1891 Tobacco Protest in Iran PDF

Massive protests against the concession began in the spring of 1891, when the tobacco company\'s agents began to arrive and to post deadlines for the sale of all tobacco to the company. The first major protest, led by a religious leader, came in Shiraz, and this leader was exiled to Iraq. There he c...

Massive protests against the concession began in the spring of 1891, when the tobacco company\'s agents began to arrive and to post deadlines for the sale of all tobacco to the company. The first major protest, led by a religious leader, came in Shiraz, and this leader was exiled to Iraq. There he conferred with Afghani, who now wrote his famous letter to the most important leader of the Shii ulama, Hajji Mirza Hasan Shirazi, asking him to denounce the Shah and his sale of Iran to Europeans. Some writers to the contrary notwithstanding, Shirazi did not immediately take any strong action, but he did write privately to the Shah making many of the points that Afghani had made to him. A dangerously revolutionary movement now broke out in Tabriz, where the government was forced to suspend the concession operation, and mass, largely merchant- and ulamaled protests spread to Mashhad, Isfahan, Tehran and elsewhere. In December 1891, the movement culminated in an incredibly successful nationwide boycott on the sale and use of tobacco, observed even by the Shah\'s wives and by non-Muslims, which was based on an order either issued by, or more likely, attributed to Shirazi, which he subsequently confirmed. The government tried to suppress only the company\'s internal monopoly, leaving it with an export monopoly, but this proved impossible. A mass demonstration in Tehran culminating in the shooting on an unarmed crowd causing several deaths, followed by even more massive protests, forced the government to cancel the entire concession in early 1892. The affair left the Iranians with their first foreign 291 debt --- £500,000 from the British owned Imperial Bank for exorbitant compensation to the company. The movement was the first successful mass protest in modern Iran, combining ulama, modernists, merchants, and townspeople in a coordinated movement against government policy. The movement\'s coordination throughout Iran and with the mujtahids of Iraq was facilitated by the existence and heavy use of the telegraph. Although many of the ulama were now bought off by the government and some quiet years followed, the \"religiousradical alliance\" had shown its potential for changing the course of Iranian policy, and the government did not grant further economic concessions for several years. The tobacco movement also encouraged the growth of Russian influence at the expense of the British. To preserve his position, Amin al-Sultan felt it necessary to assure the Russians that he would henceforth be oriented towards them, and his later policies bore this out. The British policy of 1888---90, of encouraging economic concessions by the Shah --- a policy favoured by Lord Salisbury and the Foreign Office, and pushed with special energy by Wolff--- had backfired, as Russian counter concessions and Russian support against the tobacco concession culminated in an increase in Russian, and not British, influence. Those who, looking only at the years 1888---90, dub the Wolf ministry, which ended in 1890, a success close their eyes to the implicitly anti British revolt and the rise of Russian influence which were, in fact, the most important international political consequences of that policy, as many contemporaries recognized. Ulama opposition to the Shah temporarily died down as many ulama were bought off, but attacks on the government from abroad continued. From London, Afghani contributed strong articles to Malkum\'s Qanun, and printed a letter sent out to Shii ulama in Iraq and Iran calling on them to depose the Shah. Late in 1892, Afghani went to Istanbul as a guest of Sultan Abdulhamid, who kept him from publishing further attacks on the Shah, but encouraged him to spread pan-Islamic propaganda among Iranians and other Shiis, calling on them to lend support to the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph. With this aim Afghani formed an Iranian Shii pan-Islamic circle in Istanbul, two of whose prominent members were Azali Babis who had by now become radical freethinkers --- Mirza Aqa Khan Kirmani, a writer and editor Akhtar and his close friend, the poet and teacher Shaikh Ahmad Ruhi, also of Kirman. The circle sent out numerous 291 letters to the Shii ulama in Iran and elsewhere calling on them to give allegiance to the Sultan-Caliph. The Iranian Embassy complained of this activity, implicitly directed at weakening the authority of the Shah (which helps explain the participation of irreligious anti-Shah radicals in an apparently religious activity). The Ottoman Sultan agreed to the extradition of Ruhi, Kirmani, and a third Iranian, Khabir al-Mulk. While the three were waiting in prison in Trabzon, however, Afghani intervened for them, and the Sultan agreed not to send them to Iran. Meanwhile, the devoted Iranian servant and follower of Afghani, Mirza Riza Kirmani, who had been imprisoned for years for anti-government activities, arrived to visit Afghani in Istanbul in 1895. There Afghani seems to have given him the idea of returning to Iran to kill the Shah.21 After his return to Iran, Mirza Riza made his way to Shahzada Abd al- Azim, a Shii shrine, at the time that the Shah was planning to visit it in preparation for the celebration of the 50th lunar anniversary of his reign. Mirza Riza pretended to be a petitioner and suddenly shot the Shah on 1 May 1896. Immediately after, he was attacked by a crowd of women present in the shrine and lost an ear before he was saved by Amin al Sultan. The Shah was whisked away from public view, and his dead body was propped up in a carriage while Amin al-Sultan pretended to carry on a conversation with him --- this in order to avoid the disorders and rebellions that often accompanied a change of ruler. The Cossacks were notified to cover Tehran, and disorder was avoided. Further anxiety concerned possible pretentions to the throne by two of the Shah\'s powerful sons. Zill al-Sultan, the Shah\'s oldest living son who was excluded from succession due to his mother\'s low birth, had a long history of political power and ambition. Feared and powerful as the oppressive governor of a large group of southern provinces, he had built up a virtual private army of western-trained soldiers that put most of the regular army to shame, and had not hesitated to kill a major Bakhtiyari chief and put down violently anyone he considered a threat. His ambition to take the throne in place of his weak and sickly half-brother, the Crown Prince Muzafar al-Din, was well known. Concern was also felt about his young brother, Kamran Mirza Naib al-Saltana, frequently army chief and/or governor of Tehran, who had the advantage of being on the scene in Tehran. The combination of Amin al Sultan, the Cossacks, and the clearly expressed support of both Russians and 291 British for the legitimate heir, however, brought expressions of loyalty to Muzaffar al-Din by both brothers. Nasir al-Din Shah was scarcely an illustrious or progressive ruler, but he was a relatively powerful one, under whose rule there were few serious tribal disorders or local revolts. The disorders he faced were more directly political, and he or his advisors had at least the negative virtue of knowing when it was necessary to bend or give in. Unlike his son he did not squander his treasury, and the loan raised to pay compensation to the tobacco company remained his only foreign loan. His interest in reform was sporadic at best, and he sacrificed or crippled the power of his only two serious reforming chief ministers when faced by the opposition of vested interests. In his last years he lost even this much interest in reform --- a supposed project for codifying laws after the 1889 European trip came to nothing. Instead, he turned to the consolation of women and of a repulsive boy protégé, and to acquiring as much money and treasure as possible, without spending it for any public purpose. He left no legacy of a state or army machinery that might weather the eventuality he must have known was coming --- the rule of a weak and sickly successor. Not all of Nasir al-Din\'s actions had negative results however. His patronage of the arts contributed to innovations in music, painting, and calligraphy. He also took a keen interest in poetry, and even tried his hand at writing poems. Significant literary novelties developed during his reign, many of which originated with court poets. Writers, who became important in political protest before and during the Constitutional period, took important steps towards reforming the archaic character of Persian prose. Increased Western contacts influenced many of these innovations. Several European works were translated. A few modern schools and medical clinics were established, mostly by European missionaries. Other new services included the establishment of the first modern police force in Tehran with the advice of an Austrian officer (1879). City services in Tehran, such as cleaning, paving and lighting streets, collection of refuse and maintenance of public parks got their first impetus towards the end of this period. In addition to these, telegraphs, regular newspapers, and banking and limited insurance services were introduced in Iran for the first time during Nasir al-Din Shah\'s reign.23 Postal services also expanded and first postage stamps were circulated (1868). In comparison with countries like Egypt and Ottoman Turkey, however, these changes were limited. 291 Muzaffar al-Din Shah\'s relatively mild nature was shown in his treatment of Mirza Riza Kirmani, who was extensively interrogated but not tortured before he was hanged. The Iranian government also demanded from the Ottomans the extradition of Afghani and of his three followers still jailed in Trabzon. Sultan Abdulhamid still refused to return Afghani, claiming he was an Afghan and not subject to Iranian jurisdiction. The three unfortunate progressives in Trabzon, however, who had no connection with the Shah\'s assassination, were extradited, and the cruel new crown prince, Muhammad Ali Mirza, had them summarily executed in Tabriz. Continued Iranian demands for Afghani\'s extradition (Mirza Riza having said that Afghani was the only other person involved in the assassination) stopped when Afghani became extremely ill with cancer, and died in 1897. Muzaffar al-Din Shah\'s weak character did not prevent him from being open to reformist forces. He allowed the return to activity of a man nicknamed \"Rushdiyya\" because he had set up a modernized type of \"Rushdiyya\" higher school on the Ottoman model in Tabriz, where it met with overwhelming religious hostility. Such schools were now opened for the first time in Tehran. The Shah also dismissed the unpopular Amin al-Sultan and, later, appointed the reformist Amin al-Daula to be chief minister in August 1897. The Shah, however, had paid off his father\'s huge harem extravagantly, and now was continuously eager to have money to meet the incessant demands of his own courtiers, many of whom had come with him from Tabriz and pressed to make up for the years of relatively lean waiting. The Shah\'s doctors also advised trips to European watering spots, and he wanted money for this too. When Amin al Daula was unable to raise a new loan from the British, and when his reformist attempts in law, administration of finance, and education aroused the opposition of ulama and courtiers, he was dismissed and Amin al-Sultan was brought back as premier in 1898. Amin al-Daula\'s efforts for fiscal reform and centralization, like similar measures attempted by reforming ministers before him, were frustrated by opposition from court vested-interest groups and some government officials and ulama. His abolition of the barat system (assignment of drafts to be collected from provincial treasuries) made officials dependent for their salaries on the central treasury, which they saw as an ineffective tax collector and an unreliable provider of income. Reorganization of finances also meant a cut in court spending, which affected the entire ruling family including the Shah. 299 One of Amin al-Daula\'s projects was to invite in some Belgian customs administrators to reorganize the customs, which had been farmed out region by region, resulting in customs farmers underbidding each other, below the already low 5 % limit, in order to attract trade, and also in farmers collecting far more than they paid in. The Belgian experiment was extended under Amin al-Sultan, and the leader of the Belgians, Naus, was made Minister of Customs. This resulted in an increase in efficiency and collection, but also widespread complaints by Iranian merchants that they were discriminated against in favour of foreigners, particularly the Russians, with whom the Belgians had close relations. The exact validity of these charges is unclear, but it is clear that many Iranian merchants had now to pay more than formerly, and that they blamed this on the Shah, the prime minister, and the presence of foreigners. Naus\'s influence soon extended far beyond customs, and he became de facto Minister of Finance. In order to pay for the foreign trips recommended by the Shah\'s doctors, Amin al-Sultan floated two large loans from Russia, in 1900 and 1902. The first loan required Iran to pay off its British debts and not to incur any other debts without Russian consent, while the second one included major economic concessions. The Russians also insisted on a new customs treaty, which was signed in 1902, and gave key Russian goods lower rates than the already low 5 % ad valorem. The income gained from the loans and from customs reform was not used productively, and went largely for the three extravagantly expensive trips to Europe which the Shah and his entourage took between 1900 and 1905. Meanwhile, discontent with the government was becoming organized once again. Secret oppositional societies became active in Tehran and elsewhere, and distributed inflammatory leaflets, called shabnamas (night letters) because of their nighttime distribution, against the government in 1900 and 1901. Some members of the societies were afterwards discovered and arrested. A new coalition among some of the leading ulama, courtiers, and secular progressives began to focus on the dismissal of Amin al-Sultan, who was seen as responsible for the alarming growth of loans and concessions to the Russians that were leading to Russian control of Iran. Even the British, alarmed at the growth of Russian influence, gave some money and encouragement to leading members of the ulama in Tehran and in the shrine cities of Iraq to help arouse activity against the Russian-favoured trade agreement. This opposition movement also called for the removal of Belgian customs officials and closure of newly established modern schools. These agitations were accompanied by an outburst of anti-foreign and antiminority feelings in a few cities, instigated by some of the ulama. Chief among these were the anti-Bahai riots of the summer of 1903 122 which led to the killing of dozens of Bahais in Isfahan and Yazd. The Bahais were easier scapegoats than the foreign subjects residing in Iran. Although unable to stop the 1902 loan from Russia as they had tried, the opposition became menacing enough to help force the dismissal of Amin al Sultan (now adorned with the higher title of Atabak) in September 1903. A decree execrating the Atabak as an unbeliever attributed to the leading Shii ulama of Iraq was widely circulated and believed, although doubts were cast on its authenticity. The Shah now appointed a reactionary relative of his, Ain alDaula, as premier, but popular protests against the Belgian customs officials and against high prices continued. Secret societies grew, and some helped to educate their members by reading and disseminating critical literature about Iran written in Persian abroad. This literature formed the basis for the ideological awakening of many Iranians who had not travelled abroad or received modern education. It included the works of men of Persian Azarbaijani origin living in Russian Transcaucasia, such as Fath Ali Akhundov, whose father had migrated from Iranian Azarbaijan. His anonymous Kamal alDaula va Jalal al-Daula a collection of fictitious epistles describing conditions in Iran, was bitterly critical. A similar series of Persian letters was imitated by Mirza Aqa Khan Kirmani, who also wrote other books and articles critical of Iranian conditions. Also widely read were the educational works of Talibov, an Azarbaijani emigre to Transcaucasia, and especially the \"Travel book of Ibrahim Beg\" by Zain al- Abidin Maraghai a book of fictitious travels in Iran that mercilessly exposed the evils of Iranian society. Less known, but not without influence, were other critical works, such as the translation of James Morier\'s Hajji Baba of Isfahan by Mirza Habib Isfahani, which added sharpness and a more contemporary flavor of criticism to the original. The \"True Dream\" by the progressive preachers from Isfahan, Jamal al-Din Isfahan! and Malik al-Mutakallimin, criticized under false names such high ranking ulama as the notorious Aqa Najafi, who used their position to add to their wealth and power, and corrupt governors such as Zill al-Sultan Such fiction reinforced the impression created by the reformist political writings of Malkum Khan and others, and by the newspapers published abroad and sent into Iran (with greater freedom under Muzaffar al-Din than under 122 Nasir al-Din), which were now joined by Parvarish and Surayya from Cairo and Hablai-Matin from Calcutta. The legally distributed papers in Iran continued to be only official or semiofficial ones. Some Iranians now began to plan revolutionary action, and revolutionary sentiment was strengthened by the Russo-Japanese War of 1904---5 and the Russian Revolution of 1905. Iranians knew that Russia would intervene against any attempt to overthrow or undermine Qajar government, but with the Russian government fully occupied first with war and then with revolution, it was clearly a propitious time to move. In addition, the strength shown by the recently backward Japanese against the dreaded Russians gave people courage, as did the possibility of shaking by revolution such a potent autocracy as that of Russia. The sight of the only Asian constitutional power defeating the only major European nonconstitutional power not only showed formerly weak Asians overcoming the seemingly omnipotent West, but aroused much new interest in Iran as elsewhere in Asia in a constitution as a \"secret of strength\". The Iranian Constitutional Revolution is usually dated from December 1905, when the governor of Tehran bastinadoed a group of sugar merchants for not lowering their raised sugar prices. Merchants were joined by a large group of mullas and tradesmen who then took sanctuary (bast) in the Royal Mosque of Tehran, whence they were dispersed by agents of Ain alDaula with the help of the Imam Juma of Tehran, a leading progovernment cleric. A group of ulama then decided, at the suggestion of the prominent reforming mujtahid, Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba°i, to retire to the shrine of Shahzada Abd al-c Azim, south of Tehran. There they were joined by a crowd of some 2,000 religious students, middle- and low-ranking mullas, merchants and common people. The bast took 2 5 days and was financed by discontented merchants and rivals of Ain al-Daula, including supporters of Amin al-Sultan. The crucial demand was for a representative adalatkhana (\"house of justice\") of which the meaning and composition were not spelled out --- perhaps in order to maintain the unity of modernizers and traditional ulama. The Shah dismissed the unpopular governor of Tehran, and in January 1906, agreed to the adalatkhana, upon which the ulama returned to Tehran and were received with enthusiasm. The Shah and Ain al-Daula showed no sign of fulfilling the promise, however, and further agitation against the government by the popular and radical preachers, Sayyid Jamal al-Din 121 Isfahani and Shaikh Muhammad Vaiz, increased, and provided a potent means of mass political enlightenment in the absence of an open oppositional press.