An-Introduction-to-the-History-of-Psychology-PDFDrive-.pdf

 ✵ An Introduction to the History of Psychology SIXTH EDITION B.R. HERGENHAHN Professor Emeritus, Hamline University Australia Brazil Japan Korea Mexico Singapore Spain United Kingdom United States An Introduct...

 ✵ An Introduction to the History of Psychology SIXTH EDITION B.R. HERGENHAHN Professor Emeritus, Hamline University Australia Brazil Japan Korea Mexico Singapore Spain United Kingdom United States An Introduction to the History © 2009, 2005 Wadsworth, Cengage Learning of Psychology, Sixth Edition ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. No part of this work covered by the copy- B. R. Hergenhahn right herein may be reproduced, transmitted, stored, or used in any form or by any means graphic, electronic, or mechanical, including but not limited to photocopying, recording, scanning, digitizing, tap- Publisher: Michele Sordi ing, Web distribution, information networks, or information storage Assistant Editor: Rachel Guzman and retrieval systems, except as permitted under Section 107 or 108 Managing Technology Project of the 1976 United States Copyright Act, without the prior written Manager: Amy Cohen permission of the publisher. 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Compositor: Newgen For your course and learning solutions, visit academic.cengage.com Purchase any of our products at your local college store or at our preferred online store www.ichapters.com Printed in the United States of America 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 12 11 10 09 08  ✵ We have found a strange footprint on the shores of the unknown. We have devised profound theories, one after another, to account for its origin. At last, we have succeeded in reconstructing the creature that made the footprint. And lo! it is our own. —ARTHUR STANLEY EDDINGTON  ✵ Brief Contents PREFACE xxi i Chapter 1 Introduction 1 Chapter 2 The Early Greek Philosophers 29 Chapter 3 After Aristotle: A Search for the Good Life 67 Chapter 4 The Beginnings of Modern Science and Philosophy 101 Chapter 5 Empiricism, Sensationalism, and Positivism 133 Chapter 6 Rationalism 183 Chapter 7 Romanticism and Existentialism 207 Chapter 8 Early Developments in Physiology and the Rise of Experimental Psychology 232 Chapter 9 Voluntarism, Structuralism, and Other Early Approaches to Psychology 262 Chapter 10 The Darwinian Influence and the Rise of Mental Testing 293 Chapter 11 Functionalism 334 Chapter 12 Behaviorism 384 Chapter 13 Neobehaviorism 423 Chapter 14 Gestalt Psychology 456 Chapter 15 Early Diagnosis, Explanation, and Treatment of Mental Illness 486 Chapter 16 Psychoanalysis 515 Chapter 17 Early Alternatives to Psychoanalysis 552 Chapter 18 Humanistic (Third-Force) Psychology 570 Chapter 19 Psychobiology 606 Chapter 20 Cognitive Psychology 623 Chapter 21 Contemporary Psychology 643 iv  ✵ Contents PREFACE xxii Chapter 1 Introduction 1 Problems in Writing a History of Psychology 2 Where to Start 2 What to Include 2 Choice of Approach 4 Why Study the History of Psychology? 4 Perspective 4 Deeper Understanding 4 Recognition of Fads and Fashions 5 Avoiding Repetition of Mistakes 6 A Source of Valuable Ideas 6 Curiosity 6 What Is Science? 7 A Combination of Rationalism and Empiricism 7 The Search for Laws 8 The Assumption of Determinism 8 Revisions in the Traditional View of Science 9 Karl Popper 9 Thomas Kuhn 11 Paradigms and Psychology 13 Popper versus Kuhn 13 v vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Is Psychology a Science? 15 Determinism, Indeterminism, and Nondeterminism 15 Persistent Questions in Psychology 18 What Is the Nature of Human Nature? 18 How Are the Mind and the Body Related? 18 Nativism versus Empiricism 19 Mechanism versus Vitalism 19 Rationalism versus Irrationalism 20 How Are Humans Related to Nonhuman Animals? 21 What Is the Origin of Human Knowledge? 21 Objective versus Subjective Reality 22 The Problem of the Self 22 Universalism versus Relativism 23 Chapter 2 The Early Greek Philosophers 29 The World of Precivilized Humans 29 Animism and Anthropomorphism 29 Magic 30 Early Greek Religion 30 The First Philosophers 31 Thales 31 Anaximander 32 Heraclitus 32 Parmenides 33 Pythagoras 34 Empedocles 36 Anaxagoras 37 Democritus 37 Early Greek Medicine 38 Alcmaeon 39 Hippocrates 39 The Relativity of Truth 41 Protagoras 41 Gorgias 42 Xenophanes 43 Socrates 44 Plato 46  TABLE OF CONTENTS vii The Theory of Forms or Ideas 46 The Analogy of the Divided Line 47 The Allegory of the Cave 48 The Reminiscence Theory of Knowledge 48 The Nature of the Soul 49 Sleep and Dreams 50 Plato’s Legacy 50 Aristotle 50 The Basic Difference between Plato and Aristotle 52 Causation and Teleology 53 The Hierarchy of Souls 54 Sensation 54 Common Sense, Passive Reason, and Active Reason 55 Memory and Recall 56 Imagination and Dreaming 56 Motivation and Happiness 57 The Emotions and Selective Perception 58 The Importance of Early Greek Philosophy 59 Chapter 3 After Aristotle: A Search for the Good Life 67 Skepticism and Cynicism 67 Skepticism 68 Cynicism 69 Epicureanism and Stoicism 70 Epicureanism 70 Stoicism 72 Neoplatonism 73 Philo 74 Plotinus 75 Emphasis on Spirit 76 Jesus 76 St. Paul 77 Emperor Constantine 79 St. Augustine 80 The Dark Ages 83 The Islamic and Jewish Influences 84 Avicenna 85 viii TABLE OF CONTENTS Averroës 86 Maimonides 86 Reconciliation of Christian Faith and Reason 87 St. Anselm 87 Peter Lombard 88 Scholasticism 88 Peter Abelard 88 St. Albertus Magnus 91 St. Thomas Aquinas 92 Limitations of Scholastic Philosophy 94 William of Occam: A Turning Point 94 The Spirit of the Times before the Renaissance 95 Chapter 4 The Beginnings of Modern Science and Philosophy 101 Renaissance Humanism 101 Major Themes 101 Francesco Petrarch 102 Giovanni Pico 103 Desiderius Erasmus 103 Martin Luther 104 Michel de Montaigne 106 Further Challenges to Church Authority 107 Ptolemy, Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo 108 Ptolemy 108 Nicolaus Copernicus 109 Johannes Kepler 111 Galileo 112 Isaac Newton 115 Principles of Newtonian Science 116 Francis Bacon 117 Baconian Science 118 Science Should Provide Useful Information 120 René Descartes 121 Descartes’s Search for Philosophical Truth 121 Innate Ideas 123 The Reflex 124 Descartes’s Explanation of Sleep and Dreams 125  TABLE OF CONTENTS ix The Mind-Body Interaction 125 Descartes’s Contributions to Psychology 126 Descartes’s Fate 127 Chapter 5 Empiricism, Sensationalism, and Positivism 133 British Empiricism 134 Thomas Hobbes 134 John Locke 138 George Berkeley 143 David Hume 146 David Hartley 153 James Mill 156 John Stuart Mill 158 Alexander Bain 162 French Sensationalism 166 Pierre Gassendi 166 Julien de La Mettrie 167 Étienne Bonnot de Condillac 170 Claude-Adrien Helvétius 171 Positivism 172 Auguste Comte 172 A Second Type of Positivism 176 Chapter 6 Rationalism 183 Baruch Spinoza 185 Nature of God 185 Mind-Body Relationship 186 Denial of Free Will 186 Self-Preservation as the Master Motive 187 Emotions and Passions 187 Spinoza’s Influence 188 Nicolas de Malebranche 189 Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz 189 Disagreement with Locke 189 Monadology 191 Mind-Body Relationship 192 Conscious and Unconscious Perception 192 x TABLE OF CONTENTS Thomas Reid 194 Common Sense 194 Direct Realism 195 Faculty Psychology 195 Immanuel Kant 196 Categories of Thought 197 Causes of Mental Experience 198 The Categorical Imperative 199 Kant’s Influence 200 Johann Friedrich Herbart 200 Psychology as a Science 201 Psychic Mechanics 201 The Apperceptive Mass 202 Educational Psychology 203 Herbart’s Influence 203 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 203 The Absolute 204 Dialectic Process 204 Hegel’s Influence 206 Chapter 7 Romanticism and Existentialism 207 Romanticism 208 Jean-Jacques Rousseau 209 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe 212 Arthur Schopenhauer 213 Existentialism 217 Søren Kierkegaard 217 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche 220 Kierkegaard and Nietzsche 227 Chapter 8 Early Developments in Physiology and the Rise of Experimental Psychology 232 Individual Differences 232 Discrepancy between Objective and Subjective Reality 233 Bell-Magendie Law 234 Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies 235 Johannes Müller 235 Hermann von Helmholtz 236  TABLE OF CONTENTS xi Helmholtz’s Stand against Vitalism 237 Principle of Conservation of Energy 237 Rate of Nerve Conduction 238 Theory of Perception 239 Theory of Color Vision 239 Theory of Auditory Perception 240 Theory of Signs 241 Helmholtz’s Contributions 241 Ewald Hering 242 Space Perception 242 Theory of Color Vision 242 Christine Ladd-Franklin 243 Early Research on Brain Functioning 244 Phrenology 244 Pierre Flourens 247 Paul Broca 248 Gustav Fritsch, Eduard Hitzig, and David Ferrier 250 The Rise of Experimental Psychology 250 Ernst Heinrich Weber 251 Gustav Theodor Fechner 252 Chapter 9 Voluntarism, Structuralism, and Other Early Approaches to Psychology 262 Voluntarism 264 Wilhelm Maximilian Wundt 264 Psychology’s Goals 266 Wundt’s Use of Introspection 267 Elements of Thought 267 Perception, Apperception, and Creative Synthesis 268 Mental Chronometry 268 Psychological Versus Physical Causation 270 Völkerpsychologie 271 The Historical Misunderstanding of Wundt 271 Edward Bradford Titchener 272 Titchener’s Paradoxical Relationship with Female Psychologists 274 Psychology’s Goals 275 xii TABLE OF CONTENTS Titchener’s Use of Introspection 275 Mental Elements 276 Law of Combination 276 Neurological Correlates of Mental Events 277 Context Theory of Meaning 277 The Decline of Structuralism 277 Other Early Approaches to Psychology 278 Franz Clemens Brentano 278 Carl Stumpf 280 Edmund Husserl 281 Oswald Külpe 283 Hans Vaihinger 285 Hermann Ebbinghaus 286 Chapter 10 The Darwinian Influence and the Rise of Mental Testing 293 Evolutionary Theory before Darwin 293 Jean Lamarck 294 Herbert Spencer 294 Charles Darwin 297 The Journey of the Beagle 298 Back in England 298 Darwin’s Theory of Evolution 300 Darwin’s Influence 301 Sir Francis Galton 302 The Measurement of Intelligence 303 The Word-Association Test 305 Mental Imagery 305 Anthropometry 305 The Concept of Correlation 306 Galton’s Contributions to Psychology 307 Intelligence Testing after Galton 307 James McKeen Cattell 307 Alfred Binet 309 Charles Spearman and the Concept of General Intelligence 313 Cyril Burt 314 The Binet-Simon Scale in the United States 315  TABLE OF CONTENTS xiii Henry Herbert Goddard 315 Lewis Madison Terman 317 Leta Stetter Hollingworth 321 Intelligence Testing in the Army 323 Robert M. Yerkes 323 The Deterioration of National Intelligence 324 Chapter 11 Functionalism 334 Early U.S. Psychology 334 Stage One: Moral and Mental Philosophy (1640–1776) 335 Stage Two: Intellectual Philosophy (1776–1886) 335 Stage Three: The U.S. Renaissance (1886–1896) 335 Stage Four: U.S. Functionalism (1896 to Present) 336 Characteristics of Functionalistic Psychology 336 William James 337 James’s Crisis 338 Opposition to Wundt’s Approach to Psychology 340 Stream of Consciousness 341 Habits and Instincts 342 The Self 343 Emotions 344 Free Will 345 Pragmatism 346 James’s Contributions to Psychology 347 Hugo Münsterberg 347 Münsterberg’s Applied Psychology 349 Münsterberg’s Fate 349 Mary Whiton Calkins 350 Granville Stanley Hall 353 President of Clark University 354 Recapitulation Theory 355 Hall’s Magnum Opus 355 Religious Conversion 356 Sublimation 356 Hall’s Opposition to Coeducation 356 Francis Cecil Sumner 358 Psychology at Clark University 362 xiv TABLE OF CONTENTS Functionalism at the University of Chicago 362 John Dewey 362 James Rowland Angell 364 Harvey Carr 366 Functionalism at Columbia University 367 James McKeen Cattell 367 Robert Sessions Woodworth 368 Edward Lee Thorndike 369 The Fate of Functionalism 376 Chapter 12 Behaviorism 384 The Background of Behaviorism 384 Russian Objective Psychology 385 Ivan M. Sechenov 385 Ivan Petrovich Pavlov 388 Vladimir M. Bechterev 394 John B. Watson and Behaviorism 397 Watson’s Adult Life 398 Watson’s Objective Psychology 403 Watson’s Influence 411 William McDougall: Another Type of Behaviorism 412 McDougall’s Definition of Psychology 413 Purposive Behavior 414 The Importance of Instincts 414 The Battle of Behaviorism 415 Chapter 13 Neobehaviorism 423 Positivism 423 Logical Positivism 424 Operationism 425 Physicalism 425 Neobehaviorism 426 Edward Chace Tolman 426 Purposive Behaviorism 428 Tolman’s Use of Rats 429 The Use of Intervening Variables 430 Tolman’s Position on Reinforcement 431  TABLE OF CONTENTS xv Learning versus Performance 431 Tolman’s Influence 433 Clark Leonard Hull 434 Hull’s Hypothetico-Deductive Theory 436 Reinforcement 437 Reaction Potential 437 Hull’s Theory in General 437 Hull’s Influence 437 Edwin Ray Guthrie 438 The One Law of Learning 439 One-Trial Learning 439 Why Practice Improves Performance 439 The Nature of Reinforcement 440 Forgetting 440 Breaking Habits 441 Punishment 441 Drives and Intentions 441 The Formalization of Guthrie’s Theory 441 B. F. Skinner 442 Skinner’s Positivism 444 Functional Analysis of Behavior 444 Operant Behavior 445 The Nature of Reinforcement 446 The Importance of the Environment 446 The Positive Control of Behavior 447 Skinner’s Attitude toward Theory 448 Applications of Skinnerian Principles 448 Behaviorism Today 449 Chapter 14 Gestalt Psychology 456 Antecedents of Gestalt Psychology 457 Immanuel Kant 457 Ernst Mach 457 Christian von Ehrenfels 457 William James 458 Act Psychology 458 Developments in Physics 458 xvi TABLE OF CONTENTS The Founding of Gestalt Psychology 458 Max Wertheimer 459 Kurt Koffka 460 Wolfgang Köhler 461 Isomorphism and the Law of Prägnanz 463 Application of Field Theory 464 Psychophysical Isomorphism 464 Opposition to the Constancy Hypothesis 465 Analysis: Top Down, Not Bottom Up 465 The Law of Prägnanz 466 Perceptual Constancies 467 Perceptual Gestalten 468 The Figure-Ground Relationship 468 Gestalt Principles of Perceptual Organization 468 Subjective and Objective Reality 470 The Gestalt Explanation of Learning 471 Cognitive Trial and Error 471 Insightful Learning 471 Transposition 473 Productive Thinking 474 Memory 476 Memory Processes, Traces, and Systems 476 Lewin’s Field Theory 477 Aristotelian versus Galilean Conception of Science 477 Life Space 478 Motivation 478 Conflict 479 Group Dynamics 480 The Impact of Gestalt Psychology 481 Chapter 15 Early Diagnosis, Explanation, and Treatment of Mental Illness 486 What Is Mental Illness? 486 Harmful Behavior 486 Unrealistic Thoughts and Perceptions 487 Inappropriate Emotions 487 Unpredictable Behavior 487  TABLE OF CONTENTS xvii Early Explanations of Mental Illness 487 Biological Explanations 488 Psychological Explanations 488 Supernatural Explanations 488 Early Approaches to the Treatment of Mental Illness 489 The Psychological Approach 490 The Supernatural Approach 490 The Biological Approach 491 The Return of the Supernatural Approach 493 Gradual Improvement in the Treatment of Mental Illness 495 Philippe Pinel 496 Benjamin Rush 498 Dorothea Lynde Dix 498 Emil Kraepelin 499 Lightner Witmer 500 The Tension between the Psychological and Medical Models of Mental Illness 502 The Use of Hypnotism 504 Franz Anton Mesmer 504 Marquis de Puységur 506 John Elliotson, James Esdaile, and James Braid 507 The Nancy School 507 Charcot’s Proposed Explanation of Hypnosis and Hysteria 508 Chapter 16 Psychoanalysis 515 Antecedents of the Development of Psychoanalysis 516 Sigmund Freud 518 The Cocaine Episode 519 Early Influences on the Development of Psychoanalysis 520 Josef Breuer and the Case of Anna O. 520 Freud’s Visit with Charcot 522 The Birth of Free Association 523 Studies on Hysteria 524 Project for a Scientific Psychology 524 The Seduction Theory 525 Freud’s Self-Analysis 525 Analysis of Dreams 526 xviii TABLE OF CONTENTS The Oedipus Complex 527 The Psychopathology of Everyday Life 528 Humor 529 Freud’s Trip to the United States 530 A Review of the Basic Components of Freud’s Theory of Personality 531 The Id, Ego, and Superego 531 Anxiety and the Ego Defense Mechanisms 533 Psychosexual Stages of Development 534 Freud’s View of Human Nature 536 Religion 537 Freud’s Fate 537 Revisions of the Freudian Legend 538 The Reality of Repressed Memories 540 Evaluation of Freud’s Theory 544 Criticisms 544 Contributions 545 Chapter 17 Early Alternatives to Psychoanalysis 552 Anna Freud 552 Anna Freud’s and Melanie Klein’s Conflicting Views on Child Analysis 553 Ego Psychology 554 Carl Jung 555 Libido 556 The Ego 556 The Personal Unconscious 556 The Collective Unconscious and the Archetypes 556 The Attitudes 557 Causality, Teleology, and Synchronicity 557 Dreams 558 The Importance of Middle Age 558 Criticisms and Contributions 559 Alfred Adler 559 Organ Inferiority and Compensation 560 Feelings of Inferiority 560 Worldviews, Fictional Goals, and Lifestyles 560  TABLE OF CONTENTS xix The Creative Self 561 Karen Horney 561 General Disagreement with Freudian Theory 562 Basic Hostility and Basic Anxiety 563 Adjustments to Basic Anxiety 563 Feminine Psychology 564 Chapter 18 Humanistic (Third-Force) Psychology 570 The Mind, the Body, and the Spirit 570 Antecedents of Third-Force Psychology 571 Phenomenology 572 Existential Psychology 573 Martin Heidegger 573 Ludwig Binswanger 575 Rollo May 577 George Kelly 580 Humanistic Psychology 584 Abraham Maslow 584 Carl Rogers 590 Comparison of Existential and Humanistic Psychology 595 Evaluation 596 Criticisms 596 Contributions 597 Chapter 19 Psychobiology 606 Karl S. Lashley 606 Mass Action and Equipotentiality 607 In Search of the Engram 607 Donald O. Hebb 608 Cell Assemblies and Phase Sequences 609 Roger W. Sperry 610 The Split-Brain Preparation 611 Behavioral Genetics 612 Ethology 613 Sociobiology 613 Noam Chomsky’s Influence 616 xx TABLE OF CONTENTS The Misbehavior of Organisms 616 Genetic Influences on Intelligence and Personality 617 Chapter 20 Cognitive Psychology 623 Developments before 1950 624 Developments during the 1950s 625 Developments after the 1950s 626 Artificial Intelligence 628 The Turing Test 629 Weak versus Strong Artificial Intelligence 629 Searle’s Argument against Strong Artificial Intelligence 629 Are Humans Machines? 630 Information-Processing Psychology 631 The Return of Faculty Psychology 633 The Return of the Mind-Body Problem 633 New Connectionism 635 Antecedents 635 Neural Networks 636 Back-Propagation Systems 637 Chapter 21 Contemporary Psychology 643 The Diversity of Contemporary Psychology 643 Divisions of the American Psychological Association 644 The Tension Between Pure, Scientific Psychology and Applied Psychology 644 Controversy Concerning the Training of Clinical Psychologists 650 Psychology’s Two Cultures 652 Psychology’s Status as a Science 653 Postmodernism 655 Ludwig Wittgenstein 656 Is There Anything New in Psychology? 659  ✵ Preface As with the first five editions of An Introduction to the History of Psychology, the primary purpose of the sixth edition is to provide introductory students with a comprehensive overview of the history of psychology. This purpose is achieved by showing that most of the concerns of contemporary psychologists are mani- festations of themes that have been part of psychology for hundreds, or even thousands, of years. In addition to updates to the suggestions for further reading throughout, ma- jor changes made in this edition include the following: Chapter 1: The sections describing the necessity of utilizing both historicism and presentism in reporting history, on history as a valuable source of ideas, and on Feyerabend’s “anarchistic” description of science were expanded. Chapter 2: Evidence was provided that the Hippocratic oath is of Pythagorean origin; Xenophanes’ views on religion and skepticism were expanded; Plato’s thoughts on sleep and dreaming were added and their re- lationship to Freud’s later views was discussed; Aristotle’s description of what would later be called an approach–approach conflict was added; and evi- dence that Aristotle supported slavery and believed males to be superior to females was provided. Chapter 3: Coverage of Constantine’s influence on early Christianity was expanded, and it was noted that the New Testament as it exists today was first canonized in 367 A.D.; that Martin Luther, as well as John Calvin, embraced Augustine’s doctrine of predestination; and that Anselm’s onto- logical argument for the existence of God was highly influential. Chapter 4: Sections describing Luther’s thoughts on marriage and his debate with Erasmus concerning the existence of human free will were added; the similarity between Montaigne’s critical analyses of the classics and those of xxi xxii PREFACE Derrida was noted; and biographical information on Descartes was expanded. Chapter 5: A discussion of Condillac’s analysis of language was added, and the similarity between his analysis and Wittgenstein’s later analysis was noted. Chapter 6: A section describing the similarity between Kant’s reasons for believing that God necessarily exists and Aristotle’s reasons for believing that an unmoved mover must necessarily exist was added. Chapter 7: The discussions of the Enlightenment, of Lou Andreas-Salomé’s involvement with the Freudian inner circle, and of Nietzsche’s contention that “God is dead” were expanded. A section describing Nietzsche’s dis- tinction between opinions and convictions was added. Chapter 8: The discussion of Ferrier’s contributions to cortical localization research was expanded. Chapter 9: It was noted that, although Wundt found it to be ineffective, Donders’s use of reaction time to measure mental events was rediscovered in the 1960s and used effectively. Chapter 10: The biographical information on Darwin was expanded; the fact that Thomas Huxley became the primary spokesman for Darwin’s theory of evolution was noted; a section on the debate Darwinians had with church authorities concerning the age of the earth was added; and Darwin’s con- tention that women are intellectually inferior to men was further documented. Chapter 11: Coverage of G. Stanley Hall was substantially expanded, and the biographical information on Kenneth Clark was updated. Chapter 12: Bertrand Russell’s general support for Watson’s behaviorism was noted, and evidence was provided that McDougall continued to believe that his hormic psychology would become the foundation of all the social sciences until shortly before he died. Chapter 13: The similarity between Tolman’s approach to studying mental events and that of contemporary cognitive psychology was elaborated, and the continuing influence of behaviorism on contemporary psychology was noted. Chapter 14: A history of research on apparent motion prior to Wertheimer’s was added. Chapter 15: Sections describing Kraepelin’s pioneering research in psycho- pharmacology, and the widespread influence of mesmerism in the United States, were added. Chapter 17: The relationship between Anna Freud’s proposed ego defense mechanism of altruistic surrender and the Stockholm syndrome was noted.  PREFACE xxiii Chapter 18: Further evidence for the compatibility between May’s conten- tion that myth guides most human behavior and contemporary narrative therapy was provided; the observation that Kelly’s fixed-role therapy pro- vides an early version of narrative therapy was added; evidence for the con- tinuing influence of Maslow’s ideas was provided; and coverage of positive psychology was expanded to include the concept of flourishing, and the similarity between that concept and those introduced by earlier humanistic psychologists, was noted. Chapter 19: A section discussing the debate as to whether the fields of so- ciobiology and evolutionary psychology can be equated was added. Chapter 20: Coverage of cognitive science was revised and expanded. Chapter 21: APA divisional and overall membership numbers were updated; the fact that Louisiana became the second state to grant clinical psychologists prescription privileges was noted; the discussion of psychology’s efforts to become a unified discipline was expanded, as was Kimble’s vision of psy- chology as a unified science; and a section describing Wittgenstein’s concept of family resemblance was added. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to thank the following reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions: Steve Donohue, Ph.D, Grand Canyon University John “Jay” Holden, Ph.D, California State University, Northridge Daniel McConnell, Ph.D, Wichita State University Craig Nagoshi, Ph.D, Arizona State University James R. Prather, Ph.D., Western Kentucky University Susana Urbina, Ph.D, University of North Florida Criss Wilhite, M.A., B.C.B.A., Califorinia State University, Fresno B. R. Hergenhahn This page intentionally left blank  1 ✵ Introduction T he definition of psychology has changed as the focus of psychology has changed. At various times in history, psychology has been defined as the study of the psyche or the mind, of the spirit, of consciousness, and more re- cently as the study of, or the science of, behavior. Perhaps, then, we can arrive at an acceptable definition of modern psychology by observing the activities of contemporary psychologists: Some seek the biological correlates of mental events such as sensation, per- ception, or ideation. Some concentrate on understanding the principles that govern learning and memory. Some seek to understand humans by studying nonhuman animals. Some study unconscious motivation. Some seek to improve industrial-organizational productivity, educational practices, or child-rearing practices by utilizing psychological principles. Some attempt to explain human behavior in terms of evolutionary theory. Some attempt to account for individual differences among people in such areas as personality, intelligence, and creativity. Some are primarily interested in perfecting therapeutic tools that can be used to help individuals with mental disturbances. Some focus on the strategies that people use in adjusting to the environment or in problem solving. Some study how language develops and how, once developed, it relates to a variety of cultural activities. Some explore computer programs as models for understanding human thought processes. 1 2 CHAPTER 1 Still others study how humans change over the Aristotle, for example, created elaborate theories course of their lives as a function of maturation that attempted to account for such processes as and experience. memory, perception, and learning. Is this the point at which psychology started? Or did psychology These are just a few of the activities that engage come into existence when it became a separate sci- contemporary psychologists. ence in the 19th century? It is common these days Clearly, no single definition of psychology can to begin a history of psychology at the point where take into consideration the wide variety of activities psychology became a separate science. This ap- engaged in by the more than 148,000 members and proach is unsatisfactory for two reasons: (1) It ignores the vast philosophical heritage that molded affiliates of the American Psychological Association, psychology into the type of science that it eventu- not to mention the many other psychologists ally became; and (2) it omits important aspects of around the world. It seems best to say simply that psychology that are outside the realm of science. psychology is defined by the professional activities Although it is true that since the mid-19th century, of psychologists. These activities are characterized psychology has, to a large extent, embraced the by a rich diversity of methods, topics of interest, scientific method, many highly influential psychol- ogists did not feel compelled to follow the dictates and assumptions about human nature. A primary of the scientific method. Their work cannot be purpose of this book is to examine the origins of ignored. modern psychology and to show that most of the This book’s coverage of the history of psychol- concerns of today’s psychologists are manifestations ogy will not go back to the conceptions of the of themes that have been part of psychology for ancients. I believe that such conceptions are within hundreds or, in some cases, thousands of years. the domain of psychology, but space does not per- mit such a comprehensive history. Rather, this book starts with the major Greek philosophers whose explanations of human behavior and PROBLEMS IN WRITING A thought processes are the ones that philosophers HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY and psychologists have been reacting to ever since. Historiography is the study of the proper way to What to Include write history. The topic is complex, and there are no final answers to many of the questions it raises. In this Typically, in determining what to include in a his- section, we offer our answers to a few basic questions tory of anything, one traces those people, ideas, and that must be answered in writing a history. events that led to what is important now. This book, too, takes this approach by looking at the way psychology is today and then attempting to Where to Start show how it became that way. There is at Literally, psychology means the study of the psy- least one major danger in using the present state che, or mind, and this study is as old as the human of psychology as a guide in writing its history, how- species. The ancients, for example, attempted to ever. Stocking (1965) calls such an approach to his- account for dreams, mental illness, emotions, and tory presentism, as contrasted with what he calls fantasies. Was this psychology? Or did psychology historicism—the study of the past for its own sake commence when explanations of human cognitive without attempting to show the relationship be- experience, such as those proposed by the early tween the past and present. Copleston (2001) de- Greeks, became more systematic? Plato and scribes historicism as it applies to philosophy:  INTRODUCTION 3 If one wishes to understand the philosophy where it has not happened, even if we only of a given epoch, one has to make the want to observe change, some level of attempt to understand the mentality and presentism is necessary; without the present, presuppositions of the men who lived in the very concept of “history” would be that epoch, irrespective of whether one meaningless. (p. 33) shares that mentality and those presuppo- sitions or not. (p. 11) Although contemporary psychology provides a guide for deciding what individuals, ideas, and On the other hand, presentism attempts to un- events to include in a history of psychology, there derstand the past in terms of contemporary knowl- remains the question of how much detail to in- edge and standards. Presentism implies that the clude. If, for example, we attempted to trace all present state of a discipline represents its highest causes of an idea, we would be engaged in an al- state of development and that earlier events led di- most unending search. In fact, after attempting to rectly to this state. In this view, the latest is the best. trace the origins of an idea or a concept in psychol- Although I use present psychology as a guide to ogy, we are left with the impression that nothing is what to include in psychology’s history, I do not ever entirely new. Seldom, if ever, is a single indi- believe that current psychology is necessarily the vidual solely responsible for an idea or a concept. best psychology. The field is simply too diverse to Rather, individuals are influenced by other indivi- make such a judgment. At present, psychology is duals, who in turn were influenced by other indi- exploring many topics, methods, and assumptions. viduals, and so on. A history of almost anything, Which of these explorations will survive for inclu- then, can be viewed as an unending stream of in- sion in future history books is impossible to say. terrelated events. The “great” individuals are typi- Using psychology’s present as a frame of reference, cally those who synthesize existing nebulous ideas therefore, does not necessarily assume that psychol- into a clear, forceful viewpoint. Attempting to fully ogy’s past evolved into its present or that current document the origins of an important idea or con- psychology represents the best psychology. In gen- cept in a history book would involve so many de- eral, then, I assume historicism provides a better tails that the book would become too long and framework for understanding psychology’s history boring. The usual solution is to omit large amounts than presentism. However, I agree with Lovett of information, thus making the history selective. (2006) that no matter how much historicism is em- Typically, only those individuals who did the phasized, presentism cannot be completely avoided most to develop or popularize an idea are covered. when reporting history: For example, Charles Darwin is generally associated with evolutionary theory when, in fact, evolution- To try to understand what historical events ary theory existed in one form or another for thou- were like for those who participated in those sands of years. Darwin documented and reported events is reasonable and desirable, but to evidence supporting evolutionary theory in a way conduct historical research—from the se- that made the theory’s validity hard to ignore. lection of projects to the evaluation of Thus, although Darwin was not the first to formu- sources to the interpretation of findings— late evolutionary theory, he did much to substanti- without any regard for present knowledge is ate and popularize it, and we therefore associate it counterproductive. The present trend of with his name. The same is true for Freud and the “historical contextualization” supports this notion of unconscious motivation. assertion as soon as we ask what object we This book focuses on those individuals who are historically contextualizing: psycholog- either did the most to develop an idea or, for what- ical research and practice. If we ever hope to ever reason, have become closely associated with an know where progress has happened and idea. Regrettably, this approach does not do justice 4 CHAPTER 1 to many important individuals who could be men- will at least be understood; whether they are ac- tioned or to other individuals who are lost to an- cepted, rejected, or ignored is another matter. tiquity or were not loud or lucid enough to de- The approach taken in this book is to combine mand historical recognition. the Zeitgeist, the great-person, and the historical development approaches to writing history. This book will attempt to show that sometimes the spirit Choice of Approach of the times seems to produce great individuals and Once the material to be included in a history of that sometimes great individuals influence the spirit psychology has been chosen, the choice of ap- of the times. I will also show how both great in- proach remains. One approach is to emphasize the dividuals and the general climate of the times can influence of such nonpsychological factors as devel- change the meaning of an idea or a concept. In opments in other sciences, political climate, techno- other words, I take an eclectic approach that en- logical advancement, and economic conditions. tails using whatever approach seems best able to Together, these and other factors create a illuminate an aspect of the history of psychology. Zeitgeist, or a spirit of the times, which many historians consider vital to the understanding of any historical development. An alternative is to WHY STUDY THE HISTORY OF take the great-person approach by emphasizing the works of individuals such as Plato, Aristotle, PSYCHOLOGY? Descartes, Darwin, or Freud. Ralph Waldo Emerson (1841/1981) embraced the great-person approach to history, saying that history “resolves Perspective itself very easily into the biography of a few stout and earnest persons” (p. 138). Another approach is As we have seen, ideas are seldom, if ever, born the historical development approach, showing full-blown. Rather, they typically develop over a how various individuals or events contributed to long period of time. Seeing ideas in their historical changes in an idea or concept through the years. perspective allows the student to more fully ap- For example, one could focus on how the idea of preciate the subject matter of modern psychology. mental illness has changed throughout history. However, viewing the problems and questions cur- In his approach to the history of psychology, rently dealt with in psychology as manifestations of E. G. Boring (1886–1968) stressed the importance centuries-old problems and questions is humbling of the Zeitgeist in determining whether, or to what and sometimes frustrating. After all, if psychology’s extent, an idea or viewpoint will be accepted. problems have been worked on for centuries, Clearly, ideas do not occur in a vacuum. A new should they not be solved by now? Conversely, idea, to be accepted or even considered, must be knowing that our current studies have been shared compatible with existing ideas. In other words, a and contributed to by some of the greatest minds in new idea will be tolerated only if it arises within an human history is exciting. environment that can assimilate it. An idea or viewpoint that arises before people are prepared Deeper Understanding for it will not be understood well enough to be critically evaluated. The important point here is With greater perspective comes deeper understand- that validity is not the only criterion by which ideas ing. With a knowledge of history, the student need are judged; psychological and sociological factors not take on faith the importance of the subject are at least as important. New ideas are always matter of modern psychology. A student with a judged within the context of existing ideas. If historical awareness knows where psychology’s sub- new ideas are close enough to existing ideas, they ject matter came from and why it is considered  INTRODUCTION 5 important. Just as we gain a greater understanding exhaust our concepts; we only grow tired of a person’s current behavior by learning more of them.… about that person’s past experiences, so do we Fashions have their amusing and their gain a greater understanding of current psychology serious sides. We can smile at the way by studying its historical origins. Boring (1950) bearded problems receive tonsorial trans- made this point in relation to experimental formation. Having tired of “suggestibility,” psychologists: we adopt the new hairdo known as “persuasibility.” Modern ethnology excites The experimental psychologist … needs us, and we are not troubled by the recol- historical sophistication within his own lection that a century ago John Stuart Mill sphere of expertness. Without such staked down the term to designate the new knowledge he sees the present in distorted science of human character.… perspective, he mistakes old facts and old Reinforcement appeals to us but not the views for new, and he remains unable to age-long debate over hedonism. The evaluate the significance of new move- problem of freedom we brush aside in fa- ments and methods. In this matter I can vor of “choice points.” We avoid the hardly state my faith too strongly. A psy- body-mind problem but are in fashion chological sophistication that contains no when we talk about “brain models.” Old component of historical orientation seems wine, we find, tastes better from new to me to be no sophistication at all. (p. ix) bottles. The serious side of the matter enters when we and our students forget that the Recognition of Fads and Fashions wine is indeed old. Picking up a recent While studying the history of psychology, one is number of the Journal of Abnormal and Social often struck by the realization that a viewpoint Psychology, I discover that the twenty-one does not always fade away because it is incorrect; articles written by American psychologists rather, some viewpoints disappear simply because confine 90 per cent of their references to they become unpopular. What is popular in psy- publications of the past ten years, although chology varies with the Zeitgeist. For example, most of the problems they investigate have when psychology first emerged as a science, the gray beards.… Is it any wonder that our emphasis was on “pure” science—that is, on the graduate students reading our journals gaining of knowledge without any concern for its conclude that literature more than a de- usefulness. Later, when Darwin’s theory became cade old has no merit and can be safely popular, psychology shifted its attention to human disregarded? At a recent doctoral exami- processes that were related to survival or that al- nation the candidate was asked what his lowed humans to live more effective lives. Today, thesis on physiological and psychological one major emphasis in psychology is on cognitive conditions of stress had to do with the processes, and that emphasis is due, in part, to re- body-mind problem. He confessed that he cent advances in computer technology. had never heard of the problem. An un- The illustrious personality theorist Gordon W. dergraduate said that all he knew about Allport (1897–1967) spoke of fashions in Thomas Hobbes was that he sank with the psychology. Leviathan when it hit an iceberg in 1912. (1964, pp. 149–151) Our profession progresses in fits and starts, largely under the spur of fashion.… With such examples of how research topics We never seem to solve our problems or move in and out of vogue in science, we see again 6 CHAPTER 1 that “factuality” is not the only variable determin- been proposed. This fact fits nicely into the ing whether an idea is accepted. By studying the Zeitgeist interpretation of history, suggesting that emotional and societal factors related to the accu- some conditions are better suited for the acceptance mulation of knowledge, the student can place cur- of an idea than others. The notions of evolution, rently accepted knowledge into a more realistic unconscious motivation, and conditioned responses perspective. Such a perspective allows the student had been proposed and reproposed several times to realize that the process through which a body of before they were offered in an atmosphere that al- knowledge is accepted as important or as “true” is lowed their critical evaluation. Even Copernicus’s at least partially subjective and arbitrary. As “revolutionary” heliocentric theory had been en- Zeitgeists change, so does what is considered fash- tertained by the Greeks many centuries before he ionable in science, and psychology has not been proposed it. A final example is that of lateralization immune to this process. of brain function. Many believe that the idea that the two cerebral hemispheres function in radically different ways is a new one. However, over 100 Avoiding Repetition of Mistakes years ago, Brown-Séquard’s article “Have We George Santayana said, “Those who cannot re- Two Brains or One?” (1890) was one of many member the past are condemned to repeat it.” written on the topic. In fact, important scientific Such repetition would be bad enough if it involved ideas can be rejected more than once before they only successes because so much time and energy are finally appreciated. Feyerabend (1987) said, would be wasted. It is especially unfortunate, how- The history of science is full of theories ever, if mistakes are repeated. As we will see in this which were pronounced dead, then resur- text, psychology has had its share of mistakes and rected, then pronounced dead again only to dead ends. One mistake was the embracing of phre- celebrate another triumphant comeback. It nology, the belief that personality characteristics makes sense to preserve faulty points of view could be understood by analyzing the bumps and for possible future use. The history of ideas, depressions on a person’s skull (see Chapter 8). One methods, and prejudices is an important part dead end may have been the entire school of struc- of the ongoing practice of science and this turalism, whose members attempted to study the practice can change direction in surprising elements of thought by using the introspective ways. (p. 33) method (see Chapter 9). It is generally thought that the efforts of the structuralists, although ex- No doubt, many potentially fruitful ideas in psy- tremely popular at the time, were sterile and un- chology’s history are still waiting to be tried again productive. Yet it was important for psychology under new, perhaps more receptive, circumstances. that such an effort was made, for we learned that such an approach led to little that was useful. This Curiosity and other important lessons would be lost if the errors of the past were repeated because of a lack Instead of asking the question, Why study the his- of historical information. tory of psychology? it might make more sense to ask, Why not? Many people study U.S. history be- A Source of Valuable Ideas cause they are interested in the United States, and younger members of a family often delight in hear- By studying history, we may discover ideas that ing stories about the early days of the family’s elder were developed at an earlier time but, for whatever members. In other words, wanting to know as reason, remained dormant. The history of science much as possible about a topic or person of interest, offers several examples of an idea taking hold only including a topic’s or a person’s history, is natural. after being rediscovered long after it had originally Psychology is not an exception.  INTRODUCTION 7 WHAT IS SCIENCE? systematic attempt to explain these facts constitutes the theoretical component. As At various times in history, influential individuals science has developed, specialization, or (such as Galileo and Kant) have claimed that psy- division of labor, has occurred; some men chology could never be a science because of its have devoted their time mainly to the concern with subjective experience. Many natural making of observations, while a smaller scientists still believe this, and some psychologists number have occupied themselves with would not argue with them. How a history of psy- the problems of explanation. (p. 1) chology is written will be influenced by whether psychology can be considered a science. To answer the question of whether psychology is a science, however, we must first attempt to define science. A Combination of Rationalism Science came into existence as a way of answering and Empiricism questions about nature by examining nature di- What makes science such a powerful tool is that it rectly rather than by depending on church dogma, combines two ancient methods of attaining knowl- past authorities, superstition, or abstract thought edge: rationalism and empiricism. The rationalist processes alone. From science’s inception, its ulti- believes that mental operations or principles must be mate authority has been empirical observation employed before knowledge can be attained. For (that is, the direct observation of nature), but there example, the rationalist says that the validity or inval- is more to science than simply observing nature. To idity of certain propositions can be determined by be useful, observations must be organized or cate- carefully applying the rules of logic. The empiricist gorized in some way, and the ways in which they maintains that the source of all knowledge is sensory are similar to or different from other observations observation. True knowledge, therefore, can be de- must be noted. After noting similarities and differ- rived from or validated only by sensory experience. ences among observations, many scientists take the After centuries of inquiry, it was discovered that, by additional step of attempting to explain what they themselves, rationalism and empiricism had limited have observed. Science, then, is often characterized usefulness. Science combined the two positions, and as having two major components: (1) empirical ob- knowledge has been accumulating at an exponential servation and (2) theory. According to Hull (1943), rate ever since. these two aspects of science can be seen in the ear- The rational aspect of science prevents it from liest efforts of humans to understand their world: simply collecting an endless array of disconnected Men are ever engaged in the dual activity empirical facts. Because the scientist must somehow of making observations and then seeking make sense out of what he or she observes, theories explanations of the resulting revelations. are formulated. A scientific theory has two main All normal men in all times have observed functions: (1) It organizes empirical observations, the rising and setting of the sun and the and (2) it acts as a guide for future observations. several phases of the moon. The more The latter function of a scientific theory generates thoughtful among them have then pro- confirmable propositions. In other words, a the- ceeded to ask the question, “Why? Why ory suggests propositions that are tested experimen- does the moon wax and wane? Why does tally. If the propositions generated by a theory are the sun rise and set, and where does it go confirmed through experimentation, the theory when it sets?” Here we have the two es- gains strength; if the propositions are not confirmed sential elements of modern science: The by experimentation, the theory loses strength. If the making of observations constitutes the theory generates too many erroneous propositions, empirical or factual component, and the it must be either revised or abandoned. Thus, 8 CHAPTER 1 scientific theories must be testable. That is, they of natural events, however, is highly complex and must generate hypotheses that can be validated or usually requires substantial experimental research. It invalidated empirically. In science, then, the direct cannot be assumed, for example, that contiguity observation of nature is important, but such obser- proves causation. If rain follows a rain dance, it vation is often guided by theory. cannot be assumed that the dance necessarily caused the rain. Also complicating matters is the fact that events seldom, if ever, have a single cause; rather, The Search for Laws they have multiple causes. Questions such as, What Another feature of science is that it seeks to discover caused the Second World War? and What causes lawful relationships. A scientific law can be defined schizophrenia? are still far from answered. Even as a consistently observed relationship between two simpler questions such as, Why did John quit his or more classes of empirical events. For example, job? or Why did Jane marry John? are, in reality, when X occurs, Y also tends to occur. By stressing enormously complex. In the history of philosophy lawfulness, science is proclaiming an interest in and science, the concept of causation has been one the general case rather than the particular case. of the most perplexing (see, for example, Traditionally, science is not interested in private or Clatterbaugh, 1999). unique events but in general laws that can be publicly observed and verified. That is, a scientific law is gen- The Assumption of Determinism eral and, because it describes a relationship between empirical events, it is amenable to public observa- Because a main goal of science is to discover lawful tion. The concept of public observation is an impor- relationships, science assumes that what is being in- tant aspect of science. All scientific claims must be vestigated is lawful. For example, the chemist as- verifiable by any interested person. In science, there sumes that chemical reactions are lawful, and the is no secret knowledge available only to qualified physicist assumes that the physical world is lawful. authorities. The assumption that what is being studied can be There are two general classes of scientific laws. understood in terms of causal laws is called deter- One class is correlational laws, which describe minism. Taylor (1967) defined determinism as the how classes of events vary together in some system- philosophical doctrine that “states that for every- atic way. For example, scores on intelligence tests thing that ever happens there are conditions such tend to correlate positively with scores on creativity that, given them, nothing else could happen” tests. With such information, only prediction is pos- (p. 359). The determinist, then, assumes that every- sible. That is, if we knew a person’s score on an thing that occurs is a function of a finite number of intelligence test, we could predict his or her score causes and that, if these causes were known, an on a creativity test, and vice versa. A more powerful event could be predicted with complete accuracy. class of laws is causal laws, which specify how However, knowing all causes of an event is not events are causally related. For example, if we necessary; the determinist simply assumes that they knew the causes of a disease, we could predict and exist and that as more causes are known, predictions control that disease—preventing the causes of a dis- become more accurate. For example, almost every- ease from occurring prevents the disease from oc- one would agree that the weather is a function of a curring. Thus, correlational laws allow prediction, finite number of variables such as sunspots, high- but causal laws allow prediction and control. For altitude jet streams, and barometric pressure; yet this reason, causal laws are more powerful than cor- weather forecasts are always probabilistic because relational laws and thus are generally considered many of these variables change constantly and more desirable. others are simply unknown. The assumption under- A major goal of science is to discover the lying weather prediction, however, is determinism. causes of natural phenomena. Specifying the causes All sciences assume determinism.  INTRODUCTION 9 REVISIONS IN THE Vienna by beginning a lecture with the following instructions: “Take pencil and TRADITIONAL VIEW OF paper: carefully observe, and write down SCIENCE what you have observed!” They asked, of course, what I wanted them to observe. The traditional view is that science involves empir- Clearly the instruction, “Observe!” is ical observation, theory formulation, theory testing, absurd.… Observation is always selective. It theory revision, prediction, control, the search for needs a chosen object, a definite task, an lawful relationships, and the assumption of deter- interest, a point of view, a problem. (p. 61) minism. Some prominent philosophers of science, So for Popper, scientific activity starts with a however, take issue with at least some aspects of the problem, and the problem determines what obser- traditional view of science. Among them are Karl vations scientists will make. The next step is to pro- Popper and Thomas Kuhn. pose solutions to the problem (conjectures) and Karl Popper then attempt to find fault with the proposed solu- tions (refutations). Popper saw scientific method as Karl Popper (1902–1994) disagreed with the tradi- involving three stages: problems, theories (proposed tional description of science in two fundamental ways. solutions), and criticism. First, he disagreed that scientific activity starts with empirical observation. According to Popper, the older Principle of Falsifiability. According to Popper, view of science implies that scientists wander around the demarcation criterion that distinguishes a scien- making observations and then attempt to explain what tific theory from a nonscientific theory is the prin- they have observed. Popper (1963/2002a) showed the ciple of falsifiability. A scientific theory must be problem with such a view: refutable. Contrary to what many believe, if any con- ceivable observation agrees with a theory, the theory is Twenty-five years ago I tried to bring home weak, not strong. Popper spent a great deal of time [this] point to a group of physics students in criticizing the theories of Freud and Adler for this rea- son. Without exception, everything a person does can be seen as supportive of either of these theories. This is because those theories are so vague that no matter what happens, their verification can be claimed. According to Popper, it is also vagueness that prevents a meaning- ful test of the horoscopes created by astrologers (1963/2002a, p. 49). Popper contrasted such theories with that of Einstein, which predicts precisely what should or should not happen if the theory is correct. Thus, Einstein’s theory, unlike the theories of Freud © Keystone/Staff/Hulton Archive/Getty Images and Adler and astrological predictions, was refutable and therefore scientific. Thus, for Popper, for a theory to be scientific, it must make risky predictions—predictions that run a real risk of being incorrect. Theories that do not make risky predictions or that explain phenom- ena after they have already occurred are, according to Popper, not scientific. In addition to vagueness, another major problem with many psychological Karl Popper theories (such as Freud’s and Adler’s) is that they 10 CHAPTER 1 engage more in postdiction (explaining phenom- cal” … it is not thereby found to be un- ena after they have already occurred) than in pre- important, or insignificant, or “meaning- diction. Whether due to vagueness or the emphasis less,” or “nonsensical.” (1963/2002a, p. 50) on postdiction, these theories make no risky predic- tions and are in no danger of being falsified. They Popper used falsification as a demarcation be- are, therefore, unscientific. tween a scientific and a nonscientific theory but not According to Popper, it is a theory’s incorrect between a useful and useless theory. Many theories predictions, rather than its correct ones, that cause in psychology fail Popper’s test of falsifiability either scientific progress. This idea is nicely captured by because they are stated in such general terms that Marx and Goodson (1976): they are confirmed by almost any observation or because they engage in postdiction rather than pre- In real scientific life theories typically diction. Such theories lack scientific rigor but are contribute not by being right but by being often still found to be useful. Freud’s and Adler’s wrong. In other words, scientific advance in theories are examples. theory as well as experiments tends to be built upon the successive corrections of many errors, both small and large. Thus Thomas Kuhn the popular notion that a theory must be Until recently, it was widely believed that the sci- right to be useful is incorrect. (p. 249) entific method guaranteed objectivity and that sci- In Popper’s view, all scientific theories will ence produced information in a steady, progressive eventually be found to be false and will be replaced way. It was assumed that the world consists of by more adequate theories; it is always just a matter knowable “truths” and that following scientific of time. For this reason, the highest status that a procedures allowed science to systematically ap- scientific theory can attain, according to Popper, is proximate those truths. In other words, scientific not yet disconfirmed. Popperian science is an unend- activity was guided by the correspondence the- ing search for better and better solutions to pro- ory of truth, “the notion that the goal, when eval- blems or explanations of phenomena. Brett uating scientific laws or theories, is to determine (1912–1921/1965) made this point effectively: whether or not they correspond to an external, mind-independent world” (Kuhn, 2000a, p. 95). We tend to think of science as a “body of Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996) changed that con- knowledge” which began to be accumu- ception of science by showing science to be a lated when men hit upon “scientific highly subjective enterprise. method.” This is a superstition. It is more in keeping with the history of thought to Paradigms and Normal Science. According to describe science as the myths about the Kuhn, in the physical sciences one viewpoint is world which have not yet been found to commonly shared by most members of a science. be wrong. (p. 37) In physics or chemistry, for example, most research- ers share a common set of assumptions or beliefs Does this mean Popper believed that nonscien- about their subject matter. Kuhn refers to such a tific theories are useless? Absolutely not! He said, widely accepted viewpoint as a paradigm. Al- Historically speaking all—or very nearly though Kuhn used the term paradigm in several all—scientific theories originate from ways, most typically he defined it as “the entire myths, and … a myth may contain im- constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so portant anticipations of scientific on shared by the members of a given [scientific] theories.… I thus [believe] that if a theory is community” (1996, p. 175). For those scientists ac- found to be non-scientific, or “metaphysi- cepting a paradigm, it becomes the way of looking  INTRODUCTION 11 at and analyzing the subject matter of their science. successful, the profession will have solved Once a paradigm is accepted, the activities of those problems that its members could scarcely accepting it become a matter of exploring the im- have imagined and would never have un- plications of that paradigm. Kuhn referred to such dertaken without commitment to the activities as normal science. Normal science pro- paradigm. And at least part of that vides what Kuhn called a “mopping-up” operation achievement always proves to be perma- for a paradigm. While following a paradigm, scien- nent. (Kuhn, 1996, pp. 24–25) tists explore in depth the problems defined by the paradigm and utilize the techniques suggested by That is the positive side of having research guided the paradigm while exploring those problems. by a paradigm, but there is also a negative side. Kuhn likened normal science to puzzle solving. Although normal science allows for the thorough Like puzzles, the problems of normal science have analysis of the phenomena on which a paradigm fo- an assured solution, and there are “rules that limit cuses, it blinds scientists to other phenomena and per- both the nature of acceptable solutions and the steps haps better explanations for what they are studying. by which they are to be obtained” (Kuhn, 1996, Mopping-up operations are what engage p. 38). Kuhn saw neither normal science nor puzzle most scientists throughout their careers. solving as involving much creativity: “Perhaps the They constitute what I am here calling most striking feature of … normal research pro- normal science. Closely examined, blems … is how little they aim to produce major whether historically or in the contempo- novelties, conceptual or phenomenal” (1996, rary laboratory, that enterprise seems an p. 35). Although a paradigm restricts the range of attempt to force nature into the preformed phenomena scientists examine, it does guarantee and relatively inflexible box that the para- that certain phenomena are studied thoroughly. digm supplied. No part of the aim of By focusing attention upon a small range normal science is to call forth new sorts of of relatively esoteric problems, the para- phenomena; indeed, those that will not fit digm forces scientists to investigate some the box are often not seen at all. Nor do part of nature in a detail and depth that scientists normally aim to invent new the- would otherwise be unimaginable.… ories, and they are often intolerant of those During the period when the paradigm is invented by others. Instead, normal- scientific research is directed to the articu- lation of those phenomena and theories that the paradigm already supplies. (Kuhn, 1996, p. 24) A paradigm, then, determines what constitutes a research problem and how the solution to that problem is sought. In other words, a paradigm guides all of the researcher’s activities. More impor- tant, however, is that researchers become emotion- ally involved in their paradigm; it becomes part of their lives and is therefore very difficult to give up. MIT News Office How Sciences Change. How do scientific para- digms change? According to Kuhn, not very easily. First, there must be persistent observations that a cur- Thomas S. Kuhn rently accepted paradigm cannot explain; these are 12 CHAPTER 1 called anomalies. Usually, a single scientist or a small ary stage, during which an existing paradigm is group of scientists will propose an alternative view- displaced by another paradigm. point, one that will account for most of the phenom- ena that the prevailing paradigm accounts for and will Paradigms and Psychology also explain the anomalies. Kuhn indicated that there is typically great resistance to the new paradigm and What has all of this to do with psychology? that converts to it are won over very slowly. Psychology has been described as a preparadigmatic Eventually, however, the new paradigm wins out discipline (Staats, 1981) because it does not have and displaces the old one. According to Kuhn, this one widely accepted paradigm but instead several describes what happened when Einstein challenged competing schools or camps that exist simulta- the Newtonian conception of the universe. Now the neously. For example, in psychology today we Einsteinian paradigm is generating its own normal see camps that can be labeled behavioristic, func- science and will continue to do so until it is over- tionalistic, cognitive, psychobiological, psychoana- thrown by another paradigm. lytic, evolutionary, and humanistic. Some see this Kuhn portrayed science as a method of inquiry preparadigmatic situation as negative and insist that that combines the objective scientific method and psychology is ready to synthesize all of its diverse the emotional makeup of the scientist. Science pro- elements into one unified paradigm (for example, gresses, according to Kuhn, because scientists are Staats, 1981, 1989, 1991). Other psychologists do forced to change their belief systems; and belief not agree that psychology is a preparadigmatic dis- systems are very difficult to change, whether for a cipline but claim that psychology is a discipline that group of scientists or for anyone else. has, and perhaps has always had, several coexisting paradigms (or, at least, themes or research tradi- The Stages of Scientific Development. Accord- tions). For these psychologists, there has never ing to Kuhn, the development of a paradigm been, nor has there been a need for, a Kuhnian that comes to dominate a science occurs over a type of revolution (for example, Koch, 1981, long period of time. Prior to the development of 1993; Leahey, 1992; Royce, 1975; Rychlak, a paradigm, a science typically goes through a pre- 1975). The latter psychologists view the coexistence paradigmatic stage during which a number of of several paradigms in psychology as healthy, pro- competing viewpoints exist. During this period, ductive, and perhaps inevitable because psychology which Kuhn referred to as prescientific, a discipline studies humans. is characterized by a number of rival camps or Mayr (1994) notes that Kuhn was a physicist schools, a situation contrary to unification and and says that perhaps his analysis of scientific change that results in, essentially, random fact gathering. applied to that science but not others. For example, Such circumstances continue to exist until one Mayr observes that several paradigms have always school succeeds in defeating its competitors and be- existed simultaneously in biology, and there was a comes a paradigm. At this point, the discipline be- kind of Darwinian competition for the acceptance comes a science, and a period of normal science of ideas among them. Successful ideas, no matter begins. The normal science generated by the para- what their source, survived, and unsuccessful ideas digm continues until the paradigm is displaced by did not. This natural selection among ideas is called a new one, which in turn will generate its own evolutionary epistemology, and it conflicts with normal science. Kuhn saw sciences as passing Kuhn’s concept of paradigm shifts. The question through three distinct stages: the preparadigmatic remains as to whether psychology is more like bi- stage, during which rival camps or schools compete ology or like physics in this regard. In this text, it for dominance of the field; the paradigmatic is assumed that psychology is a multiparadigmatic stage, during which the puzzle-solving activity discipline rather than a discipline at the preparadig- called normal science occu