Philippine Local Government Structure PDF

SH1688 THE PHILIPPINE LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE (Mendoza and Melegrito, 2016, pp. 140-144)  Unitary form of government with a multitiered structure o Unitary government = single and national institutions exercising undisputed sovereignty and supreme constitutional authority...

SH1688 THE PHILIPPINE LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE (Mendoza and Melegrito, 2016, pp. 140-144)  Unitary form of government with a multitiered structure o Unitary government = single and national institutions exercising undisputed sovereignty and supreme constitutional authority, so this is highly centralized. o Local government units (LGU)  “Ultra vires” rule = the Constitution must explicitly mandate or say the specific powers of the LGUs, and these must be delegated/devolved from the central government. o Multitiered structure = different layers of government from the central government to the administrative regions down to barangays.  First Tier o National/Central government = operates through a huge bureaucracy of around 20 departments and agencies. o Administrative regions = divided into 18 regions and composed of several provinces, with most departments of the national government maintain offices in each region.  These do not have elected governments like those at the provincial, city, municipal, and barangay levels (except for Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao or BARMM).  The 1987 Constitution does not refer to ‘regions’ but provides for territorial and political subdivision into provinces, cities, municipalities, and villages (barangays).  Second Tier o Province (First layer) = largest LGU that an elected governor heads. The governor also heads the provincial legislative assembly (Sangguniang Panlalawigan), and the elected vice-governor and council members assist.  Other officials are appointed to head offices of finance, tax collection, audit, public works, agriculture, health, and education. o Cities and Municipalities (Second layer) = an elected mayor heads both that are further divided into barangays.  City = made up of the more urbanized and developed barangays that can be created, divided, merged, abolished, or have their boundaries altered by law and subject to the 05 Handout 1 *Property of STI Page 1 of 6  SH1688 approval of a majority vote cast in a plebiscite conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The elected vice mayor heads the city legislative council (Sangguniang Panlunsod).  Component city = within a province  Independent component city = ‘highly urbanized’ or ‘chartered’ cities o It is not a part of any province, so it does not elect provincial officials and is not subject to any provincial taxation. o It has the power to levy its own taxes.  Municipality = subordinate to the provincial government. The elected vice mayor heads the municipal legislative council (Sangguniang Bayan). o Barangay (Third layer) = smallest LGU and have the least autonomy. An elected barangay captain heads the barangay legislative assembly (Sangguniang Barangay). Table 12 Basic Services and Facilities to be Provided by LGUs in the Philippines Local Government Unit Basic Services and Facilities Barangay  Agricultural support; health/social welfare;  General hygiene and sanitation; beautification and solid waste collection; barangay justice;  barangay roads and bridges and water supply system maintenance; infrastructure facilities; information and reading center; satellite or public market, where viable. Municipality  Extension and on-site agriculture and fishery activities research services/facilities; control/review of DENR and implementation of community- based forestry projects; management/control of communal forests and establishment of forest development projects;  Health/social welfare; information services; solid waste disposal system; general hygiene;  Municipal buildings, cultural centers, public parks; infrastructure to service municipality residents; public markets, slaughterhouses; public cemetery; tourism facilities; sites for police, fire stations, and municipal jail. Province  Extension and on-site agriculture and fishery activities research services/facilities; control/review of DENR, forestry laws enforcement to community-based projects, pollution control law, small-scale mining law, and other laws protecting the environment; mini hydroelectric projects for local purposes;  Health services (hospitals and tertiary health services); social welfare services;  Infrastructure such as freedom parks and other public assembly areas, facilities to service the residents, low-cost housing;  Investment support services including access to credit financing; upgrading and modernization of tax information and collection services; inter-municipal telecommunication services tourism development and promotion. City All the services and facilities of the municipality and province PLUS adequate communication and transportation facilities, public works and infrastructure projects, etc.  Each tier enjoys autonomy in principle but is subject to supervision from higher levels that is restricted to budgets and ordinances to comply with the 1991 Local Government Code and subsequent amendments. o But the President exercises supervisory authority over all kinds of local governments.  After the 1991 Code, the number of LGUs increased as of 2005: regions (from 13 to 18), provinces (75 to 79), cities (60 to 79), and barangays (41,820 to 41,980). Municipalities have decreased (from 1,543 to 1,501) that may be due to high population growth, urbanization, and the more generous fiscal treatment of cities. 05 Handout 1 *Property of STI Page 2 of 6  SH1688 THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 (Mendoza and Melegrito, 2016, pp. 146-150)  The 1991 Code was the government’s policy framework and agenda to address the highly centralized system of government or the decades-old problem of an overcentralized politico-administrative system (according to Alex Brillantes).  Decentralization = to enhance administrative efficiency and to promote local autonomy. o Devolution = the main decentralization strategy in the country that meant the transfer of powers/responsibilities to LGUs, which were elected in 1987. o Fiscal and administrative in nature.  Three Features o Transfer of fundamental responsibilities/accountabilities to LGUs  Basic social services (health, social welfare, environment, agriculture, education, tourism, telecommunications, housing, and investment support)  Enforcement of certain regulatory powers (reclassification of agricultural lands, environmental laws, food product inspection, National Building Code, tricycle operation, subdivision plan processing/approval, and cockpit and cockfight establishment) o Increase of financial resources available to LGUs  Taxing powers are broadened.  LGUs are provided with a specific share from the national wealth exploited in their area (mining, fishery, and forestry).  Revenue share from the national taxes (internal revenue allotments or IRA) is increased from 11% to as much as 40%. o Institutionalization of participation of the private sector, non-government organizations (NGOs), and people’s organizations (POs) in local planning and implementing processes  Mandatory membership of said groups to the four local special bodies (development council, health board, school board, and peace and order board).  NGOs/POs are also empowered to participate through other modes:  sectoral presentation (e.g., women, workers) in the local legislative council;  preferential treatment for local cooperatives;  mandatory consultations by national government agencies before implementing development projects; and 05 Handout 1 *Property of STI Page 3 of 6  SH1688  joint undertakings (e.g., build-operate-transfer arrangements) between government and the private sector in the delivery of basic social services.  Linkages between local governance and development (Figure 3) to examine the contribution of decentralization to democracy. o First linkage = from local governance to local service provision to local development. o Second linkage = intrinsic value of governance; participation or social inclusion is considered development in itself. o Third linkage = feedback loop from local development to governance.  Key elements of good governance (Asian Development Bank) and its relation to the 1991 Code features o Accountability = helps make public officials answerable for government behavior, responsive to the entity from which their authority is derived.  The 1991 Code provided for a 3-year term in office and restricted the number of consecutive terms from an unlimited number (old 1983 Code) to a maximum of three.  Provisions requiring the mayors to submit an annual report to the local legislative assembly (Sanggunian). o Participation of groups (affected by government decisions) = is imperative in ensuring accountability where citizens must be involved in the development process.  The 1991 Code increased the number of local special bodies from one (old 1983 Code) to four. o Predictability (of government laws, regulations, and policies) = to demonstrate the government’s commitment to its promises. o Transparency = fair and consistent application of laws, regulations, and policies is guaranteed when these are clearly enunciated and made known to citizens.  The 1991 Code required elected officials to fully disclose their business interests aside from the submission of statements of assets and liabilities (SAL).  The requirement of LGUs to undertake procurement through a prequalification, bids, and awards committee to prohibit elected officials from engaging in a direct business transaction with the local government.  Capuno (2007, 210): The effectiveness of the provisions [in the 1991 Code] depends on compliance and implementation, and evaluation”. NATIONAL-LOCAL GOVERNMENT DYNAMICS IN THE PHILIPPINES (Mendoza and Melegrito, 2016, pp. 150-153)  No similar devolution of taxation = even though the spending of LGUs is devolved through the automatic transfer of IRA, reducing the national government’s discretion and ability to intervene in the LGU affairs. o Emmanuel de Dios (2007, 196): Automatic resource transfers have since given rise to a common-pool problem—the revenue share received by LGUs bears no relationship to their efforts at revenue collection.  No incentive exists either to augment revenues or to use them effectively. Many LGUs are exclusively reliant on the IRA for financing (treated as a dole) and have not striven to raise their own revenues.  The quality of spending is also highly uneven because no palpable connection exists between taxation and its results.  Therefore, assured revenue transfers have not weaned local politics away from the imperative of securing additional resources through typical networks of patronages and vertical transactions with the center. The patronage system remains intact. 05 Handout 1 *Property of STI Page 4 of 6  SH1688  Weaknesses in the fiscal provisions of the 1991 Code and other laws (Capuno, 2007) o A mismatch between the assignment of devolved functions and gradual revenue shares, and the need for LGUs to provide for unfunded mandates (additional mandatory benefits for health workers and health insurance coverage for indigents). o Existing fiscal transfer schemes do not adequately address fiscal inequities and possible inefficiencies due to fiscal competition and spillovers among LGUs.  Causes of the weak fiscal capacity of LGUs (from several studies) o Lack of willingness to raise their own-source revenues because of their high dependency on the IRA o Continuing control by the national government of the productive tax bases o Various limitations imposed by the 1991 Code in establishing local tax rates o Weak local tax administration o The current system of tax assignment does not comply with the autonomy criterion of decentralization (Manasan, 2007).  The national government retains the discretion over the more revenue-productive taxes even though the Code authorizes LGUs to levy a good number of taxes.  The Code constrains the LGUs’ power to set local tax rates, so there is a mismatch between the LGUs’ spending responsibilities and powers to tax.  The mismatch creates poor incentives for local accountability because they are spending money that is not raised within their own jurisdictions.  What exacerbates these poor incentives for the LGUs are the provisions on central government augmentation of devolved services and the use of these to justify legislators’ ‘pork barrel’.  The President’s power of intervention = vast control of the disbursement of public funds provides greater discretion to the president to intervene in the affairs of LGUs. This breed and sustain the system of patronage both at the national and local levels of governance. o Power to cut deals with locally elected officials. o Power to control the disbursement of special and discretionary funds without the scrutiny of the legislative branch. o Power to withhold fund disbursement already approved by Congress (pork barrel allocations, congressional insertions, and funds for designated projects). o Authority to reduce the automatic IRA to local governments (in the event of “unmanageable public sector deficit”).  Dynamics of local patronage politics (De Dios, 2007, p. 165): o Local politicians continue to be intermediaries/brokers with central/national powers as long as resources (tax revenue shares) are centralized (accessed from outside and above), and the autonomous action of local communities is circumscribed. o Political power and legitimacy will then derive from the local leaders’ network of vertical political and economic connections, which endows them with a seemingly charismatic ability to bend and sway to their purposes the very priorities of the state itself. Therefore, particularist politics and centralized power are two faces of the same coin. o LGUs become dependent or reliant on grants from the national government and their networks of connections, especially at the national level. The grant system is then “substitutive rather than stimulative”.  Proliferation of enterprising LGUs = deliberate efforts to tap wider sources of income and become less dependent on the national government’s IRA.  During the period 1993-2002, 143 LGUs bested Galing Pook Awards for their outstanding or trailblazing programs, mostly on health services, revenue mobilization, and expenditure management. 05 Handout 1 *Property of STI Page 5 of 6  SH1688  Tax collection program of Binangonan, Rizal; real property tax computerization and administration program of Muntinlupa City; financial engineering program of Tagaytay City; and the tax and government computerization projects of Cebu City and Naga City. Reference Mendoza, D.J., and Melegrito, M.L.F (2016). Politics Without Borders: Philippine Politics and Governance. Phoenix Publishing House, Inc. 05 Handout 1 *Property of STI Page 6 of 6