NUCE 304: Evaluative Methods for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Security Lecture 9 (PDF)

NUCE 304: Evaluative Methods for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Security Nuclear Materials Control, History and Policy Dr. Ahmed Alkaabi 1  Nuclear Materials Control, History, and Policy Learning Objectives: Understand the impact of WMD....

NUCE 304: Evaluative Methods for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Security Nuclear Materials Control, History and Policy Dr. Ahmed Alkaabi 1  Nuclear Materials Control, History, and Policy Learning Objectives: Understand the impact of WMD. Understand the history of nonproliferation efforts and the international organizations that participate in these efforts. Understand how new challenges are transforming global nonproliferation efforts. 2  Different Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction Explosive device caused by nuclear fission or nuclear fusion (2 basic types) Nuclear Nuclear Fission = Atomic/Atom Bombs (A-bombs) Weapons Nuclear Fusion = Hydrogen Bombs (H-bombs) or Thermonuclear Weapons Examples: Little Boy and Fat Man (as pictured) Naturally-occurring and can survive on their own Dual-use Biological Self-replicating Weapons Can be difficult to detect Present in many types of facilities Examples: Smallpox, Anthrax, Yellow Fever Not regenerating Appear in gas, liquid, or solid form Chemical Lethal and non-lethal versions: can blister, choke, and affect the nerves or Weapons blood Examples: Nerve Agents, Mustard Agents, Hydrogen Cyanide, Tear Gases 3  Weapons of Mass Destruction and Nonproliferation Goals Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Limit spread of weapons ⚫ Non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) commit not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons and to verify this commitment Nuclear ⚫ Nuclear weapon states (NWS) agree not to assist NNWS in obtaining nuclear weapons Weapons ⚫ All countries agree not to export nuclear equipment or material to NNWS except under safeguards ⚫ All countries agree to facilitate exchange of peaceful nuclear technology ⚫ All countries agree to work towards future nuclear disarmament Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) Ban class of weapons Biological ⚫ Bans development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or transfer of biological Weapons agents or toxins in quantities that have no justifiable peaceful purpose. ⚫ Bans weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents for hostile purposes Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Ban class of weapons Chemical ⚫ Bans development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or transfer of Weapons chemical weapons ⚫ Requires verified destruction of all chemical weapons and production facilities 4  Nuclear Weapon Status of Countries Five NPT Nuclear Weapon States – United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia and China Non-Nuclear Weapon States (partial list) – Japan, Iran, Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Republic of Korea, Brazil, Argentina, Indonesia, Germany, Sweden, South Africa, United States Signing of the NPT - 1968 Vietnam, Turkey, Italy, ……… Non-NPT Member States with Declared Nuclear Weapons Programs – India, Pakistan, North Korea There are some non-NPT and NPT members suspected of having or developing nuclear weapons 5  What Motivates the Nonproliferation Community? WMD are inherently worse than conventional Moral Imperative weapons. Therefore, preventing their spread and eliminating those which exist is of highest priority. By preventing the spread of nuclear weapons we Preserve Status-Quo maintain the status-quo international order, in which only 5 countries legitimately possess nuclear weapons. The world is more secure (not just for the status- International Security and quo powers, but for all) if all WMD are limited or Disarmament even eliminated. Can you think of other motivations? 6  Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime Non-state actors seek nuclear material and expertise. Wider availability of sensitive nuclear technology, material and expertise. More potential de-facto nuclear weapon states in the future. Growing number of NWS outside the NPT. Dissatisfaction with the NPT. Increasing world-wide demand for nuclear energy. 7  What’s the Problem? What’s the Solution? Goal: Reduce the risk that states can acquire the capabilities to develop nuclear weapons; Maintain a separation between peaceful and non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy – Reduce the risk that states might believe that their neighbors were acquiring the capabilities to develop nuclear weapons Elements of a nuclear weapons capability – Material – Technology Restricting the dispersion of – Expertise sensitive materials and – Motivation technologies can limit Solutions opportunities and reduce – Restrict access to key elements misperceptions – Monitor the use of key elements – Reduce the motivation 8  Relationship of Nonproliferation to Broader International Security Issues Security Issues Relation to Nonproliferation - Nuclear weapons are not relevant to all aspects - Israel/PA conflict of Middle East security Middle East - Terrorism - Nuclear weapons change balance of power and - Iran’s role in region increase danger - Insecurity drives proliferation - Nuclear weapons raise the stakes South Asia - Conflict over Kashmir - Nuclear weapons change the strategic outlook: - Terrorism minor events could lead to major consequences - Nuclear weapons are DPRK’s major liability - DPRK political and economic internationally East Asia instability - DPRK weapons exports related to economic - Conventional conflict across DMZ problems - Conflict involving China - Potential for additional proliferation if US - Regional tensions (e.g., energy extended deterrence weakens supplies; historical distrust) 9  Different Strategies for Dealing with Proliferation Stages in Proliferation Motivation Development Achievement Retirement Reduce Demand Control Supply Respond to Threat Dismantle Weapons - Security assurances - export control - diplomacy - arms control / - arms control regimes - offensive military and transparency - regional security - IAEA safeguards covert activities - international verification - penalties for violating - protection of - emergency response - safe, secure material norms weapons and tech - threat assessment / disposition - minimize utility of - limit production of detection - environmental WMD weapons material restoration Strategies to prevent, rollback, or mitigate consequences of proliferation 10  Examples Illustrate Concerns Pakistan – Used black market network to clandestinely purchase uranium enrichment capabilities. Iran – Used black market network to clandestinely purchase uranium enrichment capabilities. – Seeks to retain enrichment capabilities, which are not prohibited by the NPT. North Korea – Separated plutonium at declared facilities (detected by IAEA). – Used black market network to clandestinely purchase uranium enrichment capabilities. – Withdrew from NPT and Agreed Framework without relinquishing material or capabilities. – Has now tested nuclear weapons. Notice: Similar methods used to acquire illicit materials! 11  Should “reducing demand” take more precedence as a strategy against proliferation? Resolve regional security concerns Territorial disputes Natural resources Legitimate concerns of sub-state actors Enhance partnerships with countries in vulnerable regions – Build capacity to design and implement cooperative agreements – Seek to integrate into international community Reward countries that set good examples – Increase international prestige – Economic incentives What about the “hard” cases? Iran and North Korea? – Diplomatic, military, other options? Should nonproliferation be an implicit (rather than explicit) goal? 12  History of Nuclear Nonproliferation Efforts 13  Scientific Origin of Nuclear Power 1938: Discovery of sustained nuclear fission Dr. Oppenheimer – Splitting of the atom and a nuclear chain reaction 1942: Chicago Pile-1 (CP1) Oppenheimer – World’s first artificial nuclear reactor 1942-1946: Manhattan Project – Project to develop the first atomic bombs Szilard and Einstein during WWII – Extremely fast time-frame! Y-12 Plant D-Reactor at Hanford Einstein and Szilard 14  Policy Origins to Control Nuclear Power “Three Nation Agreed Declaration on Atomic Energy” (November 1945) - US, UK and Canada Atomic weapons are a type of weapon “in the employment of which no single nation can in fact have a monopoly” Willing “to proceed with the exchange of fundamental scientific literature for peaceful ends with any nation that will fully reciprocate” But, limit information about atomic energy until safeguards against improper use developed Proposes international control US., UK and Soviet Union propose a United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) - 27 December 1945 15  Preventing Misuse: International Control of Technology, Facilities, and Activities Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy (Acheson-Lilienthal Report - March 1946) “...no prospect of security...in a system of international agreements... controlled only by a system which relies on inspection and similar police-like methods.” An effective safeguards system must look to “the promise of man’s future well-being as well as to his security” Proposed an international agency to conduct all “intrinsically dangerous operations in the nuclear field” Dangerous activities should be carried out by an international authority – Safe activities should be left to states – Authority must also have a development function Dangerous: – Mining and refining of uranium and thorium Dean Acheson – Uranium enrichment and David Lilienthal – Production and separation of plutonium – R&D in atomic explosives 16  Preventing Misuse: International Control The Baruch Plan (June 1946) Bernard Baruch appointed to United Nations Atomic Energy Commission by President Truman Proposes the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority to control “all phases of the development and use of atomic energy, starting with the raw material and including: ▪ All potentially dangerous atomic energy activities ▪ Control and inspection of all other atomic activities ▪ Promoting the beneficial uses of atomic energy ▪ Research and development to put the Authority “in the forefront of atomic knowledge and thus to enable it to comprehend, and therefore to detect, misuse of atomic energy.” ▪ The US proposed turning over all of its weapons if others would agree not to produce them. Soviet Union rejected the plan Argued UN was dominated by U.S. and could not be trusted Also attacked on economic grounds 17  Preventing Misuse: Rules and Verification Atoms for Peace (1953) Video: Speech by US President Eisenhower to the UN General Assembly 18  Preventing Misuse: Rules and Verification The NPT (1968) and Safeguards NPT – Three Pillars Nuclear Nonproliferation Disarmament Peaceful Uses Safeguards – All non-nuclear weapons state (NNWS) parties must conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) with the IAEA NNWS insisted that safeguards obligations not infringe on NPT Article IV “inalienable right... to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” Minimize intrusion and protect commercial interests – Focus on nuclear material 19  What could possibly go wrong? 20  Smiling Buddha India’s “Peaceful Nuclear Explosion” (May 18, 1974) Did the regime fail? “The Pokhran test was a bomb, I What effect did responses have? can tell you now… An explosion is an explosion, a gun is a gun, whether you shoot at someone or shoot at the ground… I just want to make clear that the test was not all that peaceful.” Raj Ramanna Former Director of India’s Nuclear Program Pokhran October 1997 Responses Indira Gandhi Establishment of the Nuclear Suppliers Group 1975 NPT Review Conference: “regional or multilateral nuclear fuel cycle centres may be an advantageous way to satisfy, safely and economically, the needs of many States, while, at the same time facilitating protection and the application of safeguards.” 21  Arms Control 22  Arms Control – The Beginning Arms Control = restrictions upon the development, production, stockpiling, proliferation and usage of weapons History: Evidence indicates Arms Control agreements go back centuries – this is not a new concept! – First recorded attempt at Arms Control made by the Amphictyonic Leagues in ancient Greece around the 7th Century BC Association of several tribes in Greece – clarified the rules of war Breaking of the rules would be met with fines or war – Rise of Roman Catholic Church – attempted to limit the means of warfare Second Lateran Council (year 1139): prohibited the use of crossbows against other Christians – though it did not prevent their use against non-Christians – Strasbourg Agreement (year 1675): France and The Holy Roman Empire First international agreement limiting the use of chemical weapons (i.e. poison bullets) – Rush-Bagot Treaty (year 1817): United States and the United Kingdom First Arms Control treaty of the modern industrial era Called for the demilitarization of the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain region of North America 23  Primary Nuclear Arms Control Treaties Modern Times Bilateral → Regional → Global Bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I, START II) Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) Regional Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I)* Global Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Not in Force Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) Not Negotiated 24  Arms Control Treaties - Bilateral Brief Synopsis Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) – 1969 SALT II and ABM – replaced Includes the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty by Designed to limit missile deployments START I States limited to only two ABM sites Limited by continual refusal by Soviets to accept on-site verification Verification limited to national technical means (NTM) SALT II signed in 1979 – never implemented Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty – 1987 First time Soviets agreed to on-site inspections 20 per year for each side Called for complete elimination of all US and Soviet- deployed missile systems with a range of 300 to 3400 miles (500 to 5500 km) 3 year elimination period Entered into force in 1988 – by 1991, all treaty-prohibited forces had been eliminated or accounted for First major accomplishment signaling the end of the 25 Cold War  Arms Control Treaties - Bilateral/Regional In Depth Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) July 1991 Proposed by US President Reagan in 1982 Goal = major reductions in nuclear deployments and adequate on-site verification Carried out in three phases over seven years Central limits include: 1,600 Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs) 6,000 accountable warheads 4,900 ballistic missile warheads 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) for the Soviet side START establishes prohibitions on locations, training, testing and modernization 26  Arms Control Treaties - Bilateral/Regional In Depth Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) - Five months after it was signed, the Soviet Union collapsed - Now four independent states contained strategic nuclear weapons in their territories Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine Bush and Gorbachev sign START I – July 1991 Became parties to START as legal successors to the Soviet Union - By September 1991, both sides began eliminating their intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and launchers, and heavy bombers well in advance of START's anticipated entry of force date - The breakup of the Soviet Union delayed START's entry into force nearly three-and-a-half years until Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine ratified START and joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapons states 27  Arms Control Treaties - Bilateral/Regional In Depth Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) In December 1994, the parties exchanged instruments of ratification at the Budapest summit START I was to have a 15-year duration and could be extended for successive five-year periods by agreement among the Parties All nuclear warheads have been removed from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine also have eliminated all their strategic offensive arms. On 5 December 2001, the United States and Russian Federation successfully reached the START I levels of 6,000 deployed warheads START 1 expired on December 5, 2009 28  Arms Control Treaties - Bilateral In Depth Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) January 1993 File:George H. W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin 1993.jpg START II, when implemented, will eliminate heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMS) and all other multiple- warhead (MIRVed) ICBMS It will also reduce the total number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by both countries, by two-thirds below pre- Presidents Bush and Yeltsin sign START II START levels By the end of the first phase, each side must have reduced its total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to no more than 3,500 (down from 6,000 in START I) 29  Arms Control Treaties - Bilateral In Depth Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) By the end of the second and final phase, each side reduce its total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,000-3,500. – Of those, none may be on MIRVed ICBMS, including heavy ICBMS; only ICBMs carrying a single-warhead will be allowed. No more than 1,700-1,750 deployed warheads may be on SLBMS, which may be MIRVed. The September 26, 1997 Protocol on Early Deactivation extends the date by which the START II limitations and reductions must be completed from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2007. – It also extends the date by which the interim limitations must be carried out from seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty (December 5, 2001) to December 31, 2004. Never entered into force npro Bypassed by SORT 30  Arms Control Treaties - Bilateral In Depth File:Bush and Putin signing SORT.jpg Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) Also known as Moscow Treaty Signed May 24, 2002, between the US (President G.W. Bush) and the Russian Federation (Vladimir V. Putin) – On a path of new relationship Presidents Putin and Bush sign SORT Treaty between the United States and Russia. Entry into force on June 1, 2003 By December 31, 2012 the aggregate number of such warheads does not exceed 1700-2200 for each Party. 31  Arms Control Treaties - Bilateral In Depth Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) 5 Articles Article IV: – Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. – Treaty shall remain in force until December 31, 2012 and may be extended by agreement of the Parties or superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement. – Each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, may withdraw from this Treaty upon three months written notice to the other Party. 32  Arms Control Treaties - Bilateral In Depth New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) Replace SORT treaty which was scheduled to expire in December 2012. Number of strategic launchers cut by half Limits deployed strategic warheads to 1550 Satellite and remote monitoring as Presidents Obama and Medvedev well as 18 on-site inspections Signed treaty in Prague annually to verify limits. Signed April 8, 2010 Entry into force on February 5, 2011 Valid for 10 years 33  Arms Control Treaties - Global Brief Synopsis Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) – 1963 Bans all nuclear testing in the atmosphere and space, but allows underground testing Eliminated the threat of worldwide fallout from nuclear testing Showed for the first time that the US and Russia could reach nuclear weapons agreement Set the stage for the NPT Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) – 1968 States that exploded nuclear weapons before 1967 were designated as nuclear weapons states (NWS) – all others are non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) Provisions: – NWS may not transfer nuclear weapons to NNWS, or help NNWS acquire nuclear weapons – NNWS may not manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons and must accept IAEA safeguards 34  Arms Control Treaties - Global In Depth Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Not yet in force Officially called the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Organization (CTBTO) Article I - Basic obligations – Not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control. – Furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. Member States 183 Treaty Status as of Total Ratifications 159 February 2013 Annex 2 Ratifications 36 Latest State Signatory Niue Latest Ratifying State Chad 35  Arms Control Treaties - Global In Depth http://www.ctbto.org/typo3temp/pics/b073ab1574.gif Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Article II - The Organization – A. General provisions – B. The Conference of the States Parties Composition, Procedures and Decision-making Powers and Functions – C. The Executive Council Composition, Procedures and Decision-making Powers and Functions – D. The Technical Secretariat – E. Privileges and immunities 36  Arms Control Treaties - Global In Depth Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) The International Monitoring System – Seismological Monitoring – Radionuclide Monitoring – Hydro-acoustic Monitoring – Infrasound Monitoring International Data Center On-Site Inspections 37  Arms Control Treaties - Global Brief Synopsis Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) Not yet negotiated. Would ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices Would not apply to plutonium and HEU for non-explosive purposes Would not apply to non-fissile materials, like tritium Would not address existing stockpiles. 38  International Organizations 39  United Nations Headquartered in New York, USA Established in 1945 192 Member States Around 44,000 staff members $5.048 billion budget for 2010-2011 16 Peacekeeping Operations (not UN Headquarters included in budget) Main Nonproliferation Treaties Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) – not yet in force Preamble “To unite our strength to maintain international peace and security” 40  United Nations Organization Structure 41  United Nations – Mission Statements “To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace” “To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace” “To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion” “To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends” 42  United Nations Charter CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION Mandatory Articles 39 - 51 Article 39: The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. Article 43: All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Article 48: The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine. 43  United Nations 6 Principle Organs 1. General Assembly Disarmament and International Security Committee; Economic and Financial Committee; Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee; Special Political and Decolonization Committee; Administrative and Budgetary Committee; Legal Committee 2. Security Council Five Permanent Members – China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States Non-Permanent Members (2-year terms) – Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Gabon, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Nigeria, Turkey, Uganda (as of December 2011) 3. Economic and Social Council 4. Trusteeship Council 5. International Court of Justice 6. Secretariat 44  United Nations Related Agencies & Organizations Food and Agriculture World Bank Group Organization of the United Nations World Health Organization International Civil Aviation World Intellectual Property Organization Organization International Fund for Agriculture Development World Meteorological International Labour Organization Organization World Tourism Organization International Maritime Organization International Atomic Energy International Monetary Fund Agency (IAEA) International Telecommunication Preparatory Commission for the Union Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (CTBTO) Organization Organization for the Prohibition United Nations Industrial of Chemical Weapons Development Organization Universal Postal Union World Trade Organization 45  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Originally called the “Atoms for Peace” Organization (1957) Headquartered in Vienna, Austria Regional Offices: Geneva, Switzerland; New York, USA; Toronto, Canada; Tokyo, Japan International Laboratories: Seibersorf and Monaco IAEA Headquarters 151 Member States 2,300 Staff Members from 90 countries $418.3 million regular budget in 2010 Target for voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund = $85 million Objective “To accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world.” 46  IAEA Organization Structure 47  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Organization Structure 48  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mission Statements “Is an independent intergovernmental, science and technology- based organization, in the United Nations family, that serves as the global focal point for nuclear cooperation” “Assists its Member States, in the context of social and economic goals, in planning for and using nuclear sciences and technology for various peaceful purposes, including the generation of electricity, and facilitates the transfer of such technology and knowledge in a sustainable manner to developing Member States” “Develops nuclear safety safeguards and, based on these standards, promotes the achievement and maintenance of high levels of safety in applications of nuclear energy, as well as the protection of human health and the environment against ionizing radiation” “Verifies through its inspection system that States comply with their commitments, under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other non- proliferation agreements, to use nuclear material and facilitates only for peaceful purposes” 49  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Pillars of Nuclear Cooperation 1. Safeguards and Verification IAEA Inspectors verify that nuclear material and activities are not used for military purposes IAEA has four decades of verification experience 2. Safety and Security Assists Member States in ensuring nuclear safety and security, in line with international conventions, standards and expert guidance Assists Member States to respond to radiological emergencies 3. Science and Technology Assists Member States in implementing peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology Focus on: Energy, Environment, Health, and Agriculture 50  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors – Oversees Agency operations – Meets five times per year (more if necessary) – Makes budget recommendations 35 Board Member States (2010-2011)(2011-2012): Argentina, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, Niger, Pakistan, Peru, Portugal, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Tunisia, Tanzania, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela. Designated and elected by the General Conference 51  Implementing Nonproliferation One Element: The US Government and National Laboratories U.S. Government Department Department Department Other of State of Energy of Defense Agencies National Nuclear Other DOE Security Administration Offices Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore Other DOE Labs National Laboratories Other NNSA Labs What are examples of other organizations contributing to nonproliferation implementation? 52  Implementing Nonproliferation Example of Specific Goals for the National Nuclear Security Administration Reduce weapons stockpiles, materials and infrastructure Secure WMD materials, technology and expertise Detect and/or prevent undeclared weapons development, acquisition programs, or use of nuclear weapons by rogue states or terrorists Strengthen commitment to nonproliferation norms Secure and/or dispose of high-risk nuclear materials and equipment Reduce the proliferation risk of the global expansion of nuclear energy How do these map into the strategies? “reduce demand, control supply, respond to threat, and dismantle weapons” 53  Primary Nonproliferation Efforts 54  Nonproliferation Efforts EXBS and INECP UNSCR 1540 55  Treaties: General Observations International legal framework Assumption: sovereign nation states Process: Negotiation → Signature → Ratification → Entry into Force Living with it: Monitor → Verify → Adapt → Amend → Events (anomalies) Events Chicken & egg situation: – Codify existing consensus – Attempt to effect change Value? 56  Types of “Proliferation” Greater Increased Do the international treaties and numbers of sophistication weapons conventions address both? Vertical Proliferation of weapons Indigenous Development of Weapons State possessing Horizontal Proliferation State(s) without Weapons Weapons materials, know-how, other assistance 57  Creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” proposal in 1953 at UN led to creation of International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA; – IAEA’s mandate: Not about searching for weapons, but to support non-weapon states to acquire nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; – NPT is really “TOTNPONW= Treaty On The Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons” – NPT’s Three Major Pillars: – Peaceful uses of nuclear technology – Nonproliferation Earl History: NW Acquisition – Disarmament World War II: U.S. use of nuclear weapons (1945) Pre-NPT Acquisitions: Russia (1949), UK (1952), France (1960), China (1964) What were President International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Eisenhower’s motivations 1963: Limited Test Ban Treaty 1968: NPT opens for signature for making the “Atom for Entry Into Force (EIF): March 5, 1970 Peace” proposal? 58  Provisions of NPT Article I: NWS obligations – do not transfer nuclear weapons to NNWS – do not “in any way assist, encourage, or induce…” a NNWS to “manufacture or otherwise acquire” Article II: NNWS obligation – not to receive the transfer of… – not to manufacture or otherwise acquire… – not to seek or receive assistance… NWS: Nuclear-Weapon States NNWS: Non Nuclear-Weapon States 59  Provisions of NPT Article III: Safeguards – the stick: NNWS obligation to accept verification – codified separately in a Safeguards Agreement – Prohibits transfer of nuclear technology to states without a comprehensive safeguards agreement Article IV: Peaceful Nuclear Technology – the carrot: NNWS reward for accepting safeguards 60  Provisions of NPT Article V: Non-Discrimination for Potential Peaceful Use – Potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty Article VI: Disarmament – all states parties to “pursue negotiations in good faith” 61  Provisions of NPT Article VII: Nuclear-Weapon Free Zones –.. the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. Article VIII: Amendments and Review / Cons – treaty may be amended – Review Conferences every five years Article IX: Signature, Ratification, EIF (Entry Into Force), Depositary Governments – definition of “nuclear weapon state” 62  Provisions of NPT Article X: Withdrawal; Indefinite Extension – States ….have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides … – … shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance.. Article XI: Language & Archives – English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese 63  NPT: General Observations Premise: Proliferation is bad Signed 1 July 1968 – World is safer if fewer states have Location New York, USA NW – Freeze and possibly reverse this Effective 5 March 1970 development Condition Ratification by the UK, the Preserved the “Atoms for Peace” vision US, and 40 other signatory states of nuclear development for peaceful use Created a “discriminatory” treaty regime Parties 190 – Nuclear weapon states (NWS) parties – Non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) As of January 2015 – But also a third group: “SON”- States Outside the NPT (3) NPT: nonproliferation vs. disarmament? 64  NPT: Issues and Status Security Assurances for NNWS (negative and positive) 1995: indefinite extension of NPT - Middle East resolution - Strengthened review process Currently 189 states parties + Taiwan – Five NWS: US, UK, France, Russia, China – Not party to the NPT: India, Israel, Pakistan – Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced its withdrawal in Jan 2003 Despite enormous challenges to the NPT regime, it has thus far been a great success. Do you agree? 65  Safeguards Overview IAEA Safeguards = set of technical measures by which the IAEA Secretariat independently verifies the correctness and the completeness of the declarations made by States about their nuclear material and activities. Traditional Measures (“traditional safeguards”) – Verification activities performed at facilities where States have declared the presence of nuclear material subject to safeguards Strengthening Measures (since 1992) – Model Additional Protocol Integrated Measures (since 1998) – Combination of all safeguards measures available to the IAEA IAEA currently has safeguards agreements with more than 170 States (as of August 2011) 66  Safeguards Role of Safeguards: 1. Confidence-Building Measure 2. Early Warning Mechanism 3. Trigger (allows response by international community if and when the need arises) Verification Measures: 1. Inspections: Ad-hoc Inspections, Routine Inspections, Special Inspections, Safeguards Visits Environmental monitoring by IAEA 2. Ongoing Monitoring and Evaluation IAEA Safeguards provides credible assurances to the international community that nuclear material is being used for peaceful purposes only. 67  Safeguards Agreements Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) – Applies safeguards on all nuclear material in all nuclear activities in a State – “The scope of a CSA is not limited to nuclear material actually declared by a State, but includes any nuclear material that should have been declared to the IAEA.” – Pursuant to the NPT: NNWS are required to conclude a CSA with the IAEA within 18 months of joining the NPT Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) – Designed for states with little or no nuclear materials (originally allowed states to possess small amounts of nuclear material without having to report it States can develop nuclear programs with small amounts of nuclear material – constitutes a weakness in the safeguards system Voluntary Offer Agreement (VOA) – Between the IAEA and a nuclear weapon State which, per the NPT, is not required to accept safeguards but which has offered to do so, voluntarily – VOA Agreements in place with the five NWS, defined by the NPT 68  Additional Protocol (AP) INFCIRC/540 Additional Protocol: “Protocol Additional To The Agreement (s) Between State(s) And The International Atomic Energy Agency For The Application of Safeguards” Not an addition to NPT, but an addition to Safeguards – verification of State’s declared and un-declared material and facilities IAEA granted expanded rights of access to information and sites Re-states NWS “obligation” to contribute to nonproliferation objectives States with Additional Protocols Overall Signed In Force 147 + Euratom, Taiwan 145 124 + Taiwan and and Greenland Greenland As of January 2014 69  Additional Protocol Some facts… Additional Protocol – To Safeguards: Created in 1997: After the discovery of clandestine nuclear weapons programs in Iraq and North Korea during the 1990’s This exposed big weaknesses in existing safeguards IAEA started the AP process in 1993 to better constrain NPT member-states’ abilities to illicitly pursue nuclear weapons Was originally called “93+2” because it was initiated in 1993 and was supposed to be done in two years – took much longer! 18 Articles, 2 Annexes, 64 pages “The essence of the Additional Protocol is to reshape the IAEA’s safeguards regime from a quantitative system focused on accounting for known quantities of materials and monitoring declared activities to a qualitative system aimed at gathering a comprehensive picture of a state’s nuclear and nuclear-related activities, including all nuclear-related imports and exports.” 70  Additional Protocol Some facts… State provision of information about, and IAEA inspector access to, all parts of a State’s nuclear fuel cycle – including uranium mines, fuel fabrication and enrichment plants, and nuclear waste sites – as well as to any other location where nuclear material is or may be present. Short-notice inspector access to all buildings on a nuclear site. State provision of information about, and IAEA verification mechanisms for, its research and development activities related to its nuclear fuel cycle. State provision of information on the manufacture and export of sensitive nuclear-related technologies, and IAEA verification mechanisms for manufacturing and import locations in the State. Collection of environmental samples beyond declared location. 71  Secondary Nonproliferation Efforts UNSCR 1540, PSI, and Export Controls 72  UNSCR 1540: Criminalizing WMD Proliferation Problem – Discovery of A.Q. Khan network revealed serious gaps in the WMD nonproliferation regime – Lack of enforcement 73  UNSCR 1540: Criminalizing WMD Proliferation Video: Nuclear Secrets, The Terror Trader 74  UNSCR 1540: Process US-led initiative Rooted in Security Council statement: “the proliferation of all WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security” Precedence includes UNSCR 1373 to require all member states to prevent and suppress terrorist acts and financing Invokes Chapter VII of the UN Charter (mandatory character) Lengthy consultative process lasted over a year, yet many believe the negotiation process was fast tracked, keeping input from non-council members limited UN Security Council voting for and adopting Resolution 1540 75  UNSCR 1540: Approach Passed in April 2004 It requires all UN member states to enact and enforce effective measures on the material control and accounting, physical protection, export, border security, and transshipment of CBRN materials and their means of delivery. It specifically address the prevention of CBRN proliferation among non-state actors Requires each member state to enact legislation for criminal penalties of violations By October 2004, all member states were to have submitted country status reports on their legislative and regulatory infrastructure that related to the resolution 76  UNSCR 1540: Approach Operative Paragraph 1 (OP1): prohibits states to provide “any form of support to non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, transfer or use of CBRN weapons and their means of delivery” Operative Paragraph 2 (OP2): requires states to adopt and enforce appropriate and effective laws to prohibit activities under their national legislation Several other Operative Paragraphs (OP) 77  UNSCR 1540: Implementation Established 1540 Committee in accordance with OP4 of the resolution. It has a two-year mandate (which is likely to be extended) By October 2004, all member states were to have submitted country status reports on their legislative and regulatory infrastructure that related to the resolution Only 50 states met this deadline 1540 Committee reviews country status reports and provides feedback or requests for additional information 155 of 191 reports have been submitted (as of July 2008) 78  UNSCR 1540: Implementation Quantitative Analysis: – 27 measures had been taken on 17 relevant provisions of the resolution – 50 measures in planning phases – Largest number of measures related to OP2 – 10 states indicated planning was underway to implement OP3a (accounting and security measures) – Compliance varies in regard to different provisions (only 63% addressed OP8d – informing the public and industry of NP obligations and laws) – Reports ranged from extensive to minimal (e.g. Yemen’s was five lines: “we don’t have any WMD …”) 79  UNSCR 1540: Evaluation Issues with resolution’s language and definitions Delays in reporting and/or quality of compliance (e.g. what is a non-state actor?) A number of states reported under OP8 ratifying the IAEA Additional Protocol, strengthening CWC obligations and implementing other multilateral regimes Timeline not adequate for adopting national legislation Concerns with the UN interfering in national issues by mandating specific legislation Lack of disarmament provisions 80  UNSCR 1540: Questions Are states in compliance? If not, what steps can be taken to achieve compliance? Has 1540 made a significant contribution to preventing WMD terrorism? What is unique about 1540? Is it possible to implement 1540? Are states forced to alter their constitutions? What are the roles of regional and international institutions? What is the relationship of UNSCR 1540 to treaty regimes (NPT, CWC, etc.)? Is it complimentary or contradictory? Enforcement measures? Who and how? Trigger levels? 81  Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Problem – Need to strengthen interdiction efforts – Need for a more dynamic, active approach to the global WMD proliferation – “The initiative seeks to coordinate governmental nonproliferation activities around the world in the face of advanced communications technologies and expanding global trade that have facilitated the smuggling of WMD.” – Prompted by incidents such as: “On December 10, 2002, acting on a tip from U.S. intelligence, a Spanish warship on patrol in the Indian Ocean as part of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan stopped the So San, a North Korea cargo ship en route to Yemen. In the ship’s hold, hidden amid 40,000 bags of cement, inspectors found fifteen scud missiles armed with conventional warheads. Though dangerous, the cargo was not illegal, and Spain lacked the legal authority to seize the weapons. The following day the Spanish allowed the So San to continue its voyage.” Council on Foreign Relations 82  Proliferation Security Initiative Process Stop shipments of CBRN weapons, materials, and related goods Announced May 31, 2003 by President Bush Developed primarily by Under-Secretary of State, John Bolton Participants: 98 countries (as of September 2010) Participants Commit to: 1. Interdict transfers to and from states and non- state actors of proliferation concern to the extent of their capabilities and legal authorities; 2. Develop procedures to facilitate exchange of information with other countries; 3. Strengthen national legal authorities to facilitate interdiction; EXPORT CHALLENGE — Container ships are a 4. Take specific actions in support of interdiction challenge to export control enforcement. The largest ships can carry 8,000 containers, each efforts. 40 feet long. 83  Proliferation Security Initiative Approach US and allies search planes and ships suspected of carrying illegal weapons and associated technologies (how is this done within the international law on high seas?) Calls on participants not to engage in WMD related trade with proliferation-concerned countries and/or entities (who defines those?) Share information regarding vessels that are “reasonably suspected” of carrying WMD or WMD related technologies (what is reasonable?) The PSI builds on existing international law: It cannot empower states to do anything they could not do before It encourages member states to utilize each country’s existing mechanisms to their full potential (i.e. stopping ships without a national flag or proper registration) Bilateral agreements to expedite ship-boarding 84  Proliferation Security Initiative Implementation There have been several successful interdictions since the PSI was created: – July 2003: Spanish forces seized a South Korean ship headed to Senegal carrying arms and rifles, most likely destined for a third party (e.g. Ivory Coast) – August 2003: 158 barrels of phosphorous pentasulfide are seized from a North Korean ship in Taiwan (CAT I precursor chemical) – September 2003: German and Italian governments, warned by intelligence from the US and UK, diverted a German-owned ship (“BBC China”) on its way to Libya and seized parts for making gas centrifuges – February 2005: A European government was tipped off that one of its national entities was going to ship coolers to Iran that could be used in their heavy-water reactor program. The European government investigated this claim and denied the export license. – February 2007: Unnamed sources alerted port Authorities to a shipment destined for Syria of U.S – origin equipment that could be used for ballistic missile purposes. After the inspection, the shipment was seized and returned to the US. 85  Proliferation Security Initiative Evaluation There are multiple examples of successful interdictions But has this slowed progress on the part of proliferators? Countries of concern are unlikely to accord stop-and-search powers to other states Need new international laws, expand UNSC conventions Calls on US to lead by example Secrecy of most interdictions hint that items found may be inconclusive Lack of clear definitions and authority China to has kept its distance, citing concerns about the legality of interdictions Real reasons? PSI participants have downplayed “membership” calling the Initiative an activity and not an organization “Assessing the PSI’s results has been difficult. Governments have been reticent to discuss specific interdictions publicly, claiming that to do so might imperil future operations by exposing intelligence sources and methods relied on to get useful information.” Arms Control Association 86  U.S. Department of State Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program Problem The proliferation threat is more diverse and unpredictable than ever Terrorist organizations are actively pursuing weapons of mass destruction Countries of concern continue to pursue WMD and missile programs They also have become “secondary proliferators,” providing assistance to other countries and to terrorist organizations EXBS is designed to help prevent proliferation of: Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) WMD missile delivery systems Conventional weapons, and related items 87  U.S. Department of State EXBS Approach Prevent unauthorized transfers of materials or technology used in development or production of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and their missile delivery systems. Impede or deny proliferators’ and terrorists’ access to key material, equipment or technology for use in their WMD, and related items, and prevent the misuse and diversion of these goods that pass through a country’s territory, even in transit. Enhance legitimate trade by building confidence between countries that enact strong controls over the transfer of sensitive goods. 88  U.S. Department of State EXBS Program - Implementation EXBS Program is active in over 30 countries The program’s original focus was on the WMD “source countries” in the Former Soviet Union - but has broadened to include: Nearby states on potential smuggling routes in Eastern Europe and Central Asia and the Caucasus Countries and territories with major transshipment hubs in the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Southeast Asia The EXBS Program works bilaterally and multilaterally to improve export control capabilities in the following areas: Comprehensive legal/regulatory frameworks Effective licensing and procedures and practices Effective enforcement techniques and capabilities Government outreach to industry Interagency coordination and cooperation 89  International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP) U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration AREAS OF ENGAGEMENT MISSION Strengthen global Proliferation Risk Analysis in the Licensing Process efforts to prevent Ensure the license review process competently assesses proliferation of WMD proliferation risks associated with end-uses and end- users, and ensure technical specialists are being utilized -related materials, equipment, and Government Outreach and Enterprise Compliance technology Assist governments to establish outreach programs and promote enterprise compliance at key enterprises and technology holders WMD-related Commodity Identification Training and reach-back for Customs Ensure enforcement personnel are sensitized to WMD- related materials and equipment, and have access to technical/analytical resources and support 90  3 Pillars of INECP Activity U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration Major Activity Who Why What Licensing Officers Need to conduct Technical Introduction to and Analysts competent Licensing (TIL) proliferation risk End Use and End User analysis in the LICENSING licensing process Analysis Training (EUEU) Analysis of Strategic Commodity Transfers (ASCOT) Managers of public These major Enterprise Outreach (EO) sector & legacy technology holders are WMD enterprises, targets of opportunity COMPLIANCE labs, manufacturers, for proliferants etc. Customs Officers Widespread ignorance Commodity Identification and other regarding strategic Training (CIT) ENFORCEMENT enforcement commodities personnel 91  Case Study: Argentina and Brazil 92  Brazil’s Nuclear Program: Timeline 1950’s: Scientists started experimenting with nuclear fission 1950’s: Brazil/US signed several agreements to help develop Brazil’s nuclear program – US commitment to transfer nuclear technology 1965: US agrees to send a power plant to Brazil – Angra I delivered in 1971 1967: Brazil signs the Treaty of Tlatelolco, with a reservation – Reservation removed in 1994 1970’s: Energy crisis hits Brazil – country starts looking for alternative energy sources 1975: Brazil/Germany agreement – transfer of nuclear technology Nuclear Fuel Factory at Resende, Brazil Late 1970’s: Brazil’s President approved the creation of a clandestine (military) nuclear program to run in parallel with the country’s civilian nuclear power program – partly because of rivalry with Argentina – Autonomous Program of Nuclear Technology (PATN) 93  Brazil’s Nuclear Program: Timeline 1987: Brazilian navy announces it had successfully enriched uranium – believed to have happened sooner 1980’s: Changing political climate 1985: Democratization of Brazil 1988: New constitution bans all nuclear activities except for peaceful purposes 1990: Brazil reveals it had a military program intended to develop to nuclear weapons 1998: Brazil signs the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) “Brazil has a myriad of nuclear civilian facilities including a number of power reactors, research reactors, uranium enrichment plants, and uranium processing plants.” Nuclear Threat Initiative 94  Brazil’s Nuclear Program Motivation Military dictatorship (1964-1985) Longstanding rivalry with Argentina over regional influence and international recognition Wanted to be the Latin American “hub” of science, technology, and nuclear power Argentina's covert nuclear program was progressing (faster), further provoking a regional rivalry over nuclear development “The technology itself was seen as a "species of deterrence“ concerning Argentina’s nuclear program Military viewed Argentina's growing nuclear capabilities as a serious threat to Brazil's national security 95  Overview of Nuclear Programs: Brazil and Argentina “From the 1960’s to the early 1990’s, Argentina’s nuclear program and missile activities aroused concern that the country was seeking to develop nuclear weapons and possibly aid other countries in developing and delivering them. Argentina has since eschewed nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons but retains an ambitious nuclear energy program.” Nuclear Threat Initiative “In the early 1990s, Brazil abjured nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and curtailed its ballistic missile program. From the 1970’s to the early 1990s, however, Brazil’s nuclear energy program aroused concerns; at that time, the country had a secret parallel nuclear program. The international community – Washington in particular – raised additional concerns that technology from Brazil’s space launch vehicle program would be used for the production of ballistic missiles. Now, Brazil is a member of all key international nonproliferation regimes.” Nuclear Threat Initiative 96  Brazil’s Nuclear Program Transition to Peaceful Purposes Democratization In 1988, Congress approved a new constitution banning all nuclear activities except for peaceful purposes In 1991, signed a bilateral agreement with Argentina pledging to use nuclear technology only for peaceful purposes - Enforced by the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC) In 1991, created the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) in order to manage and apply the SCCC SCCC extended in 1991, to include the application of IAEA safeguards, known as the Quadripartite Agreement - In 1993, an agreement on privileges and immunities was added 97  Argentina’s Nuclear Program: Timeline 1950: Creation of Argentina’s National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) – By 1953, CNEA had started mining uranium 1955: Nuclear cooperation agreement signed with US 1958: US-designed research reactor arrives in Argentina – RA-1 at Constituyentes 1967: Construction completed on three additional reactors 1968: Purchase of “Atucha I” from Germany 1960s to 1990s: – Refused to join the NPT Atucha I, Argentina – Refused to join the Latin America nuclear-weapon- free zone (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 1976: Military junta claims power – efforts were made to increase self sufficiency “While the Brazil-Argentine rivalry was later mitigated by democratization, it is believed that the Argentine nuclear program was an estimated ten years ahead of her Brazilian counterpart.” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) 98  Argentina’s Nuclear Program: Timeline 1983: Democratic rule returns to Argentina – nuclear program placed under civilian control – Evidence indicates that, under military rule, Argentina was developing a nuclear weapon capability since 1978 (Pilcaniyeu Plant) – Nuclear cooperation and confidence- building efforts pursued with Brazil 1994: Joined the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 1995: Joined the NPT as a Non-Nuclear Weapons State (NNWS) 2 operating nuclear power plants: Atucha I and Embalse – Atucha II under construction – Plans for a 4th plant underway 2006: Initiative to revive nuclear energy development Atucha I and II, Argentina – $3.5 billion in 8 years 99  Argentina’s Nuclear Program Motivation Military dictatorship Desire for independence from developed nations Rivalry with Brazil over regional influence Security concerns – Brazil: traditional rivalry and Brazil’s expanding space program – Chile: over the Beagle Channel islands – Great Britain: over the Falkland/Malvinas islands Political prestige 100  Argentina’s Nuclear Program Transition to Peaceful Purposes In 1983, end of military rule Democratization New President placed nuclear program under civilian control, rather than under control of the Navy In 1991, signed a bilateral agreement with Brazil pledging to use nuclear technology only for peaceful purposes Enforced by the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC) In 1991, created the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) in order to manage and apply the SCCC SCCC extended in 1991, to include the application of IAEA safeguards, known as the Quadripartite Agreement In 1993, an agreement on privileges and immunities was added 101  Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) “The path leading to the generation of trust was a long one and required many years of negotiations performed in stages marked by joint declarations that, little by little, promoted aperture and mutual knowledge about the nuclear activities in Argentina and Brazil.” ABACC Created in 1991 as a bi-national safeguards organization – Agreement for the Exclusively Pacific Use of Nuclear Energy Verifies that all nuclear materials being used in both countries are for peaceful purposes only ABACC is the only bi-national safeguards organization in the world “Since 2008 Argentina and Brazil have been exploring possible areas for nuclear cooperation including the development of reactors for the production of electricity and the creation of a bi-national company to produce radiopharmaceuticals and to enrich uranium on an industrial scale.” ABACC 102  Overview of Nuclear Programs: Brazil and Argentina Lessons Learned Bilateral agreement pledging to use nuclear technology only for peaceful purposes can be used as a model Bi-national agreements could be implemented in other regions Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC) can be used as a model Due to previous dispute with IAEA, Brazil has not signed the AP yet – important for IAEA to approach inspection of suspected programs carefully Regions can develop their own verification mechanisms that can be audited by the IAEA. Will this work in the Middle East? The Gulf Region? GCC? 103  Nuclear Law 104  What is Nuclear Law? Nuclear Law is the legal framework under which activities related to nuclear technology and ionising radiation are conducted in order to adequately protect individuals, property, and the environment. Nuclear Law consists of legal norms developed over more than six decades to govern a highly complex technology. Goal: To balance, through effective management, the special risks to health and safety posed by nuclear technology with the promise of its significant societal benefits. 105  International Nuclear Law Treaties, conventions and other international agreements and legal instruments that govern nuclear-related activities – Such activities may affect one or more states’ safety, security, and environmental integrity The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the pre-eminent entity overseeing & monitoring nuclear activities regulated under international law – Created in 1957, IAEA is independent of the UN – IAEA reports to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Also regional organizations & bilateral agreements Some examples: – EURATOM: European Atomic Energy Community (1957) European Union: 21 member States – OECD/NEA: Nuclear Energy Agency (1958) Organization for Economic and Cooperative Development: 34 member States – ABACC: Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting & Control of Nuclear Materials (1991) Guadalajara Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy (bilateral agreement); “Quadripartite Agreement” between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the IAEA – ICRP: International System of Radiological Protection (1928) International standards, legislation, guidelines, programs, and practice 106  Scope of International Nuclear Law Safeguards – Deter the diversion of nuclear materials or technology from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or uses unknown Deterrence of diversion by risk of early detection – “significant quantity” – State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) Security – Prevent malicious acts by non-state actors (“adversaries”) that might endanger the public or the environment Safety – Ensure the safe operation and maintenance of nuclear installations and related facilities in accordance with internationally accepted norms and standards Liability for nuclear damage – Facilitate the bringing of actions and the enforcement of judgments without hindrance by national legal systems 107  Evolution of International Nuclear Law 1950s IAEA, EURATOM & OECD/NEA established – “Atoms for Peace” 1960s Focus on radiation protection and liability for damage – Rapid expansion of nuclear energy 1970s Focus on non-proliferation and physical protection – Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (1970) 1980-90s Focus on safety and liability for damage – Three Mile Island (1976) and Chernobyl nuclear accidents (1986) 2000s Focus on nuclear security & import/export controls – Iraq nuclear program, Terrorist attacks of 2001, DPRK nuclear tests 2010s ? Renewed focus on Safety; “3S”; liability for damage? – Fukushima: multiple reactor failures caused by a natural disaster 108  International Treaties and Conventions IAEA Related Treaties Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Limited or Partial Test Ban Treaty) Regional Treaties and Agreements – Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty) – African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) and the Cairo Declaration – South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty) – Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok) – Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republlic of Brazil, The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards – Verification Agreement between the IAEA and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) Other – Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter – International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea – Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Materials – Paris Convention on Third Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy – Brussels Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention 109  Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) General provisions ARTICLE I ARTICLE VI – All States will negotiate an end to the – Nuclear weapon States will not transfer nuclear arms race and to complete nuclear weapons to any non-nuclear nuclear disarmament weapon State, nor assist any such state in acquiring nuclear weapons ARTICLE VII ARTICLE II – NPT does not affect regional treaties that create “nuclear weapons free zones” – Non-nuclear weapon States will not seek (NWFZ) to acquire nuclear weapons ARTICLE III ARTICLE VIII – Treaty amendments and five-year reviews – Non nuclear-weapon States will conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA ARTICLE IX ARTICLE IV – Signature, ratification, and entry into force – Assures the right of States to develop and use peaceful nuclear energy ARTICLE X ARTICLE V – Right to withdraw and 25-year decision on indefinite extension – Peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non- ARTICLE XI nuclear-weapon States – Treaty language (English, Russian, French, Spanish, Chinese) 110  International Treaties and Conventions Treaties under the IAEA Safety – Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident INFCIRC/335 – Convention on Assistance in the case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency INFCIRC/336 – Convention on Nuclear Safety INFCIRC/449 – Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management INFCIRC/546 Security – Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material INFCIRC/274 – Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material GOV/INF/32005/10-GC(49)/INF6 – International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) United nations: A/RES/59/290 – United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)1540 State commitments to preventing WMD (national laws, enforcement, domestic controls) 1540 Committee Liability – Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage INFCIRC/500 – Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and of the Paris Convention INIFCIRC/402 – Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage INFCIRC/566 – Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage INFCIRC/567 111  Nuclear Security: International Initiatives Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) – Non-governmental organization (NGO) to reduce global threats from WMD (2001) Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) United States program, managed by DOE/NNSA IAEA Nuclear Security Plan – Needs assessments, Prevention, Detection, and Response (periodic updates since 2001) GOV/2009/54-GC(53)/18 EU Strategy Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction – Supports IAEA’s Nuclear Security Plan of Activities United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy – 2006: Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) – Prevent &combat nuclear terrorism, while protecting human rights and upholding the rule of law Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) – US-Russia Initiative (2006) – National commitments to combat nuclear terrorism consistent with national legal authorities and obligations under international instruments (ICSANT, CPPNM ,UNSCR 1540) World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) – NGO: 2006 Agreement between NTI and Institute of Nuclear Material Management (INMM) support from US Department of Energy and in consultation with IAEA – Share best practices for security of nuclear materials Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) – US initiative (2010); 2012 NSS in Seoul, ROK – National commitments to nuclear security; reinforces IAEA’s role in international nuclear security 112  International Legal Instruments: Safeguards International Nuclear Safeguards – Agreements Between the IAEA and States Required in Connection with Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Article III INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) – Model Protocol Additional To the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards “Additional Protocol” INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) 113  International Nuclear Law: Export Controls Zangger Committee Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) NPT suppliers All major suppliers – Established 1971 – Established 1974 Trigger List List of single-use items & related – Nuclear material and single use items triggering safeguards when supplied to technology NNWSs Conditions of supply Conditions of supply: – Assurance of non-explosive use – Assurance of non-explosive use – IAEA safeguards agreement in place – IAEA safeguards agreement in place – Provisions for re-transfer – Provisions for re-transfer – Caution in transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and material INFCIRC/209 Enrichment, reprocessing – Physical protection requirements in place INFCIRC/254 INFCIRC/539 114  National Nuclear Law A coherent and comprehensive national legal framework for ensuring safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear technology Such a framework is required to 1. Implement relevant international instruments to which States are parties Treaties, conventions, etc. 2. Create a national legal framework and establish the duties and responsibilities of the various organizations responsible for a national nuclear program 115  National Nuclear Law Legal norms for managing and regulating nuclear technology are part of a State’s overall legal system Nuclear law exists within the normal legal hierarchy: 1. Constitutional level Basic institutional and legal structure governing all relationships within a State 2. Statutory level Specific laws enacted by a national legislative body that govern the broad range of activities affecting national interests – May establish other governing bodies and adopt specific legal measures 3. Regulatory level Detailed, often technical rules that control or regulate specific activities. 4. Non-mandatory guidance instruments Recommendations designed to assist persons and organizations in meeting legal requirements 116  Key Provisions of National Nuclear Law National nuclear regulator & Transport of radioactive regulatory activities material – Notification, authorization, Radioactive waste & spent fuel inspection, enforcement, penalties Nuclear liability Radiation protection Safeguards Radioactive sources Export & import controls Safety of nuclear facilities & decommissioning Nuclear security, physical – Power reactors protection & illicit trafficking – Research reactors – Code of conduct on the safety and security of radioactive sources – Nuclear fuel cycle facilities – Convention on the physical – Decommissioning protection of nuclear material Emergency preparedness & – UNSCR 1373 response – UNSCR 1540 Mining & processing of – International convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings radioactive material – International convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism 117  IAEA Nuclear Law Handbooks Handbook on Nuclear Law Part I Part I sets out basic principles. Part II focuses on the practical side of drafting national laws by providing model provisions and examples of national laws. IAEA Office of Legal Affairs http://ola.iaea.org/OLA/ Part II 118  IAEA Milestones Milestones towards a National Nuclear Power Program 1. Ready to make a knowledgeable commitment to a nuclear program 2. Ready to invit