coded characteristics of the senders, characteristics of the truths and lies, publication statistics, and methodological aspects of Determining Independent Samples the studies (see Table 2). In the category of sender characteristics we coded the population sampled (e.g., students, suspects in crimes, patients in pain Our final data set consisted of 120 independent samples from 116 reports clinics, people from the community), the senders’ country, and the rela- (see Table 1). Of those 120 samples in our review, only 32 were included tionship between the sender and the interviewer or target of the commu- in the Zuckerman et al. (1981) review.4 nications (e.g., strangers, acquaintances, friends). We also coded senders’ Most often, the behaviors of a particular sample of senders were de- race or ethnicity and their precise ages, but this information was rarely scribed in just one report. For example, Bond et al. (1985) coded 11 reported and therefore could not be analyzed. different cues from 34 different senders. The behaviors of those 34 senders To test our predictions about the links between senders’ motivations and were not described in any other report. Therefore, we considered the cues to deception, we determined whether senders had identity-relevant sample of senders from that study to be an independent sample. Sometimes incentives, instrumental incentives, both kinds of incentives, or no special senders were divided into different subgroups (e.g., men and women, incentives. Coded as identity-relevant were studies in which senders’ Jordanians and Americans, senders who planned their messages and dif- success was described as indicative of their competence at their chosen ferent senders who did not), and cues to deception were reported separately profession or reflective of their intelligence or other valued characteristics. for each of those subgroups. In those instances, we considered each of the Also included were studies in which senders expected to be evaluated or subgroups to be an independent sample. For example, Bond, Omar, Mah- scrutinized. Studies in which senders were motivated by money or material moud, and Bonser (1990) coded 10 different cues separately for the 60 rewards were coded as primarily instrumental. Studies in which both Jordanian senders and the 60 American senders. Therefore, the Jordanian incentives were offered to senders were classified separately. senders were one independent sample and the Americans were another. The characteristics of the messages that we coded included their duration In 11 instances, data from the same senders were published in different and whether senders had an opportunity to prepare. If senders had an reports. For example, Hadjistavropoulos and Craig (1994) coded 11 cues opportunity to prepare some but not all of their messages, but behavioral from 90 senders, and Hadjistavropoulos, Craig, Hadjistavropoulos, and differences were not reported separately, we classified the study as having Poole (1996) coded two cues from the same 90 senders. Therefore, the some prepared and some unprepared messages. In other studies, the mes- samples described in those two reports were not independent. In Table 1, sages were scripted. For example, senders may have been instructed to give they have the same letter code in the column labeled “Ind. sample code.” a particular response in order to hold verbal cues constant so that investi- Most samples listed in Table 1 have no letter code in that column; all of gators could assess nonverbal characteristics of truths and lies more those samples are independent samples. precisely. All estimates of a particular cue were included in the analyses of that We also coded the experimental paradigm used to elicit the truths and cue. We used independent sample codes, not to exclude data, but to lies or the context in which they occurred. In some studies, senders lied or estimate degrees of freedom properly and to weight estimates appropri- told the truth about their beliefs or opinions or about personal facts. In ately. As we explain in more detail below, multiple estimates of the same others, senders looked at videotapes, films, slides, or pictures and described cue that came from the same independent sample were averaged before (text continues on page 89) being entered into the analyses. Cue Definitions 4 There were three unpublished reports (describing results from four Within the sample of studies, 158 different behaviors or impressions, independent samples) in the Zuckerman et al. (1981) review that we were which we call cues to deception, were reported. These are defined in unable to retrieve for this review. 84 DEPAULO ET AL. Table 1 Summary of Studies Included in the Meta-Analysis No. of No. of Ind. sample Report N effect sizes cues codea Motb Transc Msg Intd Cuese Alonso-Quecuty (1992) P Unplanned messages 11 5 5 0 0 001, 005, 037, 076, 085 Planned messages 11 5 5 0 0 001, 005, 037, 076, 085 Anolli & Ciceri (1997) 31 36 12 0 0 L 1 001 (8), 004 (2), 010 (6), 032 (2), 039 (2), 063 (2), 094 (2), 097 (2), 110 (2), 112 (2), 113 (2), 140 (4) Berrien & Huntington (1943) 32 1 1 2 1 1 155 Bond et al. (1985) 34 11 11 2 0 1 003, 022, 027, 035, 038, 044, 045, 046, 052, 058, 068 Bond et al. (1990) Jordanians 60 10 10 0 0 L 1 001, 027, 037, 038, 045, 046, 052, 058, 066, 068 Americans 60 10 10 0 0 L 1 001, 027, 037, 038, 045, 046, 052, 058, 066, 068 Bradley & Janisse (1979/1980) 60 1 1 0 0 L 1 065 Bradley & Janisse (1981) 192 1 1 2 1 1 065 Buller & Aune (1987) 130 17 15 0 0 1 016, 018, 026, 027, 028, 044 (2), 053, 054 (2), 055, 064, 067, 068, 069, 105, 119 Buller et al. (1996) 120 4 4 A 0 0 L 1 021, 022, 023, 101 Buller et al. (1989) 148 18 16 0 0 L 1 001 (2), 009, 017, 018, 027 (2), 034, 037, 040, 044, 055, 058, 067, 068, 069, 111, 119 Burgoon & Buller (1994) 120 4 4 A 0 0 1 026, 053, 054, 061 Burgoon, Buller, Afifi, et al. (1996) 61 8 5 0 0 1 001, 015 (4), 064, 104, 106 Burgoon, Buller, Floyd, & Grandpre (1996) Interactants 18 11 8 0 0 1 004, 015 (2), 025 (2), 026, 031, 049, 061, 115 (2) Observers 10 11 8 0 0 1 004, 015 (2), 025 (2), 026, 031, 049, 061, 115 (2) Burgoon, Buller, Guerrero, et al. (1996) 40 4 2 0 0 1 004, 025 (3) Burns & Kintz (1976) 20 2 1 0 1 1 027 (2) Chiba (1985) 16 4 2 0 0 L 1 033 (2), 066 (2) Christensen (1980) 12 6 3 0 0 1 016 (2), 049 (2), 061 (2) Ciofu (1974) 16 1 1 2 0 1 063 Cody et al. (1989) 66 85 17 B 2 0 P 1 001 (5), 004 (5), 009 (5), 010 (5), 018 (5), 021 (5), 022 (5), 027 (5), 038 (5), 039 (5), 041 (5), 046 (5), 055 (5), 058 (5), 066 (5), 070 (5), 119 (5) Cody et al. (1984) 42 54 8 0 0 P 1 001 (6), 004 (27), 007 (3), 009 (3), 010 (3), 035 (3), 039 (6), 041 (3) Cody & O’Hair (1983) Men 36 8 4 C1 0 0 1 009 (2), 018 (2), 048 (2), 069 (2) Women 36 8 4 C2 0 0 1 009 (2), 018 (2), 048 (2), 069 (2) Craig et al. (1991) 120 28 13 0 0 L 1 033 (2), 056 (2), 057 (2), 059 (2), 060 (2), 066 (2), 129 (4), 130 (2), 131 (2), 132 (2), 133 (2), 146 (2), 148 (2) Cutrow et al. (1972) 63 3 3 3 0 1 009, 066, 144 B. M. DePaulo et al. (1992) 32 2 2 1 0 0 015, 051 B. M. DePaulo et al. (1990) 96 3 3 D 1 0 1 001, 004, 016 B. M. DePaulo, Jordan, et al. (1982) 8 1 1 0 0 L 0 014 B. M. DePaulo et al. (1983) 32 2 2 1 0 1 061, 091 B. M. DePaulo et al. (1991) 96 1 1 D 1 0 1 012 B. M. DePaulo & Rosenthal (1979a) 40 1 1 E 0 0 L 0 014 B. M. DePaulo, Rosenthal, Green, & 40 4 3 E 0 0 L 0 014 (2), 061, 090 Rosenkrantz (1982) B. M. DePaulo, Rosenthal, 40 16 11 E 0 0 L 0 006 (2), 010 (2), 022, 023, 024 (2), 035, Rosenkrantz, & Green (1982) 038, 052 (3), 096, 136, 137 P. J. DePaulo & DePaulo (1989) 14 16 15 2 0 0 001, 004, 010, 014 (2), 021, 034, 035, 039, 044, 049, 052, 055, 066, 070, 091 deTurck & Miller (1985) Unaroused truth tellers 36 10 10 1 1 1 001, 009, 028, 037, 042, 046, 048, 058, 066, 070 Aroused truth tellers 36 10 10 1 1 1 001, 009, 028, 037, 042, 046, 048, 058, 066, 070  CUES TO DECEPTION 85 Table 1 (continued ) No. of No. of Ind. sample Report N effect sizes cues codea Motb Transc Msg Intd Cuese Dulaney (1982) 20 20 10 0 1 1 001 (2), 004, 007 (3), 009, 019 (6), 020 (3), 022, 024, 042, 139 Ekman & Friesen (1972) 21 3 3 F 1 0 1 034, 069, 070 Ekman et al. (1988) 31 2 2 F 1 0 L 1 117, 118 Ekman et al. (1976) 16 1 1 F 1 0 1 034 Ekman et al. (1985) 14 40 20 0 0 1 011 (2), 044 (2), 045 (2), 056 (2), 057 (2), 059 (2), 060 (2), 088 (2), 129 (2), 130 (2), 131 (2), 132 (2), 133 (2), 146 (2), 147 (2), 148 (2), 149 (2), 156 (2), 157 (2), 158 (2) Ekman et al. (1991) 31 2 2 F 1 0 L 1 018, 063 Elliot (1979) 62 4 4 2 0 L 1 012, 049, 050, 115 Exline et al. (1970) 34 2 2 2 1 1 027, 061 Feeley & deTurck (1998) Unsanctioned liars 58 15 14 0 1 1 001 (2), 009, 010, 022, 024, 027, 035, 037, 038, 044, 046, 048, 058, 068 Sanctioned liars 68 15 14 0 1 1 001 (2), 009, 010, 022, 024, 027, 035, 037, 038, 044, 046, 048, 058, 068 Fiedler (1989) Study 1 23 1 1 0 0 1 012 Study 2 64 1 1 0 0 012 Fiedler et al. (1997) 12 8 6 0 0 1 001, 004 (3), 008, 012, 016, 061 Fiedler & Walka (1993) 10 10 10 0 0 L 1 010, 012, 014, 015, 016, 039, 045, 063, 068, 118 Finkelstein (1978) 20 14 10 E 0 0 L 0 017, 043, 045 (3), 046 (2), 047 (2), 051, 058, 064, 067, 068 Frank (1989) 32 12 12 3 0 0 001, 009, 018, 027, 034, 040, 044, 045, 048, 058, 066, 068 Gagnon (1975) Men 16 11 9 2 0 1 001 (2), 010, 027, 040 (2), 044, 045, 046, 047, 048 Women 16 11 9 2 0 1 001 (2), 010, 027, 040 (2), 044, 045, 046, 047, 048 Galin & Thorn (1993) 60 26 12 0 0 L 0 011 (4), 033 (2), 056 (2), 059 (2), 060 (2), 066 (2), 129 (2), 130 (2), 132 (2), 133 (2), 147 (2), 149 (2) Goldstein (1923) 10 2 1 2 0 1 009 (2) Greene et al. (1985) 39 45 15 0 0 P 1 001 (3), 009 (3), 018 (3), 027 (3), 034 (3), 044 (3), 045 (3), 046 (3), 048 (3), 055 (3), 058 (3), 067 (3), 068 (3), 069 (3), 119 (3) Hadjistavropoulos & Craig (1994) 90 24 11 G 0 0 L 1 011 (2), 033 (2), 056 (2), 057 (2), 059 (2), 060 (2), 066 (2), 129 (4), 130 (2), 131 (2), 132 (2) Hadjistavropoulos et al. (1996) 90 2 2 G 0 0 L 1 054, 088 Hall (1986) 80 3 3 3 1 1 010, 032, 063 Harrison et al. (1978) 72 2 2 0 0 L 1 001, 009 Heilveil (1976) 12 1 1 0 0 1 065 Heilveil & Muehleman (1981) 26 9 9 0 0 1 001, 009, 027, 037, 040, 046, 048, 055, 058 Heinrich & Borkenau (1998) 40 6 1 0 0 L 0 014 (6) Hemsley (1977) 20 13 10 0 0 1 008, 009, 027 (2), 029, 042, 043, 044, 058 (2), 066, 068 (2) Hernandez-Fernaud & Alonso-Quecuty 73 12 4 2 0 1 004 (9), 005, 076, 083 (1977) U. Hess (1989) 35 5 4 H 0 0 0 011 (2), 057, 117, 132 U. Hess & Kleck (1990) Study 1 35 2 2 H 0 0 0 089, 150 Study 2 48 2 2 H 0 0 0 089, 150 U. Hess & Kleck (1994) 35 3 3 H 0 0 0 029, 058, 066 Hocking & Leathers (1980) 16 25 21 1 0 1 009, 010, 018, 027 (2), 036, 037 (2), 038, 044, 045, 048 (2), 054, 058, 061 (2), 062, 069, 070, 107, 108, 109, 144, 145 Horvath (1973) 100 11 8 3 1 1 002, 025, 027, 049, 050, 052 (3), 0