Juncos Readings - European Foreign Policy PDF

JUNCOS READINGS Table of Contents SESSION 1. WHY COOPERATE? THEORISING EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY.................................................................. 3 ANDREATTA, FILIPPO AND LORENZO ZAMBERNARDI. “THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS”, IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, EDITED BY CHRISTOPHER HILL, MICHAEL SMITH, AND SOPHIE VANHOONACKER. 4TH ED., 45-63. OXFORD: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2023. ) [PDF]..............................3 POHL, BENJAMIN. “NEITHER BANDWAGONING, NOR BALANCING: EXPLAINING EUROPE’S SECURITY POLICY”, CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 34, NO. 2 (2013): 353-373. (HERE; PDF)................................................... 3 KEUKELEIRE, STEPHAN AND SHARON LECOCQ. “OPERATIONALISING THE DECENTRING AGENDA: ANALYSING EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY IN A NON-EUROPEAN AND POST-WESTERN WORLD”, COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 53, NO. 2 (2018): 277-295. (HERE; PDF)............................................................................................................................................... 3 SESSION 2: THE MAKING OF EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY......................................................................................... 4 JUNCOS, ANA E. “THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY: BETWEEN INTERGOVERNMENTALISM AND SUPRANATIONALISM”, IN THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, EDITED BY DERMOT HODSON, UWE PUETTER, SABINE SAURUGGER, AND JOHN PETERSON. 5TH ED., 299-320. OXFORD: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2022. ( HERE PDF)..........................................................................................................................................4 AMADIO VICERÉ, MARIA GIULIA. “LOOKING TOWARDS THE EAST: THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE’S ROLE IN EU FOREIGN POLICY ON KOSOVO AND UKRAINE”, EUROPEAN SECURITY 29, NO. 3 (2020): 337-358. (HERE; PDF).............................. 4 PORTELA, CLARA, PAULINA POSPIESZNA, JOANNA SKRZYPCZYŃSKA, AND DAWID WALENTEK. “CONSENSUS AGAINST ALL ODDS: EXPLAINING THE PERSISTENCE OF EU SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA”, JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 43, NO.6 (2021): 683-699. ( HERE; PDF)................................................................................................................................. 4 SESSION 3: THE EUROPEANISATION OF NATIONAL FOREIGN POLICIES.........................................................................5 LADRECH, ROBERT. EUROPEANIZATION AND NATIONAL POLITICS, 190-205 [CHAPTER 9]. BASINGSTOKE: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2017. (PERLEGO ; PDF)......................................................................................................................... 5 MÜLLER, PATRICK, KAROLINA POMORSKA, AND BEN TONRA. “THE DOMESTIC CHALLENGE TO EU FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING: FROM EUROPEANISATION TO DE-EUROPEANISATION?”, JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 43, NO. 5 (2021): 519-534. (HERE; PDF).................................................................................................................................. 5 DRYBURGH, LYNNE. “BLAIR’S FIRST GOVERNMENT (1997-2001) AND EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY: SEISMIC SHIFT OR ADAPTATION?”, BRITISH JOURNAL FOR POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 12, NO. 2 (2010): 257-273. (HERE; PDF)............................................................................................................................................... 6 GROSS, EVA. “GERMANY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE COOPERATION: THE EUROPEANIZATION OF NATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT”, SECURITY DIALOGUE 38, NO. 4 (2007): 501-520. (HERE; PDF)................................................. 6 IRONDELLE, BASTIEN. “EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE END OF FRENCH EUROPE?”, JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 30, NO. 1 (2009): 153-168. (HERE; PDF)................................................................................................ 6 JAKOBSEN, PETER VIGGO. “SMALL STATES, BIG INFLUENCE: THE OVERLOOKED NORDIC INFLUENCE ON THE CIVILIAN ESDP”, JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES 47, NO. 1 (2009): 81-102. (HERE; PDF)..............................................6 SESSION 4: PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD..................................................................................7 SCHIMMELFENNIG, FRANK AND ULRICH SEDELMEIER. “THE EUROPEANIZATION OF EASTERN EUROPE: THE EXTERNAL INCENTIVES MODEL REVISITED”, JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 27, NO. 6 (2020): 814-833. (HERE; PDF).........7 RICHTER, SOLVEIG AND NATASHA WUNSCH. “MONEY, POWER, GLORY: THE LINKAGES BETWEEN EU CONDITIONALITY AND STATE CAPTURE IN THE WESTERN BALKANS”, JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 27, NO. 1 (2020): 41-62. (HERE; PDF)................................................................................................................................................... 7 KOVAL, NADIIA AND MILADA ANNA VACHUDOVA. “EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT AND GEOPOLITICAL POWER IN THE FACE OF WAR”, JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES (2024), HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.1111/JCMS.13677. [PDF]..............7 SESSION 5: THE EU GLOBAL STRATEGY AND THE PURSUIT OF STRATEGIC AUTONOMY.................................................8 EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE. SHARED VISION, COMMON ACTION: A STRONGER EUROPE - A GLOBAL STRATEGY FOR THE EU’S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY, BRUSSELS, JUNE 2016 [FOREWORD AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY], ACCESSED 29 AUGUST 2024. HTTPS://EEAS.EUROPA.EU/ARCHIVES/DOCS/TOP_STORIES/PDF/EUGS_REVIEW_WEB.PDF. [PDF]................. 8 COTTEY, ANDREW. “ASTRATEGIC EUROPE”, JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES 58, NO. 2 (2020): 276-291. (YOU CAN ACCESS THE ONLINE VERSION OF THIS ARTICLE HERE). [PDF]............................................................................................. 8 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. A STRATEGIC COMPASS FOR SECURITY AND DEFENCE, BRUSSELS, MARCH 2022. HTTPS://WWW.EEAS.EUROPA.EU/SITES/DEFAULT/FILES/DOCUMENTS/STRATEGIC_COMPASS_EN3_WEB.PDF. [PDF]................... 8 JUNCOS, ANA E., AND SOPHIE VANHOONACKER. “THE IDEATIONAL POWER OF STRATEGIC AUTONOMY IN EU SECURITY AND EXTERNAL ECONOMIC POLICIES”, JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES 62, NO. 4 (2024): 955-972. (YOU CAN ACCESS THE ONLINE VERSION OF THIS ARTICLE HERE). [PDF]............................................................................................. 8 HELWIG, NIKLAS. “EU STRATEGIC AUTONOMY AFTER THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE: EUROPE'S CAPACITY TO ACT IN TIMES OF WAR”, JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES 61, ANNUAL REVIEW (2023): 57-67. (YOU CAN ACCESS THE ONLINE VERSION OF THIS ARTICLE HERE). [PDF].............................................................................................................. 8 SESSION 6: A GLOBAL SECURITY ACTOR? THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (CSDP)......................... 9 TARDY, THIERRY. “DOES EUROPEAN DEFENCE REALLY MATTER? FORTUNES AND MISFORTUNES OF THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY”, EUROPEAN SECURITY 27, NO. 2 (2018): 119-137. (HERE, PDF)..................................9 2 FIOTT, DANIEL. “AS YOU WERE? THE EU AS AN EVOLVING MILITARY ACTOR”, IN THE CSDP IN 2020: THE EU’S LEGACY AND AMBITION IN SECURITY AND DEFENCE, EDITED BY DANIEL FIOTT, 110-123 [CHAPTER 8]. PARIS: EU INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES, 2020, ACCESSED 29 AUGUST 2024. HTTPS://WWW.CLINGENDAEL.ORG/SITES/DEFAULT/FILES/2020-04/CSDP_REPORT_APRIL_2020.PDF; PDF)............. 9 EJDUS, FILIP. “‘HERE IS YOUR MISSION, NOW OWN IT!’ THE RHETORIC AND PRACTICE OF LOCAL OWNERSHIP IN EU INTERVENTIONS”, EUROPEAN SECURITY 26, NO. 4. (2017): 461-484. (HERE; PDF)......................................................... 9 3 Session 1. Why Cooperate? Theorising European Foreign Policy Andreatta, Filippo and Lorenzo Zambernardi. “The European Union and Theories of International Relations”, in International Relations and the European Union, edited by Christopher Hill, Michael Smith, and Sophie Vanhoonacker. 4th ed., 45-63. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023. ) [PDF] Federalism (Altiero Spinelli, Ernesto Rossi): Focus on high-politics (war and peace), political integration as a solution to anarchy - common foreign and defence policy. Normative rather than analytical approach. Functionalism (David Mitrany): Focus on low-politics (economics, society, well-being). Not limited to Europe but global. State became obsolete in this sense (not effective governance).Focus is therefore set on common interests and necessities, where states and non-state actors participate in global integration that is conducted by the gradual erosion of state sovereignty. In this setting, authority is a construction based on functions and needs. ->Neofunctionalism (1960s, Ernest Haas): Integration into the European political union is necessary to achieve functional goals. Difference with federalists is that integration is a source of spillover (gradually, in different sectors), and endogenous. Technical spillovers -> political spillovers. 1960s-70s, slowdown of Eur integration: Criticism of the above frameworks for being Eurocentric and having a teleological approach. In response, main IR theories, liberalism and realism looked at Eur integration. Both are analytical (=/= normative like the first two) approaches, but liberalism focuses on low politics and realism on high politics. Both share different degrees of scepticism towards the end goal of Eur integration being a federal-type entity. For realists - because states will not relinquish national sovereignty in areas of high politics / for liberals - because EU institutions are an effective forum of cooperation between states. More recently, critiques of liberalism and realism: Bounded rationality (impossible for decision makers to be perfectly rational). ->Taking cognitive constraints / biases into account is important. Constructivism - Europeanisation, importance of values, construction of a new type of international system / international society. Allows for dilution of anarchy, interference in each other's affairs, enabled by norms and values. =>The EU is an experiment of a new type of international governance (postmodern type). Deconstructive critique (Zielonka): EU is still an empire, through conditionality and enlargement it advances a "civilising mission" and appeals to universal values just like colonial powers. In this regard it is a tool of the member states. 4 Pohl, Benjamin. “Neither Bandwagoning, nor Balancing: Explaining Europe’s Security Policy”, Contemporary Security Policy 34, no. 2 (2013): 353-373. (here; PDF) Abstract & intro ○ Realists try to understand European security developments by using their concepts and vocabulary but neither bandwagoning nor balancing captures the developments balancing proposition does not explain why the EU MS support rather than constrain US foreign policy this does not automatically mean that the EU is bandwagoning the US European security policy is driven by partly shared liberal consensus and by diverging national preferences and priorities ○ this paper will look at how British, french and German governments acted in CSDP-context how those governments supported the military missions in Bosnia and Chad; and the civilian missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan will allow us to see agreements and conflicts underlying CSDP ○ CSDP, designed to support/complement/undermine transatlantic alliance? ○ How did the transatlantic relations impact the EU cooperation on foreign, security and defence realm? ○ gap in the literature: how transatlantic relations impacted CSDP and vice versa (few payed detailed attention to the diplomatic history behind the missions and/or role US played in their genesis) + often single case studies ○ what is CSDP - Common Security and Defence Policy? Institutional structure within the EU for taking and implementing collective decisions relating to civilian and military crisis management In fact tool for managing violent conflicts outside th EU 5 ○ argument of this paper: key driver behind CFSP neither balancing nor bandwagoning but EU governments followed inductive and experimental approach ○ European foreign policy —> attempts to classify it under balancing or bandwagoning but is a no-go under this paper in the past: governments feared conquest and domination from foreign actors today survival rarely dependent on their relative external power BUT domestic political position fragile and incentivizes governments to treat foreign policy as function of domestic political calculations Discussion of assumptions & implications of balancing and bandwagoning hypotheses ○ For what purpose did EU governments create a framework for collective foreign policy some structural realists say to balance against the US then at least there should be conscious coordination of diplomatic action in order to obtain outcomes contrary to US preferences, so frustrate US so absence of constraining intentions would falsify this other group of realists: to bandwagon (consciously aligning x stronger side) please US this paper: in what way did Washington influence CSDP? objectives key EU governments pursued in CSDP operations ○ Neither balancing nor bandwagoning explains CSDP in action ○ variation regarding degree to which EU governments aimed for proximity to US France and UK on extreme sides Germany 6 Although traditionally Atlanticist often mentioned as possible balancer since opposition Iraq war ○ OPERATION 1 - EUFOR Althea in Bosnia union offered to take over this operation from NATO same timing as transatlantic fallout Iraq —> lending some credence to balancing hypothesis s- same timing as riots nearby Kosovo analysis France : French government: most important supporter of CSDP French objectives show that reason for this is more related to symbolic domain of demonstrating ability to act autonomous THAN to any anti-American balancing agenda vb. if US really feared balancing, could have kept the NATO operation in Bosnia in place analysis UK: supporter but diff reasons than France helping US and demonstrating viability Berlin plus framework that tied CSDP to NATO analysis German government: fully supported transition from NATO to EU reason bit like UK, please US demonstrate usefulness of Berlin plus framework so compatibility and complementarity of CSDP x NATO also like France saw it as an opportunity to strengthen EUs standing as a security actor in its own right ○ OPERATION 2 - EULEX Kosovo rule of law mission + 2007 —> negotiations on Kosovo’s status became to a dead end —> EULEX also served to manage and attenuate eu disunity analysis France : France again active supporter but in line x Washington & London (independence of Kosovo in exchange for guaranteed minority rights & temporary supervision) 7 Instead of bandwagoning, rather shared predicament that W governments need to find exit from vulnerable governance arrangements in Kosovo analysis UK gave very active support along x US and other major EU powers didn’t go hand in hand x delivering personnel analysis Germany similar stance like France, Uk & US but more hesitant regarding Kosovo’s recognition ○ OPERATION 3 - police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) under pressure US to increase their efforts there obstacles due to insufficient political support from EU governments Analysis France: french position defined in conscious distinction from US preferences YET French position not targeted at undermining US objectives analysis UK same as in Kosovo sooo suggests that London saw those missions as a means to deliver the support of other EU governments to American foreign policy objectives Analysis Germany support for mission as partly a concession to US pressure ○ OPERATION 4 - EUFOR chad/CAR(Central African republic) Analysis France: lots of French lobbying Sole initiator US encouraged to deploy analysis UK rather useless sideshow, focus on American priorities analysis Germany Germany position without much transatlantic dimension but US encouraged them to participate ○ CONCLUSION 8 Analysis France: transatlantic relationship played significant role for French objectives BUT NOT according to pattern captured by balancing/bandwagoning not balancing since alliance in all 4 operations ○ not always fully on the same page (Afghanistan & Bosnia ) but did not undermine American policy not bandwagoning since no evidence France taking positions just to please US analysis UK like France highly preoccupied x CSDP impact on transatlantic relationship in all 4 operations BUT unlike FR, took American supportive stance almost by default EXCEPT when it came to contributing personnel certainly not balancing bandwagoning? When we purely look at its positioning yes BUT why did it then not support the CSDP more vigorously + motives are not there for bandwagoning (escape direct threats (maybe domestic threats of being elected for the labour government) nor partaking in spoils of victory) analysis German government generally been less proactive than France and UK, particularly reluctant deploying armed forces beyond territorial defence NO EVIDENCE that the German government sought to use CSDP to balance against US ○ Bosnia & Afghanistan: invoked US wishes to undertake and support the operations BUT NOT enough for bandwagoning Taking the 3 governments together, what did we learn of their intentions vis-à-vis US? ○ More often than not in alignment x US so NO BALANCING 9 ○ Bandwagoning then? NO: 1. Relative importance of pleasing US for EU governments ○ French: certainly no importance ○ Germany: in Bosnia and Afghanistan did play a role BUT hardly pivotal driver behind policy remained cautious to domestic calculations & avoiding risks ○ UK: position very much shaped by expected US reception ○ sooo with 1 of 3 main actors committed to bandwagoning strategy questionable whether EU collectively would follow but then more enthusiasm for CSDP from UK side needed and is not 2. Bandwagoning entails more than just proximity to US ○ motives of promise or threat of punishment needed in order to be bandwagoning neither applies for EU 3. Lack of plausible alternative explanations does not imply the evidence of bandwagoning (it’s not balancing so it has to be bandwagoning, no!) NO bandwagoning either so what then? Real drivers behind CSDP ○ US had important impact on what EU did but NOT according to the causal mechanisms structural realists focused on ○ structural pressures impacting on European states made CSDP possible ○ nature of the impact US had on CSDP LESS a question of relative power in a world of security competition BUT Q of degree of overlap between US and European allies conclusion 10 ○ CSDP underpinned by shared liberal ideology ○ BUT driven apart by diverging national preferences ○ behaviour EU MS grounded in domestic expectations of regional security, preferred foreign policy roles AND NOT RELATIVE POWER ○ so relevant arena for struggle for power is the domestic stage ○ sooo American influence on CSDP via inciting transnational support for its preferences ○ material capabilities do matter for the ease and likelihood of success and public support depends on a large extend on the perception whether the intervention will be successful soooo what is decisive for governments are perceptions of what their domestic audiences accept or expect from them in the real of international security governance Keukeleire, Stephan and Sharon Lecocq. “Operationalising the Decentring Agenda: Analysing European Foreign Policy in a Non-European and Post-Western World”, Cooperation and Conflict 53, no. 2 (2018): 277-295. (here; PDF) Examination of the entrenched Eurocentrism in the analysis of European foreign policy (EFP). By integrating non-European perspectives, the authors aim to better contextualize the EU's role in an increasingly interconnected, contested, and multipolar world. The Problem of Eurocentrism Eurocentrism has historically dominated European foreign policy analysis, shaping assumptions and methodologies that often ignore or undervalue non-European realities. Despite scholarly calls for "decentring," efforts to systematically incorporate diverse perspectives remain limited. This article responds to that gap by proposing an operational framework rooted in six decentring categories: spatial, temporal, normative, polity, linguistic, and disciplinary. These are based on the dual dimensions of provincialising (critiquing Eurocentric assumptions) and engagement (learning from and engaging with non-European perspectives), as outlined by Fisher Onar and Nicolaïdis (2013). The Six Decentring Dimensions 1. Spatial Decentring Spatial decentring addresses the material contexts in which EFP operates. Western geography and material assumptions often shape policy, but other regions have distinct 11 spatial realities—such as vast, sparsely populated areas or different resource distributions—that influence governance and policy effectiveness. Examples: The EU’s policy towards Libya, with its challenging geography of deserts and long borders, or its involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), half the size of Europe with limited infrastructure, demonstrates the importance of understanding local spatial contexts. Engagement: Analysts must consider local geographic features, infrastructure, and socio-economic landscapes to assess EFP’s effectiveness beyond Western notions of spatial organization. 2. Temporal Decentring Temporal decentring critiques the Eurocentric framing of history, which often generalizes European historical benchmarks as universal (e.g., the Treaty of Westphalia, World Wars, or the Cold War). This linear, progressive view of modernity overlooks diverse trajectories and local historical experiences. Examples: Non-European events such as colonial suppression or the “century of humiliation” in China hold deep resonance in global contexts but are often sidelined in EFP analysis. Engagement: Analysts should integrate alternative historical benchmarks and recognize diverse developmental trajectories, such as hybrid forms of modernity influenced by local traditions and external ideologies. 3. Normative Decentring European foreign policy often assumes the universality of its norms, such as democracy, human rights, and secularism. However, these values are not always prioritized or interpreted similarly in other societies. Critiques: EFP’s focus on individual rights over collective responsibilities, or its selective attention to human rights (e.g., prioritizing civil rights over economic and social rights), reflects Eurocentric biases. Engagement: Analysts should study how non-European societies value norms like relationality, stability, harmony, or spirituality, and explore their implications for foreign policy. For instance, Asian concepts like mianzi (face) or Middle Eastern values of justice (al-‘adala) may contrast sharply with European normative frameworks. 4. Polity Decentring Polity decentring challenges the state-centric and modernity biases in EFP, which assume the primacy of sovereign territorial states. In many regions, alternative governance structures such as tribes, clans, religious organizations, or warlord systems provide identity, order, and services. Examples: Polities based on ethnicity (e.g., clans in the Middle East or chiefdoms in Africa) or religion (e.g., the umma or Islamic networks) are central in some regions but often overlooked by European frameworks. Engagement: Analysts must consider these alternative polities, their legitimacy, and their relationship with state structures. For example, understanding the role of tribal dynamics in the Arab uprisings provides a more nuanced view of local governance and its interactions with EFP initiatives. 12 5. Linguistic Decentring Language shapes thought and analysis. European foreign policy studies often rely on English-language sources, which limits access to local perspectives and nuances in other languages. Challenges: Concepts in non-European languages may carry meanings that cannot be fully translated into Western terms. For instance, ubuntu in African contexts emphasizes relationality and community, which may be lost in translation to “humanism.” Engagement: Analysts should collaborate with local scholars and incorporate primary sources in local languages to uncover alternative frameworks and meanings. 6. Disciplinary Decentring Disciplinary decentring critiques the dominance of Western research traditions and methodologies in the study of EFP. These often prioritize positivist, explanatory approaches over descriptive or interpretive ones, marginalizing non-European perspectives. Examples: The exclusion of non-Western scholarly works and overreliance on Western sources perpetuate Eurocentric narratives. Engagement: Scholars should incorporate interdisciplinary methods, such as anthropological fieldwork or area studies, to capture local contexts and complexities. Engaging with postcolonial and non-Western theoretical perspectives can also broaden analytical horizons. Challenges and Pitfalls of Decentring The decentring agenda faces several challenges: 1. Epistemological Biases: Western scholars are often constrained by the Eurocentric paradigms in which they are trained. 2. Simplification and Othering: Overemphasizing differences risks stereotyping non-European societies as fundamentally “other.” 3. Fragmentation: A focus on local contexts can lead to case-specific knowledge without broader applicability. 4. Practical Barriers: Language barriers, access to local data, and methodological constraints pose significant hurdles to effective decentring. Toward Reconstruction The authors emphasize that decentring is not just about critique but also reconstruction. This involves renewing EFP practices with humility and mutual respect while fostering situational awareness of Europe’s role in a multipolar world. Steps Forward: Refining the analytical framework through case studies. Expanding decentring categories, such as incorporating cultural, gender, or class dimensions. Focusing on practical applications, such as improving EU diplomatic strategies by integrating non-European perspectives. 13 Conclusion Keukeleire and Lecocq’s framework provides a comprehensive tool for decentring the study of European foreign policy. By systematically addressing spatial, temporal, normative, polity, linguistic, and disciplinary dimensions, the framework enables scholars and policymakers to move beyond Eurocentric assumptions. This approach not only enhances the analytical depth of EFP studies but also helps Europe navigate its role in a diverse and interconnected global order. 14 Session 2. The Making of European Foreign Policy Juncos, Ana E. “The Institutions of the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Between Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism”, in The Institutions of the European Union, edited by Dermot Hodson, Uwe Puetter, Sabine Saurugger, and John Peterson. 5th ed., 299-320. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. ( here PDF) This paper offers an overview of the institutional framework of EU’s CFSP, detailing its (1) historical evolution, (2) its institutional structures, (3) and its key challenges (=importantly, the divide between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism amongst 5 dimensions). (1) Looking Back to the Origins: From the Failed European Defence Community to the Treaty of Lisbon a. CFSP developed as an intergovernmental approach due to the sensitivity of foreign, security and defence policies. These were considered core elements of national sovereignty by some MS which refused to move towards supranational decision-making. b. CSDP= from the onset of European integration, with inception of European Defence Community, attempts to move towards defence integration met with resistance. Over time, further institutionalisation acquired after recent crises (=Yugoslavian conflicts). (2) Institutional Framework EU Institutions= a. The European Commission= on matters of external action and external dimension of internal policies, Commission has exclusive right of initiative (proposals), it carries out implementation, manages EU budget. - on CFSP/CSDP matters, does not have right of initiative (=HR/VP role), it manages CFSP budget, sometimes carries out implementation (=on sanctions, aid provision or provision of expertise), it increasingly plays a role in security and defence (=civilian crisis management, European Defence Fund, maritime security), and DEFIS (=DG for Defence, Industry and Space). 15 b. The European Parliament= on matters of EU external action, the EP has budgetary powers and has to consent to international agreements (trade agreements, cooperation and association agreements, international agreements on external dimension of EU internal policies). - on CFSP/CSDP matters, the EP has budgetary powers, plays a role on human rights and democracy matters, has to be ‘immediately and fully informed’ of CFSP/CSDP ongoings, has debates twice a year on progress CFSP/CSDP, HR/VP has to undergo a parliamentary hearing for confirmation. c. The EU External Action Service (EEAS)= exchange of information, carry out joint assessments and help formulate and implement the EU approach and ensure EU decisions are complied with and implemented, drive to protect d. The Council of Ministers= the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC): ensures unity, consistency and effectiveness of EU external action NOTE: chaired by the HR The Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER): COREPER I= Deputy Permanent Representatives who prepares the work of 6 Council configurations: (1) agriculture and fisheries, (2) competitiveness, (3) education, youth, culture and sport, (4) employment, social policy, health and consumer affairs, (5) environment and (6) transports, telecommunications and energy. COREPER II= Permanent Representatives (MS Ambassadors to the EU) who prepares the work of 4 Council configurations: (1) economic and financial affairs, (2) foreign affairs, (3) general affairs and (4) justice and home affairs. The Political and Security Committee (PSC): representatives of MS at (junior) ambassadorial level, chaired by a representative of the HR/VP The High Representative for Foreign Affairs (HR/VP): seen as bridge-builder position who (1) dismantles institutional barriers, (2) submits proposals and initiatives on CFSP, (3) ensures implementation of actions, (4) stands as external representation in CFSP, (4) ensures consistency across CFSP and EU external action policies. 16 e. The European Council=decides of strategic direction and sets the agenda in CFSP matters and plays leadership role during crises and has high-visibility f. The European Court of Justice (CJEU)= holds jurisdiction over external actions. EXCEPTION occurs as CJEU monitors that CFSP implementation should not affect competences and vice-versa (article 40) AND CJEU reviews legality of sanctions imposed. (3) Five Dimensions of Institutional Politics There are five dimensions to check in EU politics on foreign policy: a. A Continuum from Intergovernmentalism to Supranationalism: EU foreign policy works along a continuum from intergovernmentalism (Intergovernmental Unanimity CFSP/CSDP) to supranationalism (Community method, QMV, Trade) b. International vs Transnational Cooperation: EU external action as an example of inter-governmental cooperation (classical multi and bilateral diplomacy) and EU external action as an example of trans-governmental cooperation (e.g. negotiations in Committees and WGs) c. Ensuring Coherence in EU External Relations: Coherence as a legal principle: ensuring ‘the consistency of the Union's external action’ (Article 18(4) TEU, LT). d. Leadership and Autonomy of EU Institutions: MS decide to ‘delegate’ (principal-agent relationship), so creation of Brussels-based actors (e.g. HRVP, EEAS, EDA) seeks to ensure more integration (effectiveness) without supranationalism. e. The Legitimacy of EU Institutions: legitimacy, accountability and representativity of EU institutions are questioned (input/output legitimacy of EU) KEY TAKE-AWAYS= 1. Decision-making within CFSP remains predominantly intergovernmental, requiring unanimity. However, incremental changes, such as the Treaty of Lisbon, have introduced supranational elements like Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in certain areas, moving towards greater supranationalism (=increased Brusselization) 17 2. A "capability-expectation gap" persists, where institutional and resource limitations hinder the EU's ambitions as a global actors. Amadio Viceré, Maria Giulia. “Looking Towards the East: The High Representative’s Role in EU Foreign Policy on Kosovo and Ukraine”, European Security 29, no. 3 (2020): 337-358. (here; PDF) The article examines the degree to which the post-Lisbon institution of the HR/VP is able to shape the EU’s foreign policy (using a broad definition of FP - not just CFSP but also competencies under the Commission’s responsibility). It tries to answer this question by studying the practice of the first two post-Lisbon HR/VPs, Catherine Ashton and Federica Mogherini, and focusing on two case studies: Kosovo and Ukraine. What these two case studies have in common is that they have elements of both intergovernmental FP (CFSP) as well as supranational FP (trade, enlargement), and are both emblematic examples of crises in the EU’s neighborhood which the EU tried to play a key role. The authors contextualise their study by introducing the theoretical framework of new intergovernmentalism, used to explain the introduction of the CFSP since the Maastricht Treaty - namely, the EU Member States want to increase their level of cooperation and deepen integration in the area of FP, but are reluctant to surrender core state competences in this area, resulting in an intergovernmental approach as the driving force of integration at the level of FP - primarily exercising these functions through the European Council and FAC (Council of the EU). The authors conduct their case studies by focusing on three dimensions of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism highlighted in the scholarly literature: autonomy, behavioral norms and decision-making logics. In the case of Kosovo, both HR/VPs benefitted from consensus in the EuCo on the need to stabilize the Western Balkans (despite different opinions on Kosovo’s statehood). They also effectively served as a bridge between CFSP and Commission resources, most notably by linking the EU membership perspective with progress on the talks, and ensured effective external representation (mainly positioning the EU as a mediator in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue). In the case of Ukraine, the two HR/VPs promoted the Commission’s role to different extents. This was more pronounced under Ashton, who delegated much of the authority to Stefan Fule, the Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement. Mogherini preferred a more hands-on approach, with some successes when there was agreement at the level of the European Council (ex. sanctions on Russia after the Crimea annexation). She was however unable to act as an effective consensus builder in the FAC in 2015 when fighting resumed in 18 Eastern Ukraine, and her policy proposals (differentiation of sanctions on Russia related to Crimea vs Donbas) were unsuccessful because they were not backed up by the guidelines of the European Council. The authors conclude that the HR/VP is an effective agent when they have clear guidelines from the European Council. When this is the case, the HR/VP can effectively steer the policies coming from this consensus, build consensus at the FAC about the details, and serve as a bridge between supranational and intergovernmental dimensions of EU FP. However, when there is a lack of consensus (ex. of Serbia not being granted candidate status in 2011 / of divergences emerging between MS in 2015 due to the war in Eastern Ukraine), the HR/VP’s agency and ability to impact FP is limited, and they often turn into an instrument of the European Council. This also has an impact on the effectiveness of EU FP coming from the different dimensions (supranational / intergovernmental), and its coordination with the FP implemented by Member States. Portela, Clara, Paulina Pospieszna, Joanna Skrzypczyńska, and Dawid Walentek. “Consensus against all Odds: Explaining the Persistence of EU Sanctions on Russia”, Journal of European Integration 43, no.6 (2021): 683-699. ( here; PDF) Context ○ In 2014, the EU imposed sanctions on Russia in response to its annexation of Crimea and actions in eastern Ukraine. ○ These sanctions, part of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), targeted individuals, entities, and sectors such as finance, defense, and energy. ○ Despite internal divisions among member states, the sanctions were consistently renewed. Challenges to Sanction Cohesion: ○ Sanctions under CFSP require unanimous renewal, making them susceptible to vetoes. ○ Diverse member state perspectives on Russia (e.g., hawkish Baltic states vs. dovish Southern European states) created inherent tensions. ○ Economic impacts and Russian counter-sanctions (e.g., a food embargo) increased pressure on EU unity. ○ Utilizes Putnam's two-level game theory, where leaders navigate domestic and international pressures to maintain consensus. ○ Key domestic actors influencing decisions: 19 Political elites: Shape national policy and Council negotiations. Business elites: Often critical due to economic losses. Public opinion: Mixed responses influence leader flexibility. Case Studies: ○ Poland (Hawkish): Strong political support for sanctions to ensure national security against Russia. Business sectors, especially agriculture, opposed sanctions due to economic losses. Domestic economic constraints broadened Poland's flexibility, enabling compromise in Council negotiations. ○ Spain (Dovish): Moderate political support for sanctions tied to respect for international law (e.g., sovereignty of Ukraine). Weak public and business elite support for sanctions due to limited trade with Russia. Low domestic salience of the issue allowed Spain to align with hawkish states. Findings: ○ The presence of dissenting domestic groups in both hawkish and dovish states paradoxically facilitated consensus. ○ Russian counter-sanctions unintentionally strengthened EU cohesion by mobilizing economic stakeholders. Key Theories and Contributions: 1. Two-Level Game Theory: ○ Policy decisions depend on interplay between domestic pressures and international negotiations. ○ "Win-sets" (acceptable outcomes for domestic groups) determine a state's negotiation flexibility. 2. Domestic-EU Interaction: ○ Structural constraints, such as economic ties and political priorities, shape consensus outcomes. 20 ○ Leaders balance security goals and economic considerations to maintain unity. 3. Franco-German Leadership: ○ Germany's economic influence and France's alignment with EU policies were crucial but insufficient alone to ensure cohesion. 4. Impact of Counter-Sanctions: ○ Russian retaliatory actions (e.g., food embargo) inadvertently united EU member states by redistributing economic pressures. 5. Role of Low-Salience Issues: ○ In less affected states like Spain, low public interest in sanctions enabled political elites to maintain EU solidarity. 21 Session 3. The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policies Ladrech, Robert. Europeanization and National Politics, 190-205 [chapter 9]. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. (Perlego ; PDF) How the EU Affects National Foreign Policy: The Mechanism of Domestic Change Introduction: Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Objectives and Mechanisms The CFSP, often considered the last bastion of national sovereignty, has seen a degree of adaptation and harmonization among member states through the Council of Ministers. The continuous exchange of information and policy options among member states has gradually shaped national foreign policies, though the overall influence of (supranational) EU institutions remains limited. This raises the question of how extensive the Europeanization effect on national foreign policy truly is. The CFSP of the EU was designed to foster common policies among member states in the realm of foreign affairs. It is built on an intergovernmental institutional and decision-making structure with the goal to ‘promote international cooperation’ between member states and beyond (Art. 11 Maastricht Treaty) through ‘defining the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy; deciding on common strategies; adopting joint actions; adopting common positions; strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy’. The text looks sets out three dimensions under which Europeanisation can be observed: 1. Change to domestic institutional set-up 2. Change of domestic policies 3. Identification and Values Historical Developments of the European Dimension in Foreign Policy The development of a European foreign policy dimension has been a gradual process. While the CFSP goes beyond informal networking among national foreign ministries, there has never been unanimous agreement among member states on the need for a Europeanized foreign and security policy. This reluctance stems in part from the existence of NATO and American security guarantees, which have historically diminished the urgency of developing a distinct European defense 22 identity. The neutrality of some member states, such as Austria, has also complicated efforts to forge a common policy. Only after the Cold War, in response to crises like those in Yugoslavia and Iraq, efforts to create a European foreign and security policy began to gain momentum. The Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, along with the 1998 St. Malo meeting (for CSDP), marked significant milestones in this process. However, the main goal has always been the coordination of information and policy actions, rather than the creation of a fully unified foreign policy. Due to its intergovernmental nature, the European Council and the Council of the EU remain the primary decision-making bodies for foreign and security policy, with the rotating presidency and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HRVP) playing key roles. This intergovernmental structure suggests that any impact the CFSP has on national foreign policies is most likely to occur through learning and adaptation rather than direct imposition. Theories of Europeanisation in CFSP Michael Smith (2000) identified four dimensions through which the CFSP influences national foreign policy: 1. elite socialization, 2. bureaucratic adaptation, 3. constitutional changes, 4. changes in public opinion. These changes occur gradually as prolonged participation in the CFSP leads to the internalization of norms and expectations, fostering a form of multi-level governance that incorporates both national and EU-level actors. This process represents both institutional and cognitive change, aligning with rational institutionalist and social-constructivist approaches to European integration. Ben Tonra (2000) argued that it is the constant interaction between member states, rather than top-down European directives that drives the Europeanization of foreign and security policies. Through continuous cooperation and information exchange, national foreign policy cultures gradually converge, resulting in the internalization of European norms and expectations. Furthermore, other theories of Europeanization in national foreign policy set out three main dimensions: polity (institutional change), policy (change in policy content), and politics (identity change). Although these changes are often subtle, they reflect the broader impact of the CFSP on national decision-making processes. 23 1. Domestic Institutional Change One of the most significant effects of the CFSP on national foreign policies is the shift in the balance of power within domestic institutions. The increasing involvement of national executives in EU decision-making, particularly through the European Council, has strengthened the role of heads of government. This has made parliamentary oversight of foreign policy more challenging, concentrating power in the executive branch. Within the executive, in light of the development towards presidentialisation, powers and responsibilities, as for instance on coordinating with other member states and EU institutions, have shifted from foreign ministries to heads of government. Furthermore, changes in staffing have been observed, as shown in the UK (before Brexit), where Europeanists officers have become more prominent within the Foreign Office. The need for better coordination between national ministries, particularly in areas such as security and defense, has also drawn foreign and defense ministries closer together. Constitutional changes have also occurred in response to the internationalization of foreign and security policies. For example, Germany amended its constitution to allow the deployment of troops in conflict zones, such as the Balkans [though this was done through NATO rather than the EU, hence only giving a very limited scope to Europeanisation as a factor for such a constitutional change]. 2. Policy Change National foreign policies may change over time as a result of consultations and coordination under the CFSP. Member states may adopt new policies toward specific issues or third countries as a result of their participation in EU-level discussions, as by the development of positions on issues where national governments previously had no established policy, but other member state positions are put forward in the European framework, as seen in the evolution of member state positions on the Arab-Israeli conflict. In some cases, member states may be required to formulate new policies in response to crises during their term as the rotating president of the Council. Additionally, countries with historic ties to certain regions may find that EU membership introduces new considerations that influence their foreign policy choices. For instance, EU-Latin American bilateral cooperation has shifted Spain’s relationship with LA countries. Furthermore, Europeanisation can be used as a ‘political opportunity structure’ to legitimise policy changes which are not popular 24 with domestic audiences. For instance, Germany used the rather positive attitudes towards the EU to reinforce its national preferences, legitimising its military engagement in Afghanistan through the framework of CFSP. 3. Identity and Values Change Values or identity, or more specifically, policy preferences, may change as a result of the continual interaction of political elites within the various points of the CFSP process. Wong (2005) refers to this dimension of change as ‘identity reconstruction’, meaning that socialization of interests and identities, and policy indicators of such change are represented by (a) the emergence of norms among policy-making elites, and (b) shared definitions of European and national interests. Furthermore, Gross (2007) explains that one sign of Europeanization is when national policymakers instinctively turn to the "European option" in decision-making. This means they increasingly see EU-based solutions or approaches as an ‘instinctive choice’. Another indicator is the importance they place on using a European framework or strategy when dealing with a particular policy issue, showing that European approaches have become a valued part of their decision-making process. Socialization of elite officials is the key mechanism of change, which hence only slowly occurs. Nevertheless, socialization and identity making is limited by a form of coexistence of different policy cultures, as well as officials and ministries that with a different extent of implication into the EU fora or in difference prioritisation of bilateral relations or other multilateral groupings, creating diverging ‘instinctive habits’ to use CFSP as a forum to promote and discuss foreign policies. Europeanization in Post-Communist Member States In the context of recent regime change and accession processes, Eastern European countries have undergone an ‘anticipatory Europeanisation’ in foreign policy. In the case of CFSP, although this is a second-pillar inter-governmental policy of the EU, it was included in the accession negotiations between the Commission and the applicant governments. Chapter 27 of accession negotiations stipulates the obligation to “give active and unconditional support to the implementation of the common foreign and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. Member states must ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions and defend these common positions in international fora.” Commission monitoring (creating supranational political conditionality) was an additional external pressure that older member states never experience. This pressured governments and foreign ministries to vast institutional, value and policy changes. The pre-accession period hence represents a more intense relationship with the EU 25 that puts a premium on accelerated institutional adaptation. Concrete effects on staffing and resources, as well as institutional set-up can be observed, as the Polish example with the emergence of the Office of the Committee for European Integration (UKIE) underlines. However, the Europeanization of foreign policy in these states was also influenced by broader geopolitical factors, such as NATO membership and bilateral relations with the United States. As a result, it can be difficult to isolate the specific influence of the EU on foreign policy changes in these countries. Methodological Issues in Researching Europeanization and the CFSP Two key methodological issues arise when studying the Europeanization of national foreign policies through the CFSP. - Differential outcomes of Europeanization across member states. While some countries have experienced significant changes in their foreign ministries and policies, others have seen little impact. These differences can be attributed to internal power dynamics, the influence of external events, and the varying degrees of commitment to the CFSP among member states. - Isolation of the EU's role in driving domestic change. Given the absence of authoritative top-down policies in the CFSP, it is difficult to attribute changes in national foreign policies solely to the EU. Many of these changes occur in response to specific foreign policy events or broader global trends, making it challenging to distinguish between EU-driven and other external influences. Conclusion The Europeanization of national foreign policies occurs primarily through the structured and frequent interactions of national officials with their counterparts in the EU. These interactions introduce new perspectives and foster learning, leading to gradual changes in policy content, institutional structures, and political identities. However, the CFSP remains an intergovernmental framework, and the influence of EU institutions on national foreign policy is limited. The Europeanization effect is primarily one of socialization and adaptation, driven by the need for coordinated action rather than the imposition of supranational authority. 26 Müller, Patrick, Karolina Pomorska, and Ben Tonra. “The Domestic Challenge to EU Foreign Policy-Making: From Europeanisation to de-Europeanisation?”, Journal of European Integration 43, no. 5 (2021): 519-534. (here; PDF) De-Europeanisation relates to situations: where EU foreign policy-making runs against the grain of certain Member States’ declared values and interests; where Member States are less willing to engage in collective foreign-policymaking at the EU-level, prioritising other multilateral frameworks or (unilateral) national actions; where the results of that policy-making are, on occasion, explicitly undermined by Member State practice. Such behaviour may emerge from within the Union’s foreign policy process and institutions, it may be conducted unilaterally by member states in other multilateral fora (such as the UN), or it may arise in bilateral or mini-lateral relations with third parties Potential reasons: Domestic politics (populist, nativist, and/or semi-authoritarian political dynamics); Lisbon institutional changes: with the loss of the rotating member state presidency within the Foreign Affairs Council and its associated structures (PSC, Military Committee, CFSP Working Groups etc.), member states are less positively engaged, and a certain diplomatic esprit de corps has been lost. Important warning (there is a difference between…): a certain level of norm contestation – as well as occasional breaches – does not necessarily imply the erosion, regression or even death of a norm Rather, deEuropeanisation relates to more stable trends or pattern of objection to well-established CFSP norms in a member state's foreign policy discourse and practice So, Distinguishing Criteria between: in the name of national interests, legitimate “normal political contestations”(=simple policy contestations which must be accepted as part and parcel of EU foreign policy evolution) – and a clear shift towards De Europeanisation: 1. Scope or discursive tone of the challenge 27 On the national policy shift: If it is the one that does obvious and clear violence to core foundational norms underpinning EU foreign policy, e.g. by vindicating or justifying gross human rights abuses, transgressing international law or undermining multilateral institutions, then the Member State may well be judged to be pursuing a different agenda on that issue. On the national core procedural norms – like information-sharing, consensus-seeking, the respect of ‘agreed language’ and established EU foreign policy positions – that make up CFSP’s culture of cooperation: If it is an outright opposition to the EU’s culture of cooperation, then it can amount to de-Europeanisation (however, not an occasional disregard of these procedural norms and hard bargaining behaviour, which is part of the normal EU politics). 2. The scale of challenge If it is a few key policy challenges – where the political/ideological landscape of the Member State has clearly shifted to privilege a different foreign policy perspective – then it is a simple political contestation (=acceptable). But if it is across a wide range of issues, then there is a basic re-orientation of the member state away from European norms, its associated Europeanisation and thus de Europeanisation. 3. Associated policy challenges place the state across the wide spectrum of member state policy positions. If during the process of crafting policy positions within EUFP(=reaching a compromise within a range of national positions, from ‘hawks’ to ‘doves’), the Member State(s) concerned is consistently positioning themselves either outside the range of existing Member State positions or else consistently at their furthest fringes Three elements of de-Europeanisation: 1. ‘Reconstruction of professional roles’: both substantive foreign policy as well as institutional and procedural aspects. The reason might be: traditional foreign policy rationales and (or even exclusively) direction towards domestic political audience; or foreign policy bureaucracy on de-construction of professional roles (by instilling a more national-minded agenda in the selection, training, promotion and posting of diplomats, or even replace existing staff with ‘loyal’ officials and increase the frequency of rotation in Brussels). What happens is: At the level of foreign policy discourse and official diplomatic rhetoric, national officials may represent themselves increasingly as champions of their Member 28 States' national interests, whilst questioning or actively opposing joint European priorities, interests and positions. 2. Repudiation of fundamental norms - a regression from a commitment to well-defined procedural and substantive EU norms. a regression from foundational EU norms and values (prescribed in the Union’s treaties)=when EU Member States disagree with and oppose the fundamental and foundational aspects of EU foreign policy that we speak of de-Europeanisation. Within both: institutional development of CFSP=a culture of cooperation in the Counci=procedural norms such as ‘information sharing’, ‘consultation’, ‘consensus-seeking’, ‘compromise’, and the respect of previously agreed foreign policy positions (so-called ‘agreed language’) and within substantive norms (democracy and the respect for the rule of law), marking the Union’s identity 3.Structural disintegration of collective policy-making institutions Structural disintegration in the ways of Member State’s ‘disengagement’ from EU-level foreign policymaking or the ‘circumvention’ of EU foreign policy institutions. Member states that disengage from CFSP may thus give less diplomatic backing to EU foreign policy and dedicate less time, staff, and resources to (particular) CFSP matters, reducing their level of active participation in the various stages of the policy cycle (i.e. agenda setting, policy formulation, decision-making, and implementation) ‘Circumvention’: at the discursive level and at the level of substantive policy actions: At the discursive level, circumvention manifests itself in statements and declarations through which a Member State expresses its principal loyalty and commitment to mini and multi-lateral foreign policy frameworks other than the EU in previously Europeanised foreign policy domains. At the level of substantive policy actions, it manifests itself as the growing reliance on alternative frameworks in the actual conduct and implementation of foreign policy. In practice, the member states may choose to use a specific smaller grouping as a vehicle for ‘pre-cooking’ and coordinating its policies and as such it should not be viewed as an alternative forum to EU’s CFSP. 29 Session 4. Promoting Democracy in the Neighbourhood Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier. “The Europeanization of Eastern Europe: The External Incentives Model Revisited”, Journal of European Public Policy 27, no. 6 (2020): 814-833. (here; PDF) → The External Incentives Model (EIM) was designed to explain the Europeanization of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) through the EU’s accession conditionality. Intro: 2004 → 1st wave of Central and East European Countries (CEECs) Europanization → “process in which states adopt EU rules’ o Accompanied their democratics and market-economic transitions EU conditionality → played an important role in successful post-communist democratization and Europeanization of public policies (suggested by a number of studies) Concerns: o Is conditionaly sustainable? ▪ Democratic backsliding + Non-compliance with EU legislation on allocation of asylum seekers in CEEEs o Can it be replicated in different contexts? ▪ Slow progress + Set-backs of Europeanization in current candidate countries for EU membership in Southeast Europe (SEE) External Incentives Model (EIM) → Theory explaining when EU conditionality leads to domestic change o Altering cost-benefit calculations of candidate States through sanctions and rewards. Conditions: ▪ Size of the EU’s rewards ▪ Determinacy of the conditions ▪ Credibility of conditionality ▪ Size of the adjustment costs of compliance for target governments. HOWEVER, Does EIM hold beyond the original CEE enlargement context? Can it explain the success and failures of conditionality? 30 o E.g. Weakening of europeanization after accession Finding: Europanization succeeds for the reasons specified by the EIM and it fails due to the theoretically expected conditions The External Incentives Model (EIM) Bargaining Model Key instrument for Europeanization: Conditionality 1. Adoption of EU norms and rules as conditions that the target States have to fulfill to receive award Conditions can be: 1. Political → E.g Democracy and Rule of Law 2. Regulatory → Pertaining to EU’s public policies Types of conditionality: 1. Democratic Conditionality: Requires countries to adopt EU political and democratic standards 2. Acquis Conditionality: Requires countries to adopt “EU's acquis Communautaire” (the body of EU laws, regulations, and policies that all MS must follow) Rewards: 1. From financial to technical assistance 2. Higher rewards → More demanding conditions Gov. of target States can 1. Accept → If benefits higher than cost of compliance 2. Reject → If opposite. If Gov fails to meet conditions, EU withholds reward (no coercive sanctions) EU negotiations with Gov 1. Gov → Constrained by domestic institutional, partisan veto-players, interest groups Further Conditions influencing Gov. Cost-Benefit calculations: 1. Size + Distance of EU’s REWARDS ▪ More sizeable and tangible → More effective 2. DETERMINACY of the conditions it sets for obtaining the reward 31 ▪ More specific + clear conditions (E.g. Feedback) → More likely 3. CREDIBILITY of the conditionality ▪ Higher threat credibility: ⇨ Little to gain from having that state as a member or partner ⇨ Target state lacks alternatives to EU membership or association ⇨ Weak internal EU consensus on desirability of enlargement (more willing to withhold benefits) ⇨ Coherence + consistency in applying conditionality ▪ Lower promise credibility: ⇨ EU has higher bargaining power (can delay/alter reward) ⇨ EU lacks consensus on enlargement (undermine its willingness to follow through on promises) ⇨ ‘cross-conditionality’: Incompatible conditions set by other international actors who offer comparable rewards at lower costs 4. Size of the adoption COSTS ▪ Depends on the domestic situation in target countries ▪ Domestic cost of adopting EU law ⇨ Power: Election-wise, Coalition partners ⇨ Harming of institutional or societal actors (number of affected veto-players) ⇨ Lack of financial/administrative capacity/expertise to implement them => HOWEVER, EIM does not state any of these conditions to be necessary or sufficient. CEE after accession: 1. Conditions of post-accession compliance a. Rewards and Credibility i. Pre-accession → Use of conditional rewards (EU membership) ii. Post-accession → Can only use negative incentives (Sanctions) iii. Credibility of threat: Depends largely on autonomy of EU institutions in the imposition of sanctions 32 1. “Rules of Liberal Democracy” – Art 7(2) TEU: a. Allows Council to “suspend certain … rights” of MS for “serious and persistent” breaches b. Limited autonomy: MS decide through unanimity if such breach occurred c. More compliance problems 2. “(Single market) acquis” – Art 258 and 260 TFEU: a. Commission’s autonomy to launch infringement procedure + refer MS to CJEU → Financial penalties b. Credibility of threat: HIGHER c. Less compliance problems iv. EIM expects deterioration of compliance after accession b. Determinacy i. Infringement procedure (via Article 258 TFEU) 1. Provides high determinacy because the European Commission and the CJEU offer clear, legally binding interpretations of the acquis. ii. Art 7 TEU 1. Has lower determinacy since breaches of democratic values are decided by MS voting, which is more political and less legally grounded. iii. EIM expects better compliance with the acquis (art 258) than in the area of democracy (art 7) c. Costs i. Vary across issue areas and new MS ii. Higher for Political conditions of liberal democracy (affect the basis of Gov. hold on office) 2. Post-accession compliance with the single market acquis a. EIM expectation: i. Deterioration of compliance with the acquis in the CEECs after accession. b. Reality: i. Most new MS outperform most old MS 1. Except: Poland (compliance laggard) 33 ii. Powerful states need to care less about reputational costs of non compliance c. Conditionality has more durable positive impact on compliance with regard to acquis than would have been expected by the EIM 3. Post-accession compliance with liberal democratic conditions a. No general deterioration b. Cases in which backsliding manifests: i. Hungary (since 2010) ii. Poland (since 2015) ⇨ Gov have concentrated power + Undermined pluralistic competition iii. Romania (2013) ⇨ Gov openly defied the rule of law c. EIM does not predict why certain countries backslide d. EIM correctly predicts that: i. Once backsliding occurred, EU institutions are unable to redress it due to the lack of credible sanctions ii. Influence of EU institutions on compliance decrease the more a Gov hold on to power depends on its illiberal practices iii. Influence of EU in Hungary is stronger bcs its illiberal practices also infringed EU acquis Comm used Art.258 TFEU e. EU’s (negative) rewards for compliance are generally weaker in the post-accession period, for both the acquis and liberal democracy i. Low-credibility of the threat to use sanctions f. Post-accession compliance with the single market acquis generally remain good (surprising for the EIM) SEE in pre-accession: the current candidates 1. Conditions of pre-accession compliance a. Rewards and credibility i. Promise of full membership ii. Withhold of membership in case of non-compliance iii. Asymmetrical interdependence (in favor of EU) 1. SEE countries less relevant for the EU 34 iv. EU announced it would not treat the Western Balkans as a single “enlargement round” Would judge every candidate on its own merit 1. Strengthens credibility Less compliant States cannot hide v. EU prioritization of stability and peacebuilding at the expense of democracy 1. External legitimacy “stabilitocracies”: Guarantors of stability while adopting authoritarian policies at home vi. EIM argument: Lack of consistency in the application of democratic conditionality that undermines the democratization pressure on Western Balkan regimes as long as they deliver stability. vii. Credibility lower than with the CEEs because of: 1. Unfavorable public opinion towards future enlargements 2. Increasing threat of referendums 3. Lack of consensus and coherence among MS 4. Existence of bilateral conflicts btw individual MS and candidate countries 5. Weakened institutional commitment of the Commission b. Determinacy i. Candidates of the Western Balkans became subject to the ‘Copenhagen Plus’ criteria which added: 1. Full cooperation with the ICTY 2. Implementation of peace agreements 3. Resolution of bilateral disputes ii. EU’s stronger emphasis of democracy and rule of law in SEE than CEE 1. Increased both salience and precision of these criteria 2. Negotiation chapters remain open until the very end 3. Commission can link opening of other chapters to progress in rule-of-law chapters. iii. Higher determinacy of conditions should improve Europeanization likelihood, BUT iv. More demanding conditions increase adoption costs, potentially reducing Europeanization likelihood. 35 c. Costs i. High EU membership popularity for SEE 1. Generally lowers the domestic adoption costs and induces governments to engage in Europeanization. ii. SEE countries have started their transition and Europeanization process from a lower level of fit 1. Struggles of statehood at the start of the process 2. Domestic costs higher for SEE than CEE iii. EIM expects Europeanization to slow down and conditionality to be less effective in the SEE than in the CEE countries. 2. Pre-accession compliance with democratic norms in Western Balkans and Turkey a. Main difference between CEE and SEE enlargement: Higher adoption costs + Lower credibility of EU’s conditionality b. SEE started from greater distance than EU standards c. SEE faced additional prerequisites of accession d. SEE were given more distance and uncertain membership perspective ⇨ Slowdown of Europeanization (specially in countries with weak statehood) Conclusions The EIM accurately predicts that: o EU's "illiberal democracies" have resisted EU institutions due to low credibility of sanctions and high domestic costs. o In CEE pre-accession, effective Europeanization due to high and credible rewards, moderate domestic costs, and the ability to overcome high political costs with even higher rewards. While increased determinacy can improve the likelihood of successful Europeanization, higher adoption costs can reduce this likelihood. Public support for EU membership has declined in some SEE countries due to the perceived lack of credibility of the accession promise. The SEE countries face higher political and administrative costs compared to CEE due to lower initial fit, state-building challenges, and state capture. The EIM remains relevant for understanding Europeanization in SEE, but credibility is the key condition for compliance. 36 37 Richter, Solveig and Natasha Wunsch. “Money, Power, Glory: The Linkages between EU Conditionality and State Capture in the Western Balkans”, Journal of European Public Policy 27, no. 1 (2020): 41-62. (here; PDF) → How can we explain the decoupling between formal compliance and democratic transformation in the Western Balkans? Introduction Western Balkan countries are experiencing a disconnect between formal compliance with EU membership criteria and actual democratic performance Argument: o Presence of state capture: Local elites manipiulate political and economic systems to mantain power Decoupling of compliance and democracy levels in the Western Balkans Root Problem: o Contrary to common perception, the Western Balkan candidates overall are making gradual progress in their fulfilment of membership conditions, BUT o Compliance does not translate into positive developments with regards to democratic performance (In decline at the regional level) 38 Theoretical argument: explaining the adverse impact of EU conditionality EU conditionality has unintentionally contributed to the consolidation of state capture in the Western Balkans The dominant EIM explains political conditionality as a top-down process o Candidate countries must meet specific criteria to receive rewards from the EU o Compliance expected to lead to positive political changes EU enlargement policy may have negative effects on third countries. o Jacoby has observed "Potemkin-village organizational structures" Elites adapt their behavior in short-term to hide informal decision-making practices. Effectiveness of EU conditionality is diminished due to the unique political and historical context of the region, which includes ongoing state-building processes and post-conflict dynamics. Mechanisms linking EU conditionality to state capture: 1. Money: The pressure for market liberalization, without a robust legal framework, allows a small elite to gain significant private benefits and influence political decision-making. 2. Power: The top-down nature of conditionality suppresses domestic political discussion and weakens accountability mechanisms Enables ruling elites to suppress dissent and maintain control. 3. Glory: Engagement with EU officials and the prospect of EU membership serve to legitimize ruling elites, reinforcing their power and undermining genuine democratic processes. Rather than fostering democratic reforms, EU conditionality has led to a "state capture trap," where local elites exploit the conditionality framework to consolidate their power. o Result: Stagnation of democratic progress and the implementation of superficial reforms. 39 Conditionality and state capture in Serbia Emergence of state capture in Serbia, particularly during the country's early transition period. o Main agents of state capture: Ruling political parties Highly politicized state administration characterized by clientelism and patronage. Prevalence of clientelist networks: Political parties, particularly the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), maintain control over state resources and influence through extensive party membership and loyalty. o Undermining democratic accountability and transparency Reiteration of the 3 mechanisms of state capture identified in the theoretical framework as —money, power, and glory—as they apply specifically to Serbia Significant decoupling between Serbia's formal compliance with EU membership criteria and actual democratic performance. o While Serbia may show progress in meeting technical requirements, this does not translate into genuine democratic governance or accountability. Evidence: o Extensive clientelist networks within Serbia, particularly highlighting the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). ▪ Membership in the SNS is substantial, with around 700,000 members, which constitutes about 10% of the population. ▪ Strong party-based clientelist structure that allows the ruling party to exert significant control over state resources and political processes. o Regular replacement of civil servants following changes in government highly politicized state administration. ▪ Entrenchment of clientelism: New appointees are often loyal to the ruling party rather than to the state or public interest. o State resources often allocated to organizations closely aligned with the ruling party. E.g. ▪ Creation of NGOs shortly before calls for proposals Manipulation of state resources to benefit party affiliates. o Interviews with key stakeholders say: ▪ EU conditionality is utilized by ruling elites to consolidate power. 40 ▪ Lack of genuine political competition and the suppression of dissenting voices. o Although government effectiveness may have improved, this has not corresponded with a reduction in corruption. ▪ Corruption levels have stagnated or declined, particularly in areas where political participation and accountability have diminished. Beyond Serbia: money, power, glory in the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe Similar dynamics of clientelism and political manipulation as the ones identified in Serbia can be observed in other countries in the region. Macro-level trends: Prevalence of state capture across the Western Balkans. o Despite some improvements in governance effectiveness, political participation and accountability have stagnated or declined Hybrid status quo where democratic processes are undermined. Lack of direct indicators for state capture Use of proxy measures to demonstrate its prevalence. o While state institutions may function effectively, they do not promote genuine democratic engagement or accountability EU conditionality, while intended to promote democratic reforms, has often reinforced existing power structures and clientelist networks. o Pressure for simultaneous economic and political reforms Opportunities for elites to consolidate their power (rather than fostering genuine democratic change) Similar patterns of state capture and the adverse effects of EU accession policies can be observed in the region (not only Serbia) Conclusion EU conditionality has often inadvertently reinforced patterns of state capture in the Western Balkans. o Instead of dismantling clientelist networks and promoting genuine democratic governance, the conditionality framework has allowed ruling elites to consolidate their power and manipulate political processes. Political landscape in the Western Balkans remains hybrid, characterized by a mix of formal democratic structures and informal clientelist practices. 41 o This hybrid status quo undermines the effectiveness of democratic institutions and processes, leading to stagnation in political participation and accountability. One-size-fits-all approach to conditionality may not be effective o Policymakers should consider the specific dynamics of state capture and clientelism in each country. Koval, Nadiia and Milada Anna Vachudova. “European Union Enlargement and Geopolitical Power in the Face of War”, Journal of Common Market Studies (2024), https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13677. [PDF] → In responding to the war, the EU has shown both its promise as a geopolitical actor and its severe limitations. It has set the stage for the revival of EU enlargement as an important pillar of its ability to promote EU values. Argument: linking Ukraine’s enlargement prospects to its ability to fight off the Russian invasion and the EU’s future as a geopolitical actor has opened a new chapter in European integration. - ‘For the first time, the EU clearly chose the side of Ukraine in the Russia–Ukraine conflict and mobilised strong support to push back Russia’s unjustified aggression. This was a significant shift towards becoming a geopolitical actor, standing in contrast to the EU’s usual role of a mediator and facilitator in external conflicts’ (Raik et al., 2023, p. 25). - The EU’s sudden recognition of Ukraine as a future candidate reflected the EU’s prior experiences of using enlargement as a foreign policy tool (Vachudova, 2014). - For the third time, it is an external shock – and, for the second time, war – that spurring enlargement. We show that enlargement is once again coming into conflict with EU producers and challenging the EU to manage short-term economic interests in pursuit of its long-term security (Rabinovych and Pintsch, 2024). Enlargement as Foreign Policy: Three Decades of Change 42 - The collapse of communist rule across East Central Europe caused an ‘enlargement shock’ (Vachudova, 2007). - For aspiring members, the economic and geopolitical benefits of gaining EU membership were and are tremendous. - And for the EU, an enlarged membership promised a greater geopolitical role on the world stage, economic opportunities in a larger internal market and stable states along its eastern borders (Michel, 2024; Vachudova, 2005). - In the early 1990s, however, the EU acted to protect its producers, not to support stability and democracy in neighbouring states. - By the late 1990s, what had been separate – enlargement and foreign policy – was brought together as leaders realized that the EU’s most effective foreign policy tool was indeed enlargement (Vachudova, 2005). What are the dynamics of EU enlargement today in the face of Russia’s war? There are four points 1. the benefits of EU membership that give the EU passive leverage – and, potentially, tremendous active leverage over candidate states (Vachudova, 2005) – have remained strong despite the ebbs and flows of European integration. Whilst the EU has become more adept at granting access to the internal market in pursuit of foreign policy goals, the economic benefits of joining the EU’s internal market are still enormous (Meunier and Vachudova, 2018). 2. Enlargement and the EU’s geopolitical power continue to be spurred by external shocks. In 1999 and 2022, the EU reached for enlargement in response to the war in its neighbourhood. In both cases, the EU granted struggling countries recognition as credible candidates for membership. 3. whilst EU enlargement is now heralded widely as the EU’s most powerful foreign policy tool (European Parliament, 2022), it still harbours weaknesses stemming from the longtime primary function of EU institutions as architects and caretakers of the internal market (Meunier and Vachudova, 2018). EU enlargement helps promote democratic reforms because the benefits of membership create incentives for ruling elites in candidate states to adopt and implement the rules and regulations in force amongst EU member states – the acquis communautaire (see Sedelmeier, 2011). 4. there are now strong forces that may overcome the roadblocks that immobilized EU enlargement for Western Balkan candidates in the 2010s. On the side of the EU, 43 disinterest, petty regional politics and a preference for stability at any cost destroyed the effectiveness of conditionality, and the meritocracy of the process was extinguished (Džankić et al., 2019). For both sides, Ukraine as an EU candidate may be a game changer (Džankić et al., 2023). For the EU, there are now compelling geopolitical reasons to end regional political games and revive a meritocratic process. Enlargement and Defence in the Face of War EU leaders accepted the logic of the interconnectedness of Ukraine’s enlargement prospects, its ability to fight off the Russian invasion and the EU’s future as a security actor. Has Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine led to deeper European integration? Scholars have argued that the EU has the potential to become a powerful geopolitical actor, even a superpower, if member states decide to strengthen supranational decision-making in foreign policy and defence (Meunier and Vachudova, 2018). In this way, they could build on the EU’s undisputed power in trade, where member states have transferred competencies to EU institutions and abandoned the need for unanimity in the Council. In the first months of the war, as EU leaders implemented significant and unprecedented measures in the areas of enlargement and security, some scholars expressed optimism about the EU’s growing power (Håkansson, 2024; Laffan, 2023; Orenstein, 2023). Two years on, others have observed that the war has so far not empowered EU institutions in a durable way, strengthening instead intergovernmental decision-making. Three dynamics that have challenged the EU’s enlargement and security agenda in the face of war: 1. Crisis Leadership in European Institutions - Supranational theories of European integration suggest that in times of crisis, the EU’s supranational institutions assume new responsibilities for themselves through 44 agenda-setting and political and institutional spillover (Leuffen et al., 2022, pp. 98– 100). - Since 2022, the European Commission, under the leadership of President von der Leyen, has significantly expanded its geopolitical influence and aspirations (Håkansson, 2024). - In March 2022, the Commission played a critical role in implementing the first packages of sanctions. - These 2022 initiatives illustrate how the Commission hit the ground running after the start of the war and expanded its remit into new areas. - Nevertheless, over the course of 2023, the leadership and initiative of the Commission gradually diminished because the Commission’s new crisis-driven competencies that allowed for innovation and deepening integration were not institutionalized = their acceptance and final shape relied on unanimity amongst the member states in the Council. 2. Franco–German Leaderlessness in the Council - The Franco–German ‘integration engine’ has stopped functioning because of strategic differences between France and Germany on how to respond to the war: - For over two decades, Germany and France privileged economic interests by pursuing a ‘Russia first’ approach whilst downplaying the security concerns of EU partners near Russia’s borders. - Even after 2014, EU leaders sought to curb Russian aggression by asking Ukraine to accept limitations on its own sovereignty in tandem with deepening their own lucrative economic relations with Russia (Raik et al., 2023) = calls for ‘Wandel durch Handel’ (Change through trade) claiming that economic relations foster peace and boost bargaining power (Rabinovych, 2023). - Germany in 2023 and 2024 has continually followed the US lead, adopting a policy of cautious assistance in the spirit of ‘escalation management’ and a ‘negotiated solution’. - France, in contrast, has maintained its goal of building up the EU’s ‘strategic autonomy’ but has vacillated greatly on how to achieve it. It now lends full-throated support to Ukraine’s victory over Russia, embraces an enlargement path for Ukraine and supports the idea of sending foreign (including French) troops to Ukraine. - An important step towards any variety of a geopolitically stronger EU would be for France and Germany to agree on more ambitious joint strategies for helping Ukraine 45 win the war whilst making plans for a realistic division of labour with NATO (Daßler and Weiss, 2024). 3. Coalitions and Veto Players in Enlargement and War - With the leadership and vision of France and Germany missing, 2023 became a leaderless year of ad hoc coalitions and individual state initiatives. - Unanimous voting in the Council continues to give members opposed to EU support for Ukraine disproportionate leverage (Juncos and Pomorska, 2024). Hungary has stood out by making full use of its veto threat. - ⇒ This has facilitated a shift towards short-term political decision-making Conclusion - The EU has the potential to project geopolitical power by anchoring European security through enlargement and defence, even as it pursues a geopolitical market strategy to leverage the power of its vast internal market (see McNamara, 2023; Orenstein, 2023). - As has happened many times before, the interests of domestic producers in the EU are in competition with the EU’s security interests, and the EU needs to do more to bridge them. - Seeking an ephemeral “negotiated solution” is an untenable strategy that will strengthen the hands of authoritarian rule, damage European security and diminish the EU’s power. - We argue that the EU’s future as a geopolitical actor is closely tied to the outcome of the war and to the credibility of a revived enlargement process. But it may take another shock, such as a Russian military attack on an EU member or an even more gruesome attack inside Ukraine,

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