A2 2 History: Partition of Ireland 1900-1925 PDF

Mr J Proctor A2 2 History: Partition of Ireland 1900-1925 1- The crisis over the Third Home Rule Bill up to September 1914 Specification Content:  The significance of the Liberal victory in the 1906 General Election for Irish...

Mr J Proctor A2 2 History: Partition of Ireland 1900-1925 1- The crisis over the Third Home Rule Bill up to September 1914 Specification Content:  The significance of the Liberal victory in the 1906 General Election for Irish politics, following 10 years of Conservative rule  The significance of the General Election results of January and December 1910 for Irish politics  The extent to which the Liberal Government under Asquith and the Irish Parliamentary Party under Redmond achieved their aims by September 1914, with focus on the Home Rule Act  The motives for Ulster Unionist, Southern Unionist and Conservative Party opposition to Home Rule, led primarily by Carson, Craig and Law  The methods they used and the extent to which each party opposing Home Rule achieved its aims by September 1914  The main developments in the period 1910-1914, analysing the extent to which the Liberal Government and other political parties can be blamed for what became the Home Rule crisis NAME: ___________________________________________________ 1  Mr J Proctor The political background to the Third Home Rule Bill It is important to understand the political situation in both Britain and Ireland in 1900. Both Unionism and Nationalism faced difficult internal challenges at the beginning of the new century. While the IPP and Nationalism looked to the Liberal Party in Britain to promote their interests, so too did Unionism look to the Conservative Party to protect theirs. In both cases, these relationships were often strained. British Government The Conservative Party became the dominant political party in Britain after the Liberal Party split over Home Rule in 1886. Their election victory of 1895 eliminated any prospect of Home Rule. In 1900, the Conservatives were re-elected into government under Lord Salisbury. The Conservatives were opposed to Home Rule for Ireland and instead focused on resolving the land question, adopting a policy of ‘Constructive Unionism’. This essentially was the belief that if the Conservatives could successfully improve social and economic life in Ireland, then the demand for Home Rule would fade away. Many critics felt this was an attempt to: ‘kill Home Rule with kindness’ as the Tories introduced legislation such as the 1903 Wyndham Land Act. Unsurprisingly, progress on the land issue under the Conservative Government was not mirrored with progress on the Nationalist goal of Home Rule. The Liberal Party appointed a new leader in 1900 called Sir Henry Campbell- Bannerman. He was aware that Home Rule had damaged the party under Gladstone, and so he favoured a gradual approach to Home Rule, viewing it as less of a priority. There was a recognition within the Liberal Party that Home Rule had distracted the party from its focus on social reform – under Campbell-Bannerman the party would proceed slowly on the path to Home Rule. By 1905, after 10 years in power, the Conservative Government under Arthur Balfour was deeply unpopular in Britain and running out of steam. Balfour resigned, with a General Election called for January 1906. Nationalism and the IPP John Redmond reunited the IPP (also known as the Home Rule Party at this time) in 1900, following a decade of the ‘Parnellite Split’. He had led the ‘Parnellites’ in the 1890s. John Dillon was deputy leader and was crucial in supporting Redmond as he was more aware of the opinions of grassroots Nationalists in Ireland. Dillon had been pivotal in the ‘Anti-Parnellite’ wing of the IPP before 1900. Dillon was focused on ensuring Home Rule was delivered. In 1900, the IPP were relatively powerless in their pursuit of Home Rule, as the Conservative Government in Britain were anti-Home Rule. Redmond could do little more than wait in the hope that the Liberal Party would return to government in the future. 2  Mr J Proctor Other shades of Nationalism were also emerging at this time, causing some concern for Redmond’s IPP. New, cultural Nationalism was emerging with the GAA and Gaelic League. An organisation called ‘Cumann na nGaedheal’ emerged in 1900 targeting Redmond, who they believed was sympathetic to British imperialism. Another important opponent was Arthur Griffith who was against the IPP’s limited objective of Home Rule. Griffith proposed a much more radical course for Irish Nationalism – separation for Ireland and the destruction of the Union, with Irish MPs withdrawing from Westminster altogether. Griffith would establish ‘Sinn Fein’ in 1905 based on these core principles of abstentionism. Griffith had been critical of Redmond and the IPP following the Royal Visit of King Edward VII to Ireland in 1903 and regarded Redmond welcoming the King as a betrayal of Nationalism. It must be noted that Redmond himself was not a separatist – he did not wish to see Ireland break away from Britain, and so made no call for full independence. Although Redmond had reunited the IPP, the reality was that many of the differences in opinion within the party had not been dealt with. There was a division between the Parnellites and Anti-Parnellites over whether a continued alliance with the Liberal Party at Westminster was a good idea. The reality was that the Parnellite Split had cast a long shadow over the IPP. Their voters did become disillusioned by this prolonged period of infighting. Unionism Unionism had emerged as an organised political movement in the 1880s in response to the First Home Rule Bill. Unionists believed that Nationalist calls for Home Rule would eventually result in an unstoppable demand for full independence. Unionists viewed Home Rule as a threat to their identity, religious freedom, and their economic and social standing. During the period of Conservative Party dominance in Britain from 1895-1906, Home Rule was no real threat. Unionism had formed its own political party – the ‘Irish Unionist Party’ (IUP) led by Colonel Edward Saunderson. In 1905, Unionism united around the ‘Ulster Unionist Council’ (UUC). Saunderson died in 1906, with Walter Long elected Chairman of the UUC. He was an ineffective leader of Unionism, and was replaced in 1910 by Sir Edward Carson, who was steadfast in his opposition to Home Rule. Additional reading: Student Guide, pages 9-10 3  Mr J Proctor The significance of the Liberal victory in the 1906 General Election for Irish politics, following 10 years of Conservative rule By the end of 1905, the Conservative Party had ruled Britain for a decade. The January 1906 General Election provided the opportunity for the country to make a change in government. It proved to be a traumatic election for the Conservative Party. The Liberal Party would win a landslide victory in the 1906 election and under Prime Minister Campbell-Bannerman they would embark upon a programme of social reform. Home Rule was not the priority for Campbell-Bannerman, or for Herbert Asquith (pictured) who replaced him as Liberal Prime Minister in 1908. The IPP had welcomed the Liberal victory of 1906 and attempted to apply pressure on the new government to move forward on Home Rule. However, it soon became clear that the new government would not meet their expectations. It was no real surprise that Home Rule wasn’t top of the priority list for the Liberals, who faced a great deal of domestic challenges, such as the relationship with the House of Lords. The Irish Councils Bill (1907) However, that is not to say that the Liberal Government did not introduce legislation in Westminster specific to Ireland. The Liberals attempted to appease the Irish Nationalists by moving closer to Home Rule with the Irish Councils Bill (1907). This law would create an Irish Council which would have some (limited) powers over administration such as local government and education. The Liberals hoped this would end the struggle over Home Rule, but the Irish Council proposal was rejected by Redmond and the IPP whose expectations were still shaped by Home Rule. As much as the IPP were disappointed with this new Liberal Government, they realised that the only way any future progress could be made on Home Rule was reliant on an alliance with the Liberals. It was difficult to continue with this alliance after the Irish Councils Bill which was inadequate to the IPP, but the alliance was essential. The People’s Budget (1909) Home Rule would be back on the agenda in Westminster in 1909, after the People’s Budget was rejected by the House of Lords. The Conservatives had been keen to get revenge on the Liberals and so they used their majority in the Lords to reject the budget, which increased taxation on the rich. The rejection of the budget caused a constitutional crisis in Britain. The Liberals viewed the actions of the Conservatives as unconstitutional (illegal). The Liberals could not continue in government without a budget, and so a General Election was called for January 1910. 4  Mr J Proctor In the campaign, Home Rule was now at the forefront of British Politics once again. Liberal leader Asquith talked of how the House of Lords had ‘disabled’ the Government from progressing on the Irish Question, and that if re-elected his new Government would be ‘entirely free’. Asquith had made Home Rule a core issue in the January 1910 General Election. Additional reading: Student Guide, pages 10-12 The significance of the General Election results of January and December 1910 for Irish politics There would be two General Elections in the year 1910 – in January and December. Both elections resulted in a ‘Hung Parliament’, which meant that no one political party had enough seats to form a government on their own. The Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) would find itself in a significant position, holding the balance of power in the House of Commons. General Election, January 1910 The key issue in the January 1910 General Election was the budget. The Liberal Party won 275 seats in Parliament, with the Conservatives a close second on 273 seats. In the aftermath of this election, Sir Edward Carson – the MP for Trinity College – became leader of the Irish Unionist Party. There were 21 Irish Unionists in the House of Commons, mostly from Ulster. They had fought an election campaign highlighting the dangers associated with Home Rule. It was the Irish Nationalists (who collectively had 82 seats, 70 of which were held by the IPP) who held the balance of power, and they allied with Asquith and the Liberals to keep the Liberal Party in government. The Hung Parliament strengthened Redmond’s hand. He was now a front ranking politician in Westminster, and it appeared that Home Rule was in touching distance. Redmond made it clear to the Liberals that the IPP’s support for the Liberals was conditional on the government making changes to the House of Lords ability to ‘veto’ legislation. The slogan: ‘No Veto, No Budget’ was used. In May 1910, King Edward VII died. Redmond was aware that Asquith was likely to use this as an excuse to delay reform of the House of Lords, and consequentially delay Home Rule further. The new King – George V – was very concerned about the Monarchy being drawn into a political debate about the House of Lords. As such, he organised a conference to be held at Buckingham Palace, bringing together Liberals and Conservatives in 5  Mr J Proctor the hope that a compromise could be found. The conference broke down in November 1910 without agreement. This paved the way for a new General Election, to be held in December 1910. General Election, December 1910 The core issue in this General Election was defined by the slogan: ‘Peers versus People’. In other words, should the House of Lords continue to have an absolute veto in Parliament or not? The election result was very similar to January 1910. The Liberal Party and the Conservative Party each won 272 seats. Therefore, it was another Hung Parliament and the IPP would continue to hold the balance of power. The IPP had a successful election with their popular slogan: ‘Kill the Veto’. They had faced a challenge from a rival All-for-Ireland-League (AFIL) who failed to win seats outside of their stronghold in County Cork. Sinn Fein also failed to make up any ground outside of Dublin. Redmond’s authority in Ireland was secure. Redmond and the IPP entered into an alliance with the Liberal Party once again. In Unionism, Sir Edward Carson had made his first visit to Ulster in late November 1910 speaking at the Ulster Hall. To the delight of the Ulstermen, Carson repeated Randolph Churchill’s famous: ‘Ulster will fight and Ulster will be right!’ and concluded his speech with: ‘God save Ireland’. The creation of the UUC would help the Ulster Unionist struggle against Home Rule in the future. The election results of 1910 had maintained the status quo at Westminster. Redmond now seemed poised to finally deliver Home Rule for Ireland. The Parliament Act (1911) An uneasy alliance between Asquith’s Liberal Party and the Irish Nationalists had emerged in 1910 in order to keep the Liberals in power. As such, with some reluctance, Asquith agreed to meet his obligation to deliver Home Rule. The Parliament Act passed in 1911, which ensured that the House of Lords could only delay legislation for a maximum of 2 years. This removed the ‘absolute veto’ held by the Lords and ensured that never again could the House of Lords prevent a law from being passed (like it had done with the Second Home Rule Bill in 1893). To Redmond and the IPP, the prospect of Home Rule was greater than ever. By 1912, Asquith had introduced the Third Home Rule Bill to Parliament. Redmond believed that within two years, the dream of Home Rule would finally become a reality. Additional reading: 6 Student Guide, pages 13-14 CCEA eGuide, pages 3-4  Mr J Proctor A Chronological Overview of the Home Rule Crisis, 1910-1914 All of the events on the timeline below will be explored in more detail in the notes that follow but having a chronological understanding of the actions of the Liberals, IPP, Unionists and Conservatives during this period of time is crucial. The period 1910-1914 is referred to as the ‘Home Rule Crisis’ because the two sides of the Home Rule argument failed to reach a compromise meaning civil war in Ireland seemed likely by 1914. The 1911 Parliament Act had poisoned relations between the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party in London and this was the political context for the ‘Ulster Crisis’. An overview is below: January The Liberal Party were reliant on the IPP after a Hung Parliament election result. 191 The IPP now pressed Asquith to remove the House of Lords’ veto and push towards 0 delivering Home Rule. February Sir Edward Carson – the Dublin born Unionist MP for Trinity College becomes the leader of Unionism. August The Parliament Act is introduced which replaced the ‘absolute veto’ held by the 1911 House of Lords with a 2-year suspension veto. This made Home Rule now seem inevitable since the Lords could no longer reject it. 23 Unionists stage a rally at ‘Craigavon’ – the home of Sir James Craig. 50,000 Septembe Unionists marched to Craig’s home from Belfast City Centre to show how serious r Unionist opposition to Home Rule was. November Andrew Bonar Law becomes leader of the Conservative Party. He had family connections with Ulster and was opposed to Home Rule. 8 Winston Churchill visited Ireland to speak at a pro-Home Rule rally. Unionists were 191 February furious and tried to prevent the rally from going ahead. A crowd of Unionists 2 attempted to overturn his car en route to Celtic Park in West Belfast where he was due to speak. Churchill eventually had to be smuggled out of the country via boat from Larne. 9 April A Unionist anti-Home Rule demonstration was held at Balmoral. Conservative leader Bonar Law spoke to the crowd. 11 April Asquith introduced the Third Home Rule Bill to Parliament. This would create an Irish Parliament in Dublin which had limited control over Irish affairs, but Ireland would remain part of the UK, sending 42 MPs to Westminster. June Backbench Liberal MP Agar-Robartes introduced an amendment to the Third Home Rule Bill suggesting that the 4 most Protestant counties of Ulster be excluded from 7  Mr J Proctor Home Rule. July Sectarian violence erupted in Belfast following an incident in Castledawson when a Sunday School group was attacked. This provoked Unionist leaders to push towards Unionist unity. 28 July A demonstration was held at Blenheim Palace when Bonar Law addressed a group of up to 250,000 British Unionists and said: ‘I can imagine no length of resistance to which Ulster will go in which I and the Conservative Party are not prepared to support them’. This seemed to suggest that they would support the use of violent resistance in Ulster. 28 ‘Ulster Day’ takes place – 471,000 sign the Solemn League and Covenant. This was Septembe the clearest expression of Unionist opposition to Home Rule so far and r demonstrated discipline. 1 January Sir Edward Carson tactically begins to suggest excluding Ulster from Home Rule 191 being a compromise he may be willing to accept. This is because Carson believed 3 Home Rule could not exist without Ulster. January The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) is formed, with membership eventually reaching over 100,000 men. The UVF vowed to fight against Home Rule. 11 Lord Loreburn, a senior member of the Liberal Party in the House of Lords, Septembe proposed the idea of ‘Home Rule all round’ due to the fear of violence in Ulster. This r intervention suggested people within the Liberal Party were beginning to take the threat of Unionist opposition seriously. 9 October Another Senior Liberal, Winston Churchill, proposed ‘Home Rule within Home Rule’ whereby there would be a Parliament in Dublin and a Parliament in Belfast. It appeared movement towards a compromise was growing. 13 A member of the Liberal Government, David Lloyd-George, proposed a temporary November partition which meant that any Ulster County which wanted to ‘opt out’ of Home Rule could do so for a period of 6 years. This was never going to be acceptable to Nationalists. 25 The Irish Volunteers were formed by Eoin MacNeill with a membership of 180,000 November by 1914. Redmond initially did not support this movement which aimed to ensure Home Rule was passed, as many of its key members were drawn from extreme Nationalists. 9 March Following meetings with Bonar Law in 1913, Asquith now proposed that Ulster 191 counties could opt out of Home Rule (known as the ‘county option’) for a temporary 4 period of 6 years. Redmond and the IPP reluctantly accepted this compromise, but Sir Edward Carson did not, stating: ‘we do not want a sentence of death with a stay of execution for six years’. March The ‘Curragh Mutiny’ takes place. 58 Army Officers stated that they would refuse to obey orders to attack Ulster if the Government asked them to do so. This incident was damaging for Asquith’s government and meant that the Army could not be used in suppressing Unionist opposition to Home Rule and UVF activity. 24-25 The UVF land guns in what became known as the ‘Larne gun running’. 250,000 8  Mr J Proctor April German guns were smuggled in by boat and distributed to UVF men overnight. This armed the UVF and made them a potential military threat. 21-24 July King George V held a conference at Buckingham Palace with members of the Liberals. Conservatives, IPP and Unionists to try and find a solution to the Home Rule Crisis. The conference broke down without agreement over whether or not it would be a temporary or permanent exclusion for Ulster, and whether it would be 4 or 6 counties of Ulster that would be excluded. 26 July The Irish Volunteers landed guns near Dublin in what became known as the ‘Howth gun running’. Unlike the UVF at Larne, the Irish Volunteers were intercepted by troops who attempted to prevent the guns being distributed. 4 August World War I broke out in Europe. Unionists and Nationalists pledged to support the war effort. 18 The Third Home Rule Bill is placed on the statute book, meaning it has become law. Septembe However, it was suspended until the end of World War I because a compromise had r not yet be found for Ulster. Many extreme Nationalists were angry at this delay. 9  Mr J Proctor The extent to which the Liberal government under Asquith and the Irish Parliamentary Party under Redmond achieved their aims by September 1914, with a focus on the Home Rule Act The aims and roles of Asquith and the Liberal Party  The main aim of the Liberal Party was to stay in power. Their election victory of December 1910 was marginal, and as a result Asquith knew he needed to be careful in maintaining the support of the backbench Liberal MPs.  Asquith aimed to see Home Rule introduced for all of Ireland, including Ulster.  Asquith wanted to solve the ‘Irish Question’ once and for all. It had haunted the Liberal Party since the 1880s. Asquith wanted to deliver Home Rule while avoiding conflict or the threat of civil war in Ireland.  Whilst the Liberal Party did remain in power during the Home Rule Crisis, it can be argued that Asquith failed in one of his key aims of solving the Irish Question. Whilst Asquith did successfully introduce a Third Home Rule Bill in 1912 and get it on the ‘statute book’, by 1914 – with the threat of war in Europe – Home Rule was hanging in the balance. Many historians would also argue that Asquith’s rhetoric and actions fuelled both Unionist opposition to Home Rule and the emergence of extreme Nationalism. The aims and roles of Redmond and the Irish Parliamentary Party  Redmond’s primary aim was to deliver Home Rule for all of Ireland – he talked of how ‘Ireland is a unit’.  The IPP believed Home Rule, by granting a Parliament in Dublin, would finally rid Ireland of the problems and grievances dating back to Parnell and even Daniel O’Connell before that.  Redmond did not want complete separation from Britain. In fact, the IPP wanted Ireland to continue to have a role in the Empire in order to maintain Ulster’s economic power.  Redmond did successfully deliver upon his most important political aim – to deliver the Home Rule Bill (which passed in September 1914) – this was a significant victory for the IPP after a long struggle dating back to the 1880s. However, Home Rule was ultimately postponed due to the outbreak of World War I, resulting in what Buckland described as a ‘hollow victory’. The relationship between the Liberal Party and the IPP  The IPP had supported the Liberals in the House of Commons during this period, as Redmond was confident that Asquith would deliver Home Rule for 10  Mr J Proctor Ireland. This gave the Liberals a comfortable majority at Westminster, whilst also giving the IPP greater influence. The extent to which the aims of the Liberal Government and the IPP changed during the Home Rule Crisis  By 1912, it was becoming increasingly clear that not all Liberal MPs supported the Home Rule agenda. By June 1912 the cracks were beginning to show in the party, as highlighted by the Agar-Robartes amendment.  A change in Liberal policy did emerge by 1913-1914, with discussion of an ‘Ulster settlement’ – some exclusion for Ulster from Home Rule.  Redmond remained committed to Home Rule for all of Ireland, but by 1914 he knew that there would have to be what he coined as the ‘price of peace’ – some acceptance of a deal for Ulster which suited Unionists. Unionist Opposition to Home Rule For much of the Home Rule Crisis, Asquith and the Liberal Government worked on the assumption that Unionists were simply bluffing in their attempts to oppose Home Rule. The reality was though that by the end of 1913, the Liberals could no longer proceed with their Home Rule plans and had to begin serious consideration of some exemption for Ulster. Ulster Unionism objected to Home Rule for all of Ireland initially, seeking to preserve the British Empire and keep Ireland within the Union. Some within Unionism displayed a willingness to go to extreme lengths – including threatening the use of violence – in order to resist Home Rule. In Britain, the Conservative Party rallied around the Unionists to oppose Home Rule during the 1912-1914 crisis. Andrew Bonar Law had become leader of the Conservative Party in 1911 and he united the Conservative Party in its opposition to Home Rule, due to his family connections with Ulster. Historians have argued that no other Conservative leader would have given such a commitment to Ulster. A core principle which united Irish Unionists and British Conservatives was the belief that Irish Nationalists would never be satisfied by Home Rule but would simply use Home Rule to start an unstoppable campaign for full independence. It should be noted that Redmond and the IPP genuinely wanted Ireland to remain within the British Empire, but unionists remembered the words of Parnell who famously said that Irishmen would not be satisfied until the lasting link that binds Ireland to Britain is destroyed. 11  Mr J Proctor Reasons for Unionist opposition to Home Rule It is important to look at the motives behind the 3 key leaders who led the opposition to Home Rule, but first, we need to understand the reasons why ordinary Unionists opposed Home Rule.  Religion: A key fear for unionists was that a Home Rule Parliament would discriminate against them, due to the large Catholic population in Ireland. There was a belief that ‘Home Rule is Rome Rule’ – whereby the Catholic Church would have great influence in Irish Politics. This fear was exacerbated by the 1908 Ne Temere Decree which declared that marriage between Catholics and non-Catholics was null and void. In 1910, a newspaper article in The Northern Whig reported that a Belfast Catholic named Alexander McCann had married in a Presbyterian Church in 1908 and had two children since. The article claimed that McCann had been encouraged by a local Catholic Priest to leave his wife since the marriage was not recognised under the Ne Temere decree. McCann left his wife and removed the two children who were never seen again by their mother. The ‘McCann Case’ heightened fears of the Protestant people becoming a persecuted minority in Home Rule Ireland and led to James Craig referring to Ireland as a ‘priest ridden country’. The Protestant Churches now became involved in the anti-Home Rule campaign warning Protestants that they would be excluded from government and the civil service in Home Rule Ireland due to their religion. It should be noted that these religious concerns primarily affected Ulster Unionism, since Southern Unionists were a lot more tolerant of Catholicism.  Economic: Ulster provided Ireland with most of her wealth in terms of industry and so there was a great fear that Home Rule would remove the economic prosperity that many were experiencing under the Union and result in higher taxation, using Ulster’s wealth to subsidise the inefficient agricultural systems in the South and West of the island. Belfast at this time was economically vibrant with linen and shipbuilding industries, and many unionists feared that this growth would be mismanaged in Home Rule Ireland since they felt Nationalists had little understanding of business and economics. Ultimately, the threat of economic ties between Britain and Ireland being cut and the disruption that would cause to trade, did rally many people against Home Rule.  Social: Southern Unionists feared that their privileged social status would be threatened in a Home Rule Ireland. By this time, Southern Unionists tended to be upper-class landowners, and they feared radical land ownership legislation 12  Mr J Proctor being introduced by lower class Catholics and the potential confiscation of their land. Many unionists also feared the loss of their cultural British identity, whilst there was a view that the Irish were simply incapable of self- government.  Political: The obvious political fear was that Home Rule would result in the breakup of the British Empire, and how this could result in other countries within the Empire such as India demanding self-government. There was fear in Southern Unionist circles that their long-established links with the Conservative Party would be eroded if Home Rule was delivered. The motives of Ulster Unionist, Southern Unionist and Conservative Party opposition to Home Rule, led primarily by Sir Edward Carson, James Craig and Andrew Bonar Law Sir Edward Carson Carson was the leader of Unionism in Westminster from 1910 onwards. He was Dublin born and had trained as a barrister at Trinity College. Carson represented Trinity College as a Unionist MP. He was committed to preserving the Union. Healy described Carson as: ‘although a Unionist, he was never un-Irish’. Carson was very aware of the threat of alienating Southern Unionists with the focus of the anti- Home Rule campaign being on Ulster. As such, he tried to reassure Southern Unionists in a speech in Dublin in 1911 that the campaign of Ulster resistance to Home Rule was designed to kill Home Rule for all of Ireland. Carson said: “you need fear no action of Ulster which would be in the nature of desertion of the Southern Provinces… if Ulster succeeds, Home Rule is dead”. Sir James Craig Craig had entered Westminster in 1906 but had no real ambitions politically until 1911 and the campaign against Home Rule, when 13  Mr J Proctor he undoubtedly became a leader for Ulster Unionists. Craig masterminded the campaign against the Third Home Rule Bill, focusing primarily on Ulster and the need for Ulster to be able to ‘opt out’ of Home Rule Ireland. Craig organised a successful rally in September 1911 with 50,000 Unionist supporters marching from the centre of Belfast to Craig’s home overlooking Belfast Lough to hear Carson speak, in the aftermath of the passing of the Parliament Act which removed the final defences against Home Rule. This event captured the attention of the media in Britain, with Home Rule now dominating the national media headlines for the period 1911-1914. Andrew Bonar Law (Conservative Party) Andrew Bonar Law became leader of the Conservative Party in 1911. This was an unexpected boost for Unionist opposition to Home Rule. Bonar Law had been critical of Asquith’s Parliament Act, calling it the ‘Home Rule in Disguise Bill’. He had an association with Ulster, as his father was a Presbyterian Minister who served in a Church in County Antrim, whilst his brother was a doctor working in Coleraine. As a result, Bonar Law made frequent visits to the province of Ulster to spend time with family, and he acquired an understanding of the mentality of Ulster Unionism. Bonar Law was empathetic to Unionism, and this influenced many of the decisions he made during the Home Rule Crisis of 1912-1914. As well as his unionist sympathies, Bonar Law recognised that resisting Home Rule could be an issue which would help unite the Conservative Party, and his forthright anti-Home Rule views were endorsed by the rest of the Conservative Party leadership. Additional reading: Student Guide, pages 15-19 CCEA eGuide, pages 4-5 14  Mr J Proctor The methods used by the Ulster Unionists, Southern Unionists and Conservative Party to oppose Home Rule and the extent to which they were successful in achieving their aims by September 1914  Extra-parliamentary, militant opposition of Ulster Unionists led by Carson and Craig: Carson had been alarmed by the increased in sectarian violence in Ulster in 1912, following the introduction of the Third Home Rule Bill. In early July 1912, 2,000 Catholic workers were forced out of their jobs in the shipyards. This was sparked by an incident in Castledawson on 29 June, when a Presbyterian Sunday School group encountered a group of the Ancient Order of Hibernians who were returning from Maghera. Exaggerated rumours circulated of innocent Protestant children being attacked by drunken Catholic men. Following the expulsion of Catholic shipyard workers, further violence followed over the Twelfth holiday period. By September 1912, violence spilled over into a football match in Belfast. Carson felt that there needed to be greater control over the anti-Home Rule movement, and something to focus the minds of those who were determined to resist Home Rule. As a result, James Craig devised the idea of an ‘oath’ – the Solemn League and Covenant. This Covenant provided those who signed it to profess loyalty to the King, whilst simultaneously warning the government that the men of Ulster would use ‘all means necessary to defeat the present conspiracy to set up a Home Rule parliament in Ireland’. James Craig organised ‘Ulster Day’ on 28 September 1912, when Carson and other leading figures signed the Covenant at Belfast City Hall, on a table draped in a Union Flag following a mass rally in Belfast. This followed days of copies of the Covenant being distributed across the province of Ulster to be signed in local Orange halls. Some people had signed in blood to emphasise their commitment to Ulster. Ulster Day was a propaganda triumph aimed to show the Liberal Government how serious Ulster Unionists were when they warned of their resistance to Home Rule. It was a striking symbol of ‘Britishness’. The total number of signatories of the Covenant reached over 471,000. The Covenant had successfully created a highly disciplined mass movement. On 31 January 1913, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) was formed with membership at 90,000 by the end of the year. The UVF was formed to provide a ‘safety valve’ for Unionism, but also to act as a potential Army if Unionists created a Provisional Government in Ulster. The existence of the UVF at this time was further evidence that there was substance to Carson’s militant rhetoric of potential violent resistance in Ulster. The UVF successfully imposed the discipline on its members that Carson viewed as essential. Even if Carson’s extra-parliamentary tactics were only intended to be used as a 15  Mr J Proctor ‘threat’, they had given Unionism a confidence that violence should be contemplated.  Southern Unionist dependence on Carson’s tactics and on the Conservative Party: The anti-Home Rule campaign became increasingly focused on Ulster as 1912 and 1913 progressed. On 1 January 1913, Carson proposed an amendment to the Third Home Rule Bill in Parliament, suggesting that the entire province of Ulster be removed from Home Rule. This built on his commitments in the Ulster Covenant, but it was a risky strategy which caused greater concern amongst Unionists in the other 3 provinces of Ireland. They feared being left behind, but Carson attempted to reassure them that this was simply a tactic and under no circumstances would they be abandoned. As 1913 progressed, Carson became increasingly aware that Southern Unionists could be a potential obstacle to a compromise on the Third Home Rule Bill, and so he attempted to tackle the problem directly by meeting a delegation of Southern Unionists at his home in London. Carson got an assurance from them that they would not obstruct Ulster’s demand to be excluded from Home Rule. In truth, the Southern Unionists had been totally reliant and dependent upon Carson campaigning to prevent Home Rule for all of Ireland, yet by autumn of 1913, Carson appeared to have changed his strategy. He was no longer suggesting removing Ulster from Home Rule as a ‘tactic’, instead Carson was now trying to save as much of Ulster as possible from the unstoppable Third Home Rule Bill.  Bonar Law’s willingness to use inflammatory speeches: Bonar Law addressed a crowd of 100,000 supporters at Balmoral on Easter Tuesday 1912 arguing that if Home Rule was defeated successfully, it would “save the Empire”. He then grasped Sir Edward Carson’s hand in full view of the crowd, in what was a dramatic gesture symbolising the bond between the British Conservatives and Ulster Unionists. However, he was much more extreme in his speech at Blenheim Palace in Oxfordshire on 27 July 1912, when Bonar Law addressed a large anti-Home Rule demonstration. Speaking to 13,000 supporters, Bonar Law described Ireland as “a nation, not two nations, but one nation” and went on to say that if the Liberal Government proceeded with Home Rule, then Ulstermen “would be justified in resisting by all means necessary including violence”. Bonar Law’s famous line during this speech was: “I can imagine no length of resistance to which Ulster will go, in which I will not be ready to support them, and in which they will not be supported by the overwhelming majority of the British people”. This seemed to be an encouragement of violence in Ulster, and it caused quite a storm politically at Westminster. A month previously, on 18 June, Bonar Law had indicated to the House of Commons that there were “things stronger than parliamentary majorities”. Naturally this type of inflammatory language caused alarm 16  Mr J Proctor amongst the Liberal Government who feared violence in Ulster. Bonar Law’s militant stance can be explained by the fact he was anxious to unite his Conservative Party and felt the defence of the Union was an issue on which his party could unite.  The significance of the Curragh Incident: In March 1914, with the threat of violent resistance in Ulster growing, the Liberal Prime Minister Asquith reluctantly agreed to a plan by Churchill that the Army should be deployed to intimidate the UVF in carefully selected locations in Ulster. This followed the refusal of Ulster Unionists to accept the ‘final’ offer of compromise on Home Rule. Churchill was informed by an Army General, Hubert Gough, that 58 Army Officers would refuse to participate in any operation in Ulster, and Gough demanded a written assurance that the Army would not be used in order to coerce Ulster into accepting Home Rule. This is because many Army Officers had family connection or sympathies in Ulster. The ‘Curragh Incident’ as it became known, severely damaged Asquith’s government, and greatly limited its ability to put pressure on the Ulster Unionists. Asquith’s government had come agonisingly close to a full-scale Army mutiny. Following the crisis, Asquith was accused of hatching a “plot against Ulster”, and by late April 1914, the UVF had successfully landed a very large quantity of guns and ammunition from Europe, in what became known as the ‘Larne gun running’ of 24-25 April 1914. Somewhere in the region of 24,600 rifles and 3 million rounds of ammunition had been imported. These two events – the Curragh Incident and the Larne gun running – had been victories for Ulster Unionism and could be used as leverage in order to get further concessions from Asquith’s government. Curragh had eliminated any possibility of the UVF and Army clashing with one another.  The extent to which the Unionists and Conservatives achieved their aims in opposing Home Rule: When the Home Rule Bill finally passed on 18 September 1914, it was clear that Redmond and the IPP had made considerable concessions. Home Rule for all of Ireland had not been delivered, and there was still no agreement on what would happen to Ulster. However, it must be noted that Carson and Unionism also made considerable concessions. They had failed to prevent Home Rule from reaching the statue book (becoming law) despite it being postponed due to the war. Their original objective had been to use the idea of ‘exclusion’ for Ulster as a tactic to keep all of Ireland within the United Kingdom. Yet by Autumn 1913, Carson was privately acknowledging that the maximum he would be able to save from Home Rule was six counties in Ulster. Carson had initially abandoned Southern Unionists in Connaught, Leinster, and Munster to focus on Ulster. Now, in focusing on a 6-county exclusion, he had also turned his back on those Unionists in Donegal, Cavan and Monaghan who had signed the Ulster Covenant and joined the UVF. Ultimately, it can be said that Ulster Unionism did achieve its main aim by 1914 and that was ensuring Ulster was excluded 17  Mr J Proctor from Home Rule (albeit only 6 counties). They had also successfully ‘armed’ the UVF which had proved those such as Redmond wrong who believed Unionism was ‘bluffing’ with its threat of armed resistance. However, they did not fully achieve their aims. Carson was guilt ridden at abandoning Southern Unionists, and in truth by the outbreak of World War I, the future of Ulster remained unclear. For Southern Unionists, they certainly failed to achieve their aims. They were left stranded in a Home Rule Ireland, which had been their greatest fear. They were deserted by both Unionism and the Conservatives, and therefore failed more than any other group to achieve their aims. For the Conservative Party, they had been successful in preserving the British Empire, which was always their aim. They had also successfully built up a mass opposition movement to Home Rule and successfully prevented Home Rule in Ulster. Although, by 1914, they remained in ‘Opposition’ at Westminster and remained “office sick with hunger”. Additional reading: Student Guide, pages 19-23 CCEA eGuide, pages 5-6 18  Mr J Proctor The main developments in the period 1910-1914, analysing the extent to which the Liberal Government and other political parties can be blamed for what became the ‘Home Rule Crisis’  Asquith’s “wait and see” tactics, including introducing the Third Home Rule Bill in 1912 and seeking to steer it through the House of Commons: Asquith introduced the Third Home Rule Bill to the House of Commons on 11 April 1912. It stated that there would be an Irish Parliament in Dublin with two Chambers – the Senate and the House of Commons. The Irish Parliament was subordinate to Westminster and could make laws for Ireland but was limited on matters such as foreign affairs and taxation. Under this Home Rule Bill, Ireland remained part of the United Kingdom and would send 42 MPs to Westminster. There was to be no special status granted to Ulster. Asquith had not considered the Ulster situation until February 1912, when Cabinet members Lloyd George and Churchill brought forward suggestions that Ulster should be excluded from the Third Home Rule Bill. Asquith rejected the idea of exclusion for Ulster, preferring to ‘wait and see’ – sit back and wait to see if a compromise on Ulster was required, and what sort of compromise (if any) would be sufficient. It was clear why the ‘wait and see’ approach was preferable for Asquith. He did not want to make any premature concession for Ulster, as it may prove unnecessary (as Ulster Unionist resistance may fade away) and it would certainly undermine the position of Redmond and the IPP. However, Asquith’s famous saying of: “we better wait and see” demonstrated that he failed to give sufficient consideration to the threat of trouble in Ulster if Home Rule was imposed. By attempting to tactically play down the Ulster issue, Asquith opened the door to Carson and Bonar Law’s escalating tactics.  The development of the idea of ‘exclusion for Ulster’, 1912-1914: In late May 1912, during the Second Reading of the Home Rule Bill in Parliament, a backbench Liberal MP called Thomas Agar-Robartes proposed an amendment to exclude the four North-East Ulster counties with a Protestant majority from Home Rule (Antrim, Armagh, Down and Londonderry). Asquith rejected the amendment stating that it would not prevent Unionist opposition to the Home Rule Bill, but there is no doubt that the intervention from Agar- Robartes did cause Asquith’s government some embarrassment. Carson reluctantly supported the amendment in the hope that it would serve as a “wrecking ball” to destroy the Home Rule Bill entirely, while Redmond and the IPP were furious and reiterated their demand that Ireland had to be treated as one distinct entity. By Summer 1912, the idea of some form of exclusion or 19  Mr J Proctor partition as a possible solution to the Home Rule Crisis was openly being discussed, but it was clear no side was in the mood for compromise. The Liberal Party was not prepared to let Redmond and the IPP down, while at the same time the Conservative Party were united with the Unionists in their aim to use Ulster to destroy Home Rule entirely. The key Conservative argument at this time was that the Home Rule Bill was a “corrupt bargain” between Asquith and Redmond, and a General Election should be called to give voters a say on Home Rule. The next attempt at exclusion for Ulster came on 1 January 1913, when Sir Edward Carson proposed excluding the entirety of Ulster from Home Rule. The Liberal Government met to discuss the amendment, but the majority of Asquith’s Cabinet remained committed to a policy of ‘no compromise’ and the amendment was rejected. In September 1913, a letter from Lord Loreburn – a firm supporter of Home Rule who had served as Lord Chancellor in the Liberal Government – was published in The Times. The letter caught both Asquith and Redmond by surprise, as it urged party leaders to go the extra mile in order to reach a settlement. This was followed by a series of talks between Bonar Law (Conservative) and Churchill (Liberal) in which it became clear that Partition may be an acceptable solution. Churchill’s suggestion of ‘Home Rule within Home Rule’ was met with opposition from Nationalists – most notably T.P. O’Connor – who referred to it as the “mutilation of the Irish nation… Ireland is a unit… the two-nation theory is an abomination and a blasphemy”. However, Asquith did remain keen to reach a compromise, and he held confidential meetings with Bonar Law on 14 October, 6 November, and 10 December 1913. These talks reaffirmed to Asquith that Bonar Law would be willing to accept Home Rule providing Ulster was excluded, but that Carson would accept nothing less than 6 counties, despite the fact that Tyrone and Fermanagh had small Nationalist majorities. Asquith agreed to bring the idea of exclusion for Ulster to his Liberal Cabinet, but it was Lloyd George who took the initiative and proposed that those Ulster counties be allowed to ‘opt out’ of Home Rule for a period of 5 years. Redmond was alarmed by this amendment, and demanded an assurance from Asquith that the Liberal Government would not introduce Lloyd George’s plan. Although no further progress was reached, it was now clear that the Liberal Government were moving towards the idea of exclusion for Ulster. In December 1913 and January 1914, Asquith met with Carson to explore the idea of ‘Home Rule within Home Rule’, although this proposal was rejected by Carson. On 2 February 1914, a crucial meeting took place between Asquith and Redmond, with Asquith explaining that he had no alternative but to offer some concession to Ulster, suggesting the idea of ‘Home Rule within Home Rule’. In March 1914, Asquith and his top team met with Redmond and the IPP hierarchy to discuss a new plan developed by Lloyd-George, which would allow individual counties to ‘opt out’ of Home Rule for a period of 3 years. Redmond reluctantly accepted this ‘county option’ proposal, referring to it as: “the price of peace”. Within days, Redmond had agreed to extending it from 3 years to 6 years. This was a major concession by Redmond and the IPP, who had abandoned their ‘one Ireland’ principle. However, with Home Rule now in 20  Mr J Proctor touching distance, Redmond was willing to accept this as a temporary exclusion for Ulster to help heal the bitterness of the Ulster Crisis. Carson rejected the ‘county option’ proposal, famously stating he would not: “accept a sentence of death with a stay of execution for six years”. By the Summer of 1914, time was running out.  The unsuccessful attempt by the British Government to reach a compromise, such as the Buckingham Palace Conference of July 1914: Awareness of the ‘Ulster Crisis’ in Britain was heightened in March 1913 when Lord Willoughby de Broke formed the ‘British League for Supporters of Ulster and the Union’ in a letter signed by 100 Peers and 120 MPs. Whilst Asquith remained committed to his “wait and see policy”, King George V now became increasingly concerned about the failure to reach a compromise. In August 1913, King George V handed Asquith a memorandum suggesting an all-party conference aimed at reaching a settlement. Asquith resisted the calls for a conference and steered the King away from this potential controversy. Asquith successfully resisted the calls for a conference until mid-1914. By this time, the Home Rule Bill was soon to receive ‘Royal Assent’, meaning it has become law. At this point, Asquith reluctantly agreed to the King’s persistent requests for an all-party conference. The Buckingham Palace Conference ran from 21-24 July 1914 and was attended by Asquith and Lloyd George (Liberals); Bonar Law and Lansdowne (Conservatives); Redmond and Dillion (IPP) and Carson and Craig (Unionists). The conference merely highlighted the differences between the parties even more. Division over the area(s) to be excluded from Home Rule and the duration of that exclusion were clear, and eventually Asquith’s proposal of excluding the four Ulster counties plus South Tyrone and North Fermanagh was rejected by both Carson and Redmond! The conference broke down without agreement, with Churchill explaining how the conference: “ground to a halt along the muddy byways of Fermanagh and Tyrone”. Asquith continued in his search for a solution.  Extra-parliamentary support for Home Rule from Nationalists, such as the Irish Volunteers: As the Home Rule Crisis deepened, the Irish Volunteers were formed in November 1913. Clearly inspired by the creation of the UVF and the success of Carson’s extra-parliamentary tactics, Eoin MacNeill and a group of Nationalists who were dissatisfied with Redmond’s handling of the Home Rule Crisis formed the Irish Volunteers – an unwelcome development for both Redmond and the Liberal Government. Outraged by the events of the UVFs Larne gun running, there was a surge in membership of the Irish Volunteers in mid-1914, with over 100,000 members. This made the potential for civil war in Ireland highly likely. Redmond attempted to take control of the Irish Volunteers to give the IPP control over the movement, but it was soon apparent that the Irish Volunteers were pursuing their own agenda. Sir Roger Casement organised a gun running operation for the Irish Volunteers without informing Redmond. 1,500 rifles and 45,000 rounds of ammunition were 21  Mr J Proctor brought to Ireland from Germany, landing in Howth, Co. Dublin in July 1914. The supporters of the Irish Volunteers were convinced Carson’s extra- parliamentary tactics had been more successful than Redmond’s constitutional approach. Troops attempted to capture the weapons at Howth, and as they returned to their barracks, the troops opened fire on civilians, killing 3. This outraged Nationalists as the response to the Howth gun running seemed much more severe than the response to the UVF’s Larne gun running.  Assessment of the responsibility of each party for the crisis: Asquith’s underestimation of Unionist opposition to Home Rule – which he dubbed “Orangeade” – can be argued to have fuelled the Home Rule Crisis further. Likewise, Asquith’s failure to resolve the crisis in 1912, instead pursuing a policy of “wait and see”, lengthened the crisis. It can also be argued that Asquith opened the door to extreme Nationalism and the creation of the Irish Volunteers, as the Liberal Government appeared to bow down to Unionist opposition with the Curragh Incident and the Larne gun running. In many ways, Asquith and the Liberal Party merely complicated the Irish Question even further with their handling of the Home Rule Crisis. By September 1914, Home Rule was hanging in the balance as war was declared in Europe. The Liberals had succeeded in getting Home Rule on the statute book, but the Irish Question had not yet been solved. However, some historians would argue that Asquith’s actions were successful. His “wait and see” approach allowed events to unfold naturally, and he successfully avoided civil war in Ireland while maintaining the British Empire. For Redmond and the IPP, getting Home Rule on the statute book was evidence of achieving their most important political objective. On that day, Redmond said: “I personally thank God that I have lived to see this day”. But in many ways, this was – as Buckland describes – a “hollow victory”. Home Rule was postponed by World War I. The question of Ulster remained unresolved. The IPP was divided, and Redmond represented the views of fewer Nationalists than ever before. Like Asquith, Redmond can be blamed for the Home Rule Crisis too. He referred to Unionist opposition tactics as: “a gigantic game of bluff and blackmail”, but he was wrong, and by March 1914, Redmond found himself forced to agree to a deal which suited Ulster. He had underestimated the strength of Unionist opposition to Home Rule.  The suspension of the Home Rule Act in September 1914 with ‘special provision’ for Ulster, and the implications of this for each party involved in the Home Rule Crisis: When the Home Rule Bill finally passed on 18 September 1914, it was accompanied by a ‘Suspensory Act’ which postponed the legislation until World War I was over. There had been no agreement as yet on the ‘special provision’ for Ulster. 22  Mr J Proctor The Home Rule Crisis demonstrated a number of things:  Firstly, Redmond’s position was never as strong and secure as it appeared. Yes, the IPP had influence within the Liberal Government, but ultimately when Asquith wanted to move towards a compromise, he looked to Redmond to make concessions, rather than the Unionists. In many ways this was a tragedy for Redmond’s IPP, who had placed full trust and confidence in the Liberal Government to deliver Home Rule.  Secondly, the awkward relationship between Asquith and Redmond had clearly been a disadvantage for the IPP. They were forced to break their ‘one Ireland’ policy under pressure from Asquith and accept some form of exclusion for Ulster.  Thirdly, the Liberal Party itself was damaged by Home Rule. Asquith’s policy of “wait and see” had simply encouraged his opponents to become more militant in their opposition to Home Rule. His actions had arguably made a solution to the crisis less likely. By 1914, with World War I in full flow, Home Rule was on hold. It appeared that the Home Rule project, and Unionist resistance to it, would now be in hibernation. It was unclear what would happen next. However, it is misleading to say that the Irish Question was now ‘on ice for the duration’ of the 1914-1918 period. As we will see in the next booklet, the political landscape changed during the war. In many ways, the Irish Question was transformed during this time. Additional reading: Student Guide, pages 23-29 CCEA eGuide, pages 6-10 23  Mr J Proctor Examination Questions: You are now going to learn how to answer Question 1(a) and Question 1(b) on the CCEA A2 2 Examination. Question 1(a) is a 15-mark question which asks you how valuable Source 1 is to an historian. In your examination technique booklet for A2 2, find the CCEA document: ‘A22: How to assess the value of a source’. This will explain the acronym ‘VACDALMK’ and show you an exemplar answer based on Opposition to Home Rule. Question 1(b) is a 20-mark question which asks you to read Source 1 and Source 2 and asks you how far the sources support a view. In your examination technique booklet for A2 2, find the CCEA document: ‘A22 Student guidance for Question 1(b)’. This will explain how best to approach this question and show you an exemplar answer based on Unionist Opposition to Home Rule. End of Topic Assessment: Once you have completed both of the above tasks, you are going to attempt to answer Question 1(a) and Question 1(b) on the Specimen Paper using the CCEA Guidance documents. You will be provided with a blank copy of the Specimen Paper. Question 1(a) focuses on Opposition to Home Rule 1912-1914 with a speech from Bonar Law. Question 1(b) asks you to assess whether Sources 1 and 2 agree that Ulster was the main priority of Opposition to Home Rule by 1914. The collective mark out of 35 will form half of your Data Tracking for this topic. 24The second half will be a timed response to the following Question 3 (essay) from the 2019 A2 2 Paper: “Craig had more reason to be satisfied with the outcome of the Home Rule Crisis by September 1914 than Carson, Bonar Law, Asquith or Redmond”. To