VV CRISP entire precis MH 1947-48 & FM Cariappa PDF

PROMOTION EXAMINATION PART D MILITARY HISTORY STUDY NOTES  This page is left blank intentionally But I will not tell the intention Source of Content 1947-48 Campaign: DGMT Preci of 2019 Part D FM Cariappa Biography: DGMT Preci of 2023 ...

PROMOTION EXAMINATION PART D MILITARY HISTORY STUDY NOTES  This page is left blank intentionally But I will not tell the intention Source of Content 1947-48 Campaign: DGMT Preci of 2019 Part D FM Cariappa Biography: DGMT Preci of 2023  INDEX Ser Chapter Pages No From To 1. Syllabus i ii 2. Chapter-I : The State of Jammu and Kashmir (a) Section 1 : Historical Background 01 01 (b) Section 2 : Terrain Analysis 02 05 (c) Section 3 : Communications 06 07 (d) Section 4 : Stratrgic Importance 08 08 (e) Section 5 : The Administrative and Military Setup 09 09 2. Chapter-II : Post Independence Devp in Jammu & Kashmir (a) Section 6 : Tribal Invansion 10 10 (b) Section 7 : Operation Gulmarg 11 14 (c) Section 8 : Accession to India and Fly IN of the Army 15 18 3. Chapter-III : Build Up and Initial Operations (a) Section 9 : Initial Actions by Indian Forces 19 24 (b) Section 10 : 161Brigade Operations to Relieve Poonch 25 28 4. Chapter-IV : Relief Operations in Jammu Sector (a) Section 11 : Review of the Situation 29 32 (b) Section 12 : Strategic Planning 33 38 5. Chapter-V : Planning at Army Headquarters 39 41 6. Chapter-VI (a) Section 13 : The Loss of Jhangar (Dec 1947) 42 43 (b) Section 14 : The Defence of Poonch 44 44 (c) Section 15 : Own Operations in Chhamb and Akhnur Areas 45 47 (d) Section 16 : The Fall of Jhangar 48 52 7. Chapter-VII : The Battle for Naushera (Jan-Feb 48) (a) Section 17 : Preliminary Operations and the battle for the 53 54 line of Communication. (b) Section 18 : Operation Satyanas and Cheeta 55 58 (c) Section 19 : Operation Kipper 59 63 (d) Section 20 : Battle of Naushera 64 69 8. Chapter-VIII : Recapture of Jhangar (a) Section 21 : General 70 71 (b) Section 22 : Second Phase of Operations 72 75 (c) Section 23 : Third Phase of Operations Operation Vijay 76 86 9. Chapter-IX : The Handwara Sector Advance to Tithwal 87 94 10. Chapter-X : Limited Success on the URI Front 95 97 (a) Section 24 : Threat to the Line of Communication and URI 98 100 (b) Section 25 : Planning for Advance towards Domel 101 102 (c) Section 26 : Thrust towards Pandu and Chakothi 103 105 (d) Section 27 : Southern Advance 106 106 (e) Section 28 : Haji Pir Pass Failure 107 108 11. Chapter-XI : Enemy Counter Offensive on URI Front (Jun- 109 109 Jul 1948) (a) Section 29 : Mir Kalsi and Keran 110 111 (b) Section 30 : Setback along the Kishanganga 112 112 (c) Section 31 : Review and Adjustments 113 113 (d) Section 32 : Stiff Fighting in Tithwal 114 114 (e) Section 33 : The Loss of Pandu 115 115 (f) Section 34 : Stablising the Indian Defences 116 117  2 Ser Chapter Pages No From To 12. Chapter-XII : Operations of the Jammu Division (Apr-Jul 48) 118 119 (a) Section 35 : Capture of Chingas and Rajauri 120 123 (b) Section 36 : Operations Birbal and Operation Hat 124 127 (c) Section 37 : Other Operations 128 131 13. Chapter- The Relief of Poonch(Jan- 132 133 Nov 48 (a) Section 38 : Op Gulab The First Link up with Poonch 134 138 (b) Section 39 : Operation for Relief of Poonch 139 140 (c) Section 40 : Prelim Ops : Capture of Pt 7710, Pir Badesar, Pir 141 145 Kalewa, Ramgarh Fort and Bhimbar Gali (d) Section 41 : The Final Relief of Poonch 146 151 14. Chapter-XIV : Fierce Fight from Chhamb to Tithwal 152 152 (a) Section 42 : Bitter Fight Chhamb to Tithwal Sector 153 154 (b) Section 43 : Shelling of URI Area 155 156 (c) Section 44 : Operations by the Poonch Brigade 157 158 (d) Section 45 : Operations in Jhangar Sector 159 159 (e) Section 46 : Operations in Chhamb 160 161 15. Chapter-XV : Enemy Advent In The North (a) Section 47 : Fall of Gilgit 162 164 (b) Section 48 : Fall of Skardu 165 168 (c) Section 49 : Raiders Capture Drass and Kargil 169 172 16. Chapter-XVI : Re-Capture of Gurais (a) Section 50 : Importance of Gurais 173 174 (b) Section 51 : Re-Capture of Gurais (OP ERAZE) 175 178 17. Chapter-XVII : Defence of Leh 179 185 18. Chapter-XVIII : Recapture of Drass and Kargil (a) Section 52 : Clearence through Zojila 186 192 (b) Section 53 : Re-Capture of Drass and Kargil 193 196 19. Chapter-XIX : Conclusion and Review 197 199 20. E 200 203 Khan, DSO, Pakistan Army 21. Excepts of an Interview with Col (Retd) Shamsher Singh of 1 204 207 Patiala (Now 15 PUNJAB) 22. Excerpts of an Interview with Col (Retd) SDS Jamwal of 208 209 7 Cavalry 23. Brief Analysis of the application of the Principles of War in the 210 210 Operations 24. Chronological Sequence of Events 211 215 25. Assimilation Exercise 216 219 Biography : Fd Marshall KM Cariappa 26. Early Child hood 220 220 27. Making of an Officer and a Gentlemen 221 221 28. From Commission to Command of a Bn 222 222 29. Staff Appointment Post Command of a Bn 223 223 30. Command of a Brigade 224 225 31. The Challenges Posed By Partition and Indianisation of Armed 226 227 Forces  CHAPTER 1:  Instrument of Accession: o Signed due to Pakistan's THE STATE OF JAMMU AND pressure tactics and tribal KASHMIR incursion. o Ceded state to India. SECTION 1: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND SECTION 2: TERRAIN ANALYSIS General: Early Period:  Jammu and Kashmir's terrain is mostly  Part of Ashoka's empire and ruled by mountainous. Kanishka.  Gradual elevation from southern  Subject to conquest by various rulers Jammu to Karakoram Ranges. due to its difficult terrain.  Key strategic location due to  Passed through different empires and surrounding foreign states. conquerors.  Topography, climate, economy, and culture shaped by mountains. Medieval Period:  Administrative divisions outlined by  Ruled by the Mughals, then under mountain ranges. Afghan rule.  Main ranges: Great Himalayan Range,  Became part of Maharaja Ranjit Singh's Pir Panjal Range. empire.  Division of drainage and regions by these ranges. Modern History:  British Period (1846): Maharaja Gulab Geographical Regions: Singh ruled after British defeat of Sikhs. o Acknowledged British  Northern Region: supremacy. o Includes Gilgit, Bunji, Skardu, o Consolidated state by quelling Kargil, Ladakh. remote fiefdoms. o Bounded by Karakoram Ranges and Zoji La range. Transcultural Characteristics: o Similar to Tibet, drained by  Unique characteristics influenced by Indus River. changing rulers and circumstances.  Kashmir Valley: Post-Partition Period: o Heartland flanked by Himalayan and Pir Panjal ranges.  Maharaja Hari Singh: o Drained by Jhelum and o Preferred independent state, Kishanganga rivers. despite advice from Lord o Srinagar situated along Jhelum Mountbatten. River.  Pakistan's Interest:  Southern Region: o Wanted control based on o Hills south of Pir Panjal ranges. religious affinity and "Two o Drained by upper reaches of Nation" theory. Chenab River. o Gradual rise from Jammu plains.  Sheikh Abdullah: o Varied religious demographics o Advocated democracy and (Dogras, Chibs, Sudhans). secularism.  Standstill Agreements: o Maharaja signed agreements with India and Pakistan. 1 Military Significance:  Divergence of Regions: o High, inaccessible mountain ranges separate regions. o Operations in each region require independent efforts.  Northern Region: o Limited access to Gilgit; difficult terrain. o Ground link-up necessary for sustenance. o Skardu, Kargil dominate Gilgit - Leh axis. o Leh focal point due to inaccessibility of other areas.  Kashmir Valley: o Severe winter limits military operations (June to December). Roads: o Srinagar's terrain suited for armored vehicles.  From the West: o Infantry operations in other o Road via Wah – Abottabad – areas. Domel (most frequently used). o Jhelum and Kishanganga o Road via Rawalpindi – Murree – valleys crucial for operations. Kohala – Domel (prone to o Control of Uri Bowl aids landslides). movement towards Poonch via o Route from Domel to Srinagar Haji Pir Pass. along the Jhelum valley.  Southern Region:  From the South: o Acts as corridor between Pir o Road Wazirabad - Sialkot – Panjal and Pakistan. Suchetgarh – Jammu – Srinagar o Facilitates trans-border raids. (seasonally impassable). o Provides sanctuaries for troops; o Road Pathankot – Madhopur – encirclement potential. Kathua – Jammu (vulnerable to o Terrain allows disruption of monsoon interruptions). communication centers. o Suitable for small, dispersed Rail: force operations.  Only railway from Sialkot to Jammu. o Pakistani forces effectively  Possibility of narrow gauge rail from exploit terrain's advantages. Domel to Srinagar, not exploited. o Relief operations for Poonch require rapid road axis opening and logistical support. Air:  Limited airfields in 1947, with SECTION 3: COMMUNICATIONS emergency landing strips at various locations. Introduction:  Airfields lacked infrastructure and  Vulnerability of Jammu and Kashmir resources. due to communications from the West.  Mountainous terrain hindered modern Major roads, rail, and air routes were critical for communication development. the state's connections 2 Implications on Military Operations:  Religious Significance: o Muslims viewed Kashmir as  Communication Routes: significant due to ethnic affinity o Favorable for operations from and majority population. the West (Pakistan). o Hindus revered the region's o Blockade potential by cutting Himalayan shrines. off communications from the West.  Natural Beauty and Habitat: o Difficulties in operations from o The captivating beauty of the the South due to Banihal Pass Kashmir Valley, often called the and weak links on Pathankot- Switzerland of India. Jammu road.  Political and Military Vacuum:  Motor Transport: o Weak and indecisive ruler in o Exclusive reliance on motor Kashmir created a political and transport led to restricted military vacuum. carrying capacity. o Opportune situation for strong o Heavy demand on motor peripheral rulers to exploit. transport. SECTION 5: THE  Air Transport: ADMINISTRATIVE AND o Major importance of air MILITARY SETUP transport in the Kashmir valley. o Challenges due to limited air Administrative Structure strips, poor facilities, and  Maharaja as head of civil and military transport resources. administration  Capitals: Srinagar in summer, Jammu in winter SECTION 4: STRATEGIC  Four provinces: Jammu, Srinagar, IMPORTANCE Gilgit, and Ladakh  Each province under a Governor General:  Economic potential not the sole Military Administration determinant of Kashmir's strategic  State Army HQ in Srinagar significance.  Indian Chief of Staff: Brigadier  Other factors outweighed its economic Rajinder Singh insignificance.  Four brigades: o Jammu Brigade in Jammu Factors of Strategic Importance: o Kashmir Brigade with Body Guard Cavalry and 7 J&K Rifles  Location: in Srinagar o Geographically positioned at the o Mirpur Brigade headquartered crossroads of Russia, China, and at Jhangar India. o Poonch Brigade in Poonch- Rawalkot area  Foothold for Western Powers: o Control over Kashmir seen as Strength and Composition control over a base for  Four brigades had eight infantry countering perceived threats of battalions Communism from Soviet Union  Included garrison police companies and and China. animal/mechanical transport  Machine gun (MMG) units integral to infantry battalions 3   No artillery or armor in state force o Closure of road and rail communication links between Communication and Dependency Pakistan and J&K  Wireless link with Rawalpindi, but none o Halting supply of petrol from with New Delhi Rawalpindi Depot  Dependency on local contractors for o Stopping supply of essential supplies goods like wheat, salt, cloth from Pakistan to J&K CHAPTER – II: SECTION 7: OPERATION POST INDEPENDENCE GULMARG DEVELOPMENTS IN JAMMU Introduction AND KASHMIR  Invasion of Kashmir Valley meticulously planned by Pakistan SECTION 6: TRIBAL INVASION  Splitting J&K State's Army through hit- and-run attacks along the frontier Situation on Gaining Independence  Defending force distributed into thinly  Independence of India and Pakistan on spread garrisons due to attacks 15th August 1947  Main invasion planned and launched as  End of British paramountcy on princely "Operation Gulmarg" states  Princely states given choice to join India Planning and Preparation or Pakistan, not remain independent  Operation Gulmarg planned early,  Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) decided to reportedly around Aug 1947 have Standstill agreements with both  Tribal force assembled for the India and Pakistan operation, to be supplemented by regular troops Emergence of Tensions  Each Pathan tribe required to enlist a  Initially, J&K not affected by Lashkar of 1000 tribesmen widespread communal killings during  Lashkars concentrated at various partition locations, armed and supported by  Pakistan claimed atrocities against regular Pakistan Army personnel Muslims by Maharaja's Army  Maj-Gen Akbar Khan (code name  Pakistan threatened intervention to Tariq) commanded the force, assisted "save" Muslims by Brigadier Sher Khan  Armed raiders infiltrated J&K borders,  Broad plan involved main and assisted by Pakistan Army personnel subsidiary thrusts into J&K territory Deterioration and Invasion Main Thrust  Raiders targeted Hindu communities,  Six lashkars to advance along disrupted J&K state forces Muzzafarabad to Srinagar road  Situation worsened in September-  Objective: capture Srinagar airport, October 1947 advance beyond to Banihal Pass  Open invasion of J&K from Pakistan became imminent Subsidiary Thrusts  Two lashkars securing the right flank Economic Blockade by Pakistan via Haji Pir pass to Gulmarg  Pakistan imposed economic blockade to  Another two lashkars advancing from force Kashmir's secession to Pakistan Tithwal to Sopore, Handwara, Bandipur  Measures of blockade included: o Tapping telegraph/telephone Other Areas lines operated by Pakistan  Ten lashkars to operate in Poonch, Bhimbar, Rawalkot area 4   Aim: capture Poonch, Rajauri, advance required Jammu and Kashmir's formal to Jammu accession to India. Supporting Forces Request for Indian Troops  7 Infantry Division of Pakistan Army to back up lashkars and consolidate hold  On October 22, 1947, the Maharaja  One infantry brigade in Sialkot held requested Indian troops to help counter ready to move on to Jammu the invaders.  Challenges in fulfilling this request: Factors Favoring Operation o (a) No prior plans for troop  Communications from the West favored deployment to Kashmir, with a the aggressor's move into the valley significant distance from the  J&K State Forces not as combat-ready nearest Indian border (Srinagar as regular forces, minimal resistance over 480 km away). expected o (b) Indian troops were already  Indian Army's opposition not expected engaged in refugee assistance due to internal security duties, and internal security duties. unfavorable time and space o (c) Due to time constraints, air  Surprise advantageous due to transport was the only feasible disarrayed State Forces and option. However, the Srinagar administration landing ground didn't meet  Subversion reduced loyalty of Muslim required standards for fully units in State forces, dispersed loaded transport aircraft. deployment further weakened them o (d) Lack of depots, support services, and communication lines in the region. Instrument of Accession  Mr. VP Menon, Secretary of the Ministry of States, Government of India, visited Jammu on October 26, 1947.  He returned with the formal "Instrument of Accession" signed by the Maharaja, officially integrating the state into the Indian Dominion.  At this point, Pakistan should have halted the invasion of Jammu and Kashmir, but it continued despite the accession. SECTION 8: ACCESSION TO Induction of Indian Troops INDIA AND FLY IN OF THE ARMY Choice of Troops and Operation Instruction Accession to India  Urgent need to muster and prepare troops for Srinagar.  By late October 1947, the Indian  1 Sikh battalion, under Lt Col DR Rai, government was closely monitoring the selected from Gurgaon. situation in Kashmir.  Operation Instruction to Lt Col DR Rai:  The Maharaja of Kashmir sought India's o State of Jammu and Kashmir assistance to handle the situation but acceded to India. Indian Army's direct intervention 5  o Invaded by tribesmen from o After securing airfield, drive Pakistan. raiders away from Srinagar. o Objective: Rescue the state and secure Srinagar.  Assist Local Government for Law o Initial flight with Tactical HQ 1 and Order Sikh, 1 company 1 Sikh, and o Collaborate with local composite company of RIA. government to maintain law and o Later, phase II to move brigade order. group to Jammu. Difficulties Faced by Own Forces Lt Col DR Rai's Tasks  Lack of Enemy Intelligence  Depart for Srinagar on Oct 27, 1947. o Limited information about  Secure aerodrome and civil aviation enemy strength and positioning. wireless station.  If possible, drive away invaders, help  Insecure Land Communications maintain law and order. o Lack of reliable communication  Uncertainty: Circling airfield to check networks. for invader presence.  If airfield occupied, return to Jammu.  Absence of Area Maps o No accurate maps for effective Situation Assessment planning.  Lack of detailed info on friendly troops'  Internal Security Preoccupation locations in the state. o Engaged in security operations  Latest info from 36 hours earlier, much across Punjab and other regions. had changed.  State troops' locations reported as of Oct  Army Reorganization 25, 1947: o Concurrent restructuring of o Kohala-Srinagar Sector: Troops Indian and Pakistan armies. at various locations. o Punch Sector: Troops at Brigade Challenges in Unit Muster HQ, Hajira, Rawalkot, Bagh. o Mirpur Sector: Troops at  Internal Security Deployment Jhangar, Kotli, Mirpur, etc. o Units stationed for security o Jammu Sector: Troops at Abhor, duties across northern India. Suchetgarh, Basantar Ujh, etc.  Picquets and Dispersed Units Tasks Allotted to 1 SIKH o Units divided into smaller picquets.  Hold Srinagar Airfield and Civil o Lack of efficient Aviation Wireless Station communication among units. o Ensure defense of Srinagar airfield and wireless station at  Recall of Picquets any cost. o Time-consuming process to recall widely scattered units.  Ensure Immunity of Srinagar Air Field  Relief of Troops on Security Duties o Protect Srinagar airfield from o Required to relieve troops from enemy attacks. security duties. o Facilitate safe landings for reinforcements.  Transportation Shortage o Lack of adequate transport for  Push Back Raiders from Srinagar mobilization. 6   Last-Minute Command Changes Induction of More Troops o British officers barred from accompanying troops.  Phase-I: 1 Sikh landed at Srinagar; Phase-II preparations initiated.  Phase-II involved: o Immediate movement of a CHAPTER III brigade group to Jammu via Pathankot road. BUILD UP AND INITIAL o Simultaneous rapid troop OPERATIONS deployment by air to Srinagar.  As of Nov 1, 1947, Indian troop SECTION 9: INITIAL ACTIONS disposition in J & K: BY INDIAN FORCES o Kashmir Valley:  HQ 161 Brigade.  1 Kumaon Rifles: Actions of 1 Sikh Upon Landing Perimeter defense of  1 Sikh landed at Srinagar airfield on Oct Srinagar airfield.  Two Companies 4 27, 1947.  Battalion strength: Around 300 men, KUMAON: Brigade with one battery of 13 Field Regiment. reserve at airfield.  1 PUNJAB: Road  Deployment and Advance junction at Shaletang.  1 SIKH: One company o One company assigned for Srinagar airfield defense. at airfield.  1 battery (13 Field o Rest of 1 Sikh moved towards Pattan (17 miles) and then Regiment, Royal Field Baramulla (34 miles). Artillery). o Jammu Region: o Denied the raiders a direct route  One infantry battalion (3 of 34 miles to Srinagar. (PARA) Rajput).  One machine gun  Clashes with Raiders o Clash with raiders east of company (1 MAHAR). Baramulla, withdrew due to enemy's numerical superiority The Battle of Badgam and modern weapons. o Second clash on Oct 28, 1947. Course of Battle  Withdrawal and Loss of  Battle on Nov 3, 1947. Commanding Officer  Two companies of 4 KUMAON on hills o 1 Sikh withdrew to Pattan; Lt overlooking Badgam. Col Rai killed by stray bullet.  One company withdrawn due to lack of o Lt Col Rai posthumously raider activities. awarded Maha Vir Chakra.  At 1430 hours, Major Som Nath Sharma's company reported being under  Defensive Stand at Pattan fire from Badgam village. o Utilizing favorable ground, 1  Communication disrupted, but Sikh repelled further raider company engaged enemy despite being attacks. greatly outnumbered (7:1). o Sent urgent message for  Forward platoons overran; Major reinforcements due to superior Sharma held out with depth platoon. enemy strength.  Major Sharma killed by mortar bomb, later awarded Param Vir Chakra.  Reinforcements arrived by 1700 hours, air support provided. 7 Causes of Success Battle of Shalateng  Determined Defense Introduction o 4 KUMAON Company fought fiercely despite not tasked to  Battle of Badgam secured Srinagar fight to the last. airfield and enabled force buildup.  161 Infantry Brigade planned defense of  Effective Air Support Srinagar town and pushback of raiders o Psychological and firepower to Baramulla. impact of air support.  This became the Battle of Shalateng.  Sound Leadership Plan of Operation o Major Sharma's leadership, holding position despite losses.  Forces involved: o 1 SIKH.  Injury to Pathan Leader o 1 KUMAON. o Khurshed's injury weakened o Two armored cars from 7 enemy control. Cavalry in Bandipur. o Revealed raider force's  1 SIKH: Fix enemy at Srinagar. dependency on its leader.  1 KUMAON: Infiltrate westward, position south of raiders from Pattan. Factors Saving Srinagar  Armored Cars: Move from Krahom to Sumbal via Shadipur to join Baramulla-  Delay by State Forces at Srinagar road at Shalateng. Muzaffarabad  Armored cars surprise the enemy from  Delay by Brigadier Rajinder Singh's the rear. Party at Uri  Time Wasted by Raiders at Course of Battle Baramulla  1 SIKH's Delaying Action at  Armored cars navigate Krahom-Sumbal Baramulla and Pattan stretch.  4 KUMAON's Heroic Stand at  1 KUMAON infiltrates, reaches Badgam position.  "Go" code-word given.  Raiders attacked from three directions: armored cars in west, 1 KUMAON in south, 1 SIKH in east.  Air strikes on enemy positions.  Multi-directional attack and sudden appearance of armored cars break enemy ranks.  Advance toward Pattan and Baramulla; Baramulla captured next day. Liberation of Kashmir Valley & Srinagar Defense  Reinforcements organized defense in Srinagar.  161 Infantry Brigade advances to Uri.  Srinagar garrison formed with Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh as Commander.  Deployment: o 6 RAJ RIF - Srinagar airfield. 8  o 4 KUMAON - Srinagar town Outline Plan of Operations defense. o 2 DOGRA - Baramulla defense.  Three groups for advance: o 1 PUNJAB - Joins 161 Infantry o First Group: 2 DOGRA. Brigade. o Second Group: 1 KUMAON.  Uri captured on Nov 13, 1947; Kashmir o Third Group: Administrative valley liberation complete. elements.  2 DOGRA to secure Haji Pir Pass.  Armored car troop leads advance beyond Haji Pir Pass.  1 KUMAON joins Poonch garrison; remainder returns to Uri.  Civil transport for troop movement.  Link-up expected in one day. Course of Operations  Commenced at 0700 hours on Nov 20.  Slow progress due to steep road, hairpin bends; achieved 2 miles per hour.  2 DOGRA secures Haji Pir Pass.  Advance halted at demolished bridge near Kahuta (11 miles from Poonch) due to nullah.  1 KUMAON advances to Poonch with stores of 2 DOGRA. SECTION 10: 161 BRIGADE  Bridge destruction due to misunderstanding; Poonch Brigade OPERATIONS TO RELIEVE unaware of 161 Infantry Brigade's POONCH advance.  1 KUMAON ambushed and stranded Introduction for three days; 161 Infantry Brigade returns to Uri.  Jammu situation worsened due to raids and uprisings. Analysis of Operations  Poonch and Mirpur border Muslims joined raiders, encircled state force  Lack of Reconnaissance: No garrisons. reconnaissance of Uri-Poonch road;  Plan for Poonch garrison relief: 161 plan based on civilian vehicles and Infantry Brigade's northern pincer; 50 optimistic timeframe. Para Brigade's southern pincer.  Lack of Coordination: Lack of coordination within JAK Division; Forces Employed Poonch Brigade uninformed.  Inadequacy of Transport: Inadequate  161 Infantry Brigade: service transport; reliance on civilian o Tactical HQ 161 Infantry transport delayed movement. Brigade.  Over Emphasis on Security: Over- o One armoured car troop and one emphasis on security led to undisclosed rifle troop of 7 Cavalry. plans even to own troops. o 2 DOGRA.  Lack of Vigilance: Ambush and bridge o 1 KUMAON. burning at Milestone 7 due to lack of o 17 Mountain Battery. vigilance and precautions, causing a o Engineers and service elements. three-day delay. o One MG platoon of 1 MAHAR. 9  Serious Situation in Jammu Province  Hostile activities near Pakistan border.  Oct 1947: Armed groups of ex- servicemen from Pakistan conducted raids.  Objectives of raids: o Pin down state forces. o Serve as diversion for main thrust along Kohla - Srinagar road.  Success factors of the raiders: o Provoking turbulent Muslims on Poonch-Mirpur borders. o Equipping these Muslims with arms and ammunition. o Desertion of Muslim members from Jammu and Kashmir forces to join raiders on 18 Oct 1947. Dispositions of the State Forces CHAPTER – IV  Poonch Sector: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN o Brigade HQ in Poonch. JAMMU SECTOR o Deployment of 1 Jammu and Kashmir Infantry in Hajira. o Deployment of 9 Jammu and SECTION 11: REVIEW OF THE Kashmir Infantry in Rawalkot. SITUATION o Two companies of 7 Jammu and Kashmir Infantry in Bagh.  Mirpur Sector: o Dispersed garrisons across a vast area.  Jammu Sector: o Held by 5 Jammu and Kashmir Infantry. Despatch of Troops  Top priority: Ensure safety of Srinagar and Jhelum valley.  Poonch and Mirpur garrisons left without aid for a prolonged period.  Focus on safeguarding Pathankot- Jammu-Srinagar road.  Importance of this route due to supply depot at Pathankot and vulnerability of the road along the Pakistan border.  50 Para Brigade tasked with keeping the road open for reinforcements and supplies. 10 Action by the Air Force Defence Committee's Instructions  Offensive activities carried out:  Meeting held on 14 Nov to decide future o Patrolling over Kotli area. course of action. o Heavy strafing and bombing at  Instructions conveyed to Army Kotli on 05 Nov 1947. Headquarters: o Airdrop of ammunition and o Deny Jhelum valley approach to supplies at Kotli on 07 Nov the enemy. 1947. o Replace Indian Army personnel o Strafing and reconnaissance with state troops and police for a over Poonch-Mirpur-Palandri sustained withdrawal. on 13 Nov 1947. o Keep Jammu-Banihal-Srinagar  Ground signs displayed by state forces route open in winter. aided in targeting raiders effectively. o Establish a force in Jammu for civil power aid and minority Worsening Situation protection. o Dispatch mobile columns to  Enemy captured Rajauri. relieve and evacuate  Significant casualties among non- beleaguered garrisons. Muslim population.  Besiegement of Jhangar and threat to Challenges for Winter Actions Naushera.  Attack on Beri Pattan and damaging of  Severe winters and lack of means made bridge. winter actions impractical.  No significant actions carried out at Offensive Attempt by 50 Para Brigade to Poonch due to these constraints. Relieve Mirpur & Kotli SECTION 13: RELIEF OF  Objective: Relieve garrisons at Mirpur NAUSHERA, JHANGAR AND and Kotli. KOTLI  Two-phase plan: o Phase 1: 1 Patiala and 7 Light General Context Cavalry create diversion at Beri Pattan.  Discussion on the planning and o Phase 2: 7 Light Cavalry, 1 execution of relief operations in specific MAHAR (MG), and 33 Field regions. Ambulance move towards Jhangar. General's Concerns  Conduct: o Delay due to blown bridge at  General Butcher's concerns about the Beri Pattan and enemy situation at Poonch. occupying key heights.  Factors: o Plan altered, force concentrated o Large number of ex-servicemen at Akhnoor. from Pakistan Army in Poonch. o Possibility of mass desertions SECTION 12: STRATEGIC from state forces to increase PLANNING hostiles. o Easy access for raiders due to Introduction lack of physical obstacles. o Use of dispersal tactics by  Discussion of strategic planning for the hostiles. next phase of operations in Kashmir. o Difficulty in fighting guerrillas with regular arms. 11 The Plan for Relief Operations CHAPTER V: PLANNING AT  Major General Kalian Singh's plan for ARMY HEADQUARTERS rapid relief: o 50 Para Brigade to move swiftly Introduction on multiple axes. o Two battalions to strike from  Discussion on planning at Army Uri towards Poonch. Headquarters after initial operations. o 268 Infantry Brigade to protect critical lines of communication. Appreciation by Lieutenant-General Russell Execution of the Plan  Three-pronged approach: o Northern Thrust (Kashmir  Challenges faced on the Kotli-Jhangar Valley): 161 Brigade's initiative and Poonch-Uri roads. regained after Poonch decision.  Shortage of troops, stretched resources, and narrow roads with obstacles. o Central Thrust (Naushera-  Notable ambush faced during the Kotli-Poonch): Importance of advance. maintaining route, potential  Challenges faced in reaching Poonch deception towards Palandri. and Uri picquet. o Southern Thrust (Akhnoor- Gallant Actions Munawwar-Bhimbar): Plan to capture Bhimbar for strategic  Troops' valiant efforts despite obstacles gains. and shortages.  Spirited actions of Quarter Master Tasks Assigned Platoon to assist picquet.  Courageous stand of 1 SIKH against  Major General Kalian Singh's enemy attack. Responsibilities: o Build forces on central thrust to Air Support relieve Poonch. o Advance to Bhimbar.  Commendable efforts by RIAF: o Control Jhelum valley towards o Precise drops of supplies. Uri for Poonch support. o Tactical reconnaissance. o Accurate bombing of enemy Engineer Tasks positions. o Pilot determination despite  Focus on line of communication and enemy fire. Beri Pattan ferry.  Operational scope dependent on vehicle Peculiarities and Conclusion buildup rate of 70/day.  Observations about enemy tactics, Administration challenges, and troops' performance.  Successful completion of preliminary  Restrictions on troop numbers in tasks, setting the stage for forthcoming northern thrust. demanding operations  Delhi-East Punjab Command to take over Jammu supplies.  Importance of administrative build-up on central thrust.  Special attention to maintaining Poonch supplies. 12 Conclusion  Platoon of D coy, led by Jem Nand Singh, helped extricate B coy after  Clear strategic objectives and plans fierce combat. established for upcoming operations.  Despite confusion and losses, the Sikh troops managed to withdraw. CHAPTER VI: THE LOSS OF  Jem Nand Singh's exceptional bravery earned him a Maha Vir Chakra. JHANGAR (DECEMBER 1947)  Both Lieut-Colonel Sampuran Bachan Singh and Major Ajaib Singh were Introduction wounded.  Total casualties for 1 SIKH: 1 officer, 2  Situation overview from November to Junior Commissioned Officers, and 57 December 1947 in Jammu and Kashmir. Other Ranks killed; 2 officers, 4 JCOs,  Gradual increase in enemy activity and and 55 OR wounded. aggressiveness.  Rough estimates of enemy casualties:  Focus on attacks on vulnerable Indian around 300 killed and 500 wounded. lines of communication.  Inspiring role of Boys platoon of 4 KUMAON in facilitating the Uri Sector withdrawal of 1 SIKH.  Reorganization of 161 Brigade  Estimated presence of 4000-6000 following the battle. raiders in the Uri sector.  1 SIKH relieved by 6 RAJ RIF and  Some of these raiders were experienced moved to Srinagar for rest. soldiers from Pakistan's South  Colonel Harbakhsh Singh took over Waziristan Scouts. command of 1 SIKH and additional  Notable tactics and defenses used by duties as Station Commander Srinagar. raiders suggested professional training.  161 Infantry Brigade was positioned at Conclusion the front line in Uri.  Composition of the Uri garrison  Escalating enemy aggression led to included various units like 1 SIKH, 4 significant battles and tactical KUMAON, 1 (PARA) KUMAON, etc. adjustments in the region.  Efforts to reorganize the garrison and  The Bhatgiran battle demonstrated both strengthen the perimeter defense. the courage of Indian troops and the challenges they faced in the volatile The Bhatgiran Affair situation.  Concentration of raiders observed on SECTION 14: high hills overlooking Uri from the South-East. THE DEFENCE OF POONCH  Decision made to dislodge the raiders from their hilltop positions. Poonch Geography and Accessibility  On December 12, 1 SIKH led by Lieut- Colonel Sampuran Bachan Singh  Poonch situated in a bowl formed by launched an attack. Poonch River from Suran and Batar  The unit faced initial success in rivers. overcoming the outer enemy picquets.  Limited road links from Indian side,  Eventually encountered the main enemy summer track from Uri and few position along the ridge. mountainous tracks.  While withdrawing, raiders ambushed 1  Approaches to town followed Poonch SIKH from three sides, leading to river valley, susceptible to enemy intense fighting. interference.  B coy, under Major Ajaib Singh, faced heavy opposition and was pinned down. 13 Enemy and Challenges  Winter arrival led to pause in further operations.  Estimated 3000 enemy troops with high ground advantage. SECTION 15:  Used machine guns and mortars against OWN OPERATIONS IN CHHAMB garrison. AND AKHNOOR AREAS  Easy access for enemy from west and south via existing roads. Refugees and Hampered Communication Enemy Siege and Attacks  Raiders forced Hindus to flee Akhnoor- Bhimbar area.  Enemy laid virtual siege and  Refugees crossed China River to continuously attacked Poonch. Jammu for safety.  Persistent assaults on the town.  Exodus disrupted communication line guarding. Own Forces and Reinforcements  Necessity to capture Chhamb recognized.  In Nov 47, 1 (PARA) KUMAON reinforced Poonch garrison. Enemy Presence and Strength  Original garrison had 2000 state force troops.  2000 to 3000 raiders in Akhnoor-  Combined force became Poonch Chhamb, armed with LMGs & MMGs. Brigade, led by Brig Pritam Singh. Capture of Chhamb Defensive and Consolidatory Measures  268 Infantry Brigade included 1  Air attacks on enemy concentrations MADRAS, 2 JAT, 3 GARH RIF & 1 and picquets north of Poonch (04-12 Patiala. Dec 47).  Spread to guard communication lines to  Air dropping supplies started on 08 Dec Jammu, Kathua, etc. 47.  1 Patiala tasked to capture Chhamb.  Airstrip built using refugee labor;  Troops under command included J&K mountain guns landed on 13 Dec 47. state force, 7 Cavalry's armored cars, 30  Guns engaged enemy mortars, ending Field Battery, 1 Mahar's MMG platoon. shelling of town.  Enemy held Chhamb with about 300  About 30 tons of arms, ammo, supplies hostiles. landed on 14 Dec.  Enemy deployment on western bank of  Refugee evacuation to Jammu began. Munawwar wali Tawi.  Chhamb's western ground had strong Operations defensive positions.  Crossing at Chhamb mined and covered  Night of 12/13 Dec: Captured hill south by enemy fire. of town using available artillery.  Eliminated entrenched enemy from the Plan and Operations hill.  Resulted in enemy attacks on own  Plan to capture Chhamb by 1 Patiala on picquets south of Poonch river and west 10 Dec 47: of Betar Nala. o C and D companies cross  Repulsed attacks with artillery fire. Munawwar wali Tawi upstream. o Advance along river's western Stabilization and Winter bank. o Mortars and MMGs support.  Situation stabilized. o A company protects right flank initially. 14  o Battalion HQ and A company SECTION 16: advance on eastern bank. THE FALL OF JHANGAR o Armored cars and support troops demonstrate for General Developments diversion.  Operations proceeded as planned:  Key period: Capture of Chhamb (10 o C and D companies captured Dec 47) to enemy attack on Jhangar (24 dominating ground. Dec 47). o Advanced near Chhamb after  Developments during this time: overcoming resistance. o Strengthened defenses of o Guns and mortars engaged Poonch. enemy posts, tackled snipers. o Ambushes on convoys and o Battalion HQ with A company troops. advanced on eastern bank. o Raids and counter raids near o C and D companies encircled Naushera. Chhamb. o Stubborn enemy resistance. Importance of Jhangar o Individual gallantry crucial in overcoming enemy fire.  Jhangar: Communication focal point. o Armored car destroyed by mine.  Linked Mirpur, Naushera, Kotli to o D company faced intense Poonch. struggle.  Enemy aimed to control Jhangar for o Platoon charge wiped out last build-up against Naushera and Poonch. resistance. o Chhamb captured, enemy Own Forces suffered heavy casualties.  1/2 Punjab, 7 Cavalry troop, 1 Cooperation and Action at Sadhot MAHAR's MMG platoon held Jhangar.  Deployment with picquets to dominate  High cooperation between troops, approaches. armored cars, artillery, support weapons. Preliminary Operations  2 JAT received info about enemy attack on convoy at Sadhot.  Enemy engaged picquets from Dec 47.  Plan for company attack at Sadhot in  Series of events: two phases: o Repulsed enemy at Pir Matalsi o Phase I: Platoon and mortar ridge (9 Dec). detachment advance. o Convoy attacks, company o Phase II: A company attacks ambush (19 Dec). Sadhot. o Heavy shelling, picquet attacks (19/20 Dec). Advance Towards Chingas o Aggressive enemy patrolling, probing defenses.  50 Para Brigade focused on capturing Chingas. Road Blocks and Loss of Jhangar  Challenges at Kot feature and Chingas.  Enemy attacks on Tain Dhar repulsed.  Enemy established road blocks on  Chingas column advanced but faced Jhangar-Naushera, Beri Pattan-Chauki obstacles. roads.  Reached Kamila and captured Pt. 4622.  Armored cars stranded and engaged by  Chingas reported deserted, operations enemy. continued.  Naushera-Jhangar route blocked, Jhangar reinforcement hampered.  Enemy attacked Jhangar on 24 Dec 47. 15   Battle details: CHAPTER VII: THE BATTLE o Enemy attacked from southwest, around 2000 strong. FOR NAUSHERA o Weak company at Pir Matalsi (JAN-FEB 48) ridge fought bravely. o Enemy sustained heavy SECTION 17: PRELIMINARY casualties. OPERATIONS AND THE BATTLE o Second attack from northwest with about 1000 hostiles. FOR THE LINE OF o Enemy occupied intermediate COMMUNICATION features and surrounded Jhangar. Introduction o Jhangar troops faced difficulties due to ammo shortage, terrain,  Fall of Jhangar led to enemy dominance and weather. on Mirpur-Jhangar-Poonch axis. o Armored cars, reinforcements,  Enabled enemy to build forces to attack and air support limited. Naushera and Poonch. o Jhangar troops withdrew  Imperative to secure Naushera and its towards Naushera. communication lines. o Own casualties: killed, wounded, missing. Preliminary Operations o Equipment lost: vehicles, mortars, machine guns, rifles.  Enemy dispositions: o Focus on securing Naushera- Subsequent Events and Planning Jhangar, Naushera-Beri Pattan axes.  Enemy attacked Naushera, intense o Occupied Ambli Dhar, Tain mortar fire, infiltration attempts. Dhar, Kot, Kaman Gosha Gala,  Enemy withdrew to concentrate at Sadabad. specific locations.  Major review of situation and  Own forces: administrative changes. o 50 Para Brigade under Brig.  Need for strategy change due to Jhangar Mohammed Usman guarded loss. Naushera.  Indian forces' strength and disposition. o 80 Brigade Group (Z Brigade  General Lockhart's understanding of Group) at Chhaon guarded enemy efforts. communication lines.  Major-General Kalwant Singh's plan: o Reinforce Uri and Punch  Operations overview: sectors. o Enemy aimed to exploit Jhangar o Secure line of communication, capture and cut Naushera-Beri hold key positions. Pattan road. o Prepare for Jhangar recapture. o Enemy attack on Naushera (26 o Strengthen defenses at critical Dec 47) repulsed. locations. o Own patrols probed enemy o Recapture Bhimbar and Mirpur. defenses. o Address enemy's multi- o Enemy attacked Naushera from directional efforts. various directions (04 Jan 48):  Repelled, significant enemy losses.  Utilized fire support, artillery, mortars, armoured cars, and close air support. 16 Battle for the Line of Communication  Actions from 05 Jan to 21 Jan 48: o Enemy established road blocks between Naushera and Beri Pattan (05 Jan 48). o Own attempt to clear blocks canceled to repel another enemy attack on Naushera. o Increasing road blocks by enemy led to own action to clear them. o Line Naushera-Beri Pattan-Seri cleared by 10 Jan 48. o Subsequent days used for reorganization and resource preparation. o Own picquets and patrols faced heavy shelling and sniping. o Enemy concentrations noted at Pathradi, Kaman Gosha Gala, Point 2210. SECTION 18: OPERATION SATYANAS AND CHEETA Operation Satyanas Course of Operation Introduction  Battalion advanced without surprise, lay ambush at Tung on 23 Jan 48.  Fall of Jhangar gave enemy dominance  Ambush continued on the next day. over Mirpur-Jhangar-Poonch axis.  Advance resumed, crossed Thandapani  Necessity to secure Naushera and its wali Tawi without incident. communication lines.  On 25 Jan 48: o D company attacked Takia. Preliminary Operations o C company attacked Siot and Point 2502.  Enemy dispositions: Strong defenses at o Intense firing from enemy, C Chakli, Takia, Siot, and Dharamsal. company pinned down.  Own forces: 2 JAT under Lt. Col. RG o C company surprised Siot Naidu. defenders, inflicted heavy  Aim: Clear enemy from Chakli, Takia, casualties. Siot, and Dharamsal. o Enemy engaged Battalion HQ  Plan: from West and East. o 48-hour operation due to o C company, covered by D difficult terrain and enemy company and artillery fire, fell dispersal. back. o Advance to hills south of Thandapaniwali Tawi, set Operation of the Cheeta Force ambush. o Cross Tawi, attack Siot at Introduction daybreak.  Enemy used Bhimbar-Assar-Kadala- Sadabad route for resupply. 17   Aim: Destroy enemy base at Assar and  Enemy forces massed around Kot, Kadala, inflict maximum casualties. raising concerns about the defense of  Necessity to cripple enemy's operations. Naushera.  Operation Kipper aimed to counter this Forces threat.  Key terrain features included Kot,  Cheeta Force composition: Pathradi, and Uparla Dandesar. o 7th Light Cavalry: HQ, squadrons, Stuart tanks. o Two troops of Central India Horse. o 1/7 Rajput (Motorized). Execution  Emphasis on surprise and secrecy: o Plans kept confidential. o Concentration of force at Chhamb by 24 Jan 48.  Rapid advance on 25 Jan 48: o Armoured car and jeep casualties in minefield. o Rear protection detachments guarding against enemy threats.  Deep thrust into enemy territory: o Attack Assar and Kadala from the rear. o Enemy caught off-guard, cut off from Bhimbar.  Inflicted significant enemy casualties, around 300 dead and wounded. Lessons Learnt Key Terrain Features:  Bold pre-emptive actions lead to decisive outcomes.  Kot: Situated 9 km NE of Naushera,  Secrecy crucial in successful execution atop a hill range, offered strategic of plans. observation.  Swift and deep mechanized thrusts  Pathradi: Located near Point 3284, disrupt enemy defenses. covered in dense forest.  Unconventional approaches can  Uparla Dandesar: Positioned lower than surprise enemy and impede Pathradi, with various approaches. reinforcements. Enemy Forces: SECTION 19: OPERATION KIPPER  One battalion estimated with weapons including 3-inch mortars, machine General: guns, rifles.  Defenses concentrated at Kot, Pathradi,  January 1948 saw preparations for a and Uparla Dandesar. significant confrontation around  Well-sited and mutually supporting Naushera. defenses. 18 Own Forces: Lessons Learnt:  50 Para Brigade Group with 2/2 Punjab,  Mopping up of enemies and securing 3(Para) Maratha Light Infantry, dominating ground at objectives is vital. additional companies, 7 Cavalry  Tactical headquarters placement should squadron, artillery, and support allow swift response. elements.  Reserves at unit and subunit level  Mission: Dislodge enemy and take essential for critical situations. defensive positions at Kot.  Battalion reserves for exploitation tasks prove valuable. Attack Plan:  Forward Observation Officers (FOOs) enhance quick overcoming of enemy  Silent dawn attack planned for 01 Feb. resistance.  2/2 Punjab to attack Point 3227 and Kot  Establish relay posts for efficient from the West. casualty evacuation.  3 (Para) Maratha Light Infantry to capture Pathradi/Point 3284 and Uparla Conclusion: Dandesar.  Operation Kipper's victory: Deception Plan: o First major enemy reverse from a well-prepared defensive  Created a belief of an attack on Jhangar. position.  Armored car patrols, rumors, and o Capture of Kot and Pathradi requisitioning animals diverted enemy disrupted enemy preparations to attention. capture Naushera. o Boosted troop morale after the Operations of 3 (PARA) Maratha Light loss of Jhangar, promising for Infantry: future operations.  Silent advance started on 31 Jan. CHAPTER VIII: RECAPTURE OF  Assaulted objectives at dawn on 01 Feb. JHANGAR  Faced heavy enemy resistance, engaged in hand-to-hand combat. SECTION 21: GENERAL  Captured Pathradi by 0710 hours and Uparla Dandesar by 1145 hours. First Phase of Operations: Operations of 2/2 Punjab:  Operations divided into three phases leading to Jhangar's recapture.  Secured Point 3227 without opposition.  First phase (7-29 Feb 48) focused on  Moved through Kot village without probing enemy positions. encountering resistance.  Minimal opposition faced during  Enemy counterattacked Kot; Punjab clearance of various areas. company withdrew.  Engagements and small-scale  Brigade reserves employed to retake encounters continued. Kot; successful after intense fighting.  Total enemy casualties: 156 killed, 201 wounded. SECTION 22: SECOND PHASE OF OPERATIONS Artillery and Air Support: General:  Artillery cover neutralized enemy weapons and countered counterattacks.  Dominating Ambli Dhar - Tain Dhar  Air support engaged enemy positions crucial for Naushera's security and and retreating forces. progress towards Jhangar. 19   Ambli Dhar held by enemy; Tain Dhar o Repulsed enemy counterattacks by own troops. with reserve companies.  Operations of 1 Rajput: o Captured Point 2916 by 0530 hours on 01 March.  Operations of 50 Para Brigade: o 4 DOGRA and 2/2 Punjab secured Kaman Gosha Gala. o Point 2916 captured without difficulty. o C Company faced difficulties at Point 3574 but eventually captured it.  Consolidation: o 1 RAJPUT captured Number 1 Bump near Katora Khori after intense combat. o Established a picquet on a forward feature. o Ambli Dhar secured, enemy evicted from Kaman Gosha Gala. SECTION 23: THIRD PHASE OF OPERATIONS – OPERATION VIJAY General:  Operation Vijay planned for the Enemy: recapture of Jhangar.  Enemy redeployed after losing Ambli  Ambli Dhar held by two companies Dhar and Kaman Gosha Gala. with machine guns and mortars.  Strong enemy points located on the  Neighboring areas held by at least two Handan hill range around Jhangar. more companies. Own Forces: Own Plans:  19 Independent Brigade Group and 50  50 Para Brigade tasked with capturing Para Brigade. Ambli Dhar (Operation Bharatpur).  Armoured Column from 7 Cavalry.  19 Para Brigade to secure Kaman Gosha  Naushera Garrison units. Gala.  Operational plan involving twin thrusts  Detailed plan assigned tasks, support, by both brigade groups. and air cover. Progress of Operations:  C Company's actions deceived the enemy about the main attack.  Operations of 2 JAT: o Minimal initial opposition. o Heavy enemy fire encountered during advance. o Point 3319 captured after intense exchange of fire. 20   Gaikot Forest captured by 19 Independent Brigade Group with relative ease.  Both brigades advanced towards Jhangar. Recapture of Jhangar:  Both brigades reached Jhangar on March 17, 1948.  Enemy inner defenses thinly held due to focus on previous strongholds.  Brigades captured dominating ground and objectives with artillery support.  1 Patiala, 3 (Para) Maratha Light Infantry, 1 KUMAON, and 4 DOGRA played key roles.  Artillery and air support crucial in attaining victory.  Armoured column played a heroic role in advancing towards Jhangar.  Jhangar recaptured by March 18, 1948, closing Operation Vijay. Significance of the Recapture:  Severed enemy's communication line.  Strengthened security of Naushera and surrounding sectors.  Opened the way for further operations towards Rajauri and Poonch. Reasons for Success:  Well-conceived operational plan based on realistic enemy assessment.  Troop's valour, flexibility, detailed reconnaissance, and deception measures.  Effective use of artillery, armor, and air support. Conclusion:  Recapture of Jhangar compensated for earlier losses and strengthened Naushera's security. Progress of Operations:  Operation Vijay's success laid the foundation for advancing towards  Move of armoured column kept secret, Rajauri and Poonch. tanks camouflaged.  Operations delayed due to heavy rains.  Pir Thil captured by 50 Para Brigade Group with challenges and casualties. 21  CHAPTER IX: THE  Enemy split, withdrew; 1 SIKH attempted to surround Handwara. HANDWARA SECTOR –  Arampur reached, bridge repaired; ADVANCE TO TITHWAL battalion rested.  Point 5220 bridge secured; enemy General abandoned Trehgam.  Patrol into Shulur faced heavy fire,  Raiders through Phakiran ki Gali operation launched later, objective towards Handwara and Tithwal. taken.  Shulur abandoned, Trahagam valley in  Base established at Darugmal after enemy hands. clearing Kupwara.  1 SIKH tasked to handle threat,  Enemy attack on C company picquet supported by 7 Cavalry armored cars. repelled.  Terrain challenges with nalas and snow- clad high features. Difficulties Faced Clearance of Handwara  Oppressive winter cold.  Restricted movement due to snow.  Approx. 800 hostiles (enemy battalion)  Logistic challenges, lack of porters. in the area.  Limited logistic support for pursuit  1 SIKH tasked to establish a base, party. gather enemy info, secure Point 5220 bridge. Operation in Shulur  Enemy holding Shulur with battalion strength.  Own forces: 7 SIKH, 1 SIKH company, armored cars, 25 pdr guns.  Disposition of Own Forces detailed.  Force sent to secure Trahagam ridge; another along road, flank advance.  Shulur garrison to meet thrust; field guns at Pathahir support.  Pethahir captured with heavy enemy fire; Shulur captured, garrison established. Artillery and Command Reorganisation  Field guns deployed; new command structure with Brigadier Lakhinder Singh.  77 Para Brigade added; unit replacements and new plans implemented. Tithwal Offensive  D-day for diversionary push by 163 Conduct of the Operation Infantry Brigade set.  Force level, enemy deployment,  Base established at Watawian; characteristics, and limitations. Handwara occupied by enemy, intel  Additional troops provided for gathered. operation. 22   Multi-phase plan: secure ridges, capture Defensive Postures and Reorgani