5. Using crackdowns constructively.pdf

Using crackdowns constructively Chapter 8...

Using crackdowns constructively Chapter 8 Using crackdowns constructively in crime reduction Nick Tilley Introduction Police crackdowns describe ‘sudden increases in officer presence, sanctions and threats of apprehension either for specific offences or for all offences in specific places’ (Sherman, 1990). Crackdowns thus com- prise heightened enforcement activities relative to those that normally occur. They do not, of course, necessarily involve only the police – other enforcement agencies may apply crackdowns on their own or do so in conjunction with the police. Crackdowns require the allocation of additional resources in relation to the offences and/or places targeted. They are ordinarily short term. There is, as a rule, a return to back- ground levels of enforcement. The police (and other enforcement agencies) will rarely if ever have the resources to enforce all laws in relation to all offenders in all places. Copyright © 2004. Willan Publishing. All rights reserved. Decisions on what to prioritise have to be made. A police (or other agency) policy of applying crackdowns and switching their focus around describes one way of allocating enforcement resources. Others might include, for example, focusing consistently on the most costly offences, local residents’ chief concerns, government priorities or the local police commander’s views of what matters most, or some mixture of all these. The risk of prioritisation is that low priority offences, even if a substantial nuisance, will effectively be decriminalised since they will rarely if ever come to compete successfully with higher priority issues for police attention. In a revolving crackdown approach even quite minor offences can periodically become a focus for concentrated enforcement (Wright, 1994). 117 Hopkins, B. R. (Ed.). (2004). Hard cop, soft cop. Willan Publishing. Created from ntuuk on 2024-07-16 14:05:19.  Hard Cop, Soft Cop Crackdowns may or may not, however, be implemented as part of a coherent approach to crime and disorder problems. They may simply be part of the suite of responses that the police deploy from time to time in response to particular problems that have come to a head, or they may be applied strategically in an effort to achieve longer-term benefits. Applied strategically they may form part of a series of linked measures to address an issue or they may be implemented as stand- alone responses though configured with an eye to having a sustained impact. Crackdowns have a bad name. They seem to involve the arbitrary application of police authority to particular groups or to those in particular areas and thereby to be discriminatory and unjust. At their worst they can provoke perverse effects, alienating the community and creating mistrust of the police. The Scarman Report vividly describes how crackdowns can backfire (Scarman, 1981). Operation Swamp was followed by riots which spread widely. Lawlessness was generated by the intensified police attention among a disconsolate population that had been socially and economically marginalised. It evidently did so by intensifying community suspicion that the police were persecuting residents on the basis of their race and style of life. The (predominantly white) police went into (substantially black) Brixton, where levels of perceived police legitimacy were already low and targeted their enforcement activities there. Far from containing crime the upshot was a revolt against the police. Well-targeted crackdowns have, nevertheless, also been shown to be capable of producing rapid falls in crime (e.g. Ross et al., 1970; Homel, 1995; Braga et al., 1999). Moreover the effects have been found often to outlast the direct application of the crackdown (Sherman, 1990). If crackdowns are unconditionally applied then they risk producing unwanted side effects from time to time. If they are eschewed com- Copyright © 2004. Willan Publishing. All rights reserved. pletely, one potentially effective means to reduce crime is excluded. A key issue both for research and practice is thus that of determining the conditions in which crackdowns can produce reductions in crime without the unwanted side effects. This involves asking the realist question, ‘In what circumstances and how do crackdowns work for whom?’ (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). Sherman’s theory of crackdown In a seminal paper published in 1990 Sherman lays down many of the key terms used to discuss crackdowns and develops a theory of how 118 Hopkins, B. R. (Ed.). (2004). Hard cop, soft cop. Willan Publishing. Created from ntuuk on 2024-07-16 14:05:19.  Using crackdowns constructively they may work (Sherman, 1990). The theory is not articulated explicitly in realist terms but it lends itself to a realist reading. Sherman also reviews the then literature reporting studies of crackdowns and explores in more detail how they have been found to work in practice. In the left-hand column of Table 8.1 are listed Sherman’s main concepts for discussing crackdowns. The middle column briefly explains the meaning of the concept. The column to the right interprets the concept in realist terms. Realists attempt to produce ‘context– mechanism–outcome pattern configurations’. These describe the ways in which effects (intended and unintended outcomes) are brought about by the operation of causal processes (mechanisms) in the circumstances in which interventions are made (context). Measures are deemed to bring about their outcomes by activating one or more unseen causal mechanism. They do so by changing the context in which agents act. Mechanisms normally refer to the reasoning and resources of those affected. Thus, to take the first line of Table 8.1, heightened ‘presence’ of police (i.e. an increase in the ratio of police officers to potential offenders) alters the context for the potential offenders’ decisions to offend or not to do so. Looking down the table ‘incapacitation’ describes a mechanism through which outcomes are brought about, though, unusually, it does not refer to changed reasoning on the part of potential offenders but rather their physical containment. Further down still we find ‘initial deterrence decay’. This captures both an outcome (reduced reduction in crime) and the mechanism through which this is deemed to happen – a growing realisation by potential offenders that they had overestimated the increased risk brought about by the crackdown. Here the mechanism does refer to changed reasoning. Table 8.1 shows how Sherman’s concepts capture a range of potential context, mechanism and outcome pattern features of crackdowns. Copyright © 2004. Willan Publishing. All rights reserved. Without compromising Sherman’s own discussion at all we might now also want now to add ‘Anticipatory deterrence’ to the left-hand column. The corresponding middle column would read ‘Effect felt before crackdown implemented’ and the right-hand column ‘Outcome pattern triggered by crackdown-related activity before the crackdown itself is put in place’. Anticipatory benefits often result from media- induced deterrence, where publicity has been given to the measures yet to be put in place (Smith et al., 2002), a pattern noted in one study discussed by Sherman himself. Sherman develops a quite brilliant crackdown theory. His discussion of ‘bluff’ highlights the importance of understanding the (unseen) mechanisms producing outcomes. Crackdowns, he suggests, do not do 119 Hopkins, B. R. (Ed.). (2004). Hard cop, soft cop. Willan Publishing. Created from ntuuk on 2024-07-16 14:05:19.  Hard Cop, Soft Cop Table 8.1 Key concepts for understanding crackdowns Sherman’s concept Meaning Comments on realist category Presence ‘Increased ratio of Part of the intervention – police officers per change in context potential offender’ Sanctions ‘Any coercive police Part of the intervention – imposition on offenders change in context or potential offenders’ Media threats ‘Announced intentions Part of the intervention – to increase sanctioning change in context certainty’ Backoff Crackdown end Part of the intervention – change in context General deterrent Reduced participation Outcome and broad effect rate mechanism by which it is brought about – mechanism needs further unpacking Initial deterrence Crime reduction while Outcome during crackdown in operation intervention Residual deterrence Crime reduction Outcome after intervention sustained after ends crackdown terminated Incapacitation Removal of offender Mechanism for crime reduction Crackdown decay Declining intensity of Part of the intervention – crackdown change in context Copyright © 2004. Willan Publishing. All rights reserved. Initial deterrence Reduced deterrence as Outcome pattern during decay offenders learn that intervention and they had overestimated mechanism producing it increased risk Residual deterrence Reduced deterrence as Outcome pattern after decay offenders come to intervention and realise crackdown and mechanism producing it hence increased risk has ended 120 Hopkins, B. R. (Ed.). (2004). Hard cop, soft cop. Willan Publishing. Created from ntuuk on 2024-07-16 14:05:19.  Using crackdowns constructively much physically to prevent crimes. Rather, crime falls are effected by changes brought about in the reasoning or perception of the potential offender. Drawing on Tversky and Kahnemen (1974), Sherman suggests that the key deterrence mechanisms in crackdowns comprise heightened perceived risk and heightened uncertainty over the level of risk that would be incurred by offending. Crackdowns are thus deemed to disrupt the existing sense of risk-level and create uncertainty over it. Potential offenders may then substantially overestimate the actual risk and avoid crime. Repeat random crackdowns, with periods of withdrawal, would fuel this uncertainty, in effect continuously dis- rupting emerging confidence among the likely offending population. Continuing a given crackdown beyond a certain period, however, will allow a new stable sense of risk to evolve and hence crime could be expected to resume – the heightened uncertainty mechanism is gradually extinguished. The end of a particular crackdown, though, would not necessarily lead to an immediate restabilisation of risk estimates among prospective offenders, especially if the crackdown withdrawal happened unannounced. Sherman suggests that the same volume of resources from the police might be used intermittently in crackdowns to sustain uncertainty as could be used to maintain a given, relatively continuous presence, enabling potential offenders fairly confidently to gauge levels of risk. In the course of his theoretical discussion, Sherman acknowledges variations in the nature of those targeted which will be significant for mechanisms of adaptation to the crackdown conditions. He notes that some kinds of offender will be quicker than others at learning about risk levels and changes in them: highly active criminal populations are deemed likely to learn (and hence adapt) more quickly than less active ones (Sherman, 1990: 11). Sherman also notes that the precise attributes of the crackdown, Copyright © 2004. Willan Publishing. All rights reserved. including its intensity, sanction levels and forms of publicity will be significant for the change mechanisms activated and the outcomes brought about. To bring home his theory, Sherman cleverly invites us to take part in a thought experiment. He asks us to imagine two approaches by the income tax authorities. In one they focus on those with known tax- evasion risk attributes. In the other they randomise their selection such that half of all taxpayers with a given birthday are audited un- predictably once a decade. His hunch is that with high publicity the outcome of the second approach would be less recovered revenue per audit but greater revenue overall from those not audited. Taxpayers would send in returns that are more honest to avoid the uncertain risk. 121 Hopkins, B. R. (Ed.). (2004). Hard cop, soft cop. Willan Publishing. Created from ntuuk on 2024-07-16 14:05:19.  Hard Cop, Soft Cop This policy we are invited to prefer is counterintuitive. Most would probably conclude at first sight that efficiency and effectiveness are maximised by targeting audit resources on those with attributes most associated with evasion. Studies of crackdowns At the level of theory Sherman refers to attributes of the crackdown which change the context for potential offenders, to the causal mechanisms relevant to offending that crackdowns may activate, and to expected outcome patterns in the light of the causal mechanisms activated by the crackdown. He goes on to review studies of crack- downs and their impacts. Matters here become a little more complex. Five additional change mechanisms emerge, generating their particular crime pattern outcomes: 1 Adaptation/innovation. Sherman refers to a study finding offender innovation in the light of the new uncertainties facing them. Drug dealers in New York’s Lower East Side responding to a prolonged crackdown were reported to have developed ‘new and [less public] marketing strategies that would reduce their risk of arrest’ (Zimmer, 1986, quoted in Sherman, 1990: 24). Sherman’s point here fits with Ekblom’s more general point about the liability of offenders to adapt to preventers’ efforts to thwart them, by whatever means (Ekblom, 1997). It comprises an additional explanation for the limited time span for the impact of a crackdown. 2 Sense of threat/twitchiness. Sherman refers to Operation Clean Sweep in Washington which targeted drug markets. The numbers of homicides almost doubled (from 148 to 287) and the proportion Copyright © 2004. Willan Publishing. All rights reserved. attributed to drugs went up from 17 per cent to 68 per cent (Molotsky, 1988, cited in Sherman, 1990). The hypothesis is that dealers felt more threatened (hence twitchy) with the crackdown (Reuter et al., 1988, cited in Sherman, 1990). Moreover, the switch to dealing in apartments provoked by the crackdown put more people at risk during shootings. 3 Sensitivity to publicity/shame. Sherman notes the sensitivity of some to sanctions and publicity if their offending behaviour is exposed. He speculates that this mechanism may be class (context) sensitive – middle-class offenders being especially susceptible (Sherman, 1990: 25). He takes this to be especially significant where crackdowns 122 Hopkins, B. R. (Ed.). (2004). Hard cop, soft cop. Willan Publishing. Created from ntuuk on 2024-07-16 14:05:19.  Using crackdowns constructively affect more middle-class populations of potential targets, for example where drunk driving is the target offence. 4 Initial shock/loss of confidence. Sherman refers to initial shock as an explanation for the short-term effects and long-term decays found across several studies reviewed (Sherman, 1990: 36). Initial shock may not, of course, comprise a separate mechanism but simply be an acute version of uncertainty creation. 5 Market pressures/need for revenue. Sherman refers to classic market mechanisms in discussing how drugs supplies are reduced through crackdown leading to a price rise and a consequent need for addicts to raise more money through increased crime (in the case cited, robbery) to ‘maintain their habits’ (Barnett, 1988, cited in Sherman, 1990: 19). Sherman also refers to contextual variations in the crackdowns included in his review. These sometimes concern attributes of the areas into which the crackdowns were introduced and sometimes features of the crackdowns themselves. Such variations matter where they create differences in the causal mechanisms that are activated, and hence the types of outcome brought about: 1 Class variations. As already mentioned, class variations may be relevant in relation to responses to heightened risk and uncertainty because of differences in patterns of perceived consequences. 2 Available alternatives variations. Sherman cites a study in Lynn, Massachusetts where there were readily available alternative locations for drug supplies to street criminals (Kleiman, 1988, cited in Sherman, 1990: 19). There is an implicit contrast with sites Copyright © 2004. Willan Publishing. All rights reserved. without readily available alternative sources. 3 Dosage variations. Police presence crackdowns in large areas tend to be relatively dilute. Low-dosage crackdowns have smaller effects presumably because they fail significantly to trigger heightened risk and/or uncertainty over level of risk. This was found, according to Sherman (1990: 19) in Kleiman’s studies of the crackdown on drug markets in Lynn and Lawrence, Massachusetts. 4 Publicity variations. Sherman cites outcome variations associated with differences in levels of publicity. Sherman refers to a study in Cheshire where an unpublicised but otherwise fully implemented crackdown relating to drunk driving was associated with no change 123 Hopkins, B. R. (Ed.). (2004). Hard cop, soft cop. Willan Publishing. Created from ntuuk on 2024-07-16 14:05:19.  Hard Cop, Soft Cop in numbers of serious crashes. In contrast highly publicised crackdowns in Britain were accompanied by sharp falls at the times when drink-related accidents would otherwise be expected (Ross, 1973, 1981, cited in Sherman, 1990: 26–7). Presumably, only specific- deterrence mechanisms are activated by stops and checks alone, whereas more general deterrence mechanisms are activated where there is also publicity. 5 Duration variations. According to Sherman, long crackdowns differ from short ones in the scope for offenders to learn and adapt in the course of them. Short-term crackdowns included in the review showed no signs of deterrence decay, while there were some signs of deterrence decay in most of the long-term crackdowns (Sherman, 1990: 35). As might be expected given context and mechanism variations in the studies reported by Sherman, differences in outcome pattern are identified also. These include, for example: reduction in the number of arrests; increased drug prices; initial deterrence decay; fall then rise in robberies to higher than pre-crackdown levels; displacement beyond the immediate locale of the crackdown; increased homicide; displacement of open drugs market to a closed one; geographical displacement of drug market use; quick re-establishment of drug market; Residual accident fall (deterrence) during drink-driving crackdown back-off; Copyright © 2004. Willan Publishing. All rights reserved. fall then rise in subway crime over two years; pre drink-driving crackdown, but post-publicity reduction in cars at taverns and hospital admissions from car crashes. Unsurprisingly, none of these outcomes is found universally. Crack- downs differ in target, implementation and context. Sherman, however, identifies initial deterrence in 15 of the 18 studies covered in his review. This comprises pretty robust evidence that targeted crackdowns can produce a short-term reduction in crime, but not that they will always do so. He also concludes that displacement is not an inevitable side effect though he presents evidence that it can happen – it was clearly indicated in four of the crackdowns considered. Sherman found none 124 Hopkins, B. R. (Ed.). (2004). Hard cop, soft cop. Willan Publishing. Created from ntuuk on 2024-07-16 14:05:19.  Using crackdowns constructively of the successful short-term crackdowns to suffer initial deterrence decay, though he reports it in most long-term ones where evidence was provided. For all five projects tracking what went on post-crackdown, which had also found an initial effect, Sherman reports residual deterrence during the back-off period. Crime reductions thus normally continued beyond the operating period of the crackdown. Sherman’s findings seem to support the inclusion of brief crack- downs as one potential component of a crime reduction strategy. Indeed, Sherman suggests that benefits might be maximised by the accompaniment of publicity announcing the crackdown but not their ending, and by switching the focus of the crackdown. This will take advantage of anticipatory deterrence and residual deterrence effects extending the period during which impact is felt. These extensions to the period of impact comprise a form of ‘diffusion of benefits’.1 New crackdowns can be initiated intermittently and when crime levels rise again above an acceptable level. Sherman’s case for making use of crackdowns is quite compelling. However, part of the evidence Sherman himself provides, as well as the Brixton experience, suggest that crackdowns are not always benign in their effects. They can sometimes produce unintended and unwanted side effects. This explains, of course, the need for a realist reading of the evidence to determine how they produce what outcomes for whom and in what circumstances. Only with this can informed decisions be made about when it is safe and useful and when it is unsafe or useless to apply crackdown responses to crime problems. There is a good deal of devil in the detail in individual cases. Sherman summarises one unpublished report, which suggests some complex context–mechanisms–outcome patterns: Zimmer (1986) has documented how some drug dealers and users Copyright © 2004. Willan Publishing. All rights reserved. responded to the Lower East Side crackdown. She claims, apparently from interviews, that many stayed off the streets at first, waiting for law enforcement to return to ‘normal’; some took vacations out of the country. When the crackdown was maintained, she reports, the ‘drug sellers’ began to re-emerge, developing the new [less public] marketing strategies that would decrease their risk of ‘arrest’ (1986: 24). Moreover, she claims that the more gentrified areas of the crackdown zone experienced no decay in the deterrence of public drug dealing, which remained suppressed. Rather, despite police concentration of more personnel on the poorer blocks, the greatest visible decay was observed there. (Sherman, 1990: 21–2) 125 Hopkins, B. R. (Ed.). (2004). Hard cop, soft cop. Willan Publishing. Created from ntuuk on 2024-07-16 14:05:19.  Hard Cop, Soft Cop There are several outcomes, mechanisms and contexts here. The outcomes include initial withdrawal of dealers, their changed methods of working and the variations in change in locations of drug dealing within the area covered by the crackdown. Mechanisms include (presumably) heightened uncertainty and perceived risk among dealers, efforts by dealers to spot opportunities to return to previous activities, and their subsequent adaptations in methods of operating to circumvent the increased risks presented by the new conditions. The variation in outcome by sub-area (context) within the scope of the crackdown is unexplained. Perhaps local resident hostility is greater (or perceived to be greater) to dealers contemplating a return. Zimmer’s account suggests that the particular details of any particular location will need to be considered in individual crackdown decisions. The best that social science can hope to offer is some evidence-based theory to inform practitioners and policy-makers about the sorts of details that need to be looked at and why. Before coming to that, though, three further accounts of crime-reduction work involving crackdowns are briefly summarised. Random breath tests in New South Wales From December 1982 police in New South Wales were able to pull drivers over randomly to take a preliminary breath test. They did so in large numbers and with extensive publicity. As Homel (1995) put it, there were ‘highly publicised and visible random checking procedures applied indiscriminately to the whole population of potential offenders’. About a million tests were made in the first year, in a popu- lation of three million drivers. There was no ‘back-off’. Many of the ingredients found in successful crackdowns were present. There was a substantially middle-class target group, heavy publicity and signifi- cantly increased police activity. Most importantly, the major apparent Copyright © 2004. Willan Publishing. All rights reserved. mechanisms, consistent with Sherman’s theory, comprised a plausible increase in risk and the creation of heightened anxiety about whether the risk was high or low on any given occasion (Homel, 1995). No increase in arrests followed, but there was a dramatic and instan- taneous fall in fatal crashes (by 22 per cent) and more especially in alcohol-related fatal crashes (36 per cent). The falls have been maintained for at least a decade. Homel argues that ‘RBT succeeds not at the level of efficient enforcement of the law but as a communications exercise. By removing from the offender all control over risks of apprehension, and by keeping him guessing as to what those risks are at any time, RBT changes in a strategic way the game of “breathalyser 126 Hopkins, B. R. (Ed.). (2004). Hard cop, soft cop. Willan Publishing. Created from ntuuk on 2024-07-16 14:05:19.  Using crackdowns constructively roulette” many drinkers engage in’ (original italics). In the RBT experiment Homel also notes what he deems to have been crucial contextual conditions. Public views on drinking and driving were changing and citizens were minded to stop. RBT provided a trigger and pretext for initiating changed behaviour. It gave drivers an ‘excuse’ to stay dry, where they might otherwise have found it difficult to refuse a drink – an interesting supplementary change mechanism. Homel believes that the RBT experience suggests the more general use of a ‘keep potential offenders guessing’ mechanism. The Boston gun project Whereas the focus of the New South Wales RBT was indiscriminate and ‘worked’ because no one could evade police enforcement attention, the crackdown provisions in Boston ‘worked’ because potential targets for enforcement attention could reduce risks by behaving in specified ways (Braga et al., 1999). Gang conflict lay behind many shootings in Boston. Operation Ceasefire attempted to reduce them. In this, in the event of an incident a crackdown would be initiated in relation not just to the supposed perpetrator, but to all relevant gang members. The Operation Ceasefire crackdown was implemented by a wide range of enforcement agencies in Boston, not just the police. Moreover, it was highly publicised in meetings with gang members, through flyers and through the media. There was an immediate and dramatic fall in shootings. The mechanisms here relate not so much to uncertainty about enforcement as to a promise over its certainty. Though not in any sense made exempt from normal police enquiries, gang members could avoid bringing sustained broad-based attention to all their activities and ways of life by avoiding engaging in shootings. They did so. Kennedy (1997) suggests that leverage along these general lines could be applied across a range of unwanted behaviours, where classes of offender could avoid Copyright © 2004. Willan Publishing. All rights reserved. inviting wide enforcement attention by ceasing to engage in defined behaviours. In the case of the gangs it is plausible that informal social control by some gang members of their colleagues might have been applied to avoid the generalised police attention. Moreover, the back- ground research to Ceasefire suggested that many gang members would prefer not to carry weapons. They did so defensively. Reduced risk would lead to reduced weapon carrying, and fewer opportunities and temptations to use them. If this is the context for weapons use then success in triggering an initial fall in shootings might be expected to bring further change processes in train consolidating the effects of the crackdown per se.2 127 Hopkins, B. R. (Ed.). (2004). Hard cop, soft cop. Willan Publishing. Created from ntuuk on 2024-07-16 14:05:19.  Hard Cop, Soft Cop Crackdown and consolidation in Boggart Hill In Boggart Hill, part of a local authority housing estate in Leeds, a crackdown was targeted on suspected prolific burglars in the area, with the intention of incapacitating those offenders as well as achieving general deterrence as the crackdown became known (Farrell et al., 2000). In the crime lull achieved through the crackdown, longer-term measures, including for example security upgrades on vulnerable, victimised properties, were put in place to achieve longer-term falls – the consolidation side of the strategy. In this area analysis suggested that the vast majority of offences were committed by high-rate offenders who commit burglaries at a uniform rate. Rates of burglary varied with the number active burglars available to commit them, suggesting that the incapacitation was leading to a fall in burglary. Diffusions of benefit were found in the form of reductions in thefts of vehicles in Boggart Hill and of burglary in adjacent areas – suggesting that the offenders were generalists and also tended to commit their offences locally, though not necessarily exclusively in Boggart Hill. A revised, realist account of crackdowns Let us turn now to realist readings of the literature looked at here. Table 8.2 presents a series of context–mechanism–outcome (CMO) pattern configurations that are suggested. It is clear that much of Sherman’s original theory remains intact, though it is supplemented with fresh insights from empirical research. It is unlikely, though, that all significant contexts and mechanisms liable to be activated by crackdowns have yet been identified here. Sherman himself notes one further mechanism not mentioned so far, in a study that took place after his review of literature on crackdowns. He Copyright © 2004. Willan Publishing. All rights reserved. notes illegally held gun seizure in Kansas City, following the intro- duction of targeted patrol (Sherman et al., 1995).3 In the same study context variation is used to explain the success in using body language cues to spot those carrying concealed weapons in New York City but their failure in Kansas City. Because of enormous differences in population density, in Kansas City people tend to travel by car but in New York they walk. As Sherman et al. (1995) put it, ‘The social and physical characteristics of cities vary widely, and these methods may work better in different kinds of communities.’ What we do have so far, however, are the beginnings of a partially evidenced-tested account that may help inform decisions about the 128 Hopkins, B. R. (Ed.). (2004). Hard cop, soft cop. Willan Publishing. Created from ntuuk on 2024-07-16 14:05:19.  Using crackdowns constructively propriety and usefulness of crackdowns as part of a crime reduction strategy. The final section of the chapter spells out some possible practical implications. The place of crackdowns in crime reduction The potential for crackdowns to produce disastrous side effects speaks in favour of their application only with very great caution. The expense and short-term impact of any single crackdown tells against their use simply as occasional acts of desperation in the face of recurrent problems (Read and Tilley, 2000). The availability of many alternative ways of addressing specific problems, including tactics that do not turn on enforcement at all, suggests that crackdowns, even if potentially effective, may not comprise the only option or the best option (Goldstein, 1990). Despite these caveats about the use of crackdowns they may still have a place within crime reduction strategies, where problems are serious and the context suggests likely beneficial effects, the absence of countervailing, unwanted side effects and no plausible preferable alternative strategies. There are at least three possible ways they might be used constructively. 1 To nip problems in the bud. If a crime problem were emerging and there were grounds for believing it could otherwise become more serious, then a crackdown might conceivably be used to eliminate it early. This is the basic logic of ‘broken windows’, where a concerted response at a tipping point is designed to avert a spiral of decline into more serious and entrenched problems (Wilson and Kelling, 1982). Copyright © 2004. Willan Publishing. All rights reserved. 2 To keep offenders guessing in the long term. Sherman’s prescription for sporadic, repeated but unpredictable crackdowns, introduced with publicity and abandoned quietly, is designed to maximise offender uncertainty and the period of crackdown impact. Repetition is designed to maintain significant levels of uncertainty over risk. 3 To create conditions for longer-term, non-crackdown measures effectively to be introduced. In some circumstances, crackdowns may provide necessary conditions for the operation of longer-term measures. In the case of the Boston gun project longer-term social measures had not been having a discernable effect prior to Operation Ceasefire. 129 Hopkins, B. R. (Ed.). (2004). Hard cop, soft cop. Willan Publishing. Created from ntuuk on 2024-07-16 14:05:19.  Copyright © 2004. Willan Publishing. All rights reserved. Table 8.2 Some realist CMO configurations for crackdowns 130 Intervention Context Mechanism Outcome Sudden unannounced Marginal groups, with low Indignation; provocation; Resistance and riot; high police presence in levels of police trust, but police delegitimation reduced cooperation with Created from ntuuk on 2024-07-16 14:05:19. Hard Cop, Soft Cop area some internal cohesion and mistrust the police Well-publicised high High crime transitional area Increased risk perception; Rapid initial crime fall initial police presence in uncertainty over risk area, with quiet Hopkins, B. R. (Ed.). (2004). Hard cop, soft cop. Willan Publishing. withdrawal High-rate offenders Innovation and speedy Early resumption of crime re-estimates of changed risk as revised risk estimates made; some innovation in MOs; quick initial and residual deterrence decay Low-rate offenders Non-innovation and slow Gradual initial and re-estimate of risk and residual deterrence decay slow realisation of crackdown withdrawal Area crackdown on High crime proceeds need Adaptation to offending Displacement of offending property crimes offenders (perhaps because patterns to yield equivalent by place, type or method of drug dependency) returns Time-limited crackdown ‘Respectable’ offenders Anxiety over apprehension; Quickly reduced on specific behaviour uncertainty over risk; inability offending; residual to control risk deterrence decay  Copyright © 2004. Willan Publishing. All rights reserved. Publicity announcing Plausible messages to Perceived increase in risk; Rapidly reduced crackdown offenders uncertainty over level of risk offending pre (or without increase actual) crackdown; residual deterrence till absence of reduced risk perceived Created from ntuuk on 2024-07-16 14:05:19. Randomised enforcement/ Members of groups wanting Anxiety about uncertain and Rapid fall in targeted crackdowns on to be deemed ‘respectable’ uncontrollable risk of exposure behaviour and slow individuals, with minor to shame resumption penalties Hopkins, B. R. (Ed.). (2004). Hard cop, soft cop. Willan Publishing. Members of ‘marginal’ groups ?Anger at arbitrary, unexpected ?Violence, compensatory detection or resignation at crime, compliance with penalty punishment Conditional crackdowns, Offenders belonging to loose Perceived heightened group Reduced behaviour applied to membership groups engaged in diverse risk and costs of generalised activating crackdown group following specified behaviour open to enforcement on members; behaviours enforcement activities informal social control within target group Sustained low publicity, Typical offender population Crackdown not noticed, lacks/ No change low dosage crackdown quickly loses credibility over large area Crackdown targeted on Large proportion of offences Incapacitation; general Reduction in crime suspected prolific committed by known regular, deterrence proportionate to supply of offenders high-rate offenders high-rate offenders at any given time. Using crackdowns constructively 131 Note: Except for entries marked ‘?’, these are rooted in some evidence, though it is far from conclusive.  Hard Cop, Soft Cop The crackdown introduced by Ceasefire may have created conditions in which the social measures in place could begin to have an effect. By breaking the cycle of weapon carrying and weapon use and by providing a pretext for members to leave gangs Operation Ceasefire may have opened the way for social measures to be taken up by gang members (Braga et al., 2000; Bullock and Tilley, 2002). In the case of the crackdown and consolidation strategy implemented in Boggart Hill, there is evidence of the immediate effects of the offender-focused crackdown and of some longer-term victim-focused consolidation (Farrell et al., 2000). Figure 8.1 shows a vicious cycle of neighbourhood decline in one area in Wolverhampton (Tilley and Webb, 1994). Part of the response involved a crackdown on the families intimidating residents, creating a breather while other physical and social measures were adopted in relation to other elements in the cycle. The estate has since ceased to suffer the chronic and widespread crime and disorder problems that had earlier afflicted it. A similar pattern occurred in an estate in Leicester where a crackdown accompanied the introduction of a variety of social measures in a coherent strategy. This evidently produced some sustained effects (Leigh et al., 1998). The random breath testing in New South Wales created conditions in which a growing disposition not to drink could be acted on since the crackdown gave an acceptable pretext to stay dry (Homel, 1995). In regard to drugs markets, May et al. (2000) have argued that success in their disruption through concerted enforce- ment activities needs to be complemented by treatment services for users and situational measures in the market’s locality.4 Finally, there may be potential benefits from applying crackdowns to offences characteristically or frequently committed by those who are Copyright © 2004. Willan Publishing. All rights reserved. socially integrated and jealous of their reputations, especially members of the middle classes. Homel’s account of the random breath testing introduced in New South Wales suggests that it might be effective. Sherman’s thought experiment for tax evasion could, perhaps, become a real experiment. Other offences that might be subject to revolving crackdowns might include, for example, crimes connected with fraud, pollution, breaches of safety regulations at work, internal theft, much domestic violence, false accounting and traffic violations. These are all potentially highly damaging areas of offending. The costs of detection are likely to be high. Police attention is very limited. The characteristic offenders are middle class and value their respectability. The unknown 132 Hopkins, B. R. (Ed.). (2004). Hard cop, soft cop. Willan Publishing. Created from ntuuk on 2024-07-16 14:05:19.  Using crackdowns constructively Poor physical conditions F F Tenants able to do so leave Apathy about estate conditions F F High turnover and difficult to let Low neighbourhood self-confidence F F Problem tenants Intimidation of law- allocated housing abiding tenants F F High burglary rate Producted by: Presence of motivated offenders + Vulnerable – poorly secured – properties + Absence of effective community guardianship or control Copyright © 2004. Willan Publishing. All rights reserved. Figure 8.1 Neighbourhood decline in a Wolverhampton estate (from Tilley and Webb, 1994) risk of exposure as ‘common criminals’, activated through the certainty of crackdowns but their unpredictable timing, might be very threatening and a substantial disincentive to crime. Moreover, though likely targets might resist the attention of enforcement agencies, their response is unlikely to be to riot. These groups and their likely offences are not, though, those who have so far ordinarily been targeted with crackdowns. Perhaps they should be. 133 Hopkins, B. R. (Ed.). (2004). Hard cop, soft cop. Willan Publishing. Created from ntuuk on 2024-07-16 14:05:19.  Hard Cop, Soft Cop Notes 1 Where the precise boundaries of a crackdown are unknown, there may also be other forms of benefit diffusion, for example by offence or by geographical scope. 2 A strategy was agreed for Manchester that would replicate elements of Ceasefire in Britain. See Bullock and Tilley (2002). 3 This amounts to ‘crime resource removal’ in Ekblom and Tilley’s terms (2000). 4 May et al. (2000) also note, however, innovations in methods of operating the market with the arrival of mobile phones, making crackdowns more difficult. Copyright © 2004. Willan Publishing. All rights reserved. 134 Hopkins, B. R. (Ed.). (2004). Hard cop, soft cop. Willan Publishing. Created from ntuuk on 2024-07-16 14:05:19.