Chapter-V-Interpretation-of-Words-and-Phrases.pdf

0  Chapter V INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES A. IN GENERAL 5.01. Generally ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 2 5.02. Statutory definition …………………………………………………………………………………. 2 5.03. Qualification of r...

0  Chapter V INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES A. IN GENERAL 5.01. Generally ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 2 5.02. Statutory definition …………………………………………………………………………………. 2 5.03. Qualification of rule ………………………………………………………………………………… 2 5.04. Words construed in their ordinary sense ………………………………………………………... 2 5.05. General words construed generally ……………………………………………………………… 3 5.06. Application of rule ………………………………………………………………………………….. 3 5.07. Generic term includes things that arise thereafter ……………………………………………... 4 5.08. Words with commercial or trade meaning ………………………………………………………. 4 5.09. Words with technical or legal meaning ………………………………………………………….. 4 5.10. How identical terms in same statute construed ………………………………………………… 5 5.11. Meaning of word qualified by purpose of statute ……………………………………………….. 5 5.12. Word or phrase construed in relation to other provisions ……………………………………... 5 5.13. Meaning of term dictated by context …………………………………………………………….. 5 5.14. Where the law does not distinguish ……………………………………………………………… 6 5.15. Illustration of rule …………………………………………………………………………………... 6 5.16. Disjunctive and conjunctive words ……………………………………………………………….. 7 B. ASSOCIATED WORDS 5.17. Noscitur a sociis ……………………………………………………………………………………. 8 5.18. Application of rule ………………………………………………………………………………….. 8 5.19. Ejusdem generis …………………………………………………………………………………… 9 5.20. Illustration of rule …………………………………………………………………………………. 10 5.21. Limitations of ejusdem generis ………………………………………………………………….. 10 5.22. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius …………………………………………………………... 10 5.23. Negative-opposite doctrine ………………………………………………………………………. 11 5.24. Application of expressio unius rule ……………………………………………………………... 11 5.25. Limitations of rule …………………………………………………………………………………. 11 5.26. Doctrine of casus omissus ………………………………………………………………………. 12 5.27. Doctrine of last antecedent ……………………………………………………………………… 13 5.28. Illustration of rule …………………………………………………………………………………. 13 5.29. Qualification of the doctrine ……………………………………………………………………... 14 5.30. Reddendo singula singulis ………………………………………………………………………. 14 C. PROVISOS, EXCEPTIONS AND SAVING CLAUSES 5.31. Provisos, generally ……………………………………………………………………………….. 14 5.32. Proviso may enlarge scope of law ……………………………………………………………… 15 5.33. Proviso as additional legislation ………………………………………………………………… 15 5.34. What proviso qualifies ……………………………………………………………………………. 16 5.35. Exception to the rule ……………………………………………………………………………... 17 5.36. Repugnancy between proviso and main provision ……………………………………………. 17 5.37. Exceptions, generally …………………………………………………………………………….. 17 5.38. Exception and proviso distinguished …………………………………………………………… 18 5.39. Illustration of exception …………………………………………………………………………… 18 5.40. Saving Clause …………………………………………………………………………………….. 19 1  A. IN GENERAL 5.01. Generally ❖ Generally a word or phrase used in a statute may have an ordinary, generic, restricted, technical, legal, commercial or trade meaning. ❖ It may have been defined in the statute itself, or may have previously received a judicial construction. ❖ Which meaning should be given to a word or phrase in a statute depends upon what the legislature intended. ❖ The task involves ascertaining legislative intent primarily from the statute itself and secondarily, from extraneous and relevant circumstances and, having ascertained it, construing the word or phrase in such a way as to effectuate such intent. 5.02. Statutory definitions ❖ A statute sometimes defines particular words and phrases used therein. In such cases, the legislative definition controls the meaning of the statutory word, irrespective of any other meaning the word or phrase may have in its ordinary or usual sense. 5.03. Qualification of rule ❖ The statutory definition of a word or term "as used in this Act" is controlling only insofar as said act is concerned. ❖ The definition is not conclusive as to the meaning of the same word or term as used in other statutes, particularly with respect to transactions that took place prior to the enactment of the act. 5.04. Words construed in their ordinary sense ❖ In construing words and phrases used in a statute, the general rule is that, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, they should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. ❖ The words should be read and considered in their natural, ordinary, commonly accepted and most obvious signification, according to good and approved usage and without resorting to forced or subtle construction. 2  ❖ For words are presumed to have been employed by the lawmaker in their ordinary and common use and acceptance. ❖ And courts, as a rule, should not presume that the lawmaking body does not know the meaning of the words and the rules of grammar. Consequently, the grammatical and ordinary reading of a statute must be presumed to yield its correct sense. 5.05. General words construed generally ❖ A word of general significance in a statute is to be taken in its ordinary and comprehensive sense, unless it is shown that the word is intended to be given a different or restricted meaning. ❖ The rule is expressed in the maxim, generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda, or what is generally spoken shall be generally understood or general words shall be understood in a general sense. ❖ A general statement is understood in a general sense - Generale dictum generaliter est interpretandum. 5.06. Application of rule ❖ The maxim, generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda, is best Understood by way of illustration. For instance, the word “foreigner” In the Election Code prohibiting any foreigner from contributing Campaign funds includes a juridical person. ❖ The word “person” Comprehends private juridical corporation, unless it appears that It is used in a more limited sense; and the word “person” under a Penal statute which is intended to inhibit an act, must be “a person In law,” that is, an artificial as well as a natural person. ❖ The term “judge” without any modifying word or phrase accompanying it is to Be construed in its generic sense to comprehend all kinds of judges, Including judges of inferior courts and justices of the Supreme Court. ❖ The word “government” used without qualification should Be understood in its implied or generic sense and not in the strict Signification of the term “National Government.” In its implied Or generic sense, it includes government-owned or controlled Corporations.37 The term “National Government” refers only to the Central government, consisting of the legislative, executive and Judicial departments as well as constitutional bodies, as distinguished From local governments and other governmental entities, and is not Synonymous with the 3  term “The Government of the Republic of the Philippines” or “Philippine Government,” which are expressions Broad enough to include not only the central government but also local Governments and government-owned or controlled corporations. 5.07. Generic term includes things that arise thereafter ❖ Progressive interpretation A rule of construction which provides that a word of general signification employed in a statute should be construed, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, to comprehend not only peculiar conditions obtained at the same time of the enactment but those that may normally arise after its approval as well. 5.08. Words with commercial or trade meaning ❖ As a general rule especially applicable to tariff laws and laws of commerce, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, trade or commercial terms, when used in a statute, are presumed to have been used in their trade or commercial sense and should be given such trade or commercial meaning as has been generally understood and accepted among merchants. 5.09. Words with technical or legal meaning ❖ The technical or legal, not the ordinary or general, meaning of a word used in a statute should be adopted in the construction of the statute, in the absence of any qualification or intention to the contrary. ❖ The general rule is words that have, or have been used in a technical sense or those that have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning should be interpreted according to the sense in which they have been previously used, although the sense may vary from the strict or literal meaning of the words. ❖ The presumption is that the language used in a statute, which has a technical or well-known legal meaning, is used in that sense by the legislature. 4 5.10. How identical terms in same statute construed ❖ The general rule is that a word or phrase repeatedly used in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute. The word will not be so construed as to give it a meaning different from that of the same word in said statute, unless a different intention appears so or is clearly expressed. 5.11. Meaning of word qualified by purpose of statute ❖ The meaning of a word or phrase used in a statute may be qualified by the purpose which induced the legislature to enact the statute. Thus, if a statute is ambiguous and capable of more than one construction, the literal meaning of the word or phrase used therein may be rejected if the result of adopting such meaning will be to defeat the purpose which the legislature had in mind. ❖ Where the purpose of statute will be accomplished by giving a word employed therein non-technical sense, its technical or legal meaning will be rejected in favor of the construction which will effectuate intent or purpose. 5.12. Word or phrase construed in relation to other provisions ❖ The general rule is that a word, phrase or provision should not be construed in isolation but must be interpreted in relation to other provisions of the law. It should be interpreted in relation to the other provisions of a statute or other statutes dealing on the same subject. ❖ The word or provision should not be given meaning that will restrict or defeat, but should be construed to effectuate what has been intended in an enacting law. 5.13. Meaning of term dictated by context ❖ While ordinarily a word or term used in a statute will be given its usual and commonly understood meaning, the context in which the word or term is employed may dictate a different sense. ❖ A word is to be understood in the context in which it is used - Verba accipienda sunt secundum materiam. (e.g. in a statute which provides that the “family home 5  extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment, except for non payment of debts”, the word “debts” in the context in which it is used should be taken in its generic sense, i.e., obligations in general.) ❖ The context may likewise give a broad sense to a word of otherwise ordinarily limited meaning. ❖ The context may also limit the meaning of what otherwise is a word of broad signification. 5.14. Where the law does not distinguish ❖ It is a well-recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish - Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. ❖ The rule requires that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of the law. ❖ There should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated (courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction). ❖ The courts may distinguish when there are facts or circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification (Where law does not distinguish nor make any qualification, courts should not make any). 5.15. Illustration of rule ❖ Where a statute grants a person against whom the possession of “any land” is unlawfully withheld the right to bring an action for unlawful detainer, the phrase “any land” includes all kinds of land, whether agricultural, residential or mineral. The phrase cannot be said to relate exclusively to public land any more than it could relate exclusively to private land, the law not having made any distinction. ❖ Where a law does not distinguish between “stabilizer and flavors” used in the preparation of food and those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental 6  cream, the courts are not authorized to make any distinction, and must construe the words in their generic sense. ❖ Ligget & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue the case involves the interpretation of a provision of the Tax Code which imposes a specific tax “on cigarettes containing Virginia tobacco and/or flue-cured tobacco of seventy-one millimeters or less in length weighing one and one-fourth kilos or less per thousand, wrapped in tinfoil or cellophane or packed in cartons covered with paraffin or wax paper or in tin cans, on each thousand, ten pesos; Provided, that if the length exceeds seventy-one millimeters or the weight per thousand exceeds one and one-fourth kilos, that tax shall be increased by one hundred per centum” Issue: whether or not the length or weight of cigarettes, filters should be excluded. Held: The court ruled that the law not having distinguished between filter and non-filter cigarettes, neither the executive department nor the court may distinguish one from the other. Hence, the tax should be paid as fixed under the proviso. 5.16. Disjunctive and conjunctive words. ❖ The word “or”: Is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from each of the other things enumerated. As a rule, it should be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. The use of the disjunctive word “or” between two phrases connotes that either phrase serves as a qualifying phrase. The term “or” has sometimes been held to mean “and” when the spirit or context of the law warrants (e.g., Section 2, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court authorizing the municipal trial judge to conduct “preliminary examination or investigation” may mean “and” because under the law, the judge has the authority to conduct both). The word “or” may also be used as the equivalent of “that is to say”, giving that which precedes it the same significance as that which follows it. It may also mean successively. 7  ❖ The word “and”: The word “and” is a conjunction pertinently defined as meaning “together with”, “joined with”, “along or together with”, “added to or linked to”. It is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or union. The exception that “and” may mean “or” is resorted only when a literal interpretation would pervert the plain intention of the legislature as gleaned from the context of the statute or from external factors. The term “and/or”: ○ Means that effect shall be given to both the conjunctive “and” and the disjunctive “or” or that one word may be taken accordingly as one or the other. B. ASSOCIATED WORDS 5.17 Noscitur a sociis ❖ Where the law does not define a word, it will be construed as having meaning similar to that of words associated or accompanied by it. ❖ Where most of the word in an enumeration of words in a statute are used in their generic and ordinary sense, the rest of the words should similarly be construed 5.18 Application of rule ❖ People v. Delantar Defendant Delantar was charged because of facilitating and inducing his stepdaughter to sexual servitude. Because of their relationship, it was claimed that the crime was attended with an aggravating circumstance of relationship. Held: His relationship with the victim is not included in those enumerated. It was not proven that he was the real or biological father. At the most, he was said to be the guardian. But the word “guardian” envisaged by the law is that of having a legal relationship considering the other words in the list. 8  ❖ Carandang v. Santiago Petitioner survived the attack of respondent Santiago. As a result, the respondent was charged with frustrated homicide. Carandang filed a civil case to recover damages against respondents and his parents. Respondents argued that frustrated homicide was not included as a basis for a civil case under Art. 33 invoked by the petitioner. Held: The term “physical injuries” under Art. 33 should not be construed as a specific crime falling under the Revised Penal Code. Other words associated with it - defamation and fraud - do not have a specific definition and provisions in the RPC. Hence, it should be understood in its generic sense, any bodily injury. 5.19. Ejusdem generis ❖ While general words are accorded their generic sense, as a rule, they will not be given such meaning if they are used in association with specific words. ❖ When a general word follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class, the general word is to be restricted to persons, things or cases of the same kind as those specifically mentioned. Presumption: Had the legislature intended the general words to be used in their generic and unrestricted sense, it would not have enumerated specific words since the minds of the legislators are addressed to the particularization. Requisites: 1. Enumeration of particular and specific words, followed by a general word 2. The specific words constitute a class or of the same kind 3. Enumeration is not exhaustive or be an example 4. No indication of legislative intent to give the general words or phrases a broader meaning 9 5.20. Illustration of rule ❖ Vera v. Cuevas Petitioner, the commissioner of internal revenue, ordered the withdrawal of the private respondents’ filled milk products from the market which do not bear the inscription required by Sec. 169 of the Tax Code. Held: The broad phrase “all milk” in said provisions should be understood within the meaning of skimmed milk since the headnote (skimmed milk) and the text (condensed skimmed milk) talk about this. Hence, the inscription is not required upon this kind of milk. 5.21. Limitations of ejusdem generis ❖ (1) The specific words do not constitute a readily discernible class and are patently not of the same kind. ❖ (2) There is the regulatory intent to give the general phrase a broader meaning. ❖ (3) The most important is that the statutory provision is not itself restrictive. ❖ (4) Where the law is clear and free from ambiguity. 5.22. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius ❖ Express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all the others ❖ Also known as negative-opposite doctrine ❖ Canon of restrictive interpretation based on the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind (particularization) ❖ Opposite of doctrine of necessary implication ❖ Generally used in the construction of statutes, granting powers, creating rights, and imposing penalties and forfeitures, as well as those strictly construed. 10  Presumption The legislature would not have made specified enumerations in the statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. Variations a. What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied (i.e. if the statute is expressly limited, it may not be extended to other matters). b. A thing that is not excepted must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule (exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis). 5.23 Negative-opposite doctrine ❖ The principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied or argumentum a contrario 5.24. Application of expressio unius rule ❖ The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its corollary canons are generally used in the construction of statutes granting powers, creating rights and remedies, restricting common rights, and imposing penalties and forfeitures, as well as those statutes which are strictly construed. ❖ Where a statute directs the performance of certain acts by a particular person or class or persons, it implies that it shall not be done otherwise or be a different person or class of persons. ❖ If a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily, and by implication, be excluded. 5.25. Limitations of rule ❖ The rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not a rule of law. It is a mere tool of statutory construction or a means of ascertaining the legislative intent. 11  ❖ The rule, not being inflexible nor a mechanical or technical tool, must yield to what is clearly a legislative intent. ❖ It is no more than an auxiliary rule of interpretation to be ignored where other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive. ❖ It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature. ❖ It will not apply where the enumeration is by way of example or to remove doubts only. ❖ It will not apply in case a statute appears upon its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other persons or things not so enumerated should not have been included and manifest injustice will follow by not including them. ❖ The rule may be disregarded if it will result in incongruities or a violation of the equal protection clause of the constitution, inconvenience, hardship and injury to the public interest. ❖ Where the legislative intent shows that the enumeration is not exclusive, the maxim does not apply. 5.26. Doctrine of casus omissus ❖ The rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est states that a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. ❖ The principle proceeds from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration ❖ The rule does not apply where it is shown that the legislature did not intend to exclude the person, thing, object from the enumeration. If such legislative intent is clearly indicated, the court may supply the omission if to do so will carry out the clear intent of the legislature and will not do violence to its language. 12 5.27. Doctrine of last antecedent ❖ Qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated. They do not qualify words or phrases which are distantly or remotely located. ❖ In the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, preferential and qualifying words and phrases must be applied only to their immediate or last antecedent, and not to the other remote or preceding words or association of words. ❖ The maxim expressive of this rule is proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sententia, or relative words refer to the nearest antecedents, unless the context otherwise requires. ❖ The use of comma to separate an antecedent from the rest exerts a dominant influence in the application of the doctrine of last antecedent. 5.28. Illustration of rule ❖ CASE LAW: Members of the family of the tenant includes the tenant’s son, son-in-law, or grandson, even though they are not dependent upon him for support and living separately from him BECAUSE the qualifying phrase “who are dependent upon him for support” refers solely to its last antecedent, namely, “such other person or persons, whether related to the tenant or not” (Pangilinan v. Alvendia, 101 Phil. 794, 1957) Issue: whether holders of backpay certificates can compel government-owned banks to accept said certificates in payment of the holder’s obligations to the bank. Statute: “obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this amendatory act for which the applicant may directly be liable to the government or to any of its branches or instrumentalities, or to corporations owned or controlled by the government, or to any citizens of the Philippines or to any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines, who may be wiling to accept the same for such settlement” 13  Held: the court, invoking the doctrine of last antecedent, ruled that the phrase qualify only to its last antecedent namely “any citizen of the Philippines or association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines” The court held that back pay certificate holders can compel government-owned banks to accept said certificates for payment of their obligations with the bank. (Florentino v. Philippine National Bank, 98 Phil. 959, 1956) 5.29. Qualification of the doctrine ❖ Doctrine of last antecedent is subject to the exception that where the intention of the law is to apply the phrase to all antecedents embraced in the provision, the same should be made extensive to the whole. ❖ Slight indication of legislative intent so to extend the relative term is sufficient. Nor does the doctrine apply where the intention is not to qualify the antecedent at all. 5.30. Reddendo Singula Singulis ❖ The variation of the doctrine of last antecedent is the rule of reddendo singular singulis. The maxim means referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be taken distributively. ❖ Reddendo singular singulis requires that the antecedents and consequences should be read distributively to the effect that each word is to be applied to the subject to which it appears by context most appropriately related and to which it is most applicable. C. PROVISOS, EXCEPTIONS AND SAVING CLAUSES 5.31. Provisos ❖ Is either to limit the application of the enacting clause, section or provision of a statute or except something or to qualify or restrain its generality or exclude some possible grounds of misinterpretation of it. 14  Rule of proviso Is to restrain or qualify the generality of the enacting clauses or section to which it refers. Purpose of proviso To limit or restrict the general language or operation of the statute, not to enlarge it. Location of proviso Commonly found at the end of a section or provision of a statute as a rule, by the word “Provided”. 5.32 Proviso may enlarge scope of law ❖ Even though the primary purpose of the proviso is to limit or retrain the general language of a statute, the legislature, unfortunately, does not always use it with technical correctness; consequently, where its use creates ambiguity, it is the duty of the court to ascertain the legislative intention, through resort to the usual rules of construction applicable to statutes ❖ It gives effect even though the statute is thereby enlarged or the provision made to assume the force of independent enactment and although a proviso as such has no existence apart from which it is designated to limit or qualify. ❖ A proviso may enlarge instead of restrict or limit, what otherwise is a phrase of limited import had there been no proviso qualifying it U.S vs. Santo Nino It shall be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie, knife, dagger, kris or any other deadly weapon; Provided, that this provision shall not apply to firearms in the possession of persons who have secured a license therefore or who are entitled to same under provisions of this Act Held: Through the proviso it manifested the intention included in the prohibition other than the armas blancas as specified 5.33. Proviso as additional legislation ❖ A clear and unqualified purpose expressed in the opening statement of a section of a statute comprising several subdivisions has been construed. Where the proviso if segregated therefrom would mean exactly the reverse of what it necessarily implied when read in connection with the limitation 15 5.34. What Proviso qualifies ❖ General rule - Qualifies or modifies only the phrase immediately preceding it or restrains or limits the generality of the clause that is immediately followed. ❖ Exception - Unless it clearly appears that the legislature intended it to have a wider scope. Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. Prince Stabilization Board Under the Sec. 15 RA 426 Any existing law, executive order or regulation to the contrary notwithstanding, no government agency except the Import Control Commission shall allocate the import quota among the various importers. Provided, That the Philippine Rehabilitation and Trade Administration shall have exclusive power and authority to determine and regulate the allocation of wheat flour among importers. Issue: whether or not the proviso excluded wheat flour from the scope of the Act itself Held: Proviso can only refer to the clause immediately preceding it and can have no other meaning than the function of allocating the wheat flour instead of being assigned to the Import Control Commission was assigned to the Philippine Rehabilitation. If the intent of the law is to exempt wheat flour from the provision of the Act, the proviso would have been placed in the section containing the repealing clause. Flores vs, Miranda The contention of the petitioner is that the approval of the Public Service Commission of the sale of public service vehicles was not necessary because of proviso in Sec, 20 of Commonwealth Act no. 146 which stated “it shall be unlawful for any public service vehicle or for the owner, lessee or operator thereof, without the previous approval and authority of the Commission previously had xxx to sell, alienate xxx its property,franchise; Provided, however that nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the transaction from being negotiated or completed before its approval or to prevent the sale, alienation or lease by any public service of any of its property in the ordinary course of business” Held: The proviso xxx means only that the sale without the required approval is still valid and binding between the parties and the phrase in the ordinary course of business xxx could not have been intended to include the sale of the vehicle itself, but at most may refer only to such property that may be conceivably disposed of by the carrier in the ordinary course of its business like junked equipment. 16 5.35. Exception to the rule ❖ Proviso construed to qualify only the immediately preceding part of the section to which it is attached; if no contrary legislative intent is indicated ❖ Where intent is to qualify or restrict the phrase preceding it or the earlier provisions of the statute or even the statute itself as a whole, then the proviso will be construed in that manner, in order that the intent of the law may be carried out 5.36. Repugnancy between proviso and main provision ❖ A proviso should be so construed as to harmonize and not to repeal or destroy, the main provision of the statute. ❖ When there is an irreconcilable conflict or repugnancy between a proviso and the main provision of a statute, that which is located in a later portion of the statute prevails, unless there is a legislative intent to the contrary or such construction will destroy the whole statute itself. ❖ The latter provision, whether a proviso or not, is given preference because it is the latest expression of the intent of the legislation. 5.37. Exceptions, generally ❖ Exception consists of that which would otherwise be included in the provision from which it is excepted, generally expressed in such words as “except”, “unless otherwise”, and “shall not apply”. ❖ An exception will be construed as such if it removes something from the operation of a provision of law. ❖ It is often said that an exception confirms the general rule. It should not be construed to qualify the words or phrases constituting the general rule. ❖ Express mention of exceptions operates to exclude other exceptions and conversely, those which are not within the enumerated exceptions are deemed included in the general rule. ❖ Exceptions, generally, should be strictly but reasonably construed. Where a general rule is established by statutes with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication. 17 5.38. Exception and proviso distinguished: Exception Proviso Exempts something absolutely Defeats its operation from the operation of statute conditionally Takes out of the statute something Avoids by way of defeasance that otherwise would be a part of or excuse the subject matter of it If the enactment is modified Part of the enactment itself, by engrafting upon it a new absolutely excluding from its provision, by way of operation some subject or thing amendment, providing that would otherwise fall within conditionally for a new case- the scope this is the nature of proviso Similar in a sense that one of the functions of proviso is to except something from an enacting clause. 5.39. Illustration of Exception ❖ MERALCO v. Public Utilities Employees’ Association Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No 444 – “No person, firm, or corporation, business establishment or place shall compel an employee to work on Sundays & legal holidays, unless paid an additional sum of at least 25% of his renumeration; Provided, however, that this prohibition shall not apply to public utilities performing public service, e.g. supplying gas, electricity, power, water etc.…” Issue: Is MERALCO liable to pay the 25% for employees who work during holidays and Sundays? Held: No. 2nd part is an exception although introduced by “Provided.” As appellant is a public utility that supplies electricity & provides means of transportation, it is evident that appellant is exempt from qualified prohibition established in the enactment clause. ❖ Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance Article 6, Sec 26(2) of 1987 Constitution – “No bill shall be passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed 3 readings on separate days, & printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its members 3 days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency”. Issue: Whether or not the “except” clause qualifies only its nearest antecedent. 18  Held: No. It qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law. "Unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause. To construe the "except" clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement would not only violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate the very premise of the "except" clause. ❖ Gorospe v. Court of Appeals Rule 27, Sec 8 of Rules of Court - “Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee; but if fail to claim his mail from the post office within 5 days from date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect at the expiration of such time.” Issue: Whether the actual date of receipt of the registered mail or after 5-day period, is the date from which to count the prescriptive period to comply with certain requirements. Held: Service is completed on the 5th day after the 1st notice, even if he received the mail months later. The 2nd part is separated by a semicolon and begins with, ‘but’ which indicates exception. 5.40. Saving Clause A clause in a provision of law which operates to except from the effect of the law what the clause provides or to save something which would otherwise be lost. It is used to except or save something from the effect of a repeal of a statute. It should be construed in the light of the intent or purpose of the legislature. It should be given a strict or liberal construction depending upon the kind of interpretation that should, considering its nature, be given to the statute as a whole. 19