European Integration, Recap Lecture PDF

Recap previous lecture Elise Treaty  symbol of complete reconciliation France-Germany, but real meaning was by D.G. and Adenauer the way to counter-balance JFK approach to Euro-Atlantic relation. D.G. wanted to create a partition, to tell Adenauer to choose France instead of US....

Recap previous lecture Elise Treaty  symbol of complete reconciliation France-Germany, but real meaning was by D.G. and Adenauer the way to counter-balance JFK approach to Euro-Atlantic relation. D.G. wanted to create a partition, to tell Adenauer to choose France instead of US. JFK reaction: strong alarm, it was a menace to Euro-Atlantic relation as considered in new grad design. Key point: preamble before Treaty in which Atlantic relation came rst and then relation with France. US wanted it to become part of Atlantic building. Huge, large Atlantic building and the treaty is part of it. On contrary, could become a building upon European integration process, a restart from Franco-German axis. - Important for Franco-German, but a defeat for D.G. Idea that Adenauer ended his political life, Erhard in a certain sense created for D.G. on one hand possibility of a new restart of relation, but Erhard decided to choose Atlantic relation. Interpretation of Euro-Atlantic relation: - D.G.: independence from US - Erhard: alliance with US Hollstein intervention in 1965  president of European Commission decided to intervene for some reasons: - Change in UK leadership from conservative to labour leadership in ‘65 - D.G. in dif culty - Common market was in the middle of the process to its complete creation Hollstein scandalous proposal = it was time to propose something for doing: - Independent budget - Democratization and legitimization of EEC, a strong institutional intervention, to work inside European institutions D.G. decided to come back after the crisis  for a lot of reasons - Pressure on D.G.: o External: France needs the common market, in particular the agricultural dimension o Internal: presidential elections Demands: - Commission, had to present proposal 1st to member gov. and then to Council of Ministers o Gov. of each country members o If Hollstein had some proposal, he had to write to each gov. and present them the proposal, then it would have been discussed in Council of Min. fi fi  o Council of Min. has to be considered a European institution, but members of countries have to be considered a national dimension - Any declaration without consultation with Council of Min. o D.G. furious because he was talking in public vs national members - Representation of Community to outside world left to Council of Min. o If something can be considered of foreign policy, it has to be represented by Council of Min. - Vital interest o Not so clear, each gov. can decide its own vital interest o We can discuss, but about unanimity To restart the discussion from this Decalogue  after 10 days, diplomats of the 6 restarted to discuss on 6 points: - Last one: majority voting  Schroder (foreign affairs W.G.) did a concession to France: “if there are very important interests of one or more partners, we need to nd a consensual solution” o The nal joint declaration was on this consensual solution  idea of vital interest found as substitution idea of a consensual solution, which meant unanimity. It’s also called the “ nal Luxemburg compromise”. Jan. 1966: - Couve accepted end of blockade - Other 5 countries accepted that point about vital interest can be ne substitution of each discussion has to nally end with consensual solution  way to nd a point of mediation for restarting with a concrete life inside European integration process D.G. reaction to the restart: - It’s time to re-organize consultation inside the 6 for starting a new political integration and union - Decided to work on the Euro-Atlantic relation D.G. said it was “time to nd response to what JFK and Johnson are doing about Euro-Atlantic relation”  March 1966: withdrawal from integration defence structure of NATO, decided to show concretely his idea of France as a 3rd force After Lux. compromise, D.G. was saying “Impossible to go on without me”, but at the same time, there was no guarantee Community will develop in his desired direction - France was showing to the others he had possibility to stop European integration process, but on the other hand not clear which kind of direction could develop this process fi fi fi fi fi fi fi  o Even if Lux. Process created condition for a restart, D.G. was in a potential stalemate A potential development only without D.G.! D.G., in conference, Feb. 1966, decided to: - organize political consultation among the 6 huger than ever before - presenting idea to withdraw from integrated defence structure saying “before the expiration of Atlantic Pact of April 1969”, it had to be resigned after 20 years. Before it, France will abandon the defence structure of NATO, not the Atlantic Pact, from the military dimension, not from the political one D.G. went on some weeks later  wrote to Johnson about French intention to regain the full exercise of her sovereignty, saying “all the American forces had to abandon French territory” and “from now we decide to cease participation from NATO” - concretely, lot of important consequences: o French generals withdraw from military command of NATO o high command in Paris shifted in Brussel o in all the French territory there where 100,000 American soldiers that had to abandon France o a lot of concrete operation possibilities of NATO (e.g. airspace capacity of NATO) from this time found a lot of dif culties Not only a symbolic decision, it was a real break inside Euro-Atlantic relation About West Germany  1966: it changed the government. Adenauer left power to Erhard, but it was always liberal + CDU. In Dec. 1966 liberal party decided to leave the majority  it was born a new majority, strange: CDU + SPD, the so-called Grosse Koalition, expression to say Christian Democracy + SPD - chancellor of this new W.G. was Kiesinger (CDU) - Foreign affairs minister was Brandt, major of West Berlin, leader of SPD This couple: could be considered much more pro-Gaullist than Erhard and Schroder before  D.G., with the new coalition, seemed to nd a new possibility of building this Europe as a 3rd force New situation in W.G.  D.G. decision to withdraw  new situation also in UK In UK New situation from Oct. 1964  Parliamentary elections won by Labour Party - Harold Wilson, Labour Party leader and new British PM, won elections because its campaign was led vs MacMillan ideas of an application for being member of EEC o When he became PM, he considered EEC membership completely incompatible with a socialist planned economy fi fi  o For the Labour Party, in 1964 EEC wasn’t part of the project o For Wilson there were: ▪ Idea of plan: we need a plani cation of our economy, we don’t need to enter the common market ▪ Idea of UK independent: a UK potentially 3rd force o Wilson was completely strongly outside a conception of a new application in this moment Problem: in 1965 and beginning 1966  ambition of a state-centred economy were completely frustrated, it was a failure - When Wilson will start to build a new potential application, beginning of 1966, it was something completely new for a Labour Party - While in Jan. 1966 Wilson organized 1st cabinet Committee for discussing potential implication of British access to EEC, it was completely new inside Labour world Inside LP there were minority of members that wanted this idea to enter EEC  only in Oct. 1966 Wilson was convinced to start exploration with gov. of the 6 if it was possible and under what conditions a new application - 10th Nov. 1966  of cial announcement of Wilson intention to enter the EEC, if essential British and Commonwealth interests are safeguarded Why Wilson changed his mind? 3 main reasons: - For a new industrial growth, there was the need of common market, a synonymous of a potential British industrial growth  EEC as response to British crisis - EEC can become also a new tech community useful to counter balance American challenge  idea of a Europe as 3rd force o Different from MacMillan approach - Idea of potential British leadership inside this Europe + another reason: potential support of Brandt  “we’re both members of European International Socialist Movement, why don’t we build a socialist Europe?” - Idea of a politicization of European integration is starting in mid-60s  ideas of European political families, cultures started here Jan. 1967 D.G. met Wilson in Paris saying “impossible to think about a British full membership, why don’t you explore other possibilities?”  e.g. some forms of association, not full membership - As still today, e.g. with Ukraine  not a complete membership, but we can start from some forms of association fi fi  10th May 1967  arrived of cial application - D.G. immediate response  new veto o “Even if there’s a labour proposal, and not a conservative one (it’s not MacMillan), the potential result is the same, with UK inside, EEC will become a free trade zone Atlantic oriented”  labour or conservative is the same o Offered alternative of an association Other 5 gov. reaction  “it’s an opportunity, we can not only discuss on that, but it can be possibility for a relaunch, why don’t we use the situation for relaunch of European integration process?” - From this moment, till end-1968, there was a potentially: o Stalemate o New crisis 3rd Oct. 1968: Belgian foreign affairs minister, Harmel, said “we can go on without France, there won’t be a new Empty Chair Crisis” - First time there was this possibility  possibility of acting without France, using an expression we use also today: we can propose possibility of close cooperation = only a part of EEC could decide to go on without France o E.g. Current currency, Euro, is a close cooperation  some decided to create it In general, he was presenting possibility of going on in closing cooperation In France stared strong pressure on D.G., most important arrived from the Gaullist world, a loyal politician, Michelle Debré - He was probably the most loyal politician to D.G., he was with him in London in resistance, he was with him when D.G. decided to leave politics and D.G. PM in 1959 till 1962, he wrote the constitution - In 1968 he was Minister of the Economy - In Oct.-Nov. 1968 he lived a strong currency crisis as Minister of Economy, crisis of French money (not only) - May 1968 strong movements of people and students This provoked a strong capital ight from France to the Federal Republic  if the French money was living a dif cult situation, W.G. money a potentially very good situation - In order to create a situation unbalanced between France and W.G., in particular the American gov., but also the French one demanded to W.G. to appreciate the German Mark  demand of economic solidarity  response: economy and nance ministers said NO! fi fi fi fl  o West Germany was becoming not only a huge and strong economic country, but also a potentially strong political country Connection with UK  Debré was trying to tell D.G. of a strong need to counterbalance politically West Germany - In order to do that, France had to take again the political leadership of EEC, but for retaking the political leadership, you have to solve the most important problem  UK application - Debré trying to say from a Gaullist prospective it was impossible to continue to say no and stop the situation, because the concrete risk is not only the close cooperation, but also a W.G. political leadership For concretely retaking political leadership in EEC France has to become the sponsor for the UK full membership W.G. attitude: “it’s not our interest to intervene on our money for solidarity reasons”  Debré was talking about a new W.G. self-con dence, “they’re becoming too self- con dence, economically and politically speaking”  risk to transform self-con dence in economy into political strength - Impossible to go on saying no, because no is not a political solution How to convince D.G. about that? Impossible  because D.G. considered European integration process a geopolitical process, he consider European integration inside Cold War moment - He didn’t consider connections politics-economy  D.G. wasn’t able to accept the fact that, e.g., W.G. economic strength could transform it in a new strong political country - D.G. saying “history is more important, it’ll be impossible for W.G. to have political leadership in this Europe” (country geographically divided, that 20 years ago was Nazi, etc.) Debré was showing that in 1968 in currency crisis W.G. was showing you can be leader in politics using economy - Important also for today: idea of not only considering the geopolitical idea D.G. was trying to stop the time, Debré said “we need to adapt at the situation” and that adaptation in that moment was linked to British application  the other members said without UK application wouldn’t have been any evolution 28th April 1969  D.G. for trying to nd a new internal legitimation, proposed a referendum on a regional reform in France  he lost the referendum and he decided (it was a personal decision, he could have remained president) to abandon policy on 30th April New election  George Pompidou (much Gaullist) elected new French president (PM from 1962 to 1968) fi fi fi fi  - He considered from beginning British complete membership a strategic necessity, because he was linking membership to a relaunch of European integration led with French leadership For Pompidou  UK membership was a strategic necessity because he was saying “without this, the evolution of EEC will remain blocked, it’s the way for a restarting of EEC” EEC is a need for France 1st of all for the economic modernization of the country - D.G. unable to understand that a relaunch of European integration process was important for a new French modernization - European countries are blocking all the initiative for community till UK will come in = we need to reopen British issue “France will completely change its mind, from a Gaullist phase (blocking the integration) we’ll become the country that proposes a new life for the integration”  he was Gaullist, not stopping, but leading the situation The British membership will be only the last point of the relaunch, there’ll be 2 other points before the enlargement: - Completion: to complete common market in particular in agriculture - Deepening: to deepen the process, e.g. doing something about monetary system, not a common currency - Widening, enlargement of EEC = British membership Proposals held 1st and 2nd Dec. 1969 in The Hague Conference  relaunch of European integration process after the Gaullist decade Closing with Gaullist approach  we’ll take the leadership of this potential British membership  we can restart to develop European integration process Lecture 12 – 11/12 Recap previous lecture 1. Differences 1st and 2nd veto. Not only for DG approach (it’s not so different, he was convinced UK was symbol of an Atlantic-centred European integration process, both in 1963 and 1967). What was different: external attitude, French and German public opinion. Iin particular, some Gaullist politicians idea that was important to take again the leadership of European integration process. The way to restart with French leadership will become idea to enlarge the community. Debrè convinced to retake the leadership of the process. 2. Idea of reopening the British dossier saying “it’s a French issue”  differences DG and Pompidou. In general, in politics, importance of political leadership. No other possibilities for de-blocking the situation than nal of political life of DG. fi  Arrival of Pompidou and Willibrandt in 1969, also WG with new coalition (SPD + Liberal) 3. Menace from idea that we can go on without France from Belgium  idea of close cooperation, important as a method, idea that is possible to create closed cooperation or thinking more integration Key words: completing, deepening and widening  sequence of restart of European integration process. Most important moment: Hague Conference, in De. 1969 -> key protagonist of this Conference were Pompidou and Willy Brandt, Franco-German axis - Inside conference there were these 3 concepts. Completing Idea of nancing of common agriculture policy  it has to close de nitely from 1st Jan. 1970 Idea: community could add its own possibility to control some parts of the budget  important starting point for the evolution of a potential supranational community - Impossible without obtaining the decision of all the 6 o Crisis DG-Hallstein  was about that, idea of community creating a community budget Deepening During 70s incremental plan for establishment of economic and currency union  idea of doing something more than common market and custom union. - Currency and economic union  started question “is it possible to build common market without having common economic system? To build a custom union without having a common currency?” o Crisis in 1971, after Nixon announcement of end of Bretton Wood system (dollar crisis) created condition for going faster and faster in idea of currency union. - The project of currency union was in The Hague nal resolution! - Not only dollar crisis after Nixon announcement of end of B-W creating this need  the need of building common currency and working for an economic union was already inside the Hague conference Widening Candidates had to accept communitiy’s entire acquis communautaire  each new candidate hada to accept all the rules and the principles of the EEC, not only some of them. - It means: for beginning, for having the full membership you need to take all the European package, e.g. principle of common agricultural policy (dif cult for UK to accept it at the beginning) fi fi fi fi  o Example: for UK, to asset the priniciple of common agricultural policy was complicated  UK imported a lot of agricultural products and there were lot of taxes on these importation from outside custom union  so agreeing = nancial burden + UK had to pay a lot for obtaining few: agricultural system not so developed in UK o Tathcer: spending not so much and obtaining more - This idea was important also for enlargement to other countries, not only UK The Hague Conference  talking about UK, from this moment, ater the conference, it opened negotiations for British entry. There were interesting negotiations guidelines  during council of Min. session in Jun. 1970: decided that candidates for entry had to accept some guidelines for 1st enlargement: - Preference of the community, uniformity of prices and solidarity in nancing the agricultural market: o Key word of solidarity - Transition period for adjusting to be kept as brief as possible o On the contrary, London wanted a long transition period o Key word: transtition period - Leadership during negotiations was to be given to Council  Pompidou insisted on it: it meant in particular to France, Pompidou was leader of negotiations with UK o Key word: the Council = intergovovermental dimension - Commission: role to support French government All the 1st part of negotiation Council-UK (there were also Ireland, Denmark and Norway, even if nally not part of nal membership)  most dif cult point: Heath (British PM) focused on the idea of obtaingin a longer transition period - All the negotiate was based on this idea that Heath wanted 1st of all to negotiate 1 to 1 with Pompidou (negotiation led in Paris in 1 to 1 summite ) and 2nd to obtaining longer transition period - Pompidou strong during negotiate  Jan. 1971 in press said, talking about UK, “the British people have 3 qualities: humour, tenacity and realism. We stayed ne in humour stage. I have no doubt that tenacity will follow. I hope that realism will nally triumph”  in fact, nal result was full of realism. - Another problem: UK didn’t want to the pound as a second international reserve currency fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi  o Other EEC countries didn’t want this idea of sterling 2nd international reserve currency, in particular France  because pound was too much vulnerable to uctuations: if a currency so vulnerable to uctuations will enter common market, concrete risk is to destroy common market. We need to stop idea of considering sterling as 2nd international reserve currency o Not so easy for UK before dollar century sterling was 1st reserve currency o Implications in public opinion - Most important problem remains question of the budget o British major importer of non-community products (from Commonwealth, but also from Argentina)  risk to pay a lot for external tariffs for importation + for receiving little because European community budget was dominated by common agricultural policy and London had little small agricultural sector o Initially, EEC proposed UK had to contribute a fth to community budget, paying 20%, but for receiving a small part cause agricultural sector was not 1/5 of the UK budget, probabily was 1/10 o UK counter-proposal: to pay 3% o Summit Pompoidou-Heath  closing was that UK was contributing for 19% of the budget in 5 years starting from 9% ▪ From 1st year of of cial membership (1973) it will start from 9 to arrive to 19% ▪ In 1978 had to be 19% o This is the reason why in 1979 Tatcher PM saying impossible to pay 1/5 of budget obtaining nothing o In this situation, Heath decided to close in such a way  because: ▪ We will discuss for other 5 years the possibility to arrive 20 ▪ Application in 1961  lasted 10 years. In this moment, UK not in a good economic situation = DG was winning in May 1971: UK was entering (DG loosing), but UK was entering at conditions that the 6, in particular France, wanted UK obtained membership  1 positive and 1 negative consequence for EU integration process fl fi fi fl  - Positive: better to have UK inside than outside  UK absence during 60s was becoming synonymous of possibility to stop the negotiations (smaller ctys saying we’ll ratify only with UK)  impossible to say to stop here till UK entering. o Idea of long period of negotiation witout obtaining full membership  can be applied to the Turkish case as well: started at beginning of 21st century and situation is frozen rn, but Turkey itself lost completely the desire of being part of EU integration process - Negative: connected to idea of a too late membership, too long negotiations  UK full membership in 1963 arrived when post-war golden age was ending. UK entered European economic community when problems were starting and London added problems to EEC issues - 3rd consideration: linked to British public opinion perception  long-lasting membership, long road to EEC, inside UK public opinion was nally considered a surrender to EEC o Right-wing weekly journal wrote article at end of negotiation: “unconditional surrender”  main topic was Heath and conservative party did what Napoleon 1st and Hitler after aspired to do, but failed to do o Continent was able to do what Napoleon and Hitler were trying to do o This created from beginning a feeling of Euro-scepticism towards full membership Economic and currency union  during The Hague conference: Werner Committee (Werner was Lux. PM whlo led committee) to produce a 1st document on economic and monetary union - Committee produced document  in this, 2 key questions: 1. Is it possible to build a common market and a custom union without an economic and currency union? Is it possible to build a common market with 6/7/8/9 diffferent economic policies?  key question still today: inside Mastricht treaty idea of common economic policy is still on the stage, there are some important rules inside it for trying to regulate the different economic policies, but it’s still an issue a. To nd a solution for having a much more common economic policy to add the common market and custom union = internal issue b. Progress in custom union without harmoninzng economic policies  is it possible? 2. About external situation  what to do for facing the decrease of con dence in the dollar as a leading currency  idea of dollar as fi fi fi  leader currency (Autumn 1970, before Nixon decision of 1971 to declare of cially to stop with B-W Idea of common currency and economic union  it was considered in a different way inside the 6 + 3 - Different priorities in arriving to this common currency and economic union, e.g. economically weak members (Italy for example) that were saying “good idea, but with idea to support our weak currency”  contrary, France “common currency only after macro-economic convergence and budgetary discipline” o Yes, build a common currency, but for economiccaly weak members (Italy and also France) to support the complicated life of the currencies living a dif cult situation. On the contrary, WG approach was that of a country with a strong currency: “we can build a common currency, but only after idea of creating a common economic union based on budgetary discipline” o = different priorities  again today, aftere end of NEXT Gen Eu there’s now a debate on “we can restart as before Covid or going on with EU commission that is creating EU debt for solidarity”  now, at the beginning: “we’re creating common currency to save weak currency, or after having created a common economic union based on budgetary discipline?” - My currency is living dif cult situation  common currency can support the situation - Bundesbank, in particular Economic and nance min. insisted on idea of before giving budgetary discipline and only after creating a common currency Important struggle still today! Starting debate  arrived dollar crisis: 15th Aug. 1971 Nixon of cially decided dollar was free to oat  it was oating during all the 60s, starting from mid-60s (linked to the Vietnam war and building of the so-called Great Society in US)  new: Nixon of cially and unilateral (not talking with Euro-Atlantic allies) was deciding it, the end of B-W system Bretton Woods system: - Free trade system in Atlantic world - Technically, in 1944 was decided a xed value in gold and all the other currency should nd a x relation to the dollar - Most important consequence of stopping this system  EU countries worried about not the immediate, but long-term effect of dollar because of possible devaluation of gold in EU banks in short-term and in medium/long-term there was a risk inside custom union and common market  dollar would decline more sharply vs the mark than vs the lira, pound, French frank and this would fi fi fl fi fi fl fi fi fi fi fi  create a situation of asymmetry between European currencies, creating e.g. commercial advantages for countries with a weak currency o Dollar crisis was creating competition among European currencies! o Real potentially destroying effect of Nixon decision  there was possibility of creating commercial advantage or disadvantage inside the custom union and common market o EEC will be able to survive in front of facing this decision? Or there will be creation of internal competition? o Immediately, Popmpidou started to negotiate with Nixon the exact level of the dollar devaluation  you have to give us a number  at the end of “Smitsonian agreement” (inside Smitsonian institute in Washington, meeting of G10 nance ministers, 6 EEC + US, Canda, UK and Japan), 18th Dec. 1971, before entering of UK  level of dollar devaluation quite 8% of devaluation ▪ Double idea of creating a range of uctuation of Euroepan currencies in comparison to the dollar  the so-called tunnel: max and min levels of uctuation for EU currencies  currencies has to remain “in the tunnel”  this range was created from 1.5% to 4.5% ▪ To reduce the uctuation margins among European currencies = to create idea to connect each of the currencies  not only the uctuation in comparison to the dodllar, but also in comparison to currencies each other! = creating inside the tunnel the so-called “European snake”  connecting each currency to the other. Mark was the stronger currency Nixon proposing a plan: no more convertibility of dollar in gold, 10% surcharge on imports, cutting on federal spending in oversea aid, etc. Werner committee proposing common currency and economic union as a result at end-70s  important questions: internal one (to go on only with common market and custom union without something more economically speaking?) and external one (dollar loosing leadership, is it possible European solution?) Nixon deicision  need to react. Before his decision, inside EEC countries there was idea of “common currency to protect weaker currency”, but WG approach “after having harmonized them” After Nixon: idea of a tunnel and inside it the 1st idea of a connection among different currencies European snake  response to not using currencies for creating commercial advantage for weak currencies fl fl fi fl fl Response to Nixon decision was creating 1st concrete steps for building a currency union  for facing this unilateral decision, European ctys concretely made 1st step to create currency union All that happened 1971-1972  1973: arrived as the most complicated year inside Euro-Atlantic relations - US living leadership crisis with the end of B.W. (a way to say “w’re not imposing our money leadership), but Nixon was talking about to stop intervention in Vietnam, negotiating with USSR - Complicated year because: o Kissinger  1973 is year of Europe: I’s time to rede ne Atlantic Pact ▪ Eu ctys in 70s are not one of the 50s  he ws saying “at end of WWII US created an Atlantic world and Eu integration process was part of it, now, after Nixon decision, situation is quite of competition or sth similar” = time to rede ne a new pact Europe-US o European countries didn’t appreciate this Kissinger speech: ▪ It arrived in April 1973 during dollar crisis period ▪ They considered the speech arriving in a moment in which European ctys trying to create also an international image  in Oct. 1972, 6 ctys of EEC + 3 new ctys entering (Uk, Ireland and Denmark) had of cially said that by 1980s they would create a real European Union with its own currency and a common foreign policy = idea to become adult in European integration process ▪ Potential issue: watching US and USSR signing treaties under European heads without talking with EU ctys  are we loosing US nuclar guarantee? o 6th Oct. 1973 started the so-called Yom Kippur War  attack Egypt and Syria on Israel: main effect that in 1 week oil prices raised by 70%  about Euro-Atlantic relation: Europeans dependend on Aarb nations  US decided to back Israel, on the contrary the European ctys tried to buil a Euro-Arab strategy ▪ Only Portugal and Ned gave military support to Israel (allowed US transport planes to use territories), all the others didn’t give possibility to use their territory to US ▪ Nov. 1973, after end of war, EEC foreign Ministers called for Israel withdrawal to 1967 borders, to the previous borders  trying to have their own politics in middle-East. fi fi fi  ▪ When OPEC doubled the price of oil in Dec. European ctys decided to start an autnonomous dialogu with oil producers ▪ In Dec. 1973 EEC foreign Ministers  Declaration on European Idenitity, in which for 1st time EEC was trying to show a real foreign policy ▪ All that created a trouble response by US  response to European initiative was “no Euro-Arab dialogue, but creation of consumers cartel of the largest industrial nations, led by US”  us forced Eureopans to accept this new policy: Nixon adm. Linked energy question to the security question, “if you don’t agree, therew ill be a real American withdrawal from Europe in the future” 1973-beginning 1974 was really creating potential conditions for new Euro-Atlantic realtions and for idea of creating a much more independente European integration process from the original one. From 1971 till 1973  potentially there was creation of a 2nd life of the process, between April and June 1974 the situation seemed to reach a new Euro-Atlantic consenus - April: EEC agreed to consult with US whenever they had to take foreign policy initiatives (same before 1973 criisis), and end-June NATO members signed a new declaration on the Atlantic relations From April 1974 till end-May changed French president (Pompidou died), Willibrandt substituted by Smith (for internal scandal) - French PM and Smith can be considered much more atlanticists than Pompidou and Willibrandt o They immediately worked to create condition to rebuild good Euro-Atlantic relations o They also immediately considered that 1971-1974 was a turning point for Euroepan integration process  all that happened in a famous summit in Paris, 9th and 10th Dec. 1974: informal summit, conference organized by FR PM and backed by Smith (with 9 chiefs of gov. of EEC), important because: ▪ Conference was of cially, formally transformed the European Council: every 4 months from 1975 European Council had to meet  idea to connect supranational evolution and inter-gov. (European Council, but they had to formally meet) Formalization of European Council as the most important institution, inter-gov. approach was winning fi  ▪ During this summit it was decided that of cially European Parliamentary Assmebly (written inside Rome treaties) had to be elected directly Idea of creating a EU parliament directly elected  this path started from 1975 till 1st direct elections in 1979 Lecture 13 – 12/12 Recap previous lecture Completing, deepening and widening. Complete common agricultural policy  common agri policy, CAP, can be considered probably the most important policy of EEC in this period, because taling about custom union, possibility of free to movement of money and capital etc. we’re not talking about a policy. CAP: each country paid money for a budget and this budget was divided to support agricultural sector of each nation. CAP was key centre of French poicy inside EEC. When EEC was composed by 6 ctys, biggest agri sector was the French one. It was essentially a French and Dutch policy. Ex. WG paid for French agri system and accepted that for building custom union and common market. Because WG received a little money because it agri sector wasn’t so big. CAP = double problem for UK: 1. Entering EEC, UK had to buy Euro agri products  Eu agri products cost more than Commonwealth ones 2. UK had to pay for this budget and a lot of this budget was money that came back to the members (after 1973 are 9), but with little agri sectore a. Ex. Ireland received a lot by CAP because its agri sector was important So, also today CAP is really important, not so important as it was in 70s. Also today e.g. Polish agri sector is receiving lot of money for its sector. Now there are also lot of other policies in the udget, but till mid-90s, before Maastricth, CAP was centre of Euro budget. When Tatcher arrived in 1979  she was using CAP as instrument for attacking Europeanism cause conservative party was transforming in Euro-sceptic. In 50s was the labour party the sceptist one. She was able to use budget of CAP to say “impossible for UK to pay a lot for receiving a few, impossible to pay for FR and NED agri systems”. In 1984 Tatcher will be able to obtain a reduction in paying for budget. Idea of having Euro budget was also symbol of autonomization of European institution  important point: to nd some form of independent European taxation for having an autonomous budget fi fi  - In mid-80s Mitterandt with Edmund Call negotiated for so-called value added solution  more taxation for building a bigger budget not using common agri policy = to create much more autonomy. Deepening: Werner Committee  draft about idea of a potential common currency. Ready in Oct. 1970. - No strong connection between idea of building common currency and the end of Bretton Woods  there was a re ection on common currency before Nixon decision. This idea was thought before also because dollar was oating also before Aug. 1971. Currency crisis of 1968 connected with idea of dollar oating Inside report of Werner Committee  3 important targets: 1. Idea of creating a Council of Economic and Finance Ministers  can be de ned gran parent of Euro group: today there’s of cial meeting of all economic and nance min. of Eurozone. Inside Werner report there was already this idea of the Council 2. Easch national gov. had to progressively be obliged to conduct a common scal policy  to create a common scal policy. 3. National central banks of each EEC members had to work progressively for narrowing the margins of uctuation a. Idea of the snake in 1972 was linked to Werner Committee Immediately, inside 6 it was clear idea of creating common currency and potentially a common economic policy was though confronting to different priorities - weaker members saying “good idea for our dif cult situation - WG saying “good idea, but insisting e.g. on the scal policy, the budget discipline, macro-economic convergence”  idea of doing sth together, but in a German way = creating common currency, but rstly we need to unify our national budget situations, our scal policies o One of critics of WG towards Greek membership: “impossible because its economic system is so different from our one = impossible to really arrive to a full membership”, same talking about Portugal, Spain, etc. European reaction to Nixon decision in Aug. 1971 - Nixon unilateral decision, so Nixon was breaking Euro-Atlantic relation for Euro ctys. Previous presidents were not so unilateral. Nixon was closing BW, but also breaking Atlantic solidarity - Risk of Euro internal response to this decision  the risk of “competitive devaluation”, idea of making competitive choices using the possibility of devaluating its own currency = weaker currency could become more competitive fi fl fi fi fl fi fi fi fi fl fl fi fi  internally towards US. With competitive devaluation  no possibility for custom union and common market o A cty with a weaker currency can sell products to US in an easier way o Reasons that created need of Tunnel and snake  as a reaction to this risk of competitive devaluation Provocation by Kissinger “it’s time to change Euro-Atlantic relations”  he was also saying sth true: that Euro-Atlantic relations were different in mid-70s, but when Kiss. said “time for Europe to show possibility of having a real foreign policy” and EEC started Euro-Arab dialogue  US replied saying “this dialogue it’s impossible in this way, you need to build a cartel of the much more industrialized ctys led with a US leadership, on the contrary US withdrawal in particular on military point”. - Potential US withdrawal: important for understanding that Eu process and idea of creating EEC as an instrument of Eu development  all that spending quite nothing for Euro securitiy, because it had the American guarantee = Kiss. saying sth real In mid-70s Eu ctys accepted to remain under US military and nuclear umbrella and this meant idea of not become autonomous from military POV. Trying to be autonomous = spending a lot of money in military sector = maybe could provoke problems in welfare state system, rich in Euro ctys Important changes at end-1974  Euro-Atlantic issues and dif cutlies of 1973-1974 ended also thanks to some important changes in Euro and US leadership - Aug 1974 Nixon abandoned White House  internal political crisis of Watergate - Ford, new president (vice of Nixon) immediately worked for trying to recreate wide Euro-Atlantic relations. In Europe much more atlatnicist presidents/ chancellors o France there was ??? o Smidth in WG This euro presidents started to work together  Paris summit in 1974 important inn particular for 2 reasons, in particular: 1. Formally, Euro Council and idea that at least 3 times each year there was a summit of chiefs of gov. EEC members was formalized in Paris  this was a victory for an inter-gov approach Mid-70s happened sth important in southern part of Europe  woring for creating a currency association was also strongly linked with possibility of a new expansion of the community - When in Greece, Portugal and Spain ended the dictatorial systems, idea that potentially all these ctys could reach EEC, was sth on the table fi  - Possibility of new enlargmenet  connected to idea of expanding of creating a currency association 25th April 1974  movement inside armed force organized a push vs the Salazar- Caetano regime in Portugal - From this moment, democratic and communist forces started to try to build a new gov. in Portugal - Internal revolution that moved from the military forces, in particular those that didn’t want to go on with Portuguese colonial adventure in Mozambique, Angola, Guinea, etc. July 1974: so-called colonners regime ruling in Greece collapsed - Last attempt of regime was internal push in Cyprus + Turkish response and the partition, till today question going on (one of problems of potential Turkish application to EU, it is not recognizing southern Cyprus, only sovereign, but only northern part) - Karamanlis, PM in 60s, came back to Greece and started constitutional path in direction of rule of law and democracy Nov. 1975 Franco died, but in 1969 Franco prepared his exit - At death of Franco king Juan Carlos will become the King of Spain  immediately, he started a transformation of Spain in a consititutional monarchy The end of all these 3 dictatorship created possibility for Pportugal, Greece and Spain to apply for a full membership + possibility of full membership created possibility for becoming full democratic system - Was it possible to apply without being a democracy? To start the application and negotiation of cially without being concretely a democracy?  key element, there will be some differences between Greece and Spain/Portugal Situation of GR, PORT and SP talking about EEC: - Portugal: o NATO: was a member from 1949, from origins, founding member. For tactical and strategical reasons mostly, even if it was not democracy o Europe: no application - Greece: o NATO: entered in 1952 with Trukey  Cyprus question was complicated question for NATO, there was a real war between two members of same security organization o Europe: association agreement in 1961, but after colonels push was frozen  without democracy no possibility of entering EEC fi  - Spain: o NATO: not member  in 1953 (neutral in WWII) Madrid Pact with US: even if it was not part of NATO, special relation SP and Western world o Europe: 1962 it presented an application for association and the EEC ctys, Euro Commission, continualy delayed application saying Franco dictatorship was not democratic Greece After end of colonels regime  Greek gov. was the 1st to present the application demand  in which way? - Karamanlis programme (new PM, conservative and liberal PM)  immediately worked for arriving to a quick application  12th Jun 1975 Greece announced its intention - Able to do that because o in Dec. 1974 there was referendum to abolish monarchy  too much linked to colonels regime o 11th June 1975: new Parliament, democratic elections and new Republican constitution - Karamenlis strongly backed by France in idea of immediate and full membership + presenting idea of doing rapidly saying “the risk is that Greece could choose another direction, not the Western one, e.g. there’s a socialist party (PASOK) strongly anti-American, anti-Western, anti-NATO  Do you want PASOK to take leadership and deciding for abandoning NATO etc.? o We need EEC to become a strong democracy  risk is interruption of democratic path - Internally Europe: worries about it o In London (UK now member) because there they were saying “problems e.g. with Turkey, not EEC member, but really important NATO member, 2nd military force after US”  Turkey had signed association agreement with EEC = with Greece there’ll be potential problems with Turkey o In Rome: competition in agricultural sector  potentially, Greece could create competition inside agricultural market o In Bonn: about economy  do you thing we can really build a common Euro currency with this economic distance between WG and Greece? The 28th Jan. 1976 - Commission: “you could have full membership when you will have a democratic evolution”  - Karamanlis: “without full membership, impossible to have a democratic evolution” - Commission: “only thing we can offer is a preliminary membership, but without saying how long will be this preliminary membership”, saying “we can give you not the real membership, but we cant de ne the duration” Greece had to show more to convince Commission of full membership Karamanlis had one important card to play  able to take advantage of sth happening not in Greece, but in Portugal and Italy in 1975: - Italy: at the communal and regional elections, June 1975, communist party arrived close to level of the Christian Democracy party  important for Karamanlis - Portugal: April there was internal revolution and then started a period in which political life was divided between democratic pluralistic solution and communist solution  risk was that after Salazar-Caetano a communist regime Karamanlis said “look what’s happening there, there’s the concrete risk of sth similar also in Greece” - not strong communist party, PASOK not linked to Moscow, socialist  but impressions in politics are important US were watching situation  because Mediterranea was important, in particular eastern part, for Cold War and also Portugal (one of founding NATO) - Ford adm. started to push to give Greece and Portugal full membership in quick time  it’s a way to ght communism Karamanlis  able to transform EEC full membership in a way to ght inside Cold War + a way to create strong Euro-Atlantic relations - Ford adm. was considering EEC as a key player in stabilizing non-democratic political systems o “EEC Is working for pluralistic democracy in Europe and anit-communism” Karamanlis won  Euro Commission 28th Jan 1976 offered preliminary membership, 28th May 1979 accession agreements signed in Athens - There were inside exceptional regulations bene tting the internal ctys: o Tomatoes and peaches allowed without tariffs only after 7 years: bene t for internal ctys, strongly imposed by Italy. For 7 years it will be impossible for Greece to be sold inside the EEC common market o Free movement of labour only after 7 years: risk was that a lot of Greek workers can leave immediately Greece to work in central or Northern Europe. UK gov. insisted on this point Portugal fi fi fi fi fi  Karamanlis was using anti-communist card without communism  in Portugal, possibility of a communist regime was on the table - Commission and the Euro gov.s immediately said “there will be help to Portugal only staying away from communist evolution, but also if there will be military evolution”  carnation revolution was a military revolution. We need civilian, pluralistic and republican nations - Parliamentary election 25th Apr. 1976 (2 years after Carnation revolution)  strong support for Portuguese socialist led with important leader, Mario Soares. Played important role link between Portuguese socialist party-spanish socialist party-German one-Italian one-French one, in particular with Willibarndt - Membership in EEC for Soares: same of Karamanlis  need membership for stabilizing our young democracy From Euro ctys  need to show concretely that you’re ready to build democratic system Soares made immediately a symbolic break with past  Aug. 1976, as chief of poruguese gov. Portugal entered Council of Europe (NOT European Council) - Strong break cause Portugal, even if NATO member, never entered it  it hadn’t real power, but strong emphasis on rights o Idea of entering Council of Europe was a strong break After bilateral negotiations in particular with WG (France-Greece and WG-Portugal)  28th March 1977 arrived of cial application Portugal of cially entered EEC in 1986: - Commission needed more than 1 year before taking a positive position on the application - Negotiation began after 5 months  negotiations started in Sept. 1978 o Connected to inter-connection with Spanish negotiation  commission decided to deal with both applications: Spanish situation was more complicated o Long delay rstly because inter-connection with Spanish negotiation  potentially could go on alone and enter before, but Iberian issue was one issue for Commission Spain Franco’s death: 20th Nov. 1975  22nd Nov. 1975 Juan Carlos king of Spain - Immediately, in his 1st speech  presented his monarchy like a model of parliamentary and liberal monarchy, insisted on importance of Europeanism and presented himself like a symbol of Spanish desire of joining asap EEC If you want to apply you have to show us sth concrete  in May 1976, report of Euro Parliament (it started to have a role in EEC) on SP possibility to enter EEC fi fi fi  - In the report there was written about Spain: if it wants full international legitimacy there’s strong need of restoring individual freedoms, civil and political rights and to legalize poltical parties  if you want to enter, must guarantee all that Concretely, inside formal resolution of Euro  1st of all have to change your PM, when Juan Carlo became king chose Navarro as PM, strongly linked to Franco dictatorship - July 1976 Adolfo Suarez became PM  he immediately worked in direction of building democratic system o Nov. 1976 Spanish Parliament (Cortes) voted law for political reform, consititutional law that was completely desrtoyng all Franco system o Referendum on this law for political reform o June 1977 1st free elections  last free elections in Spain were in 1936 o New gov. submitted application, June 1977 Immediately, good judgment on Suarez gov. Why for Spain (in 1978 of caily new Spanish democratic constitution) was so important full membership? Because it was becoming the real symbol of breaking with Francoism  entering EEC for Spain was the way of proposing a real revolutionary movement - Law for political reform voted by cortes in 1976, voted by Francoist parliament  cortes, in Nov. 1976 were francois o It was the same system that was killing itself, considered a fantastic political way of acting by Suarez  he able to convince members of cortes of closing francoist system ▪ Rupture pactada: breaking not with a revolution, but with a pact - Juan Carlos: he was product of Francoism, Franco decided it in 1969 as successor - Suarez chosen by king Carlos chose by Franco = product of Francoism. He was member of some gov.s in Francoism Entering EEC = real way of legitimizing new democratic system Also Spain entered in 1986 even if ready before  connection POR-SP + French veto before a Giscard veto, after a Mitterandt veto on Spain connected to: 1. For Giscard: in particular agriculture  entering of SP was risky  veto in 1979 2. For Mitterandt: need to nd a common solution to SP and POR enlargement and to British demand about common agricultural policy. To nd a comprehensive solution for all questions associated to expansion  veto in 1982-1983, but he found solution because SP entered thanks to him fi fi fi