Exam 1 Studying PDF
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Summary
This document provides an overview of various historical and political events, including mercantilism, the Pax Britannica, and World War I and II. It discusses the interplay of international relations and various state actors.
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Mercantilism - Stems from the goals of countries in the 1500s - Political/military power - Powerful merchants ally with the crown, so they also want exotic markets - Goal: manipulate trade so it favors the mother country - Lower demand by only allowing trade wit...
Mercantilism - Stems from the goals of countries in the 1500s - Political/military power - Powerful merchants ally with the crown, so they also want exotic markets - Goal: manipulate trade so it favors the mother country - Lower demand by only allowing trade with mother country - Use monopolies to control and regulate trade - The small country gets protection in return, but usually the protection is of less monetary value than they produce - Military and economic/colonial power feed into each other → wars fought over colonies - Wars: - Spain beats Portugal - Spain loses to France/Dutch/English in the 30 yrs war - France loses to England in the 7 yrs war - France loses to England in the Napoleonic wars - Consequences of War - The 30 yrs war leads to the Peace of Westphalia - Gives each state sovereignty - The notion that within their jurisdiction, the state has full control - Thus, the international system is anarchic - English hegemony - 100 years’ peace - After Napoleon, states realize the value in protecting existing regimes from external revolutionary threats - The industrial revolution changes economic structure → countries want free trade - Thus, nations join forces Pax Britannica - English hegemony means it mediates conflict - Britain starts the gold standard - Increasing globalization - Still extracting resources from poor countries - New global players - USA, Japan, Germany, Italy - Weakening of some countries - Ottoman Empire, Austriahungary, Russia - These create tension Modern Times - WW1 - Expensive, ruins economies (esp Germany thru Treaty of Versailles) - Great Depression - League of Nations (failure) - Largely inconclusive, still high tension - WW2 - Absolutely ruinous, only US + USSR left - Weakened European powers take focus off developing world - Developing countries become economically independent - Nationalism + american desire for markets + american fear that colonies would turn to USSR to decol - Leads to decolonization - OPEC - ‘73-’74 oil shocks cause global recession - To deal with this, economic barriers removed → globalization - EU/NAFTA - Cold War - Capitalist - Bretton Woods System - Economic alliance - NATO - Military alliance - Communist - Warsaw Pact - Military - Soviet economies - Diff regions make diff things - Relations get better 1960-1980 - In 1980, USSR goes to afghanistan to protect a pro-USSR government - This leads to relations declining and the collapse of the USSR - Iraq - Iraq invades Kuwait to gain control of oil fields - USA protects Kuwait by invading Iraq - US-led UN dominance - Iraq responds w/ 9/11 and almost obtaining WMD’s - US goes to war in Iraq Actors - Relevant individuals and composite groups - Shifts based on lens of analysis - Chinese/US National interest vs. Trump/Xi - Thus, all analysis starts with identification of the actors - Most important composite group: State - State interests are national interests - States have sovereignty Interests - What actors want - Helps actors rank outcomes by desirability - Categories - Power - Ability to make someone do smth they don’t want to - National Security - Allies - Security of state - Security of citizens - Money - Ideological goals - Power is a prerequisite for the other - Nations pursuing interests, with the influence of institutions, leads to interactions Interactions - How the choices of 2+ actors create outcomes - Actors have to take others’ anticipated reactions into account - Cooperation - 2+ actors make the decision to improve one without harming another party involved in the interaction - Easier when there are less actors - Positive-sum - Coordination - Coordinate actions such that defecting gives no benefit - Driving on one side of the road - Collaboration - Actors have incentive to defect - Prisoner’s dilemma - Arms race - Collective action problem - People benefit even if they don’t take action so no one takes action - Public Goods - Non-exclusive - Non-rival in consumption - Has collective action problems (free rider) - Cooperation with the same actors multiple times - iteration - Cooperation then enforced by the threat of ending iteration - Linkage - Cooperation on 1 issue → cooperation on another - When is cooperation successful? - Less actors - Iterations - Facilitated by institutions - Bargaining - Distributing/dividing something of value - To reach a bargain, both sides need to agree that the deal is better than the alternative, or reversion outcome - Power - the ability to make an actor do what they don’t want to via coercion - Coercion makes the reversion outcome worse - Could be military or economic (sanctions) - Agenda setting - Making the reversion outcome more favorable - Outside options - Also makes the reversion outcome more favorable The “-isms” - Realism - The state is dominant - States live in constant fear - Type of government doesn’t matter - Liberalism - States, institutions, and markets - Democracy, economic globalization, and international organization lead to peace - Connectivism - Many actors - Actors interests are influenced by culture - Institutions define identities by creating norms - Norms can be changed by entrepreneurs and political actors Institutions - Rules that structure interactions “rules of the game” - Embody the bargaining power of the actor that established them - Help mediate cooperation - Resolve disputes - Provide efficient ruling bodies - Verify compliance - Set standards of behavior - Why not constantly redone? - Requires larger cooperation - Creating new ones is difficult War - Organized use of force by 2+ parties w/ at least some threshold of severity - War is diff than mass killing - Severity Threshold - Correlates of War - 1k deaths in 12 months - Militarized interstate disputes (includes displays of force) - Uppsala Conflict Data Program - 25 deaths in a calendar year - Actors must hold incompatible positions - To resolve this, they must use force - One actor must be a state - Extrastate - Anticolonial (state fighting outside its territory) - Intrastate - Rebel groups - Internationalized Intrastate - Internationally backed rebel groups - Interstate - 2+ states - ACLED - Catalogs events, even violence against citizens - CoW/UCDP don’t - Broad causes - Realism - War is a natural consequence of international anarchy - Anarchy → states use bargaining to resolve disputes - Wars are used as preventative measures - Security Dilemma - Fear → militarization → fear - Misperceptions/Mistakes - Wars are caused by misjudgement - Either chances of winning or costs of war - Interests within states - Corporations, diasporas - What do states fight over? - War is a bargaining problem, but over what goods? - Territory - Economic value (oil, eg. Iraq/Kuwait) - Military value (eg. Israel/Syria battling for high ground) - Cultural value (eg. Russia and the Donbas) - Policies - Regime type - Eg. US-led coups in South America - War as a Bargaining Problem - If a state threatens military action during a bargain → crisis bargaining - Value of War = $(thing you want) - $(cost of war) - Because cost of war is so high, there is almost always a - Bargaining range - A range within any deal gives both actors more than they’d get from war - Coercive Bargaining - Compellence - Change status quo through threat of force (eg. US and Iraq) - Happens when the status quo is outside the bargaining range, meaning that going to war would be better than nothing - Deterrence - Keep status quo through threat of force (eg. Cold War) - Problem - Incomplete Info, so need to think about risk and reward - Unknowns: Capability (strength) and Resolve (will) - Why don’t states just tell each other? - Credibility: Threats are hard to make - War is costly, so war threats are not credible - States have a private interest to be deceptive (prisoner’s dilemma) - Making effective threats - must be too costly to be a bluff - Brinksmanship - Getting closer and closer to war, threatening that eventually war will break out - War is a slippery slope, not a cliff - Tying Hands - Making threats that make backing down look bad by audience costs (Bush in Iraq) - Paying for Power - Spending a lot of money - Credibility to NOT use force: - First-strike advantage/pre-emptive war - Commitment problems increase if bargaining over smth that gives future bargaining power - If you lose, your enemy gets stronger - An actor is growing in capability → preventative war - Prisoner’s Dilemma/Game Theory - Indivisible goods - Usually actually only a problem of enforcement of sharing - War Today - Less conflict over territory - Tech has made physical space relatively unimportant - Increasing costs of war - Increased democracy and international institutions Domestic Actors - Nationalism - Prioritizing attachment to one’s nation - Reduces domestic disagreement about foreign policy - Hawks: use violence to solve probs - Doves: use money to solve probs - Whose interests matter? - Institutions (eg. democracy) - Democratic Peace - Not much war between mature democratic states - Why? - Less incomplete info because democratic systems are more transparent - Shared liberal values - Democratic peace or capitalistic peace? - Why has the US interfered in so many democratic elections? - Domestic institutions shape leaders’ interests - Leaders have accountability - Some autocratic leaders face audience costs - Weeks 2008 - From bureaucrats - Audience costs: repercussions if someone does something wrong - Single-party regimes - Military regimes - Dynastic monarchies - No audience costs: - Personalist regimes - Non-dynastic monarchies - Autocrats face more backlash if they lose - Leaders - Spread their ideology - Beliefs about foreign policy - Hold onto power - Beholden to whoever controls their political fate - The Rally Effect - People become more patriotic in the face of dramatic international events - Gives leaders a diversionary incentive - Spark crisis → get support - Eg. Bush after 9/11 - Doesn’t last forever because people don’t like casualties - “casualty sensitivity” - Influenced by if the war is “right” and if we’re “winning” - Not everyone rallies equally - More exposure to conflict → less rallying - Personality, military experience - Bureaucracy - What makes up the state apparatus - Huge tree in the U.S. - Interest Groups - Military-Industrial Complex - Increasing role of military in decision making → more aggro state - But military != militarism - Military contractors - Unelected, unaccountable - Benefit from the U.S. going to war - Economic/Ethnic Lobbies - How do small groups create influence? - Military: Guns + information - Plays a role in ensuring continuation of current gov - Can skew estimates about cost of war - Interest Groups - Smaller than the general public, so can be more focused - General Public - Holding leaders accountable - Votes - Protest - Alliances - Institutions that specify standards of behavior - Create military cooperation - Offensive - “if you invade, I’ll help” (Germany/Russia Pact to invade Poland) - Defensive - “if someone invades you, I’ll help” (NATO) - Not necessarily mutual (eg. US and SK) - Why? - Compatible interests - Balance of Power Theory - Alliances form to create blocs of equal power - Happens based on perceived threat - explains why there isn’t balancing against the US till the middle east war - Unipolar distribution of power - one powerful state - Dangerous/unstable → needs counterbalance - DoP can also be dipolar, multipolar - Bandwagoning Theory - Powerful states team up (often offensive) - States ally for personal power - States bandwagon when the hegemon decides to share - Do alliances lead to peace? - WW1/2 - NATO makes their articles vague to avoid entrapment - Most alliances unfulfilled in modern times, but also states with non-credible alliances are usually more targeted - Some alliances increase war, some decrease it - If a target’s allies will remain neutral, rate of attack actually goes up - Interstate Bargaining - Alliances change war outcome, war costs → adjust bargaining range - Entrapment - when an alliance traps an actor into an unfavorable decision - Lowers the status quo the non-alliance actors can challenge - Collective Security Organization - Ensure any changes to the status quo are peaceful - Assumes that all states want to prevent war, regardless of the aggressor - Lower first-strike advantage - UN Security Council - P5 - US, GB, France, Russia, China - Veto power - Peace-enforcement operations - armed responses - Peacekeeping operations - preventative - Actually works pretty well - Good at reducing violence/protecting civilians - Problem - sexual exploitation/abuse, trouble establishing local legitimacy - Walter et al 2021 - Conflict mediation - Has had inaction in genocide Civil War - Armed conflict between organized actors within a state - Why Rebel? - Interests in $/Social well-being, autonomy, power - Goals: - Leave the state → territory - Separatism - getting its own state - Irredentism - attach territory to another state - Alter policy → policy - Take over → regime - Lots of the same reasons states go to war - Grievance/Greed/Social Sanctions - Why do only some situations turn into civil war? - Individual Level Factors - Proxies for grievance predict insurgency and counterinsurgency - Forced recruitment - Collective action problem - Even if you like the rebels, why risk it? - Does this happen? - Confirmed vietcong were less likely to die than just suspected - Kalyvas & Kocher 2007 - Group Level Factors - Ethnic groups causing polarization - Political and economic inequality between groups - State Level Factors - State’s wealth - State’s repressive capacity - High poverty also means more grievance - Autocracy - Population, terrain - Things that make guerilla war easier - International Factors - Foreign investors - Shared interests - Ethnic/religious ties - Dislike of current government - Proxy wars - Civil War as Bargaining Failure - Incomplete information - Less likely because the state has sovereignty, also civil conflicts can last a long time - Indivisibility - Especially with things like regime or policy, the entire state is indivisible - Commitment Problems - Combatants have to live together after - Civil war doesn’t usually end with bargaining - Power changes on either side - Civil War Strategy - Insurgency - Hit-and-run events - Hide amongst the people - Provokes government response - Good for small forces Terrorism - Why? - Terrorist groups are weak, both relative to their demands and the state - Bypass the state’s military using guerrilla warfare - Hiding amongst the people often leads to drain the sea theory - Bargaining failures - Incomplete information - Terrorist groups obscure strength on purpose - Commitment problems - If terrorists disarm, how can they be sure the other side will follow through - Indivisibility - Lots of times terrorists don’t compromise - Strategy - Coercion - Policy change by imposing costs, usually civilian death - Assumes that terror → fear → policy change - But terror usually leads to anger - Also, most states will put up with a lot of death before they make a change - Provocation - Attack to provoke a disproportionate response - Home population needs to be kind of on the fence - Targets moderates - Spoiling - Spoil relations between the target and their moderate home country - Outbidding - Violence to outbid rivals for support of the home population - Targets extremists - Ideology - Fear of ethnic groups - Defines what a group targets - Use of violence for group cohesion - Target groups are usually seen as unwinnable - Local characteristics - Higher power imbalances in a certain area - History of selective violence against terror group