Nuclear Nonproliferation Quiz

NUCE 304: Evaluative Methods for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Security

• Course name: NUCE 304: Evaluative Methods for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Security
• Course subject: Nuclear Materials Control, History and Policy
• Instructor: Dr. Ahmed Alkaabi

Learning Objectives

• Understand the impact of WMD.
• Understand the history of nonproliferation efforts and the international organizations that participate in these efforts.
• Understand how new challenges are transforming global nonproliferation efforts.

Different Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Nuclear Weapons

• Explosive devices caused by nuclear fission or nuclear fusion (two basic types)
• Nuclear Fission = Atomic/Atom Bombs (A-bombs)
• Nuclear Fusion = Hydrogen Bombs (H-bombs) or Thermonuclear Weapons
• Examples: Little Boy and Fat Man

Biological Weapons

• Naturally-occurring and can survive on their own
• Dual-use
• Self-replicating
• Can be difficult to detect
• Present in many types of facilities
• Examples: Smallpox, Anthrax, Yellow Fever

Chemical Weapons

• Appear in gas, liquid, or solid form
• Lethal and non-lethal versions: can blister, choke, and affect the nerves or blood
• Examples: Nerve Agents, Mustard Agents, Hydrogen Cyanide, Tear Gases

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Nonproliferation Goals

Nuclear Weapons

• Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
• Non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) commit not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons
• Nuclear weapon states (NWS) agree not to assist NNWS in obtaining nuclear weapons
• All countries agree not to export nuclear equipment or material to NNWS except under safeguards
• All countries agree to work towards future nuclear disarmament

Biological Weapons

• Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
• Bans development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or transfer of biological agents or toxins in quantities that have no justifiable peaceful purpose.
• Bans weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents for hostile purposes

Chemical Weapons

• Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
• Bans development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or transfer of chemical weapons
• Requires verified destruction of all chemical weapons and production facilities

Nuclear Weapon Status of Countries

• Five NPT Nuclear Weapon States
• United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China
• Non-Nuclear Weapon States (partial list)
• Japan, Iran, Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Republic of Korea, Brazil, Argentina, Indonesia, Germany, Sweden, South Africa, Vietnam, Turkey, Italy, and others
• Non-NPT Member States with Declared Nuclear Weapons Programs
• India, Pakistan, North Korea

What Motivates the Nonproliferation Community?

• Moral Imperative: WMDs are worse than conventional weapons; preventing their spread and eliminating existing ones is critical
• Preserve Status Quo: Preventing WMD proliferation maintains international order, where only 5 countries have nuclear weapons
• International Security and Disarmament: Global security improves if all WMD are limited or eliminated

Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

• Non-state actors seek nuclear material and expertise.
• Wider availability of sensitive nuclear technology, material and expertise.
• More potential de-facto nuclear weapon states in the future.
• Growing number of NWS outside the NPT.
• Dissatisfaction with the NPT.
• Increasing worldwide demand for nuclear energy.

What's the Problem & What's the Solution?

• Goal: Reduce risk that states develop nuclear weapons; maintain separation between peaceful and non-peaceful nuclear energy uses.
• Reduce risk that states might believe neighbors are developing nuclear weapons.
• Elements of a nuclear weapons capability: Material, Technology, Expertise, and Motivation
• Solutions: Restrict access to key elements, monitor the use of key elements, and reduce motivation

Relationship of Nonproliferation to Broader International Security Issues

• Middle East: Israel/PA conflict, Terrorism, Iran's role in the region
• South Asia: Conflict over Kashmir, Terrorism
• East Asia: DPRK political and economic instability, Conventional conflict across DMZ, Conflict involving China, Regional tensions (energy supplies, historical distrust).
• Nuclear weapons change power balances, increase danger, raise stakes, and change the strategic outlook; minor events could trigger major consequences.

Different Strategies for Dealing with Proliferation

• Stages in Proliferation: Motivation, Development, Achievement, and Retirement
• Reduce Demand: Security assurances, arms control, regional security, and penalties for violating norms.
• Control Supply: Export controls, IAEA safeguards, and protection of technology and weapons material.
• Respond to Threat: Diplomacy, offensive military and covert activities, and threat assessment and detection.
• Dismantle Weapons: Arms control, transparency, international verification, safe and secure material disposition, and environmental restoration.

Examples Illustrate Concerns

• Pakistan used black market networks to clandestinely purchase uranium enrichment capabilities.
• Iran used black market networks to purchase uranium enrichment capabilities, seeking to maintain enrichment capabilities that are not prohibited by the NPT.
• North Korea separated plutonium at declared facilities (detected by IAEA). Used black market networks to clandestinely purchase uranium enrichment capabilities. And withdrew from NPT and Agreed Framework without relinquishing material or capabilities. Tested nuclear weapons.

Should 'Reducing Demand' Take Precedence?

• Resolve regional security concerns: Territorial disputes and natural resources.
• Enhance partnerships in vulnerable regions: Build capacity, seek to integrate into the international community, and increase prestige.
• Reward good examples: Economic incentives.
• Evaluate "hard" cases (Iran and North Korea): Diplomatic, military, or other options.

History of Nuclear Nonproliferation Efforts

• 1938: Discovery of sustained nuclear fission
• 1942: Chicago Pile-1 (CP1) - world's first artificial nuclear reactor
• 1942-1946: Manhattan Project -- project to develop first atomic bombs
• Post-WWII: "Three Nation Agreed Declaration on Atomic Energy: limit info about atomic energy until safeguards against improper use developed
• International control; US, UK and Soviet Union propose a United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC)

Scientific Origin of Nuclear Power

• 1938: Discovery of sustained nuclear fission
• Splitting of the atom and nuclear chain reaction
• 1942: Chicago Pile-1 (CP1)
• World's first artificial nuclear reactor
• 1942-1946: Manhattan Project
• Project to develop the first atomic bombs during WWII
• Extremely fast time-frame!
• Y-12 Plant and D-Reactor at Hanford (locations)

Policies/Treaties to Control Nuclear Power

• "Three Nation Agreed Declaration on Atomic Energy" (November 1945): US, UK, and Canada
• Willing "to proceed with the exchange of fundamental scientific literature for peaceful ends with any nation..."
• But, limit information about atomic energy until safeguards against improper use developed
• Propose an international control; US, UK and Soviet Union propose a United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC)

Preventing Misuse: International Control; Policy Origins to Control Nuclear Power

• Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy (Acheson-Lilienthal Report - March 1946) - no prospect of security in a system of international agreements only by a system of inspection
• Proposed an international agency to conduct all intrinsically dangerous operations in the nuclear field.
• Dangerous activities (mining and refining of uranium and thorium, uranium enrichment, production and separation of plutonium) should be carried out by an international authority
• Safe activities should be carried out by states.
• The Baruch Plan (June 1946): Propose a creation of an international Atomic Development Authority to control "all phases" of the development and use of atomic energy
• Proposes turning over all of its weapons to an international agency if others agree not to produce their own.
• Soviet Union Rejected the plan because the UN was dominated by the US, and could not be trusted.
• Rejected on economic grounds also.
• Atoms for Peace (1953): Speech by US President Eisenhower to the UN General Assembly.

Preventing Misuse: Rules and Verification

• The NPT (1968) and Safeguards: Three Pillars -- Nuclear Nonproliferation, Disarmament, and Peaceful Uses.
• All non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) parties must conduct a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) with the IAEA.
• NNWS insisted that safeguards obligations not infringe on NPT Article IV, allowing "right to develop, research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes"
• Minimize intrusion and protect commercial interests
• Focus on nuclear material.

What could possibly go wrong?

• Possible dangerous consequences related to nuclear weapons or materials.
• Concern about proliferation.

Smiling Buddha

• India's "Peaceful Nuclear Explosion" (May 18, 1974)
• Did the regime fail?
• What effect did responses have?
• Establishment of the Nuclear Suppliers Group
• 1975 NPT Review Conference

Arms Control

• Restrictions on the development, production, stockpiling, proliferation and usage of weapons
• First recorded attempt at Arms Control: Amphictyonic Leagues in ancient Greece
• Association of several tribes in Greece clarified the rules of war
• Rise of Roman Catholic Church – attempted to limit the means of warfare
• Second Lateran Council (1139): prohibited the use of crossbows against Christians
• Strasbourg Agreement (1675): France and the Holy Roman Empire -- first international agreement limiting chemical weapons use (i.e., poison bullets)
• Rush-Bagot Treaty (1817): United States and United Kingdom -- first arms control treaty of the modern industrial era

Primary Nuclear Arms Control Treaties (Modern Times)

• Bilateral
• Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)
• Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF)
• Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I, START II)
• Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)
• New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)
• Regional
• Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I)
• Global
• Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)
• Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
• Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
• Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)

Arms Control Treaties - Bilateral

• Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) – 1969: Includes the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
• Designed to limit missile deployments
• States limited to only two ABM sites
• Verification limited to national technical means (NTM).
• SALT II (1979) - never implemented. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty – 1987
• First time Soviets agreed to on-site inspections
• Called for complete elimination of all US and Soviet-deployed missile systems
• Entered into force in 1988
• First major accomplishment signaling the end of the Cold War

Arms Control Treaties - Bilateral / Regional (in depth)

• Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) (July 1991)
• Proposed by US President Reagan
• Goal = major reductions in nuclear deployments, adequate on-site verification
• Carried out in three phases over seven years
• Central limits include: 1,600 Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs), 6,000 accountable warheads, 4,900 ballistic missile warheads, 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy ICBMs (for the Soviet side)

Arms Control Treaties - Bilateral/Regional (in depth)

• Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START 1)
• Five months after it was signed, the Soviet Union collapsed. Four independent states, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine contained strategic nuclear weapons.
• Became parties to START as legal successors to the Soviet Union
• By September 1991, both sides began eliminating their intercontinental ballistic missiles and launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles/launchers, and heavy bombers
• START's Entry into Force delayed almost three-and-a-half years
• START states joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Arms Control Treaties - Bilateral/Regional (in depth)

• Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START 1)
• In December 1994, the parties exchanged instruments of ratification at the Budapest summit.
• START I was to have a 15-year duration and could be extended for successive five-year periods by agreement among the Parties.
• All nuclear warheads have been removed from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine
• On 5 December 2001, the US and Russian Federation successfully reached the START I levels of 6,000 deployed warheads
• START 1 expired December 5, 2009

Arms Control Treaties - Bilateral (in depth)

• Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) (January 1993)
• When implemented, will eliminate heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles, heavy ICBMs, and all other multiple-warhead ICBMs.
• It also reduced the total number of strategic nuclear weapons
• By the end of the first phase, each side must have reduced its strategic nuclear warheads to no more than 3,500

Arms Control Treaties - Bilateral (in depth)

• Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II)
• By the end of the second and final phase, each side reduced their deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,000-3,500
• Of those, none may be on MIRVed ICBMS, including heavy ICBMs

Arms Control Treaties- Bilateral (In Depth)

• Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) (May 24, 2002),
• Also known as the Moscow Treaty
• Signed between the US (President George W. Bush) and the Russian Federation (Vladimir V. Putin)
• On a path of a new relationship between US and Russia
• Entry into force June 1, 2003
• By December 31, 2012 the aggregate number of such warheads does not exceed 1700-2200 for each Party

Arms Control Treaties - Bilateral (In Depth)

• New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) (April 8, 2010)
• Replaced the SORT treaty and was scheduled to expire in December 2012.
• Limits deployed strategic warheads to 1550, and the number of strategic launchers cut by half
• Satellite and remote monitoring, as well as 18 on-site inspections annually to verify limits
• Signed April 8, 2010
• Entry into force: February 5, 2011
• Valid for 10 years

Arms Control Treaties - Global

• Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)
• Bans all nuclear testing in the atmosphere and space, allowing underground testing.
• Eliminated the threat of worldwide fallout from nuclear testing.
• Showed that the US and Russia could reach nuclear weapons agreements.
• Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); States that exploded nuclear weapons before 1967 are designated as nuclear weapon states (NWS); all others are non-nuclear states (NNWS)
  • NWS may not transfer nuclear weapons; help NNWS.
  • NNWS may not manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or accept IAEA safeguards.
• Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
• Not yet in force.
• Article I: Basic obligations – not to carry any nuclear weapon test explosion, or other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit or prevent any such nuclear explosions
• Furthermore, refrain from causing, encouraging, or participating in any nuclear weapon test explosion.
• Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT): Not yet negotiated.

International Organizations

• United Nations: Headquarters in New York, USA, 192 Member States, $5.048 billion budget for 2010 - 2011 (16 peacekeeping operations NOT included in budget), around 44,000 staff members; Main nonproliferation treaties include the NPT, and PTBT, and CTBT
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
• Originally called "Atoms for Peace" (1957)
• Headquartered in Vienna, Austria
• Regional and International Laboratories
• 151 Member States
• $418.3 million regular budget (2010)

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

• Organization Structure
• Traditional and Modern Safeguards
• Safeguards Agreements: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs), Small Quantities Protocol (SQPs), Voluntary Offer Agreements (VOAs)
• Additional Protocol (AP)
• Additional Protocol -- verification expanded from only declared material to declared and undeclared material.

Secondary Nonproliferation Efforts

• UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540)
• Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
• Export Controls

UNSCR 1540: Criminalizing WMD Proliferation

• Problem: Discovery of A.Q. Khan network revealed serious gaps in the WMD nonproliferation regime. Lack of enforcement.
• Video: Nuclear Secrets, The Terror Trader.
• Process: US-led initiative, rooted in Security Council statement; precedence includes UNSCR 1373; invokes UN Chapter VII (mandatory character); lengthy consultative process; keeping input limited.

UNSCR 1540: Approach

• Passed in April 2004; requires all UN member states to enact and enforce measures to control material (accounting, physical protection, export, border security, and transshipment of CBRN materials) and their means of delivery; It specifically addresses the prevention of CBRN proliferation; requires member states to enact legislation with criminal penalties for violations; report submitted to the 1540 Committee by October 2004 about status of legislation.
• Quantitative Analysis: taken on 17 relevant provisions; 50 measures in planning phases; 10 states indicated planning to implement OP3a (accounting and security measures).
• Compliance varied; 63% addressed OP8d (informing) public/industry of obligations and laws

UNSCR 1540: Evaluation

• Issues with resolution's language and definitions
• Delays in reporting or quality of compliance (e.g., what is a non-state actor?)
• Number of states reported under OP8 ratifying IAEA Additional Protocol ; strengthening CWC obligations and implementing other multilateral regimes.
• Timeline not adequate for adopting national legislation.
• Concern with the UN interfering in national issues by mandating specific legislation.
• Lack of disarmament provisions.

UNSCR 1540 Issues

• Questions related to compliance measures, significant contributions, uniqueness, implementation, roles of regional or international institutions, and relationships with treaty regimes

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

• Problem: Strengthened interdiction efforts, need for a more dynamic approach; spurred by incidents like the Spanish seizure of a ship with weapons
• Process: Developed primarily by Under-Secretary of State, John Bolton; 98 participating countries (2010) ; participants pledged to interdict transfers to/from states or non-state actors of concern.
• Approach: US and allies use planes/ships to examine ships that are considered potentially transporting prohibited materials. Information will be shared with concerned partners related to the suspicious vessels. Calls on participants to avoid trade with countries of proliferation concern. Doing so will enhance existing capabilities to control and facilitate interdiction; bilateral agreements expedite ship boarding.
• Implementation: Various examples of successful interdictions since 1991

Proliferation Security Initiative Evaluation

• Multiple examples of successful interdictions, but has this slowed proliferation efforts ?
• Need new international laws.
• Need to expand UNSC conventions
• Secrecy of most interdictions may hint that items found are inconclusive
• Lack of clear definitions or authority
• Some countries like China have kept their distance citing concerns

U.S. Department of State (EXBS): Export Control and Related Border Security Program

• Problem: threat is more diverse & unpredictable; terrorist involvement
• Countries of concern still pursue WMD and missile programs; secondary proliferators provide assistance to other countries and terrorists
• EXBS is designed to help prevent proliferation of WMDs, WMD missile delivery systems, as well as conventional weapons and related items

EXBS Approach

• Prevent unauthorized transfers of materials/technologies used in the development and production of weapons (chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons as well as missile delivery systems), and related items
• Impede or deny proliferators' and terrorists' access to key material, equipment, or technology, preventing misuse and diversion
• Enhance legitimate international trade while building confidence between exporting countries

U.S. Department of State (EXBS) Program-Implementation

• Active in over 30 countries
• Original focus was on WMD "source countries" in the Former Soviet Union, but it has broadened to include nearby states, countries and territories with major transshipment hubs.
• Comprehensive legal/regulatory frameworks, effective licensing and procedures and practices, effective enforcement techniques, government outreach to industry, and interagency coordination and cooperation were put in place.

International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP)

• Strengthens global efforts to prevent WMD proliferation
• Proliferation risk assessment, ensuring licensing competence, government outreach to enterprises for compliance

International Nuclear Safeguards, International Atomic Energy Agency

• Treaties
• Agreements between the IAEA and states, with particular focus on Article III Safeguards for the NPT.
• Treaties and agreements are detailed in various documents from the IAEA (INFCIRC/153, INFCIRC/540).

International Nuclear Law (Export Controls)

• Zangger Committee and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
• NPT suppliers
• Established 1971
• Established, 1974
• Trigger List (nuclear materials; useable items; triggering safeguards for supplying to NNWS)
• Conditions of supply (assurance of non-explosive use; IAEA safeguards, etc.)

National Nuclear Law

• Coherent and comprehensive national legal framework; ensures safe, secure, peaceful uses of nuclear technology.
• Implementation of treaties, creation of national legal frameworks, and establishing duties and responsibilities

National Nuclear Law

• Legal norms managing and regulating nuclear technology are part of national legal systems.
• Considers constitutional level (basic institutional structure), statutory level (enacted laws affecting specific national interests), regulatory level (details), and non-mandatory guidance instruments (recommendations)

Key Provisions of National Nuclear Law

• National nuclear regulator and regulatory activities
• Radiation protections, radioactive sources, and safety of nuclear facilities
• Power reactors, nuclear fuel cycle facilities, and decommissioning
• Emergency preparedness and response.
• Mining and processing of radioactive material
• Transport of radioactive material
• Radioactive waste and spent fuel.
• Safeguards, export and import control, and nuclear security

IAEA Nuclear Law Handbooks

• Handbook on Nuclear Law, Part I & II
• Provides basic principles, practical side of drafting national laws, model provisions, and examples of national laws.
• IAEA Office of Legal Affairs resources

IAEA Milestones

• Milestones towards a National Nuclear Power Program: commitment to a program, invitation for bids on the first plant, and commissioning/operating the first plant

IAEA Milestones

• Legislative Framework: National energy policy; independent regulatory authority; responsible institutions; economic and commercial considerations; licensing, inspection, and foreign investment.
• Intellectual property rights; roles of national & local governments; stakeholders and public; fuel cycle issues and ownership; regulatory framework: import/export, storage, security, radiation, waste, and emergency planning.

Additional Resources

• IAEA site, documents detailing safeguards, treaties, and liability
• Downloadable treaty documents