Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA) 2015 PDF

9. Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA) Prof. Dong-Ik Shin Yonsei University 1. Overview of Iran’s Nuclear Development (Brief History)  Mohamed Reza Shah initiated Iran's nuclear program during the 1950s with assistance from the U.S. Atoms for Peace Program. Establi...

9. Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA) Prof. Dong-Ik Shin Yonsei University 1. Overview of Iran’s Nuclear Development (Brief History)  Mohamed Reza Shah initiated Iran's nuclear program during the 1950s with assistance from the U.S. Atoms for Peace Program. Establishing the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in 1974, the Shah had ambitious plans to construct 20 nuclear power reactors, a uranium enrichment facility, and a reprocessing plant for spent fuel.  However, after the 1979 Iranian Revolution deposed the Shah, Ayatollah Khomeini deemed the nuclear program "un-Islamic" and ordered it terminated. In 1984, Khomeini reversed course on the issue of nuclear power and sought international partners to continue building the Bushehr reactors.  Currently, Iran has complete nuclear fuel cycle capabilities including uranium mining, milling, conversion, and enrichment facilities. Iran's extensive enrichment program, which could be used to produce highly enriched uranium(HEU) for a nuclear weapon, has been particularly controversial. At its 2015 peak, the program comprised nearly 20,000 centrifuges at 3 major facilities.  The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors found Iran in non-compliance with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in 2005, and the UN Security Council passed seven resolutions demanding that Iran halt its enrichment and reprocessing activities. 2  Beginning in 2002, Iran, the IAEA, and world powers—first with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the EU-3), and later accompanied by China, Russia, and the United States (the P5+1)—made numerous attempts to negotiate a settlement to the dispute.  Negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran yielded the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015, a comprehensive nuclear agreement limiting Iran's nuclear capacity in exchange for sanctions relief.  On 16 January 2016, all nuclear-related sanctions on Iran were lifted in response to progress in Iran’s implementing requirements for the verification of the nuclear deal. 3 (President Trump and JCPOA)  U.S. President Donald Trump campaigned on a promise to "dismantle the nuclear deal with Iran." However, the US administration upheld the deal even after the election in 2017.  On 8 May 2018, President Trump officially withdrew the United States from the JCPOA and announced the imminent re-imposition of all nuclear-related sanctions.  He alleged that the deal was “defective at its core,” citing Iranian support for terrorism and pursuit of ballistic missiles, as well as a presentation by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu alleging that Iran had concealed details of its early-2000’s nuclear weapons programs.  Notably, President Trump did not claim that Iran had violated any specific terms of the agreement. Iran has expressed a willingness to remain in the JCPOA despite the U.S. withdrawal.  And all other P5+1 states (E3, the U.S., China, Russia) reiterated their commitment to full implementation of the deal with Iran. 4 5 2. JCPOA(Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action)  The JCPOA is a detailed, 159-page agreement with five annexes reached by Iran and the P5+1 (China France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) on July 14, 2015.  The nuclear deal was endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2231, adopted on July 20, 2015.  Iran’s compliance with the nuclear-related provisions of the JCPOA will be verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) according to certain requirements set forth in the agreement. (Timeline and key components of JCPOA)  July 14, 2015, Finalization Day: conclusion of the agreement. Finalization day triggers Iran and the U.S. to begin domestic review processes of the JCPOA.  Iran also begins providing the IAEA with information to complete its investigation into past activities.  October 18, 2015, Adoption Day: 90 days after the passage of the UN Security Council Resolution endorsing the deal (July 20, 2015).  Adoption day triggers Iran and the P5+1 to take steps (outlined below) to meet the commitments to fully implement the JCPOA. 6  January 16, 2016, Implementation Day: the IAEA certifies that Iran has taken the key steps to restrict its nuclear program and has put in place increased monitoring.  The IAEA's report on implementation day triggers U.S., EU, and UN sanctions relief.  October 2023, Transition Day: Eight years after adoption day. It triggers the UN to lift missile restrictions, Iran to seek ratification of its additional protocol, the EU to terminate all remaining nuclear sanctions, and the U.S. to seek legislative termination of certain sanctions.  October 2025, Termination Day: Ten years after adoption day. Termination day terminates Resolution 2231 and the Security Council closes Iran's nuclear file (resolutions). 7 8 Negotiations for an Iran nuclear deal framework were a series of intensive talks from 2013 to July 2015 in Geneva and Vienna, between the foreign ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, Germany, France, China, the EU and Iran. 9 3. UN Security Council Resolutions on Iran and IAEA’s Verification A. UN Security Council  The UN Security Council has passed eight resolutions on Iran since 2006: Resolution 1696(31 July 2006) demanded that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment activities, Resolution 1737(23 December 2006) imposed sanctions after Iran refused to suspend its enrichment activities, required Iran to cooperate with IAEA, Resolution 1747(24 March 2007) expanded the list of sanctioned Iranian entities, Resolution 1803(3 March 2008) extended those sanctions to additional persons and entities, Resolution 1835(27 September 2008) reaffirmed the preceding four resolutions, Resolution 1929(9 June 2010) imposed a complete arms embargo on Iran, banned Iran from any activities related to ballistic missiles, authorized the inspection and seizure of shipments violating these restrictions. It also extended the asset freeze to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), established Panel of Experts (whose mandate was extended three times). 10 (Resolution 2231's Principal Provisions)  This resolution endorsed the comprehensive nuclear deal (JCPOA) reached between Iran and the P5+1 on July 14, 2015, and laid the groundwork for the Security Council to lift nuclear-related sanctions on Iran when Tehran completed key steps under the deal that restricted its nuclear activities.  Iran met the requirements in January 16, 2016.  Resolution 2231 retains the arms embargo on Iran for five years after implementation and the sanctions on Iran's ballistic missile program for eight years.  These sanctions are "nuclear-related" as they were put in place under Resolution 1929. Iran is also “called upon” not to undertake activities on ballistic missiles designed to be nuclear-capable.  It also requests that the IAEA undertake the necessary monitoring and verification to implement the deal.  The resolution also puts in place language laying out the procedure to re- impose UN sanctions (snap back).  The Security Council resolution requests reports quarterly from the IAEA on implementation of the deal and the agency's efforts to reach a broader conclusion about Iran's nuclear program. 11 B. IAEA’s Verification and Monitoring Activities in Iran (March 2015 report)  In March 2015, IAEA Director General Amano reported that Iran did not provide sufficient access or information to resolve a dozen issues related to the possible military dimensions of its nuclear program, giving only very limited information on only one of those issues. (December 2015 report)  The Agency assesses that a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device were conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and some activities took place after 2003.  Following this report, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution closing its consideration of the issues in the report and terminating previous resolutions about Iran. 12 IAEA Verification and Monitoring in Iran Disputes between Iran and Israel 13  4. The United States and Iran A. US-Iran relations: A brief history (1979: Iranian revolution)  The US-backed Shah of Iran, Reza Pahlevi, is forced to leave the country on 16 January following months of demonstrations and strikes against his rule by secular and religious opponents.  Two weeks later, Islamic religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini returns from exile. Following a referendum, the Islamic Republic of Iran is proclaimed on 1 April. (1979-81: US Embassy hostage crisis)  The US embassy in Tehran is seized by protesters in November 1979 and American hostages are held inside for 444 days.  The final 52 hostages are freed in January 1981, the day of US President Ronald Reagan's inauguration. Several hundred young Iranians, supported by a crowd of more than 3,000, climb the walls of the U.S. Embassy on November 4, 1979 14 (1985-86: Iran-Contra scandal)  The US secretly ships weapons to Iran, allegedly in exchange for Tehran's help in freeing US hostages held by Hezbollah militants in Lebanon.  The profits are illegally channeled to rebels in Nicaragua, creating a political crisis for Reagan. (1988: Iranian passenger plane shot down)  The American warship USS Vincennet shoots down an Iran Air flight in the Gulf on 3 July, killing all 290 people on board. The US says the Airbus A300 was mistaken for a fighter jet. (2002: 'Axis of evil‘)  In his State of the Union address, President George Bush denounces Iran as part of an "axis of evil" with Iraq and North Korea. The speech causes outrage in Iran. (2000s: Nuclear fears and sanctions)  In 2002 an Iranian opposition group reveals that Iran is developing nuclear facilities including a uranium enrichment plant.  The US accuses Iran of a clandestine nuclear weapons program. A decade of diplomatic activity and intermittent Iranian engagement with the IAEA. 15  But several rounds of sanctions are imposed by the UN, the US and the EU against Ahmadinejad's government. This causes Iran's currency to lose two- thirds of its value in two years. (2013-2016: Closer ties, and a nuclear deal)  In September 2013, a month after Iran's new moderate president Hassan Rouhani takes office, he and US President Obama had the first top-level conversation in more than 30 years.  Then in 2015, after a flurry of diplomatic activity, Iran agrees a long-term nuclear deal with the P5+1.  Under the accord, Iran agrees to limit its sensitive nuclear activities and allow in international inspectors in return for the lifting of crippling economic sanctions. (2019-: Tension in the Gulf)  Relations between the US and Iran worsen. In May and June 2019, explosions hit six oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman, and the US accuses Iran.  On 20 June, Iranian forces shoot down a US military drone over the Strait of Hormuz. The US says it was over international waters, Iran says it is over their territory. B. US withdrawal from the JCPOA  After its inauguration, the Trump administration certified in April and in July 2017 that Iran was complying with the deal.  But in October, 2017, Trump announced that the United States would not make the certification provided for under U.S. domestic law, on the basis that the suspension of sanctions was not "proportionate and appropriate," but stopped short of terminating the deal.  On May 8, 2018, the United States announced its withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action(JCPOA), also known as the "Iran nuclear deal".  President Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from the JCPOA. He called the agreement "a horrible one-sided deal that should have never, ever been made“.  After inauguration of President Biden 2021, participants discuss the possible return of the US to JCPOA and how to ensure the full and effective implementation of the agreement by all sides. 17 5. Status of the JCPOA (since 2019) A. United Nations (74th UN General Assembly, September 2019) (US)  U.S. President Donald Trump called on all nations to act against Tehran and not "subsidize Iran's bloodlust." "One of the greatest security threats facing peace-loving nations today is the repressive regime in Iran“.  Denouncing "four decades of failure" since the Islamic revolution, he called for Iran's leaders to "finally put the Iranian people first," and warned that U.S. sanctions will not be eased unless Tehran changes it behavior. (Iran)  Iranian President Hassan Rouhani warned world leaders that tensions are high in the Persian Gulf region and that a "single blunder" could "fuel a big fire."  The Iranian president directly addressed President Trump, calling him the "incumbent" U.S. president. "Our response to any negotiations under sanctions is negative.”  Rouhani called out the U.S. for "international piracy" and "merciless economic terrorism," referring to the increase in U.S. sanctions. 18 B. Iran’s Response  Since May 2019, Iran has reduce its commitment to the JCPOA by limiting IAEA inspectors’ access to its nuclear sites.  In a televised statement, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said the 1,044 machines at the plant will be injected with the uranium gas starting.  In response to U.S. re-imposition of nuclear-related sanctions, Iran reduced its compliance with the JCPOA in five phases:  In 2019, Iran exceeded 300 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride(UF6); enriched uranium past 3.67% up to 4.5%; announced that its commitments for research and development under the JCPOA would be completely removed.  Iran notified the Agency that its stock of heavy water had exceeded 130 metric tons.  In 2020, Iran proceeded with the planned fifth and final rollback to its commitments, forgoing all agreed-to limits on centrifuges.  Throughout 2020, Iran has exceeded limits on uranium enrichment agreed to in the JCPOA, however it has not enriched beyond 5% U-235.  In 2021, Iran has refused IAEA access to sites associated with revelations from the "atomic archive" released by Israel in 2018.  The UK, France, and Germany joined the US in submitting a resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors calling on Iran to allow IAEA inspection teams to all requested sites. 19  Resumption of uranium enrichment at the Fordow plant is Tehran's latest step back from the dying nuclear deal.  Iran abandoned two of its commitments under the deal by allowing its stockpile of enriched uranium to exceed the 300kg limit and breaching the cap on the purity(3.67%) of its uranium stocks.  The IAEA confirmed that Iran exceeded both a 300 kg limit on its enriched uranium stock and its 3.67% cap on the fissile purity (5-20%). (Iran's Rouhani announces another step away from JCPOA, 2019.11.5) 20 C. IAEA and Iran (IAEA September 2020 report)  The IAEA reports that Iran has exceeded by ten-fold the JCPOA’s cap of 300 kilograms of low enriched uranium (hexafluoride mass), or 202.8 kg (uranium mass).  Iran continued to take steps to violate the JCPOA’s limitations on advanced centrifuges. (IAEA September 2021 report)  The IAEA stresses that Iran fails to fully honor agreement on monitoring nuclear facility and equipment.  Iran's decision not to allow agency access to the TESA Karaj centrifuge component manufacturing workshop is contrary to the agreed joint statement and the JCPOA. (IAEA September 2022 report)  The IAEA reports that Iran's stock of uranium enriched to 60% and in the form of uranium hexafluoride, the gas that centrifuges enrich, was estimated to be 55.6 kg, an increase of 12.5 kg from the previous quarterly report.  The IAEA also found Iran in breach of its safeguards obligations for failing to declare its use of nuclear material at Lavisan-Shian site.  It was not in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear program is  exclusively peaceful purpose. 21 (IAEA September 2023 report)  2023 report by the IAEA highlights that Iran has increased its rate of production of uranium enriched up to 60% at Natanz and Fordow to levels observed between January and June 2023.  Director General is seriously concerned that Iran appears to have “frozen” the implementation for the past two reporting periods, and questions Iran’s continued commitment to its implementation.  Director General continues to strongly condemn Iran’s sudden withdrawal of the designations of several experienced IAEA inspectors, regards Iran’s stance as not only unprecedented but contrary to the cooperation in order to facilitate the effective implementation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement. 22  In November 2020, IAEA report said that Iran had further developed centrifuge technology, the novelty of which was explicitly prohibited by the JCPOA.  The IAEA report also said that Tehran "holds more than 12 times the amount of enriched uranium permitted under the JCPOA, and that "work has also begun on the construction of new underground facilities close to Natanz, its main enrichment facility".  In February 2021, however, Iran and the IAEA, have agreed to temporary measures to offset Iran's decision to restrict access to inspectors.  IAEA chief Rafael Grossi said that these would enable the agency to retain the "necessary degree of monitoring and verification work".  In September 2021, Iran agreed that IAEA inspectors will be able to service the Agency’s monitoring and surveillance equipment in Iran and replace their storage media, which will be kept under seals of both the IAEA and the AEOI. 23 D. US Response and Possible Return to the JCPOA  Former Secretary of State Michael Pompeo announced May 2020, that the US would terminate all remaining sanctions waivers allowing for nonproliferation cooperation projects in Iran.  Pompeo said the waivers covering the conversion of the Arak reactor, the provision of enriched fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, and the export of Iran’s spent fuel would expire.  But he clarified that the waiver covering international support for Iran’s Bushehr reactor would remain in place.  Iran's nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was assassinated near Tehran and the killing could further complicate the US-Iran relations and the possibility of negotiation over restoring the JCPOA. 24  (Negotiation Suspended)  In September 2023, Iran said no point reviving 2015 JCPOA without guarantees the US would not withdraw again and unless U.N. inspectors close inspections of Tehran's atomic program.  At the UN General Assembly, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi said: "What is the use of having a revived deal without assuring guarantees that the U.S. will not violate again? The US should prove its "goodwill and determination" to revive 2015 JCPOA.  In addition, Iran wants the IAEA to drop its years-long probes of unexplained traces of uranium found at three undeclared sites in Iran.  U.S. official rejected it as "unreasonable“ in terms of what they’re asking for with regards to the IAEA probe into the unexplained presence of traces of uranium particles.  IAEA chief Rafael Grossi said on Wednesday he hoped to speak to Iranian officials on the investigation, but insisted it would not simply disappear Iran's President Ebrahim Raisi addresses the 78th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (2023.9) 25 (Russian hurdle)  In early March 2022, the US said a deal was possible with Iran on its nuclear program and an agreement had to be completed urgently as Tehran advances its capabilities.  But the Iran nuclear deal is uncertain in a new situation of conflicts in Ukraine and Palestine these days.  Just as negotiators were poised for a breakthrough in talks over the future of the JCPOA, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine threatened to kill the deal once and for all.  Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov demanded that the U.S. provide Russia with “written guarantees” that Western-led sanctions would not impinge upon Russian trade and investment with Iran.  Until that point, Russia had only sought to clarify whether those sanctions would prevent Russian companies active in the nuclear sector from participating in the civil nuclear cooperation outlined in the JCPOA.  Since diplomats from JCPOA members were now not only exhausted but also confused, they decided to postpone the talks indefinitely. 26 (President Biden on JCPOA negotiation)  Biden administration took a major step, joining with European partners in offering to begin talks with the Iranians for the first time in four years.  Iran previously set a deadline, vowing that if US sanctions are not lifted, it will expel IAEA nuclear inspectors from the country.  The political brinkmanship raises questions over Biden’s plans to salvage a deal which has effectively been on life support since former President Trump pulled out of it in 2018.  Biden administration confirmed that they will focus on identifying actions that both the US and Iran will need to take in order to come back into compliance with the Iran deal, including the US lifting sanctions.  However, on 20 December 2022, President Biden said that the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran is “dead,” but stressed the U.S. won’t formally announce it. It's a long story." 27 (Going nowhere)  Since 2023, a proposal went through, Iran will be allowed to access the funds only to buy food, medicine or other humanitarian purposes. In return, Iran possibly freeze its uranium enrichment at current levels of 60 percent purity and fully cooperate with inspectors from the IAEA.  Iran has steadily expanded its uranium enrichment work and has enough fissile material for more than one nuclear weapon if it chose to enrich the material to 90% purity.  In May 2024, the death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash could lead to a period of political instability but is unlikely to change Iran's foreign policy including JCPOA negotiation.  In July 2025, new President Masoud Pezeshkian declared that he intends to work to lift US sanctions on Iran’s critical sectors of the Iranian economy, such as the energy(oil).  It requires new round of negotiations with the US and EU. President Pezeshkian wasn’t the only one who discussed the need to return to a nuclear deal.  But it will happen only after US President election and new policy will be made after January 2025.  28 E. European Union  At the UN General Assembly, French President Macron said that it's time for Iran, US to resume negotiations.  He stressed that “I am not naive at all and I don’t believe in miracles,” “I believe it takes courage to build peace and that is why it is important for the US, Iran and the signatories of the agreement(JCPOA) to show this courage.”  EU’s chief diplomat Josep Borrel (High Representative of EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy),“the region cannot afford another war, we call for an urgent de-escalation and maximum restraint.”  EU reaffirmed European commitments preserving the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA).  EU has been playing an important role in mediating between the US and Iran to save the JCPOA, hosting the Vienna meeting with all members of the JCPOA including the US and Iran from November 2021 until now. 7. Lessons Learned from Iran Nuclear Negotiation (JCPOA) (Positive views)  Positive view contended that President Obama actually scored a major success vis-à-vis Iran in his use of soft power.  (1). This is the one form of power that the Iranian regime has no effective tools to confront, so Obama was correct to purposely direct messages to the Iranian people, thereby frightening the regime. Moreover, Obama sincerely believed in diplomacy, and in the positive effect of demonstrating to Iran a cooperative American approach.  (2). Israel’s threat to employ military force only strengthened Obama’s determination to reach a deal at almost any cost – he knew that if Israel followed through on the threat, the US could easily be pulled into military conflict as well.  (3). Furthermore, it challenges the authority of the UN Security Council, which has unanimously passed a resolution endorsing the JCPOA and calling on all UN member states to take action to support the JCPOA’s implementation. 30  (4). Despite the US withdrawal, the JCPOA remains in force; it is a multilateral agreement to which seven of the original eight parties still adhere.  The JCPOA limits Iran’s uranium enrichment program until 2030 and contains monitoring and transparency measures that will remain in place long after that date.  (5). General assessment has been that the agreement is technically sound with robust verification procedures. The IAEA has consistently found that Iran is fully living up to its undertakings.  In short, well-crafted and properly implemented, the JCPOA closes off Iran’s pathway to nuclear weapons, should it decide to go in that direction.  (6). Regardless of its views about Iran’s regional policies and actions, the US withdrawal from the JCPOA is regrettable for many reasons.  It undermines the value of multilateral diplomacy and raises questions about the sustainability of international agreements. 31 (Negative views)  (1). The fact that the P5+1 sought this result through dialogue (without employing military force) did not mean that the effort would not require a forceful approach.  (2). However, at the negotiating table, the international negotiators began making concessions to Iran in order to secure a deal, and in the hope that a more cooperative approach would elicit a similar response from Iran.  (3). It was noted that while the Obama administration insisted that this deal was better than no deal at all. It was contentious, mainly due to the “sunset provisions” that dictated the expiration of key restrictions, beginning in 7-8 years. At that time Iran will be able to build up a vast nuclear infrastructure.  (4). Challenges to the JCPOA If the Iranian economy continues to remain stagnated, and foreign investment remains low, it is likely the public will turn away from the nuclear deal since it did not bring the level of economic relief that many Iranians banked their support of the deal on.  (5). As was witnessed in US President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA, leadership change could derail its implementation and constitute a bad precedent to multilateral agreement for denuclearization. -After August Iranian presidential election, it is also not clear for new Iranian President to fully respect the JCPOA. 32 8. Application of the lessons to North Korea  There are three elements of diplomacy (negotiations) with Iran that we should be looking at. (A) The first is to initiate a low-key diplomatic channel authorized at the highest level.  Prior to the start of official negotiations, diplomats from the United States and Iran engaged in a series of meetings held secretly over a period of about 16 months.  These eventually led to the multilateral P5+1 talks and an interim agreement in November 2013. Given the level of mistrust between Pyongyang and Washington, it would be a good first step to try to have a dialogue without preconditions.  We can call it “talks about talks” to help clarify the acceptable conditions to begin negotiations. How can we meet them and overcome differences? What are the non-negotiables ? (B) The second element is to focus on a limited set of realistic objectives, not a grand bargain.  The U.S.-Iranian discussions were limited to what both sides deemed to be a very specific, manageable set of items in the nuclear field.  The United States placed a priority on preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon; the Iranians focused on lifting sanctions. Now the United States must decide on its highest priority with North Korea. 33  It must zero in on identifying a key, early goal that is within the realm of achievability  To diffuse tensions, the best bet would be to begin by pursuing a freeze on North Korea’s nuclear testing. One of the key goals would be to get IAEA’s inspectors back into the country. One of the most remarkable elements of the JCPOA is its extensive monitoring and verification requirements.  A suspension of testing is an interim step, and a nuclear weapons-free Korean peninsula should remain an end goal. The suspension is an important first step that could create the space to pursue an additional agreements. (C). The third element is to pursue a win-win approach.  The United States and Iran committed themselves to a win-win narrative in their early talks that enabled them each to say they succeeded in fulfilling their objectives at the end. This reinforced the understanding that each side would have to make compromises.  However, reflecting diplomacy with the North Koreans before—it is too difficult, they cheat, and they cannot be trusted. There were the same arguments about Iran for years. In fact, during the 35 years of hostility before the JCPOA was reached, there were countless failed attempts at diplomacy, as well as missed opportunities.  Because we have failed in the past does not mean we should not try again. Indeed, we should learn from past attempts. 34  Iran-the U.S. negotiation, 2015,Vienna Bottom-Up Approach North Korea-the U.S. negotiation, 2019, Hanoi Top-Down Approach 35 Nuclear Weapon Countries (SIPRI) 36 37 Nuclear Weapons Tests 38