ANNEX Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships v.4 PDF

THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS Produced and supported by BIMCO, Chamber of Shipping of America, Digital Containership Association, International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO), InterManager, International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO), International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), International Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI), Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF), Superyacht Builders Association (Sybass) and World Shipping Council (WSC) v4 The Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships Version 4 Terms of use The advice and information given in this publication is intended purely as guidance to be used at the user’s own risk. No warranties or representations are given, nor is any duty of care or responsibility accepted by the authors, their membership or employees of any person, firm, corporation or organisation (who or which has been in any way concerned with the furnishing of information or data, or the compilation or any translation, publishing, or supply of this publication) for the accuracy of any information or advice given in this publication; or any omission from the guidelines or for any consequence whatsoever resulting directly or indirectly from compliance with adoption of or reliance on guidance contained in this publication, even if caused by a failure to exercise reasonable care on the part of any of the aforementioned parties. Contents Introduction............................................................................................................................................................. 1 1 Cyber security and risk management.............................................................................................................. 3 1.1 Cyber security characteristics of the maritime industry.......................................................................................... 3 1.2 Senior management involvement........................................................................................................................... 6 1.3 Roles, responsibilities, and tasks............................................................................................................................. 7 1.4 Differences between IT and OT systems.................................................................................................................. 7 1.5 Plans and procedures.............................................................................................................................................. 8 1.6 Relationship between shipowner and ship manager.............................................................................................. 9 1.7 Relationship between the shipowner and the agent............................................................................................ 10 1.8 Relationship with vendors and other external parties.......................................................................................... 10 2 Identify threats............................................................................................................................................. 12 2.1 Threat actors......................................................................................................................................................... 12 2.2 Types of cyber threats.......................................................................................................................................... 13 2.3 Stages of a cyber incident..................................................................................................................................... 14 2.4 Quantifying the threat........................................................................................................................................... 15 3 Identify vulnerabilities.................................................................................................................................. 17 3.1 Common vulnerabilities........................................................................................................................................ 17 3.2 IT and OT systems’ documentation....................................................................................................................... 17 3.3 Typical vulnerable systems.................................................................................................................................... 18 3.4 Ship to shore interface.......................................................................................................................................... 19 3.5 Ship visits............................................................................................................................................................... 20 3.6 Remote access....................................................................................................................................................... 20 3.7 System and software maintenance....................................................................................................................... 21 4 Assessing the likelihood................................................................................................................................ 22 4.1 Likelihood as the product of threat and vulnerability.......................................................................................... 22 4.2 Quantifying the likelihood..................................................................................................................................... 22 5 Impact assessment....................................................................................................................................... 23 5.1 The CIA model....................................................................................................................................................... 23 5.2 Quantifying the impact.......................................................................................................................................... 23 5.3 “Critical” equipment and technical systems.......................................................................................................... 24 6 Risk assessment........................................................................................................................................... 26 6.1 Relationship between factors influencing risk....................................................................................................... 26 6.2 The four phases of a risk assessment.................................................................................................................... 26 6.3 Third party risk assessments................................................................................................................................. 29 7 Develop protection measures....................................................................................................................... 30 7.1 Defence in depth and in breadth........................................................................................................................... 30 7.2 Technical protection measures.............................................................................................................................. 31 7.3 Procedural protection measures........................................................................................................................... 34 8 Develop detection measures........................................................................................................................ 40 8.1 Detection, blocking and alerts............................................................................................................................... 40 8.2 Malware detection................................................................................................................................................ 40 9 Establish contingency plans.......................................................................................................................... 41 10 Respond to and recover from cyber security incidents.................................................................................. 43 10.1 Effective response................................................................................................................................................. 43 10.2 The four phases of incident response................................................................................................................... 43 10.3 Recovery plan........................................................................................................................................................ 45 10.4 Data recovery capability........................................................................................................................................ 45 10.5 Investigating cyber incidents................................................................................................................................. 45 10.6 Losses arising from a cyber incident...................................................................................................................... 46 ANNEX 1 Target systems, equipment and technologies................................................................................................ 48 ANNEX 2 Cyber risk management and the safety management system........................................................................ 50 ANNEX 3 Onboard networks....................................................................................................................................... 54 ANNEX 4 Glossary....................................................................................................................................................... 58 ANNEX 5 Contributors to most recent revision of this publication............................................................................... 61 THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS V4 Contents Introduction The purpose of these guidelines is to improve the safety and security of seafarers, the environment, the cargo, and the ships. The guidelines aim to assist in the development of a proper cyber risk management strategy in accordance with relevant regulations and best practises on board a ship with a focus on work processes, equipment, training, incident response and recovery management. Shipping is relying increasingly on digital solutions for the completion of everyday tasks. The rapid developments within information technology, data availability, the speed of processing and data transfer present shipowners and other players in the maritime industry with increased possibilities for operational optimisation, cost savings, safety improvements and a more sustainable business. However, these developments to a large extent rely on increased connectivity often via internet between servers, IT systems and OT systems1, which increases the potential cyber vulnerabilities and risks. The guidelines explain why and how cyber risks should be managed in a shipping context. The supporting documentation required to conduct a risk assessment is listed and the risk assessment process is outlined with an explanation of the part played by each component of cyber risk. This publication highlights the importance of evaluating the likelihood and threat in addition to the impact and vulnerabilities when conducting a cyber risk assessment. Finally, this publication offers advice on how to respond to and recover from cyber incidents. Approaches to cyber risk management will be company and ship specific but should be guided by the requirements of relevant national, international and flag state regulations and guidelines. In 2017, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted resolution MSC.428(98) on Maritime Cyber Risk Management in Safety Management System (SMS). The resolution stated that an approved SMS should consider cyber risk management in accordance with the objectives and functional requirements of the (International Safety Management) ISM Code. It further encourages administrations to ensure that cyber risks are appropriately addressed in SMS no later than the first annual verification of the company’s Document of Compliance (DoC) after 1 January 2021. The same year, IMO developed guidelines2 that provide high-level recommendations on maritime cyber risk management to safeguard shipping from current and emerging cyber threats and vulnerabilities. As also highlighted in the IMO guidelines, effective cyber risk management should start at the senior management level. Senior management should embed a culture of cyber risk management into all levels and departments of an organisation and ensure a holistic and flexible cyber risk governance regime, which is in continuous operation and constantly evaluated through effective feedback mechanisms. In addition to the IMO resolution, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework Version 1.1 (April 2018) has also been taken into account in the development of these guidelines. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework assists companies with their approach to risk assessments by helping them understand an effective approach to manage potential cyber risks both internally and externally. As a result of applying the Framework, a “profile” is developed, which can help to identify and prioritise actions for reducing cyber risks. The profile can also be used as a tool for aligning policy, business and technological decisions to manage the risks. Sample framework profiles are publicly available for maritime bulk liquid transfer, offshore, and 1 Operational Technology (OT) systems include hardware and software which monitor and/or control physical devices, processes, and events. Information Technology (IT) systems include hardware and software which manages data (ie IT systems do not control physical devices, processes, or events). 2 MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3 on Guidelines on maritime cyber risk management. THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS V4 1 passenger ship operations3. These profiles were created by the United States Coast Guard and NIST’s National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence with input from industry stakeholders. The NIST’s profiles can be used together with these guidelines to assist industry in assessing, prioritizing, and mitigating their cyber risks. Guidelines are also available from other associations, such as the Digital Container Shipping Association’s (DCSA) “DCSA Implementation Guide for Cyber Security on Vessels v1.0”. The DCSA’s guidelines are based on an analysis of version 3 of these guidelines and the NIST framework. While the target audience for DCSA’s guidelines is the container industry, other segments of shipping may also find them worthwhile to read. The International Association for Classification Societies (IACS) has issued a “Recommendation on Cyber Resilience (No. 166)”. This recommendation consolidates IACS’ previous 12 recommendations related to cyber resilience (Nos. 153 to 164) and applies to the use of computer-based systems, which provide control, alarm, monitoring, safety or internal communication functions that are subject to the requirements of a classification society. The IACS recommendation applies to newbuild ships only but can also serve as guidance for existing ships. In due course, IACS is expected to develop Unified Requirements, which will also apply to newbuilds only. This publication is not intended to provide a basis for, and should not be interpreted as, calling for external auditing or vetting the individual company’s and ship’s approach to cyber risk management. 3 The NIST Framework Profiles for maritime bulk liquid transfer, offshore, and passenger operations can be accessed here: https://www.nist.gov/ cyberframework. THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS V4 2 1 Cyber security and risk management 1.1 Cyber security characteristics of the maritime industry Cyber security is important because of its potential effect on personnel, the ship, environment, company, and cargo. Cyber security is concerned with the protection of IT, OT, information and data from unauthorised access, manipulation, and disruption. Cyber incidents can arise as the result of eg: a cyber security incident, which affects the availability and integrity of OT, for example corruption of chart data held in an Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) an unintended system failure occurring during software maintenance and patching, for example through the use of an infected USB drive to complete the maintenance loss of or manipulation of external sensor data, critical for the operation of a ship. This includes but is not limited to Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), of which the Global Positioning System (GPS) is the most frequently used. failure of a system due to software crashes and/or “bugs” crew interaction with phishing attempts, which is the most common attack vector by threat actors, which could lead to the loss of sensitive data and the introduction of malware to shipboard systems. The maritime industry has a range of characteristics that affect its vulnerability to cyber incidents. These include: involvement of multiple stakeholders in the operation and chartering of a ship potentially resulting in lack of accountability for the IT and OT system infrastructure and ship’s networks use of legacy IT and OT systems that are no longer supported and/or that rely on obsolete operating systems use of OT systems that cannot be patched or run anti-virus due to type approval issues ships that interface online with shoreside parties and other parts of the global supply chain ship equipment that is remotely monitored and accessed, eg by the manufacturers or support providers the sharing of business critical, data sensitive and commercially sensitive information with shore- based service providers, including marine terminals and stevedores and also, where applicable, public authorities the availability and use of computer controlled critical systems, which may not have the latest patches installed or be properly secured, for the ship’s safety and for environmental protection a cyber risk management culture that still has potential for improvement, eg through more formalised training, exercises and clarified roles and responsibilities frequently the automation system comprises of multiple sub-systems from numerous vendors that are integrated by shipyards with minimal regard to cyber issues. These elements should be considered, and relevant parts incorporated into the company cyber security policies and SMS. The growing use of comprehensive data analysis, smart ships and the “Industrial Internet of Things” (IIoT) will increase the amount of information available to threat actors and the potential attack THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS V4 Cyber security and risk management 3 surface to cyber criminals. This necessitates robust approaches to cyber risk management4. Cyber risk management should be an inherent part of a company’s safety and security culture conducive to the safe and efficient operation of the ship and be implemented at various levels of the company, including senior management ashore and onboard personnel. Cyber risk management should: identify the roles and responsibilities of users, key personnel, and management both ashore and on board identify the systems, assets, data, and capabilities that, if disrupted, could pose risks to the ship’s operations and safety implement technical and procedural measures to protect against a cyber incident, timely detection of incidents and ensure continuity of operations a contingency plan which is regularly exercised. Some aspects of cyber risk management may include commercially sensitive or confidential information, for example the cyber risk assessment and its associated hardware and software inventories and network maps. Companies should, therefore, consider protecting this information appropriately, and as far as possible, not include sensitive information in their SMS. 4 Lloyd’s Register, Qinetiq and University of Southampton, Global Marine Technology Trends 2030. THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS V4 Cyber security and risk management 4 Identify threats Understand the external cyber security threats to the ship. Understand the internal cyber security threat posed by inappropriate use and poor cyber security practices. Identify Respond to and vulnerabilities recover from cyber security incidents Develop inventories of onboard systems with direct and indirect communications links. Respond to and recover from cyber security incidents using the Understand the consequences of a contingency plan. cyber security threat on Assess the impact of the these systems. effectiveness of the Understand the capabilities response plan and and limitations of existing CYBER RISK re-assess threats and protection measures. vulnerabilities. MANAGEMENT APPROACH Assess risk exposure Establish response Determine the likelihood of plans vulnerabilities being exploited by external threats. Develop contingency plans Determine the likelihood of vulnerabilities being exposed by to effectively respond to inappropriate use. identified cyber risks. Determine the security and safety impact of any individual or combination of vulnerabilities Develop protection being exploited. and detection measures Reduce the likelihood of vulnerabilities being exploited through protection measures. Reduce the potential impact of a vulnerability being exploited. Figure 1: Cyber risk management approach as set out in the guidelines. Development, implementation, and maintenance of a cyber risk management programme in accordance with the approach in figure 1 is no small undertaking. It is, therefore, important that senior management stays engaged throughout the process to ensure that the protection and contingency planning are balanced to manage risks within an acceptable limit. Factors such as impact, likelihood, vulnerabilities, threats, capability, opportunity, and intent of malicious actors are interrelated (see figure 2) and are all relevant when assessing risk. It follows that if either of the factors is low or even zero, the same will eventually apply to the risk. It is important to emphasize that risk assessment is not a one-time activity. It must be repeated at regular intervals to assess whether threats, vulnerabilities, likelihoods, impacts and risks have changed, and if the control measures are still appropriate. THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS V4 Cyber security and risk management 5 Intent (see ch. 2) Impact (see ch. 5) Opportunity Threat Risk (see ch. 2) (see ch. 2) (see ch. 6) Likelihood (see ch. 4) Capability Vulnerability (see ch. 2) (see ch. 3) Figure 2: The relationship between different factors influencing the risk. The lines represent multiplication, ie “Likelihood” is multiplied with “Impact” to produce “Risk”. 1.2 Senior management involvement Cyber risk management should involve the senior management level of a company on an ongoing basis, instead of for example, only the ship security officer or the IT manager. There are several reasons for this: Some cyber risks have wide-ranging destructive potential to the safety of personnel and the environment as well as the performance and reputation of the company. Cyber risks are therefore not simply security challenges, but business challenges that require leadership’s involvement. Initiatives to heighten cyber security and safety may affect standard business procedures and operations by rendering them more time consuming and/or costly. It is, therefore, a senior management decision to evaluate and allocate the necessary resources to establish risk mitigation to an acceptable level of residual risk. Initiatives, which heighten cyber awareness, may change how the company interacts with unions, customers, suppliers, and authorities, and impose new requirements on the co- operation between parties. It is a senior management decision whether to drive these changes in relationships and how best to do so. The answers to the following questions may be used as a basis for informing and involving senior management about the importance of addressing cyber risks onboard ships: What assets are at risk? What is the potential impact of a cyber incident to the business, customers, partners, and stakeholders? Who has the final responsibility for cyber risk management? Are the OT systems and their working environment protected from unauthorized access and changes? Is there remote access to the OT systems and, if so, how is it monitored and protected? Are the IT systems protected and is access being monitored and managed? What cyber risk management best practices are being used? What is the cyber risk training level of the personnel operating the IT and OT systems? Based on the answers, the company should describe and delegate authority as appropriate, and allocate the resources needed to develop and maintain suitable solutions based on the risk assessment results. THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS V4 Cyber security and risk management 6 1.3 Roles, responsibilities, and tasks Effective cyber risk management relies on a clear allocation of responsibilities and tasks within the company. Cyber risk management is an integral part of ship management and ship operation, and different employees have different roles, responsibilities, and tasks. Furthermore, in some companies, some roles, responsibilities, and tasks are outsourced to third parties. The various responsibilities and tasks should be mapped to the job descriptions and/or role descriptions found in the SMS. As cyber risk management planning and execution involves the whole company; it may be useful during the mapping process to clarify who is the responsible person, and who is required to support that person. For example, a ship IT manager may well be the responsible party for cyber risk management in ships, but he relies on support from other managers and staff from across the whole company, eg security staff, safety staff, training staff, procurement staff, marine HR staff, crew etc. Often, the allocation of responsibilities and tasks will work best if it is aligned with the normal chain of command. For example, when allocating the responsibility for compliance with cyber risk management procedures on board a ship, it will often make sense to appoint the Master or the Chief Engineer. Task Cyber input to Cyber risk Cyber risk Ship IT Crew safety/security assessment assessment infrastructure cyber risk policy on ship OT on ship IT management management Role/person systems systems training Managing Responsible director Company IT Supporting Supporting manager Ship IT manager Supporting Responsible Responsible Responsible Safety manager Supporting Supporting Supporting Supporting Supporting Procurement Supporting Supporting manager Fleet manager Supporting Supporting Supporting Supporting Training manager Supporting Supporting Marine HR Supporting Responsible manager Figure 3: Example (non-exhaustive) of mapping roles, responsibilities, and tasks in a matrix. Job titles and associated job scope and responsibilities will vary from company to company. IT and OT responsible persons need to align and coordinate the company’s cyber risk management strategy. 1.4 Differences between IT and OT systems Whereas IT systems manage data and support business functions, OT is the hardware and software that directly monitors/controls physical devices and processes and as such are an integral part of the ship and must function independently of the IT systems onboard. The systems can, however, be connected to the IT network for performance monitoring, remote support etc. Such systems are sometimes referred to as belonging to the Industrial Internet of Things (IIOT). In such cases, it must be ensured that the interface is sufficiently guarded by a firewall as a minimum and potential THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS V4 Cyber security and risk management 7 vulnerabilities in the OT systems are not exposed in the IT network. This is important because it is not always possible or feasible to ensure a proper patch level in OT systems. IT covers the spectrum of technologies for information processing, including software, hardware, and communication technologies. Traditionally OT and IT have been separated, but with the internet, OT and IT are coming closer as historically stand-alone systems are becoming integrated. Disruption of the operation of OT systems may impose significant risk to the safety of onboard personnel, cargo, damage to the marine environment and impede the ship’s operation. Likewise, failure of certain IT systems, eg lack of immediate access to dangerous goods manifest, could also result in hazardous situations. For example, in situations where a container aboard ship is on fire, information about the contents of adjacent containers is critical for proper firefighting. There may be important differences between who handles the purchase and management of the OT systems versus IT systems on a ship. IT managers are not usually involved in the purchase of OT systems and may or may not have a thorough understanding of cyber security. The purchase of such systems should involve someone, who knows about the impact on the onboard systems but will most probably only have limited knowledge of software and cyber risk management. It is therefore important to have a dialogue with an individual knowledgeable of cyber security to ensure that cyber risks are considered during the OT purchasing process. Updating of OT software requires a thorough compatibility check and class approval as opposed to IT software, which is normally updated routinely. To obtain an overview of potential challenges and to help establish the necessary policy and procedures for software maintenance, it can be an advantage for the party responsible for cyber security on board the ship to have an inventory of OT systems. 1.5 Plans and procedures IMO Resolution MSC.428(98) identifies an urgent need to raise awareness on cyber risk threats and vulnerabilities to support safe and secure shipping, which is operationally resilient to cyber risks. Thus, all maritime stakeholders should work towards safeguarding shipping from current and emerging cyber threats and vulnerabilities. The resolution furthermore affirms that the SMS should consider cyber risk management in accordance with the objectives and functional requirements of the ISM Code. The 101st session of IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (the report from this meeting is found in IMO document MSC 101/24) “…agreed that aspects of cyber risk management, including physical security aspects of cyber security, should be addressed in Ship Security Plans (SSP) under the ISPS Code; however, this should not be considered as requiring a company to establish a separate cyber security management system operating in parallel with the company Safety Management System (SMS)”. In the same meeting, IMO also “…confirmed that resolution MSC.428(98) on Maritime cyber risk management in SMS set out IMO’s requirements for Administrations to ensure that cyber risks were appropriately addressed in existing SMS (as defined in the ISM Code), verified by an endorsed Document of Compliance and Safety Management Certificate, and that in the Ship Security Plan, reference should be made to cyber risk management procedures found in SMS”. For a company, a simple way of arranging procedures as required by IMO could be to reflect the following in the Ship Security Plan (SPS): procedures related to physical access to areas with IT and OT systems a reference to the SMS’ cyber security procedures. Consideration should be given to wording the reference in a way that will not require it to be updated every time a cyber security related procedure in the SMS is amended, added or removed, as changes to the SPS would normally require approval from Flag State or the Recognised Organisation authorised to do so by the Flag State. THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS V4 Cyber security and risk management 8 Accordingly, the remaining procedures on cyber risk management should be reflected in the SMS, whilst excluding sensitive information such as the system’s documentation described in section 3.2 of the present guidelines that could be exploited by malicious actors outside the company. The SMS already includes procedures for reporting accidents or hazardous situations and defines levels of communication and authority for decision making. If needed, such procedures should be amended to reflect communication and authority in the event of a cyber incident. The Master must have a defined resource to refer to in the event of a cyber incident and the SMS should include a well- designed response plan for cyber contingencies – see chapter 9. Additional guidance on how to incorporate cyber risk management into the company’s SMS can be found in annex 2 of these guidelines. SMS procedures should consider risks arising from the use of IT and OT on board, taking into account applicable codes, guidelines and recommended standards. It can be considered that procedures addressing eg commercial risks are also included in the SMS rather than a separate document. The company should consider if there is need for ship-specific risk assessments based on whether particular ships or groups of ships are configured uniquely in terms IT/OT setup within their fleet. The factors to be considered include but are not limited to the extent to which IT and OT are used on board, the complexity of system integration and the nature of operations. Similarly, consideration should be given to whether procedures in the SMS can be arranged to cover the company’s fleet, or whether specific procedures are required for specific ships. The cyber risk assessment and the IT and OT systems documentation described in section 3.2 are considered sensitive information. While there is no regulation describing how this information should be stored, the recommendation is for it to be stored and controlled in a similar manner as the Ship Security Assessment and Ship Security Plan. 1.6 Relationship between shipowner and ship manager The Document of Compliance (DoC) holder is ultimately responsible for ensuring the management of cyber risks on board. If the ship is under third party management, then the ship manager is advised to reach an agreement with the shipowner. Emphasis should be placed by both parties on the split of responsibilities, alignment of expectations, agreement on specific instructions to the manager and possible participation in purchasing decisions as well as budgetary requirements. Apart from ISM requirements, such an agreement should take into consideration additional applicable legislation like the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) or specific cyber regulations in other coastal states, as appropriate. Managers and owners should consider using these guidelines as a base for an open discussion on how best to implement an efficient cyber risk management regime. Agreements between ship managers and shipowners on cyber risk management should be done in writing and signed. THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS V4 Cyber security and risk management 9 1.7 Relationship between the shipowner and the agent The importance of this relationship has placed the agent5 as a named stakeholder, interfacing continuously and simultaneously with shipowners, operators, terminals, port services vendors, and port state control authorities through the exchange of sensitive, financial, and port coordination information. The relationship goes beyond that of a vendor. It can take different forms and especially in the tramp trade, shipowners require a local representative (an independent ship agent) to serve as an extension of the company. Quality standards for agents are important because like all other businesses, agents can also be targeted by cyber criminals eg in connection with delivery of IT or OT equipment to the ship. Cyber- enabled crime, such as electronic wire fraud and false ship appointments, and cyber threats such as ransomware and hacking, call for mutual cyber strategies and cyber-enhanced relationships between shipowners and agents to mitigate such cyber risks. INCIDENT: Ship agent and shipowner ransomware incident A shipowner reported that the company’s business networks were infected with ransomware, apparently from a phishing email attachment. The source of the ransomware was from two unwitting ship agents, in separate ports, and on separate occasions. Ships were also affected but the damage was limited to the business networks, while navigation and ship operations were unaffected. In one case, the owner paid the ransom6. The importance of this incident is that harmonized cyber security across relationships with trusted business partners and manufacturers is critical to all in the supply chain. Individual efforts to fortify one’s own business can be valiant and well-intended but could also be insufficient. Parties in the supply chain should work together and share information as appropriate to mitigate cyber risk. 1.8 Relationship with vendors and other external parties Companies should evaluate the physical security and cyber risk management processes of their interaction with service providers, vendors and other external parties, including public authorities. Lack of physical and/or cyber security at a supplier, vendor or service provider may result in a breach of corporate IT systems and/or corruption of ship OT/IT systems. The company should therefore consider entering into supplier/vendor/service provider agreements and contracts that define cyber- related requirements and expectations, as appropriate. Companies should also evaluate the cyber risk management processes for both new and existing contracts. Broadly recognised standards exist (eg Service Organization Control (SOC) 2 Type 2) but the company can also define its own standards. The processes evaluated during supplier vetting and included in contract requirements may involve: security management including management of sub-suppliers manufacturing/operational security software engineering and architecture asset and cyber incident management personnel security data and information protection. 5 The party representing the ship’s owner and/or charterer (the Principal) in port. If so instructed, the agent is responsible to the principal for arranging, together with the port, a berth, all relevant port and husbandry services, tending to the requirements of the Master and crew, clearing the ship with the port and other authorities (including preparation and submission of appropriate documentation) along with releasing or receiving cargo on behalf of the principal (source: Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic (FAL Convention). 6 Nothing in these guidelines should be taken as recommending the payment of ransom. THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS V4 Cyber security and risk management 10 Evaluation of service providers beyond those with whom the company has a direct relation may be challenging especially for companies with many direct suppliers. Third party providers that are collecting and managing supplier risk management data may be an option to consider. A ship’s and its company’s interactions with public authorities are complex covering many issues ranging from ship arrival to crew changes to advance cargo manifest submissions. They also involve relevant challenges for the cyber risk management process. Normally, these challenges cannot be addressed in the same way as those, which the company has with its commercial relationships. However, it is important that current and future communication connections with public authorities for the provision and exchange of mandatorily required information be evaluated and assessed as part of the company’s cyber security position, and that any cyber security concerns arising from such connections be brought to the attention of the relevant authorities, as appropriate. Some of these issues are further discussed in section 3.4. The following should be considered regarding manufacturers and third parties including vendors, contractors, and service providers: Manufacturers’ and service providers’ will and ability to implement effective and cost-efficient cyber security best practice in their products and services, which can be demonstrated in different ways eg by following the CIRM Cyber Risk Code of Practice for Vendors of Marine Electronic Equipment and Services and the associated implementation guidelines.7 Manufacturers’ and service providers’ cyber risk management awareness and procedures: Some companies may lack cyber awareness training and governance in their own organisations, and this may represent more sources of vulnerability, which could result in cyber incidents. Third party vendors and suppliers are increasingly being targeted by threat actors and have played a role in well publicized cyber incidents over the years. These companies should have an updated cyber risk management company policy, which includes training and governance procedures for accessible IT and OT systems. The maturity of a third party’s cyber risk management procedures: The shipowner should query the internal governance of cyber network security and seek to obtain a cyber risk management assurance when considering future contracts and services. This is particularly important when covering network security if the ship is to be interfaced with the third party such as a marine terminal, stevedoring company or OT supplier for ongoing support and maintenance. INCIDENT: Unrecognised virus in an ECDIS delays sailing A newbuild dry bulk ship was delayed from sailing for several days because its ECDIS was infected by a virus. The ship was designed for paperless navigation and was not carrying paper charts. The failure of the ECDIS appeared to be a technical disruption and was not recognized as a cyber issue by the ship’s Master and officers. A manufacturer technician was required to visit the ship and, after spending a significant time in troubleshooting, discovered that both ECDIS networks were infected with a virus. The virus was quarantined and the ECDIS computers were restored. The source and means of infection in this case are unknown. The delay in sailing and costs in repairs totalled in the hundreds of thousands of dollars (US). 7 The Code and the guidelines can be found at the website of Comité International Radio-Maritime (CIRM): http://cirm.org/publications. THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS V4 Cyber security and risk management 11 2 Identify threats 2.1 Threat actors When identifying threats, companies should consider any specific aspects of potential threat actors’ capability, opportunity, and intent to attack. This can include using eg an external person or an insider as an unintentional middleman unknowingly carrying the threat eg on an infected USB stick. Once identified, threats should be considered alongside identified vulnerabilities to evaluate the likelihood of an attack or incident taking place. Together with the impact of a given incident, the likelihood of the incident occurring produces the risk factor. Organisations and individuals can constitute an intentional or even unintentional threat to the safety and security of a crew, the environment, and the ship. The following figure lists examples of threat actors and their possible motivations and objectives. The list is non-exhaustive. Such threat actors will have varying degrees of skills and resources to potentially threaten the safety and security of ships and a company’s ability to conduct its business: Group Motivation Accidental actors No malicious motive but still end up causing unintended harm through bad luck, lack of knowledge or lack of care, eg by inserting infected USB in onboard IT or OT systems. Activists (including revenge disgruntled employees) disruption of operations media attention reputational damage Criminals financial gain commercial espionage industrial espionage Opportunists the challenge reputational gain financial gain States political/idealogical gain eg (un)controlled disruption to economies and critical national infrastructure State sponsored organisations espionage Terrorists financial gain commercial espionage industrial espionage commercial gain Figure 4: Threat actors’ motivation and objectives. THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS V4 Identify threats 12 2.2 Types of cyber threats In general, there are two categories of cyber threats that may affect companies and ships: untargeted attacks, where a company or a ship’s systems and data are one of many potential targets targeted attacks, where a company or a ship’s systems and data are the intended target or one of multiple targets. Untargeted attacks are likely to use tools and techniques available on the internet, which can be used to locate, discover and exploit widespread vulnerabilities that may also exist in a company and onboard a ship. Examples of some tools and techniques that may be used in these circumstances include: Malware. Malicious software, which is designed to access or damage a computer without the knowledge of the owner. There are various types of malware including trojans, ransomware, spyware, viruses, and worms. Ransomware encrypts data on systems until a ransom has been paid. Malware may also exploit known deficiencies and problems in outdated/unpatched business software. The term “exploit” usually refers to the use of a software or code, which is designed to take advantage of and manipulate a problem in another computer software or hardware. This problem can, for example, be a code bug, system vulnerability, improper design, hardware malfunction and/or error in protocol implementation. These vulnerabilities may be exploited remotely or triggered locally eg a piece of malicious code may often be executed by the user, sometimes via links distributed in email attachments or through malicious websites. Water holing. Establishing a fake website or compromising a genuine website to exploit unsuspecting visitors. Scanning. Searching large portions of the internet at random for vulnerabilities that could be exploited. Typosquatting. Also called URL hijacking or fake URL. Relies on mistakes such as typos made by internet users when inputting a website address into a web browser. Should a user accidentally enter an incorrect website address, they may be led to an alternative and often malicious website. Targeted attacks may be more sophisticated and use tools and techniques specifically created for targeting a certain company or ship. Examples of tools and techniques, which may be used in these circumstances, include: Social engineering. A non-technical technique used by potential cyber attackers to manipulate insider individuals into breaking security procedures, normally, but not exclusively, through interaction via social media. Brute force. An attack trying many passwords with the hope of eventually guessing correctly. The attacker systematically checks all possible passwords until the correct one is found. Credential stuffing. Using previously compromised credentials or specific commonly used passwords to attempt unauthorized access to a system or application. Denial of service (DoS) prevents legitimate and authorised users from accessing information, usually by flooding a network with data. A distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack takes control of multiple computers and/or servers to implement a DoS attack. Phishing. Sending emails to a large number of potential targets asking for particular pieces of sensitive or confidential information. The email may also contain a malicious attachment or request that a person visits a fake website using a hyperlink included in the email. Spear-phishing. Like phishing but the individuals are targeted with personal emails, often containing malicious software or links that automatically download malicious software. In some instances, SAT-C messages have been used to establish a sense of familiarity with a THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS V4 Identify threats 13 malicious sender’s email address. Subverting the supply chain. Attacking a company or ship by compromising equipment, software or supporting services being delivered to the company or ship. The above examples are not exhaustive. Other cyber attack methods are evolving such as impersonating a legitimate shore-based employee in a shipping company to obtain valuable information, which can be used for a further attack. The potential number and sophistication of tools and techniques used in cyber attacks continue to evolve and are limited only by the ingenuity of those organisations and individuals developing them. 2.3 Stages of a cyber incident In 2019, it took on average 279 days between the time a victim’s network was breached and the containment of the breach. However, intrusion can go undetected for years. This figure went up from 266 days in 20188. The length of time to prepare a cyber attack can be determined by the motivations and objectives of the attacker, and the resilience of technical and procedural cyber risk controls implemented by the company, including those onboard its ships. When considering targeted cyber attacks, the generally observed stages of an incident are: Survey/reconnaissance. Open/public sources such as social media are used to gain information about a potential target (eg a company, ship or seafarer) in preparation for a cyber attack. Social media, technical forums and hidden properties in websites, documents and publications may be used to identify technical, procedural and physical vulnerabilities. The use of open/public sources may be complemented by monitoring (analysing – sniffing) the actual data flowing into and from a company or a ship. Delivery. Attackers may attempt to access the company’s and ship’s systems and data. This may be done from either within the company or ship or remotely through connectivity with the internet. Examples of methods used to obtain access include: company online services, including cargo or container tracking systems sending emails containing malicious files or links to malicious websites to personnel providing infected removable media, for example as part of a software update to an onboard system creating false or misleading websites, which encourage the disclosure of user account information by personnel. Breach. The extent to which an attacker can breach a company’s or ship’s system will depend on the significance of the vulnerability found by an attacker and the method chosen to deliver an attack. It should be noted that a breach might not result in any obvious changes to the status of the equipment. Depending on the significance of the breach, an attacker may be able to: make changes that affect the system’s operation, for example interrupt or manipulate information used by navigation equipment gain access to, take copies of or alter operationally important information such as loading lists or commercially sensitive data such as cargo manifests and/or crew and passenger/visitor lists achieve full control of a system, for example a machinery management system. Pivot. Pivoting is the technique of using an already compromised system to attack other systems in the same network. During this phase of an attack, an attacker uses the first compromised system to attack otherwise inaccessible systems. An attacker will usually target the most vulnerable part of the victim’s system with the lowest level of security. Once access is gained then 8 IBM Cost of a Data breach Report 2019. THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS V4 Identify threats 14 the attacker will try to exploit the rest of the system. Usually, in the pivot phase, the attacker may try to: upload tools, exploits and scripts in the system to support the attacker in the new attack phase execute a discovery of neighbour systems with scanning or network mapping tools install permanent tools or a key logger to keep and maintain access to the system execute new attacks on the system. The motivation and objectives of the attacker will determine what effect they have on the company or ship system and data. An attacker may explore systems, expand access and/or ensure that they are able to return to the system in order to: access commercially sensitive or confidential data about cargo, crew, visitors and passengers manipulate crew or passenger/visitor lists, cargo manifests, stow plans or loading lists. This may subsequently be used to allow the fraudulent transport of illegal cargo, or facilitate thefts cause complete denial of service on business and operational systems enable other forms of crime for example piracy, theft and fraud disrupt normal operation of the company and ship systems, for example by deleting critical pre- arrival or discharge information or overloading company systems demand a ransom for operational or personal data. 2.4 Quantifying the threat General considerations Threat is the product of the threat actor’s capability, opportunity and intent to cause harm. The purpose of quantifying the threat is to help the quantification of the likelihood, which forms part of the assessment of risk that is the product of likelihood and impact. In other words, if either the capability, opportunity, or intent of a threat actor is zero or close to zero, the threat and thereby the risk will be small. Threats against OT systems Unlike other areas of safety and security, where historic evidence is available, cyber risk management is made more challenging by the scarcity of statistics about incidents and their impact. Indications are that attacks targeted specifically against OT systems are less common and, in many cases, not publicised. Reasons for this are likely to be eg: Most OT systems in the marine industry are still not connected to networks with external access, ie threat exposure is low and cybercriminals have no opportunity to attack. There are exceptions, however, for example, many monitoring devices (eg devices monitoring engine performance) are connected to the internet and usually have minimal cyber security controls in place, especially in comparison to IT or even OT systems. These systems are referred to as Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) and are becoming more integrated onboard ships to provide remote monitoring and connection of systems to allow for greater automation and efficiency in operations. Threat actors can scan for these systems and use them as initial point of infiltration to a ship network, from which they can pivot as outlined previously. Therefore, risks to these systems are important to assess and should not be overlooked. OT systems normally have no direct potential for economically rewarding the cybercriminal. Attacking OT systems entail safety risks to the victims, something which may constitute a disincentive and even a deterrent to some cybercriminals. THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS V4 Identify threats 15 Despite the above, the risks to OT systems should not be underestimated. Threats posed eg by malware introduced through software updates – either online or through manual processes such as eg USB sticks – or through unregulated or unauthorised access by crew can still materialise and have been known to cause disruptions and operational downtime. Threats against IT systems Threats against IT systems are generally easier to quantify because there is much more evidence in terms of accidents both generally and specifically for the maritime industry. Usually disruption of IT systems is not considered to be the cause of potential harm to people, the environment, assets, or cargo, but threats against IT systems should not be underestimated. Recent examples from the liner industry have illustrated that cyber incidents have the potential to wreak havoc on ship operations and cargo management, thus causing significant financial losses. Furthermore, such incidents can also have cascading implications for the safety of people, environment, assets, and cargo, for example when disruptions of IT systems lead to lack of control of perishable cargo or dangerous goods. THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS V4 Identify threats 16 3 Identify vulnerabilities 3.1 Common vulnerabilities The following are common cyber vulnerabilities, which may be found onboard existing ships, and on some newbuild9 ships: obsolete and unsupported operating systems unpatched system software outdated or missing antivirus software and protection from malware inadequate security configurations and best practices, including ineffective network management and the use of default administrator accounts and passwords shipboard computer networks, which lack boundary protection measures and segmentation of networks safety critical equipment or systems always connected with the shore side inadequate access controls to cyber assets, networks etc for third parties including contractors and service providers staff inadequately trained and/or skilled to manage cyber risks missing, inadequate or untested contingency plans and procedures. 3.2 IT and OT systems’ documentation To assist every step of the risk assessment, the IT and OT systems need to be clearly identified with documented governance and ownership responsibilities within an asset register, which shall be kept updated as appropriate. The asset register should include an asset valuation, with the cost of the asset and the cost of maintaining that asset. IACS Recommendation no. 166 on Cyber Resilience is applicable to newbuilds only, however it may nevertheless serve as guidance for the development of documentation that may include: Inventory of communicating devices inventory network communication devices logical map of networks: IP addresses non IP addresses non Ethernet access points desktops and servers connectors and communicating field devices software inventory (in some cases this inventory is part of a Ship Software Logging System) inventory of network services for each equipment. Tools are available to handle the inventory of an IT system but not recommended for an OT system as the integrity of the OT system could be disrupted (unless handled by a well-qualified expert in close consultation with the Master, Chief Engineer etc). 9 With the publication of IACS “Recommendation on Cyber Resilience (No. 166)” future newbuild ships may be less vulnerable. THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS V4 Identify vulnerabilities 17 3.3 Typical vulnerable systems Identification of vulnerabilities involves an analysis of the applications, systems, and procedures to uncover weaknesses that could be leveraged by potential threats. It may be facilitated by internal experts and/or supported as appropriate by external experts with knowledge of the maritime industry and its key processes. INCIDENT: Crash of integrated navigation bridge system at sea A ship with an integrated navigation bridge system suffered a failure of nearly all navigation systems at sea, in a high traffic area and reduced visibility. The ship had to navigate by one radar and backup paper charts for two days before arriving in port for repairs. The cause of the failure of all ECDIS computers was determined to be attributed to the outdated operating systems. During the previous port call, a manufacturer technical representative performed a navigation software update on the ship’s navigation computers. However, the outdated operating systems were incapable of running the software and crashed. The ship was required to remain in port until new ECDIS computers could be installed, classification surveyors could attend, and a near-miss notification had been issued as required by the company. The costs of the delays were extensive and incurred by the shipowner. This incident emphasizes that not all computer failures are a result of a deliberate attack and that outdated software is prone to failure. More robust testing and proactive software maintenance on the ship may have prevented this incident from occurring. The goal of an assessment of a ship’s network and its systems and devices is to identify any vulnerabilities that could compromise or result in the loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability of data and systems required to operate the equipment, system, network, or even the ship. These vulnerabilities and weaknesses could fall into one of the following categories: temporary exposures such as software defects, outdated or unpatched systems design such as access management or unmanaged network interconnections implementation errors for example misconfigured firewalls procedural or other user errors. Stand-alone systems will be less vulnerable to external cyber incidents compared to those attached to uncontrolled networks or connected directly to the internet. Network design and network segregation will be explained in more detail in Annex 3. Care should be taken to understand how critical shipboard systems might be connected to uncontrolled networks. The human element should be taken into consideration, as many incidents are initiated by personnel’s actions. Onboard systems could include: Cargo and loading management systems. Digital systems used for the loading, management and control of cargo, including hazardous cargo, may interface with a variety of systems ashore, including ports, marine terminals and stevedores. Such systems may include shipment tracking tools available to shippers via the internet. Interfaces of this kind make cargo management systems and data in cargo manifests and loading lists vulnerable to cyber incidents. Bridge systems. The increasing use of digital, network navigation systems, with interface to shoreside networks for update and provision of services, make such systems vulnerable to cyber incidents. Bridge systems that are not connected to other networks may be equally vulnerable, as removable media are often used to update such systems from other controlled or uncontrolled networks. A cyber incident can extend to service denial or manipulation and, therefore, may affect all systems associated with navigation, including ECDIS, GNSS, AIS, VDR and Radar/ARPA. Propulsion and machinery management and power control systems. The use of digital systems to monitor and control onboard machinery, propulsion and steering makes such systems vulnerable to cyber incidents. The vulnerability of these systems can increase when used in conjunction with remote condition-based monitoring and/or are integrated with navigation and THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS V4 Identify vulnerabilities 18 communications equipment on ships using integrated bridge systems. Access control systems. Digital systems used to support access control to ensure physical security and safety of a ship and its cargo, including surveillance, shipboard security alarm, and electronic “personnel-on-board” systems are vulnerable to cyber incidents. Passenger servicing and management systems. Digital systems used for property management, boarding and access control may hold valuable passenger related data. Intelligent devices (tablets, handheld scanners etc) are themselves an attack vector as ultimately the collected data is passed on to other systems. Passenger facing public networks. Fixed or wireless networks connected to the internet, installed on board for the benefit of passengers, for example guest entertainment systems, should be considered uncontrolled and should not be connected to any safety critical system on board. Administrative and crew welfare systems. Onboard computer networks used for administration of the ship or the welfare of the crew are particularly vulnerable when providing internet access and email. This can be exploited by cyber attackers to gain access to onboard systems and data. These systems should be considered uncontrolled and should not be connected to any safety critical system on board. Software provided by ship management companies or owners is also included in this category. Communication systems. Availability of internet connectivity via satellite and/or other wireless communication increases the vulnerability of ships, and recent developments indicate that for example VSAT signals are vulnerable to exploitation using low-cost, off-the-shelf products. Communication systems with encryption should be considered. The cyber defence mechanisms implemented by the service provider should be carefully considered but should not be solely relied upon to secure every shipboard system and data. Included in these systems are communication links to public authorities for transmission of required ship and cargo reporting information. Applicable authentication and access control management requirements by these authorities should be strictly complied with. Also included are shipboard capabilities to collect data from and interrogate devices and data loggers affixed to containers for onward transmission to designated recipients ashore (see also section below on ship to shore interface). The abovementioned onboard systems consist of potentially vulnerable equipment, which should be reviewed during the assessment. The vulnerability assessment can be assisted by answering the below questions for each system: Is the system stand-alone or is it connected to other systems? Is the system connected externally, either directly or via other systems? Does the system have effective, built-in risk mitigation measures such as eg encryption? Does the system require regular software updates? Does operating the system involve connecting removable devices, for example to obtain diagnostic information? Is the system easy to physically access? 3.4 Ship to shore interface Ships are becoming more and more integrated with shoreside operations because digital communication is being used to conduct business, manage operations, and retain contact with head offices. Furthermore, critical ship systems essential to the safety of navigation, power and cargo management have become increasingly digitalised and connected to the internet to perform a wide variety of legitimate functions such as: engine performance monitoring THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS V4 Identify vulnerabilities 19 remote diagnostics maintenance and spare parts management cargo and container tracking and management, loading and unloading, and stowage planning crane and pump management monitoring of systems for adherence to environmental regulations and reporting voyage performance monitoring. The above list provides examples of this interface and is not exhaustive. The above systems contain, process and exchange data, which may be of interest to cyber criminals to exploit. Modern technologies can add vulnerabilities to the ships especially if there are insecure designs of networks and uncontrolled access to the internet. Additionally, shoreside and onboard personnel may be unaware how some equipment manufacturers and software providers maintain remote access to shipboard equipment and its network system. Unknown, and uncoordinated remote access to an operating ship should be taken into consideration as an important part of the risk assessment. It is recommended that companies fully understand and document, as appropriate, the ship’s OT and IT systems and how these systems connect and integrate with the shore side, including public authorities, marine terminals, and stevedores. This requires an understanding of all computer based onboard systems and how safety, operations, and business, including cargo and load management, can be compromised by a cyber incident. 3.5 Ship visits Visits to ships by third parties requiring a connection to one or more computers on board can also result in connecting the ship to shore. It is common for technicians, vendors, port and other officials, marine terminal representatives, agents, pilots, and other technicians to board the ship and plug in devices, such as laptops and tablets. Some technicians may require the use of removable media to update computers, download data and/or perform other tasks. It has also been known for customs officials and port state control officers to board a ship and request the use of a computer to “print official documents” after having inserted an unknown removable media. Sometimes there is no control as to who has access to the onboard systems, eg during drydocking, layups or when taking over a new or existing ship. In such cases, it is difficult to know if malicious software has been left in the onboard systems. It is recommended that sensitive data is removed from the ship and reinstalled on returning to the ship, and at the very least there should be a back-up of data. Where possible, systems should be scanned for malware prior to use. OT systems should be tested to check that they are functioning correctly. 3.6 Remote access Some IT and OT systems are remotely accessible and may operate with a continuous internet connection for remote monitoring, data collection, maintenance functions, safety and security. These systems can be “third party systems”, whereby the contractor remotely monitors and maintains the systems. These systems could include a two-way data flow and/or upload-only. Systems and workstations with remote control, access or configuration functions could, for example, be: bridge and engine room computers and workstations on the ship’s administrative network cargo such as containers with reefer temperature control systems or specialised cargo that are tracked remotely THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS V4 Identify vulnerabilities 20 stability decision support systems hull stress monitoring systems navigational systems including Electronic Navigation Chart (ENC) Voyage Data Recorder (VDR), dynamic positioning (DP) load planning, stowage, and cargo management engine monitoring and control, safety and security networks, such as CCTV (closed circuit television) specialised systems such as drilling operations, blow out preventers, subsea installation systems, Emergency Shut Down (ESD) for gas tankers, submarine cable installation and repair. The extent and nature of connectivity of equipment should be known by the shipowner or operator and considered as an important part of the risk assessment. 3.7 System and software maintenance IT and OT systems, software and maintenance can be outsourced to third party service providers and the company itself may not be in a position to verify the level of security supplied by these providers. Some companies use different providers responsible for software and cyber security checks. In such cases, the suppliers should be requested to provide details of the updates. INCIDENT: Navigation computer crash during pilotage A ship was under pilotage when the ECDIS and voyage performance computers crashed. A pilot was on the bridge. The computer failures briefly created a distraction to the watch officers; however, the pilot and the Master worked together to focus the bridge team on safe navigation by visual means and radar. When the computers were rebooted, it was apparent that the operating systems were outdated and unsupported. The Master reported that these computer problems were frequent (referred to the issues as “gremlins”) and that repeated requests for servicing from the shipowner had been ignored. It is a clear case of how simple servicing and attention to the ship by management can prevent mishaps. THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS V4 Identify vulnerabilities 21 4 Assessing the likelihood 4.1 Likelihood as the product of threat and vulnerability There is a tendency to assess risks alone based on potential impacts and existing vulnerabilities. However, as previously accounted for, the likelihood of a cyber security event happening is the product of the threat and the vulnerability. This also means that if either of these two factors is close to non-existent, so will the likelihood be, and this should be considered when quantifying the likelihood. 4.2 Quantifying the likelihood A company’s SMS will normally contain a risk assessment matrix, where the likelihood of a given event is measured on a five-step scale. Using the SMS’s existing likelihood scale can be an advantage because using existing language and concepts to describe cyber-related risks will ease the understanding throughout the company. An aligned enterprise risk management strategy and understanding is critical to ensuring senior leadership’s support for effective cyber risk management strategies based on the outcomes of the risk assessment. One example of such a scale can be found below: Level Likelihood description 1 Never heard of in industry. Close to being something unimaginable. 2 Heard of in industry, but only extremely rarely and as the result of a chain of many unfortunate events. 3 Incident has probably occurred in own company, but in the context of faulty equipment or by surprising mistakes made by people involved. 4 Happens occasionally in own company, typically in the context of faulty equipment or by mistakes by people involved (the kind of mistakes that tend to happen on board from time to time). 5 Happens frequently when undertaking the work in question. Figure 5: Example of likelihood scale from an SMS. In an ideal world, quantifying the likelihood would be substantiated by access to shipping-specific industry-wide threat intelligence based on incident reports. However, such threat intelligence is not immediately available, and it is therefore worthwhile to look to other sectors than shipping, as threat actors frequently repurpose techniques previously used to attack one sector to target another sector. Furthermore, it will often be worthwhile to look closer at the threat factors capability, opportunity, and intent. Looking especially at intent can be useful, as zero intent will quantify a given potential threat as theoretical, and therefore produce only a small likelihood when juxtaposed against (or multiplied with) the vulnerability. THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS V4 Assessing the likelihood 22 5 Impact assessment 5.1 The CIA model The confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) model10 provides a framework for assessing the impact of: loss of confidentiality of information, eg unauthorised access to and disclosure of information or data about the ship, crew, cargo and passengers loss of integrity, which would modify information and data relating to the safe and efficient operation and management of the ship loss of availability due to the destruction of the information and data and/or the disruption to services/ operation of ship systems. The relative importance of confidentiality, integrity and availability depends on the use of the information or data. Conversely, assessing the vulnerability of OT systems onboard ships, particularly safety critical systems, may focus on availability and/or integrity instead of confidentiality. 5.2 Quantifying the impact A company’s SMS will normally contain a risk assessment matrix, where the impact of a given event is measured on a five-step scale of increasingly serious impacts to different categories eg safety of personnel, safety of environment, cargo safety, asset safety, business continuity, financial impact, and company’s reputation. Using the SMS’s existing impact scale can be an advantage because using existing language and concepts to describe cyber-related risks will ease the understanding throughout the company. If this scale has not been used to describe impacts arising out of cyber risks, it may be necessary to modify the verbal description of each of the impact levels. Using such a scale, also allows the company to distinguish between different ships in the fleet according to their criticality to the company’s overall activities. One example of such a scale can be found below: Level Impact description 1 No health effect/injuries. No damage to environment, assets, finances, or company’s reputation. 2 Very slight health effect/injuries. Very slight damage to environment, assets, finances, or to company’s reputation. 3 Some health effect/minor injuries. Minor damage to environment, assets, finances, or to company’s reputation. 4 Major health effect/relatively serious injuries. Local but major damage to environment, assets, finances, or to company’s reputation. 5 Fatality or permanent disabilities. Widespread, significant damage to environment, assets, finances, or company’s reputation. Figure 6: Example of an SMS’s verbal description of impact levels. There are also several other assessment methodologies that can help define the magnitude of the 10 Federal Information Processing Standards, Publication 199, Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8900. THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS V4 Impact assessment 23 impact from a cyber incident, eg the example in figure 7:11 Potential Definition In practice impact Low The loss of confidentiality, A limited adverse effect means that a security breach might: integrity, or availability could (i) result in minor harm to individuals; be expected to have a limited adverse effect on company (ii) result in minor financial loss; and ship, organisational assets, or individuals. (iii) result in minor damage to organisational assets; or (iv) cause a degradation in ship operation to an extent and duration that the organisation is able to perform its primary functions, but the effectiveness of the functions is noticeably reduced. Moderate The loss of confidentiality, A substantial adverse effect means that a security breach might: integrity, or availability (i) result in significant harm to individuals that does not involve loss could be expected to have a of life or serious life threatening injuries; substantial adverse effect on company and ship, assets or (ii) result in significant financial loss; individuals. (iii) result in significant damage to organisational assets; or (iv) cause a significant degradation in ship operation to an extent and duration that the organisation is able to perform its primary functions, but the effectiveness of the functions is significantly reduced. High The loss of confidentiality, A severe or catastrophic adverse effect means that a security breach integrity, or availability might: could be expected to have (i) result in severe or catastrophic harm to individuals involving loss a severe or catastrophic of life or serious life-threatening injuries; adverse effect on company and ship operations, assets, (ii) result in major financial loss; environment or individuals. (iii) result in major damage to environment and/or organisational assets; or (iv) cause a severe degradation in or loss of ship operation to an extent and duration that the organisation is not able to perform one or more of its primary functions. Figure 7: Potential impact levels when using the CIA model. 5.3 “Critical” equipment and technical systems The impact assessment should be carried out for every system on board. For OT systems, such an impact assessment also forms part of the list of equipment and technical systems, the sudden operational failure of which may more or less promptly result in hazardous situations, which is required by paragraph 10.4 of the ISM Code (often referred to as “critical” equipment and technical systems). The potential impact for IT systems should also be assessed and will normally require input from the primary users, and depending on the functionality of the system this could be eg stowage staff, operations staff, commercial and finance staff etc. Consequences of a degrading or loss of IT systems can be very disruptive to the ship’s operations, regulatory compliance and even safety performance and should not be underestimated. 11 Methodologies include, and are not limited to, ISO/IEC 27005:2018 Information technology – Security techniques – Information security risk management, COSO Enterprise Risk Management Framework, and ISO 31000:2018 Risk management – Guidelines. THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS V4 Impact assessment 24 Example A ship is equipped with a complex power management system. It consists of switchboards and generators controlling systems for auto load sharing, power control and auto synchronizing. On top of the power management system, a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system provides output and makes it possible for the crew to control the distribution of onboard electric power. Power management is important to the safety of the crew, ship, and cargo. It also has a clear environmental and financial impact as power is generated by use of fuel either by the ship’s main engine (shaft generator) and/or auxiliary engines. Therefore, a cyber incident that disables or causes the power management system to malfunction can place the operation and safety of the ship at risk. To lower the risk, the company should add protection measures that minimize the possibility of such a cyber incident taking place. The SCADA system contains real-time sensor data, which is used on board for power management. It also generates data about the power consumption, which is used by the shipping company for administrative purposes. To determine if the potential impact of data and information is being breached, the CIA model should be used. When doing so, the shipping company should determine the potential impact of the most sensitive information stored, processed or transmitted by the SCADA system. Using the CIA model, the shipping company can conclude that: losing confidentiality of the sensor data acquired by the SCADA system will have a low impact as the sensors are publicly displayed on board. However, from a safety point of view, it is important that the information transmitted by the sensors can be relied upon. Therefore, there is a potential high impact from a loss of integrity. It will also be a safety issue if the information cannot be read. So, there is a potential high impact from a loss of availability. a loss of confidentiality regarding the power consumption information being sent to the shipping company for statistical purposes is assessed as a potential low impact. There will also be a potential low impact from a loss of integrity and availability as the data is only used for in-house considerations. The following figure shows the result of the assessment: SCADA system Confidentiality Integrity Availability Overall impact Sensor data Low High High High Statistical data Low Low Low Low Figure 8: Result of CIA assessment of SCADA system. THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS V4 Impact assessment 25 6 Risk assessment 6.1 Relationship between factors influencing risk Only after having established an overview of threats (intent, capability, and opportunity), vulnerabilities, impacts and likelihood, is it then possible to conduct the risk assessment. A risk assessment is not a one-off activity but should be repeated at appropriate intervals to ensure that the risk assessment’s findings are kept up to date. Intent (see ch. 2) Impact (see ch. 5) Opportunity Threat Risk (see ch. 2) (see ch. 2) (see ch. 6) Likelihood (see ch. 4) Capability Vulnerability (see ch. 2) (see ch. 3) Figure 9: The relationship between different factors influencing the risk. The lines represent multiplication, ie “Likelihood” is multiplied with “Impact” to produce “Risk”. 6.2 The four phases of a risk assessment Phase 1: Pre-assessment activities Risk assessments apply to existing ships as well as newbuilds and second-hand ships entering the fleet. Assessment of cyber risks is a complex undertaking, which requires detailed knowledge about cyber risk management, and third-party support to the risk assessment process is likely to be required in some cases. Prior to starting a cyber risk assessment on board, the following activities should be performed: Review the documentation of IT and OT systems as described in 3.2 and assess potential impact levels, for example using the CIA model (see 5.1.). Identify main manufacturers of critical shipboard IT and OT equipment (a risk-based approach should be used in this identification process). Identify cyber security points-of-contact with the most important manufacturers and establish a working relationship with them. Review detailed documentation on the ship’s maintenance and support of the IT and OT systems. Establish contractual requirements and obligations that the shipowner/ship operator may have for maintenance and support of shipboard networks and equipment. Phase 2: Ship assessment When all risk factors (threats, vulnerabilities, likelihood and impact) are assessed, the risk assessment and associate risk mitigation can be carried out. The risk assessment is a systematic consideration of relevant risk factors. THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS V4 Risk assessment 26 The risk assessment is carried out system by system and is therefore based on the system documentation described in 5.2. To be accurate, the risk assessment relies on knowledge of the functionality of the systems, data flows to and from the system, and precisely how each system is connected to other systems either by cable or wireless connection. For the same reason, the risk assessment will most likely require input from a broad range of company staff, equipment makers and external cyber security experts, when appropriate. Every connection is a potential vulnerability. For example, a connection to an internet accessible shared network printer entails a risk that cyber criminals can use the printer as a gateway to other systems connected to the printer. The identification and implementation of mitigation measures based on risk assessments is well established on all ships via the ISM code and the company SMS. However, cyber risk assessments should not be confused with the operational risk assessments normally carried out by the crew as per the SMS. Cyber risk assessments are a more complex undertaking that will quite likely require the involvement of office staff and possibly even third-party consultants depending on the level of complexity. To calculate the risk for a given system, the likelihood and the impact should be assessed. Risk score matrix (scale 1-25) 5 5 10 18 20 25 Risk score 1-5 = Low Risk Risk score 6-10 = Medium Risk 4 4 8 12 16 20 Risk score 11-19 = High Risk Risk score 20-25 = Extreme Risk 3 3 6 9 12 18 Likelihood (scale 1-5) 2 2 4 6 8 10 1 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

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