Multinational Federalism in Canada PDF

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This page intentionally left blank  15 W i l l K y m l i c k a M u l t i n a t i o n a l F e d e r a l i s m in Canada: R e t h i n k i n g the Partnership Introduction A N ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF INK HAS BEEN SPILT RECENTLY ON THE ALLEGEDLY DISIN- tegrative and divisive impact of Canada's multiculturalism policies for immigrants. However, the real threat to Canada's long-term stability remains the failure to reach a satisfactory arrangement with Canada's non-immigrant national minorities — namely, the Quebecois and the Aboriginal peoples. I call these groups "national" minorities because they have fought to form themselves (or rather to maintain themselves) as separate and self-governing societies, and have adopted the language of "nationhood" to both express and justify this struggle for self-government.1 Thus it is no coincidence that the Quebec provincial legislature is called the "National Assembly," or that the main organization of Aboriginal bands is called the "Assembly of First Nations." These groups have defined them- selves as "nations" and, as such, they claim the same inherent rights of self-deter- mination as other colonized or conquered nations around the world. Because Canada contains these internal minority nationalisms, it is not usefully seen as a traditional "nation-state," but rather as a multination state. The crucial question facing Canada, or any other multination state, is how to recon- cile these competing nationalisms within a single state. The potential risk to social unity from such nationalist movements is obvious. One of the defining features of nationalism, historically, has been the quest for an independent state. (Indeed, nationalism is often defined as the view that nations and states should coincide.)2 Even if not explicitly secessionist, nationalists typically insist that the nation is the primary locus of political loyalty and allegiance, so that participation in any supranational political community is always a conditional one, assessed solely for pact 1 W i II l< y m I i c k a 16 how well such participation serves the interest of the primary national commu- nity. Once the Quebecois or Crees define themselves as a nation, therefore, it seems that their allegiance to Canada can only be derivative and conditional. Considerations of military security or economic gain may keep these national groups from pursuing secession. But once an ethnocultural group defines itself as a nation, the whole logic of political debate seems to change. Even if independence is not the preferred option, it becomes the benchmark against which other options are measured. The question is not "why seek more power than we now have?", but rather "why accept anything less than the independence which we initially possessed, and to which we are morally entitled?" In this way, the threat of secession always is present in multination states. Yet multination states are not doomed to disintegration. Many multination states have survived, and indeed flourished. However, the existence of such minority nationalisms dramatically changes, and constrains, our options. Institutions and principles which might work in a uni-national state will not work in a country with powerful minority nationalisms. In my view, much of the debate in Canada has yet to fully absorb these constraints. In this paper, I will try to spell out some of these constraints, and to devel- op an idea of "multinational federalism" which I think is responsive to them. My aim is not to give a detailed description of the institutions of such a multination- al federalism, but rather to explore the identities and self-conceptions of the var- ious parties to the partnership. I will begin by explaining why the explicit recognition of our "multinational" character is unavoidable if we are to secure the willing agreement of national minorities to a new partnership, and why this rules out familiar forms of symmetrical federalism. I will then turn to the more difficult part of the equation — namely, explaining how and why English-speaking Canadians might come to accept this new conception of Canada. The Need for National Recognition The adoption of the language of nationalism by the Quebecois and Aboriginals in Canada has disturbed some commentators, who view it as inevitably leading to secession. Even those who endorse some notion of self-government for Aboriginals and the Quebecois often wish to eliminate the language of nations and nationalism from the Canadian debate. Jeremy Webber, for example, argues that we should replace the term "nation" with that of "political community," since b e y o n d the i m p a s s e  17 Multinational Federalism in Canada: Rethinking the Partnership the term nation "carries the assumption that an individual can only have one nation."3 Adopting this exclusive conception of nationality implies that Quebecers must decide whether they are "Quebecers first," in which case they have no real loyalty to Canada and might as well secede, or "Canadians first," in which case they should relinquish the claim that Quebec has any special status as the forum for national self-government by the Quebecois. Webber argues that this is a false choice, and that most Quebecers have a real sense of loyalty to both Quebec and Canada, a multiple allegiance that cannot be captured in the lan- guage of either "Quebec nationalism" or "Canadian nationalism." I agree with Webber that most Quebecois, and most Aboriginals, have a genuine sense of loyalty to Canada as a political community. But it is hopeless, I think, to expect these groups to relinquish the language of nationalism. For one thing, it is simply too entrenched in our political vocabulary. More importantly, the language of nationhood serves a number of valuable functions for these groups. For example, it provides these groups with some standing (and, possibly, legal rights) under international law — nations and peoples have claims to self- government under international law which mere political subunits lack. And both Aboriginals and the Quebecois have cited international law to support their claims. Also, the language of nationhood adds an historical dimension to the group's claims, showing how demands today are not just political power-grabs by the current elite, but rather relate to a consistent history of struggles and negoti- ations which have defined the terms under which the group was incorporated into Canada. This sense of history not only provides a justification for current demands, but also strengthens the sense of collective identity needed to sustain nationalist mobilizations. The language of nationhood also serves as a way of differentiating their claims from those of other groups. It is important for both Aboriginals and the Quebecois to distinguish their claims from immigrant groups, on the one hand, and from the nine other provinces, on the other. Unlike immigrants, these nation- al groups seek robust forms of self-government, perhaps through some form of federalism, but unlike the other nine provinces, the appropriate form of federal- ism cannot be a purely "symmetrical" one which treats all federal subunits as identical in their rights and powers (for reasons I discuss later). The language of nationhood is uniquely able to explain these differences. What distinguishes Aboriginals and Quebec from immigrant groups and other provinces is that the part 1 W i l l K y m l i c k a 18 former are what I call below "nationality-based political units," in the sense that they provide the forum within which a national group exercises self-government. This points to yet another, larger, function of the language of nationhood — namely, to equalize the bargaining power between the majority and a nation- al minority. So long as political issues are discussed in terms of how the majority treats the "minority," then in a democratic society, the presumption will always be that majority rules. The language of nationhood questions these definitions of majority and minority. By defining the minority as a nation, it converts numeri- cal superiority/inferiority into a co-equal partnership. So there are several strategic reasons for adopting the language of nation- hood. But it is not simply strategic — the fact is that these groups are nations in the sociological sense. That is, they are historical societies, more or less institu- tionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and culture.4 Moreover, the power to name oneself is one of the most important powers sought by groups, and respecting this power is seen as a cru- cial test of one's respect for the group as a whole. We can see this in the efforts made to replace the name "negro," first with "Black" and then "African- American," or in the efforts of women to eliminate sexist language. If Aboriginals have adopted the label of "First Nations," can we seriously propose that they should refrain from doing so simply because the term "nation" makes some non- Aboriginals nervous? Indeed, any attempt to deny national minorities their claims to nationhood will be counter-productive, since it will be seen as an insult, as one more stage in the long history of denigrating their status as distinct peoples and cultures. If we wish to avoid the disintegrating effects of minority nationalism in Canada, therefore, our aim should not be to prevent groups from seeing them- selves as nations. Rather, our aim should be to break the link between nation and state — i.e., to challenge the presumption that an independent state is the only or best form for national self-government. One strategy for breaking the link between nation and state is to redefine the national minority's sense of its territory or homeland, so that it encompasses the country as a whole, rather than simply one region within it. This was Trudeau's strategy of "sea-to-sea bilingualism," which attempted to encourage French Canadians to reject the view that they were only "at home" in Quebec. Trudeau hoped that this strategy might eventually diminish the sense that English beyond t h e impasse  19 Multinational Federalism in Canada: Rethinking the Partnership and French formed distinct national groups, in favour of a new notion of Canada as a single nation of bilingual people who feel at home in both languages. But even if the overwhelming majority remained unilingual, and retained a strong sense of either English or French identity, this strategy would at least inhibit any secessionist potential, since it would undermine the sense that French Canadians' national aspirations could be achieved through the secession of Quebec.5 But this strategy is unrealistic. It makes no sense whatsoever in the context of Aboriginal peoples (and Trudeau never proposed that Aboriginal languages would be official languages from sea to sea). If the Nishga are to be able to pur- sue their national aspirations, it will only be in their part of British Columbia, not in New Brunswick. Even for French Canadians, the dream of sea-to-sea bilin- gualism is unrealistic. It was once a realistic strategy — there is no reason why the West could not have been settled equally by Francophones and Anglophones. If the half-million or more French Canadians who moved to the United States had instead settled out West, then the notion of Canada as a bilingual country from sea-to-sea would perhaps be a reality today. But French Canadians showed little inclination to move West, and whatever inclination they had was effectively ended by the execution of Riel, the first in a long series of events and policies (e.g., the Manitoba schools crisis) which made it clear that the French would only truly be at home in Quebec (and adjacent areas of Ontario and New Brunswick), and that the West would be overwhelmingly English-speaking.6 It was right and proper for Trudeau to denounce this history of exclusion, and to insist that French Canadians should be able to feel at home throughout Canada. And the policy of official bilingualism is, I think, an appropriate sym- bolic affirmation of that fact. But there is no chance today that this policy can reverse the reality that it is only within Quebec and parts of New Brunswick and Ontario that Francophones can truly live and work within their own societal cul- ture. There can be French-language churches and public schools in Alberta, and access to French-language media, but there is no way for Francophones to par- ticipate meaningfully in the political, economic or academic life of the province except in English. And the evidence is that despite the best efforts of federal bilin- gualism policies, francophone communities in the West are both economically marginalized and demographically shrinking. Therefore, Quebec will remain the heart of the French-speaking nation in Canada. Indeed, the main effect of sea-to-sea bilingualism is not to make living part 1 W i l l K y m l i c k a 20 outside of Quebec a more realistic option for the Quebecois, but rather to ensure that living in Quebec remains a viable option for English-speakers. Sea-to-sea bilingualism may have been intended to strengthen the opportunities for Francophones outside Quebec, but in Quebec it is widely seen instead as pro- tecting the rights of Anglophones in Quebec, whether they are native-born Anglophones or immigrant allophones. For this reason, unless it is accompanied by recognition of the special status of Quebec, the ideology of sea-to-sea bilingualism is often seen by the Quebecois as a threat to their very existence. Most Quebecois believe that a vibrant francophone culture cannot survive in Canada unless it survives in Quebec, and that the ongoing viability of the French culture in Quebec depends on ensuring that newcomers to the province, whether from overseas or other provinces, integrate into the franco- phone society. The Quebec provincial government, therefore, must play a pivotal role in maintaining the viability of the French society in Canada, and to fulfil this role, it must have the ability to regulate certain language rights. Any conception of sea-to-sea bilingualism that denies this fact is likely to be denounced in Quebec. Attempts to redefine the Quebecois as la nation canadienne-fran