PS21111 - Reasoning 2024 part III Belief Bias.pptx

PS2111 - BELIEF BIAS REASONING DR CAREN FROSCH BELIEF BIAS IN REASONING Believable If fast food is taxed then childhood obesity will decrease. Unbelievable If fast food is taxed then childhood obesity will increase. Modus Childhood does notobesity Affirmation of the Consequent: Childhood Denial Modu...

PS2111 - BELIEF BIAS REASONING DR CAREN FROSCH BELIEF BIAS IN REASONING Believable If fast food is taxed then childhood obesity will decrease. Unbelievable If fast food is taxed then childhood obesity will increase. Modus Childhood does notobesity Affirmation of the Consequent: Childhood Denial ModusTollens: of Ponens: the antecedent: Fast food obesity isFast taxed food ? is not taxed  ? decrease/does not increase ? decreases/increases ? Person has to deal with conflict between logical validity & believability  overcome intuitive response Mean accuracy (out of 4) Belief bias effect Believable (Frosch & Simms, 2015) Unbelievable 4 3 2 1 0 MP MT DA Inference Type AC Main effect of believability: F(1,65) = 26, p IU Hence… Belief Index measures the difference in acceptance of believable and unbelievable conclusions: the bigger the index, the more belief bias is observed (VB +IB – VU – IU) Belief bias effect In both conditional and syllogistic reasoning the believability of the conclusion exerts a strong influence on endorsement rates Believable conclusions make it easier to make valid inferences (enhances reasoning) Unbelievable conclusions make it harder to make valid inference because belief and logic are in conflict (hinders reasoning) Believable conclusions make it harder to reject invalid inferences (hinders reasoning) Unbelievable conclusions make it easier to reject invalid inference because belief and logic are not in conflict (enhances reasoning) Dual systems/process theories of thinking 1. Fast heuristic processing or rapid intuitive inferences (system 1) 2. Slow analytic processing or slower deliberate inferences (system 2) (Kahneman, 2003) Fast thinking/slow thinking (Kahneman, 2011) Heuristic-analytic theory (Evans, 2006) Heuristic-analytic theory (Evans, 2006) Three principles Singularity – only a single mental model considered at a time Relevance – consider most relevant (plausible or probable) mental model based on prior knowledge or context Satisficing – the current mental model is considered by analytic system and accepted if adequate The relationship between intuitive and deliberate systems De Neys (2012) Feeling of Rightness Valerie Thompson Monitoring system evaluates output of intuitive and heuristic processing system (assessed by feeling of rightness ratings) Participants are asked to make a quick response and then rate their ‘feeling of rightness’ before making a more deliberated response Low feeling of rightness associated with longer analytic processing Responses are quicker when feeling of rightness is high Evidence of early conflict detection Greater physiological arousal, as measured by skin conductance, during conflict problems (on a belief bias reasoning task) presence of conflict was detected below conscious level (De Neys et al., 2010) The relationship between intuitive and deliberate systems De Neys (2012) Experiment 2 Belief bias by using conditionals with low or high counterexample availability (CA): Mental Models & inferences If I attend all of my lectures then I will do well on my exam! Attend lectures do well not attend lectures do well not attend lectures not do well Valid inferences require 1 model: Modus ponens: attend lectures do well Modus tollens: not attend lectures not do well Invalid inferences require 2 models: Denial of the antecedent: not attend lectures do well not attend lectures not do well Affirmation of the consequent: do well do well attend lectures not attend lectures Experiment 2 Belief bias by using conditionals with low or high counterexample availability (CA): Low CA – If a person sleeps then they will feel rested. High CA – If a person retires, then they will will rested. No-CA – If a person blekks, then they will feel morcher. Quick response to evaluate conditional inferences + feeling of rightness judgment Prediction I Belief-based processing  At Time 1 & Time 2 lower rate of invalid inferences in high CA condition because inference is less believable, e.g.: Major premise: If a person retires, then they will will be rested. Denial of the antecedent: Minor premise: A person does not retire. Affirmation of the consequent: Minor premise: A person is rested.  They will not be rested?  They retired? Evidence of fast belief based processing at Time 1 Not affected by time Evidence of slow belief based processing at Time 2 Predictions II Evidence for fast rule-based processing if discrimination between valid & invalid inferences at Time 1 Evidence for slow rule-based processing if discrimination improves at Time 2 Heuristic–analytic theory: evaluation Strengths Wide applicability within cognitive research Evidence for reasoning being based on singularity, relevance and satisficing principles Evidence for distinguishing between heuristic and analytical processes is strong Accounts for some individual differences based on the extent to which they use analytic processes 23 Heuristic–analytic theory: evaluation Limitations Distinction between heuristic and analytic processing is too neat Implicit/explicit and heuristic/analytic may actually represent two independent dimensions Not clear how individuals decide on which process to use Assumes logic is conscious Fails to lay out how the heuristic and analytic processes interact 24 Are we rational? Not lack of motivation (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999) Individual differences in ability (e.g. Brase et al., 2006) Steps to make rational response easier not always successful (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman, 1983) Experts display errors in reasoning But Peculiarities of laboratory tasks may bring out the irrational In everyday reasoning validity not as clearly defined Is normative rationality appropriate standard? Summary Conditional reasoning Role of additional information & counterexamples Mental Model Theory Wason’s selection task Belief bias effects Syllogistic reasoning Heuristic analytical theory Feeling of rightness Conflict detection Thinking ‘fast & slow’ Are we rational? References Eysenck, M.W. & Keane, M.T. (2020). Cognitive psychology: A student's handbook. (8th ed.) Abingdon: Routledge.(ch.14 pp. 672-690 & 701-711) Eysenck, M.W. & Keane, M.T. (2015). Cognitive psychology: A student's handbook. (7th ed.) Hove: Erlbaum. (ch.14 pp. 594 – 611 & 622 - 631) Byrne, R.M.J. (1989). Suppressing valid inferences with conditionals. Cognition, 31, 61-83. Cheng, P.W., & Holyoak, K.J. (1985). Pragmatic reasoning schemas. Cognitive Psychology, 17, 391-416. Newman, I.R., Gibb, M., & Thompson, V.A. (2017). Rule-based reasoning is fast and belief-based reasoning can be slow: Challenging current explanations of belief-bias and base-rate neglect. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 43, 1154 – 1170. [especially Experiment 2] References you can find in E&K Evans et al. 1993 De Neys et al. 2005 Oaksford 1997 Johnson-Laird, 1983 Khemlani & Johnson-Laird 2012 Kahneman 2003 Evans 2006 De Neys 2012 Thompson et al. 2011 Camerer & Hogarth 1999 Brase et al. 2006 Tversky & Kahneman 1983