Chapter 6 - Responding to Determinism PDF - F2024

Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 Chapter 6: Responding to Determinism: Indeterminism and Compatibilism 2/ 2/ 2024 Introduction and Objectives First, let’s review the terrain – I’ve...

Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 Chapter 6: Responding to Determinism: Indeterminism and Compatibilism 2/ 2/ 2024 Introduction and Objectives First, let’s review the terrain – I’ve noted that the “Challenge of Determinism” can be framed via something called, “The Inconsistent Triad” - The Inconsistent Causal Triad: ▪ Determinist Thesis/ Principle of Universal Causation (PUC) = “Every event (including human decisions) has a causal explanation”. ▪ Freedom Principle (FP) = “Humans are (under normal circumstances) free.” ▪ Inconsistency Principle (IP) = “PUC is inconsistent with FP” (or “If PUC is true, then FP is false”). The Three Traditional Positions: ▪ Hard Determinism: affirms PUC & IP; rejects FP ▪ Libertarianism/ Indeterminism: affirms FP & IP; rejects PUC ▪ Compatibilism/ Soft-Determinism: affirms PUC & FP; rejects IP In the previous chapter, I sketched the case for the determinist thesis and laid out the hard-determinist case that this principle (PUC) implied that no one was ever free, since every decision we ever make is causally determined. In this Chapter, we are going to sketch and assess the two responses to hard determinism: Libertarianism and Compatibilism. We’ve seen that Determinism rests on the simple common-sense principle that “everything has a cause” (called, “the Determinist Thesis” or “the Principle of Universal Causation”). This principle seems innocent enough and we appeal to it continually in our daily lives in addition to throughout modern science. But, hard-determinists argue that this intuitive principle implies that we have to do everything we do (we “could not have done otherwise”) and therefore we are not “truly free”. Determinism strikes many as counter-intuitive. To many it seems obvious that we are free in the contra- causal sense, but we've seen appearances can be deceiving. Similarly, the hard-determinist conclusion that we aren’t free is definitely not a popular one, but popularity isn’t evidence. If we are going to reject hard-determinists’ conclusion we need some reason. In this chapter, we consider two responses to hard-determinism. Here’s the nuts and bolts version of the Hard-determinist argument. 1. Every event has a cause (PUC). 2. If every event has a cause, the no one is free (IP). 3. So, no one is free. Hopefully, you can all recognize that this is a valid inference (can you identify the inference pattern?). That means that one must respond to it by either accepting the conclusion or rejecting one of the  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 premises. Hard-determinists accept the conclusion. But, if you are going to reject it, you need to deny one of the two premises. In this chapter we are going to sketch the case for both of these responses. In the first part, we consider a direct challenge to the Principle of Universal Causation (i.e., to premise 1), via Libertarianism (or Indeterminism), including arguments from evidence from modern physics (i.e., Quantum Mechanics) In the second part, the focus is on an indirect challenge to PUC from the apparent tension between it and a popular notion of individual moral responsibility. And, in the third part, we consider the challenge to premise 2 levied by Compatibilists (or “Soft- determinists”). Compatibilism (/ “Soft-determinism”) is the view that there is no real conflict between Determinism and human freedom (i.e., Universal Causation is consistent with human freedom), BTW – I strongly recommend the brief video lecture on Determinism, which I posted in this week’s module, “You don’t have free will, but don’t worry”, along with another episode of the Crash Course Philosophy series on Free will, on "Compatibilism". These don't cover everything I cover in the chapter (and cover a few things I don't), and their terminology is a little different (so, you still need to read the chapter), but they are still really good. Ok – let’s get to it - Part 1: Considering Indeterminism and Responsibility Indeterminism is the position that determinism doesn’t apply to every event in nature; there are some events that are uncaused. We’ll see that there is some support for this position from contemporary physics. But, in order to be an effective response to determinism, Indeterminism needs to apply not just to “some events”, but at least some human decisions. Moreover, what really matters is not just that some human decisions are uncaused but that they are the result of a free will that has the power to choose between real alternative courses of action, Libertarianism is the position that humans are free in this strong sense of freedom (i.e., metaphysical or “contra-causal freedom”). Let’s see a case for Libertarianism can be made from the evidence for Indeterminism - The Argument for Indeterminism from Quantum Mechanics Since its inception in the Renaissance, the Principle of Universal Causation has been a lynchpin of modern science. The idea that the universe was govern by a small set of universal and uniform physical laws that were discoverable through observation and experimentation was definitive of this new approach to understanding the world. That is, to be a scientist was to accept determinism. At least, up until the early 1900’s and the investigations of scientists into the nature of light and subatomic physics, by scientists, including: Max Planck, Niels Bohr, and Werner Heisenberg. Out of  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 this research, a new field of physics – Quantum Mechanics – arouse, which held that causal determinism did not perfectly apply at the microscopic level. According to Determinism there is a necessary connection between all antecedent causes and their effects (i.e., given the presence of the causes the effects must follow) but in the subatomic world this necessity is lacking and one is left only with degrees of probability. According to Quantum Mechanics, while certain outcomes are highly probable under certain conditions, they are never absolutely certain. Many scientists were reluctant to accept the experimental results which support this view, including Einstein, who famously objected, “God does not play dice” – But the experimental evidence for Quantum Mechanics kept piling up and it is currently the best theory available as to the nature of the workings of the subatomic world. For more on Quantum Mechanics, see: http://www.pbs.org/transistor/science/info/quantum.html http://www4.ncsu.edu/unity/lockers/users/f/felder/public/kenny/papers/quantum.html http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_mechanics  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 Some philosophers have tried to use the indeterminism that lies at the heart of Quantum Mechanics as an objection to the Determinist claim that no human action is free. Here’s (really) short video of physicist Michio Kaku making this point – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lFLR5vNKiSw Physicists like Kaku point out that modern physics does suggest that the Principle of Universal Causation (PUC) is false, at least at the sub-atomic level some events are purely random (i.e., uncaused). This is a serious objection to the hard determinist argument, since PUC is the main premise in that argument. But, to point out that an argument is unsound, because it has a false premise, is not the same as demonstrating that the conclusion of the argument is false. Unsound arguments can have true conclusions. Reflection Point: construct your own example of an unsound argument with a true conclusion. But, it is a leap to conclude from this, as many physicists (including Kaku) appear to do, that humans have free will in the contra-causal sense (i.e., the ability to have done otherwise). Here’s a standard  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 form version of how this argument for free will based on Quantum Mechanics seems to go. The Libertarian Argument for Free Will from Quantum Mechanics 1. Many subatomic events are purely random. 2. If some subatomic events are purely random, then some human decisions are also purely random. 3. If some human decisions are purely random, then human beings are free. 4. So, human beings are free. Once again, we’ve constructed a valid argument. So, it presents a challenge to hard-determinists who deny the conclusion. Specially, unless they want to surrender their position, hard determinists need to deny a premise. According to the experts, the first premise is supported by the results of countless experiments. A “unified theory of everything” which explains this evidence from a determinist pov many come along, but for now the first premise looks pretty strong. But, note there are two additional, premises. And, both of these conditional premises (2 & 3) are controversial. Let’s consider premise 3 first. It is difficult to see how (some) human decisions/ behavior being governed by pure randomness would result in a substantive sense of free will. When we talk of our decisions being free or voluntary we don’t normally mean that they are random or uncaused. We unusually intend to convey that they are the product of our own will, we are their sole author, and we are responsible for them. But, it is hard to see how this is consistent with (let alone follows from) the view that our decisions are purely random and completely unpredictable. In a sense, under this indeterminist view, I could have done otherwise, but whether or not I would have done otherwise is (under this view) in no way up to me, it was a purely random happenstance. For example, you chose to start reading this essay, but could you have chosen otherwise? Under the indeterminist view, you might have chosen otherwise (since our decision to do so was a purely random event), but this “choice” would not have been up to you in the sense that most people who affirm free will care about. In Quantum Mechanics, to say an event is “uncaused” implies that the event is random (i.e., completely unpredictable), but if our decisions are random than we are no more responsible for them, than if they are caused by external forces. Consider the follow weird analogy – The Crazy Neuroscientist Analogy Pretend that there is a crazy neuroscientist who has inserted some remote-control device in you which controls your arm. Whenever she wants the neuroscientist can flip a switch a cause an electrical impulse in your arm which cause it to swing out violently. Imagine she flips the switch and causes you arm to swing out and hit someone as they are walking by. You wouldn’t be responsible for hitting them, right? You weren’t in control of your arm – you couldn’t have done otherwise, even if you had wanted to. But, what if the neuroscientist hooked up her machine to your brain, so that at the flip of the switch it caused you to have an overwhelming desire to swing your arm. She flips the switch and again you swing out and hit someone. Now, you did it because you wanted to. And, you could have not wanted to (if she wouldn’t have flipped the switch). But,  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 whether or not you wanted to wasn’t up to you – you still didn’t freely do it (did you?). It’s the neuroscientist’s fault for hitting the passerby, not yours – right? Ok – but now imagine that the neuroscientist hooks up the machine (under both these scenarios) to a random number generator. So, it went off at random unpredictable moments. If it did happen that it went off and you hit someone, you still wouldn’t have done so “freely”, would you? You wouldn’t be responsible for doing so, would you? Critics of the Libertarian argument, use this case (and similar ones) to argue that even if some human decisions are purely random, they are not “free” (at least they are not the result of a will that is free in a meaningful sense). Ok, so what about premise 2. Many contemporary determinists insist that while determinism breaks down in the subatomic world, it still reigns in the macroscopic world which includes human action, let’s call this view “Modified Determinism” - Modified Determinist Thesis: The Principle of Near-Universal Causation: Every macro-level event (including all human behavior) is governed by highly uniform and predictable causal laws in spite of the randomness conveyed from the subatomic realm. Under this view, All macro-events are 99.99% predictable by the physical circumstance and macro-level causal forces, while the randomness inherent at the quantum level conveys a small probability (something like a.01% chance) of a purely random and unpredictable outcome.  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 The revised claim merely asserts that any human’s behavior is highly predictable given all the relevant information of the circumstances and the causal forces at play, while there always remains a small probability that they will do something completely unpredictable. However, this small degree of unpredictability (this “sliver of randomness”) doesn’t convey any meaningful sense of freedom (or responsibility) to human decisions, any more than the randomness inherent in the Crazy Neuroscientist Analogy would. Sounds pretty reasonable, right? Based on this view we can formulate a modified version of the hard determinist argument which takes the evidence from Quantum Mechanics into account - The Modified Hard-determinist argument 1) All macro-level events (including all human actions) are governed by highly uniform and predictable causal laws in spite of the randomness conveyed from the subatomic realm. 2) If human action is determined by highly uniform and predictable causal laws, then it is not free (in any substantive sense) even if there is some small possibility for a purely random and unpredictable outcome. 3) So, no human action is free (in any substantive sense). Reflection Point: Is the inference of this argument valid? How would you evaluate it? Agent Causation Libertarianism (Indeterminism) Some Libertarians, called “Agent Causation” proponents, respond to the above argument by rejecting the first premise as resting on a false dichotomy: either human choices are causally determined (by forces external to the agent) or they are purely random. “Agent Causation” fits the way we often talk about human decisions, e.g.: “I caused my arm to rise.” “Nothing caused me to do it. I just chose to do it.” However, as a scientific theory, Agent Causation Libertarianism (or “the Freewill Hypothesis”, FWH) is vastly inferior to Determinism (or the “Determined Will Hypothesis”, DWH). One reason for this is that FWH conflicts with current theories concerning “causes” which are generally understood to be sufficient conditions for their effects (given certain background environments). E.g., to say that a spark caused the explosion implies that the spark is a sufficient condition for the explosion (i.e., “Whenever a spark is present in similar circumstances, there will be an explosion”).  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 But, the notion of 'agent causation’ (e.g., ‘I caused that action / want"), utilized by FWH is inconsistent with this understanding of causes in terms of sufficient conditions, since “I” can’t be a sufficient condition for any of my individual actions. I like to summarize this point with the expression, “Agent causation is weird causation.” It just doesn’t seem to make sense to refer to individuals as causes of anything (at least, of their own actions or mental states). For example, say I raise my arm. I may say, “I caused my arm to rise.” But what does that mean? “I” am not a sufficient condition for my arm to rise (since, I am often present without my arm rising). So, it isn’t literally true that “I” am the cause. One interpretation here is, “I caused my arm to rise” may be interpreted as “a desire within me caused my arm to rise”. But, the issue then becomes what caused this desire in me? The options seem to be: - Nothing - Me - Something other than me The answer “nothing” leads us back to the strict indeterminism of quantum mechanics. But, answering “me” leads us back to the same problem – “I” can’t be the cause of a specific desire of mine, since “I” am not a sufficient condition for any specific mental state of mine (since “I” can be present without the mental state/ desire being present). Hence, we seem to be left with, “Something other than me”, which is the determinist answer. In addition, there’s all the other reasons for preferring DWH over FWH covered in the the previous Chapter. I don’t want to review this whole abductive argument here (for it, review the last Chapter), but here’s a brief recap: 1. DWH has greater explanatory power than FWH, since under it evidence like following are "less surprising”:  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 Actions/ decisions are strongly correlated with (conscious or unconscious) desires/ wants which seem to serve as motives for one’s actions and which are themselves “discovered” not chosen. The success of sciences like Psychology, Sociology, & Neurobiology Self-destructive behavior & Phobias the correlation between brain chemistry & mood, desire, & behavior (e.g., the success of anti-depressant drugs) 2. DWH is ontologically simpler than FWH, since FWH posits, in addition to all the (genetic and environmental) causal forces of DWH, there exists an additional force (i.e., independent human wills). 3. FWH is consistent with (and even is a foundation for) contemporary theories of physics, biology, sociology, psychology, etc.; for example: The FWH seems to violate the well-established principle of physics, The Conservation of Energy (i.e., mass-energy can neither be created nor destroyed), since it assumes that free agents (/ free wills) can generate/ initiate new causal threads (seemingly) “from nothing”. 4. DWH has a broader scope than FWH - i.e. the causal laws/ forces common to both theories have a broader scope under DWH than FWH, since under FWH these laws apply to all events in the universe, while under DWH they do not. 5. DWH is more fruitful in that it implies that human behavior is in principle predictable and controllable. This research paradigm has led psychologists, sociologists, and other behavioral scientists to develop theories along these lines. Theories which have been supported via experimental research (and thus which have in turn supported PUC). It also allows each of us to coordinate our behavior with how we predict others would react to possible events/ situations. In spite of this evidence, we definitely commonly talk in terms of agent causation. Saying, “I caused it”, “I did it”, “I chose to do it”, “I freely chose it”, “I just wanted to, so I did.” But, according to determinism, this language is just short-hand for determinist explanations of our behavior of which we may be ignorant. For example, when we perform an action “because we want to”, according to determinists, we are generally ignorant of the causal conditions within us that produced this desire. So, “I caused it” is merely a convenient short-hand for, “Some conditions within me (of which I am unaware) caused it.” But, what does this do to the notion that individuals are morally responsible for their actions? The obvious implication here is that, under determinism, individual responsibility disappears –  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 Part 2: Determinism and Responsibility Here’s the implication in standard form: If all human decisions are caused, then individuals cannot be held responsible ("blamed") for their actions. Determinists definitely endorse the antecedent of this conditional (affirming all human decisions are caused, is definitive of determinism). Hence, this implication leads hard-determinists to the conclusion that responsibility (along freedom) is an illusion. The Hard-determinist Responsibility Argument 1. Everything has a cause. 2. If everything has a cause, then no one is responsible for their actions. 3. So, no one is responsible for their actions. For many Indeterminists this is a bridge too far. And they respond that this absurd implication counts as evidence against determinism. Study Point: Note the parallels between this response and Moore’s common-sense reductio response to skepticism. Determinism seems to directly conflict with widely held views of personal responsibility which form the cornerstone of a widely accepted view of criminal justice (namely, the view that justice results from a system of retribution “deserved punishment”). But, the critics argue, this views of responsibility and justice “can’t” be rejected. Hence, they conclude, determinism must be rejected. Here’s the reductio objection in standard form – The Responsibility Reductio Objection to Determinism 1. If Determinism (i.e., universal causation) is true, then no one is morally responsible for their actions. 2. But, individuals ARE (generally) morally responsible for their actions. Therefore, 3. Determinism is false.  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 Reflection Questions: ▪ Can you explain why the inference of this argument is valid? What inference pattern does it express? ▪ How do Hard-Determinists, Soft-Determinists, and Libertarians would all respond to this argument? Like all reductio arguments, the inference of this argument is valid, but no determinist is going to accept the conclusion (if they did so, they’d no longer be a determinist). Moreover, hard-determinists generally agree with Libertarians that the first premise is reasonable, affirming that determinism does imply that there is no moral responsibility. Why not? Well – the reasoning goes something like this, if everything thing has a cause, then all human decisions are caused and no one could have do anything other than they in fact did, but responsibility (e.g., praise and blame) only make sense if the agent could have don otherwise. It doesn’t make sense to praise or blame someone who had to do what they did, but, according to determinism, we all always have to do what we do, no one could ever have done otherwise. It doesn’t make sense to blame a puppet or a robot for their actions, but according to determinism, we are all (like) puppets and robots. It doesn’t make sense to blame the victim of the crazy neuroscientist for the swinging of their arms, but, according to determinists, we are all like these victims. It doesn’t make sense to blame the mental ill for criminal behavior they commit (because they weren’t in control of their actions), but according to determinism, no one is ever in control of their actions – we are all (in this respect) similar to mental ill criminals. The Criminal Insanity Analogical Argument 1. Mentally ill individuals are not morally responsible for their behavior (including criminal behavior), since they are not in control of their actions. 2. According to determinism, no one is in control of their actions. 3. So, according to determinism, no one is morally responsible for their actions.  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 Ok, that’s the argument; how do determinists respond? Refer back to the Responsibility Reductio – 1. If Determinism (i.e., universal causation) is true, then no one is morally responsible for their actions. 2. But, individuals are (generally) morally responsible for their actions. Therefore, 3. Determinism is false. Assuming they are not going to accept the conclusion, determinists can respond by either denying the implication (rejecting premise 1) or biting the bullet (rejecting premise 2). And, in fact, different determinists take each of these options. Hard-determinists bite the bullet, while soft-determinists deny the implication. Let’s focus on the hard-determinist response first - The Hard Determinist Response: Beyond Crime and Punishment Hard Determinists, like d’Holbach, admit that determinism implies that no human ever acts “freely”. So, it shouldn’t be surprising that they would admit that this also implies that no human is morally responsible for their actions. This is quite a bullet to bite, since the notion of individual responsibility is deeply embedded in the moral psyche of most Americans and in a popular view of Criminal Justice. They acknowledge that this claim will strike many people as “absurd”, but they don’t take that as evidence for rejecting determinism. Rather, it is the popular belief in individual responsibility and the  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 related views on criminal justice which the hard-determinists reject, arguing that we (as individuals and as a society) will be better off for it. Here’s an excerpt from a famous speech from Clarence Darrow, one of the most famous defense attorneys of the 20th century (and staunch determinist), speaking to a group of prisoners, proudly biting this bullet by denying the meaningfulness of the popular notions of responsible and crime. “If I looked at jails and crimes and punishment in the way that the common person does, I should not speak on this subject to you. The reason I speak on the question of crime, its cause and cure, is that I really do not in the least believe in crime. There is no such thing as crime as the word in generally understood… I do not believe that people are in jail because they deserve to be. They are in jail simply because they cannot avoid it on account of circumstances which are entirely beyond their control and for which they are in no way responsible... I do not want you to believe that I think all you people here are angels. I do not think that. You are people of all kinds, all of you doing the best you can, and that is evidently not very well —…. In one sense everybody is equally good and equally bad. We all do the best we can under the circumstances. But as to the exact things for which you are sent here, some of you are guilty and did the particular act because you needed the money. Some of you did it because you are in the habit of doing it, and some of you because you are born to it, and it comes to be as natural as it does, for instance, for me to be good.” – “Address to the Criminals of the Cook County Jail” Extra Credit: Darrow’s full speech is remarkable and controversial. Here's Darrow's full talk, http://www.bopsecrets.org/CF/darrow.htm Follow link, then to the Coffee House Forum post your thoughts on a few additional selections from it (include one or two quotes).  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 More Extra Credit - this determinist notion that the notion that individuals are solely responsible for their actions (and crimes) is also implicit within the lyrics of this powerful Bob Dylan song, “Only a Pawn in Their Game”; here’s the lyrics. In the Coffee House Forum, post your thoughts on (some of the lyrics); include one or two quotes of a few lines. And/ or post and comment on another song where freedom (or the lack of it) is prominent in the lyrics. Contemporary philosopher Sam Harris echoed Darrow’s thesis in his book, The Moral Landscape, Clearly, we need to build prisons for people who are intent on harming others. But if we could incarcerate earthquakes and hurricanes for their crimes, we would build prisons for them as well. The men and women on death row have some combination of bad genes, bad parents, bad ideas and bad luck – which of these quantities, exactly, were they responsible for? No human being stands as author to his own genes or own upbringing, and yet we have every reason to believe that these factors determine his character throughout his life. Our system of justice should reflect our understanding that each of us could have been dealt a very different hand in life…The urge for retribution…seems to depend upon our not seeing the underlying causes of human behavior. (109) Reformers like Darrow and Harris argue that we should stop viewing crime as voluntary actions of free individuals and view it as events which (like all other events) result from a set complex but uniform (and largely predictable) external forces, including biological and environmental causes. We should view crime in the same way we view infectious disease -  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 Here's an NPR story of a group of sociologists who analyzed murders in New Jersey via computer models used to analyze the spread of infectious disease - http://www.npr.org/2012/12/06/166600403/can-murder-be- tracked-like-an-infectious-disease These reformers (actually, this view of crime and justice goes back in the western tradition at least to Aristotle, who studied under Plato) argue that if we really want to reduce crime, we should take time to identify and address the "root causes" of crime. For example, poverty has long been identified as a (contributing) cause to crime. To support this “thesis”, determinists, including many contemporary sociologists, point to correlational evidence like the average income of convicts (prior to their conviction), which is significantly lower than national (or local) averages. Darrow pointed to the fact that (at his time) the crime rate went up significantly in the winter (when homeless individuals became increasingly desperate). Reflection Question: What do you think? Does poverty cause crime? How would a determinist respond to the objection that not all poor people commit crimes; hint: how do biologists who affirm “smoking causes cancer” respond to the objection that not all individuals who smoke get cancer? They also argue that we should dramatically alter our views of Criminal Justice, which assumes that criminals deserve punishment because they made a voluntary choice to break the law. They advocate shifting our view of prisons as places of deserved punishment to places of: correction, reform, and rehabilitation. Philosophers of Law refer to these views of criminal justice as forward-looking (since the justification for sentencing a criminal is based on the future (e.g., trying to "cure" them or prevent future crime). In contrast, the Libertarian view of "retributive justice" based on “deserved punishment” is backward-looking in that the justification for the sentence comes from the past ("we are locking you up, because of what you did."). Back-forwarding looking views think of criminal sentences as balancing out the “scales of justice” which were upset by the crime.  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 Although they deny that we are justified in “punishing” criminals or anyone else, Hard-determinists do not assert that we should have no laws or even that we are not justified in locking up individuals who break laws. They don’t bite the “determinism implies we should never lock anyone up” bullet. They just argue that we need to change our view of criminals to a more “Humanitarian” one, since under Determinism criminals are all (to paraphrase Darrow), “doing the best they can, which evidently is not very well.” This reform view has gained in popularity, since Darrow’s day, at least with respect to nonviolent crimes. For example, an increasing number of people are now in favor of treatment (as opposed to prison) for illegal drug-users. Consider the follow plea by 2016 Presidential candidate, Chris Christie speaking on these topic. However, not everyone is ready to jump on the “reform” bandwagon though.  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 C.S. Lewis (one of the most famous literary writers of the 20th century) argues against these types of "humanitarian" (or forward-looking) types of reforms, like those advocated by Darrow, in part because they: take the issue of what is an appropriate sentence for a crime out of the hands of ordinary people (i.e., juries) and put it in the hands of "experts" (e.g., psychologists) could result in justifying inhumane sentences (e.g., what if torture was the most efficient or only way to ensure a criminal would change his ways and get "scared straight"). This is the premise behind the classic but highly disturbing film, A Clockwork Orange. Here's a key scene from the film - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j- cS3u-pWn Here’s Lewis’s full essay, http://www.angelfire.com/pro/lewiscs/humanitarian.html Reflection Question: What do you make of the Hard-Determinist case for reforming our criminal justice system to focus more on rehabilitation than punishment? What about Lewis’s  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 objections? The Self-defense/ Quarantine Response Lewis seems to assume that the determinist “humanitarian” view of criminal justice must have as its aim rehabilitating criminals or deterring future crime. But, determinists may advocate a less-lofty goal of “self-defense” (or “societal defense”). Under this view, the justification for locking criminals away rests on the value of protecting society. Determinists with this view, like Darrow (and even Mohandas Gandhi), refer to crime as a type of disease. Just as we may (forcibly) quarantine individuals with a highly contagious and deadly disease, even though they didn’t freely choose to become sick, we may lock up dangerous criminals. Just as quarantine of sick individuals protects others from a contagious disease, whether or not we can successfully rehabilitate crimes or deter future ones, locking up a dangerous individual does prevent that person from harming anyone else (at least anyone outside of prison, while they are in prison). Reflection Question: Explain why determinists endorse Forward-looking views of criminal justice (like rehabilitation and deterrence), while Libertarians typically endorse the (backward- looking) retributivist view. Which resonates most with your own intuitions of criminal justice? Case Study: Consider Capital Punishment. How would the justification for capital punishment for the most violent crimes (e.g., mass murder) differ between a Determinist and a Libertarian? How might a determinist argue against Capital Punishment? What do you think, is capital  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 punishment ever justified? Why (not)? Is your reasoning forward-looking or backward looking? William James’s Case for Libertarianism A slightly different reductio objection to determinism was raised by the great, 20th century American philosopher and psychologist, William James. James felt that causal determinism was inconsistent with our conception of ourselves as moral agents. In particular, he felt that it was inconsistent with the belief that we commonly make moral mistakes and do the wrong thing. In other words, according to James, determinism is inconsistent with “regrets”, since regrets involve the belief or wish that we had done something different (or differently), but this requires believing that we COULD have acted differently. Here’s his argument expressed as a reductio in standard form: William James’s Regret Reductio to Determinism 1. If determinism is true (i.e., everything has a cause), then moral regrets are meaningless. 2. But, moral regrets are NOT meaningless. 3. So, (I must believe that) determinism is false. Before assessing James’s argument (or any argument), we should seek to understand it. Why did he think that determinism precluded moral regrets? Well, according to James, to have a regret was to affirm, “I shouldn’t have done that” and this claim presumes, “I could have done something else”. But, if determinism is true, “no one could have done otherwise (than they did)”; so, claiming you “shouldn’t have done what you did” is meaningless.  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 Unsurpisingly, different determinists respond differently to James’s challenge to them. In general, once again, hard-determinists bite the bullet, while soft-determinists deny the implication. James felt that this conceptual conflict was a problem for determinism because (according to him) regrets are vital to a healthy moral attitude (given no one is morally perfect). But, many determinists, including 17th century determinist Baruch Spinoza, are willing to bite the bullet here and affirm that moral regrets are meaningless. In fact, some determinists have seen this as a benefit of determinism because it helps individuals let go of regrets and the guilt, depression, and anxiety that they can cause - “Stop beating yourself up over your past. You did the best you could – you didn’t know any better then. You couldn’t help it…” Spinoza reasoned along these lines, when we argued that determinism was liberating and a source of contentment. Alternatively, some soft-determinists, including David Hume, have denied the implication of James’s reductio – claiming that there is no inconsistency in affirming both, “I regret it” and “I had to do it”. Hume’s approach here focuses on the meaning of “regret”. For James, to regret something is (in part) a wish you had done something else or done something differently. In contrast, for Hume, to regret something is merely to feel bad about it. In Hume’s words, it is looking at a past action with  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 “disapproval”. And, determinists can feel bad about things they’ve done. In fact, according to determinism, there are causal explanations for why someone would feel bad about something they did. Often after performing an action, you learn something new about the negative effects it had and this new knowledge can in turn change the way you felt about the action. For example, let’s say a boy ate all his little brother’s Halloween candy, then saw how sad it made his brother, and as a result felt bad about what he did. We can imagine that his new knowledge could cause the older brother to feel bad about (i.e., “regret”) his behavior. James’s view on regret seems to also assume that apologies are meaningless under determinism; that one cannot sincerely apologize for an action if they felt that they had no choice but to perform the action. Affirming “I am sorry, but I had no choice” is the best apology a determinist could give according to James, but it is a hallow apology devoid of any substance. Sincere apologies require affirming, “I shouldn’t have done it” and “I should (and could) have done something else instead.” But, under Hume’s soft-determinist view, an apology (like a regret) could be purely forward-looking. An apology need not rest on a belief that one could have done otherwise, rather it could merely be meant to convey a (current) feeling of disapproval of the action and a resolution to act differently in the future. “I am sorry I did that” = “I feel bad for doing it and I resolve to never do that again.” Reflection Point: What do you think? How would you evaluate James’s reductio? Do you agree that determinism is inconsistent with regrets? What precisely do you think it means to regret something anyway? Can you regret something if you believe you had no choice but to do it? What about the hard-determinists’ bite the bullet response? Are regrets valuable? Would we be better off without them? What about the debate over apologies? Can you form the formal reductio objection to determinism here? How would you evaluate this reductio?  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 Part 3: Compatibilism – Having your Determinism and Freedom too The debate over determinism and freedom (and responsibility) is a deep philosophical one precisely because there are strong intuitions on both sides. The principle of universal causation is deeply ingrained in our collective notions of reason and the methods of modern science. Conversely, the belief that at least under normal circumstances individuals are free to make voluntary decisions and as a result are morally responsible for their conduct is also deeply etched into our psyches. (Note, under determinism, there are causal explanations for why “we” don’t believe in determinism.) Hence, it’s worth looking more closely at compatibilism (or “soft-determinism”). Compatibilists affirm that hard-determinists and libertarians are both right and both wrong. According to compatibilists, hard- determinists are correct in affirming everything is caused (including human decisions), while libertarians are correct in affirming that, under normal circumstances, individuals are free and responsible. Where both these diametrically opposed philosophical positions err, according to compatibilists, is in affirming that these positions are incompatible – that one must be EITHER a determinist or a proponent of freedom. Compatibilists affirm that this is a false choice or false dichotomy: causation or freedom. “Compatibilists” affirm, “freedom is compatible with universal causation/ determinism” – that’s pretty straightforward. But, don’t get mislead by the term that’s often used as a synonym for “compatibilism”, “soft- determinism”. “Soft-determinism” sounds like “partial” or “semi-“ determinism, but this isn’t the idea. “Soft- “determinists are not “partial” or “wishy-washy” determinism; they don’t affirm that determinism applies to everything except human decisions. Soft-determinism (i.e., compatibilists) affirm EVERY EVENT has a cause, including all human actions and decisions; soft-determinists are FULL determinists.  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 This means that compatibilists accept that, given the state of the universe prior to an event, there is one unique causal outcome of that event. Everything that happens had to happen; nothing could have been otherwise (given the antecedent causes and conditions). Hence, compatibilists agree with hard- determinists that (given the prior state of the universal and relevant causal laws) no one “could have done otherwise”. There are causal forces which explain every event in the universe, including every human decision (perhaps with the exception of some randomness at the quantum level). So, how according to compatibilists can anyone ever be free is everything is determined and “no one could have done otherwise”? Well, unsurprisingly, it comes down to the meaning of “free”. Compatibilists agree with hard-determinists that no one is free in the “contra-causal sense of free”. Contra-causal Freedom (CCF), denied by all determinists & affirmed by Libertarians: = metaphysical (/ strong) freedom of choice/ free will = the ability to perform an action and the ability to refrain from performing it = the (unexercised) ability to “have done otherwise” than you in fact did All determinists agree that, given the state of the universe prior to any action or decision we make (i.e., given all the antecedent causes and conditions), we could not have done or decided otherwise. This is precisely why hard-determinists claim we aren’t free. But, this doesn’t mean we aren’t free, according to compatibilists, because compatibilists think that to be free means something else. Reflection Point: What do you think? Pause for a second and reflect on what you think  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 it means to be “free”? What does it mean to say that you made a free decision or acted freely? Well, again unsurprisingly, there are different compatibilists – each with their own alternative definition of “free”. What they all agree to is that being free is compatible with being caused and, hence, freedom doesn’t mean having the (unexercised) ability to have done otherwise. I want to focus here (again) on one of the first western philosophers to argue for compatibilism, the brilliant 17th century Scottish philosopher, David Hume, and the English philosopher who strongly influenced him John Locke. For Further Study (e.g., if you are planning to write a paper on this topic): ▪ Locke, “On Power”, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk II, Chapter 21 (in, MP 301-310) ▪ Hume: “Of Liberty and Necessity”, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Sec VIII (in MP 522-532) http://web.mnstate.edu/gracyk/courses/phil%20101/Hume%20Section%20VIII.htm Hume wrote that the problem of free will and determinism was, “the most contentious question of metaphysics”, but surprisingly insistent that the two sides could be easily “reconciled” – “it will not require many words to prove that mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of liberty as well as the doctrine of necessity, and that the whole dispute… has been up to now merely verbal.” That is – the problem merely rested on an improper understanding of the word “free” (i.e., in terms of CCF). Hence, Hume’s reconciliation amounted to revealing that this was not the sense of “free” that ordinary people (i.e., non-philosophers) care about when they talk about and fight for “freedom” or “liberty”. What do ordinary people care about? What is this ordinary sense of freedom”? Hume tells us, “By liberty..., we can only mean a power of acting or not acting according to the determinations of the will – that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we may also. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains.” At first glance, this may seem to be no different than the contra-causal sense of “free”. But, be sure to study this definition carefully. Hume isn’t saying that the will is free to choose between real alternatives. He is merely claiming that someone is free when they can do what they will; that is –  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 You are free, if you can do what you want. Hard-determinists (and Libertarians) are concerned over where one’s “wants” come from, over why we want or decided what we do – do our wants come to us “freely” or are they the product of internal and external causes (nature and nurture)? But, Hume asserts this whole debate is irrelevant to the concerns of the average person – normal people don’t care about why they want what they do or about the causes behind their decisions; they just know they want what they want. And, if they can do what they want, then they are free; at least, in the sense that they care about. It is the absence of external constraints preventing individuals from doing what they want that real people (i.e., non-philosophers) care about and fight for. Real people feel their freedom has been lost when external powers (e.g., “authorities and governments) prevent them from doing something they want to do; for example, I want to stay up late, but my parents won’t let me. I want to leave this prison but the guards won’t let me. We want to practice our religion, but the king won’t let us. I want to express my beliefs, but the school won’t allow it. I want to get a divorce and marry someone else, but that is illegal. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eBShN8qT4lk In all these cases, individuals feel as if they are not free because some external force is preventing them from realizing or expressing a desire of theirs. Let’s consider a few cases in some detail –  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 A prisoner who wants to leave their cell isn’t free; it doesn’t matter why they want to leave their cell; it doesn’t matter if their “want” was causally determined. All that matters with respect to their freedom in this case, are the bars and the guards preventing them from doing what they want. Here’s another case - the colonial pilgrims wanted to practice their religion, but they were denied this right in England – so, they ventured to America where they could worship freely. They weren’t free in England, because they couldn’t do what they wanted there; they were free in America, because they could. Note – hard-determinists would point out that there were causal forces which explain where, why, and how the pilgrims’ beliefs and values originated, but this causal background is irrelevant to whether or not they are free, in the sense they care about.  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 Here’s one more case – consider gay marriage. Until recently (2015 in all states), homosexual couples who wanted to marry couldn’t. They weren’t free to do so, but now they are. They are free, because they can do what they want. It doesn’t matter (in this regard), why they want what they do; it doesn’t matter why they want to marry or whether or not homosexuality is a choice or not. All that matter, regarding their freedom, is that that wanted to be able to do something, but they couldn’t before and can now – now they are free (in this respect). So, freedom requires the ability to do what you want, and this requires the absence of external constrains (like bars, guards, walls, laws, and guns). The sense of “free” is often called by philosophers, the political sense of freedom or the basic compatibilist sense. Political sense of freedom or the basic compatibilist sense = the ability to do what you want, without external constraints. According to Hume, it is this sense of “freedom” that real people care about and fight for. Beyond Locke’s Locked Room But, it’s a little more complicated (it usually is) – there’s a little more to Hume’s full account. Hume recognized people want to be able to do what they want and hence that we associated freedom with the absence of external constraints. But, our sense of our own freedom (and definitely our sense of the freedom of our society) can also be enhanced when there are no external constraints that would prevent us from performing actions which we don’t (currently) want to perform. Say, for example, a prisoner wanted to stay in their cell (for whatever reason), perhaps they don’t even realize that the only door to the room they are in is locked are they are (currently) perfectly happy in the – this is scenario is referred to as “Locke’s locked room”. They would be free in the political sense, but we may still consider they prisoners who have had their freedom restricted, because – They couldn’t leave, IF THEY WANTED TO.  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 This is the “hypothetical” (or conditional) sense of ‘free’ that Hume mentions. No prisoner is free (in this sense), since there are external constraints which would prevent them from leaving if they wanted to. Similarly, I don’t clearly want to change my religion and become say a Jehovah’s Witness. But, IF I wanted to, I would be able to (in America). And, I don’t want to get a divorce (and I do not envision that I will want to get one), but it does enhance my sense of freedom to know - IF I WANTED TO get a divorce, then no external force would prevent me (i.e., it is legal). Moreover, even if I did get a divorce, I don’t envision that I would change my sexual identification and suddenly want to marry my best friend, Bob; but IF I wanted to do that too, I could. Keep in mind that Hume is a full determinist, hence he acknowledges that my current desire not to get a divorce (and marry Bob) is the causal result of forces beyond my control. And, hence, given these forces and my circumstances I COULD NOT HAVE WANTED ANYTHING DIFFERENT. But, we can imagine things were different and I did have these desires. And, these conditional facts reveal that we have more freedom in present-day America than in people did in the past or than people living in other countries. So, under Hume’s Compatibilist sense of “free”, an individual, S, is free when: 1. S can do what she wants (i.e., there are no external constraints preventing S from doing what she wants). 2. IF S had wanted to do otherwise (than she in fact did), then she would have done otherwise (i.e., there would have been no external constraints preventing S from doing otherwise). Note that Hume’s view can explain the intuitive lack of freedom of: ▪ A prisoner who wants out but is prevented (“barred”) from leaving; and even a prisoner who wants to stay in their prison, since they couldn’t leave, IF THEY WANTED TO ▪ someone being threatened or coerced; for example, someone who gives their wallet to a mugger, since they couldn’t refrain from giving up their wallet, IF THEY WANTED TO ▪ Citizens of a free/ open society whose laws allow them to engage in a wide range of activities regardless of their (current) desires. Sounds good – Hume definitely identified an important sense of freedom. But, is it all we ever care about? What about the Libertarian worry that, under determinism, we are all just puppets or slaves to the forces that are causally responsible for producing our beliefs, values, and desires that make us want what we do and decide what we do.  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 If you want a coke, you might feel free if you can get one; say there’s a working, full vending machine nearby and you have enough money in your pocket. But, the Coca-Cola corporation has spent a lot of money fostering that desire within you (over $4 billion annually in advertising alone). Are we free, if we our very desires are being manipulated by powerful forces, like the Coca-Cola Corporation? Aren’t we all just like brainwash victims? The Brainwash Victim Objection 1. All my wants are causally determined. 2. If all my wants are determined, then I am relevantly like a brainwash victim. 3. But, brainwash victims are not free. 4. Therefore, I am not free. Hume, it would seem, would bite the bullet here; insisting that brainwash victims can be free, if no one is preventing them from doing what they want. So - It doesn’t matter if the hypnotist caused you to want to act like a chicken, Hume has to admit this person is free as long as no one is preventing you from acting like a chicken and no one would force you to act like a chicken (say by gun point) if the hypnosis didn’t work and you didn’t want to.  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 Reflection Point: Is this argument’s inference valid? How would a Hard-determinist evaluate it? How would you assess the argument? What do you make of Hume’s bullet biting here? Do you think brainwash victims are free? Why (not)? Try to rephrase the argument as a straightforward reductio objection (with just two premises) Hume’s Compatibilist Responsibility I noted that compatibilists affirm both that freedom and responsibility are compatible with determinism. We’ve seen Hume’s compatibilist take on freedom, but how can individuals be morally responsible for their actions if determinism is correct? Surely brainwash victims aren’t responsible for their actions (are they?) and if we are relevantly similar to them (under determinism), then it would seem we can’t be responsible for our actions either. Reflection Point: See if you can place this argument by analogy in standard form. And then consider how Hume would respond to it and offer your own assessment of it. Recall, the responsibility reductio in standard form – The Responsibility Reductio: 1. If determinism is correct, then no one is (morally) responsible for their actions (since no one could have done otherwise). 2. But, People are morally responsible for their actions. So, 3. determinism is not correct. While hard-determinists bite the bullet here and deny that anyone is morally responsible for anything. Hume denied the implication, affirming that individuals can be held morally responsible for their actions even if they had to perform them (i.e., even if they couldn’t have done otherwise). Once again, Hume’s reconciliation rests on a reinterpretation of the key concept, in this case “responsibility”. For Hume, Responsibility is a matter of praise and blame. Moral responsibility was simply a matter of praise and blame and ascribing praise and blame for an action was simply an expression of approval or disapproval. According to Hume, in praising you for an act, I am merely conveying my approval of it (perhaps in the hope of encouraging you or others to repeat it). And we can definitely still approve and disapprove of people’s actions whether or not these actions are causally determined by forces beyond the subject’s control. To praise a child for being polite is, according to Hume, simply an expression of approval. Conversely, to blame a criminal for their crime is, according to Hume, simply an expression of disapproval. Ok, but what about premeditated crimes? In our criminal justice system, crimes committed with forethought and planning on thought to be more clearly voluntary than crimes of passion, for example. If  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 you plan a crime you clearly chose it. But, not according to Hume or any other determinist; according to determinists, no crime if ever freely chosen (in the contra-causal sense), whether planned or committed in the heat of passion. So, why hold criminals who premeditate to be any more responsible than those who don’t; why punish them more severely? Here’s a version of this concern in standard form - The Premeditation Reductio Objection 1. If determinism is true, then a criminal who premeditates before committing their crime is no more responsible for their crime and should not be treated any more severely, then criminals who do not. 2. But, criminals whose crimes are premeditated are more responsible than those who do not and should be sentenced more severely. Therefore, 3. Determinism is not correct. Reflection Point: ▪ What do you make of this objection? ▪ Many students want to bite the bullet on this one. Do you? Be sure you can explain what this means. While some hard-determinists might bite the bullet here, Hume responded to this reductio by denying the implication. He maintained that we can hold someone who deliberates and commits a crime more responsible (i.e., sentence them some severely) than someone who does not, even though both were “determined” to do so (& thus, could not have done otherwise), since those who deliberate prior to committing a crime, “reveal their character to be more deeply flawed.” In other words, such individuals are a greater danger to the rest of us and, hence, the forward-looking criminal justice concern of social defense justifies more severe measures in their case. Beyond Politics – Contemporary Compatibilism Ok, Hume accounts for a popular political sense of freedom. And, he can account for common sense uses of free, including: People in prison are less free than people out of prison People are less free under Totalitarian governments than liberal democracies. He does this by focusing his definition on “the absence of external constraints”, but sometimes the forces that inhibit our freedom appear to be internal. Hence, many contemporary compatibilists insist that Hume’s compatibilist definition of freedom is too narrow. Reflection Point: Testing Hume Consider the following cases, Hume would argue that in each of these cases the individual is free – but would do you think? A mentally ill person with an uncontrollable compulsion which they frequently act on. An agoraphobic with a strong fear of going outside (and strong desire to stay  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 inside) who, in fact, spends their entire life in their house A brainwashed victim whose been given an overwhelming desire to walk and cluck like a chicken, and is currently doing so. A drug addict who frequently uses Contemporary Compatibilists object that Hume’s definition does not account for internal constraints which influence one’s will (e.g., compulsions, additions, and phobias). To solve address this short-coming, these new compatibilists have sought a more inclusive compatibilist definition of freedom. Here’s one example from modern psychiatry. The Contemporary Psychiatric Sense of Free Under this modern psychiatric definition, a subject is said to be “free” or acting freely when: = their will (i.e., deliberating faculty) is functioning properly. Sounds good, but when is one’s will “functioning properly”? One standard psychiatrists use is “when your decisions which are not harmful to oneself or others.” Under this standard, free acts are healthy acts and forced acts aren’t healthy.  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 Here’s one more contemporary compatibilist idea. Some contemporary compatibilists have sought to expand Hume’s standard by introducing the idea of “second order desires”. A second order desire is a desire to have or not have a desire. For example, desiring to exercise is a first order (or primary) desire. In contrast, desiring to desire to exercise is a second order desire. Craving a cigarette is a first order desire, wanting not to crave cigarettes is a second order desire. Second order desires are weird things. To even formulate one means that something weird is going on. If you can’t realize a second order desire right away, then you might not feel free. People that under the grip of an addiction or a phobia or another mental disorder generally have second order desires. Let’s take one case – let’s say my wife is an agoraphobic (i.e., she suffers from a fear of being outside) and as a result she always wants to stay indoors. But, she doesn’t like this condition of hers and she wishes that she wanted to go outside (i.e., she has a second order desire). In this scenario, my wife’s free in Hume’s sense, since she can do what she wants (i.e., stay inside) and IF she wanted to do otherwise, no external constraint would prevent her (i.e., no one would prevent her from going outside IF she wanted).  Dr. Daniel Zelinski: The Challenge of Philosophy – Chapter 6 So, if we want to say that my wife (and agoraphobics in general) are not free, then we need to go beyond Hume’s definition. Adding that to be really free requires the absence of both external and internal constraints (like unrealized second-order desires) could do the trick – at least, according to contemporary compatibilists. For contemporary compatibilists, freedom requires the ability to realize “second order desires” = the ability to want what you want (i.e., the absence of internal constrains, addictions or compulsions, preventing the efficacy of second order desires). Reflection Point: what do you think? Do you agree with contemporary compatibilists that those who suffer from mental disorders, like anxieties, compulsions, and phobias aren’t free? Addendum - The Costs and Benefits of “belief in Free will” So, all determinists agree that the retributive sense of justice as deserved punishment lacks any empirical foundation, since every criminal was causally determined to commit their crime(s) by forces beyond their control (including both biological and environmental causal factors). Nevertheless, some determinists (including philosopher, Daniel Dennett) argue that the retributive system of punishment is extremely useful for keeping crime in check and that giving it up (and treating crime purely as a disease) would have disastrous consequences. Note – assuming the belief that deserved punishment (and, hence, “contra-causal freedom”) has these benefits, this is a weird sort of justification for it. It is not a scientific argument that it is true, but a pragmatic or moral that we should continue to affirm it because it is a “useful fiction”. Needless to say, the topic of the costs and benefits of the “belief in free will” and “deserved punishment” is a contentious one. Here’s a summary of the contemporary debate - http://www.naturalism.org/philosophy/free-will/free-will-roundup