Quiz #2: The US Supreme Court and the Judiciary PDF

Quiz #2 The US Supreme Court and the Judiciary, pt. I I.​ U.S. District Courts ​ Courts of original jurisdiction. ​ Mostly civil and criminal trial courts. ​ U.S. is divided into 94 districts at this level. I.​ U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal ​ Intermediate court...

Quiz #2 The US Supreme Court and the Judiciary, pt. I I.​ U.S. District Courts ​ Courts of original jurisdiction. ​ Mostly civil and criminal trial courts. ​ U.S. is divided into 94 districts at this level. I.​ U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal ​ Intermediate courts of appellate jurisdiction. ​ Many judges serve at a given time, ranging from about a dozen to nearly 30. ​ Cases usually heard by way of a 3-judge panel. ​ Oral arguments by both sides, including questioning by the judges. ​ Appeal to the full court (en banc) is possible, but rare. ​ 13 circuit districts in the U.S. I.​ U.S. Supreme Court ​ Appellate court in almost all circumstances. ​ Size set at 9 by Congress since 1869. ​ Nomination process has become highly politicized in the last 35-40 years, but there are occasionally controversial appointments farther back in history too. I.​ Certiorari ​ 4 out of 9 justices must agree to hear a case (“cert”). ​ Justices meet in private conference to consider petitions for hearings. ​ Hears less than 1% of case petitions. ​ When the federal government is a party to a case, the likelihood of the USSC hearing it will increase substantially. V. ​Federalist #78 (Hamilton) ​ Hamilton stresses the importance of life tenure for federal judges “during good behavior”. ​ Judicial branch will be the weakest and least dangerous of the three. ​ Endorses the principle of judicial review. ​ The jagged boundaries with some of the states denote the U.S. District Court boundaries. Note that California has four, while small states usually have one. ​ The colors denote the various 13 U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal. ​ Washington, D.C. has its own Circuit Court, given how heavy the docket will be for the national capital. ​ The Federal Circuit Court, which is sometimes called the Thirteenth Circuit Court is a special court that mainly handles patent law, and disputes over trademarks, government contracts and matters involving federal employee benefits. It is not a criminal court; it is more like an administrative court for the federal government. The US Supreme Court and the Judiciary, pt. II I.​ Judicial Review ​ Judicial branch determines if a governmental law, rule or procedure is constitutional or not. ​ Sets precedents for related future cases. ​ Local, state and federal governments are subject to judicial review. ​ First U.S. Supreme Court case to use judicial review was Hylton v. United States (1796), though the Court ruled that the federal carriage tax was constitutional. I.​ Marbury v. Madison (1803) ​ John Adams’s midnight judicial appointments (1801). ​ William Marbury’s situation: a judicial nomination as a Justice of the Peace for the new District of Columbia, the federal capital. He was confirmed by the Senate on Adams’s last day as president, but Marbury’s commission was not delivered to him by the State Department. The new president, Thomas Jefferson, and his Secretary of State, James Madison, refused to deliver the commission to Marbury. ​ Can the Supreme Court order (a writ of mandamus) Madison to deliver the commission? ​ No, because Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, under which Marbury sued was unconstitutional. ​ Jefferson and Madison were acting in bad faith, but the Court, as Chief Justice Marshall explained, could not provide relief for Marbury. ​ The Constitution establishes the Supreme Court as predominantly an appellate court, not a court of original jurisdiction. The Judiciary Act of 1789 unconstitutionally expanded the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. See Article III, section 2. Therefore, Marbury had no basis to file a case because he went straight to the Supreme Court, using the court as a tribunal of original jurisdiction. ​ Marshall and a unanimous Supreme Court ruled that Congress cannot enact laws that violate the Constitution. If they do, it is the judiciary’s responsibility to nullify those  measures. Or the courts can strike down part of a law as unconstitutional, and leave the rest intact. That is what happened here. ​ The Jefferson Administration technically won the case, but he was uncomfortable with the notion that a court could throw out a law enacted by Congress. ​ Precedent of judicial review is most important here. The Legislative Branch, Part I I.​ Congress ​ In Article I of the Constitution. ​ Each chamber is meant to reflect different, but sometimes competing principles in a representative democracy in a federalist system. a.​House of Representatives ​ Size set at 435 for about 100 years. ​ The House usually reflects the more immediate demands of the people. ​ Usually more ideologically polarized than the Senate. ​ Most members come from non-competitive, politically “safe” districts. a.​Senate ​ Slows down the legislative process. ​ Six-year term gives Senators some freedom to cast unpopular roll call votes. ​ Senators used to be chosen by state legislatures until the 17th Amendment was ratified in 1913. I.​ The Incumbency Advantage ​ Re-election rates in the House are about 90-98% in election years. ​ Over 80% in the Senate. ​ Gerrymandered districts in the House. ​ Advantages of having name recognition, a legislative track record to benefit their constituents, staff, and a greater ability to raise money than a challenger. I.​ The Term Limits Movement ​ Popular political fad in the 1990’s. ​ Was part of Ross Perot’s independent presidential campaign in 1992, and the Republican congressional election wave in 1994. ​ Pros: New blood in Congress with new ideas and energy; get rid of old dinosaurs who are impossible to dislodge because of incumbency advantage. ​ Cons: Inexperienced members of Congress can be ineffective and poor legislators, often with little understanding of how the federal government works; they can also be easily taken advantage of by scheming lobbyists and bureaucrats. I.​ US Term Limits v. Thornton (1995) ​ Arkansas voters enact a referendum in 1992 that imposes term limits on their U.S. congressional delegation (3 terms in the House; 2 in the Senate). ​ U.S. Rep. Ray Thornton (D-AR), who was about to be term limited out, sues on the grounds that the Constitution makes no provision for term limits, and that the state cannot impose a statutory limit on U.S. congressional terms. ​ U.S. Term Limits, an interest group, argued the case on behalf of Arkansas voters, because the state would not defend this new law. Arkansas’ own supreme court had already deemed the measure unconstitutional. ​ On appeal, the US Supreme Court agreed with the Arkansas Supreme Court. John Paul Stevens wrote for the majority, saying that allowing states to set their own term limits for congressional representation in Washington was contrary to the Framers’ vision of a uniform national legislature. Qualifications to serve in Congress are spelled out in the Constitution. They say nothing about a term limit. Only the Constitution can establish eligibility to serve in Congress. Otherwise it is up to voters to decide how many terms a member of Congress shall serve. The right to choose Representatives and Senators is a right of the people, not the states. That principle was affirmed when we expressly mandated that the people, not the state legislatures, choose US Senators. Unless the candidate(s) are unqualified by some provision that is explicitly in the US Constitution, the people have the right to vote for the candidate of their choice. The US Constitution mandates qualifications for serving in Congress, not the states. The policy merits of term limits, the Court said, should be taken up in the political arena, if there is a desire to amend the Constitution to limit congressional terms. ​ The conservatives on the Court dissented, arguing that because the Constitution was silent concerning congressional term limits, it was well within the states’ rights to limit their congresspersons’ and senators’ terms, as per the Tenth Amendment. ​ Term limits was part of the Republicans’ Contract with America in 1995 when they took over the Congress. The sought to change the US Constitution. The vote failed in Congress, and has never since been voted on in Congress. Legislative Branch, Part II I.​ Federalist Papers: Madison a.​#52 ​ Defense of the 2-year term for the House. ​ Annual elections are impractical and won’t allow Representatives to acquire experience and settle into the job. ​ Achieve a balance between democratic accountability and experience. ​ Representatives are elected by the people and the House will be a diverse body (by eighteenth century standards, anyway). b.​#53 ​ Madison argues on behalf of experience in the House. ​ Implicit argument against term limits. ​ A 2-year term allows Representatives to develop expertise on public policy. ​ One year terms also make foul play in elections more likely; bribery, for ex. c.​#55 ​ Argument on behalf of a small size for the House of Representatives.  ​ Large popular assemblies are dangerous, and prone to behaving as a mere mob of politicians: “passion never fails to wrest the scepter from reason.” ​ The 2-year term will serve as a check on the House’s abuse of power, along with the states retaining important governing responsibilities. ​ The House’s size will grow with the U.S. population and new states being added to the union. d.​#62 ​ Madison makes the case that the Senate promotes order and stability. ​ Senators presumably will be older and wiser than Representatives. ​ The Senate makes states relevant and important partners in the federal government. ​ State legislatures used to select senators until about 1913 (17 Amendment). th ​ Two senators per state promotes equality of the states, and gives small states the platform that they need in national debates. a.​#63 ​ The Senate is necessary for U.S. credibility in foreign affairs. ​ Defends the 6-year term as providing Senators with a detachment from political whims. ​ Ancient republics often had senates, but Madison opposes life terms, which was also common. Legislative Branch, Part III I.​ United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (1936) ​ What happens when Congress gives away its authority in foreign policy? ​ Congress always retained a secondary role to the president in foreign affairs, even when the US had mostly isolationist policies and a weak presidency. The Congress passed a law in 1934 delegating the power to the President of the United States to impose an arms embargo at his discretion to nations who were at war in the Chaco region in South America, which was near Bolivia. President Franklin D. Roosevelt then imposed an arms embargo on Bolivia and Paraguay. The Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation violated the arms embargo by selling bombers as passenger planes. The company was indicted by the federal government. Curtiss-Wright Co. argued that the arms embargo was unconstitutionally imposed because the Congress had improperly delegated discretion to the president to impose an arms embargo. In other words, the president had been given powers by way of legislative delegation that properly belonged to Congress. Only Congress could impose such an arms embargo, the company said. The previous year, the USSC had struck down part of the National Recovery Act on the grounds that Congress had delegated broad and vague powers, without specific guidelines, to the president to regulate trade and commerce (Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 1935). Curtiss-Wright, in their argument, tried to cite this case as precedent to argue that the Court should strike down the embargo law. The Roosevelt Administration argued in court that this case involved foreign affairs, not  domestic economic policy, as the Panama Refining case had. In other words, the administration argued, presidents enjoyed more constitutional latitude to conduct foreign affairs than domestic policy. ​ The majority opinion, written by Justice Sutherland, a conservative, actually sided with the Roosevelt Administration. Remember, this was still a mostly conservative Court that had shown some real hostility to New Deal legislation in the past. But this case did not involve New Deal policies. It involved the balance of congressional-presidential powers, and here the Court asserted that the president has the ability to conduct foreign policy under the Constitution, even if the document does not explicitly give him all powers in foreign policy, but the Constitution implies that the chief executive is the chief actor in foreign policy affairs, which is very different from the Constitution’s implied role for the president in domestic policy. The Court did not bar congressional action in the realm of foreign policy. Far from it! But the Court did say that the president is the Supreme actor, and congressional legislation that delegates wide latitude to the executive in foreign policy is constitutionally acceptable given the executive’s unique position as the head of state in foreign policy. The president is uniquely positioned by constitutional design to act with dispatch and wide latitude in ways that Congress is not. For example, the Congress can enact an embargo against Cuba, but grant the president the power to refine, adjust or even suspend that embargo as foreign policy circumstances evolve and change. ​ This case gave constitutional legitimacy to the notion that presidents enjoy significantly more authority in matters of foreign affairs, which is something that Alexander Hamilton had argued in the early years of the republic, back when George Washington issued a Neutrality Proclamation without congressional consent, declaring US neutrality between the British and French war in 1793. ​ Trade policy, where domestic and foreign policy intersect, is one example of an arena where presidents can act without congressional approval, if there is legislation on the books that permits unilateral executive action. The 1962 Trade Expansion Act provides the president with a wide authority to simply levy tariffs on other countries on the basis of “national security”, which the president gets to determine. Donald Trump invoked this law to impose tariffs upon Chinese steel and aluminum in March 2018. Another option Trump may have in is second term is to use the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which would enable him to claim there is a national emergency and potentially levy tariffs upon selected countries. ​ Even presidents who are politically constrained on the domestic front, have a lot of latitude to conduct their own foreign policy. ​ Jimmy Carter: Brokering peace between Egypt and Israel. ​ Bill Clinton: The air war to protect the Muslim Kosovars in the former Yugoslavia. ​ Barack Obama: Negotiating a nuclear agreement with Iran. ​ Donald Trump: Opening up a dialogue with Kim Jong-Un of North Korea.