Ontology and Epistemology PDF

Ontology Refers to the nature or object of social reality (about what can be known) Ontos - (relates to being , to what is , to what exists ) Key question: What is the nature of the reality being investigated? What exists that we might acquire knowledge of? Broad ontological positions ...

Ontology Refers to the nature or object of social reality (about what can be known) Ontos - (relates to being , to what is , to what exists ) Key question: What is the nature of the reality being investigated? What exists that we might acquire knowledge of? Broad ontological positions  Foundationalism/objectivism ○ A real world exists outside of our knowledge of it. Reality is not simply what we make of it. ○ Positing the existence of objective, absolute, and unconditional truths Broad ontological positions Foundationalism/objectivism ○ A real world exists outside of our knowledge of it. Reality is not simply what we make of it. ○ Positing the existence of objective, absolute, and unconditional truths Broad ontological positions Anti-foundationalism/constructivism/relativism ○ Realities are actively constructed through the interactions of agents and structures. ○ Realities are local and specific, varying between individuals and groups. Epistemology The process or act of knowing or acquiring knowledge (about what can be known, and who can be a knower) Epistēmē (relating to knowledge) Key question: What can we (hope to) know about the reality being investigated? Epistemology  The process or act of knowing or acquiring knowledge (about what can be known, and who can be a knower) Epistēmē (relating to knowledge) Key question: What can we (hope to) know about the reality being investigated? Broad epistemological positions Scientific ○ Empirical tradition (reality can best be apprehended via the senses) ○ What we can know about reality are causal laws supplying generalizable and objective explanations to the reality being studied. Social science as (generally) analogous to natural science ○ Identification of causes of social behavior, and emphasis on explanation ○ Objective, detached observer Broad epistemological positions Hermeneutic ○ Focus: meanings of behavior  What we can hope to know about reality are meanings attached by those who live in or with said reality. ○ Emphasis on understanding (significations and meanings) ○ Observer is involved in what is being observed (double hermeneutic)  This is because the observer is implicated in the meaning-making process (at the level of the subjects of the research and at the level of the investigator with respect to the subjects) ○ Social science is not analogous to natural science. Determining ontological and epistemological positions Is there a single, objective reality to all which can be objectively measured Is there a “real” world out there independent of our knowledge to it? Or is reality subjective, multiple, socially constructed, and therefore interpreted differently?  Can an observer identify “real” or “objective” relations between social phenomena? To the extent that we can establish “real” relationships between social phenomena, can we do this simply through direct observation, or are there some relationships which “exist” but are not directly observable? Methodology  Bridges ontological and epistemological assumptions/positions to the choice of data collection as well as analysis of methods and procedures Key question: How do we go about acquiring the knowledge of the reality being investigated?  Methodological positions are distinct, yet related with one’s ontological and epistemological positions. Epistemological positions (POLSC) Positivism ○ Foundational ontology: The world exists independently of our knowledge of it ○ Natural science and social science are broadly analogous Establishing regular relationships between social phenomena, using theory to generate hypotheses, which can be tested via direct observation The world is “what-you-see-is-what-you-get” (WYSIWYG) Belief in the neutral, objective observer Epistemological positions (POLSC) Positivism ○ Aim of social science: Crafting of causal statements explaining the relationships between social phenomena crucial to predicting and controlling forces that surround us. These posit a dichotomy between empirical and normative questions.  Empirical questions - questions of what is Normative questions - questions about what should be Epistemological positions (POLSC) Positivism ○ Karl Popper’s critique of positivism: logic of falsification The progress of science is hypothetico-deductive Science and knowledge progress by advancing hypotheses, making deductions from them, and using observations and experiments continually to test these deductions until they are falsified, then revising the hypotheses to cope with the falsification. Epistemological positions (POLSC) Positivism ○ Karl Popper’s critique of positivism: logic of falsification  We do not collect facts neither do we gather unbiased observations, but interpret our observations in light of biases, preconceptions, hypotheses, and theories. Observation is theory-laden (there will always be hypothesis implicit or explicit in observation. Facts and observations are open to interpretation in light of a different theory. Deductions from a theory, even if satisfied now, may not always be satisfied. Epistemological positions (POLSC) Positivism ○ Critique of positivism: Irreconcilable differences between social and natural/physical phenomena The way agents understand and put meaning to social structures affect the very reality of said structures. Social structures, unlike natural structures, do not exist independently of the activities they govern  Social structures, unlike natural structures, do not exist independently of the agents’ conceptions of what they are doing in their activity Social structures, unlike natural structures, may only be relatively enduring (so that the tendencies they may ground may not be universal in the sense of space-time-invariant) Epistemological positions (POLSC) Positivism ○ Critique of positivism: Irreconcilable differences between social and natural/physical phenomena The way agents understand and put meaning to social structures affect the very reality of said structures. Social structures, unlike natural structures, do not exist independently of the activities they govern Social structures, unlike natural structures, do not exist independently of the agents’ conceptions of what they are doing in their activity  Social structures, unlike natural structures, may only be relatively enduring (so that the tendencies they may ground may not be universal in the sense of space-time-invariant) Epistemological positions (POLSC) Critical realism ○ Foundational ontology: reality is independent of our knowledge. ○ Crafting causal statements about social phenomena is possible. However, critical realists believe reality is not always what it seems. ○ Dichotomy between reality and appearance There are deep structures that cannot be observed and what can be observed may offer a false picture of those phenomena/structures and their effects Knowledge, therefore, is theoretically-laden. Theory is always for someone and for some purpose. Epistemological positions (POLSC)  Interpretivism ○ Anti-foundational ontology: The world is socially or discursively constructed. Reality is best apprehended through intersubjective agreement. ○ Interpretations/understandings of social phenomena affect outcomes. ○ Knowledge is theoretically or discursively-laden ○ Double hermeneutic: The world is interpreted by the actors (first level) and their interpretations are interpreted by the observer (second level) Meta-theoretical issues WORK IN SOCIETY WORK IN SOCIETY Meta-theoretical issues Structure vs agency Material vs ideational factors Marsh: More modern scholars would view these issues as dualities not dualisms, while also emphasizing the dialectical approaches to these relationships. Meta-theoretical issues Structure vs agency Material vs ideational factors Marsh: More modern scholars would view these issues as dualities not dualisms, while also emphasizing the dialectical approaches to these relationships. Approaches Giddens’ structuration theory ○ Structure and agency are a duality because they are interdependent and internally related. One cannot see the effect of both structure and agency at the same time. ○ Hay’s critique: This approach is not dialectical as it does not allow us from studying the relationship between the two, and in empirical terms, it tends to favor agency. Approaches Archer’s morphogenetic approach ○ There is an ontological and an analytical distinction between structure and agency, and that both work in different ways. ○ Three-phase cycle of change T1: structural conditioning from a pre-existing context within which action occurs and affects agents’ interests. T2 and T3: Social interaction. Agents are influenced by structural conditions at T1, but can also affect outcomes using “abilities” to forward their interests. T4: Due to the actions at T2 and T3, the structural conditions are either changed (morphogenesis) or not (morphostasis). T4 is the starting point of the next cycle. Approaches Archer’s morphogenetic approach ○ Hay’s critique: Structure and agents are only analytically separate. He takes issue with her view that structure pre-dates agency. For him, Archer and Giddens present an agent-centered, individualistic view of morphogenesis. Approaches Hay’s strategic-relational approach ○ Structure and agency are analytically related, co-constitutive, co-exist, and cannot be temporally separated. ○ Neither agents nor structures are real, as their existence is relational and cannot exist in isolation from each other. ○ The core of this approach is the interaction between strategic actors and the strategic context within which they find themselves. Agents are conscious, reflexive, and strategic, in which their actions change the structured context and contribute to their strategic position (structure holds no independent causal power). ○ Marsh’s critique: This approach cannot be dialectical. Approaches Hay’s strategic-relational approach ○ Structure and agency are analytically related, co-constitutive, co-exist, and cannot be temporally separated. ○ Neither agents nor structures are real, as their existence is relational and cannot exist in isolation from each other. ○ The core of this approach is the interaction between strategic actors and the strategic context within which they find themselves. Agents are conscious, reflexive, and strategic, in which their actions change the structured context and contribute to their strategic position (structure holds no independent causal power). ○ Marsh’s critique: This approach cannot be dialectical. Approaches Marsh’s conceptualization of a dialectical structure/agency relationship: ○ Structures provide the context within which agents act. These structures are both material and ideational. ○ Agents have preferences/objectives which they attempt to forward. ○ Agents interpret the context within which they act, a context which is structural and strategic. ○ However, these structures can have subconscious effects on agents. ○ In acting, agents change the structures. ○ These structures then provide the context within which agents act in the next iteration. Bourdieu and Habitus  Habitus is defined as the socially acquired and culturally embodied systems of predispositions, tendencies, or inclinations. ○ These are “deep structural” propensities, involving both classification and assessment and they are embodied in all aspects of life.  The social construction of reality is structured, as all our cognitive structures have social origins inscribed in the habitus. Thin and thick constructivism For Hay, both thick and thin constructivism see the relationship between the material and the ideational as dialectical. ○ Thick constructivism favors ideational factors and constitutive logics. ○ Thin constructivism favors material factors and causal logics. Thin and thick constructivism  For Hay, both thick and thin constructivism see the relationship between the material and the ideational as dialectical. ○ Thick constructivism favors ideational factors and constitutive logics. ○ Thin constructivism favors material factors and causal logics. Hay’s constructivist institutionalism Response to the limitations of historical institutionalism Actors are strategic, seeking to realize certain complex, contingent and changing goals. They act within contexts favoring some strategies over others. Ideas matter as they guide action. Interests are social constructs and not rooted in material difference The functionality/dysfunctionality of institutions/structures is an ope question in historical and empirical terms. Hay’s constructivist institutionalism Focus on ideational and institutional path dependence Aim is to identify, detail, and interrogate the extent to which throug processes of normalization and institutional embedding, establishe ideas become codified, serving as cognitive filters through which actors come to interpret environmental signals. Change occurs in the context which is structured in ways facilitatin certain forms of intervention while militating against others. ○ Access to strategic resources and knowledge of the institutional environment is limited. Stability and change Positions on the relationship between stability and change are root in different conceptualizations of time. Approaches: ○ Hay’s linear approach ○ Tomkiss’ non-linear approach ○ Flexi-time model Stability and change Hay’s linear approach ○ A significant amount of institutional change occurs within short bursts of time, but there are extended periods of relative stasis after bursts. ○ Punctuated equilibrium [evolution]: a discontinuous conception of time where periods of comparative modest institutional change are interrupted by more rapid and intense moments of transformation. Stability and change Tomkiss’ non-linear approach ○ Draws on the poststructural and Foucauldian tradition  Highlights the discontinuity of social change which seriously challenges the notion of historical explanation in social science ○ Change is arbitrary, accidental, or unpredictable, as well as ubiquitous and untheorizable. Stability and change Flexi-time approach ○ Bates’ circadian conception of time: time is both linear and cyclical. “Circadian” refers to openness to variation rather than sameness, invariant repetition, and fixed accuracy.  Change is context-based, multidimensional, and capable of different interpretations. ○ Adam: natural time is characterized in terms of a series of many intersecting spirals where linear, irreversible processes fold back on themselves in multiple feedback cycles.  Change is ubiquitous as these processes never merely reproduce. The degree of change varies depending on the context. Punctuated evolution model What causes the rapid change? ○ Hay: Crisis and how that crisis is narrated leads to radical change. ○ Normal period of policymaking vs radical/exceptional institutional innovation both stemming from a successful crisis narrative Normal: Responses to policy problems occur largely among policy elites operating within a given set of values and a particular definition of the problem (with strategic learning). The outcome is policy evolution within these parameters. Radical: Policy elites have no control of the problem definition. Their perceptions of the issue may change. The problem is clearly visible and broadly aired. If a successful crisis narrative is developed/believed, this leads to a “paradigm shift” and significant policy change. Punctuated evolution model  Marsh’s response: Hay’s model has two issues: ○ Hay treats stability and change as a dualism and focuses too heavily on change. ○ His empirical analyses privilege agency over structure and the material over the ideational. Punctuated evolution model On the spatial dimension ○ Bates and Smith: Empirical mapping over theoretical modelling, in which the former emphasizes the complex relationship between stability and change, while also suggesting that change has a spatial dimension. For them, Hay’s model is unidimensional and is cast in terms of a dualism. Punctuated evolution model Marsh’s response: The stability/change relationship is better viewe a duality. ○ Change and stability often co-exist in different spheres/policy- areas ○ The stability/change relationship is interactive and iterative. Punctuated evolution model Marsh’s response: The stability/change relationship is better viewe a duality. ○ Change and stability often co-exist in different spheres/policy- areas