Summary

This document provides an overview of various historical and political events, including mercantilism, the Pax Britannica, and World War I and II. It discusses the interplay of international relations and various state actors.

Full Transcript

Mercantilism -​ Stems from the goals of countries in the 1500s -​ Political/military power -​ Powerful merchants ally with the crown, so they also want exotic markets -​ Goal: manipulate trade so it favors the mother country -​ Lower demand by only allowing trade wit...

Mercantilism -​ Stems from the goals of countries in the 1500s -​ Political/military power -​ Powerful merchants ally with the crown, so they also want exotic markets -​ Goal: manipulate trade so it favors the mother country -​ Lower demand by only allowing trade with mother country -​ Use monopolies to control and regulate trade -​ The small country gets protection in return, but usually the protection is of less monetary value than they produce -​ Military and economic/colonial power feed into each other → wars fought over colonies -​ Wars: -​ Spain beats Portugal -​ Spain loses to France/Dutch/English in the 30 yrs war -​ France loses to England in the 7 yrs war -​ France loses to England in the Napoleonic wars -​ Consequences of War -​ The 30 yrs war leads to the Peace of Westphalia -​ Gives each state sovereignty -​ The notion that within their jurisdiction, the state has full control -​ Thus, the international system is anarchic -​ English hegemony -​ 100 years’ peace -​ After Napoleon, states realize the value in protecting existing regimes from external revolutionary threats -​ The industrial revolution changes economic structure → countries want free trade -​ Thus, nations join forces Pax Britannica -​ English hegemony means it mediates conflict -​ Britain starts the gold standard -​ Increasing globalization -​ Still extracting resources from poor countries -​ New global players -​ USA, Japan, Germany, Italy -​ Weakening of some countries -​ Ottoman Empire, Austriahungary, Russia -​ These create tension Modern Times -​ WW1 -​ Expensive, ruins economies (esp Germany thru Treaty of Versailles) -​ Great Depression -​ League of Nations (failure) -​ Largely inconclusive, still high tension -​ WW2 -​ Absolutely ruinous, only US + USSR left -​ Weakened European powers take focus off developing world -​ Developing countries become economically independent -​ Nationalism + american desire for markets + american fear that colonies would turn to USSR to decol -​ Leads to decolonization -​ OPEC -​ ‘73-’74 oil shocks cause global recession -​ To deal with this, economic barriers removed → globalization -​ EU/NAFTA -​ Cold War -​ Capitalist -​ Bretton Woods System -​ Economic alliance -​ NATO -​ Military alliance -​ Communist -​ Warsaw Pact -​ Military -​ Soviet economies -​ Diff regions make diff things -​ Relations get better 1960-1980 -​ In 1980, USSR goes to afghanistan to protect a pro-USSR government -​ This leads to relations declining and the collapse of the USSR -​ Iraq -​ Iraq invades Kuwait to gain control of oil fields -​ USA protects Kuwait by invading Iraq -​ US-led UN dominance -​ Iraq responds w/ 9/11 and almost obtaining WMD’s -​ US goes to war in Iraq Actors -​ Relevant individuals and composite groups -​ Shifts based on lens of analysis -​ Chinese/US National interest vs. Trump/Xi -​ Thus, all analysis starts with identification of the actors -​ Most important composite group: State -​ State interests are national interests -​ States have sovereignty Interests -​ What actors want -​ Helps actors rank outcomes by desirability -​ Categories -​ Power -​ Ability to make someone do smth they don’t want to -​ National Security -​ Allies -​ Security of state -​ Security of citizens -​ Money -​ Ideological goals -​ Power is a prerequisite for the other -​ Nations pursuing interests, with the influence of institutions, leads to interactions Interactions -​ How the choices of 2+ actors create outcomes -​ Actors have to take others’ anticipated reactions into account -​ Cooperation -​ 2+ actors make the decision to improve one without harming another party involved in the interaction -​ Easier when there are less actors -​ Positive-sum -​ Coordination -​ Coordinate actions such that defecting gives no benefit -​ Driving on one side of the road -​ Collaboration -​ Actors have incentive to defect -​ Prisoner’s dilemma -​ Arms race -​ Collective action problem -​ People benefit even if they don’t take action so no one takes action -​ Public Goods -​ Non-exclusive -​ Non-rival in consumption -​ Has collective action problems (free rider) -​ Cooperation with the same actors multiple times - iteration -​ Cooperation then enforced by the threat of ending iteration -​ Linkage -​ Cooperation on 1 issue → cooperation on another -​ When is cooperation successful? -​ Less actors -​ Iterations -​ Facilitated by institutions -​ Bargaining -​ Distributing/dividing something of value -​ To reach a bargain, both sides need to agree that the deal is better than the alternative, or reversion outcome -​ Power - the ability to make an actor do what they don’t want to via coercion -​ Coercion makes the reversion outcome worse -​ Could be military or economic (sanctions) -​ Agenda setting -​ Making the reversion outcome more favorable -​ Outside options -​ Also makes the reversion outcome more favorable The “-isms” -​ Realism -​ The state is dominant -​ States live in constant fear -​ Type of government doesn’t matter -​ Liberalism -​ States, institutions, and markets -​ Democracy, economic globalization, and international organization lead to peace -​ Connectivism -​ Many actors -​ Actors interests are influenced by culture -​ Institutions define identities by creating norms -​ Norms can be changed by entrepreneurs and political actors Institutions -​ Rules that structure interactions “rules of the game” -​ Embody the bargaining power of the actor that established them -​ Help mediate cooperation -​ Resolve disputes -​ Provide efficient ruling bodies -​ Verify compliance -​ Set standards of behavior -​ Why not constantly redone? -​ Requires larger cooperation -​ Creating new ones is difficult War -​ Organized use of force by 2+ parties w/ at least some threshold of severity -​ War is diff than mass killing -​ Severity Threshold -​ Correlates of War - 1k deaths in 12 months -​ Militarized interstate disputes (includes displays of force) -​ Uppsala Conflict Data Program - 25 deaths in a calendar year -​ Actors must hold incompatible positions -​ To resolve this, they must use force -​ One actor must be a state -​ Extrastate -​ Anticolonial (state fighting outside its territory) -​ Intrastate -​ Rebel groups -​ Internationalized Intrastate -​ Internationally backed rebel groups -​ Interstate -​ 2+ states -​ ACLED -​ Catalogs events, even violence against citizens -​ CoW/UCDP don’t -​ Broad causes -​ Realism -​ War is a natural consequence of international anarchy -​ Anarchy → states use bargaining to resolve disputes -​ Wars are used as preventative measures -​ Security Dilemma -​ Fear → militarization → fear -​ Misperceptions/Mistakes -​ Wars are caused by misjudgement -​ Either chances of winning or costs of war -​ Interests within states -​ Corporations, diasporas -​ What do states fight over? -​ War is a bargaining problem, but over what goods? -​ Territory -​ Economic value (oil, eg. Iraq/Kuwait) -​ Military value (eg. Israel/Syria battling for high ground) -​ Cultural value (eg. Russia and the Donbas) -​ Policies -​ Regime type -​ Eg. US-led coups in South America -​ War as a Bargaining Problem -​ If a state threatens military action during a bargain → crisis bargaining -​ Value of War = $(thing you want) - $(cost of war) -​ Because cost of war is so high, there is almost always a -​ Bargaining range -​ A range within any deal gives both actors more than they’d get from war -​ Coercive Bargaining -​ Compellence -​ Change status quo through threat of force (eg. US and Iraq) -​ Happens when the status quo is outside the bargaining range, meaning that going to war would be better than nothing -​ Deterrence -​ Keep status quo through threat of force (eg. Cold War) -​ Problem - Incomplete Info, so need to think about risk and reward -​ Unknowns: Capability (strength) and Resolve (will) -​ Why don’t states just tell each other? -​ Credibility: Threats are hard to make -​ War is costly, so war threats are not credible -​ States have a private interest to be deceptive (prisoner’s dilemma) -​ Making effective threats - must be too costly to be a bluff -​ Brinksmanship -​ Getting closer and closer to war, threatening that eventually war will break out -​ War is a slippery slope, not a cliff -​ Tying Hands -​ Making threats that make backing down look bad by audience costs (Bush in Iraq) -​ Paying for Power -​ Spending a lot of money -​ Credibility to NOT use force: -​ First-strike advantage/pre-emptive war -​ Commitment problems increase if bargaining over smth that gives future bargaining power -​ If you lose, your enemy gets stronger -​ An actor is growing in capability → preventative war -​ Prisoner’s Dilemma/Game Theory -​ Indivisible goods -​ Usually actually only a problem of enforcement of sharing -​ War Today -​ Less conflict over territory -​ Tech has made physical space relatively unimportant -​ Increasing costs of war -​ Increased democracy and international institutions Domestic Actors -​ Nationalism -​ Prioritizing attachment to one’s nation -​ Reduces domestic disagreement about foreign policy -​ Hawks: use violence to solve probs -​ Doves: use money to solve probs -​ Whose interests matter? -​ Institutions (eg. democracy) -​ Democratic Peace -​ Not much war between mature democratic states -​ Why? -​ Less incomplete info because democratic systems are more transparent -​ Shared liberal values -​ Democratic peace or capitalistic peace? -​ Why has the US interfered in so many democratic elections? -​ Domestic institutions shape leaders’ interests -​ Leaders have accountability -​ Some autocratic leaders face audience costs -​ Weeks 2008 -​ From bureaucrats -​ Audience costs: repercussions if someone does something wrong -​ Single-party regimes -​ Military regimes -​ Dynastic monarchies -​ No audience costs: -​ Personalist regimes -​ Non-dynastic monarchies -​ Autocrats face more backlash if they lose -​ Leaders -​ Spread their ideology -​ Beliefs about foreign policy -​ Hold onto power -​ Beholden to whoever controls their political fate -​ The Rally Effect -​ People become more patriotic in the face of dramatic international events -​ Gives leaders a diversionary incentive -​ Spark crisis → get support -​ Eg. Bush after 9/11 -​ Doesn’t last forever because people don’t like casualties - “casualty sensitivity” -​ Influenced by if the war is “right” and if we’re “winning” -​ Not everyone rallies equally -​ More exposure to conflict → less rallying -​ Personality, military experience -​ Bureaucracy -​ What makes up the state apparatus -​ Huge tree in the U.S. -​ Interest Groups -​ Military-Industrial Complex -​ Increasing role of military in decision making → more aggro state -​ But military != militarism -​ Military contractors -​ Unelected, unaccountable -​ Benefit from the U.S. going to war -​ Economic/Ethnic Lobbies -​ How do small groups create influence? -​ Military: Guns + information -​ Plays a role in ensuring continuation of current gov -​ Can skew estimates about cost of war -​ Interest Groups -​ Smaller than the general public, so can be more focused -​ General Public -​ Holding leaders accountable -​ Votes -​ Protest -​ Alliances -​ Institutions that specify standards of behavior -​ Create military cooperation -​ Offensive - “if you invade, I’ll help” (Germany/Russia Pact to invade Poland) -​ Defensive - “if someone invades you, I’ll help” (NATO) -​ Not necessarily mutual (eg. US and SK) -​ Why? -​ Compatible interests -​ Balance of Power Theory -​ Alliances form to create blocs of equal power -​ Happens based on perceived threat - explains why there isn’t balancing against the US till the middle east war -​ Unipolar distribution of power - one powerful state -​ Dangerous/unstable → needs counterbalance -​ DoP can also be dipolar, multipolar -​ Bandwagoning Theory -​ Powerful states team up (often offensive) -​ States ally for personal power -​ States bandwagon when the hegemon decides to share -​ Do alliances lead to peace? -​ WW1/2 -​ NATO makes their articles vague to avoid entrapment -​ Most alliances unfulfilled in modern times, but also states with non-credible alliances are usually more targeted -​ Some alliances increase war, some decrease it -​ If a target’s allies will remain neutral, rate of attack actually goes up -​ Interstate Bargaining -​ Alliances change war outcome, war costs → adjust bargaining range -​ Entrapment - when an alliance traps an actor into an unfavorable decision -​ Lowers the status quo the non-alliance actors can challenge -​ Collective Security Organization -​ Ensure any changes to the status quo are peaceful -​ Assumes that all states want to prevent war, regardless of the aggressor -​ Lower first-strike advantage -​ UN Security Council -​ P5 - US, GB, France, Russia, China -​ Veto power -​ Peace-enforcement operations - armed responses -​ Peacekeeping operations - preventative -​ Actually works pretty well -​ Good at reducing violence/protecting civilians -​ Problem - sexual exploitation/abuse, trouble establishing local legitimacy -​ Walter et al 2021 -​ Conflict mediation -​ Has had inaction in genocide Civil War -​ Armed conflict between organized actors within a state -​ Why Rebel? -​ Interests in $/Social well-being, autonomy, power -​ Goals: -​ Leave the state → territory -​ Separatism - getting its own state -​ Irredentism - attach territory to another state -​ Alter policy → policy -​ Take over → regime -​ Lots of the same reasons states go to war -​ Grievance/Greed/Social Sanctions -​ Why do only some situations turn into civil war? -​ Individual Level Factors -​ Proxies for grievance predict insurgency and counterinsurgency -​ Forced recruitment -​ Collective action problem -​ Even if you like the rebels, why risk it? -​ Does this happen? -​ Confirmed vietcong were less likely to die than just suspected -​ Kalyvas & Kocher 2007 -​ Group Level Factors -​ Ethnic groups causing polarization -​ Political and economic inequality between groups -​ State Level Factors -​ State’s wealth -​ State’s repressive capacity -​ High poverty also means more grievance -​ Autocracy -​ Population, terrain -​ Things that make guerilla war easier -​ International Factors -​ Foreign investors -​ Shared interests -​ Ethnic/religious ties -​ Dislike of current government -​ Proxy wars -​ Civil War as Bargaining Failure -​ Incomplete information -​ Less likely because the state has sovereignty, also civil conflicts can last a long time -​ Indivisibility -​ Especially with things like regime or policy, the entire state is indivisible -​ Commitment Problems -​ Combatants have to live together after -​ Civil war doesn’t usually end with bargaining -​ Power changes on either side -​ Civil War Strategy -​ Insurgency -​ Hit-and-run events -​ Hide amongst the people -​ Provokes government response -​ Good for small forces Terrorism -​ Why? -​ Terrorist groups are weak, both relative to their demands and the state -​ Bypass the state’s military using guerrilla warfare -​ Hiding amongst the people often leads to drain the sea theory -​ Bargaining failures -​ Incomplete information -​ Terrorist groups obscure strength on purpose -​ Commitment problems -​ If terrorists disarm, how can they be sure the other side will follow through -​ Indivisibility -​ Lots of times terrorists don’t compromise -​ Strategy -​ Coercion -​ Policy change by imposing costs, usually civilian death -​ Assumes that terror → fear → policy change -​ But terror usually leads to anger -​ Also, most states will put up with a lot of death before they make a change -​ Provocation -​ Attack to provoke a disproportionate response -​ Home population needs to be kind of on the fence -​ Targets moderates -​ Spoiling -​ Spoil relations between the target and their moderate home country -​ Outbidding -​ Violence to outbid rivals for support of the home population -​ Targets extremists -​ Ideology -​ Fear of ethnic groups -​ Defines what a group targets -​ Use of violence for group cohesion -​ Target groups are usually seen as unwinnable -​ Local characteristics -​ Higher power imbalances in a certain area -​ History of selective violence against terror group

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