Responding To Firearms Incidents PDF

logo2 **RESPONDING TO FIREARMS INCIDENTS** **TABLE OF DOCUMENT DETAILS** +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Title | | +===================================+===================================+ | Reference No | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Relevant Department or | | | | | | Group | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Ownership | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Document Author | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Approved by | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Approval Date | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Implementation Date | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | To be Reviewed Date | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Last Revised Date | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Quality Assured by | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Protective Marking | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Linked to other SO | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Relevant Legislation | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Pages | | | | | | (including this page) | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ [Introduction](#introduction) [Page 3](#introduction) [ ] [Section 1](#introduction) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------ [Objectives and Priorities when responding to firearms incidents](#OBJECTIVES) [Page 3](#OBJECTIVES) [Section 2](#OBJECTIVES) [Definition of a firearms incident](#WHATISFIREARMSINCIDENT) [ ] [Page 3](#WHATISFIREARMSINCIDENT) [Section 3](#WHATISFIREARMSINCIDENT) [Firearms Role Profiles](#FIREARMSROLE) [ ] [Page 4](#FIREARMSROLE) [Section 4](#FIREARMSROLE) [Standing Authority](#STANDINGAUTHORITY) [for the issue and carrying of Firearms ] [Page 4](#STANDINGAUTHORITY) [Section 5](#STANDINGAUTHORITY) [Firearms Command Structure](#FIREARMSCOMMANDSTRUCTURE) [Page 4](#FIREARMSCOMMANDSTRUCTURE) [Section 6](#FIREARMSCOMMANDSTRUCTURE) [Command Roles and Functions](#commandandrolesfunctions) [Page 5](#commandandrolesfunctions) [Section 7](#commandandrolesfunctions) [Legal Framework](#LEGALFRAMEWORK) [ ] [Page 9](#LEGALFRAMEWORK) [Section 8](#LEGALFRAMEWORK) [Authority and Discretion to use force and Firearms](#AUTHORITYANDDISCRETION) [Page 14](#AUTHORITYANDDISCRETION) [Section 9](#AUTHORITYANDDISCRETION) [Criteria for deployment of ARV Officers](#criteriafordeployment) [Page 15](#criteriafordeployment) [Section 10](#criteriafordeployment) [Individual responsibility and accountability](#individualresponsibility) [Page 15](#individualresponsibility) [Section 11](#individualresponsibility) [Influencing factors](#influencingfactors) [Page 16](#influencingfactors) [Section 12](#influencingfactors) [Less Lethal options](#lesslethaloptions) [Page 16](#lesslethaloptions) [Section 13](#lesslethaloptions) [Command Decisions](#commanddecisions) [Page 17](#commanddecisions) [Section 14](#commanddecisions) [Authorisation](#authorisation) [Page 20](#authorisation) [Section 15](#authorisation) [Initial Command responsibility](#initialcommandresponsibility) [ ] [Page 22](#initialcommandresponsibility) [Section 16](#initialcommandresponsibility) [Strategy](#strategy) [Page 24](#strategy) [Section 17](#strategy) [Sustained Public Protection](#sustainedpublicprotection) [ ] [Page 25](#sustainedpublicprotection) [Section 18](#sustainedpublicprotection) [Recording and Accountability](#recordingandaccountability) [Page 26](#recordingandaccountability) [ ] [Section 19](#recordingandaccountability) [Decision making](#decisionmaking) [Page 26](#decisionmaking) [Section 20](#decisionmaking) [Tactical Advice](#tacticaladvice) [Page 26](#tacticaladvice) [Section 21](#tacticaladvice) [Command support](#commandsupport) [Page 26](#commandsupport) [Section 22](#commandsupport) [Tactical Parameters](#tacticalparameters) [Page 27](#tacticalparameters) [Section 23](#tacticalparameters) [Command and Operational resilience](#commandandoperationalresilience) [Page 27](#commandandoperationalresilience) [Section 24](#commandandoperationalresilience) [Command Location](#commandlocation) [Page 28](#commandlocation) [Section 25](#commandlocation) [Command protocols](#commandprotocols) [Page 28](#commandprotocols) [Section 26](#commandprotocols) [Armed Deployment](#armeddeployment) [Page 29](#armeddeployment) [Section 27](#armeddeployment) [National Decision Model](#NDM) [Page 29](#NDM) [Section 28](#NDM) [Health and Safety Risk Assessment](#healthandsafety) [Page 37](#healthandsafety) [Section 29](#healthandsafety) [Briefing and Debriefing](#briefinganddebriefing) [Page 38](#briefinganddebriefing) [Section 30](#briefinganddebriefing) [Operational Deployment](#operationaldeployment) [Page 38](#operationaldeployment) [Section 31](#operationaldeployment) [Medical Assistance](#medicalassistance) [Page 38](#medicalassistance) [Section 32](#medicalassistance) [Community Impact Assessment](#communityimpactassessment) [Page 39](#communityimpactassessment) [Section 33](#communityimpactassessment) [Record keeping](#recordkeeping) [Page 40](#recordkeeping) [Section 34](#recordkeeping) [Dealing with people](#dealingiwthpeople) [Page 40](#dealingiwthpeople) [Section 35](#dealingiwthpeople) [Police Responders](#policeresponders) [Page 46](#policeresponders) [Section 36](#policeresponders) [Range capabilities of the more common types of weapons](#rangecapabilities) [Page 47](#rangecapabilities) [Section 37](#rangecapabilities) [Responding to a Marauding Terrorist Attack (MTA)](#respondingtoMTA) [Page 47](#respondingtoMTA) [Section 38](#respondingtoMTA) [Post Incident Investigation](#PIM) [ ] [Page 48](#PIM) [Section 39](#PIM) **TABLE OF CONTENTS** **INDEX OF APPENDICES** [**Appendix 1**](https://modgovuk.sharepoint.com/teams/1860/INTRANET%20new%20items%20LTD/STANDING%20ORDERS/Operations/SO%20OP10/Strategic%20Firearms%20Commander%20Policy%20File%20and%20Desicion%20Log%20_Appendix%201.doc) **[SFC Log](https://modgovuk.sharepoint.com/teams/1860/INTRANET%20new%20items%20LTD/STANDING%20ORDERS/Operations/SO%20OP10/Strategic%20Firearms%20Commander%20Policy%20File%20and%20Desicion%20Log%20_Appendix%201.doc) [ ]** ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [**Appendix 2**](https://modgovuk.sharepoint.com/teams/1860/INTRANET%20new%20items%20LTD/STANDING%20ORDERS/Operations/SO%20OP10/Tactical%20Firearms%20Commander%20Policy%20File%20and%20Desicion%20Log%20_%20Appendix%202.doc) **[TFC Log](https://modgovuk.sharepoint.com/teams/1860/INTRANET%20new%20items%20LTD/STANDING%20ORDERS/Operations/SO%20OP10/Tactical%20Firearms%20Commander%20Policy%20File%20and%20Desicion%20Log%20_%20Appendix%202.doc) [ ]** [**Appendix 3**](https://modgovuk.sharepoint.com/teams/1860/INTRANET%20new%20items%20LTD/STANDING%20ORDERS/Operations/SO%20OP10/Operational%20Firearms%20Commanders%20Log%20_%20Appendix%203.doc) [**OFC Log**](https://modgovuk.sharepoint.com/teams/1860/INTRANET%20new%20items%20LTD/STANDING%20ORDERS/Operations/SO%20OP10/Operational%20Firearms%20Commanders%20Log%20_%20Appendix%203.doc) [**Appendix 4**](https://modgovuk.sharepoint.com/teams/1860/INTRANET%20new%20items%20LTD/STANDING%20ORDERS/Operations/SO%20OP10/Tactical%20Advisors%20Operational%20Log%20_%20Appendix%204.doc) **[T.A Log](https://modgovuk.sharepoint.com/teams/1860/INTRANET%20new%20items%20LTD/STANDING%20ORDERS/Operations/SO%20OP10/Tactical%20Advisors%20Operational%20Log%20_%20Appendix%204.doc) [ ]** [**Appendix 5**](https://modgovuk.sharepoint.com/teams/1860/INTRANET%20new%20items%20LTD/STANDING%20ORDERS/Operations/SO%20OP10/NDM_Appendix%205.pdf) **[National Decision Model](https://modgovuk.sharepoint.com/teams/1860/INTRANET%20new%20items%20LTD/STANDING%20ORDERS/Operations/SO%20OP10/NDM_Appendix%205.pdf) [ ]** [**Appendix 6**](https://modgovuk.sharepoint.com/teams/1860/INTRANET%20new%20items%20LTD/STANDING%20ORDERS/Operations/SO%20OP10/FA_01_V%20ARV%20deployment%20form%20Appendix%206.doc) **[ARV Deployment form](https://modgovuk.sharepoint.com/teams/1860/INTRANET%20new%20items%20LTD/STANDING%20ORDERS/Operations/SO%20OP10/FA_01_V%20ARV%20deployment%20form%20Appendix%206.doc) [ ]** [**Appendix 7**](https://modgovuk.sharepoint.com/teams/1860/INTRANET%20new%20items%20LTD/STANDING%20ORDERS/Operations/SO%20OP34.pdf) [**Post Incident Procedures SO OP34**](https://modgovuk.sharepoint.com/teams/1860/INTRANET%20new%20items%20LTD/STANDING%20ORDERS/Operations/SO%20OP34.pdf) [Appendix 8](https://modgovuk.sharepoint.com/:w:/r/teams/25468/Police%20Forms/Orders,%20Policies%20and%20Contingency%20Plans/STANDING%20ORDERS%20NEW/Operations/SO%20OP10/Appendix%208%20-%20TFC%20(Cadre)%20Log%20for%20Operational%20Competency%20Approval.doc?d=w450e7b6c506749febe68e1f651f729b8&csf=1&web=1&e=sSPHEt) [TFC (Cadre) Log for Operational Competency Approval](https://modgovuk.sharepoint.com/:w:/r/teams/25468/Police%20Forms/Orders,%20Policies%20and%20Contingency%20Plans/STANDING%20ORDERS%20NEW/Operations/SO%20OP10/Appendix%208%20-%20TFC%20(Cadre)%20Log%20for%20Operational%20Competency%20Approval.doc?d=w450e7b6c506749febe68e1f651f729b8&csf=1&web=1&e=sSPHEt) **1.** []{#introduction.anchor}**Introduction** **1.1** Police Officers are frequently required to deal with conflict situations. Many of these are resolved using well-chosen and appropriate words. Other incidents require varying degrees of physical force, including, on occasions the use of firearms by accredited firearms officers. This proportionate response is a well-established and necessary approach to managing conflict in a democratic society. This standing order details the general principles for the police use of force, firearms and less lethal weapons, the circumstances when weapons may be used, and the accountability of ARV officers and commanders for their use. The overall context is set out within a human rights framework. **2.** []{#OBJECTIVES.anchor}**Objectives and priorities when responding to firearms incidents** **2.1** The objectives of any police response to ECHR Article 2 Right to Life Risks are to Identify, Locate, Contain and thereby Neutralise the threat by the safest possible means. It is the duty of a Police Officer to safeguard the Public and this must be our initial priority. However, a Police Officer should not endanger his/her life or the lives of colleagues in desperate attempts at rescue or early resolution. **3.** []{#WHATISFIREARMSINCIDENT.anchor}**Definition of a firearms incident** **3.3** A firearms incident can be described as any incident where a firearm or suspected firearm of any description has been or is suspected to be, in possession of a person in circumstances indicating that an offence has been, is being or is likely to be committed, AND any other incident where the risk to life justifies the deployment of armed officers. **4.** []{#FIREARMSROLE.anchor}**Firearms Role Profiles** **4.4** The SBA Police has enhanced the role profile of the Self Loaded Pistol Officer (SLP) and the role profile of the Armed Response Vehicle Officer (ARV) in line with the SBAP Armed Policing Strategic Threat & Risk Assessment (APST&RA). Self - Loaded Pistol Officer (SLP), is a police officer who has been selected, trained, accredited and authorised by the SBAP Chief Constable to carry a self - loaded pistol as part of his/her personal protection equipment operationally for the sole purpose of protecting his/her life or the public from an imminent threat to life. Armed Response Vehicle Officer (ARV) is the term used to define a patrolling vehicle which contains firearms and less lethal options. The vehicle is crewed by two police officers suitably trained in the use of the weapons and equipment carried in the vehicle. The purpose of an ARV is to provide an immediate armed response to spontaneous incidents and planned firearms operations with the ability to deploy firearms or less lethal options where justified. **5.** []{#STANDINGAUTHORITY.anchor}**Standing authority for the issue and carriage of firearms** **5.1** The strategic intention of the SBAP Chief Constable is to ensure that all trained and appropriately qualified SLP and ARV Officers are deployed with self-loading pistols. For this reason, since 2016, there is a firearm standing authority for all trained firearms officers to overtly possess their Glock17G4 side pistols so that they can better protect themselves and any other person who is at risk. This standing authority is under a six-month review, in line with the force's APST&RA. **6.** []{#FIREARMSCOMMANDSTRUCTURE.anchor}**Firearms Command structure** **6.1** The generic firearms command structure used in the SBA Police operates at three levels: Strategic, Tactical and Operational. Firearms operations often form one part of a more complex, multifaceted operation that will already be using gold, silver, bronze command descriptors. It is, therefore, important to define the command of the firearms element through the use of functional descriptors. The descriptors used throughout this standing order are: **6.2 Strategic Firearms Commander (SFC)** Determines the strategic objectives and sets any tactical parameters. Retains strategic oversight and overall command and responsibility. **6.3 Tactical Firearms Commander (TFC) or Initial Tactical Firearms Commander (ITFC)** Develops, commands and coordinates the overall tactical response in accordance with strategic objectives. **6.4 Operational Firearms Commander (OFC)** Commands a group of officers carrying out functional or territorial responsibilities related to a tactical plan. In an operation where the sole purpose is to use armed officers to carry out a specific action at a single location, the roles performed by commanders will be as outlined in command roles and functions. **7.** []{#commandandrolesfunctions.anchor}**Command roles and functions** **7.1** The command structure offers flexibility in response to a varied and developing range of circumstances and is functional rather than based on rank. The structure must be clearly articulated to all those involved in the operation. The function of the SFC or TFC must not be undertaken by the senior investigating officer (SIO) responsible for the investigation of the offence(s) for which the firearms operation is being conducted. It is the responsibility of the SFCs to satisfy themselves that the tactical plan is capable of meeting the strategic aims of the operation, and that the provisions of European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) Article 2 take precedence. Any change of command structure should where time permits, be discussed before it is undertaken and must then be documented. **7.2 [Command Roles and Responsibilities]** Strategic firearms commander - has overall strategic command, with responsibility and accountability for directions given - must set, review, communicate and update the strategy based on the threat assessment and the available intelligence - should consider consulting a [tactical advisor](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/command/#tactical-advisor) - should consider any [tactical parameters](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/command/#tactical-parameters) to be placed on the police response - must ensure that the [strategy](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/command/#strategy) for the armed deployment is recorded, including any changes to it, to provide a clear audit trail - must authorise the deployment of ARV officers, or ratify or rescind the deployment where it has already been approved by the [tactical firearms commander](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/command/#tactical-firearms-commander) - should ensure that all decisions are recorded, where practicable, in order to provide a clear audit trail (Appendix 1) - must ensure that the firearms strategy complies with the wider strategic aims of the overall operation - should test the tactical plan against the established strategy, where practicable and/or time allows - is responsible for overall resourcing in respect of the deployment of ARV officers where appropriate, will chair meetings of the [strategic coordinating group ](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/operations/command-and-control/command-support/#strategic-coordinating-group)(SCG) when they are held during a multi-agency or multi-discipline response - should set [command protocols](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/operations/command-and-control/definitions-and-procedures/#command-protocols) where appropriate - should consider consulting partners, stakeholders and interest groups involved (if any) when determining [strategy](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/command/#strategy) - should consider the need for a [community impact assessment](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/operations/operational-planning/strategic-planning/#community-impact-assessments) - should consider declaring and managing the event as a [critical incident](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/critical-incident-management/) - should maintain a strategic overview - must be able to be contacted by the tactical firearms commander - is responsible for reviewing and ensuring the resilience and effectiveness of the command structure and the effectiveness of the tactical firearms commander - should consider the appointment of more than one tactical firearms commander where the management of ARV officers is only one part of the operational police response. Tactical firearms commander Where an SFC is not yet in place, the TFC or the ITFC will set the working strategy, including any appropriate [tactical parameters](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/command/#tactical-parameters). These will be reviewed and ratified by an SFC as soon as practicable: - must assess and develop the available information and intelligence, and complete the threat assessment - should consult a [tactical advisor](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/command/#tactical-advisor) as soon as practicable - is responsible for developing and coordinating the tactical plan in order to achieve the strategic aims, within any tactical parameters set - is responsible for ensuring that officers and staff are fully briefed - should consider the provision of medical support - should be so located as to be able to maintain effective tactical command of the operation - should ensure that all decisions are recorded, where practicable, in order to provide a clear audit trail (Appendix 2). - provides the pivotal link in the command chain between strategic and operational firearms commanders - must constantly monitor the need for the continued deployment of ARV officers - must review and update the tactical plan and ensure that any changes are communicated to the operational firearms commanders and, where appropriate, the strategic firearms commander - should consider and, where appropriate, conduct a community impact assessment - should consider declaring and managing the event as a [critical incident](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/critical-incident-management/) - should consider the number, role and function of the operational firearms commanders - should consider the wider community, public safety and evidential implications of the use of [specialist munitions](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/weapons-and-equipment/#specialist-munitions) or incapacitants - should ensure that after all deployed staff are appropriately debriefed, operational and organisational learning takes place. - 'Officers who have undergone their Tactical Firearms Commander (CADRE) Course **[must]**, after the conclusion of the course, download the **TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT LOG** as per [APPENDIX 8](https://modgovuk.sharepoint.com/:w:/r/teams/25468/Police%20Forms/Orders,%20Policies%20and%20Contingency%20Plans/STANDING%20ORDERS%20NEW/Operations/SO%20OP10/Appendix%208%20-%20TFC%20(Cadre)%20Log%20for%20Operational%20Competency%20Approval.doc?d=w450e7b6c506749febe68e1f651f729b8&csf=1&web=1&e=sSPHEt) and after reading the **Introduction & Guidelines** fill in the related parts. CFI will initiate their operational development process in which, several steps (stated within appendix 8) will follow to develop the officer further. Their operational capability will be sealed when their recommended actions are completed and approved by the by the Deputy Chief Constable. **7.3** Operational firearms commander - must have knowledge and clear understanding of their role and the overall aim of the operation - must, where practicable, ensure that their staff are appropriately briefed - should be located where they are able to maintain effective command of their area of responsibility - ensures the implementation of the tactical firearms commander's tactical plan within their territorial or functional area of responsibility - updates the tactical firearms commander, as appropriate, on current developments - makes decisions within their agreed level of responsibility, including seeking approval for any variation in agreed tactics within their area of responsibility - must ensure clear communication channels exist between themselves, the [tactical firearms commander](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/command/#tactical-firearms-commander) and those under their command - should consider declaring and managing the event as a [critical incident](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/critical-incident-management/?s=) - should be available to those under their command, however, they should allow them sufficient independence to carry out their specific role in accordance with the [strategy](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/command/#strategy) and tactical plan - should ensure decisions taken are recorded, where possible, to provide a clear audit trail (Appendix 3). **7.4** Tactical advisor - advises on the capabilities and limitations of the ARV officers and other police resources being deployed - advises the strategic or tactical firearms commander on the implication of any tactical parameters which have been set - advises on the available tactical options for consideration by the strategic and tactical firearms commander within the existing strategy and any tactical parameters set - advises the firearms commanders on the tactical considerations, contingencies and implications for each tactical option - should be in a position to assist and advise the tactical firearms commander at all stages of the operation - provides tactical advice reflecting the existing threat assessment - ensures that advice given is recorded (Appendix 4). [The role of a tactical advisor is to advise and not to make command decisions.] The responsibility for the validity and reliability of the advice lies with the advisor, but the responsibility for the use of that advice rests with the commander. **8.** []{#LEGALFRAMEWORK.anchor}**Legal Framework** **8.1** Despite making important and often time-critical decisions during responding to a firearms incident, police officers are still accountable through the law for their actions. Respect for an individual's human rights including those of the suspect(s) should be the central focus throughout the entire police response to any incident involving threat to life. All officers have an individual responsibility for ensuring that they are aware of relevant legislation and are informed about the extent of their legal powers and the context within which those powers can be properly exercised. When police officers are required to use force to achieve a lawful objective, such as making a lawful arrest, acting in self-defence or protecting others, all force used must be reasonable in the circumstances. Use of force by police officers can result in judicial proceedings in both the criminal and civil courts. Every effort should be made to resolve a situation involving firearms without resorting to the use of force or firearms, however, the overriding consideration should be a human rights-based approach to public and officer safety. The SBA Police has a positive obligation to ensure that the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) are protected. The following ECHR rights and freedoms are most relevant to policing: **8.2** Article 2 -- right to life Article 2 of the ECHR states: Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. Article 2 imposes on EU states an obligation to safeguard life. This consists of the following main duties: - an obligation to protect the right to life - prohibition on the taking of life - procedural obligation to investigate deaths resulting from the Police use of force or from the Police's failure to protect the right to life. Article 2 can also require, in certain well-defined circumstances, a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of Article 2 when it results from the use of force which is no more than [absolutely necessary](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/legal-framework/#absolutely-necessary) to achieve one of the following permitted objectives: - in defence of any person from unlawful violence - in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained - in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection. The European Court of Human Rights has made a distinction between the use of force which is intended to be lethal, or as a result of which death occurs, and other uses of force. Article 2 will be scrutinised whenever death occurs in the hands of the Police (or serious injury in a situation where death could have occurred), irrespective of the police contact or type of force or weapon used. The European Court of Human Rights has held that this will apply to: - the use of force which is intended to result in the death of a person, and which has that effect - the use of force which results in the death of a person and which could have been reasonably foreseen to have that consequence - the use of force which results in serious injury to a person, where death could have occurred. ![Table showing rights and freedoms under the ECHR](media/image2.png) **8.3** Human Rights Act considerations The following considerations will assist in ensuring that the principles of accountability, legality, necessity and proportionality are addressed in respect of any action being considered. - What is my objective? - Is what I am doing proportionate? - Do I have a lawful power? - Is there a legal basis to my action? - Is the proposed action relevant and necessary? - Is there a reasonable relationship between the aim to be achieved and the means used? - Is there a less intrusive alternative? - Can the objective be achieved with less impact on the rights of the subject and any other(s) likely to be affected by the action? - Is the operation being planned to minimise, to the greatest extent possible, recourse to the use of lethal force? **8.4** Section 16(2) of the Criminal Procedure 9/2016 If the person to be arrested forcibly resists arrest or attempts to evade arrest, the police officer or other person making the arrest may use all means necessary to make the arrest, [but must not use more force than is reasonable in the circumstances]. **8.5** Section 17 of Cap 154 Necessity An act or omission which would otherwise be an offence may be excused if the person accused can show that it was done or omitted to be done only in order to avoid consequences which could not otherwise be avoided, and which if they had followed, would have inflicted upon him or upon others whom he was bound to protect inevitable and irreparable evil, that no more was done than was reasonably necessary for that purpose, and that the evil inflicted by it was not disproportionate to the evil avoided Absolutely necessary The question of whether a use of force was absolutely necessary in the circumstances is one that depends to a large degree on the facts of the individual case. To use lethal force when it is not absolutely necessary to do so is surely to act unreasonably. [Key issues to consider include:] The nature of the aim pursued -- is it the protection of a person from unlawful violence which poses a real and immediate risk to life? Is the use of firearms or force which has the potential to result in death absolutely necessary in the circumstances, bearing in mind the dangers to the lives of all persons involved? What are the risks to others, including the subject of the force and all others in the vicinity? What other options were considered before resorting to the use of force? Why were these options discounted? What weapons or equipment were available at the time? Have all relevant decisions been recorded and reported? The police also have a duty of care to take reasonable steps to prevent a person self-harming or threatening to self-harm or carrying out acts intended to result in suicide. The force used would then have to be proportionate to the harm anticipated and designed to minimise the risk to the subject. Firearms, less lethal weapons and arrest and restraint procedures must not be used by police officers with the sole intention of inflicting severe pain or suffering on another in the performance or purported performance of official duties. Any such action may result in criminal charges. **8.6** Common law Self-defence The right of self-defence is recognised in common law. This includes the right for a person to use [reasonable force](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/legal-framework/#reasonable-force) to protect themselves or another where necessary. Police officers, therefore, have the right to defend themselves from unlawful physical violence. They also have a duty to protect others from harm. If police officers do not take appropriate and proportionate action to protect others from harm, they may be violating the human rights of those involved. Therefore, it is important that police officers give high regard to the rights of individuals, in how they exercise their discretion. **8.7** Police regulations Police Ordinance 6 of 2007 empowers Police Officers to carry arms and ammunition in the performance of the following functions: Section 5 Functions of Service The functions of the Service will be to: Maintain law and order, Preserve the peace, Prevent and detect crime, and Apprehend offenders **8.8** Lawful orders The Discipline Code and the Code of Ethics, address the responsibility of police officers to abide by all lawful orders. The SBA Police is a disciplined body. Unless there is good and sufficient cause to do otherwise, officers must obey all lawful orders. Officers must support their colleagues in the execution of their legal duties, and oppose any improper behaviour, reporting it where appropriate. Unless an order to use force or firearms is manifestly illegal or beyond the tactical capability of the ARV officers concerned, the ARV officer has a duty to respond in a professional and active manner to such instructions. However, officers shall continuously analyse and assess the situation, respond appropriately to any immediate change in that situation, and act in a measured and appropriate way. Their actions must take account of all circumstances of the dynamic situation and all information immediately available to them. Obedience to the orders of a commander or supervisor is no defence in law. If an ARV officer knows that the order to use force was unlawful and they have a reasonable opportunity to refuse to obey that order, they have a professional and legal responsibility to do so. **8.9** Improper and unlawful force Any police officer who has reason to believe that improper force has been used or is about to be used by another police officer shall, to the best of their capability, prevent and rigorously oppose any such use of force. An officer shall, at the earliest opportunity, report the matter to their commander or supervisor for investigating such matters. Commanders and supervisory officers will be held responsible if they know, or should have known, through the proper discharge of their duties, that officers under their command are resorting, or have resorted, to the unlawful use of force, and they did not take all reasonable measures to prevent or report such use. **9.** []{#AUTHORITYANDDISCRETION.anchor}**Authority and discretion to use force and firearms** **9.1** ARV Officers are first and foremost police officers. In exercising their duties they have a personal accountability and responsibility for the protection of life. In most situations it is the ARV officers who must assess the immediacy and proximity of the threat and make an operational decision on whether it is absolutely necessary to discharge a firearm or take other decisive action. **10.** []{#criteriafordeployment.anchor}**Criteria for the deployment of ARV Officers** **10.1** The deployment of ARV Officers should only be authorised in the following circumstances: where the officer authorising the deployment has ***reason to suppose*** that officers may have to protect themselves or others from a person who: - is in possession of, or has immediate access to, a firearm or other potentially lethal weapon, or - is otherwise so dangerous that the deployment of armed officers is considered to be appropriate, or - as an operational contingency in a specific operation (based on the threat assessment), or - for the destruction of animals which are dangerous or are suffering unnecessarily. Reason to suppose Use of the words 'reason to suppose' sets the level of knowledge required (about the existence of a threat justifying the deployment of ARV officers) at a far lower level than that which would actually justify the use of firearms. **Destruction of animals** The destruction of an animal is a duty which may fall to the police service if: - the animal represents a danger to lives or property; or - if the animal is in such a condition that it must be destroyed to avoid unnecessary suffering, and no veterinary surgeon or licensed slaughterer is available to perform the task or they are otherwise unable to do so. **11.** []{#individualresponsibility.anchor}**Individual responsibility and accountability** **11.1** Each ARV officer is responsible and accountable for their decisions and actions, nothing can absolve them from such responsibility and accountability. This includes decisions to refrain from using force as well as any decisive action taken, including the use of force, the use of a firearm and the use of a less lethal weapon. ARV officers and firearms commanding officers are answerable, ultimately, to the law in the courts. They must be in a position to justify their decisions and actions based on their honest belief as to the circumstances that existed at the time, and their professional and legal responsibilities. **12.** []{#influencingfactors.anchor}**Influencing factors** **12.1** ARV Officers appreciation of the critical nature of the situation may be informed by a combination of the following factors: - their observation and assessment of the situation - their perception of any imminent threat - their understanding of the wider police operation - information or intelligence that has been communicated to them - any direction or authorisation given to them. **13.** []{#lesslethaloptions.anchor}**Less lethal options** **13.1** The issues associated with hierarchical continuums of force may not be operationally or legally appropriate for adoption by the police service. Less lethal options are selected by officers having considered the capability and limitations of the option in the prevailing circumstances. Many factors will impact on the decision and it is therefore not practical to pre-determine the most appropriate options as part of a continuum of force, ie, to continue each option in strict hierarchy, in terms of an escalation of force, or to use each in turn on that basis until the objective has been achieved. The availability of less lethal options can enable officers to resolve a situation prior to it becoming absolutely necessary to discharge a firearm, in order to save life. The term 'less lethal options' refers to weapons, devices and tactics, developed and used to minimise the need for recourse to conventional firearms, each of which, have different purposes and characteristics and each may offer unique advantages in specific circumstances. It includes: - less lethal weapons - negotiation - police dogs - tactics and devices designed to minimise the risks to a subject **13.2** Less lethal weapons Less lethal weapons will, where appropriate, be deployed alongside conventional firearms and other less lethal options available to firearms officers. **Less lethal weapons should not be regarded as a substitute for firearms**. Officers armed only with less lethal weapons should not expose themselves or be exposed to unnecessary risks by confronting subjects who may be armed with a firearm. **13.3** Weapons approval Only less lethal weapons that have been approved by the SBA Police Chief Constable may be used by the SBA Police. The Taser X2 is the only conducted energy weapon currently authorised. **14.** []{#commanddecisions.anchor}**Command decisions** **14.1** Commanders and ARV officers are trained to analyse and determine appropriate courses of action in the course of armed deployments. Commanders and those involved with the assessment of intelligence, provision of tactical advice and relaying of communication will be legally and professionally responsible for decisions that they make and advise, tasking or authorisations that they give. Any advice, tasking or authorisations, and subsequent action, must be 'reasonable in the circumstances' and where appropriate the test of 'absolute necessity' as required by Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights must be met. Where a commander, on the basis of information and intelligence available to them, considers it necessary to constrain or authorise officers in respect of their use of force, firearms or any less lethal option, it is important that these decisions, and relevant constraints or authorisations, are communicated with clarity and in a timely fashion. **14.2 Context in which command decisions are made** The context within which command decisions are made and any tasking or authorisations given to ARV officers may include the: - information available - consequence and scale of the threat being addressed - immediacy of the threat including the assessment of capability and intent of the subject(s) - command structures that are in place - speed at which the situation is developing - tactical options and contingencies available. **14.3 Access to decisive information** In some situations a commander may have access to decisive information relevant to an imminent threat to life, of which an ARV officer who is operationally deployed would not be aware. A commander may not be able to pass this decisive information to the ARV officer for one or more of three principle reasons: - the danger may be so imminent that there is insufficient time for a commander to fully brief an ARV officer on all available details - a commander may be prevented by law from passing some or all of the information and its source (and therefore its quality and reliability) to the ARV officer - the source of the information (and therefore its quality and reliability) may be so confidential that a commander may be unable to pass some or all of the information to the ARV officers. In these circumstances it may be necessary for a commander who has access to the whole of the decisive information (the 'bigger picture') to constrain or authorise an ARV officer. The authorisation of a [critical](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/armed-deployment/discharge-of-firearms/#critical-shot) or a [conventional shot](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/armed-deployment/discharge-of-firearms/#conventional-shot) is one of the most extreme decisions a commander can take. The circumstances in which a commander will authorise either a [critical](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/armed-deployment/discharge-of-firearms/#critical-shot) or a [conventional](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/armed-deployment/discharge-of-firearms/#conventional-shot) shot are likely to be rare, and commanders must restrict themselves to the limited nature of their role in this regard. In the absence of the circumstances and specific criteria described, the decision to discharge a firearm should be made by an ARV officer who is able to assess the nature and immediacy of a threat based upon what they can see and hear. Therefore, it is only when a commander has information which, for one of the reasons outlined, cannot be communicated to the ARV officers, that an authorisation will be required if the threat to life is imminent and a shot is absolutely necessary to defend another. In any other circumstance, it is the ARV officer who must decide whether to discharge their firearm or not. On this basis, the conditional pre-authorisation, or introduction of a tipping point, at which a [conventional](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/armed-deployment/discharge-of-firearms/#conventional-shot) or [critical shot](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/armed-deployment/discharge-of-firearms/#critical-shot) would be automatically authorised by a commander is inappropriate. Such a potentially complex pre-authorisation may not be accurately interpreted and any later redaction, misunderstanding or confusion could result in the unnecessary loss of life and subsequently deemed to be in contravention of the criminal law and ECHR. **14.4 Constraint and authorisation of action** Where a commander constrains an ARV officer from discharging a firearm (or from taking other significant action which otherwise the ARV officer might have done in exercising the ARV officers own independent discretion) the constraint may prevent loss of life or serious harm to others such as hostages or other persons at risk. An authorisation from a commander to an ARV officer to discharge a firearm or take other decisive action may be necessary where a failure to take such action would result in a loss of life. Such communication is an authorisation to use such force and not an order to do so. This is only likely to be necessary in the most extreme of circumstances, for example: - the ARV officer has limited knowledge of the immediate threat to life - the commander is aware of the immediate threat to life and - the commander is either unable to pass the detail and the quality and reliability of that information to the ARV officers for the reasons given above or if able, any delay caused by attempting to fully brief the ARV officers may place life at immediate risk. Where command decisions are made to constrain or authorise the action of an ARV officer, the communication from the commander will form an essential part of an ARV officer's decision making. Any authorisation from a commander to an ARV officer in these circumstances must be communicated with absolute clarity what is being directed or authorised and the action required, including any time imperative. If a commander decides that as a last resort a [critical](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/armed-deployment/discharge-of-firearms/#critical-shot) shot is absolutely necessary in self-defence, which includes the defence of another, a commander will communicate that decision to an ARV officer with the words, "[critical shot](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/armed-deployment/discharge-of-firearms/#critical-shot) authorised", and an ARV officer will be entitled to rely on them subject to whatever other information is available, principally that from the scene and that which can be seen by the ARV officers. Such a communication is an authorisation to use such force and not an order to do so. If a commander decides as a last resort that a [conventional](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/armed-deployment/discharge-of-firearms/#conventional-shot) shot is absolutely necessary in self-defence, which includes the defence of another, a commander will communicate that decision to an ARV officer with the words, "[conventional shot](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/armed-deployment/discharge-of-firearms/#conventional-shot) authorised", and an ARV officer will be entitled to rely on them subject to whatever other information is available, principally that from the scene and that which can be seen by the ARV officers. Such a communication is an authorisation to use force and not an order to do so." It will be for the commander who authorises either a [critical shot](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/armed-deployment/discharge-of-firearms/#critical-shot) or a [conventional shot](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/armed-deployment/discharge-of-firearms/#conventional-shot) to later justify the authorisation, and for the ARV officer to explain their individual response and any action taken. Post incident accountability rests with the commander for giving the authorisation, and the ARV officers for their response. For the authorisation or the use of force to be justified and lawful it must be in self-defence, or in defence of another and absolutely necessary. **15.** []{#authorisation.anchor}**Authorisation** **15.1** Levels of Authority Any decision relating to the arming of ARV officers must be brought to the attention of the appropriate duty or on call SFC at the earliest opportunity. Under normal circumstances only the appropriate duty or on call SFC will determine whether or not armed officers are deployed. However, in order to minimize the delay in responding effectively to prevent loss of life, or further loss of life or serious injury, the following are empowered to authorise the deployment of armed officers in such critical time limited circumstances: - TFC or ITFC - ARV Officers through self - deployment Where authorisation is given by an Officer, other than the appropriate duty or on call SFC, the appropriate SFC must be updated as soon as practicable. He/She should then either ratify or revoke that authority when he/she has had opportunity to consider the incident and available intelligence. **ARV STATUS -- CLEAR SPEECH POLICY** There are three 'clear speech' directions governing ARV Officers deployments: From the Duty ITFC or TFC or SFC 'YOU HAVE AUTHORITY TO DEPLOY WITH FIREARMS (THE AUTHORITY IS GRANTED BY......Rank & Name.....................' Authority has been granted to deploy firearms based on the information and intelligence available 'at the time'. Such information and intelligence must be reviewed and recorded on a regular basis and status levels adjusted accordingly. The authorising officer should make it clear to the ARV crew WHO has granted the authority. From the ARV personnel 'WE ARE SELF ARMING AND SELF DEPLOYING WITH FIREARMS' This is applicable where there is an IMMEDIATE 'life threatening' situation, AND Where conventional methods of restraint or resolution are inadequate or likely to be ineffective; AND Where the immediacy of the situation precludes authority to arm being sought in the normal way; OR In circumstances not immediately 'life threatening', but where in the professional opinion of the ARV crew it is essential to arm and deploy: \(a) To commence IMMEDIATE armed containment of a located threat where failure to do so may endanger members of the public or police officers, or \(b) Where the precise location of the threat is not known but the circumstances are such that officers are required to be armed for the IMMEDIATE protection of the public or themselves. [SELF ARMING AND DEPLOYMENT MUST BE FULLY JUSTIFIED ] Where the ARV personnel have self- armed / self - deployed with firearms, the appropriate duty SFC must be informed as soon as practicable by the TFC or ITFC. It is the responsibility of that SFC to ratify or revoke the self - arming and deployment according to the information and intelligence available at the time. From the SFC 'YOUR AUTHORITY TO DEPLOY WITH FIREARMS IS RATIFIED... REPEAT... RATIFIED' OR 'YOUR AUTHORITY TO DEPLOY WITH FIREARMS IS REVOKED... REPEAT... REVOKED' When the requirement for Officers to deploy with firearms no longer exists, weapons will be withdrawn. [In all cases where deployment of firearms is involved the ARV crews are responsible for ensuring a completed 'Deployment of Armed Response Vehicle' (Appendix 6) form is sent via Divisional Commanders to the Firearms Department HQ.] **16.** []{#initialcommandresponsibility.anchor}**Initial command responsibility** **16.1** It is the responsibility of the officer authorising the deployment of ARV officers to ensure that an appropriate command structure is instigated as soon as practicable. Where appropriate, this officer should remain in command of the deployment until any transfer of command takes place. In planned operations a command structure must be in place prior to the officers being deployed. Any consideration in respect of the deployment of ARV officers should be recorded along with the decision and rationale for it. Where a recommendation for the deployment of ARV officers has been declined, the rationale for that decision should also be documented. In cases where ARV officers have self-deployed, they must contact their nominated firearms commander as soon as practicable, to enable a command structure to be instigated. **16.2** Initial command of incidents Where an incident is reported or comes to the attention of the police and an immediate operational deployment of ARV officers is considered appropriate, the command structure is likely to be condensed. Initial command will usually sit with the person having ready access to information, communications and resources -- ITFC. If incidents become protracted, there should be arrangements which enable command to be transferred to a dedicated TFC, thereby enabling others to return to their normal duties. The command of the incident and responsibility for its management rests with the ITFC until such time as command is transferred. They must ensure that all officers are sufficiently briefed, information-flows are established, and all officers are given as full a briefing as possible in the time available. A SFC should be contacted as soon as practicable and informed that an incident requiring the [[deployment of armed officers]](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/use-of-force-firearms-and-less-lethal-weapons/deployment-of-afos/) is taking place. The SFC, when in a position to do so, should then review, agree or amend the strategy and any tactical parameters set and, where necessary, confirm or rescind any given authority. **16.3** Transfer of command A designated SFC or TFC may not be in a position to take on the role immediately when contacted. They may, however, be in a position to ratify any strategic or tactical decisions made by the officers who have assumed initial command of the incident - ITFC. Initially, information can be vague and confusing. It is, therefore, important for effective command to be established as quickly as possible and undertaken by the most appropriate person available. The transfer of command roles should take place as soon as practicable. A strategic or tactical firearms commander's ability to assume command and effectively perform their command function will be dependent on a number of factors. These factors include: - **K**nowledge of the circumstances and available intelligence - **A**ppropriate tactical advice available - **T**he ability to communicate - **S**uitable environment from which to exercise the command function. On occasions, the ITFC may be in a better position to continue in the tactical firearms command role until a dedicated tactical firearms commander is in a position to take command. **16.4** Documentation The transfer of roles at any level in the command structure should be documented and include: - time and date of transfer - confirmation and relevant intelligence and information has been reviewed - confirmation that the new commander understands the situation and decisions taken. Officers involved in the incident should be made aware of any changes in command, in so far as is practicable and where relevant to their role. All documentation and decision logs of those involved in the command and manage of firearms incidents, should be forwarded to the HQ Firearms Department. **17.** []{#strategy.anchor}**Strategy** **17.1** Commanders must, at the earliest opportunity, develop an effective strategy to direct police action. A working strategy may start to be developed once information is received. It can be formalised once a threat assessment has taken place. A strategy may contain a number of objectives. Information and intelligence can change, as may the threat assessment, therefore, the strategy must remain dynamic and capable of being reviewed. While it is important that a strategy is defined and agreed as quickly as possible, it must be based on all the information available at the time. It is rare for a complete or perfect picture to exist. Public safety should always be the priority and at times this may require immediate action to protect life, which, of necessity, may be based on limited information. The strategy and the rationale behind it should be recorded as part of an audit trail, along with any revisions or amendments. Similarly, the strategy should be regularly reviewed, particularly where a change or handover of command occurs. **17.2** Effective strategy An effective strategy should: - provide clarity of purpose - recognise public safety as a priority - reflect the multidimensional threat assessment in priority order - be achievable - be dynamic to reflect changes in circumstances - be specific to the operation. When formulating a working strategy, firearms commanders are required to consider the role of the police in protecting the public alongside the wider duty to investigate crime and bring offenders to justice. Sustained public protection may be characterised as an acknowledgement that an extended duty of care to the public exists in some more complex operations. **18.** []{#sustainedpublicprotection.anchor}**Sustained public protection** **18.1** The objective of any police investigation must be to protect the public through the detection and prevention of crime. This includes obtaining sufficient evidence to bring arrested persons to justice. While this objective legitimately includes an attempt to secure sufficient evidence to demonstrate the full extent of the planned and criminal intention, this must be balanced against any associated risk to the public. Action taken to mitigate risk in the short term may only serve to displace or delay that risk and may not address the longer-term public safety considerations. It may only be possible to effectively eliminate risk to the public through the detention, successful prosecution and subsequent lengthy imprisonment of the subjects, particularly where they are committed or recidivist offenders. It may not, however, always be possible to develop a plan capable of securing sufficient evidence to do so without risk. **19.** []{#recordingandaccountability.anchor}**Recording and accountability** **19.1** If an officer outside the command structure gives advice or a directive relating to the operational plan to a commander, then this must be recorded and this officer will be accountable for the advice or direction given. **20.** []{#decisionmaking.anchor}**Decision making** **20.1** It is essential that objectivity and oversight are clearly demonstrated in the decision-making process. Separation of roles and clarity of responsibility is essential to the provision of effective command and tactical advice. **21.** []{#tacticaladvice.anchor}**Tactical advice** **21.1** Where tactical advice is required by a commander, this advice should be independent. The tactical advisor should be independent of the command structure and not part of the operational deployment. **22.** []{#commandsupport.anchor}**Command support** **22.1** Command support is a useful element of the command structure. Depending on the complexity of the operation, and the availability of support staff, all firearms commanders must consider the availability and necessity for: - intelligence liaison - tactical advisor - negotiator coordinator - logistics support - [post incident management](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/post-deployment/#post-incident-management) - media support. Where incidents become protracted, there may be a need to establish a dedicated command facility to manage the operation. This ensures that operations do not impinge on day-to-day policing activity, or vice versa. Any armed policing operation must be planned and controlled so as to minimise, to the greatest extent possible, recourse to lethal force and risk to the public. Any command decisions which may potentially increase the short-term risks associated with the tactical arrest plan in order to reduce the long-term risk to the public must be fully rationalised and justified. In such cases commanders should seek to implement appropriate safeguards to minimise identified short term-risks where possible. **23.** []{#tacticalparameters.anchor}**Tactical parameters** **23.1** The SFC may set or ratify tactical parameters within which the tactical firearms commander should develop the tactical plan. Tactical parameters are set to give strategic direction, and not to develop or dictate tactics. In setting parameters, commanders should consider consulting a tactical advisor to discuss the effects of the parameters on the formulation of tactics. Where tactical parameters are set, they should be clearly articulated and regularly reviewed. **24.** []{#commandandoperationalresilience.anchor}**Command and operational resilience** **24.1** The deployment of ARV officers can result in a series of management issues. These could include: - commanders' and ARV officers' continued fitness for duty, especially during prolonged deployments -- Containment - identification of emerging stress factors - command and operational resilience in protracted incidents - need for mutual aid - understanding of the interoperability and capability of supporting forces. These issues apply equally to ARV officers and those undertaking command and support roles. The management and command of situations involving the deployment of ARV officers can be stressful and often involves fast, time-critical decision making. It is, therefore, essential that officers at command and support levels, as well as the ARV officers involved in deployments, remain physically and mentally capable of undertaking these duties. Where, during a protracted incident or operation, officers are required to remain on duty for extended periods, consideration should be given to ensuring continuity of command and operational deployment and arrangements for providing rest and refreshments. Rest periods and refreshment breaks which are taken must be recorded. Where it is not possible to take refreshment breaks, this must also be recorded. **25.** []{#commandlocation.anchor}**Command location** **25.1** All firearms commanders should endeavour to be located where they can best undertake their respective roles. SFCs and TFCs should be located in positions where they are able to communicate, can be updated on developments and intelligence, and have access to tactical advice. However, they perform different functions therefore their location needs may differ. TFCs should be located where they can best actively monitor events and direct police actions. This may require them to be near to the scene, in a command vehicle, or in the control room, thereby enabling them to maintain an effective command function. OFCs should, as far as practicable, be located close to the officers that they are commanding. In situations where SFCs or TFCs do not have access to communications, current intelligence or other support, for example, if they need to move location, they should ensure that another commander is in a position to temporarily undertake their role. This officer will maintain command until the original commander is once more in a position to command the operation. **26.** []{#commandprotocols.anchor}**Command protocols** **26.1** SFCs and TFCs may need to agree command protocols with local geographic commanders, taking into account any community issues. Where there is a multi-agency or interdisciplinary element to an operation, command protocols can assist in clarifying areas of responsibility and command function, channels of communication and primacy of command at various stages of the operation. This is particularly relevant where the firearms commanders may be part of a larger operation using the gold, silver, bronze structure. **27.** []{#armeddeployment.anchor}**Armed deployment** **27.1** In situations requiring the deployment of ARV officers, police decision making and response is directed by available information and the assessment of threat. The [National Decision Model (NDM)](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/national-decision-model/the-national-decision-model/#the-model) assists with this decision-making process and provides a structure for documenting decisions and their rationale. Police officers have a positive duty to protect the public from harm -- a duty of care to all involved must be the overriding consideration. The nature and urgency of police action will take account of any time imperative related to public safety as well as the skills and capability of officers available. **28.** []{#NDM.anchor}**National Decision Model (NDM)** **28.1** The NDM (Appendix 5) is a decision-making model used throughout the police service. It is designed to assist operational officers, planners, advisers and commanders to manage their response to a situation in a reasonable and proportionate way. The NDM is a scalable model that can be applied before, during and after an incident requiring the [deployment of ARV](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/use-of-force-firearms-and-less-lethal-weapons/deployment-of-afos/) officers. It provides a framework for recording command decisions and the rationale behind them and can also be used to brief officers involved in the response. The NDM is driven by information and intelligence. It is a continuous cycle, constantly reviewed in light of new information and assessment that will, ultimately, affect the response to the incident. The model prompts the decision maker to take action on the basis of the most up-to-date information and intelligence available at that time. Each element of the model may be worked through and reviewed consciously or subconsciously. Decisions and the rationale behind them, can be recorded against each element. NDM phases The NDM has a number of [phases or components](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/national-decision-model/the-national-decision-model/#the-model). Each provides the user with an area for focus and consideration:* * - Gather information and intelligence - Assess threat and risk and develop a working strategy - Consider powers and policy - Identify options and contingencies - Take action and review what happened. In a dynamically evolving incident, it will not always be possible to segregate thinking or response according to each phase of the model. It may not be practical or possible, given the speed at which an incident may evolve, to articulate each decision and rationale when the overriding requirement is for immediate decision making and action. In such circumstances it will be necessary and appropriate for officers undertaking both command and tactical response to use the professional knowledge, skills and experience which they have developed across the SBA police and life experience. **28.2** Gather information and intelligence In firearms related situations, information and intelligence, combined with the experience of those responsible for directing the police response, will assist in determining the most appropriate response to a given situation. The assessment of information is a dynamic and continuing process throughout the life of an incident or operation. All involved have a responsibility for updating information and ensuring that, as far as possible, a full intelligence picture is maintained and that this is conveyed as appropriate to those involved. When gathering information, the tactical firearms commander must ensure that, as far as time permits, information and intelligence is appropriately assessed, graded and where possible verified. Information and intelligence should be passed to officers as necessary for the roles that they are performing, see APP on dissemination of intelligence. It is important that commanders are regularly updated on changes to information and intelligence in a timely and appropriate manner. These updates will enable the review of strategic objectives, tactical objectives and any tactical parameters set to take place. Commanders should seek verification of intelligence and information, be aware of the potential for reported information to be wrong and be aware that there may be intelligence gaps or failures. Gathering information Where only limited information is available, it is important to establish and maintain an effective information gathering process at an early stage. In protracted or more complex incidents there may be a need to establish a dedicated intelligence function in support of the tactical firearms commander. The initial response to a situation requiring the deployment of ARV officers depends on the intelligence available, the quality of the information received and the resources available for deployment. Considerations should include: - assessment of the current situation, including any threat being posed and to whom - persons already subjected to harm and requiring medical attention - reported existence of weapons - situational information including location and any associated hazards or risks - information available about the subject - information available about the subject's associates - any community impact factors associated with the event or location. Assessment of the current situation An assessment of the situation should take account of: - the subject's physical capacity - the subject's emotional or mental state - the subject's capacity to understand what is happening - any cultural, religious and ethnic considerations relevant to the individual or group - the locality in which the incident is taking place. The availability of such information will be subject to the circumstances, time available and level of risk. Consideration may be given to obtaining information from sources such as a friend or family member, locally based police officer, a health professional or a representative from a community group. Assess threat and risk and develop a working strategy An accurate, multi-dimensional threat assessment will ultimately allow for an effective prioritised strategy and the formulation of a proportionate response. The aim is to protect the public by the most appropriate method, balancing the risk of harm to the public in both the short and longer term. As an incident progresses, the regular review of available information and intelligence will ensure that the threat assessment remains relevant. **28.3** Threat assessment A threat assessment refers to the analysis of potential or actual harm to people, the probability of it occurring and the consequences or impact should it occur. It is based on fact, information and intelligence and will vary over time. A threat assessment is used to develop a prioritised working strategy and ultimately forms the basis on which the proportionality of the police response will be judged. A threat assessment: - should be based on information known at the time - may be supported by historic information - should take account of the nature of any threat anticipated and its proximity - should identify to whom and under what circumstances the threat may occur - should describe any consequences or impacts - should take account of the impact of change - may take the form of an analytical report or problem or subject profile. Where possible, threat assessments should be time specific so that actions can be prioritised accordingly. It is important to evaluate how police action or inaction may impact on the threat assessment. Accuracy The more accurate and specific the analysis, the greater the likelihood of being able to reduce or mitigate the threat, although it may still not be possible to eliminate the risk of harm. A threat assessment is only as effective as the information and intelligence that is available to base it on and the capability and competency of staff to analyse it in an accurate and timely manner. The flow of information and intelligence will constantly change and this needs to be considered in a dynamic and changing operational environment. Threat assessments will determine the likelihood and extent of harm that may be caused through the actions of any person. It is based on the interaction of the known or suspected capability and intent of an individual subject or group. It is a continuous process and one in which commanders, planners, intelligence officers, ARV officers and those involved in operational deployments will be engaged, both consciously and subconsciously as they undertake their respective functions. Analysis Once the threat has been identified, it will enable a specific individual threat assessment in relation to all identified parties to be formulated. The assessment should determine whether the likelihood for harm is high, medium, low or unknown in each individual case. The identification of an unknown level of risk usually indicates a gap in information/intelligence which will need to be addressed. Where one or more groups or individuals are identified as being at the same level of risk, evaluating their proximity to the threat may assist to prioritise actions or reduce or mitigate that risk. **28.4** Working strategy A working strategy may start to be developed once information is received and can be formalised when a threat assessment has taken place. The strategy and the rationale behind it as well as any revisions or amendments should be recorded and will form an audit trail. The strategy should be regularly reviewed, particularly when a change or handover of command takes place. **28.5** Consider powers and policy In determining the action that should be taken, consideration should be given to which powers and policies are applicable and necessary in the circumstances to achieve the objectives set out within the tactical plan. Considerations should include: - under which common law or statutory provision the proposed action is being taken, (eg. stopping, searching or detaining an individual, stopping a vehicle or entering a building or structure) - implications of any action under the [Human Rights Act 1998](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents) and potential infringement of the [European Convention on Human Rights](http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Basic+Texts/The+Convention+and+additional+protocols/The+European+Convention+on+Human+Rights) (ECHR) articles -- are the powers to be actioned proportionate, legal, accountable and necessary? - whether a warrant is required - whether the criteria for the deployment of ARV officers are met - whether the desired objective could be met in a less intrusive manner - whether the operation involves surveillance, and what level of authority is required under the [Regulation of Investigatory Powers Ordinance (RIPO) 2012](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/contents) - how closely the proposed action meets the strategic firearms commander's strategy. **28.6** Identify options and contingencies As soon as the first information is received, generic tactical options may be considered and selected. This may include the deployment of ARV officers as a contingency, or to carry out an investigative assessment and take whatever action is deemed appropriate. As more information becomes available, tactical options should be further considered in the light of evaluated intelligence and the relevant powers and policy. Generic tactical options set out the different ways in which a particular objective can be undertaken in a manner which minimises risk and harm. They are broad descriptions of the options the police may have available to them when dealing with an incident which requires the deployment of armed officers. Along with the primary aim of securing public safety, consideration should be given to whether it is possible to identify, locate and contain the subject and take appropriate action to neutralise the threat posed. Options Generic tactical options to consider include: **1. Wait** **2. Take mitigating action** **3. Keep the subject under observation** **4. Investigative assessment** **5. Contain the area around the subject** **6. Communicate with the subject** **7. Decisive action** Feasible specific tactics In considering the specific tactics, the tactical advisor and the commander should consider whether: - a given tactic or combination of tactics will achieve all or part of the working strategy - identified threats are likely to be reduced or eliminated - the tactics are proportionate to the threat posed and are ECHR compliant - the tactics are within any tactical parameters set. Commanders, tactical advisors and ARV officers should consider whether an overt or covert approach or a combination of both would be most appropriate. Operational constraints may include: - the immediacy of any threat - the limits of the information known - the availability of sufficient resources, people and equipment for the various options - the training and competency of officers involved in the operation for the role they will be expected to perform - the amount of time available - the impact of the police action on the public and wider community - legal constraints - environmental considerations - the result of any risk assessment. Commanders need to be clear with the tactic they authorise the ARV Officers to perform. ARV Officers are trained to deal with: - Armed Suspects in the Open -- Open Country Search - Armed Suspects in vehicles -- Armed Enquiry/Vehicle Drills 1 &2 - Armed Suspects on foot -- Contain & Control - Armed Suspects in Structures -- Investigative Assessment/Containment/ Limited Entry/Emergency and Deliberate Search. **28.7** Contingencies Operational planning should identify contingencies at an early stage. These should address what are often referred to as the 'what ifs'. They need to be reviewed as the situation develops, taking account of emerging and/or changing circumstances including: - the subject's intention, actions or behaviour (in particular the likelihood of fight, flight or compliance at the point of contact) - information and intelligence - the environment - the actions of others involved. - The potential for intelligence failures or gaps in the information known should also be considered. - probability of the outcome occurring - potential impact of the outcome on the strategy and tactical plan - potential risks to individuals involved in the incident and the response. **28.8** Take action and review what happened When a course of action has been decided on, commanders should direct resources and ensure that those involved are appropriately briefed. Actions to be taken include: - briefing (including contingencies) - health and safety risk assessment - operational deployment or activation of a tactical option - consideration of post-deployment issues - medical assistance - community impact assessment - explanation and apology. Officers need to be clear on which tactical option they are required to carry out and the tactical objective they are to accomplish. Where activation of a particular tactical option is time critical, there should, where practicable, be clearly agreed procedures for communicating any decision to defer, abort or initiate a specific tactic. Reviewing the effect of the action taken is a distinct and crucial part of this stage of the NDM. The result of the action taken is new information which may necessitate a further application of the model. Considerations could include such things as whether the identified threats have been reduced or eliminated and whether the action taken achieved all or any of the objectives of the working strategy. **29.** []{#healthandsafety.anchor}**Health and safety risk assessment** **29.1** The risk assessment will cover the hazards and risks associated with the location of the operation, the subject, any potential victims, the public and any hazards arising from the tactical options proposed. A risk assessment should be carried out for each viable tactical option. The formality and complexity of the risk assessment will depend on the time and information available. **30.** []{#briefinganddebriefing.anchor}**Briefing and debriefing** **30.1** All staff involved in situations where ARV officers are deployed must be given as full a briefing as possible. The briefing should include the current threat and risk assessment, and prioritised working strategy, together with the information and intelligence that is relevant to each. The objectives and tactics that have been authorised should be clearly explained and clarified with those being briefed. The level of additional detail given will depend on the circumstances prevailing at the time and the time available. **31.** []{#operationaldeployment.anchor}**Operational deployment** **31.1** ARV officers must be continually updated with information relevant to their role during their deployment. Officers should, whenever possible, confirm their arrival at the scene of an incident or at a pre-determined rendezvous point (R.V.P). This will ensure that commanders are aware of the location of ARV officers. It is also important from a personal safety perspective. On arrival at the scene officers will undertake roles as directed. There will, however, be circumstances in which officers are required to make their own assessment of the situation and\ act accordingly. This will extend to identifying, locating, containing and, where possible, neutralising the threat posed. **32.** []{#medicalassistance.anchor}**Medical assistance** **32.2** When planning operations where ARV officers are being deployed, tactical firearms commanders should consider where and how emergency medical aid would be provided if this is required. This should be based on risk assessment and may, in addition to the availability of officers trained in relevant first aid, include placing an ambulance on standby. **33.** []{#communityimpactassessment.anchor}**Community impact assessment** **33.1** The SFC should consider the need for a community impact assessment, the extent and formality of which will depend on the nature of the situations in which the police are involved and the time available. On some occasions the community impact assessment will be a dynamic process undertaken simultaneously by ARV officers, local officers and all those in command roles. Whenever time permits, however, a comprehensive community impact assessment should be completed in order to: - identify community, diversity and human rights issues which may be affected - consider action to retain or promote community confidence and reassurance in the police action. Assessments should be regularly reviewed to take account of emerging issues and may involve cross-boundary considerations. **33.2** The impact of armed police deployment on a community The visible deployment of ARV officers may have an impact on the community. Where police officers have discharged a firearm and an individual is killed or injured as a result, this may have a significant impact on the community in which the incident occurs as well as on communities to which the individual has affiliation. Effective management of the situation should enhance the trust and confidence of the community. The consistency, robustness and management of situations involving the deployment of ARV officers has the potential to cultivate good public relations with the community. The manner in which the police service approaches these situations can also have a significant effect on any follow-up investigation. **33.3** Explanation and apology There will be occasions when the reason for police action may not be apparent to the public. This may cause concern or anxiety, for example, to onlookers, relatives, neighbours and subjects innocent of any wrongdoing. In such circumstances commanders should consider providing a suitable explanation for the actions taken. This may include visiting the people particularly affected (ideally by a supervisor directly involved in the incident, so long as this does not cause a conflict of interest), or distributing an information leaflet setting out the circumstances of the police action. Some form of apology may be required on occasions. **34.** []{#recordkeeping.anchor}**Record keeping** **34.1** Individual commanders must be prepared to account for their decisions and to explain their rationale at the time that those decisions were taken. All plans should be documented, including options rejected or progressed, together with the reasons why such conclusions were drawn and by whom. **35.** []{#dealingiwthpeople.anchor}**Dealing with people** **35.1** Police officers at or surrounding the scene of an incident involving the deployment of ARV officers will encounter people in a number of different contexts. The following guidance outlines some general considerations for all those involved: **35.2** Handling subjects The close proximity of subjects to officers with firearms at the final stages of an incident presents risks. These stages are likely to be the most dangerous phase of an incident and constitute the subject's last chance to escape. Officers with weapons are at risk of being disarmed by subjects unless care is taken. Every effort should be made to have sufficient officers present to provide a suitable response. The use of [less lethal options](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/use-of-force-firearms-and-less-lethal-weapons/#less-lethal-options), including police dogs and negotiators, should be considered, wherever possible, in order to enable the police officers at the scene to deal with any emerging situation. Consideration should be given to providing immediate medical assistance and early support, which may include the services provided by family liaison officers. All officers should, as far as practicable, remain forensically aware when handling subjects. Operational commanders should ensure that forensic issues, such as the risk of cross-contamination, are taken into account in the planning of operations and the briefing and deployment of officers. **35.3** Hostage situations In situations where an armed subject has taken hostages or become closely involved with members of the public, it may be difficult to distinguish hostages and other persons from the perpetrators. In these circumstances it may be necessary for officers to regard all persons as a potential threat, until everyone can be isolated and their identity checked. Hostages should be treated with consideration. Officers should bear in mind that they may have been subjected to life-threatening, degrading or humiliating treatment, and may have experienced emotions ranging from disbelief to absolute terror. Police action should be designed to minimise the risks to all those involved and avoid unnecessarily raising the level of anxiety or confusion of hostages who have been released or rescued. Hostages sometimes, as a result of a shared ordeal, form an affinity with the hostage taker or their cause, and may voluntarily or under coercion become involved in action designed to assist their captors. The police response should, therefore, take account of these factors. **35.4** Environmental and behavioural influencers Environmental and behavioural influencers (EBI) can affect a subject's behaviour and their response to any contact with police officers. These influencers (sometimes referred to as moderators) can include issues such as: - crowd dynamics and peer group pressure - environments where communication is difficult - sensory impairment or communication difficulties, for example, hearing impairment or where the subject may have difficulty in understanding or communicating in English or Greek or Turkish - the effects of drugs or alcohol - subjects whose movements are impaired or exaggerated by reason of a medical condition - subjects who have learning difficulties. **35.5** Communication issues Where there are known environmental and behavioural influencers involved in a situation, the following may assist in improving communication with the subject: - prior intelligence gathering - early use of interpreters for language or communication difficulties - early use of trained negotiators, either directly or to advise others. When, during the planning phase of an operation, there is intelligence to suggest that communication may be difficult due to language, sensory impairment or a subject with learning disabilities, ways to address this should be included in the plan. Considerations may extend to involving someone with the required language skills, or the use of prepared phrases or written signs. Officers should also consider how cultural differences may result in persons responding differently when verbally challenged and be aware of how their language and tactics could be interpreted. **35.6** Children and young people The potential for children or young persons to be involved in gun related or other violent crimes, both as victims and perpetrators, should be recognised by the firearms commanders within their threat and risk assessments. Special consideration should be given to situations where the use of force places children at risk. **35.7** Intelligence relating to subject behaviour and/or condition Where appropriate, early contact should be made with healthcare professionals and/or welfare officers for information, intelligence and advice concerning a subject's behaviour and condition. If information and intelligence reveals the presence of a factor which can influence behaviour and alter response, firearms commanders and ARV officers should take this into account when considering their approach. ARV officers must be aware of how their presence and tactics might be interpreted by the subject. It is important, however, that the basic principles of tactics are complied with in order to reduce the potential threat by and/or to the subject as soon as practicable. **35.8** Defusing the situation The following actions can help create opportunities for the subject and ARV officers to have more time and space to defuse the situation: BUGEEL **B**eing prepared to back off (if safe) **U**se of effective cover by police officers **G**iving available space and time to the subject when considering containment **E**vacuation of immediate area **E**arly negotiation or negotiation advice **L**ess Lethal This may enable: - tension to be diffused - officers to have more time to assess the person's vulnerability - the effects of alcohol or drugs to wear off - positive communication and contact to be established - the level of mental or emotional distress to decrease. This may result in more positive and constructive communication with the subject, allowing the situation to be dealt with in a controlled manner. **35.9** Dealing with individuals who are emotionally or mentally distressed The term emotionally or mentally distressed (EMD) is used to describe individuals who may behave in an unexpected, extreme or challenging manner as a result of a mental health issue or emotional distress. The fact that the subject is emotionally or mentally distressed does not in any way reduce the harm they may cause to themselves or others if the incident is not resolved. However, ARV officers must be aware that an inappropriate or disproportionate response to someone experiencing emotional or mental distress could, itself, escalate the situation, causing greater harm to the subject or to others. Individuals who are emotionally or mentally distressed may respond to the arrival of ARV officers in an unexpected or unpredictable manner. This can be caused by a range of factors, for example, mental ill health or extreme distress, which may on occasions be aggravated or caused by drugs or alcohol, or the absence of prescribed medication. Failure to recognise and understand why someone may not be complying with instructions or communication could increase the tension of a situation. Negotiators and ARV officers must have an understanding of how emotionally or mentally distressed individuals may respond to their presence and any visual or verbal contact made with them. Officers should also consider how their language and tactics could be interpreted. When dealing with emotionally or mentally distressed individuals, it can be difficult to predict potential behaviour or responses to any given visual or verbal stimuli. **35.10** Indicators of emotional or mental distress Awareness of the factors that may indicate whether an individual is experiencing emotional or mental distress can improve the identification, management and monitoring of any potential risk posed either to or by the subject. Factors may include: - previous history, for example, violence, self-harm, suicide attempts - alcohol or drugs consumed or present - recent negative life event, eg, divorce, separation, bereavement - diagnosis of schizophrenia - depression - experiencing a psychotic episode or crisis, including hearing voices, or auditory, visual or sensory hallucinations - experiencing delusions or feelings of paranoia or of being - controlled by others - preoccupation with violence and/or violent fantasies - extreme agitation and excitement, particularly if escalating - apparent difficulty understanding and cooperating with instructions - impulsive or unpredictable emotions or behaviour - repetitive threats, especially if specific or focused - apparent lack of awareness of severity of the situation and potential risks - statements of intent to self-harm or die by suicide. These indicators are purely a guide and cannot be guaranteed to establish, either by their presence or absence, to what extent an individual is experiencing emotional or mental distress and exactly how an armed officer should respond. Assessment of the threat posed both by the subject and to the subject, within any given crisis situation is a continuous dynamic process. **35.11** Indicators of a severe medical condition Someone with a severe medical condition may exhibit one or more than one of the following symptoms and behaviours: - apparently inexplicable and/or aggress

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