The Anglo-Irish War: From Independence to Civil War PDF

Here is the converted text from the document into a structured markdown format, along with descriptions of images such as tables and other visual elements: ## Topic 3: Political Developments 1919-23 ### The Anglo-Irish War / War of Independence **Background:** With the clear result of the 1918 G...

Here is the converted text from the document into a structured markdown format, along with descriptions of images such as tables and other visual elements: ## Topic 3: Political Developments 1919-23 ### The Anglo-Irish War / War of Independence **Background:** With the clear result of the 1918 General election in Ireland, Sinn Fein could now claim to represent the will of the Irish majority. The election had given it legitimacy. * Its MPs decided not to take their seats in the House of Commons, thus implicitly refusing to recognize the authority of the United Kingdom Parliament over Ireland. * Instead, Sinn Fein summoned all MPs to Dublin on **21 January 1919** and constituted itself as the Parliament of the Irish Republic (Dail Eireann). Only 27 arrived. The rest (34) were either in prison or involved elsewhere. The 26 Unionist MPs for Ireland and the 6 IPP MPs refused to attend. * The Dail issued a Declaration of Independence, demanded English withdrawal from Ireland, and set up a **Provisional Government**, with de Valera as President. * In March the British Government released all Irish political prisoners, thus strengthening Sinn Fein's hand. * The Irish Provisional Government was soon able to make its authority effective over much of Ireland, where it established its own courts of law (Dail Courts), collected taxes and even replaced the Royal Mail. #### Failure of the Paris Peace Conference at Versailles Sinn Fein naively thought that the American president, Woodrow Wilson, would support its claim for Irish independence. He had made a speech in favour of 'national self-determination'. Sinn Fein representatives attended the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 in the hope of gaining support. However, their claims were ignored. Woodrow Wilson saw the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, as an ally in the post-war world. The failure of Sinn Fein to gain the support of Woodrow Wilson and other world leaders strengthened the hand of extremists in the party. #### The IRA * The new government was backed up by the power of the **Irish Republican Army (IRA)**, as the Irish Volunteers were now coming to be called. * The IRA was led by Cathal Brugha. However, he found it difficult to control IRA units spread around the country. * Some within the IRA looked instead to Michael Collins, president of the **IRB** and a **director of operations in the IRA.** * Brugha resented Collins' influence over the IRA. This resentment had major consequences in the civil war that was to follow. By 1919, the two authorities confronted one another in Ireland, both demanding the allegiance of the Irish people: * The British Government, which rested its authority upon law and established treaty rights. * The Irish Provisional Government, which claimed to represent the will of the Irish people. #### The war begins The start of the War of Independence is usually taken as the Soloheadbeg ambush in County Tipperary (21st January 1921). Two RIC officers were transporting explosives to a quarry when they were **ambushed and killed by a Volunteer unit led by Dan Breen and Sean Treacy**. * The Volunteer (IRA) GHQ was alarmed by this unsanctioned attack and it was also condemned by the local clergy - the murder of 2 popular Catholic constables could have conceivably turned public opinion against the separatist movement. * Russell Rees says that for Sinn Fein and the IRA this marked the opening shots in what they regarded as a war for Irish independence. The Government also 'proclaimed' this area of Tipperary (put it under Martial Law), but yet again this only worked in the favour of the IV. The local people now felt coerced, the wrong way to deal with a small group of Volunteer extremists. By the end of January it was clear that the more physical force elements of the Irish Volunteers had seized the initiative in the future struggle against British, when the IV newspaper, *An t Óglach* declared that a *'state of war now existed between Ireland and British...and that "every Volunteer is entitled, morally and legally...to use all legitimate methods of warfare against the soldiers and policemen of the English usurper, and to slay them if necessary"*. Although the political mainstream of the movement were worried about a campaign directed against the RIC as it would turn the local population against the movement in general. It looked, by mid 1919, as if local units of the IV, especially in Tipp, Cork and Clare were operating independently of the GHQ of the IV...with random attacks on RIC barracks and personnel occurring on an initially infrequent basis. This radical element played a vital role in developing their battle into a full scale War of Independence that would engulf Ireland. Although only 18 RIC officers were killed during 1919, hundreds of barracks were destroyed and the RIC was quickly becoming an under strength and demoralised force. In August in County Clare 2 more policemen were killed. The authorities placed the whole county under military rule. But this did little to hamper the activities of the small number of fanatics. Any sympathy the public had about the deaths of the RIC men quickly evaporated as they found themselves suffering under military rule. Fairs and markets were disrupted but the Volunteers' activity failed to be curbed. What was also emerging was the lack of trust and co-operation between the police and the military. Moreover the authorities had a true lack of intelligence as to who the insurgents were...and this led to the authorities using measures which affected and infuriated the public at large...which naturally suited the IV/IRA (despite the fact that they did not approve the Volunteer attacks, their sympathies were anti-British). Whereas the British seemed to suffer from an acute lack of intelligence, especially in the early phase of the war, the intelligence gathering of the IV seemed to be excellent. This was chiefly down to the work of Michael Collins, who became director of operations for the IV during the Wol. He successfully managed to infiltrate Dublin Castle and had at least 4 high ranking detectives, or G Men assisting him (Eamonn Broy, James Kavanagh, Patrick McNamara and David Nelligan). The Irish public also withheld information from the authorities ensuring the guerrilla campaign would not suffer from public opposition. The Irish Volunteers also used intimidation of their own people as it guaranteed co-operation. In Dublin, Collins also put together an elite SQUAD of young assassins to act on the intelligence he was given and this helped greatly in disrupting the intelligence gathering of the British. In the second half of 1919 the Volunteers stepped up their campaign against the police. The RIC abandoned many outlying barracks under pressure from local Volunteer units. New recruits had been attracted with better pay and conditions but it did not make up for the numbers that had resigned. The RIC was a demoralised and under-strength force. It has been suggested that the campaign to socially ostracise the police had made a considerable impact. During the first months of 1920, 400 barracks that had been abandoned were destroyed. Indeed, once again it could be argued that the British handled the War of Independence very badly. * They did not exploit the difficulties the IV was having in the early days when Catholic RIC officers were being killed * Their tactics of putting large areas under Martial Law merely turned more and more against them. It failed to pinpoint the small number of Volunteers. * They also failed to take advantage of the sense of public outrage shown by the after the killing of the RIC men. * Crucially, they also did not have a united policy. In fact it was an ad hoc, haphazard approach. This can be explained by the fact that LG was not really in control of his own government (the cabinet was controlled by the Conservatives who wanted a tough security policy. This contributed to the drift in Irish policy in 1919)...and that much of his time in early 1919 was spent at the Paris Peace Conference (there were also rumblings in other parts of the Empire, Egypt and India). * Their attempt to solve the Irish problem with a new Home Rule scheme in October 1919 saw both LG and BL feel that it would be enough to satisfy the Irish. * Their attempts to use repression with half-hearted conciliation. This allowed the minority of extremists on the military side to dominate Sinn Fein for the rest of the conflict. De Valera had been held in Lincoln jail until mid-1919 so his influence over the Irish Volunteers and SF was extremely weak. After his escape from jail in February 1919 he decided to go to the USA to lobby US public opinion as regards the cause of the Irish Republic. He was therefore out of Ireland between **June 1919 – December 1920**. His absence was sorely missed. He was the political guru of the movement, and for the period of 18 months the separatist movement was without its leader and most politically astute leader. His time in the US allowed the Volunteers, especially Collins, to direct the policy of the IV and SF...allowing it to take on a far more violent tinge. The Dail was finding it difficult to develop into a serious alternative government to British rule in Ireland. Most pertinently, SF needed money to 'govern'. In the Third Dail (10-12 April) Minister of Finance, Collins was given responsibility for raising £500 000, with half coming from the USA. The rest would be raised through the selling of bonds. The intention to undermine British rule got more difficult for the Dail when the British finally suppressed its meetings in September 1919. Although it made it difficult to build an effective, alternative government, it also increased the Irish sense of oppression and made a political settlement less likely. This in turn again strengthened the PF men, as it was becoming apparent that the political wing of SF was becoming more irrelevant in the pursuit of Irish separation. Indeed it could be argued that the Volunteers were not and did not accept the overall legitimacy of the Dail. In an attempt to ensure this, the Minister of Defence, Cathal Brugha, insisted that every IV member had to swear an oath of allegiance to the Dail. By late 1919 it was clear therefore that the actions of the Volunteers/IRB were directing nationalist policy in Ireland. By this stage, a very distinct pattern of guerrilla war tactics were operating throughout Ireland, and especially in the south-west. It was also clear that Michael Collins was emerging as the dominant character in this war...which led to great jealousy from Brugha, the supposed Minister of Defence. Collins used the IRB to consolidate his power base and he was determined to reduce the Brotherhood's influence within the Volunteers. It was also clear at this stage that IRB/IV intelligence was far greater than that of the Crown, and that the rebel's tactic of demoralising the RIC was paying off big time. Furthermore, the response of the British was, as usual, leading to an upsurge in support for the 'war' amongst Irish nationalists despite its excesses and its violence. #### 1920 - The War Reaches its Peak Without doubt the Wol reached its bloody and violent peak during 1920. By this stage, the IV was operating under a new name...the Irish Republican Army. Barracks and Police patrols were attacked leading to gun battles that lasted several hours. By 1920, RIC discipline had all but broken down...and officers were now involved in savage revenge attacks after the murder of colleagues. Examples of these can be found at Thurles in Co Tipperary and in Cork. In Thurles after a Policeman had been shot, the Police retaliated by firing shots and smashing windows. The houses of local Sinn Feiners were targeted. The Church condemned the attack on the Policeman and the violence that followed. In Cork after the killing of the District Inspector, the police and troops went on the rampage. Indeed after the Cork reprisals, the Lord Mayor, Tomas MacCurtain, himself an IRA man, denounced the attacks and was subsequently murdered. These attacks were inevitably followed by more IRA attacks, and the spiral of tit for tat atrocities soon reached epidemic proportions. Of course, RIC reprisals increased the propaganda initiative and gave further support to the IRA campaign by placing the local population under the control of the movement. MacCartan's funeral was attended by thousands and was another successful propaganda campaign by the IRA. By March 1920, the government realised that the beleaguered RIC needed help. The stepping up of the IRA campaign had placed a great strain on the Police. New recruits were sent to Ireland. The authorities were reluctant to send in troops, preferring to support the police. Due to a shortage of uniforms, they wore a combination of police and military attire and soon got the name 'Black and Tans'. They were mostly ex soldiers from the western front and were totally unsuitable for the role demanded from them in Ireland. At the peak of the war, there were over 7,000 'Tans' in Ireland, and they were justifiably detested by the local community, for their heavy handedness, their indiscipline and their brutality. Another force, the Auxiliaries, were also sent to Ireland. These were ex British police officers, and in many ways were far more ruthless than the Tans. The initial role of these groups was to fill the vacancies in the regular RIC but as the conflict deepened an increasing number of these police reinforcements were enrolled. Soon both the tans and the auxiliaries were also involved in the tit for tat warfare engulfing Ireland. Between April and August 1920, these organisations vented their spleen on the city of Limerick (twice - they terrorised the city after a drinking spree firing volleys of shots in the air and assaulting locals.), Miltown Malbay (Co Clare - the local were celebrating the release of Sinn Fein prisoners when a joint police and military patrol arrived and began firing shots into the crowd, wounding 9 and killing 3.) and at Knocklong (Co Limerick here they attacked the largest creamery in Ireland, causing disruption to the local economy). Their attacks were usually random and ill disciplined. Opening fire on civilians, window smashing, and attacking or burning down commercial buildings, like creameries or breweries. Particularly nasty was an attack on Balbriggan, Co Dublin in September. Here a policeman was shot in the town. That evening a lorry-load of Black and Tans swept through the town , terrorising locals, burning shops and homes and killing 2 civilians. This event brought international attention to the strategy of reprisals used by the British authorities. All of this re-enforced the public's backing for the IRA. Another massive propaganda/sympathy boost for the IRA came with the death of Terence MacSwiney after a 74 day hunger strike in Brixton Jail on October 25th. His dying and death evoked unprecedented sympathy in Ireland, and even in the UK. His steady decline in health brought daily comment from both the British and International press. His funeral was observed as a day of mourning throughout the country. Ireland had a new martyr. He was Cork's version of Patrick Pearse, through his self sacrifice, inspirations and bringing international pressure on Britain to withdraw from Ireland. The day after his death, the British, with their fabulous sense of timing, executed 18yr old Kevin Barry in Mountjoy Jail, for his part in the murder of 6 soldiers. There was no evidence that he was involved!! Even the Labour Party in Britain took up the issue in parliament and certain sections of the press attacked the government's policy of repression in Ireland. Events reached their savage peak in November 1920. ##### Bloody Sunday, 1920 On Sunday, 21st November 1920, Collins's Squad executed 11 British Agents sent to Ireland to eliminate this crack team. His intelligence system had found out that the British were closing the net around senior members of the Dublin IRA This 'Cairo Gang' was allegedly the cream of British intelligence. 11 agents were killed as the IRA forced their way into houses and Hotels and killed those inside. Many in Dublin were horrified at what happened but that afternoon the most notorious act of reprisal took place. Any sympathy the British had gained was swept aside. Auxiliary's gatecrashed a Gaelic match at Croke Park, under the auspices of searching for arms and fired recklessly into the crowd. RIC cadets also joined in. many of whom were from an Ulster Unionist background. 12 people were killed, 60 were wounded. Two IRA prisoners, Dick McKee and Peadar Clancy, were shot dead that night in Dublin Castle. The authorities tried to claim that they were shot trying to escape but Dubliners were in no doubt that the men had been shot for refusing to give the names of those involved in the shooting of British agents. Even in Ireland, the scale of Bloody Sunday shocked the populace. Yet in November, we also saw the ambush of an Auxiliary patrol by a 36 strong IRA Flying Column, led by Tom Barry at Kilmichael, Co Cork. By the end of the engagement 3 IRA men and 17 Auxiliaries were dead. Barry claimed that the Auxiliaries had used a 'false surrender' and had opened fire on the IRA men but it was found that many of the Auxiliaries had been mutilated by bayonets. These brutal incidents marked the beginning of the end of this vicious mid phase of the conflict. Each side tried to respond to the other side's actions with even greater brutality. However, revenge for the above was inevitable and it happened in Cork on December 11th. On that night, with a curfew in place and the streets empty, Auxiliaries razed to the ground large parts of the city. The burning of the city was the most spectacular reprisal of the war of Independence. They were subsequently permanently expelled from the city after an official enquiry. 2 days later a young cadet, called Harte shot dead a young man and a 70 year old Priest. Harte was found to be insane but the murders caused revulsion in the rest of Ireland. ##### British Government policy Tension between the military and the police were now at breaking point. General Macready, GOC in Ireland, refused to take responsibility for the RIC, or the Black and Tans and openly condemned their indiscipline. This tension was a major factor in the failure of the British to implement an effective security policy during 1920. Lloyd George maintained that it was a Policeman's job claiming that attacks by the IRA were that of a 'criminal gang'. The cabinet refused to recognise that a small war was happening in Ireland. This led to the decision to reinforce the police rather than use the army. During 1920 the police became increasingly independent and difficult to control and the deployment of the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries made the problem worse. When Macready issued orders forbidding the army to take any form of reprisal, Major General Hugh Tudor, the Chief of Police, refused to follow his example. He argued it would have a negative impact on Police morale. Macready hoped that Tudor, with his military background, would bring discipline to the force but with the secret consent of Lloyd George and Churchill, he allowed the policy of 'unauthorised' reprisals to continue. In addition, the authorities, although much stronger in number than the IRA, seemed to have no real answer to the 'Flying Columns' which were most active in the south-west. These were gangs of 20-30 guerrillas which used ambushes on army and police patrols as their main tactic...hit and run attacks. Their knowledge of the local terrain meant that they could melt away without detection. In many ways this led to huge frustrations within the Crown Forces and led to the policy of the reprisal...which in turn played into the hands of the IRA. This turned opinion in Britain against the government's security policy. The Restoration of Order in Ireland Act (ROIA) in August 1920. Fed up with juries finding IRA suspects not guilty, the act allowed IRA suspects to be tried in front of a court martial (military court). The irony of this was not lost on the IRA. This led to a number of wrongful convictions, as they could arrest and detain anyone suspected of being associated with Sinn Fein and then to try prisoners with courts-martial. This again played into the hands of the IRA as the bulk of the population were now suspects. Public anger was also increased as the Black and Tans and the Auxiliaries were used to seek out and arrest those who were suspected of being involved. In May 1921, with the Government of Ireland Act (see notes further down). ##### The Dail tries to assert its legitimacy In response, the Dail's local government minister, WT Cosgrave urged SF controlled councils to impede Castle rule and directly follow the direction of the Dail. The British Chief Secretary, Hamar Greenwood responded to this by withdrawing annual grants to those councils which refused to recognise the authority of the British Govt. Thus SF councils had to rely on local ratepayers for all their funds. The Dail also established their own legal system, the 'Dail Courts'. From 1920 on, republican courts began to appear all over Ireland, and seemed to have the confidence of locals (on many occasions they were actually set up by locals in a spontaneous manner). The Dail envisioned that they would only deal with simple matters of arbitration, but soon many were dealing with civil and criminal cases. The Dail had to move to catch up with local developments and on June 29, it decided that the courts could hear civil cases. Despite trying to bring the courts under its jurisdiction, under the Minister of Home Affairs, Austin Stack, the courts continued to do their own thing, especially in the west. Stack was an ineffective and poor administrator. In June 1920, with the RIC virtually driven out of many areas, and constantly harassed where they stayed, law and order seemed to be breaking down. Richard Mulcahy therefore ordered the IRA to become a surrogate police force, and this move was widely welcomed. They apprehended wrongdoers and deterred others from engaging in crime. They clamped down on hours kept by public houses and those making illegal whiskey. Thus the Dail had illustrated that they could build an effective counter state. They had now shown the people that they could be effective administrators as well as revolutionaries. This of course gained them more support and acceptance from the people. This was emphasised by the fact that Unionist landlords were willing to use the Dail courts. They felt that justice was dispensed in an even handed fashion. ##### The propaganda war Sinn Fein attached huge importance to propaganda. In fact, during the first six months of 1921, at the peak of the Anglo-Irish War, spending on propaganda increased from £407 to £4,000. From November 1919, the Dail published the Irish Bulletin, edited by Childers, twice weekly. It was intended primarily as a source of information for the Irish, British and American daily press. It was so effective that Dublin Castle tried to circulate fake copies of the newspaper, an attempt which backfired when the bogus issues were exposed and the government ridiculed. ##### The Final Phase - The End of the War As the conflict entered 1921, the violence rose sharply. All sides, as well as civilians, were losing ever greater numbers. Up to December 1920, 177 policemen, 54 soldiers and 42 civilians (including IRA personnel) had lost their lives. From January 1921, to the truce in July, 228 policemen and 96 soldiers were killed. 154 'civilians' also died, including IRA men and alleged IRA 'spies'. All sides were also becoming more ruthless. The IRA had perfected the art of guerrilla warfare where they extended its operations outside of those parts of Munster it was already active in - Leitrim, Longford, Cork, Galway, Kerry and Mayo. The British responded by deploying troops in the rural areas. This was partially successful with the flying columns withdrawing to very rural areas. But this tactic brought the IRA and the British in closer contact and an escalation of the conflict. Dublin City witnessed increasing violence in 1921. Street ambushes on police and soldiers averaged about 1 a day. Reprisal shootings by the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries was an everyday occurrence and some civilians were shot by the IRA. The IRA began to deal viciously with any individual suspected of being an informer. Collusion was as simple as having served or supplied a member of the Crown Forces. This sectarian development was a reaction to the events in the North where the Nationalists minority was consistently targeted by both paramilitary and government forces. Upon his return from the USA in December 1920, de Valera urged for a switch in tactics away from small scale ambushes to larger and more spectacular engagements. This he argued would make the IRA look more like an army and counter the British propaganda claim that they were nothing more than murder gangs. In May 1921 he got his wish, when 100+ IRA attacked the Customs House in Dublin, the centre of British administration in Ireland. It was destroyed and while it was on fire other units delayed the Dublin Fire Brigade. The IRA units were surrounded by troops and Auxiliaries. 6 were killed, 12 wounded and 70 had to surrender. It did get the propaganda de Valera wanted, but this was a big blow to IRA morale. This attack also led to a serious fall out between Collins and de Valera. Collins knew the possible cost of this operation and criticised de Valera for not realising the realities of guerrilla war. By the beginning of 1921 much of south and west of Ireland was under martial law. Proclamations by Macready warned that anyone found with arms or explosives would face a court-martial and the death penalty. Official reprisals were carried out. This took the form of burning the property of those suspected of being involved. The IRA retaliated by stating that they would burn 2 Unionists houses for every house that the British burnt. In December 1920, a New Police Order was introduced. Any male inhabitants of Macroom, or those passing through, must not appear in public with their hands in their pockets'. 'Any male infringing on this is liable to be shot on sight'. This was a public relations disaster. As the authorities relied on the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries even more there were serious breaches of discipline. Even when these were dealt with there were problems. Crozier, who was head of the Auxiliaries, investigated an incident in Trim and dismissed 21 Cadets. Tudor, the RIC chief and who was in overall control, reinstated them. Crozier resigned over it. By May 1921, LG had to reassess his Irish policy. In November 1920 he claimed that the Crown Forces had 'murder by the throat' in Ireland. This simply was not the reality. With elections for the two Irish parliaments upcoming, under the terms of the Government of Ireland Act, LG began to realise that only all out coercion was an option. This had been helped by the resignation of Bonar Law, through ill health, allowing him to be more flexible in his thinking and the possibility of ending the conflict became a possibility. He realised that the Government of Ireland Act was due to come into effect in the early summer of 1921. Therefore he took the decision to apply martial law for all 26 counties of 'southern' Ireland. Something he had constantly refused to do. Martial law was due to be enforced from July 14th onwards. Before this General Macready informed the Cabinet that if martial law was introduced, it would have to be applied with complete and utter ruthlessness, because his troops could not be expected to serve another winter in Ireland. He himself set a date of October 21 for a full and brutal military victory. Given this grim and frank military assessment, it seems that LG and Churchill got cold feet, and again began talking about how the situation in Ireland was a 'policeman's job'. There was a real lack of enthusiasm and conviction in this policy. What really set the tone for British policy in Ireland in the summer of 1921 however was a clear shift in public opinion regarding the government's Irish policy. The violence in Ireland was now seen as having reached unacceptable levels. Criticism of the government was growing. The Labour Party sent their own people to Ireland and produced a damning report of the Coalition Government's actions in Ireland. The ex PM, Asquith, urged LG to seek a settlement with SF by offering them DOMINION STATUS. At this stage, LG was against conciliation. But still the pressure on his government grew, from inside and outside Parliament. A group of Coalition Liberals withdrew their support for the government. The TUC and the non-party Peace with Ireland Council were urging peace and in April a letter appeared in The Times, from Church of England Bishops, deploring indiscriminate reprisals and imploring the govt to conclude hostilities and negotiate a settlement with SF. The influential Smuts (PM of South Africa) saw the deteriorating situation in Ireland as being a threat to the Empire. He urged the government to abandon coercion and take a more positive approach by considering a new political settlement for the 26 counties. He argued that the opening of the new parliament in Northern Ireland allowed a change to take place and felt that the King could use the occasion to plea for peace. LG now was moving more and more away from martial law, which he knew would not guarantee military victory. In essence, by June 1921 he was looking for a way out of this conflict but did not want to be seen as giving in or climbing down from his previous stance of refusing to negotiate with Sinn Fein. The opening of the Belfast Parliament by the King, on June 22nd gave him an opportunity. He used this occasion to frame a speech which called for peace in Ireland. This would be a sign that the British were edging towards peace. The British public's response to this speech was also favourable and this allowed LG to open negotiations without the appearance of a personal climbdown. In fairness, the British had been sending peace 'feelers' to Ireland since the return of de Valera in December 1920. However, their desire for a handing in of weapons and the dilution of the desire for an Irish Republic cut little ice with SF at this time. The return of de Valera appeared to present an opportunity for the ending of hostilities. He had played no part in the development of the IRA campaign and was viewed as a political rather than a military leader. What was also crucial in early 1921 was the impact of public opinion in Ireland towards the IRA campaign. De Valera and others could detect the setting in of war weariness amongst the people, especially in rural areas where Crown reprisals were taking their toll on an already brittle economy. The IRA had commandeered food from the local people and was increasingly resented. There was a yearning for peace by the local people and by the strong farmers who had supported the guerrilla warfare. The IRA had also destroyed roads, bridges and other communications. This had made the IRA leadership realise that they needed popular support to survive. Moreover, certain influential elements of the clergy, Cardinal Logue, Dr Gilmartin Archbishop of Tuam and Dr Colohan Bishop of Cork, were also beginning to condemn IRA atrocities (although Sinn Fein was generally able to ignore such criticism). The verve and vitality of the SF bandwagon seemed to be running out. All involved in the Wol realised that the war could not continue without the overt or tacit support of the Irish people. Martial law, which had been introduced in many south west counties in 1920, was also having an impact on the success and the morale of the flying columns. The new Irish administration was also losing vitality as the British stepped up their campaign of repression. The Dail's Ministry of Home Affairs was less influential - the decline of the Dail Courts proved this. The Department of Local Government was suffering financial difficulties that reduced its effectiveness. The meetings of the Dail also took place less frequently and with fewer members as many were either on the run or in prison. More rigorous application of the emergency legislation saw the number of suspects interned rise from 1,500 to 4,500 between Jan and July 1921. Roger Sweetman, the SF deputy from Wexford, who was shocked by the brutality of Bloody Sunday, became an outspoken critic of IRA violence and was calling for peace talks as early as December 1920. Thus by April 1921, the SF leadership were more willing to listen to overtures of peace. In that month the British sent over Lord Derby to sound out de Valera. This failed but it did not stop the prospect of future negotiations. Other attempts were by Patrick Clune, Archbishop of Perth and father O'Flanaghan, the Sinn Fein priest. De Valera knew that if the Britain offered reasonable truce terms, it would be a PR disaster to reject it out of hand. The mood swing after the King's speech in Belfast had also influenced some in Sinn Fein as well. Moreover Collins and others were telling him that the IRA was running out of steam. The British were closing the net. Their intelligence was much improved, extra troops were arriving and they were even using aeroplanes to sniff out the flying columns. But the shift in British opinion against coercion and some gloomy predictions by Macready gave LG second thoughts. By the time of the truce Collins estimated that the IRA could have only survived for another three weeks. It had 3,000 men on active service facing a combined force of 40,000. The increased coercion and the deployment of thousands of extra troops had put the IRA under more pressure. (Tom Barry countered this by saying that he could have kept his flying columns in the field for another 5 years!) It was the British who made the decisive move on peace talks. On June 24th (2 days after the King's address in Northern Ireland and the day that deValera had been arrested), LG sent a letter to de Valera inviting him-to London for a conference to explore the possibilities of a settlement. The swiftness of this offer took the SF leader by surprise. His release was negotiated but the move of a conference was a sudden change in policy. De Valera met with the leader of the SUs, Midleton on the 4th of July, and with the South African PM, Jan Smuts on the 5th of July, before replying to LG on July 8th. His answer was yes...but only if there was a truce in place first. The truce was signed by GOC Macready on July 11th, in the Mansion House with the violence continuing right up to the end. The IRA killed 3 civilians and 3 troops in the final week.The Black and Tans shot a prominent local figure in Cork on the final morning of the Wol . In all, 751 died in the Wol. #### Image Description: Multi-column layout of text, and diagram. The text and diagram discuss: #### Why did Britain and the Republicans agree to a truce to end the Anglo-Irish war in 1921? **Republican Public Opinion** * People in Ireland were getting war weary due to harsh conditions imposed by Britain e.g., Martial law, curfews. * Lack of support for IRA tactics criticised by de Valera when he returned from USA and Catholic Church criticised IRA and Britain equally from 1921. * Reluctance to have IRA attacks in local areas e.g.. 20 Sept 1920 Balbriggan targeted by British forces through burning buildings following IRA ambush. * IRA needed public support for guerrilla tactics to work, as they needed local people to provide cover and assistance. Loss of public support therefore added military pressure to end the war as they could not continue their campaign. **Republican Military Issues** * Michael Collins said they could only last another 3 weeks * Collins was influential and knowledgeable, showing that the best informed sources believed that they needed a truce to get out of the war before they lost. * Lack of weapons e.g. Clare raid led to 6 British deaths but only 5 guns. * Poor intelligence as war went on e.g., Clare 144 traps but no enemy for 130. * Guns were required to continue the campaign and better intelligence would be needed to enact successful querilla ambushes. **Judgement** Britain was under significant political pressure while the Republicans were under significant military pressure to agree a truce in 1921. However, due to the greater status of Britain globally, they had more to lose and so were under more pressure overall **British Military issues** * Guerrilla tactics forced Britain to use reprisals e.g. Balbriggan * Shows Britain had no effective military strategy to stop IRA. * RIC recruitment problems - boycott and targets e.g.. Thurles * Without numbers, they couldn't fight the IRA so had to rely on Black and Tans and Auxiliaries who were poorly disciplined. * Intelligence issues - Collins infiltrated G-men. * This made it difficult to defeat the IRA as they didn't have effective intelligence or administration required to combat guerrilla tactics * Prime Minister Lloyd George said 80 000 troops would be needed to win. * This would lead to too much expenditure and loss of life and would continue to damage public opinion. A truce would be preferable * De Valera returned from USA December 1920 He hadn't been involved in violence so would be acceptable to negotiate with. * Sinn Fein victories in 29/33 county councils 1920 Local Elections following Government of Ireland Act. Britain will have to deal with Sinn Fein in long term. * Socio-economic problems in England - post war slump. This needed attention and money from British government needed to resolve Ireland question to focus on this. **Republican other reasons** * Lloyd George appeared genuine - no conditions on surrender of arms or barring certain individuals (e.g., Collins who had previously been barred from talks due to his role in IRA). * This encouraged Republicans to consider a truce over military tactics as they might be able to secure a good deal. * Sectarian violence in the North summer 19