A2 2 History: Partition of Ireland 1900-1925 PDF

Mr J Proctor A2 2 History: Partition of Ireland 1900-1925 2 – Political Developments 1914-1918 Specification Content:  The political impact of the First World War on Ireland between 1914 and 1916  The long-term and short-term causes of th...

Mr J Proctor A2 2 History: Partition of Ireland 1900-1925 2 – Political Developments 1914-1918 Specification Content:  The political impact of the First World War on Ireland between 1914 and 1916  The long-term and short-term causes of the Easter Rising of 1916  The significance of the Rising and its immediate aftermath  Political developments 1916-1918, particularly the reasons for the outcome of the General Election of December 1918 in Ireland, dealing with Sinn Fein’s strengths, the weaknesses of the Irish Parliamentary Party and the failure of British Government policies NAME: ___________________________________________________ 1  Mr J Proctor An Introduction to 1914-1918 World War I was a catalyst for significant change in Irish Politics. It exposed just how frail constitutional Nationalism was, and it encouraged a militant minority to stage a rebellion against British rule in Ireland. By 1915, it became clear that the war would drag on. In that year, a new coalition government was in place in Britain, containing some strong opponents of Home Rule. In 1916, there was a rising in Ireland. The IPP were one of the main casualties of the rising, and a new, more radical Nationalist movement was emerging. In 1918, with the government in Britain – led by Lloyd George – attempting to impose conscription to the war effort in Ireland, these radical ‘separatists’ within Nationalism were handed a further advantage. It was inevitable that Sinn Fein would win the post-war General Election, and when they did, it was clear that Ireland was on the path to full separation from Britain. The Political Impact of the First World War on Ireland, 1914-1916 On 3 August 1914, the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, confirmed in the House of Commons that Britain was preparing for war with Germany. In his hour-long speech, he claimed that the: “one bright spot in this dreadful situation is Ireland”. Grey was referring to the fact that the Irish political leaders of Unionism and Nationalism, who had been embroiled in the ‘Ulster Crisis’ over Home Rule, had agreed to set their differences aside in light of the international situation and upcoming war. Carson and Redmond both pledged loyalty to Britain from the outset of the war. For Unionism, it presented an opportunity to demonstrate commitment to the Empire. IPP Leader John Redmond was in the House of Commons listening to Grey’s speech. Redmond had not planned to make a speech himself that day but did so after hearing what Grey had to say. Redmond largely had two options: 1) use the war as an opportunity to demonstrate independence from Britain, or 2) ally with Britain in the war effort, proving that Home Rule is compatible with loyalty to the British Crown and Empire. He chose the second option. Redmond told the British Government that they could remove their troops from Ireland (to use them in the war effort) and the Irish Volunteers would defend the Irish coastline instead. In pledging his support to the British war effort, Redmond asked: “is it too much to hope that out of this situation may spring a result which will be good not merely for the Empire, but for the future welfare and integrity of the Irish nation?”. Redmond had sensed an opportunity. In helping Britain in their hour of need, Ireland’s claim for Home Rule would be further secured. This was not the only reason however. Redmond did see a moral need to help protect Belgium in this war – a small Catholic country, just like Ireland. Likewise, Redmond did genuinely believe 2  Mr J Proctor that the war effort could provide the context for the healing of all animosities between Nationalists and Unionists in Ireland. Redmond addressed a Nationalist meeting in Maryborough on 16 August 1914, appealing to all Volunteers in Ireland to unite to defend the country. Redmond knew that there was risk in this strategy, and he would have to deliver Home Rule quickly to keep them on side. Redmond had written to Asquith on 4 August, stating that if Home Rule is delayed any further, he would “be unable to hold the people”. The Home Rule Bill was passed into law on 18 September 1914. Redmond was now keen to display his gratitude to the Liberal Government.  Redmond’s Woodenbridge speech in September 1914: Redmond’s initial suggestion in August 1914 was that the role of the Irish Volunteers in World War I would be to serve in Ireland only, protecting Ireland from invasion, and that the Volunteers should not be required to take the Oath of Allegiance. By September, he had changed his mind, with Home Rule now on the statute book. Following the triumph of 18 September 1914 with Home Rule given Royal Assent, Redmond made his way back to County Wicklow and by Sunday 20 September he had reached Woodenbridge. Here, Redmond delivered an impromptu speech calling on the Irish Volunteers to serve: “not only in Ireland, but wherever the firing line extends, in defence of right, of freedom and religion in this war”. Redmond had endorsed the Irish Volunteers serving overseas. The reasoning was clear. Redmond believed this was a ‘just war’ and he understood that there was an expectation for Ireland to support England. Redmond felt this was crucial in order to ensure that the Home Rule project was completed.  The split of the Volunteers into the ‘National Volunteers’ and ‘Irish Volunteers’: Redmond had anticipated that this change in strategy would cause difficulties with the leadership of the Irish Volunteers. In the immediate aftermath of the Woodenbridge speech, 20 of the 27-man original committee of the Irish Volunteers released a statement refusing to accept Redmond’s policy. Eoin MacNeill was adamant that fighting for Britain in the war would not advance the cause of Irish Nationalism, and a small group of Volunteers who were particularly opposed to Redmond’s policy were from the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) and followed the old Fenian philosophy of: ‘England’s difficulty is Ireland’s opportunity’. They hoped the war might create the right circumstances to stage a rebellion against British rule in Ireland. As a result of Redmond’s Woodenbridge speech, the Volunteer movement split. Redmond reiterated his support for overseas service, and the vast majority of the 180,000 remained loyal to Redmond. MacNeill’s ‘Irish Volunteers’ were a smaller group making up around 7% of the Volunteer movement (12,000 approximately), but they were strong in Dublin (2,000 out of 6,700 in Dublin supported MacNeill), and it was from this group that the 1916 rebels would be 3  Mr J Proctor drawn. As the conflict in Europe dragged on, the ‘Irish Volunteers’ would be identified with opposition to the war.  The formation of a coalition government in 1915 with Conservative and Unionist participation: The formation of a coalition government in May 1915 was a blow to Redmond. A series of setbacks during the early stages of the war had forced Asquith to accept the need for a coalition. In this new government, whilst the Liberal Party held the key Cabinet posts, there were also positions for some of Irish Nationalism’s rivals, such as Bonar Law, Carson, Long, Chamberlain and Balfour. Asquith had offered Redmond a position in the Cabinet also, but he refused stating that it compromised the IPP’s tradition of acting independently at Westminster – a decision criticised by historians who argue that Redmond missed an opportunity to influence the government, leaving Carson in the Cabinet as ‘Attorney General’, a man who would do anything to delay Home Rule even further.  Voluntary enlisting by sections of Nationalist and Unionist communities and the attitude of the War Office towards the UVF and National Volunteers: The response of the War Office to the Unionist and Nationalist communities was notably different. Redmond’s ‘National Volunteers’ enlisted in the war effort, with 16,500 enlisting by November 1914. During the first 6- months of the war, over 50,000 Irishmen joined the British Army. Although recruitment did slow thereafter, approximately 200,000 served overseas during the war. Their reasons for enlisting were varied: some were attracted by the prospect of being well fed while their families at home were looked after; others were motivated by a sense of duty or the desire to advance the political cause of Home Rule. In time, the 16th Irish Division was formed following pressure from Redmond to have a new Irish Brigade. Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, clearly gave favourable treatment to the Ulster Unionists. Whereas he was resistant to Redmond’s demand for an Irish Brigade, when Carson and Craig met Kitchener, they demanded that the UVF men should remain together as a fighting unit and have the name ‘Ulster’ added to their division’s official name. As a result, the 36th Ulster Division was born. The War Office had been dismissive of Nationalist recruitment in the early stages of the war, and this damaged Redmond’s position, alongside the fact that the war was not going to be over within a year, as had been widely anticipated. There was much anger and bitterness amongst Nationalists who viewed the actions of the War Office as blatantly discriminatory, and evidence that they did not appreciate the contribution of Irish Nationalism to the war effort. World War I had a profound political impact. It had temporarily defused the situation in Ulster by putting Home Rule ‘on ice’. However, it had also created the necessary 4  Mr J Proctor conditions for those critics of Home Rule to create opportunities to try and achieve their goal of independence via a rebellion against the British. Additional reading: Student Guide, pages 30-33 The Causes of the Easter Rising of 1916 CCEA eGuide, pages 11-12 World War I provided the necessary backdrop for the Easter Rising. The Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) had been determined to stage a rebellion while Britain’s full attention was fixed on the conflict in Europe. The Fenian mantra of: ‘England’s difficult is Ireland’s opportunity’ presented itself here, and the war not only provided the ‘opportunity’, but also deepened divisions within Nationalism, as more and more became disillusioned with Redmond’s constitutional tactics which appeared to be getting them nowhere, as Home Rule continued to be delayed. Lyons describes how: “it is difficult for historians to disentangle the causes of the Easter Rising”. However, they can be categorised in many ways:  ‘New Nationalism’: An important long-term cause of the rising was new Nationalism, which emerged at the beginning of the 20th Century and made a significant contribution to the rising. The Gaelic League was an organisation focused on cultural revival and it was responsible for introducing a new generation of young men to Irish Nationalism, emphasising the separate identities of Ireland and Britain. This young generation was attracted by the Irish language movement and felt alienated by constitutional Nationalism, which was dominated by older men. The Gaelic League’s language classes allowed a romantic revolutionary spirit to develop. Patrick Pearse acknowledged in his essay ‘The Coming Revolution’ that the Gaelic League had played a crucial role in educating a new generation of Irish revolutionaries, but that it had served its purpose, and a new generation had to assert Ireland’s right to be an independent nation using force. Undoubtedly, the spirit of ‘new Nationalism’ was apparent among the 1916 leaders. Tom Clarke and Sean MacDermott were crucial in encouraging Gaelic League President, Douglas Hyde, to resign in 1915, as the Gaelic League organisation became more political and devoted itself to: ‘realising the ideal of a free Gaelic-speaking Ireland’. New Nationalism had strengthened the separatist movement, provided a leadership group and a rationale for the rebellion, and developed an atmosphere in which the rebellion could take place. In many ways, the Irish Volunteers was a product of ‘new Nationalism’, as the Gaelic cultural revival sowed the seeds for what would take place in Easter 1916. It is also important to note that the establishment of Sinn Fein in 1905 was born out of new Nationalism and provided a direct challenge to the IPP. 5  Mr J Proctor  The infiltration of the Irish Volunteers, 1913-1914, by the revived Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) and radical Nationalists: Tom Clarke had a fierce hatred for Britain and had a strong Fenian spirit. He had a desire for an insurrection, and that led him to support a group of young northern militants – including Sam MacDermott – who were trying to get control of the IRB. When they successfully did so, the IRB did remain largely ineffective, until the formation of the Irish Volunteers in November 1913. Senior IRB figures joined the Volunteers and intended to manipulate the movement for their own purposes. After a falling out amongst the IRB leadership, Bulmer Hobson resigned leaving Clarke and MacDermott responsible for directing IRB strategy. The split in the Volunteers after Redmond’s Woodenbridge speech left the IRB in a strong position of influence within MacNeill’s minority Irish Volunteer movement. In August 1914, a secret meeting of the IRB Supreme Council concluded that the opportunity presented by Britain’s distraction with the European conflict enabled them to prepare (in principle) to stage a rebellion in Ireland. Although Eoin MacNeill himself was opposed to a rebellion unless it had a reasonable prospect of success, as the war in Europe dragged on, MacNeill’s leadership became marginalised and the IRB element of the Irish Volunteers began to extend its influence, given that an increasing majority of separatists were no longer willing to accept the very limited freedoms that Home Rule would provide Ireland.  The impact of ‘Carsonism’: ‘Carsonism’ had a significant impact on more radical Irish Nationalists. In leading the Ulster resistance against the Home Rule Bill, Carson had developed a successful extra-parliamentary strategy which inspired militant Nationalists to do the same. Carson had formed a huge private army (UVF) and armed it with 25,000 rifles from Germany – an action which had brought the gun back into Irish Politics. The Ulstermen had demonstrated that only force, or the threat of force, would be successful in influencing government policy. There was a clear contrast between Carson’s willingness to engage violence, and Redmond’s constitutional tactics. ‘Carsonism’ therefore had successfully converted a significant number of Home Rule supporters into radical Nationalists, and it had breathed new life into the IRB which appeared to be nearing its death. Patrick Pearse, who would be significant in the planning of the rising, famously wrote in 1913: “I think the Orangeman with a rifle a much less ridiculous figure than the Nationalist without one”. It was clear that ‘Carsonism’ had a profound influence on the development of militant Nationalism in the years leading up to the rising. Laffin described how Carson: “relit the Fenian flame”.  The impact of the Great War: War energised more militant Nationalism and intensified anti-British feeling in Ireland. The war prevented emigration from taking place, and as such the ‘safety net’ of disillusioned young men being able to flee Ireland was removed. Naturally, these disaffected people were 6  Mr J Proctor opposed to the war and fearful of conscription being introduced, and this drew them towards radical Nationalist groups. The war had a negative economic impact in Dublin, leading to some resentment as inflation impacted living standards. Another significant impact of the war was that the casualties of war meant that many of Redmond’s most loyal supporters in the ‘National Volunteers’ were killed. By Spring 1915, the Redmondite movement was in obvious decline. The most significant impact of the war was undoubtedly the fact that it provided the ideal opportunity for an insurrection to take place. Sinn Fein, the most prominent anti-war separatist group, were using propaganda effectively, which reduced recruitment for the ‘National Volunteers’ to join the war effort. It must be noted that the attitude of the War Office towards Irish Nationalist support for the war effort was at best indifferent, and this weakened Redmond’s pro-war position.  The impact of the policies and actions of the British Government, 1912- 1916: The decision by the British Government to introduce conscription in Britain in January 1916 was a significant boost for the separatist movement, who stoked up the fear that this would soon be extended to Ireland.  The roles of Clarke and MacDermott: Clarke and MacDermott formed the IRB Executive and effectively controlled the secret organisation. They were determined to stage an insurrection regardless of levels of public support for it. Clarke and MacDermott took all the crucial decisions and recruited a younger generation into the IRB, including Pearse and Plunkett. Clarke and MacDermott were obsessed with secrecy and kept many decisions, including bringing in Pearse and Plunkett, away from the ‘Supreme Council’.  The planning of the Rising by the IRB Military Council: The IRB military committee was renamed the Military Council, and it was the body which made the 1916 Rising a reality. Clarke put forward Patrick Pearse to be the figurehead of the Military Council, believing he had the necessary leadership qualities and communication skills. By late 1915, Clarke was now willing to take a back seat, confident that these new, more youthful men would succeed in bringing his life ambition of another Fenian rebellion to reality. MacDermott became the key conspirator in planning the rising. He approved all major decisions, ensured total confidentiality was maintained and he excelled in the ‘cloak and dagger’ activity that underpinned the rising.  The ‘revolution of the intellectuals’ – the roles of Pearse, MacDonagh and Plunkett: Patrick Pearse, Thomas MacDonagh and Joseph Plunkett were 3 romantic revolutionaries who had been inspired by the Gaelic League and ‘New Nationalism’. They were intensely religious young men in their 30s 7  Mr J Proctor at the time of the Easter Rising. Pearse had established a school called St Enda’s in 1908 which focused on the Irish language and taught of Ireland’s Gaelic past, with students learning of Cúchulainn, the mythical hero was alleged to have said: “I care not though I were to live but one day and one night, if only my fame and deeds live after me”. This underpinned the school’s ethos of sacrifice. Pearse himself also identified with figures in Irish history such as Wolfe Tone and Robert Emmet, who were synonymous with martyrdom for the cause of Irish freedom. The 3 men were highly intellectual and produced many writings. Their belief in blood sacrifice ensured they would support a rebellion regardless of the likely outcome. This was crucial reassurance for Clarke and MacDermott.  The importance of religion and the ideology of ‘blood sacrifice’: Pearse’s writings glorified the idea of blood sacrifice. He talked of how: “we may make mistakes in the beginning and shoot the wrong people, but bloodshed is a cleansing and sanctifying thing, and the nation which regards it as the final horror has lost its manhood. There are many things more horrible than bloodshed”. Pearse’s writings often displayed a Messianic tone. He saw Ireland’s struggle for independence in terms of Christ’s sacrifice at Calvary. This was a belief shared by MacDonagh and Plunkett, who also drew parallels in their writings between Christ’s death on the cross to save our souls, and the need for a similar sacrifice to save Ireland’s soul and resurrect the idea of the Irish nation. At the funeral of veteran Fenian O’Donovan Rossa in August 1915, Pearse said he was speaking on behalf of “the new generation that has been re-baptised in the Fenian faith” and said at O’Donovan Rossa’s graveside: “from the graves of patriot men and women spring living nations. The Defenders of this Realm… think they have pacified Ireland… the fools!”. This demonstrated Pearse’s obsession with martyrdom and blood sacrifice, and hinted at the forthcoming rebellion, which was a revolutionary sentiment echoed by MacDonagh and Plunkett who were equally willing to sacrifice themselves for Ireland’s rebirth. All 3 men had been greatly impacted by the war, and the impact of war had pushed them towards rebellion and the idea of self-sacrifice. In many ways, the doctrine of ‘blood sacrifice’ and martyrdom helps explain why the rising went ahead on Easter Monday even though the prospect of success was minimal or non-existent.  Connolly, Socialism and the ‘Irish Citizen Army’: The final member of the Military Council was writer and Socialist, James Connolly. His objective was for a Socialist Republic which was slightly different to the aim of a Gaelic Republic sought by the other writer-revolutionaries, such as Pearse and Plunkett. However, Connolly became enthusiastically convinced that Nationalism and Socialism complemented one another, and that a Nationalist revolution was a necessary precursor to a Socialist takeover. Connolly found himself agreeing with Pearse’s vision of ‘blood sacrifice’, although by 1915, 8  Mr J Proctor Connolly remained outside of the IRB’s ‘inner circle’ and wasn’t even aware that the Military Council existed! As a result, Connolly was unaware of any plans for a rebellion and became frustrated by the perceived lack of movement towards a rebellion and decided to make his own preparations for an insurrection. Connolly’s rising would be led by the Irish Citizen Army – a 200-strong Trade Union militia. By the end of 1915, Connolly was publicly advocating that if the IRB got cold feet and didn’t follow through with a rising, then the Irish Citizen Army would be ready to step in. This alarmed the IRB Military Council, since Connolly and the Irish Citizen Army could ruin their plans for a rising in Easter 1916. As a result, the IRB Military Council met with Connolly in secret from 19-22 January 1916 and convinced him of their plans for a rising in Easter 1916. Connolly agreed to shelve his plans of a rebellion using the Irish Citizen Army, and instead he joined the IRB Military Council, conceding that this would not be a Socialist rebellion. Connolly endorsed the ‘blood sacrifice’ message of his fellow writer-revolutionaries, writing in February 1916, calling on his generation to: “make the supreme act of self- sacrifice to die if need be that our race might live in freedom”. Ultimately, although Clarke and MacDermott were the driving forces behind the Easter Rising of 1916, the impact of the ‘blood sacrifice’ doctrine of the writer- revolutionaries, along with ‘Carsonism’, the new Nationalism and World War I, all combined to produce the 1916 Rising. Additional reading: Student Guide, pages 33-38 CCEA eGuide, pages 12-13 End of Topic Assessment: You are going to attempt to answer Question 2 on the 2019 A22 Paper. You will be provided with a blank copy of the Question and Interpretations. Question 2 focuses on The Causes of the Easter Rising of 1916 and provides two Interpretations. You are asked which of these two Interpretations you find more convincing. This question will be familiar to you from AS1 Germany, but please do consult the A22 Examination Technique booklet for guidance. There are 25 marks available for this question. You will plan and annotate the Interpretations in class and complete the answer in timed conditions on a separate occasion. You will have 40 minutes to write this answer without notes during class time, but you will be allowed your annotated Interpretations with you. 9  Mr J Proctor A Brief Overview of the Members of the Military Council Patrick Pearse Pearse was the figurehead. He had real leadership qualities and was an idealist with a romantic vision for Ireland. Pearse was a poet and was intensely religious and influenced by Catholic mysticism. He was pushed to the forefront by Clarke. After 1913, Pearse began writing Messianic ‘blood sacrifice’ doctrines. At Easter 1916, he would sacrifice himself for the Irish Nation. Joseph Plunkett Plunkett was a poet, like Pearse, and served as the Chief Military Strategist for the Military Council. Plunkett was responsible for drawing up the plan for the rising which the Volunteers followed. He was also keen to sacrifice himself for his country. Eamonn Ceannt Ceannt was much less well known than the others but was an active member of the Irish Volunteers. He was the Director of Communications for the Military Council and tightened the grip of the IRB on the Volunteer movement. Sean MacDermott MacDermott was a key IRB figure who planned the rising. He approved big decisions and ensured strict levels of secrecy were maintained. MacDermott prompted the actions of the Military Council and ensured the rising finally went ahead without the influence of the IRB Supreme Council. James Connolly 10  Mr J Proctor Connolly was a Socialist and a major left-wing international figure who also wanted a blood sacrifice rebellion in Ireland. Ultimately, Connolly wanted to achieve a Socialist Republic, which was a major contrast to the other members of the Military Council. Connolly came to see Socialism and Nationalism as complimentary ideologies. Thomas MacDonagh MacDonagh was intellectually gifted and collaborated with Pearse and Plunkett. MacDonagh also accepted the need for ‘blood sacrifice’ but had not considered violence until he joined the Irish Volunteers. He joined the IRB in 1915 and the Military Council just two weeks before the Rising. MacDermott gave the rising an intellectual dimension, alongside Pearse and Plunkett. Tom Clarke Clarke pushed Pearse towards the leadership of the rising. By 1915, Clarke believed he had put the right men in place to lead the rising and so he was happy to take a back seat. Instigating the rising was the fulfilment of his life’s ambition. A Chronology of the Events of Easter Week, 1916H Sunday The Military Council met in the morning at Liberty Hall to consider their options and 23 April agreed that the rising would go ahead the next day on Easter Monday. The Proclamation of the revolutionaries, a document entitled: ‘The Provisional Government of Ireland to the People of Ireland’ was printed at Liberty Hall. Monday Dublin was quiet as most people were at the races at Fairyhouse Racecourse for 24 April the traditional Easter Monday races. Before noon, a group of Volunteers blew up a large ammunition dump at the Magazine Fort in Phoenix Park. Around noon, approximately 100 Irish Volunteers and Irish Citizen Army men marched through the city of Dublin, attracting little attention. They seized various buildings across the city, including: The General Post Office (GPO); St Stephen’s Green; College of Surgeons; Jacob’s Biscuit Factory; Four Courts and Boland’s Flour Mills. They selected the GPO as their headquarters and quickly raised two flags above the GPO – one old green flag with a gold harp and with the words ‘Irish Republic’ inscribed on it in gold, and another which was a orange, white and green tricolour. Pearse took the role of the President of the new Republic and stepped outside the GPO alongside other members of the new government: Clarke, MacDermott, 11  Mr J Proctor Plunkett and Connolly. Pearse read the Proclamation to a small crowd of onlookers who were bemused. A fatal error was not seizing Dublin Castle. The Irish Citizen Army actually came close to doing so but appeared to be frightened and fled. It is said that an onlooker after hearing that ‘Ireland has risen’ asked the question: “what chance have they?”, to which a supporter of James Connolly replied: “none, and they never said they had, and never thought they would have any”. Tuesday A Dublin businessman, Alfred Fannin, said: “The whole thing was doomed to 25 April failure, all the same, after 36 hours the rebels hold nearly all the points they have taken”. In the evening, the British introduced artillery fire to remove the barricades with martial law declared. British troops begin to surround the city of Dublin. Wednesda The Gunboat Helga sailed up the River Liffey to destroy the Liberty Hall. y 26 April Thursday The Helga was now attacking the GPO with heavy shell fire. 27 April 12,000 British soldiers were now in Dublin, outnumbering the rebels. The British were taking control of the situation but fighting continued. Friday 28 The GPO was now on fire. April Lyons refers to O’Connell Street as being: “one vast lake of fire”. Much of Dublin was ablaze. Pearse could see his men were weak with exhaustion. Connolly was now on a stretcher having been wounded earlier in the week. The rebels began to retreat. Saturday Pearse eventually surrendered unconditionally, and a ceasefire was agreed with 29 April the British. The Rising officially ended, although fighting continued into the next day as word continued to reach the volunteer units that they were to surrender. Sunday A few snipers continued firing during the night, but the Rising was ending. 30 April Monday Lyons: “the rising was to all intents and purposes at an end”. 01 May 12  Mr J Proctor The Significance of the Rising and its immediate aftermath The two men responsible for affairs in Ireland under the British Government at this time – Chief Secretary Augustine Birrell and his Under-Secretary, Sir Matthew Nathan – ignored military intelligence suggesting that a rising with German assistance was being planned in Ireland for Easter Saturday. On 10 April 1916, Nathan wrote: “I do not believe the leaders mean insurrection or that the Volunteers have sufficient arms if the leaders do mean it”. Yet, on Easter Monday, against all odds, approximately 1,600 insurgents assembled to stage a rising that the Military Council knew was bound to fail militarily. The Easter Rising would see over 200 civilians and more than 100 British troops lose their lives. The insurgents – of whom 64 died – were immediately arrested following Pearse’s surrender on 29 April 1916. The Rising was undoubtedly a military failure, in part due to a lack of coherent planning, failure to secure the shipment of rifles organised by Casement, and the false start on Easter Saturday. Beyond the military disaster, it was clear to all that the insurgents had failed to win the support of the wider population, particularly in Dublin, despite the fact that it was clear that the rebels had succeeded in their claim to stand up for Irish freedom. The question was: how would the British Government respond to the rebellion?  The reactions to the Rising from: 1) Redmond and Dillon: The response of the British to the Easter Rising created real problems for the IPP. John Dillon had identified just after the rising the very real threat that a public reaction in favour of the revolutionaries could become a reaction against the ‘parliamentarians’ (politicians). Redmond pleaded to the British Government to show restraint in the aftermath of the rebellion, but Dillon went further, delivering a furious speech in the House of Commons on 11 May 1916 demanding a halt to the executions. Dillion said the rebels had: “fought a clean fight, a brave fight, however misjudged, and it would have been a damn good thing for you if your soldiers were able to put up as good a fight as these men did”. Dillon talked about how the British response to the rising was: “washing out our (IPP) whole life work in a sea of blood”. 13  Mr J Proctor 2) The Irish public: Initially, the rebels met considerable hostility from the citizens of Dublin. People were furious that their property had been destroyed, and their day-to-day lives seriously disrupted for 6 days. Likewise, people were furious at the loss of civilian life, particularly the wives of men who were off fighting on the Western Front for the British Army. This rage resulted in prisoners being jeered and abused by large groups of civilians as they were arrested and detained. However, this rage was short lived. There would soon be a dramatic transformation in attitude towards the rebels, primarily caused by the ill-judged response of the British.  The actions of the British Government in the wake of the Rising: 1) Executions and the actions of Maxwell and Asquith: The chief decision maker in the British response to the Easter Rising was Major-General Sir John Maxwell. He had acted as a military general when martial law was imposed over the whole country during the rising – a decision which was a gross overreaction since the rising was essentially a Dublin affair and caused great resentment. Under Maxwell, the British took a narrow view of the events of Easter 1916, viewing it as a ‘Sinn Fein rebellion’, clearly unaware of the role played by the IRB. The British were keen to make an example of the 1916 leaders, so that no repeat rebellion could or would take place. This was a delicate task, but Maxwell lacked the ability or understanding of Irish affairs to be able to carry it out effectively. Maxwell’s actions seemed to have little consideration for the potential consequences. Maxwell ordered large-scale arrests across the country, detaining many Sinn Fein members who had nothing to do with the rising, shipping 2,000 off to a special detention camp in North Wales (which would serve as a breeding ground for radical Nationalists!). Secret trials were held, and executions followed. On 3 May 1916, Pearse, Clarke and MacDonagh were shot via firing squad. Plunkett was executed the next day, Ceannt on 8 May, and finally Connolly and MacDermott faced the firing squad at Kilmainham Jail on 12 May 1916. In total, 15 executions were carried out, including all 7 leaders who signed the Proclamation, and a number of minor figures. The drawn-out nature of the executions, the cruel secrecy and the uncertainty that more could be executed in the future created an atmosphere of great shock in Nationalist Ireland. The publicity around each executed figure was powerfully emotive. Plunkett, who was terminally ill, had married Grace Gifford on the eve of his execution, whilst Connolly, severely wounded from the rising, had to be strapped to a chair so that he could face the executioners. The Irish public became fascinated with the bravery of the rebels, who so nobly faced the firing squads. Almost immediately, a cult developed around the dead leaders. The executed men became martyrs – memorial Masses were held; photographs of the rebels sold; money collected for their families and songs and ballads written about them. Asquith visited Dublin on 11 May 1916 to gauge opinion in 14  Mr J Proctor the country. It was only at this point that the British Government urged caution on Maxwell and the military authorities. In August 1916, Casement was executed, having been arrested before the rising began en route back to Ireland from Germany. The execution of Casement was yet another blunder for the British, as it further infuriated public opinion in Ireland, and had a negative effect on the USA, just at a time when Britain needed America’s help in World War I. Asquith returned from Ireland on 18 May 1916 and decided that his government should make a fresh attempt to reach a political settlement in Ireland. He asked Lloyd-George to lead the negotiations. 2) The Lloyd-George Talks: Lloyd-George opened the talks process on 23 May 1916 hoping that a settlement would bolster constitutional Nationalism in the face of rising extremism and placate American opinion on events in Ireland. Lloyd George was mindful of the fact that the Buckingham Palace Conference had failed miserably and so he decided to conduct the negotiations with Carson and Redmond separately. Beginning with Carson, Lloyd George confirmed that the 6 counties of Ulster would be permanently excluded from Home Rule, and the remaining 26 counties would be granted Home Rule immediately. In dealing with Redmond, Lloyd George highlighted that Home Rule would be enacted immediately for the 26 counties, adding that the 6 counties of Ulster would be temporarily excluded. Whilst he was successful in getting agreement over the exclusion of Ulster, there was disagreement over the time limit of that exclusion, and Lloyd George deliberately left this ambiguous in his proposals, hoping that this could be worked out later once the war was over. When Carson took these proposals to the UUC, he was attacked by Unionists in Cavan, Monaghan and Donegal who felt left behind, but the UUC did give Carson permission to continue negotiations. Redmond also had a tough time convincing Nationalists in Tyrone and Fermanagh to support Lloyd George’s proposals, and only after a bitter 5-hour debate at St Mary’s Hall in Belfast on 23 June 1916 did the IPP vote in favour of the exclusion proposals. However, this decision did split the IPP and undermined the party in Ulster. Lloyd George’s handling of the negotiations caused concern amongst senior Conservative Party politicians such as Walter Long and Lord Lansdowne, who were members of Asquith’s coalition government. These men understood the Southern Unionist fears that partition would leave them as a tiny minority in a 26 county Home Rule Ireland, and Asquith began to worry that Lloyd George’s proposals could result in the resignation of several Conservative MPs – something that would have grave consequences for the coalition government, and possibly lead to its collapse. Asquith said: ‘at this critical juncture in the war, a series of resignations would not only be a national calamity, but a national crime’. On 19 July 1916, when Asquith’s Cabinet met to discuss Lloyd George’s proposal again, Long and Lansdowne conspired to convince the Cabinet to make the exclusion for Ulster permanent. This, they hoped, would infuriate Redmond and the IPP, and result in the IPP walking away from the negotiations. This is exactly what 15  Mr J Proctor happened, and the negotiations collapsed. This was a hammer blow to the IPP. Redmond appeared to have been, once again, outmanoeuvred by Carson. It was clear Redmond no longer had the same influence over Asquith’s Government that he did in 1914. Irish public opinion now viewed Redmond’s Woodenbridge speech and support for the war effort as a mistake. Fears escalated that the British would soon extend conscription to Ireland. In many ways, the failure of the Lloyd-George talks in July 1917 marked the end of the IPP and constitutional Nationalism. It was the last chance to rescue the Home Rule project, and now there was an upsurge in support and enthusiasm for separatist Republicanism instead. The British may have viewed the 16 executions of key figures involved in the 1916 Easter Rising as justified by dealing with a rebellion they viewed as German-backed. However, their actions were seen by Nationalists throughout Ireland as vengeful and vindictive. As a result of the bitterness people felt after the executions, the feeling of antipathy towards the British Government in Ireland only increased further. This changing mood in Ireland in the aftermath of the Easter Rising was a boost for the separatists and proved a huge challenge for Redmond and the Irish Parliamentary Party, and ‘constitutional Nationalism’ at large. Sinn Fein, wrongly blamed for the rising, only increased in popularity now. Nationalism had been redefined by the events of Easter 1916. As WB Yeats would write in his poem Easter 1916: ‘All’s changed, changed utterly; a terrible beauty is born’. Additional reading: Student Guide, pages 38-40 CCEA eGuide, pages 14-16 End of Topic Assessment: You are going to attempt to answer the following Question 3 essay: “The impact of the First World War on Ireland was the most important cause of the Easter Rising of 1916”. To what extent would you accept this verdict? 16  Mr J Proctor Political developments 1916-1918, including the reasons for the outcome of the December 1918 General Election in Ireland, assessing the strengths of Sinn Fein, the weaknesses of the Irish Parliamentary Party and the failure of the policies of the British Government The rise of the new Sinn Fein Sinn Fein was founded by Arthur Griffith in 1905. It was a non-violent movement which advocated for an independent Ireland with a King as Head of State. By 1916, Sinn Fein was more of an umbrella movement containing various types of extreme Nationalism. Ironically, it was the British Government’s decision to label the Easter Rising as a ‘Sinn Fein rebellion’ that helped to unite the divided factions of radical Nationalism under the Sinn Fein banner. This was a slow burning process. In November 1916, the IPP successfully won the West Cork by-election, with Sinn Fein failing to field a candidate. This result was proof that the IPP was not yet finished, however in many ways, the defeat of the 2nd place candidate – Frank Healy – can be blamed on the fact that many ‘Sinn Feiners’ abstained and did not vote in the by-election, due to an article in a local newspaper by the Cork Volunteers who were in prison, stating: “neither Mr Healy nor any of the other candidates for Parliament in West Cork represent the views of either the interned prisoners or Sinn Fein”. It appeared Sinn Fein was on the rise. This in part was due to growing disillusionment with the IPP. This was further bolstered by the decision of the new British Prime Minister, Lloyd George (who had replaced Asquith) to release many of the prisoners interned after the 1916 Rising, providing Sinn Fein with a new, enthusiastic, radical leadership. The first opportunity to test this new Sinn Fein’s potential came in early 1917 with a by-election in North Roscommon. 17  Mr J Proctor  By-election successes, 1917-1918: Sinn Fein were determined to challenge the IPP in the North Roscommon by-election of February 1917. Count Plunkett, the father of the executed 1916 leader Joseph Plunkett, stood as an independent candidate, but voters were left in no doubt that he represented Sinn Fein. Plunkett won the seat in North Roscommon. His election campaign had been supported by a number of the prisoners released by Lloyd George who brought a new energy to his campaign, especially Michael Collins. The North Roscommon result was crucial in binding together the separatist movement: the old Sinn Fein, the Gaelic League, the Volunteers, Cumann na mBan and the IRB. Another by-election took place in South Longford in May 1917. Sinn Fein selected Joe McGuinness, a prisoner interned in jail in England, as their candidate. Michael Collins led the campaign with a popular slogan: ‘Put him in to get him out’ combining the election campaign with the demand for the release of remaining prisoners. McGuinness won the close election contest by 37 votes after a recount, although there were allegations of vote rigging. The result in South Longford was crucial for maintaining momentum for the growing Sinn Fein movement, which was further bolstered by the release of the remaining prisoners shortly afterward. However, for the IPP, South Longford was a disastrous result. In July 1917, a third by-election took place in East Clare. Eamon de Valera, recently released from prison, was the Sinn Fein candidate, and won a landslide victory, the scale of which even shocked his own Sinn Fein campaigners. De Valera’s campaign as an Easter 1916 hero who would abstain (not take his seat at Westminster) proved popular with the voters. A fourth by-election in August 1917 in Kilkenny resulted in another landslide Sinn Fein victory over the IPP, with W.T. Cosgrave elected after a campaign which used the new slogan ‘self- determination’. The four successive by-election victories were crucial for the growth of Sinn Fein, and the movement was further bolstered by the British Government’s decision to rearrest and imprison Thomas Ashe after the Kilkenny by-election. In prison, Ashe went on hunger strike after being refused his request to be treated as a political prisoner. The British force-fed Ashe using a painful method of tube feeding, and Ashe died on 25 September 1917, creating yet another martyr for the Republican movement. In many ways this served as another nail in the coffin of the IPP, as it once again highlighted the inhumanity of the British Government towards Nationalism, releasing another outburst in support for Sinn Fein. In 1918, the IPP would win 3 of 5 by-elections, including in Waterford following John Redmond’s death in March 1918. In June 1918, Arthur Griffith’s victory for Sinn Fein in the East Cavan by-election was symbolic – their first victory in Ulster – and in many ways served as a dress rehearsal for the upcoming 1918 General Election.  The pragmatic Republican policy adopted at the October 1917 Ard- Fhéis: The umbrella movement of Sinn Fein was growing rapidly, and division was to be expected. The convention (or Ard-Fheis) was held in Dublin on 25- 18  Mr J Proctor 26 October 1917, and de Valera – who was by now the leader of the Sinn Fein movement – aimed to avoid these divisions spilling over. A new Sinn Fein constitution was agreed which served as a pragmatic compromise between the moderates and the extremists. It stated: ‘Sinn Fein aims at securing the international recognition of Ireland as an independent Irish Republic. Having achieved that status, the Irish people may by referendum freely choose their own form of government’. This was carefully written to maintain unity among the different elements of the separatist movement. At the convention, de Valera stressed to the 1,000 delegates the need to appear as a united front. The party had committed itself to achieving an Irish Republic through a policy of abstention from Westminster. The contrast between Sinn Fein and the IPP was profound. Sinn Fein had a clear goal of an independent Irish Republic, while the IPP were still hanging on hoping for Home Rule. De Valera was a dynamic leader, whereas Redmond was aging. For the first time, Nationalism had a clear alternative political party to the IPP to vote for.  The role of de Valera and Collins: Eamon de Valera was released from prison after the South Longford by-election victory and was one of only two surviving senior figures behind the rising, alongside Thomas Ashe who was also released. Elected as the MP for East Clare in July 1917, de Valera would become the leader of the Sinn Fein movement shortly after the death of Thomas Ashe, replacing Arthur Griffith, who agreed to stand down and become Deputy Leader. De Valera was charismatic – a gifted teacher of mathematics and a senior survivor of the 1916 Rising - he was also President of the Irish Volunteers, and therefore he symbolised the unity of the separatist movement, fusing together the political wing and the physical force wing of the movement – this would be a powerful feature of the struggle for independence moving forward. Michael Collins was another crucial figure at this time, released from prison and playing a key role in the by-election campaigns. He was spared arrest in May 1918 (when almost all of the Sinn Fein leadership was arrested) and this allowed him to organise election campaigns, reorganise the Volunteer movement, and direct opposition towards the British Government. It was in 1918 that Collins established himself as a key political and military figure within the Sinn Fein movement. The decline of the Irish Parliamentary Party, 1916-1918 It is crucial to note that the rise of Sinn Fein in this period was a two-sided story, with the Irish Parliamentary Party in decline. Redmond was getting old, and he had been continuously outmanoeuvred by Unionist opposition to Home Rule in 1914-1916. Now, during the 1916-1918 period, Redmond would find himself abandoned by the Liberal Government due to the failure of the Lloyd-George talks and the Irish Convention. 19  Mr J Proctor Redmond’s pro-war stance had damaged the party immensely, and as the war became increasingly unpopular, the moderate politics of the IPP, aimed at achieving Home Rule for Ireland, became increasingly unsatisfactory for Nationalist people. Redmond died on 6 March 1918. He had failed to deliver Home Rule for Ireland, and his final political act – taking part in the Irish Convention – had also failed, allowing Sinn Fein to exploit it. As Eoin MacNeill said, Home Rule was “a cheque always post-dated”. Sinn Fein benefited in many ways from the failure of the Irish Parliamentary Party to achieve its aims. Poor decision making and a weakness on Redmond’s part to allow compromise after compromise, bowing down to both Asquith and Carson, were certainly contributing factors. However, Redmond was certainly let down by the Liberal Governments over the years. They had failed to act in 1912 to introduce Home Rule, they had allowed the Ulster Crisis to develop, they had bowed down to Unionist resistance (having at first underestimated its potential) and they had made a series of serious misjudgements, from arrests and executions to conscription, which undermined Redmond’s constitutional Nationalism and fuelled support for the radical alternative – Sinn Fein. The actions of the British Government 1917-1918  The Irish Convention, July 1917: Lloyd George’s Cabinet was willing to consider formulating a new Irish policy by May 1917. He offered both Redmond and Carson the opportunity to meet at a convention to produce a new settlement. Lloyd George was enthusiastic about the Irish Convention, and the 95 members met at Trinity College, Dublin, on 25 July 1917 for their first meeting. 52 Nationalists, 26 Ulster Unionists, 9 Southern Unionists, 6 Labour representatives and 2 Others were present. The Irish Convention was weakened by the absence of Sinn Fein, who viewed the convention as irrelevant. This, plus the unwillingness of the Ulster Unionists to play a full part in the Irish Convention, proved to be major obstacles to success. Unionists attended the Irish Convention to watch and not contribute, since the various forms of Home Rule being discussed at the Convention were all unacceptable to Unionism! The split between the demands of Ulster Unionism and Southern Unionism appeared insurmountable by early 1918, and likewise division was emerging within constitutional Nationalism. Redmond was willing to make one final risk at a compromise on 04 January 1918, but took ill and had to go back to Wicklow to rest. In his absence, Dillion and the other IPP representatives reversed Redmond’s efforts at a compromise. When Redmond returned to the Irish Convention, he was humiliated and told the Convention that he felt he was no longer of service. The Irish Convention ended in failure. In truth, it never stood much chance of success. Ulster Unionism refused to fully participate in discussions because they would not accept any form of Home Rule that was being offered. Sinn Fein had criticised the convention at the outset to be a pointless exercise, and so when the Irish Convention ended 20  Mr J Proctor without agreement, the IPP were further damaged by participating, while Sinn Fein were vindicated, since they could not be blamed for its failure, in contrast to the IPP. Historians have referred to the Irish Convention as a talking shop, a ‘gigantic irrelevance’ which aimed only to kick the can down the road.  The conscription crisis, April 1918: The Irish Convention had benefitted Sinn Fein, but it did not guarantee them success at the upcoming General Election. In fact, the IPP won 3 successive by-elections in early 1918 which sobered Sinn Fein up. Two of these IPP victories were in Ulster, where the party remained strong, and the other in Waterford, which was John Redmond’s seat since 1891. However, any possibility of an IPP comeback was shattered in April 1918 by what would become known as the ‘conscription crisis’. Following a German offensive in March 1918, Lloyd George looked to introduce conscription in Ireland to produce the 150,000 troops that were urgently required in the war. This decision would produce a crisis, displaying just how naïve the British Government were, and how they had failed to understand the views of Irish Nationalism. The IPP, led by Dillon, emphasised their opposition to conscription on 16 April 1918, with Dillion telling the House of Commons: “All Ireland will rise against you”, before storming out of the House of Commons with all IPP MPs. The IPP and Sinn Fein would join together to create an anti-conscription campaign, launched on 18 April 1918 at the Mansion House Conference, where all Nationalists joined together and took a pledge to: ‘resist conscription by the most effective means at our disposal’. The Catholic Church were also behind the anti-conscription campaign, and Eamon de Valera was comfortable in his relationship with the Catholic hierarchy, resulting in de Valera becoming the dominant figure in the anti-conscription campaign. In dominating the campaign, Sinn Fein removed any doubt that they could lead the Irish people. The conscription crisis had come at the ideal moment for Sinn Fein – on the back of 3 by-election defeats to the IPP. Having led the anti-conscription campaign, Sinn Fein virtually guaranteed themselves victory in the post-war General Election. Fitzpatrick said: “by the end of 1918, Sinn Fein seemed to have universal support”.  The ‘German Plot’, May 1918: Sinn Fein were handed an even further advantage following the British decision to arrest leading Sinn Fein members on the night of 17 May 1918. Aside from Michael Collins and Cathal Brugha, the entire Sinn Fein leadership was arrested. The next day, Lord French declared that the arrests were due to a ‘German Plot’ being discovered – the Sinn Fein leaders had been conspiring with the Germans. These arrests were not based on any hard evidence, yet 73 Sinn Fein leaders were deported to England and detained in prison. Sympathy for Sinn Fein in Ireland increased even further now, with public opinion viewing the ‘German Plot’ as a lie. Following these arrests, a by-election in East Cavan resulted in a victory for Sinn Fein’s Arthur Griffith, who was imprisoned in England. Collins – who had 21  Mr J Proctor not been arrested – led the election campaign, again using the trusted slogan: ‘Put him in to get him out!’. Sinn Fein’s first election victory in Ulster was further proof that the actions of the British Government had played into their hands. As British crackdowns followed the arrests, including the banning of hurling matches in Ireland, Sinn Fein responded with passive resistance. Public meetings were organised throughout 1918, and famously 1,500 hurling matches were played on a Sunday in August 1918 in opposition to the British Government’s outlawing of the sport. The General Election campaign in Ireland, November-December 1918, and the extent of Sinn Fein success During the election campaign, Sinn Fein knew that in their quest to replace the IPP as the voice of Nationalism at Westminster, they would need to deal with the threat of another political party – Labour. In urban areas, Labour was a threat to Sinn Fein, who were stronger in rural areas, and so the party began targeting individual Labour candidates, encouraging them to withdraw from the General Election. On 1 November 1918, at a special Labour Party conference, the party indicated it would stand down and not contest the 1918 General Election as they did not want to split the Republican vote. This was a surprise to all, and was very welcome news to Sinn Fein, who now focused their election campaign solely on the national question and attacking the IPP. The IPP, led by Dillon, was poorly equipped to fight a General Election campaign. Their ‘party machine’ had effectively disintegrated in many areas and they failed to run candidates in many constituencies, including in some seats which the IPP already held coming into the election! Dillon planned to use the press to get the IPP’s message across, but even that was cursed, as a paper shortage severely reduced the circulation of the newspaper, The Freemans Journal. In contrast, Sinn Fein’s campaign was slick. They produced a four-point manifesto: 1) abstain from Westminster; 2) establish a constituent assembly in Dublin; 3) take Ireland’s case for independence to the post-war Paris Peace Conference and 4) “use any and every means available to render impotent the power of England to hold Ireland in subjection”. This programme clearly appealed to voters at the postwar 1918 General Election. The election was held in December 1918, with the results as follows in Ireland: Sinn Fein – 73 seats Unionists – 26 seats IPP – 6 seats 22  Mr J Proctor The IPP’s low morale was highlighted by the fact that in 25/73 seats that Sinn Fein won, the IPP did not even run a candidate to challenge them. Sinn Fein’s electoral triumph was certainly in part due to the fact that the 1918 General Election was the first election in which all men over 21 and women over 30 could vote, resulting in the dynamic Sinn Fein appealing to youthful, first-time voters. The strength of Sinn Fein’s campaign was evident in the fact that many of those elected were in prison, and therefore played no part in the election campaign. This showed just how influential people like Michael Collins, and Countess Markievicz, who became MP for Dublin St Patrick’s and the first ever woman elected to Westminster, were. In Britain, Lloyd George’s coalition government was returned to power, with the Conservative Party the dominant force in the coalition Cabinet. Summary: 1914-1918 In August 1914, at the beginning of World War I, Home Rule was satisfactory to most Nationalists in Ireland. However, by the end of the war in 1918, Home Rule was viewed as a limited form of self-government which no longer satisfied anyone. Instead, full independence from Britain was now being demanded. Redmond and the IPP had been severely damaged during the 1914-1918 period – a time when the political landscape shifted significantly. The ‘Ulster Crisis’ caused by Carson’s opposition to Home Rule was a blow to Redmond’s moderate constitutional Nationalism, and in a desperate attempt to deliver Home Rule for Ireland, Redmond time and again showed he was willing to compromise and give up his one-Ireland principle. All of this raised new concerns amongst followers of the IPP. Redmond’s decision to pledge support for the war effort in his Woodenbridge speech was a gamble, and it turned out to be a disaster. After the split in the Irish Volunteers, the antiwar group were small, but much more determined and single minded, and very quickly the IRB had gained control. The war was unpopular, and many wanted to use it as an opportunity to strike for Ireland’s freedom. The Rising of Easter 1916 resulted in the blood sacrifice of its leaders. The Irish people felt a connection to the men who were executed. These executions, alongside British Government blunders such as imposing martial law and making mass arrests, created a new wave of negative attitudes towards the British. Despite the fact Sinn Fein were not at all responsible for the rising, they were clever in manipulating it into a ‘Sinn Fein Rising’ in the aftermath, turning the executed martyrs into national heroes. After the collapse of the 1916 Lloyd-George talks, Redmond and the IPP appeared to have been abandoned once again, and they became easy targets for the growing Sinn Fein movement, who had now successfully united the various separatist movements in Ireland under one banner. 23  Mr J Proctor Another attempt at a political solution with the Irish Convention came and went, doomed to failure by the abstention of Sinn Fein from the talks, and the unwillingness of Ulster Unionism to negotiate beyond the permanent 6-county exclusion of Ulster. The British Government’s decision to introduce conscription in Ireland served as the final straw, resulting in Sinn Fein’s overwhelming triumph in the 1918 General Election. The election campaign was a tale of two stories. The IPP went through the motions and understood they had little prospect of victory. Many IPP MPs were viewed as ‘yesterday’s men’. In contrast, Sinn Fein were confident, youthful, energetic and at the beginning of their political careers. By the end of the war, the IPP – the political party which had embodied Nationalist opinion for a generation – no longer did so. It had been annihilated by the British Government’s failure to deliver Home Rule. The decline of the IPP and rise of Sinn Fein is undoubtedly a key political development during the 1914-1918 period of our story. Additional reading: Student Guide, pages 40-43 CCEA eGuide, pages 16-19 End of Topic Assessment: You are going to attempt to answer an example Question 1(a), Question 1(b) and Question 2 on the topic of the rise of Sinn Fein, 1916-1918. The Questions and Sources can be found in the CCEA eGuide on pages 20 and 21. This is an extensive piece of work and so it is likely some will be completed during class time and some during study / at home. Exemplar Essay: Take a look at the exemplar essay at the back of this booklet on the Rise of Sinn Fein and 1918 General Election. It is in response to the following question: How far would you agree that the success of Sinn Fein in the 1918 General Election was solely due to the impact of British Government policy in Ireland after 1914? 24