Climate Change, Security, and Ecological Security PDF

Geoforum 155 (2024) 104096 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Geoforum journal h...

Geoforum 155 (2024) 104096 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Geoforum journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/geoforum Climate change, security and the institutional prospects for ecological security Matt McDonald School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland, GPN3 Building, Brisbane, Qld 4072, Australia A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T Keywords: It has become commonplace, almost a cliché, to begin an analysis of the relationship between climate change and Security security with the acknowledgement that this relationship looks very different depending on whose security is Climate change under consideration. In the academic literature on this relationship we have seen a steady shift away from an Ecological security exclusive focus on the protection of existing institutions from the indirect effects of climate change, and towards Discourse Institutions a focus on the biosphere or the natural world itself. Such an orientation asks whether and how the natural world, and the ecosystems that compose it, are threatened by the immediate and direct effects of climate change. While this shift seems logical in response to the geological reality of the Anthropocene epoch and the unambiguous arrival of climate change, crucial questions remain about the prospects for pursuing ‘ecological security’ in practice: what would this look like, who would be agents of ecological security, and is increasing academic and think tank engagement with the concept matched in policy and practical developments? This paper analyses the institutional and practical prospects for this approach to the climate-security relationship, drawing on policy documents and interviews with policy makers in a range of states. It finds grounds for (cautious) optimism in increasing engagement with ecological security, including at the nation-state level, evident in growing recog- nition of the need for states to address the direct threat posed by climate change to the most vulnerable. 1. Introduction approached. While some accounts have focused on the potential security implications of climate change for sovereignty or territorial integrity, Climate change is increasingly identified as a security issue. By some even flagging the possibility of armed conflict, others have focused on accounts, climate change appears in more than 70 % of national security the direct and immediate (security) threat climate change poses to strategy documents among those states producing such documents human communities and ecosystems. Crucially, such differences are (Scott, 2015; Vogler, 2023a). It has been discussed in the UN Security consequential in terms of the types of responses to climate insecurity Council with increasing frequency since the first debate in 2007, with a prioritised or envisaged: these can variously encourage adaptation draft resolution discussed in late 2021 (Hardt, 2021; Maertens, 2021; measures oriented towards defence preparedness or better insulating the Scartozzi, 2022). The 2014 IPCC report devoted a chapter to outlining state from possible instability linked to the effects of climate change, or the potential human security implications of climate change (IPCC, significant mitigation efforts to minimise harms experienced by the most 2014). And the extent of this engagement in the policy community has vulnerable across time, space and species. These differences are, in been at least matched- and arguably in part driven by- a now significant short, important. volume of scholarship on this relationship from both policy-oriented One useful means of differentiating between these accounts is to do think tanks and the broader research community.1 so on the basis of their selection of a referent object of security: of whose Yet significant and increasing engagement with the climate-security security is presented as the object of concern. We might differentiate, for relationship in practical and analytical terms belies significant differ- example, between approaches that focus on the nation-state (national ences in the way in which this relationship has been understood and security), the international community (international security), human E-mail address: [email protected]. 1 While an account of the range of this scholarship is beyond the scope of this paper, see for example recent surveys of the literature and handbooks on climate security (Busby, 2018; Gemenne et al., 2014; Ide et al., 2023; Koubi, 2019; McDonald, 2013; Trombetta, 2023), and publications produced by key thintanks in this area such as adelphi, SIPRI, Center for Climate & Security, RUSI and the Wilson Center. On the role of thinktanks in influencing the contours of climate security debate and political engagement with it, see for example Dalby (2016a). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2024.104096 Received 19 April 2024; Received in revised form 24 July 2024; Accepted 26 July 2024 Available online 9 August 2024 0016-7185/© 2024 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by- nc-nd/4.0/). M. McDonald Geoforum 155 (2024) 104096 communities (human security) or the biosphere/ ecosystems (ecological non-human beings. Rather, Barnett was sceptical about the capacity for security). Such a distinction- while imperfect- captures core contours in such a reorientation to be possible given the world we currently occupy engagement with the security implications of climate change around the and the institutions that govern it. question of whose security is viewed as under threat. The answer to this But can we justify dismissing a progressive approach to the climate (first principle) question in turn influences the way the nature of the change-security relationship because it appears foreign to existing in- threat is viewed, which actors are attributed responsibility for address- stitutions? And if we recognise the importance of a shift away from the ing it, and what means of response are appropriate to address that primacy of human collectives or the inevitability of the human-nature threat. divide, should our focus be less on finding frameworks that speak to Of these varied discourses of climate security, ecological security current institutions and more on exploring the conditions in which such clearly suggests itself as the most marginal to existing accounts of se- institutions might come to embrace and pursue those frameworks in curity in international relations thought and in the practices of global practice?4This is the question this paper will explore, examining the politics. Going further even than radical cosmopolitanism in its ethical institutional and practical prospects for an approach to the climate- imaginary,2 such an approach encourages us to focus our attention less security relationship that orients towards ecosystems themselves. In on protecting existing institutions from secondary effects of climate the process it draws on primary research including examination of na- change and more on addressing the harms experienced by the most tional policy documents, interviews with national policy-makers and UN vulnerable associated with direct climate impacts. It encourages a Security Council debates to examine the extent to which ecological se- radical reorientation of ethical responsibility, one necessitated by the curity is represented as a concern for key security institutions. scale of the climate crisis. And it is a reorientation also necessary given This paper is divided into five sections. The first briefly outlines the the onset of the Anthropocene: a mooted term for the current geological contours of climate security discourses. The second section provides a epoch that points to the role of humans as a planetary force systemati- more extended elucidation of the ecological security discourse, cally undermining the conditions for the survival of life on earth (Dalby, concluding with the question of how agency and practical prospects for 2016b; 2013a; Steffen, 2021).3 An ecological security discourse is one in the pursuit of this approach to the security implications of climate which we are encouraged to orient our concerns and action towards the change are conceived. The third section briefly notes institutional resilience of ecosystems themselves in the face of direct and immediate engagement with the climate security relationship (particularly focusing effects of climate change, in the process encouraging significant and on the UN Security Council and the role of states) before the fourth sustained efforts to minimise our contribution to the problem through section- and the central focus of the paper- identifies existing engage- reducing greenhouse gas emissions (McDonald, 2021). ment with the ecological security discourse in practice in these institu- Yet if such an approach appears more morally defensible in the tional settings, drawing on primary research noted. The conclusion context of the Anthropocene and the climate crisis, and attuned towards reflects on prospects for ecological security and the trajectory of the practices that could directly address harms associated with it, it does not climate-security relationship more broadly. It notes an increasing follow that it enjoys support in corridors of world power. Indeed central inclination towards such a discourse even in national policy statements to concerns about the viability of such an approach have been mis- and settings, while also identifying immanent possibilities for further givings about the extent to which powerful actors and institutions will movements in this direction: one increasingly necessary in the context of be willing or able to pursue a project that does not entail prioritizing the Anthropocene and the climate crisis. their own immediate interests and the rights and needs of their con- stituencies. This particularly applies to states. On the question of will- 2. Discourses of climate security ingness, the suggestion here is that leaders will be disinclined to forgo the pursuit of national interests in order to redress potential harms to As noted, there are a range of different ways of approaching the suffering outsiders. On the question of capacity, even with leaders’ climate change-security relationship, with different accounts of that willingness there are significant questions over whether such leaders relationship encouraging different sets of responses. In introducing the could expect to retain domestic support for such an orientation, espe- ecological security discourse and prospects for institutionalisation, this cially if this is seen as inconsistent the state’s primary responsibility to section outlines alternative discourses of climate security differentiated its own citizens. The respective trajectories of global aid budgets and on the basis of their categorisation of referent object- of whose security is national military spending would seem to confirm these inclinations under consideration in the face of the challenges posed by climate (Liang and Tian, 2024). change. Discourses are understood here, drawing on Hayer (1995), as Such concerns were at the heart of early dismissals of an orientation frameworks of meaning that condition the way we conceive of the towards ecological security, with Jon Barnett (2001, p. 121) memorably relationship between climate change and security. These discourses are describing ecological security as a ‘bystander on the sidelines of the characterised by different accounts of referent object (whose security substantive contest’ over how we might conceive of the relationship matters), agent (who is capable of or responsible for addressing the between environmental change and security. He did not question the threat), threat (the nature of the threat posed) and means (how the normative desirability of a shift towards the immediate and direct im- threat is to be addressed in practice) (see McDonald, 2013). The foun- plications of climate change for ecosystems, planetary functions and dational question of whose security is under consideration drives the focus here on differentiating between these discourses on the basis of their choice of referent object. 2 Though on this point, and for an attempt to develop a notion of cosmo- There are of course limits to such an approach. At times both policy politanism that extends beyond human communities to other species, see, for practitioners and analysts speak to challenges to multiple different example, Burke (2023). referent objects (MoD France, 2015; Jasparro and Taylor, 2008), while 3 It should be noted that the proposal to formally endorse the Anthropocene such a demarcation can also serve to elide important differences in the epoch failed to receive a supermajority of votes from a panel of the Interna- way in which actors focused on a particular referent object (like the tional Commission on Stratigraphy in March 2024, though there was contro- versy around the process of the vote and the proposed starting date of the nation-state) might understand and approach the ‘national’ security Anthropocene (in 1952) was a central point of contention. In her analysis of the implications of climate change (see Diez et al., 2016; Hardt et al., 2023; decision and its implications for the Anthropocene concept, Witze (2024:649) notes that ‘although the Anthropocene probably will not be added to the 4 geological timescale, it remains a broad cultural concept already used by many There are parallels here to work on the idea of the ‘Green State’, particu- to describe the era of accelerating human impacts, such as climate change and larly associated with Robyn Eckersley (Eckersley, 2004; Barry and Eckersley, biodiversity loss’. 2005). 2 M. McDonald Geoforum 155 (2024) 104096 von Lucke et al., 2014). On the latter, recent analyses suggest that we see peace and security’- to quote article 1 of the UN charter- arguably en- significant variation in the way in which nation-states conceive and courages a focus on the defence of the international status quo. This approach the security implications of climate change (Hardt et al., status quo is one, for many critics, that has not only failed to address the 2023). Nonetheless such a distinction remains a useful heuristic device, problem of climate change but even serves to drive the harms experi- enabling us to explore the contours and implications of these discourses enced by communities at the frontline of climate effects (Burke et al., based on foundational choices about whose security matters. Here I 2016a; Burke et al., 2016b; Dalby, 2013b). differentiate between a national, international, human and ecological A focus on direct harms experienced by communities as a result of security discourse in response to the security implications of climate climate change is a clear feature of a human security discourse. Here, the change. emphasis is on the direct and immediate effects of climate change for Of course a focus on threats to national security remains dominant in human survival, health and life prospects (Matthew et al., 2010; accounts of security in international relations, and the same applies even O’Brien, 2006). This approach serves at once as a critique of those ap- to the (transnational) challenge of climate change. Here, the referent proaches that would view institutions themselves as worth preserving in object is the nation-state.5 In this schema, climate change constitutes a the face of climate change- regardless of the functions they ultimately threat to national security to the extent that it poses a challenge to the performed- and as a specific affirmation of the importance of recognis- sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. With some exceptions- ing immediate harms experienced by (especially vulnerable) commu- immediate concerns of Pacific Island states associated with sea level rise nities as a result of the direct impacts of climate change. While and associated loss of territory, for example (Maas and Carius, 2012; instability or conflict linked to climate change would certainly qualify as Mitra and Sanghi, 2023) – the threat is usually indirect rather than a potential threat to human security (see, for example, Barnett and direct. Simply put, the immediate effects of climate change such as Adger, 2007) the nature of the threat posed extends well beyond these changing rainfall patterns, warmer temperatures, higher sea levels or secondary or indirect effects to the threat posed by changing rainfall disasters are viewed as problematic to the extent that they have flow on patterns, higher temperatures or desertification to lives, livelihoods and effects for the state through population displacement or armed conflict, even the celebration of culture within human communities (O’Brien for example. The threat is therefore an indirect or secondary one for the et al., 2010; Matthew et al., 2010). Given this focus on direct effects of most part, and responses to those threats that do arise in turn encourage climate change itself, it is little surprise that this discourse shifts our action not necessarily oriented towards addressing the problem of attention to the imperative of mitigation undertaken by a range of ac- climate change itself (through mitigation) but some of its flow on effects tors, alongside adaptive measures to help communities manage the (through adaptation or defence preparedness, for example). This focus onset of climate effects. This conception of the relationship between on adaptation rather than mitigation is directly noted in a range of ac- climate change and security and the imperative of response has been counts of the national security implications of climate change (Busby, endorsed by a range of UN agencies- not least the UN Development 2007, 2008; Schwarz and Randall, 2004). And in terms of agency or Program (see UNDP, 2007; UNSG, 2009)- and more recently by Pacific institutional responsibility, a key concern of this paper, it is the state and Island states in their 2018 Boe Declaration (PIF, 2018). its military that is ascribed with primary responsibility here for realising This necessarily brief survey of discourses of climate security- while or advancing climate security in this discourse through effective adap- eliding some important differences within these discourses- nonetheless tive responses to instability or conflict linked to climate change. In the presents a diverse range of approaches to the climate change-security process the state effectively attempts to best insulate itself from the relationship. These discourses start from different first principles and (secondary) effects of climate change, with the pursuit of national se- draw on distinct ethical traditions (from communitarianism in the case curity potentially viewed as separate from the need to address the ori- of the national security discourses to cosmopolitanism in the case of the gins of the problem itself. A genuinely transnational problem here is human security discourse). And in the process of settling on the question viewed through a statist lens. of whose security matters, these discourses in turn encourage alternative The latter is less of a feature of an international security discourse, approaches to the question of the nature of the threat, what means where recognition of climate change as a transboundary challenge is should be employed to address it and by which actors. In ranging from a central. While the general focus here is on the potential contribution of prioritization of national-focused adaptive responses to wholesale climate change to international instability, a more specific account mitigation aimed at vulnerable communities, the practical stakes in how would view the referent object in this discourse as international society, this relationship is understood are readily apparent. and specifically the preservation or advancement of the (dominant) Across all these discourses, including the more progressive human rules and norms of that society (see McDonald, 2021, pp. 67-69). In this security discourse that encourages us to recognise the immediate and discourse the focus largely remains on the secondary implications of direct effects of climate change and deal with the problem head on climate change: their potential to contribute to large-scale and desta- through mitigation, two key limitations remain. First, there remains a bilising population movements, regional instability, even armed conflict focus on (currently living) human populations. While drawing our (Dodo, 2014; Jasparro and Taylor, 2008; Purvis and Busby, 2004; Smith attention to vulnerable populations in the developing world, for and Vivekananda, 2007). Yet in government reports and academic an- example, the human security discourse fails to account for obligations to alyses examining potential displacement, instability or conflict linked to future generations or for other living beings- both constituencies that are climate change (see, for example, Black et al., 2022), there is usually acutely vulnerable to the implications of climate change while being more attention to the imperative of mitigation to help limit the potential unable to exercise meaningful agency to address it. This elision is even sites, and seriousness, of international insecurity linked to climate more apparent in the other discourses noted here. change. And in conceptions of agency or responsibility within this Second, and following this, these discourses work with a separation discourse, the focus is on both states (working together) and the in- of humanity and nature that may be central to modern political and stitutions of the ‘international community’ in coordinating that coop- social thought (see Clark and Szerszynski, 2021; Soper, 1995), but eration (Purvis and Busby, 2004; Werrell and Femia, 2018). Still, the nonetheless appears inconsistent with the realities of the Anthropocene tendency of orientation here towards the ‘maintenance of international and the associated opportunity it provides to recognise the inter- connectedness between human populations and ecosystems (Clark, 2014; Dalby 2013a). These limitations provide a powerful rationale for 5 As Welsh (2022, p. 91) notes, however, it is more accurate in most accounts articulating a vision of climate security that recognises the importance to define the referent object in this discourse as the ‘state’ rather than the of challenging the human-nature binary, and in which boundaries of ‘nation’, suggesting that ‘the former is a political category; the latter, an moral consideration are extended to other living beings. This is defined anthropological one’. here as ecological security. In outlining the contours of this discourse in 3 M. McDonald Geoforum 155 (2024) 104096 the following section, I will focus in particular on the question of agency exclusive focus on human populations increasingly evident in the dis- and institutional purchase- often presented as the key overarching im- ciplines of both international relations and geography, particularly pediments to the realisation of this approach in practice (Barnett, 2001). critical variants of each. Of course this animates this special issue, but follows a rich tradition of critical interventions on the question of whose 3. Contours of Ecological Security and the Question of Agency security is to be protected or advanced in dominant accounts of climate security evident in the pages of this journal.7 Ecological security is defined here as a concern with the resilience of While the ecological security discourse constitutes a direct response ecosystems themselves in the face of the (direct) impacts of climate to the particular context of ecological change and the Anthropocene, change. Ecosystems- ‘a complex of organisms, their environment and there remain difficult questions about how the referent, threat, means of their interactive relationships in a particular space’ (McDonald, 2021, p. response and agents are conceived. This is clearly more complicated 110)- are the referent object of security in this discourse because this than the national security discourse. In that discourse, the conflation of focus allows us to come to terms with the interconnectedness that de- referent and agent (both the state and its instruments), the emphasis on fines the Anthropocene epoch. It is also envisaged that an orientation insulating the state (through adaptation) and the predominant focus on towards ecosystem resilience will encourage practices that recognise secondary implications of climate change for territorial integrity or and address the rights and needs of the most vulnerable across time sovereignty provides a neat- if highly reductionist and morally dubious- (future generations), space (human populations in the developing set of responses to the core questions of what security means in the face world) and species (other living beings). And while the concept of of climate change. In the ecological security discourse the referent object resilience has been the subject of sustained critique in international is complicated: ecosystems are characterized by significant differences relations thought (see, for example, Chandler and Reid, 2016; Wakefield in size, in the functions they perform and in their capacity to continue to et al., 2021), its focus on retaining functionality (in this case of eco- do so in the face of change. Following this the threat itself is highly systems) in the face of change allows us to come to terms with the variable in terms of severity and nature across different ecosystems, ongoing effects of climate change, and the idea of protecting that which even while our focus remains on the direct and immediate implications is changing (Adger et al., 2011). An orientation towards ecological se- of climate change. Measures range from urgent mitigation action- the curity, then, involves prioritizing those actions in the face of climate priority- to adaptation focused on the most vulnerable to even contro- change that serve to minimise direct ecosystem harm. While this could versial interventions known as geoengineering (McDonald, 2023). But feasibly extend to adaptation (not least given the IPCC discusses perhaps the question of agency or responsibility, in part following the ‘ecosystem-based’ adaptive measures (2014, p. 845) in its fifth assess- expansive ethical scope of the discourse and its broad conception of ment report), urgent and sustained mitigation action to address direct means of providing security, is more complicated still. Indeed as noted, and immediate harms are prioritized in this discourse.6 the question of which actor or actors will take responsibility for the In the process of moving beyond human populations or their in- provision of ecological security has been a particular focus of criticism or stitutions when considering the effects (whether direct or indirect) of concern within this discourse, encouraging the focus in this paper on climate change, this discourse of security builds upon earlier and adja- prospects for its embrace and even institutionalisation. cent rearticulations of security in the face of ecological change. Aside With its focus on the need to address the problem of climate change from earlier uses of the ecological security term in a range of different directly- in terms of emissions and their urgent mitigation- it is imme- ways (see Barnett, 2001; Mische, 1989; Pirages and Cousins, 2005), diately clear that a range of actors can both contribute to climate harms concepts of biosphere or planetary security drew our attention to a ‘one and their management. Indeed this potentially extends from interna- world’ image of that which needs to be protected (Litfin, 1999; Myers, tional organizations to states, private corporations, communities and 1993). Other attempts to grapple with what security might mean beyond individuals engaging in practices that cause or minimise climate change human institutions and collectives, and in the context of ecological and its impacts. But in assigning responsibility for the promotion or change and the Anthropocene epoch, range from Anthropocene security realization of ecological security, where does this framework leave us? (Harrington and Shearing, 2017; Mobjörk and Lövbrand, 2021) to Ultimately, the ethical first principles of the ecological security worldly security (Mitchell, 2014), posthuman security (Cudworth and discourse- with its focus on the most vulnerable- suggest the need to Hobden, 2017), or ecospheric security (Welsh, 2022), among others. focus on the question of capacity (McDonald, 2021, pp.147–60). If part Cudworth and Hobden (2017) explicitly challenge the moral primary of what renders beings vulnerable to the effects of climate change is not attached to humans, for example, Harrington and Shearing (2017) just immediate exposure to these effects but also their limited capacity to explore possibilities for an ethics of care underpinning engagement with meaningfully influence policies and practices that contribute to the other living beings, while Audra Mitchell (2014) explores the moral problem, it follows that those who have such capacity bear (particular) obligations that extend to the earth system as a whole. obligations or responsibility. With parallels to ethical accounts of All these conceptions of security (in the context of ecological crises) distributive justice or simply equity (see Caney, 2005; Paterson, 2001; involve recognition of the limits of moral imaginaries tied to currently Shue, 1993, 1999; 2014), the suggestion here is that those actors or existing human populations and their preservation from (external) institutions that are most capable of addressing the problem of climate threat in the face of ecological crises (see also Dalby, 2020). Such in- change (through mitigation) or enabling others to do so (through terventions have generally been less explicit, however, in outlining the providing resources for mitigation or adaptation to vulnerable com- contours of these discourses in terms of questions of referent, agent, munities) are ultimately responsible for pursuing such action.8 This means and nature of threat, and have been less specifically focused on places a particular burden of agency and responsibility on developed the challenge of climate change. While the focus here is therefore on the states to further the ends of ecological security. But to what extent are contours of the ecological security discourse (as per McDonald, 2021), these responsibilities accepted? And to return to the central question of increasing academic engagement with the idea of ‘entangled’ (See the paper, to what extent do we see an increasing resonance for or O’Brien, 2024) or ‘beyond human’ conceptions of security is important movement towards acceptance of this responsibility consistent with the to note given the paper’s broader focus on prospects for the ecological commitments of the ecological security discourse? These questions security discourse in terms of institutionalisation and practice. And it inform the analysis of the remainder of this paper. points to a strong and growing inclination towards challenging the 7 See, for example, Oels (2013); Telford (2018); Dalby (2013a); Bettini 6 For a more extended discussion of the contours of the ecological security (2013); 8 discourse, see McDonald (2021). On institutional responsibility, see Erskine (2001) and Erskine (2003). 4 M. McDonald Geoforum 155 (2024) 104096 4. Climate security and institutional engagement more consistent with national security, human security or ecological security (Hardt et al., 2023). In their surveys of these countries they In examining the prospects for the embrace of ecological security in found instances of alignment between national approaches to climate formal political institutions (and associated policy settings and prac- security and the contours of the ecological security discourse, to be tices), it is worth reflecting on the extent to which those institutions noted. ultimately recognise the security implications of climate change more Increasing engagement is evident too in commentary and grey broadly. Within states and in the international community’s key inter- literature associated with policy-oriented thinktanks. Reports on national security institution- the United Nations Security Council- there ecological security (and its connection to climate change) have been is growing recognition of the relationship between climate change and produced by and for key policy thinktanks throughout the world such as security, even if responsibilities for the providing security are not wholly the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in Sweden (Smith nor consistently accepted (see McDonald, 2024). and Schoonover, 2023), the Wilson Center in the USA (McDonald, 2022) Since 2007, the UN Security Council has held several thematic de- and the Center for Security Studies in Switzerland (McDonald, 2016), for bates on climate change, with increasing frequency since 2018 (Scar- example. Beyond this, the Council on Strategic Risks- and its Center for tozzi, 2022). In late 2021 a resolution was tabled to formalize the Climate and Security- have recently established an Ecological Security UNSC’s role in addressing climate security, proposing the establishment program (https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/tag/ecological-security/), ‘of a special envoy position on climate and security; the incorporation of while in 2015 a Foundation for Ecological Security was established (http climate change considerations in peace operations; and/or the devel- s://www.fes.org.in/). opment of regular reporting – through the Secretary-General – on se- But what of the key institutions of global politics? Turning our curity risks associated with climate change’ (McDonald, 2024, p. 11). attention to nation-states, do we see their increasing engagement with While this resolution was voted down (with Russia and India voting the security implications of climate change (Vogler, 2023a) translating against and China also speaking in opposition) the debate itself saw into increasing engagement with ecological security? Addressing this majority support for both recognising the connection between climate question, alongside exploring the conditions in which such engagement change and security and formalizing a role for the Security Council in (if evident) became evident, promises to tell us much about the insti- addressing it. We will return to the form of this engagement, and the tutional prospects for ecological security in a world of states. extent to which this aligns with the ecological security discourse, in the Here the paper draws on a range of primary sources on approaches to following section. climate security among states that have explicitly recognised and Growing attention to the security implications of climate change has attempted to institutionalise climate change within the national security also been evident on the part of states. In his recent analyses of national framework. Interviews were conducted with policy practitioners, and engagement with the security implications of climate change, for others contributing to policy formation, in the USA, UK, France, Ger- example, Anselm Vogler (2023a, 2023b) points to a significant majority many, Sweden and New Zealand over the course of 2022 and 2023. In of states acknowledging the potential role of climate change as a na- these interviews, of which there were 31 in total, interview subjects tional security consideration or threat. More specifically, some states (eg were asked to outline what they considered to be the key dimensions of New Zealand) have established targets for the defence sector in terms of their national government’s engagement with climate security, and the emissions reduction within the military itself (MoD NZ, 2018), others drivers of this engagement. These interviews were augmented with (eg France) have outlined commitment to operations associated with the analysis of two forms of government documents- national security effects of climate change like Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster strategies and specific reports on climate security- to assess how the Relief missions (OCD, 2019; Estève, 2023), while others (eg UK, USA) climate-security relationship was understood and approached in these have noted the range of ways in which climate change effects should be national contexts. This extended to an examination of the extent to considered within strategic and defence planning (NIC, 2021; MoD UK, which this relationship was viewed in a manner consistent with the 2021; Depledge, 2023; Sikorsky, 2022). And while some states have contours of ecological security. been reluctant to incorporate climate considerations within national Two broad conclusions relevant to the concerns of this paper can be strategic planning or fully embrace a responsibility to address the se- drawn from this analysis, to be elucidated further below. First, and curity implications of climate change (eg Australia and India), they have consistent with the findings of Hardt et al. (2023), with a few exceptions nonetheless found themselves responding to climate effects such as di- we don’t tend to see an explicit embrace of ecological security nor an sasters or recognising this relationship more broadly (Jayaram, 2023). embrace of the full range of commitments evident in an ecological se- As will be discussed given its particular relevance to this analysis, some curity discourse. Second, however, we do see alignment with key ele- states (eg Sweden and Germany) have even explicitly embraced a ments of such a discourse or at least movements towards it through: a conception of security that moves beyond a national security to an in- focus on the security challenges facing human communities and eco- ternational or ‘globalist’ approach to security (Bunse et al., 2022; MFA systems (not just institutions); an emphasis on (obligations to undertake) Sweden, 2018; FFO Germany, 2023). But what of the prospects in this substantive action oriented towards the rights and needs of the vulner- institutional engagement for ecological security, often viewed as prob- able; and a focus on mitigation as a central (if not primary) response. lematically foreign to the interests and concerns of policy makers and leaders in key institutions of global politics (eg Barnett, 2001)? 5.1. Beyond institutions 5. Institutional engagement with ecological security On security challenges associated with climate change, states have demonstrated a willingness to move beyond a limited ethical imaginary Ecological security has certainly grown in prominence as a frame- tied to the boundaries of the state itself when considering the nature of work through which to view and approach the relationship between the security threat posed and to whom. States such as Germany and climate change and security. This is evident in academic debate, as Sweden, for example, have consistently emphasized the transboundary noted, with a range of accounts employing the term to conceptualise and global nature of the challenge posed when promoting the link be- implications of climate change for security that extend beyond the tween climate change and security. In the case of Germany, Foreign preservation of existing institutions or even human communities (see, Office reports (FFO Germany 2023), interviews with policy practitioners for example, Huang et al., 2020; McDonald, 2021; Pirages and Cousins, (Interview 1 Germany, 2022) and secondary analyses of Germany’s 2005). Indeed in their attempt to categorise national approaches to approach (Von Lucke, 2023) all point to a commitment to human se- climate security among UN Security Council members, Hardt et al. curity that extends beyond the immediate concerns of the German (2023) assess whether pronouncements linking climate and security are nation-state. Indeed one interview subject noted that in actively 5 M. McDonald Geoforum 155 (2024) 104096 promoting the idea of a link between climate change and security, historical ties to former colonies have made policy-makers acutely Germany was motivated by a desire to ‘facilitate and promote interna- aware of the immediate vulnerability to climate change in the case of tional action on climate change and international cooperation on regions such as the Sahel, the Caribbean and again the Pacific (see climate and security’ (Interview 1 Germany, 2022). Kabbej, 2023; Estève, 2023; Charbonneau, 2022). The latter has been a In the Swedish case, a similar concern with the promotion of inter- particular focus of the work of the Defence thinktank, the Observatory national action (rather than more narrowly defined national security on Defence and Climate, which published a 2019 report on the impli- considerations) has been linked to a globalist orientation in its foreign cations of climate change on defence and security in the South Pacific policy and a concern with human or global security (Interviews 1 and 2 (OCD, 2019). Indeed the latter is evidence of a move towards what Hardt Sweden, 2022). Indeed in its 2017 National Security Strategy climate et al. (2023, p.376) describe as the institutionalisation of climate secu- change is defined as ‘a threat to human survival’ (Rhinard et al., rity in France. More broadly, the French government had noted in 2013 2023:10), with one interview subject arguing that concerns with both Arria Formula talks in the UN Security Council that the aim in empha- human and ecological security are evident in Sweden’s engagement with sising the security implications of climate change should be to mobilise climate security (Interview 3 Sweden, 2022). This is supported in sec- action in order ‘to safeguard the planet for future generations’ (in ondary analyses of Sweden’s position, with Hakala (2023:38) arguing Kabbej, 2023). This latter focus on future generations aligns clearly with that ‘Sweden’s focus has been on the most fragile countries and the the commitments of the ecological security discourse, and encourages a human security implications of climate change’. In the case of both central focus on mitigation to strengthen the prospects for ecosystem Germany and Sweden, then, the orientation beyond immediate national resilience and with it the rights and needs of future generations. security considerations links up with the ecological security concern of emphasizing the immediate threat posed to human communities and 5.3. The centrality of mitigation ecosystems. Even in the US, at least under the Obama and Biden Administrations, On mitigation in response to the direct effects of climate change, a the potential human security implications of climate change have been a range of states have explicitly recognized the importance- even primacy- focus. USAID’s 2010 Quadrennial Defence and Diplomacy Review (State of urgent mitigation as a response to the security implications of climate Department, 2010) notes a concern for human security in relation to change. The French Government, for example, outlined a commitment climate change, a commitment also evident in Obama’s, 2010 National to emissions reduction in its 2022 Climate and Defence Strategy (MoA Security Strategy (Obama, 2010). And while some interview subjects France, 2022). As noted, a number of states (Germany and Sweden) not suggest that Biden avoided a human security rhetoric intentionally to only prioritised mitigation action as a means of advancing climate se- avoid alienating sceptical Defence officials (Interview 1 USA, 2022) curity, but actually saw their deployment of the climate security there was nonetheless a significant increase in attention to (and insti- narrative (through the UN Security Council, for example) as a means of tutionalisation of) a broader approach to climate security- beyond na- mobilizing such action internationally (Interview 1 Germany, 2022; tional security- under his Administration (Interview 2 USA, 2022). Interview 1 Sweden, 2022). Clearly, such commitments and statements fall short of wholly Recognition of the importance of mitigation has extended even to the embodying an ecological security discourse, and can be understood as Defence sector of states themselves. Militaries were excluded from moving towards such an approach or at times aligning with this states’ emissions reduction targets under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, framework. But in his recent analysis of the UK’s approach to the se- though this was partly corrected under the 2015 Paris Agreement- curity implications of climate change, Cameron Harrington (2023, p. military emissions were not exempted, though reporting on emissions 315) suggests that in Britain would remain voluntary (see Depledge, 2023, p. 673). Nonetheless a range of militaries throughout the world (eg Germany, France, Sweden) there are signs that an ecological security discourse is emerging that have recognised the importance of reducing their carbon ‘bootprint’ (eg challenges the historic focus on climate change as an accelerator of Söder, 2023), some (eg UK) have developed ambitious targets to reduce traditional security threats, or as a threat to individual well-being in their emissions (eg MoD UK, 2021), while others (eg New Zealand) have vulnerable states of the Global South. been compelled to do so by governments keen to ensure the military The latter clearly aligns to a commitment to the most vulnerable, does its part in the broader national response to climate change (see even recognition of an obligation to act on their behalf. MoD NZ 2021). Still others (eg USA) have at least moved towards reduction with the first step of auditing or accounting for existing 5.2. Action for the most vulnerable emissions (see Vogler, 2024, p. 9). While the (significant and tradi- tionally exempted) contribution of militaries to global emissions re- On the importance of substantive action and practices oriented to- mains a major concern and a focus of academic analysis (Crawford, wards the most vulnerable in pursuit of climate security, a range of 2022; Depledge, 2023; Vogler, 2024, pp. 8-9), movement towards states have emphasised the importance of mitigation, of contributing to emissions reduction suggests recognition of mitigation as a means of adaptative capacity building in the developing world and responding to advancing security. Future operations capacity (in terms of fuel avail- manifestations of climate change experienced by the most vulnerable. ability, for example) no doubt looms large over militaries’ inclination to This applies even to the military, with a range of states outlining a address energy use in the military (see Depledge, 2023), but this commitment to undertake humanitarian assistance and disaster relief emphasis on mitigation action also speaks to increasing recognition of missions to support vulnerable communities affected by climate-related the need to avoid being part of the security threat, and even the need for disasters. For New Zealand, for example, a focus on the immediate the military to retain their broader ‘social licence’ (Interviews 1 and 2 vulnerability of Pacific island states has been central to the framing of NZ, 2023) within those state by doing their part to act on climate climate security and the commitment to undertake HADR missions change. In the process, this also suggests recognition of some degree of (MoD NZ 2018). Indeed one New Zealand Defence Official spoke of the obligation to act arising from the capacity of these institutions to make a importance of attempting to ‘amplify’ Pacific voices regarding the im- substantive difference. mediate and direct security implications of climate change (Interview 2 To reiterate, it is not necessarily the case that the above points to a NZ, 2023). Alongside the need to meet particular emissions targets wholesale embrace of ecological security among these states, nor that imposed by the New Zealand government, this has meant a Defence statements or practices aligning with this discourse are motivated by a force concerned with emissions reduction while focusing on the consistent commitment to ecosystem resilience. But we do see this vulnerability of peoples in the Pacific (MoD NZ 2018). alignment at points, and we can recognise evidence of a movement away This is evident too in the case of France, whose extra-territories and from a narrow focus on the preservation of institutions and towards the 6 M. McDonald Geoforum 155 (2024) 104096 most vulnerable. when this was tabled just two months later (SCR, 2021). These tendencies have also been apparent in (increasingly frequent) That said, three key points are important to note here by way of UN Security Council discussions regarding the security implications of conclusion in reflecting on the institutional prospects for ecological climate change (see Scartozzi, 2022; SCR, 2021). Contributions to the security. September 2021 UNSC debate- in the lead up to the December 2021 First, we see progress towards the embrace of this discourse. We have vote- demonstrate at least some alignment with the commitments of seen a steady move away from the dominance of national security ecological security. In introducing the September 2021 debate, for framings evident in earliest interventions, such as the Pentagon- example, the Secretary-General pointed to the particular harms experi- commissioned report on the (national) security implications of an enced by ‘countries that are among the most vulnerable and least able to abrupt climate change scenario in 2003 (Schwarz and Randall, 2004). adapt to the effects of climate change’ (UNSC, 2021, 2). He further noted And significantly, Defence establishments themselves are increasingly that the first priority in addressing the security implications of climate not only recognising the security implications of climate change, but change was ‘unambiguous and credible actions by all countries to limit also the importance of a reduction in their own contribution to the global warming to 1.5 degrees to avert the most catastrophic impacts of problem through mitigation action (see Depledge, 2023). This all sug- climate change’ (UNSC, 2021, 2). In these statements, the Secretary- gests increasing purchase and resonance for a framework that recognises General emphasised the direct harms caused by climate change, the the immediate and direct threat of climate change to vulnerable com- imperative of mitigation action to minimise these harms, and the need munities and beings. for developed states to act to address the harms experienced by the most Second, and following this, we can also recognise and build upon vulnerable. immanent possibilities for further movement in this direction: resources Many of these commitments were evident too in states’ contributions within the prevailing order that might be drawn or built upon to enable to these debates. The sponsors of the September 2021 debate- Ireland- progressive change (Wyn Jones, 1999). The endorsement of concepts opened the debate noting that it was ‘essential that we act now to pre- like the Anthropocene (see Chandler, Müller and Rothe eds., 2021), vent further warming by reaching net zero emissions as quickly as precaution, and common-but-differentiated responsibility point respec- possible’ (UNSC, 2021, 5). The Vietnamese representative noted tively to the imperatives of challenging the human-nature divide, of ‘degradation of biodiversity’ as a key concern (UNSC, 2021, 6), Niger’s recognising the imperative of action to minimise harms and recognising representative spoke of the need for ‘increased efforts at prevention’ the particular obligations held by those with capacity: all consistent with through mitigation (UNSC, 2021, 9), and the US identified the ‘devas- the precepts of an ecological security discourse. More substantively, the tating and, in some instances, irreversible implications of climate change current trajectory of climate talks (with their endorsement of loss and for our majestic planet’, noting that ‘consequences are falling dispro- damage and movement away from fossil fuels), alongside grassroots portionately on vulnerable and low-income populations’ (UNSC, 2021, activism, also suggest resources upon which momentum for movement 9). France pointed to the need for developed states to act to ‘help our towards ecological security might develop. most vulnerable partners’ (UNSC, 2021, 11), Mexico argued that ‘the Finally, of course we should take care when drawing broad conclu- sustainability of natural resources and the well-being of our peoples are sions about the increasing resonance of ecological security, including in at risk’ (UNSC, 2021, 12), while Tunisia noted that climate change was the policy community. Movements in this direction are far from uni- ‘threatening food and water supply for vulnerable groups’ (UNSC, 2021, versal across states, there is clearly a gap between stated (globalist or 15). The UK suggested that the climate crisis posed an ‘existential threat, ecological) concerns and substantive practice, and incremental change not just to our shared environment but to our common security’ (UNSC, towards such an approach (while constituting ‘progress’) is arguably 2021, 15), and the St Vincent and the Grenadines representative noted inconsistent with the urgency with which the climate crisis should be that ‘the foremost way to avert climate-driven security risks remains addressed. But if ecological security is viewed as both the most morally significant mitigation action’ (UNSC, 2021, 18). Even China, tradition- defensible approach to the security implications of climate change and a ally opposed to the discussion of climate change within the UN Security necessary shift in our thinking in the context of the onset of the Council, noted that ‘climate change has become a real threat to the Anthropocene and climate-induced harm, we cannot allow its limited survival and development of mankind’ (UNSC, 2021, 20). In all of these purchase or partial take-up within existing institutions to determine its ways, elements of the ecological security discourse- orienting beyond prospects (see Lövbrand et al., 2015). Rather, it becomes important to institutional preservation to a focus on minimising direct harms (for recognize and enable movement in this direction, and to further vulnerable communities and ecosystems) caused by climate change − encourage analysts and practitioners alike to examine and address the were evident in state engagement with the climate-security nexus. immediate, direct and existential harm caused by climate change. 6. Conclusion: prospects for ecological security CRediT authorship contribution statement The story is still patchy for Ecological Security as a framework for Matt McDonald: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original approaching the security implications of climate change. Increasing draft, Resources, Project administration, Methodology, Investigation, recognition of the relationship between climate change and security has Funding acquisition, Conceptualization. stopped short, for the most part, of wholly embracing an ecological se- curity discourse. Nation-states have increasingly recognised that climate Declaration of Competing Interest change constitutes a threat to national security, international stability and to human populations, but engagement directly with the effects of The authors declare that they have no known competing financial climate change on the biosphere or ecosystems themselves is relatively interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence limited. Some suggest this points to a more ethereal or marginal role for the work reported in this paper. such concerns. In summarising a range of states’ approach to climate security, for example, Hardt et al. (2023, 312) argue that ‘ecological Data availability security is often… only the first element or domino piece in a chain of argument that at its core tries to secure the wellbeing of humans and No data was used for the research described in the article. sometimes nations’. And while the September 2021 UN Security Council debate saw majority support for recognition of the security implications Acknowledgements of climate change and even elements of the ecological security discourse invoked and endorsed, this did not result in a successful Resolution For their feedback on a previous iteration of this paper I am grateful 7 M. McDonald Geoforum 155 (2024) 104096 to the reviewers, to participants in the Hamburg Climate Security Chandler, D., Reid, J., 2016. The Neoliberal Subject: Resilience, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Rowman and Littlefield, London. workshop in September 2022, and to Rob Cullum and Aly Tkachenko. Chandler, D., Müller, F., Rothe, D. (Eds.), 2021. International Relations in the Funding for this research was provided through the Australian Research Anthropocene. Springer, Berlin. Council (DP190100709), and I am grateful for that support. Charbonneau, B., 2022. The climate of counterinsurgency and the future of security in the Sahel. 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