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Vipin Narang, What Does It Take to Deter? Regional Power Nuclear Postures and International Conﬂict, Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 57(3) 478-508 The article explores the role of nuclear forces in deterring conventional conﬂicts, challenging the prevailing 'existential bias' that assumes a small nuclear arsenal alone is sufﬁcient for deterrence. It criticizes the conventional focus on superpower experiences and argues that regional nuclear powers provide a more relevant context for understanding the dynamics of deterrence. The author introduces a novel classiﬁcation scheme for regional power nuclear postures, identifying three types: catalytic, assured retaliation, and asymmetric escalation. Through empirical analysis, the article ﬁnds that nuclear postures signiﬁcantly impact a state's ability to deter conﬂicts. Contrary to common assumptions, possessing nuclear weapons or secure second-strike capabilities does not systematically deter conventional conﬂict. Instead, the study suggests that a state must align its nuclear posture explicitly with the goal of deterring conventional conﬂict. The ﬁndings have implications for theoretical and policy debates on deterrence and proliferation, emphasizing the importance of considering nuclear posture rather than merely the possession of nuclear weapons. The article concludes by highlighting the signiﬁcance of these insights for conﬂict and nonproliferation strategies in regions such as South Asia, the Korean peninsula, and the Middle East. Moving Beyond the Existential Bias Existential Deterrence Dogma: The prevalent belief in security studies is that a regional state's acquisition of nuclear weapons serves as a critical threshold for ensuring security. This doctrine suggests that possessing nuclear capabilities not only deters nuclear attacks but also prevents conventional conﬂicts due to the fear of nuclear escalation. Existential Deterrence Logic: The concept of 'existential deterrence' posits that even a small nuclear arsenal creates a credible threat, inhibiting conventional conﬂicts through the progressive generation of risk. The article references inﬂuential theorists like Schelling, Waltz, and Mearsheimer who argue that a minimal number of nuclear weapons should sufﬁce for deterrence against both nuclear and conventional threats. Challenges to the Existential Bias: The article critiques existing empirical work for assuming an 'existential bias,' treating all nuclear states as equivalent and neglecting the impact of the size, structure, and orientation of nuclear arsenals. It points out ﬂaws in quantitative literature and the overemphasis on superpower experiences, leading to inconclusive results regarding the role of nuclear weapons in deterring conﬂict. Correctives to Advance Understanding: The author proposes two correctives for a better understanding of the role of nuclear weapons. First, regional nuclear powers should be analyzed separately as a distinct class of states due to their unique approaches and constraints. Second, the unit of analysis should shift from nuclear weapons to nuclear posture, considering the overall orientation of a state's nuclear force structure. Regional Nuclear Powers and Common Analytical Lens: The article identiﬁes regional nuclear powers—China, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa—and argues that despite variations in aggregate power metrics, their similar key dimensions make them suitable for a common analytical lens. It emphasizes the importance of understanding how these states allocate their nuclear forces, given their differing deterrence successes. Shift to Nuclear Posture as Analytical Focus: The author proposes a shift in focus from nuclear weapons to nuclear posture, deﬁned as a state's overall orientation of its nuclear force structure, including warheads, delivery vehicles, deployment rules, and targeting procedures. The hypothesis is that differences in peacetime nuclear posture generate variations in a state's ability to deter conﬂict, moving beyond the 'existential bias.' Hypothesized Impact of Nuclear Posture: The article suggests that it is the differences in peacetime nuclear posture that inﬂuence states' ability to deter conﬂict. By examining the identiﬁable and distinct nuclear postures adopted by regional nuclear powers, the study aims to isolate the factors precisely required for deterring conﬂict at different intensity levels. A Typology of Nuclear Postures Introduction of Nuclear Posture Typology: The article introduces three distinct regional power nuclear postures: catalytic, assured retaliation, and asymmetric escalation. These postures are differentiated by their primary envisioned employment, capabilities, command and control, and transparency levels. Constraints on Regional Powers: Regional powers, unlike superpowers, operate with limited nuclear force structures, leading to conceptually and empirically distinct nuclear postures. The choices made by regional powers are constrained by factors such as the absence of secure second-strike forces or tactical nuclear weapons. Catalytic Posture: The catalytic posture aims to catalyze third-party intervention, typically from a more powerful nation like the United States, by threatening to use nuclear weapons if assistance is not provided. This posture relies on ambiguity surrounding capabilities and emphasizes centralized control. Illustration of Catalytic Posture: The article provides an example of Israel adopting the catalytic posture during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Israel signaled its nuclear capability to the United States to garner assistance against perceived existential threats from Syria and Egypt. Assured Retaliation Posture: The assured retaliation posture directly aims to deter nuclear attacks by threatening nuclear retaliation, even after sustaining signiﬁcant damage. It requires survivable second-strike forces and transparency about capabilities to ensure opponents understand the ability to retaliate. - Examples of Assured Retaliation: China and India are cited as examples of states adopting the assured retaliation posture. Both possess small, secure, and survivable nuclear forces, emphasizing retaliatory strikes against strategic targets. Asymmetric Escalation Posture: The asymmetric escalation posture is designed to deter conventional attacks by enabling rapid, asymmetric escalation to the ﬁrst use of nuclear weapons against conventional or strategic targets. This posture requires transparency and the ability to deploy nuclear assets quickly. - Examples of Asymmetric Escalation: France and Pakistan are given as examples of states adopting the asymmetric escalation posture. France aimed to deter superior Warsaw Pact conventional forces during the Cold War, while Pakistan shifted to this posture to deter Indian conventional power after testing nuclear weapons in 1998. Mutual Exclusivity of Postures: The three postures are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, with each regional power falling into one of these categories. The stickiness of these postures, both in peacetime and during conﬂicts, ensures their distinctiveness and reduces measurement uncertainty. Stickiness of Postures: The stickiness of these postures, determined by capabilities and organizational inputs, ensures that peacetime postures accurately reﬂect a state's available options during conﬂicts. This stickiness maintains the exclusivity of postures and highlights that states adopt a single posture toward all politically relevant opponents. Theory and Hypotheses: Deterrence Effects of Nuclear Postures Catalytic Posture: Expectations: Catalytic postures, designed to draw thirdparty intervention, are unlikely to have a strong deterrent effect on conventional conﬂicts. The ambiguous management of forces makes nuclear use noncredible in realistic scenarios, providing a large space for conventional conﬂict. Hypothesis: States with a catalytic posture should have little effect in deterring both low- and high-intensity attacks by nuclear or nonnuclear opponents. Assured Retaliation Posture: Expectations: Assured retaliation postures may experience increased low-intensity attacks but reduced high-intensity attacks from nuclear opponents. Against nonnuclear opponents, the frequency of low-intensity conﬂicts may remain unchanged due to the perceived unlikelihood of nuclear retaliation. Hypothesis: States with an assured retaliation posture should face a reduced frequency of high-intensity attacks from both nuclear and nonnuclear opponents. They should experience an increased frequency of low-intensity attacks from nuclear opponents and an unchanged frequency from nonnuclear opponents. Asymmetric Escalation Posture: Expectations: Asymmetric escalation postures, by threatening early nuclear use, should signiﬁcantly deter conventional conﬂicts. The posture utilizes two mechanisms: credible threat of nuclear use against conventional breaches and a 'mad man' deterrent, creating fear of unauthorized nuclear release. Hypothesis: States with an asymmetric escalation posture should face fewer attacks from both nuclear and nonnuclear opponents across all measurable intensities of armed conﬂict. Overall Null Hypothesis: The extant deterrence literature suggests that there should be no variation in the deterrent effect of regional power nuclear postures. Small nuclear forces might serve as a basic 'existential deterrent' against adversaries, irrespective of posture. Additional Considerations: The section acknowledges the possibility that under an assured retaliation posture, nuclear use may only become credible at an extraordinarily high level of conventional conﬂict, potentially posing a challenge to the traditional deterrence canon. The hypotheses proposed aim to examine the impact of nuclear postures on conﬂict outcomes against both nuclear and nonnuclear adversaries. Results: General Deterrence Tests Data Set and Control Variables: The analysis employs the Bennett and Stam (2004) data set covering directed dyads from 1816 to 1992, with various control variables at monadic, dyadic, and system levels. Control variables include regime types, transitions, conventional balance of power, revisionist intentions, etc., to isolate nuclear posture effects on dispute outbreak and escalation. Methodology: Cubic spline corrections based on peace years correct for temporal autocorrelation. Dyad-clustered robust standard errors are used for statistical reliability. Relative risk ratios are presented to show the average relative risk of conﬂict after a target state adopts a particular nuclear posture. Results: Catalytic and asymmetric escalation postures show block signiﬁcance tests at p <.001, indicating improved predictive power against all opponents. Assured retaliation posture lacks robust signiﬁcance, suggesting little systematic deterrent effect. Asymmetric escalation posture's signiﬁcance is most robust, especially against high-intensity conﬂicts. Results from an expanded data set (1816 to 2001) conﬁrm the trend, highlighting the unique deterrent power of asymmetric escalation. Comparison of Nuclear Postures: Asymmetric escalation posture is consistently deterrence optimal, deterring conﬂict at every intensity level against both nuclear and nonnuclear initiators. Assured retaliation posture lacks systematic deterrent power against conventional conﬂict. Catalytic posture, while statistically signiﬁcant, experiences deterrence failures, making high-intensity conﬂict more likely. First-Difference Plots: Illustrate the change in probability for each level of the dependent variable if a state shifts to an asymmetric escalation posture. States adopting asymmetric escalation experience a substantial reduction in the probability of war against both nuclear and nonnuclear opponents. Shifting from catalytic or assured retaliation to asymmetric escalation yields measurable deterrence beneﬁts. Robustness Checks: Various robustness checks, including controlling for nuclear arsenal size, country-ﬁxed effects, and sensitivity analyses, support the substantive conclusions. Results are consistent across different speciﬁcations and time periods. Conclusion and Limitations: The study suggests an optimal deterrent conﬁguration, asymmetric escalation, uniquely effective in deterring armed disputes. Acknowledges methodological challenges, emphasizing the need for additional research and data collection to reﬁne ﬁndings. Discussion Varied Deterrent Effectiveness: The analysis challenges the assumption that nuclear weapons universally deter conventional conﬂict. Findings suggest that a nuclear posture explicitly designed for deterrence is crucial for effectiveness. The study emphasizes the theoretical and empirical importance of distinguishing between regional nuclear powers based on their postures. Asymmetric Escalation Posture's Effectiveness: States adopting the asymmetric escalation posture experience a signiﬁcant reduction in conﬂict frequency and escalation at every intensity level. This posture proves uniquely deterrence optimal compared to nonnuclear states and those with other postures. Assured retaliation posture, surprisingly, lacks measurable deterrence improvement, even against nonnuclear opponents. Catalytic Posture's Suboptimal Deterrence: States with a catalytic posture face a substantial increase in high-intensity attacks, indicating deterrence suboptimality. Low credibility of nuclear use and incentives for preventive strikes contribute to increased conﬂict risk. Instances like the 1973 attacks on Israel exemplify how the catalytic posture may create vulnerabilities. Assured Retaliation Posture's Limited Deterrence: Contrary to conventional wisdom, assured retaliation posture has little systematic ability to deter conﬂict initiation and escalation. Even against nonnuclear opponents without nuclear retaliation capability, this posture shows limited effectiveness. Instances of near war involving assured retaliators, such as the 1969 Ussuri River conﬂict, challenge the belief in its deterrent power. Effectiveness of Asymmetric Escalation Posture: Asymmetric escalation posture deters conﬂict at both low and high levels of violence against nuclear and nonnuclear states. The sheer drop in armed conﬂict frequency suggests that asymmetric escalation is uniquely deterrence optimal. States adopting this posture experience a three to four times reduction in attacks at war and subwar intensity levels. Implications: Challenges the conventional wisdom about the sufﬁciency of secure second-strike forces in deterring high-intensity conventional conﬂict. Empirical evidence questions the credibility of nuclear escalation as a deterrent. Highlights the powerful and independent deterrent effects of adopting an asymmetric escalation posture. Conclusion and Future Considerations: The study concludes by emphasizing the need for additional research and data collection to further reﬁne these ﬁndings. Calls attention to the importance of understanding the speciﬁc deterrence dynamics associated with different nuclear postures. Nicholas D. Anderson, Alexandre Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro General Nuclear Compellence, Strategic Studies Quarterly , Vol. 13, No. 3 (FALL 2019), pp. 93-121 The research discussed in the text primarily focuses on the consequences of nuclear acquisition, speciﬁcally examining nuclear deterrence and compellence. While much attention has been given to the role of nuclear weapons in crises, the text highlights two limitations in the existing debate. Firstly, the exclusive focus on crisis contexts may overlook the broader compellent effects of nuclear weapons in non-crisis settings. Secondly, the emphasis on interstate dyads in studying compellence is deemed insufﬁcient for understanding general compellence, which requires analyzing the interactions of a nuclear state in its broader strategic environment. The text proposes the concept of "general compellence," deﬁned as a new nuclear state's ability to inﬂuence favorable ally and adversary behavior outside of crisis situations due to its possession of nuclear weapons. This general compellence is argued to have signiﬁcant effects, potentially outweighing the compellent value of nuclear weapons in crisis settings. The theory suggests that general compellence beneﬁts are maximized when a relatively weak state with low allied commitment nuclearizes, leading to increased concessions and commitments from both adversaries and allies to reduce the risk of nuclear escalation. The acquisition of nuclear weapons is posited to provide a state with increased deterrence capabilities and the ability to inﬂict costs in the event of deterrence failure. However, this also comes with the risk of nuclear escalation, which can be leveraged for compellence. The text emphasizes the importance of understanding how nuclear weapons produce outcomes of general compellence, presenting a strategic logic for this phenomenon. To illustrate their theory, the authors examine four cases of general nuclear compellence involving France, China, Israel, and South Africa. The article concludes by discussing implications for international relations theory and foreign policy, emphasizing the need for a broader understanding of nuclear compellence beyond crisis contexts. The Strategic Logic of General Nuclear Compellence The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Crisis The text starts by acknowledging the unique destructive power of nuclear weapons and their utility for states in times of crisis or as tools of last resort. The argument centers on the assumption that the introduction of nuclear weapons raises the potential for conﬂict escalation, forming the basis for the compellent effects of nuclear acquisition. Compellent Effects of Nuclear Weapons Acquisition The primary compellent effect stems from the potential for nuclear escalation in a crisis, leading allies and adversaries to take actions to mitigate this risk. The greater the internalization of the risk of nuclear use, the more likely adversaries and allies are to offer concessions or commitments, making nuclear weapons effective tools of general compellence. Variables Conditioning General Compellence The text introduces three variables conditioning the general compellent effect of nuclear acquisition: state power and inﬂuence, preexisting security commitments, and level of interest. State Power and Inﬂuence: The relative conventional power of a state before nuclearization is a key variable. Stronger states are less likely to escalate to nuclear levels, limiting concessions from adversaries and allies. Preexisting Security Commitments: The level of security commitments from allies modulates the escalation risks for weaker states. Higher commitments may limit general compellent effects, while lower commitments enhance them. Level of Interest: The ally's level of interest in the state's security and regional stability independently inﬂuences its willingness to incur costs. High interest leads to increased commitments, while low interest results in distancing and greater concessions from adversaries. Historical Cases France: Achieving Strategic Autonomy Theory Prediction: The theory predicts that a relatively weak state with high security commitments from allies can achieve greater strategic autonomy through nuclear acquisition. Case of France: France acquired nuclear weapons in 1960 as insurance against the Soviet threat, leading to increased strategic autonomy from the United States. Paris no longer depended on the U.S. for its nuclear deterrent, resulting in greater independence. Compellent Beneﬁts: French nuclearization led to reduced adherence to NATO policy, withdrawal of French forces from NATO, and the ejection of U.S. forces from French territory. It facilitated rapprochement with the USSR and enhanced French inﬂuence in Europe. French nuclearization also contributed to recognizing the People’s Republic of China in 1964. Factors Inﬂuencing French Decision: France, as a relatively weak state, faced a signiﬁcant Soviet threat and had diverse foreign policy goals. The U.S.'s "New Look" policy, France's loss at Dien Bien Phu, and the Suez Crisis inﬂuenced the decision to acquire nuclear weapons. General Compellent Effects: France gained compellent beneﬁts in the form of greater strategic independence from the U.S. and increased leverage against the Soviet Union. The heightened risk of nuclear escalation made the USSR more inclined to positive relations with France. Post-Nuclearization Policies: France distanced itself from NATO, engaged in détente with the Soviet Union, and pursued a foreign policy of greater autonomy. De Gaulle emphasized the need for an independent nuclear deterrent to command France's destiny. Shifts in Relations: France's nuclearization led to withdrawal from NATO's command structure, rejection of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, and recognition of the PRC. France's autonomy was marked by a shift in foreign policy toward reducing tensions with the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc. Short-Lived Rapprochement: Despite France's short-lived rapprochement with the Soviet Union, events such as the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 prompted a move back toward reconciliation with the U.S. and NATO. Conclusion: French nuclear acquisition did not result in a drastic rearrangement of its overall strategic position, but it allowed Paris to position itself more autonomously from the U.S., highlighting the general compellent beneﬁts of nuclear weapons. China: Nuclearization and Compellent Effects Examining China's nuclearization, the section explores how a weak state with minimal ally commitment (Soviet Union) can inﬂuence political dynamics with adversaries (United States). The arguments are supported by historical developments. - Chinese Nuclearization Circumstances Weak State Status: China, a relatively weak state, acquired nuclear weapons in 1964. The Soviet Union, its ally, had minimal commitments and low interest in China's defense. - Compellent Effects and Political Developments Distancing of Soviet Ally: The Soviet Union, with low interest and commitment to China, distanced itself. Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated, leading to a conﬂict in 1969. Adversarial Response (United States): The U.S., having conventional superiority and nuclear advantage, faced increased costs in defending Taiwan against a nuclear-armed China. This compelled the U.S. to reconsider its stance on Taiwan. - Taiwan Issue and US-China Relations Taiwan Dispute: Taiwan's status was a central disagreement between the U.S. and China. China demanded resolution as a precondition for improved relations. Pre-Nuclearization US Stance: Before China's nuclearization, the U.S. was unwavering in its support for Taiwan, hindering relations with China. - Compellent Effects of Chinese Nuclearization Increased Military Risks: With China's nuclear capability, the costs for the U.S. to defend Taiwan rose signiﬁcantly. This compelled the U.S. to make concessions on Taiwan. Normalization Process: The process of normalizing relations started with President Lyndon Johnson calling for improved relations with China in 1966. President Nixon, aware of the risks of confrontation, proposed concessions on Taiwan. - US-China Rapprochement Concessions on Taiwan: Kissinger offered military concessions, reducing U.S. forces in Taiwan and indicating a shift in the status of Taiwan. Nixon reafﬁrmed these concessions during his visit in 1972. Quid Pro Quo: Nixon proposed a quid pro quo, offering concessions on Taiwan to reduce tensions, potential nuclear confrontation, and promote stability in Asia. Israel: Nuclear Acquisition and Strategic Leverage This section explores how Israel, a relatively weak state in conventional terms with limited ally support, leveraged nuclear acquisition for political beneﬁts. The argument suggests that the ally's willingness to bear additional costs inﬂuences nuclear proliferation outcomes. - Israeli Nuclearization Circumstances: Conventional Weakness: Since its establishment in 1948, Israel faced a conventional power imbalance against Arab states, receiving minimal support from the U.S. - Compellent Effects and Political Beneﬁts Ally's Willingness to Incur Costs: Israel's nuclear proliferation beneﬁts depended on the U.S.'s commitment to the region's stability. The U.S. increased its material commitments to Israel's security due to concerns over nuclear escalation. Security Risks and U.S. Response: Israeli nuclearization raised the risks of nuclear escalation in the Middle East. The U.S., deeply interested in regional stability, increased its material commitments to Israel's security, altering its stance. - Israeli Nuclear Program Timeline Nuclear Status: By May 1967, Israel was considered a nuclearweapons state. The years leading to this marked a signiﬁcant conventional power imbalance against Arab adversaries. - U.S.-Israel Relations and Security Commitments Low U.S. Security Commitment: The U.S. had a low level of material commitment to Israel's security, leading to Israeli concerns and requests for formal security guarantees. Maximal Compellent Effects: Israel's relative conventional weakness and low U.S. security commitments maximized the general compellent effects of its nuclear acquisition. - Nuclear Escalation Risks and Leverage Nuclear Escalation Potential: Israel's nuclear capability, coupled with conventional weakness, made nuclear escalation a concern. Israel sought to extract further security commitments from the U.S. U.S.-Israel Quasi-Alliance: The U.S. pledged to meet Israel's conventional weaponry needs in return for nuclear ambiguity, inﬂuencing U.S. policy decisions. - U.S. Material Support and Rapprochement Arms Sales and Aid: U.S. arms sales and military aid to Israel grew signiﬁcantly after 1967, inﬂuenced by the nuclear quid pro quo. Yom Kippur War: During the Yom Kippur War of 1973, U.S. support for Israel increased substantially, possibly inﬂuenced by Israel's nuclear capabilities. - Rapprochement with Egypt Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty: Rapprochement between Israel and Egypt in 1977, leading to a peace treaty, might have been inﬂuenced by Israel's nuclear possession. Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: Israel's neighbors recognized the risks of nuclear escalation, contributing to regional stability and improved relations with Israel. South Africa: Limited General Compellent Effects This section explores the case of South Africa's nuclear acquisition in 1979, examining how the country's relative conventional strength inﬂuenced the general compellent effects of nuclear weapons. - South Africa's Nuclearization Context: Communist Threat: South Africa pursued nuclear weapons due to concerns over a communist takeover in neighboring Angola. Pretoria anticipated the need for a deterrent against black nationalist movements supported by communist powers. - Compellent Effects and U.S. Response Conventional Advantage: South Africa had a signiﬁcant conventional advantage over its main adversary, Angola, reducing the perceived need for nuclear weapons on the battleﬁeld. Limited U.S. Interest: U.S. opposition to the apartheid regime limited Washington's interest in protecting its ally. Economic sanctions were imposed instead of increased support. - Nuclearization and Regional Relations: Moderate Regional Impact: Despite South Africa's nuclearization, improvements in relations with neighbors were modest. Nonaggression pacts with Mozambique and Swaziland were signed, but overall impact was limited. - South Africa's Nuclear Deterrence Strategy Objective of Nuclear Program: South Africa's nuclear program aimed to serve as a deterrent against the communist threat. A "catalytic deterrent" strategy expected U.S. assistance in crises to prevent nuclear escalation. Challenges to Deterrence Strategy: The conventional strength of South Africa reduced the likelihood of needing nuclear escalation. Allies and adversaries doubted Pretoria's willingness to use nuclear weapons. - U.S.-South Africa Relations Limited U.S. Support: U.S. interest in stopping communism conﬂicted with opposition to apartheid. Limited U.S. support was provided, and formal alliance between the two countries was absent. Escalation Potential and Limited Leverage: South Africa's conventional advantage and limited U.S. interest diminished Pretoria's ability to extract signiﬁcant compellent leverage. U.S. sanctions and opposition to South Africa's actions prevailed. - Diplomatic Tools and Nuclear Leverage Failed Diplomatic Tools: Efforts to use nuclear weapons as diplomatic tools failed. U.S. assistance was not forthcoming, and relations between the two countries remained distant. Regional Agreements: Nonaggression pacts with Mozambique and Swaziland had modest strategic beneﬁts, but the South African bomb did not play a direct role in these agreements. John V. Parachini (2001) Comparing Motives and Outcomes of Mass Casualty Terrorism Involving Conventional and Unconventional Weapons, Studies in Con ict and Terrorism, 24:5, 389-406, In the 1990s, a shift in terrorism towards mass casualty attacks, such as those on the World Trade Center and the Tokyo subway, was observed. Experts like Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin argue that this trend is driven by religious militants seeking widespread attention and casualties. The concern is that advancements in technology and the potential use of unconventional weapons (CBRN) by such groups may lead to more devastating attacks. This perspective has inﬂuenced U.S. counterterrorism policy, with a heightened focus on the threat of unconventional weapons. However, the author suggests that this emphasis may be disproportionate, leading to an exaggerated fear and policy confusion. The argument is that attention and resources should be balanced between high and low probability attacks to effectively address the complex challenge of mass casualty terrorism. Three Mass Casualty Incidents Involving Unconventional Weapons Incident 1: Rajneeshee Salad Bar Poisoning (1984)** - Overview: In 1984, the Rajneeshee religious cult attempted to inﬂuence a local election in Oregon by poisoning residents with Salmonella typhi. - Method: They contaminated salad bars with Salmonella acquired from the Oregon State Health Department. - Intent: The goal was to incapacitate people and decrease voter turnout rather than cause fatalities, although fatalities were considered acceptable. - Outcome: 751 people became sick, but no fatalities occurred. The outbreak was not immediately recognized as an intentional attack. Incident 2: LTTE Chlorine Attack (Sri Lanka)** - Overview: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) targeted a Sri Lankan Armed Forces facility with chlorine gas. - Method: Chlorine fumes were released as part of a general assault on the facility. - Intent: Likely a strategic blow; intended to incapacitate soldiers and assist in capturing the fort. -Outcome: More than 60 soldiers were hospitalized, but there were no conﬁrmed fatalities. The LTTE may have used chlorine due to a lack of conventional weapons. Incident 3: Aum Sarin Gas Attack (Tokyo, 1995)** - Overview: The Aum Supreme Truth carried out a sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway. - Method: Aum concentrated efforts on producing sarin gas to inﬂict mass casualties. - ntent: Inﬂict mass and indiscriminate casualties, unlike previous incidents involving subnational groups. - Outcome: 13 dead, 200 injured, and over 4,000 exposed. Main leaders and perpetrators were arrested and imprisoned. Mass Casualty Attacks with Conventional Weapons Ramzi Yousef and the World Trade Center Bombing - Consideration of Unconventional Weapons: Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, contemplated using poison gas but ultimately chose high explosives. - Reasons for Choice: Yousef cited the difﬁculty, expense, and his thoughts about using sodium cyanide for another attack as reasons for opting for conventional explosives. - Motives and Intentions: Yousef's motives included visceral hatred, revenge, retribution, and afﬁrming his self-perception as a "genius" and "bomb expert." His attack aimed to punish Americans for supporting Israel and make them understand the pain Arabs experienced. Timothy McVeigh and the Oklahoma City Bombing - Military Experience Inﬂuence: Timothy McVeigh's military experience, including the Gulf War, inﬂuenced his transformation from a model soldier to a mass killer. - Antipathy Towards Government: McVeigh's deep antipathy towards the government stemmed from feelings about gun control, his fascination with guns, and opposition to government interference in American life. - Turner Diaries Inﬂuence: The Turner Diaries, a ﬁctional book, played a crucial role in shaping McVeigh's worldview, leading him to believe that his attack on the Murrah Federal Building would spark a nationwide revolt. - Choice of Weapons: McVeigh did not consider unconventional weapons but focused on explosives due to his extensive knowledge and experience in handling them. Osama bin Laden and the Bombing of American Embassies in Africa - Choice of Targets: Attacks on American embassies in Africa resembled earlier strikes on American installations. The aim was to target symbols of the U.S. government. -Motivation by Holy War: If masterminded by Osama bin Laden, the attacks were motivated by a holy war against perceived modern-day crusaders in the Middle East. - Interest in Unconventional Weapons: Bin Laden's alleged interest in chemical and nuclear weapons was based on his belief that acquiring weapons for Muslim defense is a religious duty. - Counterterrorism Conundrum: Despite resources and alleged interest in unconventional weapons, bin Laden's attacks have been carried out using conventional explosives. The article poses questions about the reasons for this choice and the future possibilities. Comparison of the Motives and Outcomes Factors Shaping Worldviews Sense of Victimization - Perpetrators draw on a sense of victimization to justify their violence. - Examples include the LTTE, Ramzi Yousef, and Shoko Asahara. Controlling Leadership - Some cases involve leaders with immense control over group members. - This control enables leaders to command followers to perform acts they might not do voluntarily. Perception of Grand Struggle - Perpetrators view themselves as warriors in a grand struggle, justifying their violence. - Examples include Ramzi Yousef, Timothy McVeigh, and Osama bin Laden. Societal Alienation - Alienation from society shapes the worldviews of perpetrators in some cases. - Perpetrators feel disconnected from societal norms and constraints against violence. Use of Religion - Religion plays a role in motivating some perpetrators, though not all. - Shoko Asahara and Osama bin Laden are examples of those whose violence is religiously motivated. Tactical vs. Strategic Use of Weapons Symbolic Violence - Attacks with conventional explosives are often symbolic displays of power. - The psychological impact of explosions drives the attackers. Operational and Instrumental - Attacks involving unconventional weapons are more operational and instrumental. - Examples include the LTTE's use of chlorine and Aum's Tokyo subway attack. Role of Religion - While religion motivates some perpetrators, not all acts of mass violence are religiously inspired. - Perpetrators like Ramzi Yousef and Timothy McVeigh are driven by other factors. - Religion adds legitimacy to the violence for individuals like Shoko Asahara and Osama bin Laden. Weapon Selection - Choice of weapons often depends on availability, experience, and obsession. - Perpetrators use what they have experience with and what they believe will be effective. - Conventional explosives are favored due to familiarity and psychological impact. Outcomes Conventional High Explosives - **Spectacular Success:** - World Trade Center bombing killed six, injured over a thousand, and caused $300 million in property damage. - Oklahoma City bombing was the deadliest terrorist attack on American soil, killing 168 people. - Bombings of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania killed 225 people and injured almost 5,000. - **Manageable Killing: - High explosives proved to be highly effective for determined terrorists. - Perpetrators had signiﬁcant experience in combat and war ﬁghting. Unconventional Weapons Limited Efﬁcacy: Attacks with unconventional weapons material had outcomes below the perpetrators' visions. Rajneeshees struggled to sicken enough people without raising suspicion, leading to their downfall. Aum sought large deaths but failed due to crude delivery methods and impure agents. Tamil Tigers' use of chlorine backﬁred, and there is no evidence of reconsideration. Amateur Execution: Perpetrators of unconventional weapon attacks were comparative amateurs at killing and war ﬁghting. Attacks proved difﬁcult and less effective than imagined. Comparative Analysis Distinguishing Aspect: Actual killing and damage are more signiﬁcant in attacks with conventional high explosives. Downfall from Spectacular Attacks: Spectacular attacks with unconventional weapons led to the downfall of Rajneeshees and Aum. Difﬁculty and Ineffectiveness: Unconventional weapon attacks were more challenging and less effective than anticipated. Professionalism vs. Amateurism:Perpetrators of high explosive attacks had combat experience, while those using unconventional weapons were amateurs. Gary Ackerman and Michelle Jacome, WMD Terrorism: The Once and Future Threat, PRISM , Vol. 7, No. 3, COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (2018), pp. 22-37 The text discusses the concern of terrorists and other non-state actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and highlights that this is often considered a greater worry than states obtaining such weapons. The portrayal of terrorists as Bondian supervillains capable of doomsday plots is criticized for overlooking the inherent difﬁculties in executing such plans. The distinction between chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and true WMD is emphasized, with the latter implying catastrophic casualties and widespread consequences. The importance of differentiating between harm agents and weapons, or "weaponization," is highlighted, especially in the context of non-state actors facing technical obstacles in delivery mechanisms. Motives for acquiring WMD include inﬂicting casualties, operational objectives, and boosting status. The psychological impact of CBRN weapons on targeted societies is discussed, emphasizing their intangibility, invasiveness, latent effects, and unfamiliarity among citizens. Overall, the text underscores the challenges and complexities associated with the potential use of WMD by non-state actors. Harm Agents and Weapons Lack of Unequivocal WMD Attacks - Despite fears, there has never been a deﬁnitive Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) attack by Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs). - Examples, such as Aum Shinrikyo's sarin dispersal in 1995, the Union Carbide plant incident in Bhopal in 1984, and a 1996 poisoning by the Khmer Rouge, lack clarity on intentions and casualties. Pursuit and Attempted Use of CBRN by VNSAs - The University of Maryland's POICN Database records over 517 cases of VNSAs attempting to obtain or use Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons since 1990. - Table 1 depicts the breakdown of agents pursued or planned for use by VNSAs. Nuclear Weapons Acquisition Challenges - The potential route for a VNSA to acquire a nuclear weapon is either theft from a preexisting state arsenal or the production of ﬁssile material. - While Russia's nuclear arsenal shows signs of porosity, the most vulnerable source is considered to be Pakistan. - Fabricating ﬁssile material is deemed too complex and detectable for known terrorist organizations. Radiological Weapons - Radiological agents are considered attractive to VNSAs due to simpler weaponization compared to nuclear weapons. - Potential acquisition methods include theft, unauthorized transfer, or looting during political turmoil. - Detection systems at entry points can identify powerful radionuclides. Chemical Weapons Acquisition Options - VNSAs may acquire chemical weapons through theft, state sponsorship, production, or release of toxic industrial chemicals. - Unstable states like Syria, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea are potential sources. - Production of chemical agents involves precursor materials or theft from state-run programs. Challenges in Chemical Attacks - Small-to medium-scale chemical attacks are common, but breaching the WMD threshold requires signiﬁcant volumes of agents. - Release of toxic industrial chemicals presents a crude but alarming option. - Production of highly toxic chemical warfare agents requires advanced training. Biological Weapons Acquisition and Challenges - Acquisition of biological weapons involves theft or in-house production. - Potential sources include theft from state-run programs or collaboration with insiders. - Complications in in-house production include obtaining the correct microorganism, equipment, avoiding contamination, and ensuring virulence. Limitations in Biological Attacks - Biological attacks, despite having catastrophic potential, face difﬁculties in weaponization. - Most common biological weapons involve simple toxins like ricin. - No evidence of successful mass-casualty attacks by VNSAs with contagious bio-agents, with only 11 small-scale incidents involving biological agents since 2012. Ambitions and Capabilities Increasing Complexity of CBRN Incidents - Incidents involving Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs) and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) materials have become more complex and sophisticated, suggesting an ongoing threat. - Motives for WMD capability vary, leading to the pursuit of CBRN weapons by VNSAs of different ideological persuasions. Distribution of Incidents by Actor Types - Figure 1 shows that 31% of incidents are attributed to extremist religious actors, 22% to ethno-nationalist actors, and 11% to lone actors or autonomous cells. - A shift since 2012 reveals 71% of CBRN incidents are speciﬁcally attributed to religious extremist actors, emphasizing the focus on extremist religious threats. Islamic State (ISIL) Threats Historical Context - Predecessors of ISIL, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), demonstrated intent to use chemical weapons as early as 2007. - ISIL revisited the desire for a formalized chemical weapon program in 2014 and deployed various chemical warfare agents in Syria. Current Threat Status - ISIL's territorial force has been shattered, but the group's capability remains reduced, and there are concerns about the messaging value of its WMD capability. - Studies suggest potential threats, including sporadic attacks by returning foreign ﬁghters and attacks on facilities housing CBRN materials. ISIL and Bio-Agent Threats - ISIL may leverage expertise gained in Syria and Iraq for attacks in their countries of origin, utilizing poorly-secured precursor chemicals. - Despite the localized impact, such attacks can cause mass disruption, if not mass destruction. Hezbollah as a Potential Threat - While ISIL remains a concern, the Shiite militia Hezbollah, with substantial resources and technical assistance from Iran, poses a potential WMD threat, although it lacks the current motive. Lone Actors and Autonomous Cells CBRN Incidents by Lone Actors - Out of the total 38 CBRN incidents recorded since 2012, 18 are attributed to lone actors and autonomous cells. - Seventy-seven percent of these cases involve religious or ethno-nationalist motivations, making it challenging to isolate speciﬁc threats. Challenges in Detecting Lone Actors - Lone actors and autonomous cell plots are difﬁcult to detect, driven by unpredictable and idiosyncratic motives. - Motivations can range from doctrines and pathologies to individualistic emotional impulses, making detection challenging. Threats Posed by Lone Actors - Lone actors may have modest technical capabilities but present operational opportunities advantageous for WMD attacks. - Insider access, speciﬁcally technical insiders with source materials and knowledge, poses a signiﬁcant CBRN threat. - Promotion of insider attacks by terrorist organizations through magazines and manifestos increases the likelihood of successful WMD attacks by lone actors, with chemical attacks being the most likely threat. Technological Advances and Changing Adversaries Technological Advances and WMD Threats Diverse Technological Advances - Rapid technological advances in materials science, pharmaceuticals, communications, automation, biotechnology, and robotics are reported daily. - These developments have the potential to yield new forms of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Near-Term Developments: CBRN Agents - Focus on acquisition, production, and weaponization of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) agents. - Miniaturization, turn-key systems, rapid prototyping, and 3-D printing could facilitate WMD production. New Technologies' Impact on WMD Threats - Chemical microreactors enable self-contained, basementbased production of Chemical Weapons (CW) with reduced hazard and detection vulnerability. - Biotechnology "kits" simplify complex microbiological procedures, potentially leading to cheaper and safer WMD production. Democratization of Means of Destruction - Technologies quickly spreading to commercial applications, leading to the "democratization" of WMD means. - Increased difﬁculty for intelligence agencies to keep up with the pace of technological developments. Changing Adversaries and Education Adversarial Changes - Online technical education, exempliﬁed by platforms like the Kahn Academy and MOOCs, provides basic technical knowledge even in remote regions. - Pervasiveness of social media facilitates radicalization, enabling ideologues to reach individuals globally. Globalization and Information Technology - Globalization and information technology create more accomplished users, enabling terrorists to leverage technological advancements. - Terrorists move further up the WMD learning curve as technology becomes more accessible. VNSA Capabilities and Engineering Efforts Comparative Cases in VNSA Engineering - Examples like the Provisional Irish Republican Army's mortar program and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia building submarines demonstrate VNSAs' engineering capabilities. - Factors for success include substantial resources, technical expertise, safe havens, and organizational cultures that embrace learning. External Acquisition of Technologies - Need to study how VNSAs acquire sophisticated technologies externally, possibly from states, transnational criminal organizations, legitimate enterprises, or other violent groups. - Potential for "unholy alliances" between transnational criminal organizations and terrorists, posing new WMD threats. Superempowered Individuals and Threat Mitigation Concept of Superempowered Individuals - Superempowered individuals, with the power to disrupt societies, could emerge from the conﬂuence of technological trends. - Potential for individuals combining intense ideological motivation with the capacity for signiﬁcant violence, increasing the likelihood of CBRN weapon use. Terrorist Technology Adoption Model (T-TAM) - T-TAM assesses the likelihood of a VNSA gaining awareness, deciding to pursue, and successfully acquiring a given technology. - Speciﬁc terrorist-technology dyads pose the greatest concern, emphasizing the need for a nuanced approach to assessing threats. Demonstration Effect in WMD Attacks - The role of demonstration in spurring the diffusion of weapons. - Successful WMD attacks by one VNSA can catalyze future attacks by reducing uncertainty and showcasing feasibility. Helen E. Purkitt & Stephen Burgess (2002) South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme: A Historical and International Perspective, Journal of Southern African Studies, 28:2, 229-253, The article discusses South Africa's clandestine chemical and biological warfare (CBW) program known as Project Coast, which was a covert weapons of mass destruction (WMD) initiative sponsored by the apartheid regime. Unlike the welldocumented evolution and dismantling of South Africa's nuclear program, details about Project Coast are still emerging. The primary sources of information are testimonies and evidence presented at South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in 1997 and 1998 and the criminal trial of the program's director, Dr. Wouter Basson, from 2000 to April 2002. The analysis aims to contribute to the understanding of the case by identifying historical roots and factors inﬂuencing the program's evolution. It also explores international linkages that developed under Project Coast. The information is based on published documents and interviews with ofﬁcials and researchers in the United States and South Africa. There is disagreement among analysts regarding the assessment of South Africa's past covert biochemical programs. Some, like Mangold and Goldberg, argue that Project Coast was the second most sophisticated after the Soviet Union's program, while others, like Gould and Folb, characterize it as a modest program based on pedestrian science and insights from the 1950s. The article discusses some characteristics of the program that may help explain these varying assessments. The Roots of South Africa’s Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme Historical Background The decision to launch Project Coast is situated within South Africa's history of participating in early CBW research as a member of the western alliance. The country, however, became isolated due to racial policies, leading to a shift in perceptions of threat. Evolution of CBW Programs in South Africa Early CBW Research (1914–1945) South African troops faced the threat of CBW during the World Wars, contributing to the country's early involvement in CBW research. The mining industry's development of explosives linked with chemical agents in the 1930s played a role. Post-World War II Military Interest Despite dumping mustard gas in 1946, South Africa maintained military interest in CBW, with the Defence Force continuing a small research program until the initiation of Project Coast. Military ofﬁcers received training in chemical and biological warfare in the 1950s. Civilian Support for CBW Research Civilian organizations, including Afrikaans universities and the Council for Scientiﬁc and Industrial Research (CSIR), played a role in supporting South Africa's CBW research. The CSIR funded basic research projects in the ﬁeld. External Factors Inﬂuencing CBW Research The use of chemical weapons by Egyptians in Yemen (1962– 1967) prompted concerns about the African National Congress obtaining such weapons. Political unrest at home and South Africa's isolation led to a heightened interest in bio-chemical research. Cooperation with Israel and Shift in Attitudes The article highlights the 'laager complex' and isolation of South Africa, drawing parallels with Israel's 'Masada complex.' By the late 1960s and early 1970s, both countries cooperated on armaments development, including nuclear weapons and suspected chemical and biological warfare research. Resistance and Scepticism Military Resistance Senior generals of the South African Defence Force requested aggressive CBW agents in the early 1970s, but resistance from W. de Villiers and concerns about the complexities and costs of CBW slowed momentum. Scepticism and Concerns Widespread concerns among military analysts, including de Villiers, about the practicality of CBW in Africa, given the climate and potential risks to one's own troops and population, temporarily slowed the push for a sophisticated CBW program. Counter-insurgency and CBW in Southern Africa The passage details the increased support and involvement of South Africa's apartheid leaders in counter-insurgency programs during the 1960s and 1970s, particularly in neighbouring states. The experiences gained in these operations inﬂuenced the trajectory of South Africa's chemical and biological warfare (CBW) development in the 1980s. Counter-Insurgency Programs in Neighbouring States Cooperation with Portuguese Forces South Africa increased security force cooperation with Portuguese forces in Angola and Mozambique during the 1960s. This collaboration provided training opportunities and exposure to unconventional chemical and biological weapons. Involvement in Rhodesia South Africa assisted Rhodesian police and defence forces in the face of increased "terrorist" threats. South African Police (SAP) and military personnel were sent for border patrols and to train Rhodesian intelligence personnel. This collaboration led to the sharing of counter-insurgency techniques, including the use of defoliants and napalm. Use of Poisons and Unconventional Tactics The Selous Scouts, a Rhodesian unit, experimented with poisons, poisoned pens, and bacteriological cultures. South African military personnel stationed in Rhodesia learned from these experiments, which included poisoning water supplies and contaminating rivers with toxins. South African Support for Rhodesia South Africa became a principal source of funding for Rhodesian counter-insurgency, including support for the Selous Scouts. Financial aid reportedly extended to a rudimentary chemical and biological warfare plant in Rhodesia, suggesting South Africa's involvement in CBW projects. Integration of Rhodesian Forces in South Africa After Zimbabwe's political transition in 1980, elite Rhodesian counter-insurgency forces, including those experienced in CBW tactics, moved to South Africa. They were integrated into special units of the South African Defence Force (SADF) and South African Police (SAP). Impact on South African Defence Force Tactics The Rhodesian experience signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the tactics of the former South African Defence Force. SADF Special Forces and SAP ofﬁcers stationed in Rhodesia studied the organizational structures and tactics of the Selous Scouts, incorporating similar CBW tactics in Namibia and Angola. Continuation of Tactics in South Africa Tactics learned from Rhodesia, including the use of chemical and biological agents, were employed by South African forces in covert support operations, particularly against political dissidents. The Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) continued these tactics in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Collaboration with Project Coast Eugene De Kock, in charge of the Civil Cooperation Bureau, collaborated with Wouter Basson, the director of Project Coast's CBW program. This collaboration involved the supply of "special tools" for interrogations and the elimination of political dissidents using customized orders. Perceptions of a Soviet and Cuban ‘Threat’ Collapse of Portuguese Colonialism Takeover of Angola and Mozambique The collapse of Portuguese colonialism during 1974–1976 resulted in revolutionary communist regimes taking over Angola and Mozambique, backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba. South Africa, feeling abandoned by western allies, decided to intervene militarily in Angola. Sense of Abandonment South African leaders, including Magnus Malan, expressed a sense of abandonment by western allies, particularly the United States, during the military intervention in Angola. Facing Sovietbacked Cuban troops alone, South African ofﬁcials realized the need for defensive and offensive capabilities, including nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons. Motivations for Developing CBW Capabilities Rationale for CBW Programs Ofﬁcially, the South African government justiﬁed the development of NBC capabilities as a response to the "communist onslaught." Generals like Malan and Meiring argued that CBW programs were essential to counter potential threats from the Soviets, Cubans, and guerrilla groups like ANC and SWAPO. Protection Against Biological Weapons General Georg Meiring highlighted the SADF's pursuit of protection against biological weapons in the 1970s. The term "poor man's atomic bomb" was associated with biological weapons, and concerns grew about their potential use by Soviet-trained SWAPO and ANC/MK guerrillas. Acceleration of Nuclear and Missile Programs The acceleration of NBC and missile programs was not solely motivated by defensive considerations. South African ofﬁcials, including General Bill Sass, suggested that the nuclear weapons program aimed to induce a Soviet nuclear threat, attracting attention from the US and the West. Complex Motivations Need for Defensive CBW Capabilities Gould and Folb summarize the ofﬁcial rationale presented at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), emphasizing the need for defensive CBW capabilities due to Soviet backing of Cuban forces in Angola. Resource Allocation for Offensive Purposes Contrary to ofﬁcial justiﬁcations, evidence suggests that South Africa continued to allocate substantial resources to develop CBW capabilities for both defensive and offensive purposes after the intervention in Angola. The passage emphasizes that deﬁnitive conclusions require access to ofﬁcial South African documents from the 1970s. Difﬁculties in Identifying and Documenting CBW Attacks: Lessons Learned Veriﬁcation Challenges in CBW Attacks The South African case highlights the difﬁculty in conﬁrming CBW attacks and identifying the initiator. The passage emphasizes the extensive documentation of the challenges faced in verifying CBW incidents, particularly the complexities introduced into military theaters. Military Activities in Southern Africa Support for UNITA and RENAMO From the late 1970s, South Africa increased its military activities, supporting UNITA in Angola and the Mozambican Resistance Movement (RENAMO) in Mozambique. Cassinga Raid In May 1978, the South African Defence Force (SADF) launched Operation Barnacle, targeting the ANC and Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). The Cassinga raid resulted in accusations of chemical warfare, highlighting difﬁculties in verifying CBW incidents. Challenges Faced by South African Troops Defensive Measures During the 1980s, South African troops in Angola faced increased costs and maneuverability problems as they had to wear defensive CBW masks and uniforms. Daily changes in CBW uniforms and avoidance of local water supplies added to the challenges. Veriﬁcation Difﬁculties The SADF experienced difﬁculties verifying alleged CBW gas use by Cuban-backed Angolan government forces. Reports persisted of SADF forces using chemical agents against SWAPO and refugee camps, with challenges in irrefutably rebutting these allegations. - Testing Activities Reports in early 1989 suggested SADF testing of organophosphates, tear gas, battleﬁeld missile warheads, and even a miniaturized nuclear device. Alleged testing and resulting casualties raised questions about compliance with international commitments. Violation of International Commitments Geneva Conventions and BWC If South African forces were involved in offensive CBW in the 1970s, it would violate international commitments, including the 1925 Geneva Conventions and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC). Credibility of Project Coast Claims that Project Coast, developed in the 1980s, was a defensive program in response to the Soviet and Cuban threat lose credibility if the former apartheid regime had chemical and biological weapons in the 1970s. General Proposition The passage concludes by proposing a general proposition: isolated regimes in the international community may continue to violate commitments to international law when perceived threats to their survival grow. ‘Total Onslaught’ and Project Coast Military Involvement in Angola South Africa's military engagement in Angola, combined with domestic unrest, contributed to the development of Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) capabilities. Domestic Unrest and CBW Programme Concerns and Catalysts Starting in the mid-1970s, rising domestic political unrest and opposition to apartheid fueled the research and development of CBW capabilities as a means to neutralize opponents and address large-scale offensive scenarios. Weaponisation Plans While evidence suggests weaponisation plans were not operationalized, the dual pressures of military involvement in Angola and growing domestic instability ensured secretive decision-making processes. Soweto Uprisings and Political Instability 1976 and Subsequent Unrest The Soweto uprisings of 1976 and the subsequent waves of rebellion until 1984 prompted the apartheid regime to explore unconventional means, including the potential use of chemical agents, to control or incapacitate large groups of people. Muldergate Scandal Simultaneously, the "Muldergate" scandal in the mid-1970s revealed corruption within the Afrikaner-dominated bureaucracies, providing a pre-condition for top ofﬁcials like Wouter Basson to exploit the CBW program for personal gain. Leadership Changes and Total Strategy P. W. Botha's Presidency In 1978, P. W. Botha replaced B. J. Vorster as President and introduced his vision of the "total strategy," consolidating power in the military's hands. Military Orientation and Reforms Botha favored advanced weapons projects and covert operations to strengthen South Africa against adversaries, leading to internal and external military and paramilitary operations. Legitimization of Deviant Behavior Survival Tactics Under the framework of "any means necessary to survive," the regime sanctioned practices like assassinations, torture, smuggling, forgery, propaganda, and subversion as legitimate weapons against perceived threats. Project Coast Initiation Preparations for Project Coast, a chemical and biological warfare program, began under the direction of P. W. Botha and SADF Chief Magnus Malan. Surgeon General Nieuwoudt and Wouter Basson spearheaded the program in collaboration with university scientists and weapons development specialists. International Contacts In the late 1970s, Nieuwoudt and Basson reached out to South African university scientists and international experts in the scientiﬁc community to gather support for Project Coast. The Organisational Context of Project Coast The decision to house Project Coast, the chemical and biological warfare program, within the SADF Medical Service (SAMS) had signiﬁcant implications for management and research direction. Organizational Context Special Forces Connection Project Coast operated within SAMS, a separate medical branch with close ties to Special Forces, providing a secretive and loosely managed organizational context. Weak Managerial Oversight The proximity to Special Forces and weak managerial oversight led to personal abuse of authority and corruption by Project Coast manager, Wouter Basson. Organizational Changes due to Angola Involvement South Africa's military involvement in Angola in the 1970s and 1980s prompted organizational shifts, ensuring military control of the CBW program. SAMS Restructuring SAMS was restructured, becoming a new and separate fourth branch of the military, equal in command and administration to the existing three branches. Immediate Field Treatment Importance Recognition of the importance of immediate ﬁeld treatment for SADF soldiers, dating back to the Anglo-Boer War, justiﬁed elevating and reorganizing SAMS. 7th Battalion Autonomy The 7th Battalion of SAMS was tasked with managing the CBW program, enjoying a large degree of autonomy, strict conﬁdentiality, and operating on a 'need-to-know' basis. Autonomy of 7th Battalion Special Services Operations The 7th Battalion, serving as the medical support organization for special services operations, granted Dr. Wouter Basson an unusual level of decision latitude and autonomy. Surgeon General's Role While the military Surgeon General oversaw seven medical battalions, the secret nature of 7th Battalion's operations, especially during Angola incursions, allowed for operational autonomy. Shifting Functions As Special Forces' combat-related functions diminished, the 7th Battalion, under SAMS, engaged in new basic research projects and the development of chemical and biological weapons. Leadership and Recruitment Recruitment of Wouter Basson Major General Nieuwoudt recruited Major (Dr) Wouter Basson, a charismatic and effective leader, as the head of Project Coast, leveraging his entrepreneurial skills and connections. Charismatic Leadership Wouter Basson's charismatic leadership and effective recruitment strategies attracted skilled medical researchers from the military and civilian scientiﬁc communities. Sense of Patriotism Researchers, predominantly Afrikaners, joined Project Coast driven by a sense of patriotic duty, nationalistic zeal, and the belief that their work was crucial for national security. Project Coast (1981–1993) Ofﬁcial Principles of Project Coast: The principles guiding Project Coast were established through discussions in the State Security Council and the SADF leadership. Identiﬁcation of Offensive CBW Needs: The realization of the need for offensive CBW capabilities led to discussions on potential applications, including crowd control, counterinsurgency, assassinations, and black population control. Principles Finalization (April 1981): A top-level SADF committee ﬁnalized the principles for Project Coast in April 1981, emphasizing secrecy, emulation of the Soviet offensive program, and the use of front companies for research. Secrecy and Front Companies : Secrecy was deemed essential, leading to the exclusion of the state arms producer (ARMSCOR) from the initial phases. Front companies were used to conduct research in top-secret installations. Project Coast Establishment: Project Coast was formally established in May 1981 by Surgeon General Major General Nieuwoudt, with Defense Minister Magnus Malan and Finance Minister Barend du Plessis' approval. Operation Protea (August 1981): The launch of Operation Protea in Angola in August 1981, where evidence of Cuban preparations for chemical warfare was discovered, inﬂuenced the development of Project Coast. Tasking of Wouter Basson: A 'kitchen cabinet' comprising top ofﬁcials tasked Dr. Wouter Basson, a lieutenant colonel in the 7th SAMS Battalion, with managing all aspects of Project Coast, both defensive and offensive. Budget and Working Group: Project Coast had an estimated annual budget of $10 million, with a staff of 200. A Project Working Group, including Surgeon-General Nieuwoudt and his successor Dr. Niels Knobel, supervised the project. Procurement and Sanctions-Busting: Wouter Basson undertook procurement, often involving black market activities and sanctions-busting, with limited civilian leadership and oversight. The Special Defence Account limited access by the AuditorGeneral. Chemical and Biological Agents Development: Delta G Scientiﬁc Company and Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (RRL) were involved in developing chemical and biological agents. RRL researched biological agents, including anthrax, cholera, and various pathogens. Project Coast's Activities (1982-1986): Project Coast claimed its ﬁrst victims in 1982 with 'Operation Duel,' involving the elimination of SWAPO prisoners. Allegations include the use of CBW against regime opponents and supplying poisoned substances. Crowd Control Agents and Unrest (1984-1986): Growing unrest in 1984 prompted efforts to develop crowd control agents. The development of 'New Generation Tear Gas' (NGT or CR gas) and efforts to counteract widespread protests intensiﬁed. Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) and Third Force: The creation of the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) in 1986 marked the establishment of an alleged 'third force' dedicated to preventing the ANC/MK from taking power. End of Uprisings (1987): By 1987, widespread uprisings had largely ended, and negotiations between the apartheid regime and Mandela continued. Project Coast's collaboration with the CCB intensiﬁed in response to perceived threats. Continued Collaboration (1987): Amidst the end of uprisings, Project Coast continued collaborating with the CCB, with Basson supplying CBW poisons for assassination purposes based on perceived threats from the ANC/MK. Plans for Weaponisation and more Sophisticated Chemical and Biological Weapons Planned Escalation of Programme (1985): By 1985, Project Coast directors were planning a signiﬁcant escalation of the chemical and biological warfare programme, including the establishment of a mass production facility for biological agents. Expansion of Roodeplaat Research Laboratories: A new wing was added to Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (RRL) to accommodate a production-scale laboratory with advanced fermenters capable of producing large quantities of anthrax and other biological agents. International Involvement and Intelligence: British scientists from Porton Down, UK, reportedly provided assistance to Project Coast in raising safety levels. Basson's activities attracted the attention of American and British intelligence agencies, but no signiﬁcant actions were taken against him. Decision Against Funding Larger Fermenters: Despite plans for expansion, Project Coast ultimately decided against funding larger fermenters. Senior SADF ofﬁcials determined that biological agents would be used primarily in low-intensity regional conﬂicts and assassinations. Comparison with Other CBW Programmes: Although smaller in scale compared to the USSR, South Africa's CBW programme was described as the second most sophisticated, surpassing the Iraqi programme uncovered in 1995. Weaponisation and Collaboration with ARMSCOR: Weaponisation efforts began in cooperation with ARMSCOR, involving the development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and missiles capable of carrying chemical and biological agents. This was kept top secret, and weaponisation was only discovered by the Americans and British in 1994. Reports of Battleﬁeld Testing: Reports suggest that the former South African government tested battleﬁeld weapons capable of carrying biological agents and chemicals, although these reports remain unconﬁrmed. Difﬁculty in developing effective delivery systems for biological agents was noted. Progress in Delivery Systems: While sophisticated aerosolisation delivery systems were not fully developed, conceptual studies were underway. Progress was made in developing artillery warheads and tactical missiles capable of delivering nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) warheads. Unanswered Questions: Important questions remain regarding the types of missiles and warheads built, tested, and possibly sold abroad by South Africa's CBW programmes, highlighting the need for further investigation. Efforts to Control Population Growth: a Black Bomb? Population Control Motivation: Project Coast's objectives expanded beyond defense, with a focus on population control as part of the strategy to ensure the survival of white South Africa. The fear of a 'black tidal wave' in the early 1980s drove these efforts. Genetic Engineering Research: Genetic engineering research was a signiﬁcant component of Project Coast's activities. Scientists sought a peptide synthesizer to assist in genetic engineering, indicating an interest in advanced biotechnological approaches. The Concept of the 'Black Bomb': Project Coast scientists explored the concept of a 'black bomb' using bacteria or biological agents designed to selectively harm or weaken black individuals while sparing whites. This was envisioned as a method to control or suppress insurrections by affecting speciﬁc racial groups. Controlling Black Fertility: Efforts were reportedly made to control black fertility as a means of limiting black population growth. Research included investigating birth control methods to reduce the black birth rate, with a particular focus on clandestine application. Development of Contraceptives: Project Coast allegedly supported a project aiming to develop contraceptives that could be applied secretly to blacks. A vaccine for males and females was said to have been developed, with ongoing efforts to ﬁnd a discreet means of making blacks sterile without their knowledge. Unethical Research Practices: Researchers were reportedly exploring the development of products that could be administered without the recipient's knowledge, either orally or through injections. The goal was to implement birth control measures without the awareness of the affected individuals. Water Supply Contamination: Testimonies at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission suggested that Project Coast researchers were considering the option of introducing birth control substances into water supplies, indicating a willingness to explore various methods of population control. Project Coast’s International Links International Collaborations: Project Coast's research and development efforts were bolstered by collaborations with various nation-states, although many details remain classiﬁed. Open sources, cooperative exchanges with foreign ofﬁcials and scientists, and legal procurement of chemical agents contributed to the project's progress. Procurement Network: As sanctions against South Africa increased in the 1980s, Basson established his own international network facilitated by procurement specialists paid by ARMSCOR. This network enabled Basson to conduct illegal activities, including drug manufacturing, and move funds offshore. Expansion of International Contacts: Starting from 1981, Basson and Project Coast scientists intensiﬁed their international contacts, particularly at conferences on Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW). Despite some restrictions, interactions with American scientists occurred, facilitated by the Reagan administration's policy of 'constructive engagement.' Cooperation with Israel: The extent and signiﬁcance of South Africa's collaboration with Israel in CBW research remain undisclosed. However, historical ties between the two nations, particularly in nuclear and missile development, suggest potential cooperation in NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) efforts. Revelations from California: In early 2000, revelations emerged from Southern California regarding Project Coast's international connections and interest in biological warfare and birth control methods. The case involved Dr. Larry Ford, who was working on a microbicide contraceptive and claimed ties to the SADF and CIA. Unsubstantiated Claims and Investigations: Investigations into Ford's activities revealed unsubstantiated claims about his involvement with the SADF and CIA, as well as allegations of international conspiracy. However, police were unable to corroborate many of these claims, suggesting potential exaggeration or misinformation. Basson's Foreign Visits: Basson continued his foreign visits and interactions throughout the 1980s, reportedly visiting countries like Iraq, Iran, the Philippines, North Korea, Croatia, and meeting with Colombian drug cartels. The details and outcomes of these visits remain undisclosed. Allegations and Speculations: While no evidence directly links Project Coast to the intentional use of HIV or microbicide contraceptives, allegations and speculations persist. Population projections by groups like the Broederbond during the mid-1980s fueled concerns about the future impact of AIDS, potentially inﬂuencing government policies. Future Implications: As the rate of HIV infections peaked in South Africa, allegations regarding the motivations behind apartheid-era policies may resurface. The ongoing scrutiny of Project Coast's activities underscores the need for further investigation into its international connections and objectives. Corruption and the Deterioration of Project Coast Financial Exploitation and Privatization: Basson capitalized on lax ﬁnancial oversight, securing signiﬁcant funds from Project Coast years before state-owned corporations were privatized. In the mid-1980s, he involved friends and trusted employees in investing in ofﬁcial front corporations, proﬁting immensely upon their privatization in the late 1980s. Coordination of Funds: Basson served as the central ﬁgure coordinating funds for Project Coast, acting as the liaison between scientists, the army, and the government. As the project expanded into genetic engineering and drug manufacturing, millions were diverted into elaborate holding companies. Money Laundering and Offshore Companies: Basson and his American accountant, David Webster, established an intricate web of foreign shell companies to launder money. Offshore entities like WPW Investments, incorporated in the Cayman Islands, facilitated complex ﬁnancial transactions, raising suspicions of fraudulent activities. International Investigations: The investigation into Project Coast's ﬁnancial irregularities, led by forensic auditor Hendrik Bruwer, spanned seven years and covered countries such as the USA, UK, Belgium, Switzerland, Croatia, and Luxembourg. The complexity of business transactions led to sessions of the trial being held in Jacksonville, Florida. Halt of Project Coast in 1988: Corruption by Basson and others led to Project Coast's abrupt halt in 1988. With the diminishing communist threat and the anticipation of the apartheid regime's end, funds allocated for Project Coast were redirected for personal gains, including investments in offshore accounts. Privatization and Corruption: As early as 1988, top government ofﬁcials initiated the privatization and liberalization of the defense industry, creating opportunities for corruption. Basson's alleged purchase of a sophisticated peptide synthesizer in 1988 became a focal point of the investigation, with accusations of fraud and diversion of funds. Drug Manufacturing and Crowd Control: Towards the end of Project Coast, scientists appeared to be involved in manufacturing drugs, including a signiﬁcant quantity of methaqualone in 1988. Witnesses at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings provided explanations, such as using methaqualone for crowd control purposes by mixing it into gas. Role of Surgeon General Dr. Knobel: Dr. Knobel, Surgeon General from 1988, believed in Basson's claims of penetrating facilities globally. However, he acknowledged insufﬁcient monitoring of Basson's activities and identiﬁed the committee management approach as a mistake. Committee Oversight Challenges: Despite committee oversight, especially the Project Coast steering committee, Basson operated autonomously, exploiting a parallel structure known as the 'Small Command Council.' General Liebenberg believed this council superseded the steering committee in ﬁnancial reviews and collaboration with Basson. Controversial Funding Practices: General Geldenhuys defended the unconventional arms trade, citing South Africa's status as the 'skunk' of the world. However, he contradicted previous TRC statements, claiming that funds were audited, and there was no disproportional spending on Project Coast, challenging the objections of the Ofﬁce of Serious Economic Offenses. Adam Bower and Richard Price, Moral Mission Accomplished? Assessing the Landmine Ban, in Justice, Sustainability, and Security : Global Ethics for the 21st Century, edited by E. Heinze The text discusses the ethical dimensions of the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT), which aims to eliminate antipersonnel landmines globally. It acknowledges skepticism regarding the role of ethics in international politics, particularly in matters of security and warfare. Some argue that moral norms are secondary to material power and state interests. Despite the non-traditional diplomatic process that led to the MBT, the text suggests that non-hegemonic approaches may have greater potential than skeptics recognize. The chapter aims to assess the ethical impact of the landmine ban over a decade, considering state and non-state compliance. The ethical basis of the ban is rooted in a humanitarian logic, seeking to minimize harm to civilian casualties. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the resulting MBT embody this moral norm, transcending its formal legal expression. The treaty addresses various dimensions, including ending landmine use, production, and trade, demining affected areas, and providing victim assistance. The assessment considers state and non-state actors, examining compliance with humanitarian requirements. The analysis aims to answer whether meaningful progress in human security is achieved through the landmine ban. Preliminary ﬁndings indicate a high degree of compliance, suggesting substantial advancement of the moral purpose of the norm. However, the text acknowledges the contingency of normative developments and presents important caveats to a teleological view of moral progress. Overall, the landmine ban is portrayed as a hopeful ethical endeavor, contrasting with other global norms, with a recognition of the complexity and contingencies involved. Assessing Ethical Advancements against Landmines 1. Evaluating the Inﬂuence of Moral Norms The text opens with the question of how to assess the impact of moral norms in global politics. The primary metrics discussed involve evaluating the behavior of relevant actors in relation to the norm and measuring the resulting moral outcomes. The focus, in the case of landmines, is on reducing and ultimately eliminating the humanitarian impact of antipersonnel (AP) mines. 2. Key Goals of the Landmine Ban The chapter identiﬁes the key goals of the campaign and resulting treaty regarding landmines. Beyond merely ending the use of AP mines, the broader objectives include demining affected areas and providing victim assistance. The primary emphasis in the analysis is on the elimination of landmine use and the cessation of landmine casualties as the ultimate end goals, with demining and victim assistance seen as potential long-term outcomes. 3. Behavioral Indicators of Compliance The text explores behavioral indicators to assess compliance with the ban on landmine use and the resulting casualties. The focus is on understanding to what extent relevant actors adhere to the norm and achieve the desired moral outcomes. The analysis concentrates on the elimination of landmine use and casualties, with the expectation that success in these areas would eventually render demining and victim assistance unnecessary. 4. Norm Development and Robustness The literature on norms in International Relations is introduced to emphasize the signiﬁcance of additional measures in understanding norm development and robustness. The discussion delves into the mechanisms by which norms evolve and exert effects that go beyond straightforward assessments of landmine use and casualties. The text argues for a more comprehensive evaluation of the global commitment to the landmines norm by considering discursive dynamics and justiﬁcations for behaviors. This includes recognizing subtle differences in compliance, such as distinguishing between states violating a norm as a matter of course, violating it in extreme situations, or facing noncompliance due to resource constraints. 5. Assessing Discursive Dynamics Building on the need for a nuanced understanding of norm development, the chapter advocates for assessing discursive dynamics. This involves analyzing justiﬁcations for various behaviors and understanding different stages along the continuum of norm development and contestation, from rejection to rhetorical acceptance to internalization. The text highlights the importance of considering these discursive elements in evaluating the robustness of the landmines norm. Behavior and the Ethical Imperatives of the Mine Ban To evaluate the effectiveness of the ban on antipersonnel landmines, it's crucial to analyze changes in state behavior in accordance with the treaty's core principles. The Landmine Monitor, an initiative by the ICBL, offers detailed insights into state policies and practices regarding landmines, providing valuable data for assessment. This civil society monitoring mechanism ensures that compliance and implementation of the ban remain under constant scrutiny. Membership and Adherence to the Ban The Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) garnered early and widespread support, with 160 states becoming full parties as of November 2012. Contrary to expectations, even states embroiled in conﬂicts, such as Turkey, joined the treaty, highlighting its normative authority. The treaty's legitimacy encouraged states to commit, despite security concerns. However, signiﬁcant states like the US, China, Russia, and India remain non-parties, posing challenges to the norm's consolidation. Role of Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) Non-state armed groups have also shown willingness to adhere to the ban, signifying broader acceptance of the norm. Their participation increases ethical standards in armed conﬂicts and can inﬂuence state actors to follow suit. The commitments made by NSAGs, facilitated by NGOs like Geneva Call, contribute to the diffusion of international norms. Compliance Patterns States' adherence to treaty obligations demonstrates the robustness of the ban. While violations are rare, they are treated as exceptions by the international community. The decline in antipersonnel landmine use post-MBT indicates a signiﬁcant shift in state behavior, despite ongoing conﬂicts. Notably, even prominent users like the US refrained from using landmines in recent interventions. Production and Transfer Restrictions The norm against landmine production and transfer has led to a decline in these activities globally. Former producers have ceased production, and illicit transfers are minimal. Instances of attempted transfers, like the PW Defence Ltd case, highlight the norm's effectiveness in curbing these activities. Stockpile Destruction and Challenges While many states have destroyed their stockpiles, some have failed to meet deadlines, undermining the treaty's effectiveness. The existence of large stockpiles among non-parties poses a humanitarian risk and challenges the consensus on landmines as unacceptable weapons. Overall, the ban on antipersonnel landmines has signiﬁcantly altered state behavior and reduced the prevalence of these weapons in armed conﬂicts. Despite challenges and instances of non-compliance, the norm against landmines has gained substantial traction, reshaping international practices and perceptions surrounding these weapons. Discourse and the Socialization of the Mine Ban Norm Discourse and the Emergence of the Mine Ban Norm Widespread Adherence to MBT The Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) has seen widespread adherence, suggesting a fundamental shift in international norms. This adherence prompts an exploration of factors inﬂuencing compliance, including the examination of ofﬁcial statements by state and non-state actors as evidence of moral change. Humanitarian Appeal in State Endorsements States, both parties and non-parties, frequently cite the humanitarian appeal of the MBT as a reason for their support. For example, the Philippines, amidst internal conﬂict, expressed its commitment to end the use of landmines due to the call of human conscience. Croatia and other mine-affected states similarly identiﬁed the humanitarian spirit of the ban in their endorsements. Evolution of State Views The acceptance of the mine ban norm did not emerge abruptly; states underwent a transformation in their views. Initially, antipersonnel landmines were not seen as particularly horrendous weapons. The shift was driven by a reconceptualization of landmines as a humanitarian issue, challenging the existing paradigm of disarmament or war. Role of Civil Society in Norm Diffusion The norm gained force through the association with a new role identity, making adherence socially desirable among responsible international citizens. Civil society actors and private individuals played a vital role in promoting the new norm, inﬂuencing states like Canada, Japan, and the UK. Retrospective Implications of the Norm Inﬂuence on Non-State Actors The norm's force extended to non-state actors, as seen in the ANC's response to criticism for using landmines during the struggle against apartheid. The ANC abandoned the use of landmines, citing adherence to principled humanitarian norms, showcasing how non-state armed groups align with international norms. Shifts in Expectations and Identities The transformative potential of legal norms and civil society engagement enabled rapid shifts in foundational expectations. States such as Canada, Japan, and the UK accepted the norm, even at the cost of losing operational capabilities, aligning their identities with responsible international citizenship. Challenges to the Mine Ban Norm Contestation from Nonparties Despite widespread adherence, challenges persist. Nonparties, including major states like the US, China, India, Israel, Russia, and others, have contested the norm. Some argue for the enduring utility of landmines, emphasizing their role in defense. Technical and Material Impediments Some nonparties attribute their outlier status to technical and material impediments rather than opposition to the treaty itself. Laos, for instance, cites an inability to meet treaty obligations due to the severe concentration of unexploded ordinance. Ethical Dilemmas and Necessity Discourse States justify retaining antipersonnel landmines based on necessity, arguing for their value in defense. Some nonparties claim adherence to the ban's ethical goals but assert the necessity of landmines under speciﬁc security conditions. Indiscriminacy Claim Contestation Nonparties contest the claim that antipersonnel landmines are inherently indiscriminate weapons. They endorse Amended Protocol II as a more suitable means of addressing the threat while rejecting the MBT's absolute ban. Assessing Contesting Positions The contestation raises questions about the efﬁcacy of alternative approaches. While some nonparties support Amended Protocol II, evidence suggests that the MBT has broader support and more rigorous standards. Skepticism remains about the ethical justiﬁcations of contesting positions, with concerns about insincere rhetorical moves. Ethical Action and the Impact on Victims: Demining, Casualties, and Victim Assistance The discussion revisits the core objective of the volume, emphasizing the need for citizens and activists to address global injustices, protect the environment, and ensure human and international security. Impact of the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) Mixed Record in Demining Efforts Despite the effectiveness of the MBT in fostering compliance with core rules, the progress in clearing mined areas is less dramatic than the destruction of mine stockpiles. Estimates of the global landmine problem remain unreliable, and challenges persist in accurately assessing contaminated areas. Achievements in Demining Approximately 1,700 km² of mined areas have been cleared since the MBT's inception, resulting in the destruction of millions of antipersonnel and anti-vehicle mines. However, challenges persist, with around 3,000 km² of territory yet to be cleared. Civil society efforts and diplomatic engagement have been crucial in achieving improvements. Challenges in Demining Impediments to Progress While the mine ban movement raised awareness and prompted international demining assistance, challenges remain. More than 70 states are still mine-affected, and the number of fully compliant states has only slightly increased. Insufﬁcient survey, poor planning, and resource allocation are identiﬁed as impediments to progress, reﬂecting a lack of political commitment. Humanitarian Consequences The movement has contributed to reducing innocent casualties, with nearly 4,200 new casualties in 2010, an 84 percent reduction from the 1990s estimate of 26,000 landmine casualties per year. The MBT facilitates international funding and assistance for victim assistance and mine action. However, challenges persist in translating humanitarian goals into concrete results. Victim Assistance International contributions to mine action have substantially increased, reaching $518 million by 2008. Mine-affected states have also modestly increased national contributions. Despite efforts to establish best practices, the level of commitment remains insufﬁcient. Resources for victim care have not substantially improved, and challenges persist in providing extensive assistance in countries with limited social services. Conclusion: The Landmine Movement as Humanitarian Model The success of the landmines campaign in achieving widespread adherence to a robust treaty has positioned it as a model for transnational moral entrepreneurs addressing various global issues. Humanitarian Objectives of the Landmines Movement The landmines movement, with its primary objective of preventing civilian casualties from explosive remnants of war, has contributed signiﬁcantly to global cosmopolitanism. Ethical initiatives related to this movement have played a crucial role in fostering a sense of responsibility for protecting innocent lives. Application to Cluster Munitions In 2007, an international diplomatic meeting in Oslo assessed the applicability of the landmines movement to the issue of cluster munitions. This effort led to the creation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, attracting 111 state signatures and 77 ratiﬁcations. The success of applying the landmines model to cluster munitions demonstrates the potential for transnational moral initiatives. Challenges in Grafting the Model While the landmines movement served as a model for cluster munitions, attempts to apply the same model to other security issues, such as small arms and light weapons (SALW), have been less successful. Despite challenges, the landmines movement stands as a moral exemplar, countering skeptical disavowals and showcasing the possibility of humanitarian moral progress in global politics. Future Implications The extent to which the landmines movement will continue to serve as a model for other global moral initiatives remains uncertain. Its inﬂuence and impact on future transnational moral entrepreneurship are challenging to precisely determine. Nevertheless, the movement has established itself as a beacon of moral progress, refuting skepticism and encouraging efforts towards humanitarian objectives in world politics. Tom Sauer & Mathias Reveraert (2018) The potential stigmatizing e ect of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, The Nonproliferation Review, 25:5-6, 437-455 The article discusses the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), also known as the "ban treaty," which was supported by 122 states in 2017. The ban treaty aims to forbid the development, production, possession, and use of nuclear weapons, with the hope of strengthening the norm against their use. The article explores whether the TPNW can create a stigma around nuclear-armed states, potentially triggering societal and political debates within these states and accelerating the process of nuclear elimination. The concepts of stigma and stigmatization are explained, emphasizing the link between stigma and nuclear weapons. The article concludes by considering possible reactions from nuclear-armed states and their allies to this stigmatization process. Stigma and stigmatization Deﬁnition of Stigma - Sociologist Erving Goffman's deﬁnition of stigma as "an attribute that is deeply discrediting." - Historical context: In ancient Greece, inferior people were marked with a "stigma" indicating lower social status. - Evolution of stigma: From physical evidence to the disgrace itself. Construction of Stigma - Stigma depends on social classiﬁcation as deviant, where actual attributes do not align with societal expectations. - Social context is crucial, as stigmatized actors must share the same beliefs about identity as the 'normals.' Components of Stigmatization Process - Bruce Link and Jo Phelan's four components: labeling, stereotyping, separation of "us" and "them," and status loss and discrimination. - Power dynamics as an essential element in the social production of stigma. Examples of Stigmatization - Power dynamics in eighteenth-century England, nineteenthcentury United States, and twentieth-century Nazi Germany. - Labeling and stereotyping based on attributes such as race (African-American slaves, American Indians) and health status (schizophrenics, epileptics). - Status loss and discrimination leading to the devaluation, rejection, and exclusion of stigmatized individuals. Application of Stigma Concept to International Relations Stigma Research in Sociological and Medical Studies - Traditionally associated with mental illness and HIV/AIDS. - Jeffrey Chwieroth's study on the connection between stigma and the international ﬁnancial sector. - Patricia Shamai's research on the stigmatization of weapons of mass destruction. Stigma and nuclear weapons Overview of Nuclear Weapons - Nuclear weapons are acknowledged as the most destructive weapon systems without effective defense mechanisms. - Advocates argue that their destructive potential deters enemies, providing stability, security, and peace. - Nuclear weapons confer internal and external prestige. Debate on Nuclear Weapons - Advocates rely on the deterrent effect, while opponents highlight disadvantages like potential failure, proliferation, incidents, accidents, and ﬁnancial costs. - The humanitarian initiative leading to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) focuses on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapon use. Humanitarian Initiative and Stigmatization - The article explores whether non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) supporting the TPNW can stigmatize nuclear weapons and nuclear-armed states. - The central question is whether stigmatization through the ban treaty can accelerate the process of nuclear elimination. Existing Stigmatization of Nuclear Weapons - Preliminary inquiry: Examining whether nuclear weapons or their possessors are the primary target of stigmatization. - Evaluation of the current level of stigmatization for nuclear weapons and nuclear-armed states. Humanitarian Consequences - The humanitarian initiative emphasizes the potential (authorized, unauthorized, or accidental) use of nuclear weapons and its consequences. - Focus on questioning the extent to which this emphasis can contribute to the stigmatization of nuclear weapons and their possessors. Stigmatizing nuclear weapons or stigmatizing the nuclear-weapon states (NWS)? - Literature on stigma traditionally focuses on attributes directly related to individuals. - In the nuclear domain, emphasis on stigmatizing nuclear weapons rather than the states possessing them. Perception of Nuclear Weapons by Advocates - Advocates argue that nuclear weapons, due to their destructive potential, bring stability, security, and peace. - Nuclear weapons provide internal and external prestige. Stigmatization Perspective of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWS) - Stigmatizing the weapons is only effective if it leads to labeling and stereotyping of the states themselves. - Examination of the extent to which nuclear-armed states ar

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