Georgia:Russia-USSR Conflict (Unresolved) .pdf

Georgia/Russia-USSR Con ict (Unresolved) Historical Roots fi fi fi fi fi fi fl fi fi The principal adversaries in this interstate con ct experienced a very close, unequal relationship for more than two centuries. Georgia was annexed by Tsarist Russia in 1800, at the request of Georgia’s last monarch...

Georgia/Russia-USSR Con ict (Unresolved) Historical Roots fi fi fi fi fi fi fl fi fi The principal adversaries in this interstate con ct experienced a very close, unequal relationship for more than two centuries. Georgia was annexed by Tsarist Russia in 1800, at the request of Georgia’s last monarch, who appealed for support against Persia, and it was an integral part of Russia until November 1917. In the turmoil attending the Bolshevik Revolution, Georgia became an independent state for 3 years (April 1918–February 1921). Along with Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia was merged into the Trans-Caucasian Soviet Socialist Republic, within the Soviet Union, from 1922 until 1936, when the three Caucasian entities became formally independent republics of the USSR until its dissolution at the end of 1991. Georgia, as well as its Caucasian neighbors, then resumed their independent statehood. Behavior Georgia and Russia-USSR: Decisions and DecisionMakers This unresolved con ct between a major power, Russia, and Georgia, a former integral part of the Tsarist Empire, was preceded by a short-lived period of Georgia’s independence soon after the Bolshevik attainment of CHAPTER 9 Select Case Study Findings on Interstate Con cts: InterRegion © The Author(s) 2018 M. Brecher, A Century of Crisis and Con ct in the International System, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57156-0_9 262 M. BRECHER power in Russia in November 1917. Because that prelude to the current con ct, which began in 1991, remains a crucial element in the ‘historical memory’ of one of the principal adversaries, Georgia, it merits brief attention in an analysis of their behavior seven decades later and beyond. The prelude began with a declaration of independence by Georgia in May 1918, at frst with Lenin’s promise to respect Georgia’s right to independence, incorporated in the Georgia–Russia 1920 Moscow Treaty. The next year, the Bolshevik leader reversed course authorizing the Red Army to invade Georgia and re-integrate its territory into Russia. This volte face and the prelude to their interstate protracted con ct seven decades later ended with Russia’s invasion and reincorporation of Georgia into Russia in February 1921, compelling the Georgian Menshevik government to depart for self-exile in France. This interstate con ct began with Georgia’s renewed declaration of independence from the recently dissolved USSR and the Russian Federation via a referendum in March 1991. However, it was not until 17 years later, highlighted by the successful Georgia ‘Rose Revolution’ in late 2003, that its new, youthful leader, Saakashvili, displayed an unconcealed bravado by mobilizing Georgia’s army and attacking one of the two disputed Caucasian enclaves, South Ossetia, on August 7, 2008. Russia decided immediately to expel the Georgian force from its shortlived advance into South Ossetia, which was overwhelmingly successful in the four-day War that followed. Georgia and RussiaUSSR: Decision Process The political system in which Georgia’s two major decisions were taken was a Western-type democracy, in marked contrast to the authoritarian ‘democratic centralism’ that pervaded the Bolshevik regime, with Lenin as its unchallenged, commanding fgure during the regime’s frst 4+ years. However, Lenin adhered to the Marxist-Leninist principle that important decisions, especially strategic decisions, required Communist Party authorization, acting through the Party’s ultimate decision-authorizing body, the Politburo. In Period II, Georgia’s regime continued to be a democracy of the Western type. However, all three of its early presidents— Gamsakhurdia, a respected Georgian nationalist leader, Shevardnadze, a former USSR Foreign Minister, and Saakashvili—displayed a considerable bent to authoritarianism, the frst, of the traditional Caucasian ruler, the second, of the Gorbachev type, and the third, of a Western populist. The Georgia decision to attack 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 263 South Ossetia was made by President Saakashvili, with a small group of military advisors. The Russian decision-making process in Phase II was also authoritarian, as in Georgia, without the veneer of participation by any democratic institutions. The principal decisionmaker was President Putin, with a supporting role for Prime Minister Medvedev and some Russian military advisers. Con ct-Sustaining Techniques Violence several low-intensity violent incidents erupted between Georgia and two enclaves in the Caucuses, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which had been claimed by Georgia since it regained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, as well as fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi by Russia-supported secessionists in these disputed territories. The frst, in August 1992, was an Abkhaz attack on Georgian government buildings in Abkhazia’s capital, Sukhumi. Russia terminated arms supplies to Georgia and, soon after, began arms shipments to Abkhaz separatists; strangely, it also facilitated a peace agreement and encouraged negotiations between Georgia and the Abkhaz rebels in December 1993, but these quickly led to stalemate. In May 1998, an attempt by Georgian guerillas to raise Georgia’s fag on Abkhaz government buildings led to low-intensity violence for months and the forced withdrawal of the Georgians from the Abkhaz capital. Then, after several years of relative quiet, a plane fying Georgia’s Defense Minister over South Ossetia in September 2006 was attacked by unknown assailants. In April 2008, a Russian jet fghter destroyed a Georgian Unmanned Aerial Vehicle in Abkhazian airspace. Then, unexpectedly, Georgia attacked South Ossetia on August 7–8‚ 2008. Russia responded at once, forced the much weaker Georgian invaders to withdraw and occupied considerable Georgian territory. The four-day fullscale war ended with a France-arranged cease-fre on the 12th, and 2 weeks later, Russia recognized the independence of the two contested enclaves. Since then the adversaries avoided another round of violence, but the uneasy calm masks Georgian hostility and fear and Russia’s disdain. Political Hostility—Con ct-sustaining political acts, too, began soon after Georgia regained its independence. Russia began to issue Russian passports to Abkhazia residents soon after a peace agreement was 264 M. BRECHER concluded between Georgia and the Abkhaz secessionists in 1993. After a long period of relative tranquility, Russia was reported by the BBC to have threatened in 2002 to bomb Al-Qaeda and Chechen bases in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge and to have threatened Georgia for not cooperating with Russia. In August 2004, Georgia’s Premier warned Russian tourists not to travel to Abkhazia and threatened to fre on Russian ships bringing Russian tourists to Sukhumi. In the autumn of 2006, Russia began to deport ethnic Georgians illegally residing in Russia. After Kosovo’s declaration of independence, in March 2008, recognized by many Western states, Russia lifted then-existing sanctions on Abkhazia, and in April it began to recognize documents issued by the local authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Although little-noticed elsewhere, the slow escalation of hostile political acts by both Georgia and Russia prepared the ground for the full-scale war 4 months later. Verbal Hostility—Propaganda, too, was employed by the principal adversaries in this unresolved con ct, mostly in defense of their actions leading to, and during, the August 2008 War. In essence, Russia’s arguments were as follows: frst, Georgia, by its attack on South Ossetia, was the aggressor in this con ct; second, Russia had no alternative but to retaliate against Georgia’s aggression; and third, Russia’s actions in support of the enclaves were no different than NATO’s actions in defense of Kosovo, an enclave of Serbia. Georgia’s attempts to persuade onlookers from afar also focused on three arguments: frst, its decision to dispatch troops to South Ossetia was legitimate and legal because the enclave had long been recognized by the USSR as an integral part of Georgia; second, Russia’s hostile acts, challenging Georgia’s sovereignty over the two enclaves, violated international law; and third, Russia’s analogy between its behavior and NATO’s UN-sanctioned behavior toward Kosovo was basically fawed. The arguments of neither adversary were convincing among a generally disinterested external audience. Economic Discrimination—There were few openly hostile economic acts in this con ct, all by Russia, upon whose economy Georgia was almost totally dependent. One was its threat in 2006 to cut off Russia’s monopoly supply of gas to Georgia, entirely; it did not resort to this draconian act, but Gazprom doubled the price of gas that it supplied to Georgia. The other hostile Russian economic act was to halt the import of Georgia’s wine, accounting for 90% of Georgia’s wine exports, and 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 265 of its bottled water, Georgia’s two largest exports. While a serious blow to Georgia’s economy, this was the least important in sustaining the Georgia/Russia con ct. Acts of political hostility were the most frequent, but acts of violence, and the key security lessons for Georgia, reinforced by the August 2008 War, namely, the enormous difference in military power between the two adversaries, and the non-involvement of all the other major powers, especially the USA, had the greatest impact on sustaining this con ct, though without violence, in the future. Con ct Management and Attempts at Con ct Resolution During this unresolved con ct between a major power, Russia, and its small fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi neighbor, Georgia, there have been several episodes of con ct management, especially during their frst, year-long crisis, Georgia– Abkhazia Civil War (September 25, 1992–October 8, 1993) and their brief full-scale crisis-war (August 7–11, 2008). The other two crises were Pankisi Gorge (July 27– October 7, 2002) and South Ossetia-Abkhazia (June 10–November 5, 2004). All four crises within the on-going Georgia/Russia con ct focused on competing claims to territory, notably over two enclaves in the South Caucasus, Abkhazia and South Ossetia: Georgia claimed sovereignty over both entities, which aspired to independent statehood or merger with Russia, actively supported by Russia. Georgia-Abkhazia Civil War (September 25, 1992–October 8, 1993): Fighting between Abkhaz separatists and Georgian troops began in August 1992—the anti-Georgia movement for separate status began in 1977 but had been suppressed by Soviet forces. It escalated to a Georgia– Russia crisis on September 25, when Russia’s parliament, the Duma, condemned Georgia’s resort to violence and suspended the delivery of weapons and equipment to its neighbor, triggering a crisis for Georgia. Despite its denial, Russia provided arms, humanitarian aid, and logistical support to the Abkhaz separatists. Serious clashes between Georgia and the Abkhaz separatists occurred periodically during the next year. Tension between Russia and Georgia escalated, with Georgia threatening to take control of all Russian weapons and equipment on Georgian territory—it seized a Russian arms depot in southern Georgia on November 2—and accusing Russia of bombing Georgian military positions in Sukhumi, the Abkhaz capital. In mid-December 266 M. BRECHER 1992 and again in mid-March 1993, during an Abkhaz separatist attack on Georgian forces then controlling the Abkhaz capital, Sukhumi, Georgia’s President Shevardnadze, former Foreign Minister of Russia during Gorbachev’s tenure as Russia’s leader, and Georgia’s parliament demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from Abkhazia, while Russia denied involvement in the civil war. Notwithstanding this ‘war of words’ between the two principal adversaries in this con ct, the major power in the con ct region also engaged in active mediation during the intermittent Abkhaz–Georgian violent clashes. Talks between Russia and Georgia were held in Georgia’s capital in January 1993, aimed at a friendship and cooperation agreement, including the status of Russian troops in Georgia. Russia’s foreign minister held talks in Moscow with Georgian and Abkhaz delegations from June 16 to 22, 1993. This led, on July 27‚ to a cease-fre agreement signed by Abkhaz separatists and Georgia, mediated by Russia, which agreed to provide peacekeepers; the con cting parties agreed on the need for UN observers to monitor the cease-fre. The UN too became deeply involved. Georgia’s president requested a UN peacekeeping force in January 1993. In April, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali appointed a German diplomat as his Special Representative to assist in the quest for con ct resolution. Tangibly, following the cease-fre agreement, the Security Council decided on August 25 to send a UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), with 88 military observers, to the area of con ct. The next day, Georgia confrmed its withdrawal of all its heavy military equipment and some troops from the front line. On September 16, an unexpected attack by Abkhaz separatists, following the withdrawal of Georgian forces after the cease-fre, led to their take-over of Sukhumi. A few days later, accused by Georgia’s president of continuing to behave like ‘an evil empire,’ Russia imposed sanctions on Abkhazia. The crisis formally ended on October 8, 1993, when Georgia’s President Shevardnadze agreed to join the Russia-created Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a loose successor to the USSR. In continuation of its active role in con ct management, Russia sent a peacekeeping force of 500 marines, formally from the CIS, to Georgia on November 4, 1993, to protect railway lines and main roads. On December 1, a fresh cease-fre agreement, mediated by the UN, was signed by Georgia and the Abkhaz separatists, who also agreed on the deployment of more international observers. In early February 1994, the presidents of Russia and Georgia signed a (symbolic) treaty of friendship 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 267 and cooperation. Con ct management of the most important crisis in Phase 1 of this protracted con ct was consummated by the Moscow Agreement, signed by all the parties to this crisis on May 14, 1994 and formalized in a Security Council Resolution, extending the mandate of UNOMIG and calling for the deployment of more (Russian) observers. A similar pattern of active con ct management is evident in the con ct over South Ossetia, the second disputed enclave in the South Caucasus. fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi Violence began on January 5, 1991, when 6000 Georgian troops entered South Ossetia, and continued for several months in a stalemate. The presidents of Russia and Georgia, Yeltsin and Gamsakhurdia, held talks in March and signed an agreement in April aimed at stabilizing the situation in South Ossetia—via a newly created joint commission to inquire into the sources of the con ct, and the creation of a joint police unit to disarm illegally armed groups and to facilitate the return of refugees to their original homes. Russia also sent peacekeepers to wind down the fghting. A year later, in March 1992, a coup in Georgia led to the replacement of Gamsakhurdia by Shevardnadze, as noted. On June 10, Georgia’s new leader and the leader of North Ossetia signed a protocol that included a cease-fre agreement. Two weeks later, the presidents of Georgia and Russia signed the Sochi Agreement, also known as the Treaty of Dagomys, which indicated the steps to end the Georgia/South Ossetia War, notably the entry of Georgian, Ossetian, and Russian troops into South Ossetia, which occurred in July 1992, ending that violent crisis-war. The two ‘peace’ agreements, Sochi (1992) and Moscow (1994), marked the end of Phase I of the Georgia/Russia interstate con ct, setting in motion a period of 8 years of tranquility; however, their con ct was far from resolved. There were two additional Georgia/Russia crises early in the twenty-frst century, both marked by considerable verbal threats and modest violence. One was Pankisi Gorge (July 27– October 7, 2002), without any attempted mediation; it ended with a meeting between the two presidents at a CIS summit conference, an announced agreement on October 7 to create joint patrols of their common border, and a formal agreement on October 17. The other crisis, South OssetiaAbkhazia (June 10–November 5) was characterized by frequent verbal threats and little violence. It too ended without any third-party mediation: only Russia was present at the Georgia–South Ossetia negotiations that culminated in their crisis-ending demilitarization agreement on November 5. 268 M. BRECHER The peak of con ct management in this interstate con ct occurred during and soon after the four-day Georgia–Russia War (August 7–11‚ 2008). Tensions between the two contenders for control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia increased steadily after the Rose Revolution in Georgia in November 2003, when Shevardnadze was ousted from the presidency by the young, openly declared pro-American Saakashvili. Early in 2008, a concerned European Union dispatched its foreign policy leader, Javier Solana, to Abkhazia with an offer to mediate the con ct between Abkhazia and Georgia—and implicitly Russia as well—to prevent escalation to war; the Russian president—by then, Medvedev had succeeded Putin—declined. The outbreak of full-scale war between Georgia and Russia, initiated by the former late at night on August 7, 2008, generated immediate attempts at con ct management, with the goal of an early cease-fre. The USA was the frst to call for a cease-fre, with increasing intensity as Georgian troops were compelled to retreat from Georgia and Russian troops were advancing in Georgia’s territory. However, the most active con ct manager was France’s President Sarkozy, who was also head of the European Union in 2008. France’s Prime Minister Kouchner was dispatched to Georgia and Abkhazia on August 10, accompanied by the head of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Finland’s Foreign Minister Stubb, with an EU six-point plan to wind down the war: no further use of force; cessation of all military acts; complete access to humanitarian aid; immediate return of Georgia’s troops to their bases; withdrawal of Russian troops to their pre-August 7 line; and to begin a discussion of the future status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and their lasting security. Sarkozy carried the plan to Moscow and Georgia’s capital, Tbilisi on the 11th. Georgia’s President Saakashvili insisted—and Russia accepted—a meaningful change in the last point: “The territorial integrity of Georgia is not subject to discussion…and the future status of the disputed regions should be determined with help of an international process.” This vague phrasing on future attempts to resolve this protracted con ct ensured a lengthy, continuing delay in resolution. Georgia/Russia Con ct: Causes of Non-resolution Does the absence of any, some or all of the six postulated conditions conducive to con ct resolution, noted in the Con ct Resolution Model 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 269 earlier in this book, explain the absence of resolution of this dormant interstate con ct? Exhaustion—Georgia experienced a severe defeat in the 2008 war, including Russia’s occupation of much of its territory and high casualties, as well as the loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the ostensible cause of its con ct with Russia. This fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi undoubtedly led to exhaustion at the mass public level. Yet its leadership, notably President Saakashvili, insisted upon—and achieved—a signifcant change in the wording of the crucial last point in the EU Six Point Plan for a Cease-Fire in August 1998, cited above; that is, for Georgia, national exhaustion was not conducive to concessions on the future formal resolution of the con ct. As for Russia, there is no evidence of exhaustion as a result of the August 2008 war with Georgia or throughout this interstate con ct, in which it was the victor, achieving control over the two disputed enclaves. Balance of Capability—The huge disparity in the military and economic capability of the two principal adversaries was not conducive to con ct resolution, and neither Georgia nor Russia pressed for resolution, though they were receptive to con ct management of specifc episodes of crisis and war during their interstate con ct. Domestic Pressures—These were present in Georgia’s society, deriving from both the frequent eruption of threats of military incursions, including occasional occupation of Georgian territory, and economic pressure, including Russia’s boycott or discrimination against vital Georgian exports. Yet these pressures did not lead George to make concessions for peace when issues considered vital national interests, such as the disputed enclaves, were at risk. There were no evident domestic pressures in Russia for an end to its con ct with Georgia except on terms that would beneft Russia’s national interests. External Pressures—As indicated above, there were abundant foreign pressures, in the form of attempted con ct management in both phases of this con ct, 1991–1994 and 2002–2008, manifested in efforts by individual states and international organizations to wind down threats, crises, and war. Pressures were directed to both of the principal adversaries, Georgia and Russia, and were conducive to termination of crises and war. In sum, foreign pressure was the sole postulated condition that 270 M. BRECHER was conducive to, and often effective, in con ct-crisis management, but not con ct resolution. This fnding supports the basic thesis of the Resolution Model in negative terms, that is when all (or most) of the postulated conditions conducive to con ct resolution are absent, resolution is unlikely to occur. In substantive terms, resolution of the Georgia/Russia con ct remains elusive because one of the principal adversaries, Russia, having triumphed in war, has no interest in further negotiations to resolve the con ct formally, which might involve Russian concessions, and the principal mediators, the EU, the UN, and France lacked the ability to impose negotiations for con ct resolution on either of the principal adversaries. Ironically, only Russia was a persistent and usually successful mediator— in violent and non-violent crises between Georgia and the two enclaves; in the interstate con ct with Georgia, it was a principal adversary, not a mediator. Reconciliation In the absence of formal con ct resolution, reconciliation between Georgia and Russia has not occurred. The immediate cause is that, since August 2008, Russia has steadily increased its de facto annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia: Russian passports have been provided to the inhabitants of the two enclaves, as have economic and fnancial aid to impoverished dependents, and physical security against a possible attempt by Georgia to re-assert its control of these enclaves by violence. Moreover, Georgia lacks the ability to undermine or reverse this process. A more fundamental obstacle to reconciliation is the lengthy period of Russian domination —control over Georgia by Tsarist Russia and Communist Russia for more than two centuries, alluded to earlier. This historical reality, which ended only two decades ago, overrides a potential conciliatory attribute, their shared belief system, Orthodox Christianity.