Approaches to the Study of Globalization PDF

S G S G Re erence Editorial arrangement Paul Battersby, Joseph M. Siracusa and Manfred B. Steger 2014 roaches to the St dy o Globali ation Manfred B.Steger ntrod ction Even after more than two decades o...

S G S G Re erence Editorial arrangement Paul Battersby, Joseph M. Siracusa and Manfred B. Steger 2014 roaches to the St dy o Globali ation Manfred B.Steger ntrod ction Even after more than two decades of intense scholarly scrutiny, ‘globali ation has remained a contested and slippery concept. In spite of the remarkable proliferation of research programmes for the study of globali ation, there are many different approaches to the study of globali ation. Since the beginning of self-conscious academic inquiries into multiple process of globali ation in the early 1990s, academics have remained divided on the utility of various methodological approaches, the value of available empirical evidence for gauging the extent, impact, and direction of globali ation, and, of course, its normative implications. The failure to arrive at a broad scholarly consensus on the subject attests not only to the contentious nature of academic inquiry in general, but also reflects the retreat from generali ing initiated in the 1980s by the influential ‘poststructuralist turn away from ‘grand narratives. As Fredric Jameson (1998 astutely points out, there seems to be little utility in forcing such a complex set of social forces as globali ation into a single analytic framework. It seems to make more sense to survey various approaches to globali ation by linking them to the debates on the subject that have been taking place over the last two decades in two separate but related arenas. One battle has been mostly fought within the narrow walls of academia, while the other has been unfolding in the popular arena of public discourse. Although there are some common themes and overlapping observations, the academic debate differs from the more general discussion in that its participants tend to focus on the analytical rather than the normative or ideological dimension of globali ation. Certainly, there has been an explosion in the number of books and articles on the subject published by both academic and trade outlets. Consulting the electronic database Factiva, which holds some 8,000 newspapers, maga ines, and reports worldwide, the global studies scholar Nayan Chanda (2007 showed that the number of items mentioning globali ation grew from a mere two in 1981 to a high of 57,235 in 2001. Since then, it has stabili ed at an annual average of about 45,000. Many of the principal participants in the academic debate reside and teach in the wealthy countries of the northern hemisphere, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom. Their disproportionate intellectual influence reflects not only existing power relations in the world, but also the global dominance of Anglo-American ideas. Although they share a common intellectual framework, these scholars hold radically different views regarding the definition of globali ation, its scale, chronology, impact, and policy outcomes. Part of the reason why there is so much disagreement has to do with the fact that globali ation itself is a fragmented, incomplete, uneven, and contradictory set of social processes. Rosenau (2003 , for example, has defined globali ation in terms of what he calls ‘fragmegrative dynamics to ‘underscore the contradictions, ambiguities, complexities, and uncertainties that have replaced the regularities of prior epochs. Academics often respond to the analytical challenge by trying to take conceptual possession of globali ation as though it were something ‘out there to be captured by the ‘correct analytical framework. Indeed, as Rosow (2000 has pointed out, many researchers approach globali ation as if they were dealing with a process or an object without a meaning of its own prior to its constitution as a conceptual ‘territory. Moreover, since it falls outside the boundaries of established academic disciplines, the study of globali ation has invited armies of social scientists, scholars in the humanities, and even natural scientists to leave their mark on an intellectual terra incognita. Page 2 of 19 The SAGE Handbook of Globali ation S G S G Re erence Editorial arrangement Paul Battersby, Joseph M. Siracusa and Manfred B. Steger 2014 As a result, various scholars have approached the concept of globali ation by analysing and describing a variety of changing economic, political, and cultural processes that are alleged to have accelerated since the 1970s. No generally accepted definition of globali ation has emerged, except for such broad descriptions as ‘increasing global ‘inter-connectedness , ‘the expansions and intensification of social relations across world-time and world-space , ‘the compression of time and space , ‘distant proximities , ‘a complex range of processes, driven by a mixture of political and economic influences , and ‘the swift and relatively unimpeded flow of capital, people, and ideas across national borders (Giddens, 1990 Harvey, 1989 Held and McGrew, 2007 Lechner and Boli, 2011 Robertson, 1992 Steger, 2013 aters, 2001. A number of researchers object to those characteri ations, some going so far as to deny the existence of globali ation altogether. And yet, the last few years have also seen some emerging areas of consensus as well as the rise of the new transdisciplinary field of ‘global studies. It is the purpose of this chapter to provide a general overview of the principal academic approaches to the subject proposed by leading global studies scholars since the 1990s. These range from the suggestion that globali ation is little more than ‘globaloney , to conflicting interpretations of globali ation as economic, political, or cultural processes. Although such different approaches are necessary for gaining a better understanding of globali ation, I will ultimately argue that these social-scientific approaches to the subject ought to be complemented by interpretive explorations of the ideational and normative dimensions of globali ation. Globali ation as ‘Globaloney A small and rapidly decreasing number of scholars contend that existing accounts of globali ation are incorrect, imprecise, or exaggerated. They note that just about everything that can be linked to some transnational process is cited as evidence for globali ation and its growing influence. Hence, they suspect that such general observations often amount to little more than ‘globaloney (Held and McGrew, 2007 Rosenberg, 2000 Veseth, 2010. The arguments of these globali ation critics fall into three broad categories. Representatives of the first group dispute the usefulness of globali ation as a sufficiently precise analytical concept. Members of the second group point to the limited nature of globali ing processes, emphasi ing that the world is not nearly as integrated as many globali ation proponents believe. In their view, the term ‘globali ation does not constitute an accurate label for the actual state of affairs. The third group of critics disputes the novelty of the process while acknowledging the existence of moderate globali ing tendencies. They argue that those who refer to globali ation as a recent process miss the bigger picture and fall prey to their narrow historical framework. Let us examine the respective arguments of these three groups in more detail. Rejectionists Scholars who dismiss the utility of globali ation as an analytical concept typically advance their arguments from within a larger criticism of similarly vague words employed in academic discourse. Besides globali ation, another often-cited example for such analytically impoverished concepts is the complex and ambiguous phenomenon of nationalism. Craig Calhoun (1993 , for example, argues that nationalism and its corollary terms ‘have proved notoriously hard concepts to define because ‘nationalisms are extremely varied phenomena , and ‘any definition will legitimate some claims and delegitimate others. riting in the same Page 3 of 19 The SAGE Handbook of Globali ation S G S G Re erence Editorial arrangement Paul Battersby, Joseph M. Siracusa and Manfred B. Steger 2014 critical vein, Susan Strange (1996 considers globali ation a prime example of such a vacuous term, suggesting that it has been used in academic discourse to refer to ‘anything from the Internet to a hamburger. See also Clark (1999: 34 40. Similarly, Linda eiss (1998 objects to the term as ‘a big idea resting on slim foundations. Scholarly suggestions for improvement point in two different directions. The first is to challenge the academic community to provide additional examples of how the term ‘globali ation obscures more than it enlightens. Such empirically based accounts would serve as a warning to extreme globali ation proponents. Ultimately, the task of more careful researchers should be to break the concept of globali ation into smaller, more manageable parts that contain a higher analytical value because they can be more easily associated with empirical processes. This rationale underlies Robert Holton's (1998 suggestion to abandon all general theoretical analyses in favour of middle-range approaches that seek to provide specific explanations of particulars. The second avenue for improvement involves my own suggestion to complement the social- scientific enterprise of exploring globali ation as an objective process with more interpretive studies of the ideological project of globalism. Following this argument, the central task for scholars working in the emerging field of globali ation studies would be to identify and evaluate the ideological manoeuvres of prominent proponents and opponents who have filled the term with values and meanings that bolster their respective political agendas. Sce tics The second group emphasi es the limited nature of current globali ing processes. This perspective is perhaps best reflected in the writings of ade (1996 and Hirst, Thompson and Bromley (2009. See also Rugman (2001. In their detailed historical analysis of economic globali ation, Hirst and Thompson (2009 claim that the world economy is not a truly global phenomenon, but one centred on Europe, eastern Asia, and North America. The authors emphasi e that the majority of economic activity around the world still remains primarily national in origin and scope. Presenting recent data on trade, foreign direct investment, and financial flows, the authors warn against drawing global conclusions from increased levels of economic interaction in advanced industrial countries. Hirst and Thompson advance an argument against the existence of economic globali ation based on empirical data in order to attack the general misuse of the concept. ithout a truly global economic system, they insist, there can be no such thing as globali ation: ‘ A s we proceeded with our economic research our skepticism deepened until we became convinced that globali ation, as conceived by the more extreme globali ers, is largely a myth. Doremus et al. (1998 and Zysman (1996 reached a similar conclusion. Buried under an avalanche of relevant data, one can nonetheless detect a critical-normative message in the Hirst Thompson thesis: it is to show that exaggerated accounts of an ‘iron logic of economic globali ation tend to produce disempowering political effects. For example, the authors convincingly demonstrate that certain political forces have used the thesis of economic globali ation to propose national economic deregulation and the reduction of welfare programmes. The implementation of such policies stands to benefit neo-liberal interests. But there also remain a number of problems with the Hirst Thompson thesis. For example, as several critics have pointed out, the authors set overly high standards for the economy in order to be counted as ‘fully globali ed. See, for example, Held et al. (1999 and McGrew and Page 4 of 19 The SAGE Handbook of Globali ation S G S G Re erence Editorial arrangement Paul Battersby, Joseph M. Siracusa and Manfred B. Steger 2014 Held (2007. Moreover, their efforts to construct an abstract model of a perfectly globali ed economy unnecessarily polari e the topic by pressuring the reader to either completely embrace or entirely reject the concept of globali ation. Perhaps the most serious shortcoming of the Hirst Thompson thesis lies in its attempt to counteract neo-liberal economic determinism with a good dose of Marxist economic determinism. Their argument implicitly assumes that globali ation is primarily an economic phenomenon. As a result, they portray all other dimensions of globali ation culture, politics, and ideology as reflections of deeper economic processes. hile paying lip service to the multidimensional character of globali ation, their own analysis ignores the logical implications of this assertion. After all, if globali ation is truly a complex, multilevel phenomenon, then economic relations constitute only one among many globali ing tendencies. It would therefore be entirely possible to argue for the significance of globali ation even if it can be shown that increased transnational economic activity appears to be limited to advanced industrial countries. odi iers The third and final group of globali ation critics disputes the novelty of the process, implying that the label ‘globali ation has often been applied in a historically imprecise manner. Robert Gilpin (2000 , for example, confirms the existence of globali ing tendencies, but he also insists that many important aspects of globali ation are not novel developments. Citing relevant data collected by the prominent American economist Paul Krugman, Gilpin notes that the world economy in the late 1990s appeared to be even less integrated in a number of important respects than it was prior to the outbreak of orld ar I. Even if one were to accept the most optimistic assessment of the actual volume of transnational economic activity, the mo s t o n e co u l d say i s tha t th e post-war international economy has simply restored globali ation to approximately the same level that existed in 1913. Gilpin also points to two additional factors that seem to support his position: the globali ation of labour was actually much greater prior to orld ar I, and international migration declined considerably after 1918. Hence, Gilpin warns his readers against accepting the arguments of ‘hyper-globali ers. For a similar assessment, see Burtless et al. (1998 and Rodrik (1997. Similar criticisms come from the proponents of world-system theory. Pioneered by neo-Marxist scholars such as Immanuel allerstein (1979 and Andre Gunder Frank (1998 , world-system theorists argue that the modern capitalist economy in which we live today has been global since its inception five centuries ago. See also Chase-Dunn (1998. For a Gramscian neo- Marxist perspective, see Rupert and Smith (2002. orld-system theorists reject, therefore, the use of the term ‘globali ation as referring exclusively to relatively recent phenomena. Instead, they emphasi e that globali ing tendencies have been proceeding along the continuum of moderni ation for a long time. The greatest virtue of the world-system critique of globali ation lies in its historical sensitivity. Any general discussion of globali ation should include the caution that cross-regional transfers of resources, technology, and culture did not start only in the last few decades. Indeed, the origins of globali ing tendencies can be traced back to the political and cultural interactions that sustained the ancient empires of Persia, China, and Rome. On the downside, however, a world-system approach to globali ation suffers from the same weaknesses as the Marxist economicdeterminist view pointed out above in my discussion of the Hirst Thompson thesis. allerstein (1990 leaves little doubt that he considers global integration to be a process driven largely by economic forces whose essence can be captured by economistic analytical models. Accordingly, he assigns to culture and ideology merely a subordinate role as ‘idea systems dependent on the ‘real movements of the capitalist world economy. Page 5 of 19 The SAGE Handbook of Globali ation S G S G Re erence Editorial arrangement Paul Battersby, Joseph M. Siracusa and Manfred B. Steger 2014 However, more recent studies produced by world-system scholars (Amin, 1996 Carroll et al., 1996 Robinson, 2004 acknowledge that the pace of globali ation has significantly quickened in the last few decades of the twentieth century. Ash Amin (1997 , for example, has suggested that much of the criticism of globali ation as a new phenomenon has been based on quantitative analyses of trade and output that neglect the qualitative shift in social and political relations. This qualitative difference in the globali ing process, he argues, has resulted in the world-capitalist system's new configuration as a complex network of international corporations, banks, and financial flows. Hence, these global developments may indeed warrant a new label. In their efforts to gauge the nature of this qualitative difference, world-system theorists like Barry K. Gills (2002 have begun to focus more closely on the interaction between dominant-class interests and cultural transnational practices. In so doing, they have begun to raise important normative questions, suggesting that the elements of the ‘ideological superstructure politics, ideas, values, and beliefs may, at times, neutrali e or supersede economic forces. Leslie Sklair (2002 , for example, highlights the importance of what he calls ‘the ‘culture-ideology of global consumerism. Overall, then, all three groups of globali ation critics make an important contribution to academic approaches on the subject. Their insistence on a more careful and precise usage of the term forces the participants in the debate to hone their analytical skills. Moreover, their intervention serves as an important reminder that some aspects of globali ation may neither constitute new developments nor reach to all corners of the earth. However, by focusing too narrowly on abstract issues of terminology, the globali ation critics tend to dismiss too easily the significance and extent of today's globali ing tendencies. Finally, the representatives of these three groups show a clear inclination to conceptuali e globali ation mostly along economic lines, thereby often losing sight of its multidimensional character. Globali ation as conomic rocess The widespread scholarly emphasis on the economic dimension of globali ation derives partly from its historical development as a subject of academic study. For various accounts of economic globali ation, see, for example, Cohen (2006 , Dicken (2001 , Rodrik (2007 , Sassen (1998 and Stiglit (2006. Some of the earliest writings on the topic explore in much detail how the evolution of international markets and corporations led to an intensified form of global interdependence. These studies point to the growth of international institutions such as the European Union, the North American Free Trade Association, and other regional trading blocs. The most comprehensive treatment of this nature is Keohane (1984. For a more recent update of his position on globali ation, see Keohane (2001, 2002 and Keohane and Nye (2000. Economic accounts of globali ation convey the notion that the essence of the phenomenon involves ‘the increasing linkage of national economies through trade, financial flows, and foreign direct investment by multinational firms (Gilpin, 2000: 299. Thus expanding economic activity is identified as both the primary aspect of globali ation and the engine behind its rapid development. Many scholars who share this economic perspective consider globali ation a real phenomenon that signals an epochal transformation in world affairs. Their strong affirmation of globali ation culminates in the suggestion that a quantum change in human affairs has taken place as the flow of large quantities of trade, investment, and technologies across national borders has expanded from a trickle to a flood (Gilpin, 2000: 19. They propose that the study of globali ation be moved to the centre of social-scientific research. According to this view, the central task of this research agenda should be the close examination of the Page 6 of 19 The SAGE Handbook of Globali ation S G S G Re erence Editorial arrangement Paul Battersby, Joseph M. Siracusa and Manfred B. Steger 2014 evolving structure of global economic markets and their principal institutions. Studies of economic globali ation are usually embedded in thick historical narratives that trace the gradual emergence of the new post-war world economy to the 1944 Bretton oods Conference and its post-war evolution (Schaeffer, 2005. During its operation for almost three decades, the Bretton oods system contributed greatly to the establishment of what some observers have called the ‘golden age of controlled capitalism (Luttwak, 1999: xii, 27. According to this interpretation, existing mechanisms of state control over international capital movements made possible full employment and the expansion of the welfare state. Rising wages and increased social services secured in the wealthy countries of the global north a temporary class compromise. Most scholars of economic globali ation trace the accelerating integrationist tendencies of the global economy to the collapse of the Bretton oods system in the early 1970s and the rise of ‘neo-liberalism in the 1980s and its ascendancy to dominance with the 1989 91 collapse of command-type economies in Eastern Europe. In addition to the issue of free trade, perhaps the two most important aspects of economic globali ation relate to the changing nature of the production process and the liberali ation and internationali ation of financial transactions. Indeed, many analysts consider the emergence of a transnational financial system the most fundamental economic feature of our time. Its key components include the deregulation of interest rates, the removal of credit controls, and the privati ation of government-owned banks and financial institutions. As sociologist Manuel Castells (2000: 53 points out, the process of financial globali ation accelerated dramatically in the late 1980s as capital and securities markets in Europe and the United States were deregulated. The liberali ation of financial trading allowed for the increased mobility among different segments of the financial industry, with fewer restrictions and a global view of investment opportunities. Moreover, these scholars emphasi e advances in data processing and information technology that contributed to the explosive growth of tradable financial value. New satellite systems and fibre-optic cables provided the nervous system of Internet-based technologies that further accelerated the liberali ation of financial transactions. Most of the growth occurred in the purely money-dealing currency and securities markets that trade claims to draw profits from future production. Aided by new communication technologies, global rentiers and speculators earned spectacular incomes by taking advantage of weak financial and banking regulations in the emerging markets of developing countries. However, since these international capital flows can be reversed swiftly, they are capable of creating artificial boom-and-bust cycles that endanger the social welfare of entire regions. The 1997 8 Southeast Asia crisis was one such economic disaster created by unregulated speculative money flows, followed by similar debacles in Russia (1998 , Bra il (1999 , Argentina (2000 3 , and, most importantly, the Global Financial Crisis (2008 9 , which, in turn, contributed greatly to the current European Debt Crisis. hile the creation of international financial markets represents a crucial aspect of economic globali ation, many scholars utili ing this approach point to another important economic development of the last three decades that involves the changing nature of global production: powerful transnational corporations (TNCs with subsidiaries in several countries. Their numbers skyrocketed from 7,000 in 1970 to 80,000 in 2011. Consolidating their global operations in an increasingly deregulated global labour market, enterprises like al-Mart, General Motors, Exxon-Mobil, Mitsubishi, and Siemens belong to the 200 largest TNCs, which account for over half of the world's industrial output. The availability of cheap labour, resources, and favourable production conditions in the Third orld enhanced both the Page 7 of 19 The SAGE Handbook of Globali ation S G S G Re erence Editorial arrangement Paul Battersby, Joseph M. Siracusa and Manfred B. Steger 2014 mobility and the profitability of TNCs. Accounting for over 70 per cent of world trade, these gigantic enterprises expanded their global reach as their direct foreign investments rose approximately 15 per cent annually during the 1990s (Gilpin, 2000: 20. Their ability to ‘outsource manufacturing jobs that is, to cut labour costs by dispersing economic production processes into many discrete phases carried out by low-wage workers in the global south is often cited as one of the hallmarks of economic globali ation. Globali ation as olitical rocess Economic perspectives on globali ation can hardly be discussed apart from an analysis of political processes and institutions. Most of the debate on political globali ation involves the weighing of conflicting evidence with regard to the fate of the modern nation-state. In particular, two questions have moved to the top of the research agenda. First, what are the political causes for the massive flows of capital, money, and technology across territorial boundaries Second, do these flows constitute a serious challenge to the power of the nation- state These questions imply that economic globali ation might be leading to the reduced control of national governments over economic policy. The latter question, in particular, involves an important subset of issues pertaining to the principle of state sovereignty, the growing impact of intergovernmental organi ations, and the prospects for global governance. An influential group of scholars considers political globali ation as a process intrinsically connected to the expansion of markets. In particular, steady advances in computer technology and communication systems such as the orld ide eb are seen as the primary forces responsible for the creation of a single global market. See, for example, Bryan and Farrell (1996 , Kurdle (1999 , Rao (1998 and eiss (2011. As Richard Langhorne (2001: 2 puts it, ‘Globali ation has happened because technological advances have broken down many physical barriers to worldwide communication which used to limit how much connected or cooperative activity of any kind could happen over long distances. According to even more extreme technological-determinist explanations, politics is rendered powerless in the face of an unstoppable and irreversible technoeconomic juggernaut that will crush all governmental attempts to reintroduce restrictive policies and regulations. Economics is portrayed as possessing an inner logic apart from and superior to politics. As Lowell Bryan and Diana Farrell (1996: 187 assert, the role of government will ultimately be reduced to serving as ‘a superconductor for global capitalism. Perhaps the most influential representative of this view in the 1990s was Kenichi Ohmae (1990, 1995, 2005. Projecting the rise of a ‘borderless world brought on by the irresistible forces of capitalism, the Japanese business strategist argues that, seen from the perspective of real flows of economic activity, the nation-state has already lost its role as a meaningful unit of participation in the global economy. In the long run, the process of political globali ation will lead to the decline of territory as a meaningful framework for understanding political and social change. No longer functioning along the lines of discrete territorial units, the political order of the future will be one of regional economies linked together in an almost seamless global web that operates according to free-market principles. For a more recent example of the ‘end of the nation-state thesis from the opposite end of the ideological spectrum, see Prem Shankar Jha (2006. A second group of scholars disputes the view that large-scale economic changes simply happen to societies in the manner of natural phenomena such as earthquakes and hurricanes. Instead, they highlight the central role of politics especially the successful mobili ation of political power in unleashing the forces of globali ation (see, for example, Page 8 of 19 The SAGE Handbook of Globali ation S G S G Re erence Editorial arrangement Paul Battersby, Joseph M. Siracusa and Manfred B. Steger 2014 Gowan, 1999 Kapstein, 1999 Korten, 2001 Luttwak, 2000. Hence, this group of scholars argues for the continued relevance of conventional political units, operating either in the form of modern nation-states or ‘global cities. Saskia Sassen's (1991, 2007, 2008 work emphasi es the key role played by global cities in the organi ation and control of globally oriented economic and social processes. See also Amen et al. (2006 and Brenner (2006. At the same time, most proponents of this view understand that the development of the last few decades has significantly constrained the set of political options open to states, particularly in developing countries. Jan Aart Scholte (2005 , for example, points out that globali ation refers to gradual processes of ‘relative deterritoriali ation that facilitate the growth of ‘supraterritorial relations between people. Scholte emphasi es, however, that his concession to deterritoriali ation does not necessarily mean that nation-states are no longer the main organi ing forces in the world. Equipped with the power to regulate economic activities within their sphere of influence, states are far from being impotent bystanders to the workings of global forces. If concrete political decisions were responsible for changing the international context in the direction of deregulation, privati ation, and the globali ation of the world economy, then different political decisions could reverse the trend in the opposite direction. For an excellent exposition of this argument, see Cohen (2001. See also Garrett (1998 , Helleiner (1994, 1996 and Panitch (1996: 83 113. The core message of this group of academics is loud and clear: politics is the crucial category upon which rests a proper understanding of globali ation. A third group of scholars suggests that globali ation is fuelled by a mixture of political and technological factors. John Gray (1998: 218 , for example, presents globali ation as a long- term, technology-driven process whose contemporary shape has been politically determined by the world's most powerful nations. According to Gray, it is the ultimate objective of the neo- liberal Anglo-American initiative to engineer a global free market. Predicting that the world economy will fragment as its imbalances become insupportable, Gray foresees a gloomy ending to the current political efforts to establish a single global market: ‘Trade wars will make international cooperation more difficult. As global laisse -faire breaks up, a deepening international anarchy is the likely human prospect. A far less pessimistic version of a perspective that combines technology and politics to explain globali ation can be found in Castells' (1996 8, vol. 3: 356 series of studies over nearly two decades focusing on the ‘network society. The Spanish sociologist separates the powerful forces fuelling globali ation into three independent processes: ‘The information technology revolution the economic crisis of both capitalism and statism, and their subsequent restructuring and the blooming of cultural social movements. For a more recent assessment, see Castells (2009. Castells points to the rise of a new ‘informational capitalism based on information technology as the indispensable tool for the effective implementation of processes of socioeconomic restructuring. In this context, he acknowledges both the crisis of the nation- state as a sovereign entity and the devolution of power to regional and local governments as well as to various supranational institutions. On the other hand, Castells also emphasi es the continued relevance of nation-states as crucial bargaining agencies that influence the changing world of power relationships. As new political actors emerge and new public policies are implemented, the role of culture increases. hile pointing to the potential for global economic and ecological disasters brought on by globali ation, Castells (1996 8, vol. 3: 379 ends on a far more positive note than Gray: ‘The dream of the Enlightenment, that reason and science would solve the problems of humankind, is within reach. A fourth group of scholars approaches political globali ation primarily from the perspective of Page 9 of 19 The SAGE Handbook of Globali ation S G S G Re erence Editorial arrangement Paul Battersby, Joseph M. Siracusa and Manfred B. Steger 2014 global governance. Representatives of this group analyse the role of various national and multilateral responses to the fragmentation of economic and political systems and the transnational flows permeating through national borders. See the various essays collected in ilkinson (2005. Some researchers believe that political globali ation might facilitate the emergence of democratic transnational social forces emerging from a thriving sphere of ‘global civil society. This topic is often connected to discussions focused on the impact of globali ation on human rights and vice versa see the essays in Brysk (2002. For example, Martin Shaw (2000: 16 emphasi es the role of global political struggles in creating a ‘global revolution that would give rise to an internationali ed, rights-based estern state conglomerate symbolically linked to global institutions. Thus, he raises the fascinating prospect of ‘state formation beyond the national level. Democratic theorist John Keane (2003: 98 has put forward a similar model of what he calls ‘cosmocracy a messy and complex type of polity understood as ‘a conglomeration of interlocking and overlapping sub-state, state, and suprastate institutions and multi-dimensional processes that interact, and have political and social effects, on a global scale. In the aftermath of 9/11, however, both Shaw's and Keane's optimistic vision of a post-imperial multilateralism directed by a estern political conglomerate seems to be out of step with the reality of a unilateralist American Empire. Political scientists such as David Held and Anthony McGrew (Held et al. 1999 articulate in their writings the need for effective global governance structures as a consequence of various forces of globali ation. They portray globali ation as diminishing the sovereignty of national governance, thereby reducing the relevance of the nation-state. Much to their credit, Held and McGrew are two of the most vociferous advocates for moving the academic debate on globali ation in a more ideational and normative direction. In Held's view, neither the old estphalian system of sovereign nation-states nor the post-war global system centred on the United Nations offers a satisfactory solution to the enormous challenges posed by political globali ation. Instead, he predicts the emergence of a multilayered form of democratic governance based on estern cosmopolitan ideals, international legal arrangements, and a web of expanding linkages between various governmental and non-governmental institutions. Rejecting the charge of utopianism often levelled against his vision, Held (1995: 96 120 provides empirical evidence for the existence of a tendency inherent in the globali ation process that seems to favour the strengthening of supranational bodies and the rise of an international civil society. He predicts that democratic rights will ultimately become detached from their narrow relationship to discrete territorial units. If Held's perspective on political globali ation is correct, then its final outcome might well be the emergence of a ‘cosmopolitan democracy that would constitute the ‘constructive basis for a plurality of identities to flourish within a structure of mutual toleration and accountability. For a more detailed elaboration of his vision see Held (1995, 2006. In fact, even in the post-9/11 context, Held refuses to abandon his hopes for restructuring world order toward a ‘cosmopolitan social democracy characteri ed by 'strong competent governance at all levels local, national, regional, and global (Held and McGrew, 2007: 131. A number of academic critics have challenged the idea that political globali ation is fuelling a development toward cosmopolitan democracy. Most of their criticism boils down to the charge that Held and McGrew indulge in an abstract idealism that fails to engage with current political developments on the level of policy. Some critics argue that the emergence of private authority has increasingly become a factor in the post-Cold ar world. In their view, global collective actors like religious terrorists and organi ed criminals are not merely symptoms of the weakening nation-state, but their actions also dim the prospects for the rise of cosmopolitan democracy. See, for example, Hall and Biersteker (2002. Moreover, sceptics like Page 10 of 19 The SAGE Handbook of Globali ation S G S G Re erence Editorial arrangement Paul Battersby, Joseph M. Siracusa and Manfred B. Steger 2014 Robert Holton (2011: 202 3 raise the suspicion that Held and McGrew do not explore in sufficient detail the cultural feasibility of global democracy. As cultural patterns become increasingly interlinked through globali ation, critics argue, the possibility of resistance, opposition, and violent clashes becomes just as real as the cosmopolitan vision of mutual accommodation and tolerance of differences. Globali ation as lt ral rocess Held and McGrew might respond to these criticisms by arguing that one major strength of their approach lies in viewing globali ation not as a one-dimensional phenomenon, but as a multidimensional process involving diverse domains of activity and interaction, including the cultural sphere. Indeed, any analytical account of globali ation would be woefully inadequate without an examination of its cultural dimension. A number of prominent scholars have emphasi ed the centrality of culture to contemporary debates on globali ation. As sociologist John Tomlinson (1999: 1 puts it, ‘Globali ation lies at the heart of modern culture cultural practices lie at the heart of globali ation. The thematic landscape traversed by scholars of cultural globali ation is vast, and the questions they raise are too numerous to be completely fleshed out in this short survey. Rather than presenting a long laundry list of relevant topics, this section focuses on two central questions raised by scholars of cultural globali ation. First, does globali ation increase cultural homogeneity, or does it lead to greater diversity and heterogeneity Or, to put the matter into less academic terms, does globali ation make people more alike or more different And second, how does the dominant culture of consumerism impact the natural environment Most commentators preface their response to the first question with a general analysis of the relationship between the globali ation process and contemporary cultural change. Tomlinson (1999: 28 , for example, defines cultural globali ation as a ‘densely growing network of complex cultural interconnections and interdependencies that characteri e modern social life. He emphasi es that global cultural flows are directed by powerful international media corporations that utili e new communication technologies to shape societies and identities. As images and ideas can be more easily and rapidly transmitted from one place to another, they profoundly impact the way people experience their everyday lives. Culture no longer remains tied to fixed localities such as town and nation, but acquires new meanings that reflect dominant themes emerging in a global context. This interconnectivity caused by cultural globali ation challenges parochial values and identities, because it undermines the linkages that connect culture to fixity of location. A number of scholars argue that these processes have facilitated the rise of an increasingly homogeni ed global culture underwritten by an Anglo-American value system. Referring to the global diffusion of American values, consumer goods, and lifestyles as ‘Americani ation , these authors analyse the ways in which such forms of ‘cultural imperialism are overwhelming more vulnerable cultures. The American sociologist George Rit er (1993 , for example, coined the term ‘McDonaldi ation to describe the wide-ranging process by which the principles of the fast-food restaurant are coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society, as well as the rest of the world. On the surface, these principles appear to be rational in their attempts to offer efficient and predictable ways of serving people's needs. Only toward the end of his study does Rit er allow himself to address the normative ramifications of this process: when rational systems serve to deny the expression of human creativity and cultural difference, they contribute to the rise of irrationality in the w o rld. In the lon g r u n , McDonaldi ation leads to the eclipse of cultural diversity and the dehumani ation of social relations. Page 11 of 19 The SAGE Handbook of Globali ation S G S G Re erence Editorial arrangement Paul Battersby, Joseph M. Siracusa and Manfred B. Steger 2014 The American political theorist Benjamin R. Barber (1996: 17 also enters the normative realm when he warns his readers against the cultural imperialism of what he calls ‘Mc orld a soulless consumer capitalism that is rapidly transforming the world's diverse population into a blandly uniform market. For Barber, Mc orld is a product of a superficial American popular culture assembled in the 1950s and 1960s and driven by expansionist commercial interests: ‘Its template is American, its form style m usic, video, theater, books, and theme parks are all constructed as image exports creating a common taste around common logos, advertising slogans, stars, songs, brand names, jingles, and trademarks. For a more sceptical assessment of the supposed ‘Americanness of globali ation, see Marling (2006. Barber's account of cultural globali ation contains the important recognition that the coloni ing tendencies of Mc orld provoke cultural and political resistance in the form of ‘jihad the parochial impulse to reject and repel estern homogeni ation forces wherever they can be found. Fuelled by the furies of ethnonationalism and/or religious fundamentalism, jihad represents the dark side of cultural particularism. Barber (1996: 19 sees jihad as the ‘rabid response to colonialism and imperialism and their economic children, capitalism and modernity. Guided by opposing visions of homogeneity, jihad and Mc orld are dialectically interlocked in a bitter cultural struggle for popular allegiance. For a neo-Marxist perspective on the rise of a global capitalist monoculture, see Schiller (1995: 17 33. As might be expected, Barber's dialectical account received a lot of public attention after the events of 9/11. They also helped to resurrect Samuel Huntington's 1993 thesis of a ‘clash of civili ations involving primarily the est and Islam (Huntington, 1997: 26 7, 45 8. It is one thing to acknowledge the powerful cultural logic of global capitalism, but it is quite another to assert that the cultural diversity existing on our planet is destined to vanish. In fact, several influential academics offer contrary assessments that link globali ation to new forms of cultural diversity. See Appadurai (1996 and Hanner (1992, 1996. Berger and Huntington offer a highly unusual version of this ‘pluralism thesis. Emphasi ing that cultural globali ation is ‘American in origin and content , they nonetheless allow for ‘any variations and sub- globali ations on the dominant US cultural theme in various parts of the world (2002. Roland Robertson (1995: 25 44 has famously argued that global cultural flows often reinvigorate local cultural niches. Contending that cultural globali ation always takes place in local contexts, Robertson predicts a plurali ation of the world as localities produce a variety of unique cultural responses to gl ob al forces. Th e resu l t i s n ot in c reas in g cul tu ral homogeni ation, but ‘glocali ation a complex interaction of the global and local characteri ed by cultural borrowing. These interactions lead to a complex mixture of both homogeni ing and heterogeni ing impulses. Often referred to as ‘hybridi ation or ‘creoli ation , the processes of cultural mixing are reflected in music, film, fashion, language, and other forms of symbolic expression. Sociologist Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2003: 117 , for example, argues that exploring ‘hybridity amounts to ‘mapping no man's land'. For Nederveen Pieterse, the hybridity concept 'does not preclude struggle but yields a multifocus view on struggle and by showing multiple identity on both sides, transcends the “us versus them” dualism that prevails in cultural and political arenas'. Ulf Hanner (1992: 96 , too, emphasi es the complexity of an emerging ‘global culture composed of new ones of hybridi ation. See also Mendieta (2007. In addition to addressing the question of whether globali ation leads to cultural homogeneity or heterogeneity, scholars like Nederveen Pieterse, Hanner , and Robertson seek to expand the concept of globali ation by portraying it as a multidimensional ‘field. In their view, globali ation is both a material and a mental condition, constituted by complex, often Page 12 of 19 The SAGE Handbook of Globali ation S G S G Re erence Editorial arrangement Paul Battersby, Joseph M. Siracusa and Manfred B. Steger 2014 contradictory interactions of global, local, and individual aspects of social life. Cultural theorists such as Ulrich Beck (2000: 102 and Arjun Appadurai (1996 have refined this argument by contrasting common interpretations of globali ation as a ‘process with the less mechanical concept of ‘globality , referring to ‘the experience of living and acting across borders. Appadurai identifies five conceptual dimensions or ‘landscapes that are constituted by global cultural flows: ethnoscapes (shifting populations made up of tourists, immigrants, refugees, and exiles , technoscapes (development of technologies that facilitate the rise of TNCs , finanscapes (flows of global capital , mediascapes (electronic capabilities to produce and disseminate information , and ideoscapes (ideologies of states and social movements. Each of these ‘scapes contains the building blocks of the new ‘imagined worlds that are assembled by the historically situated imaginations of persons and groups spread around the globe (Appadurai, 1996: 33. Suspended in a global web of cultural multiplicity, more and more people become aware of the density of human relations. Their enhanced ability to explore and absorb new cultural symbols and meanings coexists in uneasy tension with their growing sense of ‘placelessness. Focusing on the changing forms of human perception and consciousness brought on by global cultural flows, Beck and Appadurai discuss subjective forms of cultural globali ation that are often neglected in more common analyses of ‘objective relations of interdependence. To some extent, then, scholars of cultural globali ation have shown more willingness to engage in sustained investigations of the normative dimension of globali ation than their colleagues in political science or economics. The same is true for those researchers who have explored the connection between cultural globali ation and the natural environment, especially in light of the escalating problem of global climate change. After all, how people view their natural environment depends to a great extent on their cultural milieu. For example, cultures steeped in Taoist, Buddhist, and various animist religions often emphasi e the interdependence of all living beings a perspective that calls for a delicate balance between human wants and ecological needs. Nature is not considered a mere ‘resource to be used in strum en tally to fulfil h uman des ire s. Th e m ost e xtre me m a ni festati on s o f this anthropocentric paradigm are reflected in the dominant values and beliefs of consumerism. The US-dominated culture industry seeks to convince its global audience that the meaning and chief value of life can be found in the limitless accumulation of material possessions. The two most ominous ecological problems connected to the global spread of consumer culture are human-induced global climate change, such as global warming, and the worldwide destruction of biodiversity. Indeed, the US Union of Concerned Scientists has presented data suggesting that the global average temperature increased from about 53.3o F in 1880 to 57.9o F in 2000. Further increases in global temperatures could lead to partial meltdowns of the polar ice caps, causing global sea levels to rise by up to three feet by 2100 a catastrophic development that would threaten the many coastal regions of the world. The potential economic and political ramifications of global climate change are dire, particularly for people living in developing countries in the global south. ith regard to the loss of biodiversity, many biologists today believe that we are now in the midst of the fastest mass extinction of living species in the 4.5-billion-year history of the planet. Environmental sociologist Fran Broswimmer (2002 , for example, fears that up to 50 per cent of all plant and animal species most of them in the global south will disappear by the end of this century. For a comprehensive overview of facts and data related to global climate change, see Philander (2008. For a more readable account, see Gore (2006. Page 13 of 19 The SAGE Handbook of Globali ation S G S G Re erence Editorial arrangement Paul Battersby, Joseph M. Siracusa and Manfred B. Steger 2014 An interesting crossover among economic, political and ecological dimensions of globali ation is the use of market based policy instruments to manage environmental problems. Initiatives such as carbon ‘taxes , ‘trading , and biodiversity ‘banks have emerged in policy discussions at national and global levels about approaches to global warming, species extinction, and overpopulation. Implicit in the use of these market-based policy tools, however, is still the driving neoliberal ideological assumption that the market can self-regulate and solve all problems, that capitalist based consumerism is a sustainable way to live, even an appropriate way to address ecological problems created by capitalist over-consumption in the first place. oncl sion This chapter introduced the main academic approaches to the study of globali ation by linking them to the lively ongoing debate on the subject. Still, this overview does not encompass all topics of the ever-expanding discourse on the subject. In addition to exploring the economic, political, and cultural dimensions of globali ation, many scholars have raised a number of additional topics, such as the structure and direction of transnational migration flows, the emergence of transnational social movements such as the women's movement, the spread of global pandemics, transnational crime, cyber crime, and the globali ation of warfare, military operations, and military technology linked to a transnationali ation of defence production. One of the most comprehensive surveys on the subject can be found in Held et al. (2007. But rather than providing a full account of every conceivable aspect of the debate, the purpose of this chapter has been to show that there exists a variety of approaches to the subject, but no scholarly agreement on a single conceptual framework for the study of globali ation. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that any overly objectivist approach to globali ation is bound to overlook the insight that all social-scientific concepts are simultaneously analytical and normative. This dual status of concepts means that they never merely describe that to which they refer, but are also necessarily engaged in a normative process of meaning construction (Offe, 1996: 5. It is virtually impossible for globali ation scholars to interpret the public discourse on the subject apart from their own ideological and political framework. Hence, as I have argued in my work on the subject, it is important to explore the ideological dimensions of globali ation by seeking to make sense of the contemporary emergence of various new ‘globalisms , as well as by taking into account the various ideological commitments of globali ation researchers (Steger, 2008. In spite of the obvious dangers inherent in this move, the inclusion of one's own beliefs and values does not necessarily invalidate one's research project. As the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975 has pointed out, the motivations and prejudices of the interpreter condition every act of understanding. Hence, it would be a mistake to consider the researcher's values and preconceptions solely as a hindrance to a proper understanding of social processes. In fact, the interpreter's inescapable normative involvement enables the very act of understanding. As Alan Scott (1997: 2 notes, the separation of analytical concerns from ideological and normative matters harbours the danger that the ethos of scientific detachment might unintentionally serve politically motivated attempts to provide ‘people with persuasive arguments to the effect that little can be done in the face of these enormous economic, political and social developments. 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